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Basins of attraction and equilibrium selection under different learning rules. (2010). Page, Scott ; Golman, Russell.
In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
RePEc:spr:joevec:v:20:y:2010:i:1:p:49-72.

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  1. Is ambiguity aversion bad for innovation?. (2019). Beauchene, D.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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  2. Evolutionary dynamics in multitasking environments. (2019). Sawa, Ryoji ; Zusai, Dai.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:166:y:2019:i:c:p:288-308.

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  3. Tempered best response dynamics. (2018). Zusai, Dai.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0575-9.

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  4. Learning by replicator and best-response: the importance of being indifferent. (2018). , Sofia.
    In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
    RePEc:spr:joevec:v:28:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00191-017-0547-z.

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  5. Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance. (2018). Newton, Jonathan.
    In: Games.
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  6. MATHEMATICAL FORMALIZATION OF INSTITUTIONS. (2018). Yu, A.
    In: Strategic decisions and risk management.
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  7. Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games. (2015). Hofbauer, Josef ; Zhang, Boyu.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:2:p:433-448.

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  8. An agent-based “proof of principle” for Walrasian macroeconomic theory. (2015). Gaffeo, Edoardo ; Gallegati, Mauro ; Gostoli, Umberto.
    In: Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory.
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  9. Choosing a future based on the past: Institutions, behavior, and path dependence. (2015). Page, Scott E ; Bednar, Jenna ; Jones-Rooy, Andrea.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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  10. Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels. (2014). Zusai, Dai ; Sawa, Ryoji.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:154:y:2014:i:c:p:562-577.

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  11. An agent-based proof of principle for Walrasian macroeconomic theory. (2012). Gostoli, Umberto ; Gaffeo, Edoardo ; Gallegati, Mauro.
    In: CEEL Working Papers.
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  12. A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism. (2010). Tassier, Troy ; Page, Scott E..
    In: Journal of Mathematical Economics.
    RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:6:p:1229-1242.

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  13. Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions. (2010). Page, Scott E. ; Golman, Russell.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:3:p:359-376.

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