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2. Do political parties matter? Endogenous fragmentation, partisanship, and local public expenditures in Finland. (2017). Moisio, Antti ; Le Maux, Benoît ; Dostalova, Kristna.
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   In: Public Choice.
   RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:200:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01128-y.

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2. The political economy of coastal development. (2024). Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet ; Sole-Olle, Albert ; Magontier, Pierre.
   In: Journal of Public Economics.
   RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:238:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724001142.

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3. Incumbency Effect in Competitive Autocracies: evidence from Venezuela. (2024). Trombetta, Federico ; Merzoni, Guido ; di Bonifacio, Carlos.
   In: DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo.
   RePEc:dis:wpaper:dis2402.

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4. Political Fragmentation and Coalition Alignment effects: Evidence from health Transfers to Italian Regions. (2023). Cattel, Alessandro ; Auteri, Monica.
   In: Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti.
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5. The value of a party: Local politics and the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. (2023). Quinckhardt, Matthias.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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6. The political economy of coastal development. (2021). Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet ; Magontier, Pierre ; Sole-Olle, Albert.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15780.

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7. The Political Economy of Coastal Development. (2021). Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet ; Magontier, Pierre ; Sole-Olle, Albert.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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8. Reverse Political Coattails under a Technocratic Government: New Evidence on the National Electoral Benefits of Local Party Incumbency. (2021). Savu, A.
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9. Overlapping political budget cycles. (2018). Foremny, Dirk ; Freier, Ronny ; Yeter, Mustafa ; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel.
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10. Climbing the ranks: incumbency effects in party-list systems. (2018). Fiva, Jon ; Rohr, Helene Lie.
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    In: Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS.
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    In: Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS.
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15. Do politicians gratify core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program. (2016). Reischmann, Markus ; Potrafke, Niklas ; Kauder, Björn ; Bjorn, Kauder.
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16. The illicit beneficts of local party alignment in national elections. (2016). Borcan, Oana.
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17. Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany. (2016). Thomasius, Sebastian ; Freier, Ronny.
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18. Do politicians reward core supporters? Evidence from a discretionary grant program. (2016). Reischmann, Markus ; Potrafke, Niklas ; Kauder, Björn.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:45:y:2016:i:c:p:39-56.

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19. Religious heterogeneity and fiscal policy: Evidence from German reunification. (2016). Geys, Benny ; Freier, Ronny ; Holm, Joshua.
    In: Journal of Urban Economics.
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20. Empirical Studies on Public Debt and Fiscal Transfers. (2016). Reischmann, Markus Josef .
    In: ifo Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsforschung.
    RePEc:ces:ifobei:63.

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21. Do Politicians Reward Core Supporters? Evidence from a Discretionary Grant Program. (2016). Reischmann, Markus ; Potrafke, Niklas ; Kauder, Björn.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6097.

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22. Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive. (2015). Yeter, Mustafa ; Foremny, Dirk ; Freier, Ronny ; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2015-01.

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23. The Partisan Effects of Voter Turnout: How Conservatives Profit from Rainy Election Days. (2015). Freier, Ronny ; Arnold, Felix.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1463.

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    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
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25. Overlapping political budget cycles in the legislative and the executive. (2014). Yeter, Mustafa ; Foremny, Dirk ; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel ; Freier, Ronny.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
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    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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27. Overlapping Political Budget Cycles in the Legislative and the Executive. (2014). Yeter, Mustafa ; Foremny, Dirk ; Freier, Ronny ; Moessinger, Marc-Daniel.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1429.

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28. Rainy Day Politics - An Instrumental Variables Approach to the Effect of Parties on Political Outcomes. (2014). Lind, Jo.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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