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Principal - Agent Problem in the Context of the Economic Survival. (2006). Hlaváček, Michal ; Hlavacek, Jiri.
In: Acta Oeconomica Pragensia.
RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2006:y:2006:i:3:id:81:p:18-33.

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  1. The Principal-Agent Theory and its Influence on the Quality of Assurance Services. (2014). Bobek, Michal.
    In: Český finanční a účetní časopis.
    RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2014:y:2014:i:2:id:394:p:52-68.

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  2. Lender and Borrower as Principal and Agent. (2006). Janda, Karel.
    In: Working Papers IES.
    RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2006_24.

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