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1. Divided majority and information aggregation: Theory and experiment. (2016). Llorente-Saguer, Aniol ; Castanheira, Micael ; Bouton, Laurent.
   In: Journal of Public Economics.
   RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:134:y:2016:i:c:p:114-128.

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2. Ranking Languages in European Union. (2016). Weber, Shlomo ; Moreno-Ternero, Juan ; Ginsburgh, Victor.
   In: Working Papers ECARES.
   RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/231809.

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3. Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment. (2015). Llorente-Saguer, Aniol ; Castanheira, Micael ; Bouton, Laurent.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp777.

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4. Divided Majority and Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment. (2015). Llorente-Saguer, Aniol ; Castanheira, Micael ; Bouton, Laurent.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:777.

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5. Bargaining through Approval. (2015). Nuñez, Matias ; Laslier, Jean-François ; Nunez, Matias.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01168675.

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6. Bargaining through Approval. (2015). Nuñez, Matias ; Laslier, Jean-François ; Nunez, Matias.
   In: PSE Working Papers.
   RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01168675.

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7. Bargaining through Approval. (2015). Nuñez, Matias ; Laslier, Jean-François ; Nuez, Matias.
   In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
   RePEc:eee:mateco:v:60:y:2015:i:c:p:63-73.

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8. The strategic sincerity of Approval voting. (2014). Nuñez, Matias ; Nuez, Matias.
   In: Economic Theory.
   RePEc:spr:joecth:v:56:y:2014:i:1:p:157-189.

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9. Bargaining through Approval. (2014). Nuñez, Matias ; Laslier, Jean-François.
   In: THEMA Working Papers.
   RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-06.

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10. Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules. (2014). Postl, Peter ; Giles, Adam.
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:68:y:2014:i:c:p:31-52.

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11. Counterexamples on the Superiority of Approval versus Plurality. (2014). iannantuoni, giovanna ; Pimienta, Carlos ; De Sinopoli, Francesco.
    In: Journal of Public Economic Theory.
    RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:16:y:2014:i:5:p:824-834.

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12. Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games. (2013). Nuñez, Matias ; Courtin, Sébastien ; Nunez, Matias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00914890.

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13. A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes. (2013). Nuñez, Matias ; Courtin, Sébastien ; Nunez, Matias.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00914887.

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14. The Strategic Sincerity of Approval Voting. (2013). Nuñez, Matias ; Nunez, Matias.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00917101.

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15. A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes. (2013). Nuñez, Matias ; Courtin, Sébastien.
    In: THEMA Working Papers.
    RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-31.

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16. Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games. (2013). Nuñez, Matias ; Courtin, Sébastien.
    In: THEMA Working Papers.
    RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-27.

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17. Large elections with multiple alternatives: a Condorcet Jury Theorem and inefficient equilibria. (2013). Maniquet, Francois ; Goertz, Johanna.
    In: LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE.
    RePEc:cor:louvco:2013023.

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18. One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation. (2012). Castanheira, Micael ; Bouton, Laurent ; de Moura, Micael Castanheira.
    In: ULB Institutional Repository.
    RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/108675.

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19. Two field experiments on Approval Voting in Germany. (2012). Granic, Georg ; Alós-Ferrer, Carlos ; Alos-Ferrer, Carlos.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:39:y:2012:i:1:p:171-205.

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20. Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election. (2011). Mohajan, Dr Haradhan.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:50674.

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21. Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting.. (2011). Vorsat, Marc ; Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge.
    In: Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
    RePEc:nav:ecupna:1103.

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22. Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election. (2011). Mohajan, Dr Haradhan.
    In: KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ).
    RePEc:ksb:journl:v:4:y:2011:p:77-88.

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23. Satisfaction approval voting. (2010). Brams, Steven ; Kilgour, Marc D..
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:22709.

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