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Recent Developments in German Corporate Governance. (2004). Renneboog, Luc ; Goergen, Marc ; Renneboog, L. D. R., ; Manjon, M C.
In: Other publications TiSEM.
RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f1cb70de-0638-4cfc-baf6-bb5ecf874e52.

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  1. Corporate governance convergence in Germany through shareholder activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange. (2012). Broadhurst, Tim ; Sudarsanam, Sudi.
    In: Journal of Management & Governance.
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  2. European Corporate Governance: a Thematic Analysis of National Codes of Governance. (2012). Ferris, Stephen P ; Cicon, James E ; Noronha, Gregory ; Kammel, Armin J.
    In: European Financial Management.
    RePEc:bla:eufman:v:18:y:2012:i:4:p:620-648.

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  3. The German entrepreneurial index (GEX®): a primer on an ownership-based style index in Germany. (2009). Kaserer, Christoph ; Ampenberger, Markus ; Bitsch, Florian ; Achleitner, Ann-Kristin.
    In: CEFS Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:zbw:cefswp:200913.

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  4. Gobierno Corporativo: los problemas, estado actual de la discusión y un ejercicio de medición para Argentina. (2009). Ferro, Gustavo ; Chisari, Omar.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:15630.

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  5. An empirical analysis of the 2000 corporate tax reform in Germany: Effects on ownership and control in listed companies. (2009). Weber, Anke.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:1:p:57-66.

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  6. Germany’s Corporate Governance Reforms: Has the System Become Flexible Enough?. (2008). Odenius, Jurgen.
    In: IMF Working Papers.
    RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2008/179.

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  7. Germany: Selected Issues. (2008). International Monetary Fund, .
    In: IMF Staff Country Reports.
    RePEc:imf:imfscr:2008/081.

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  8. Power and Ownership Structures among German Companies. A Network Analysis of Financial Linkages. (2007). Tydecks, Patrick ; Moebert, Jochen.
    In: Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:zbw:darddp:dar_35974.

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  9. Power and Ownership Structures among German Companies. A Network Analysis of Financial Linkages. (2007). Tydecks, Patrick.
    In: Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    RePEc:dar:wpaper:35974.

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  10. Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector of Pakistan. (2006). Goergen, Marc ; Syed, Shoeb I. ; Chaudary, Faiza A..
    In: Governance Working Papers.
    RePEc:eab:govern:22253.

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  11. An Empirical Analysis of the 2000 Corporate Tax Reform in Germany: Effects on Ownership and Control in Listed Companies. (2005). Weber, Anke.
    In: Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:cam:camdae:0556.

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  47. Option Awards for Australian CEOs: The Who, What and Why. (2002). Taylor, Stephen ; Coulton, Jeff.
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  50. Purchase versus pooling in stock-for-stock acquisitions: Why do firms care?. (2000). Kasznik, Ron ; Williams, Michael ; Aboody, David.
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