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1. Strategic ambiguity in global games. (2025). Ui, Takashi.
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2. Succinct Ambiguous Contracts. (2025). Duetting, Paul ; Rashti, Yarden ; Feldman, Michal.
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4. Optimal Multiple Loan Contracting under Sequential Audits and Contagion Losses. (2024). Lomys, Niccol ; Innocenti, Federico ; Evsyukova, Yulia.
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6. Informativeness orders over ambiguous experiments. (2024). Wang, Zichang.
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7. Persuading an inattentive and privately informed receiver. (2024). Dall'Ara, Pietro.
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8. Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games. (2024). Ui, Takashi.
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9. Ambiguous information and dilation: An experiment. (2023). Ortoleva, Pietro ; Shishkin, Denis.
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11. Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2023). Ioannou, Christos ; Galanis, Spyros ; Kotronis, Stelios.
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12. Timing Decisions Under Model Uncertainty. (2023). Auster, Sarah ; Kellner, Christian.
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13. Persuasion With Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach. (2023). Minardi, Stefania ; Alon, Shiri ; Auster, Sarah ; Gayer, Gabi.
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14. Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences. (2023). Sapiro-Gheiler, Eitan.
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15. Ambiguity and Partial Bayesian Updating. (2023). Kovach, Matthew.
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16. Ambiguous Persuasion: An Ex-Ante Formulation. (2023). Cheng, Xiaoyu.
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17. Timing Decisions under Model Uncertainty. (2023). Auster, Sarah ; Kellner, Christian.
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18. Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach. (2023). Minardi, Stefania ; Alon, Shiri ; Auster, Sarah ; Gayer, Gabi.
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19. Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguous Communication. (2022). Pahlke, Marieke.
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20. Relative Maximum Likelihood updating of ambiguous beliefs. (2022). Cheng, Xiaoyu.
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21. Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions. (2022). Auster, Sarah ; Kellner, Christian.
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22. Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors. (2022). Pahlke, Marieke.
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23. Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium. (2022). Grant, Simon ; Stauber, Ronald.
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24. Cheap talk with private signal structures. (2022). Ivanov, Maxim ; Sam, Alex.
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26. Strategic Ambiguity in Global Games. (2021). Ui, Takashi.
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27. Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues. (2021). Zapechelnyuk, Andriy ; Kim, Kyungmin ; Kamenica, Emir.
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28. Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald’s maxmin preferences. (2021). Liu, Zhiwei ; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
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29. Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver. (2021). Weng, Xi ; Hu, JU.
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30. Ambiguous Information and Dilation: An Experiment. (2021). Ortoleva, Pietro ; Shishkin, Denis.
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31. Persuasion under ambiguity. (2021). Hedlund, Jonas ; Lammert, Malte ; Kauffeldt, Florian T.
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32. Persuading a pessimist: Simplicity and robustness. (2021). Nikzad, Afshin.
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33. Relative Maximum Likelihood Updating of Ambiguous Beliefs. (2021). Cheng, Xiaoyu.
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34. Reacting to ambiguous messages: An experimental analysis. (2020). Riener, Gerhard ; Quement, Mark Thordal-Le ; Kellner, Christian.
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35. Belief Inducibility and Informativeness. (2020). Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Kerman, Toygar ; Karos, Dominik.
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36. Comparative Profitability of Product Disclosure Statements. (2020). Burkovskaya, Anastasia ; Li, Jian.
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38. Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence. (2019). Ioannou, Christos ; Galanis, Spyros.
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39. A Note on Dynamic Consistency in Ambiguous Persuasion. (2019). Pahlke, Marieke.
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