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2. Determinants of In-Court Settlements: Empirical Evidence from a German Trial Court. (2016). Berlemann, Michael ; Christmann, Robin.
   In: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2016 (Witten/Herdecke).
   RePEc:zbw:vswi16:175188.

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1. Why go to court? Bargaining failure under the shadow of trial with complete information. (2018). Skaperdas, Stergios ; McBride, Michael ; Tsai, Pi-Han.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:151-168.

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2. Expert opinion in a tort litigation game. (2016). Oytana, Yves ; Chappey, Nathalie .
   In: EconomiX Working Papers.
   RePEc:drm:wpaper:2016-23.

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3. Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements. (2014). Spier, Kathryn E. ; Prescott, J. J. ; Yoon, Albert.
   In: NBER Working Papers.
   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19873.

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4. Economic Models of Law: Introduction. (2013). Miceli, Thomas ; Baker, Matthew.
   In: Working papers.
   RePEc:uct:uconnp:2013-32.

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5. Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict. (2013). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:46808.

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6. Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoners Dilemma Game: Evidence from Long Run Play. (2013). Dahl, Gordon ; Bloom, David ; Ashenfelter, Orley.
   In: IZA Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7245.

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7. Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach. (2012). Aney, Madhav S..
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:siu:wpaper:18-2012.

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8. Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict.. (2012). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-01.

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9. Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency. (2011). Usman, Murat ; Koçkesen, Levent ; Kockesen, Levent ; Kokesen, Levent.
   In: Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers.
   RePEc:koc:wpaper:1121.

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10. Optimal litigation strategies with observable case preparation. (2010). Linnemer, Laurent ; Choné, Philippe ; Chone, Philippe.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:271-288.

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11. Make Him an Offer He Can’t Refuse: Avoiding Conflicts through Side Payments. (2010). Sheremeta, Roman ; Kimbrough, Erik.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-23.

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12. Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining. (2010). McCannon, Bryan ; Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha.
    In: Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:bir:birmec:10-28.

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13. Trial Selection Theory: A Unified Model. (2009). Lin, Haizhen ; Hylton, Keith N..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2009-06.

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14. Labor Court Inputs, Judicial Cases Outcomes and Labor Flows: Identifying Real EPL.. (2009). Kramarz, Francis ; fraisse, henri ; PROST, C..
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    RePEc:bfr:banfra:256.

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15. The Social versus Private Incentive to Sue. (2008). Miceli, Thomas.
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-12.

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16. Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening. (2008). Linnemer, Laurent ; Choné, Philippe ; Chone, Philippe.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2334.

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17. Labor Conflicts and Inefficiency of Relationship-Specific Investments: What is the Judges Role?. (2007). Lambert, Eve-Angeline ; Gabuthy, Yannick ; Deffains, Bruno.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
    RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2007-04.

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18. Consent and Exchange. (2007). Bebchuk, Lucian ; Bar-Gill, Oren.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13267.

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19. Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability.. (2007). Klein, Christopher C..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mts:wpaper:200713.

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20. Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process.. (2006). Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe ; Deffains, Bruno.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
    RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2006-11.

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21. Judicial Fact Discretion. (2006). Shleifer, Andrei ; Gennaioli, Nicola.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12679.

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22. An economic model of fair use. (2006). Miceli, Thomas ; Adelstein, Richard P..
    In: Information Economics and Policy.
    RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:18:y:2006:i:4:p:359-373.

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23. Litigation and Settlement: New Evidence from Labor Courts in Mexico. (2006). Sadka, Joyce ; Kaplan, David ; Silva-Mendez, Jorge Luis.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cie:wpaper:0606.

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24. An Economic Model of Fair Use. (2005). Miceli, Thomas ; Adelstein, Richard P..
    In: Wesleyan Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:wes:weswpa:2005-014.

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25. An Economic Model of Fair Use. (2005). Miceli, Thomas ; Adelstein, Richard P..
    In: Working papers.
    RePEc:uct:uconnp:2005-56.

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26. Learning and Bargaining in Dispute Resolution: Theory and Evidence from Medical Malpractice Litigation. (2005). Watanabe, Yasutora.
    In: 2005 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed005:440.

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27. Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does Judicial Selection Matter?. (2005). Payne, A. ; Besley, Timothy.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5211.

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28. Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy:Does Judicial Selection Matter?. (2005). Payne, A. ; Besley, Timothy.
    In: STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series.
    RePEc:cep:stipep:04.

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29. The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Literature. (2004). Lerner, Josh ; Lanjouw, Jean O.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000486.

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30. Promoting Mediation in Property Rights Conflicts. (2003). Duke, Joshua ; Jost, Ryan P..
    In: Land Economics.
    RePEc:uwp:landec:v:79:y:2003:i:1:p:29-37.

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31. Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges. (2003). Payne, A. ; Besley, Timothy.
    In: IFS Working Papers.
    RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:03/11.

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32. The Evolution and Utilization of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. (2002). Chang, Pao-Li.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:mie:wpaper:475.

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33. Conflict in divorce disputes: the determinants of pretrial settlement. (2001). Tiefenthaler, Jill ; Farmer, Amy.
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:2:p:157-180.

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34. The Use of “Most-Favored-Nation” Clauses in Settlement of Litigation. (2001). Spier, Kathryn E..
    In: Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt7hm4d39g.

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35. A Note on Settlements under the Contingent Fee Method of Compensating Lawyers. (2001). Polinsky, A. Mitchell ; Rubinfeld, Daniel L..
    In: Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt2vz8x310.

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36. Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients. (2001). Polinsky, A. Mitchell ; Rubinfeld, Daniel L..
    In: Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt2kz8r3j1.

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37. The Effect of Offer-of-Settlement Rules on the Terms of Settlement. (2000). Bebchuk, Lucian ; Chang, Howard F..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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38. An Economic Analysis of the American and the Continental Rule for Allocating Legal Costs. (2000). .
    In: European Journal of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:9:y:2000:i:2:p:115-125.

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39. Wealth Creation and Destruction from Brooke Groups Tobacco Litigation Strategy. (1999). Yermack, David ; Dahiya, Sandeep.
    In: New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires.
    RePEc:fth:nystfi:99-050.

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40. Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation. (1998). Waldfogel, Joel.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6409.

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41. Takings, litigation, and just compensation. (1998). .
    In: Atlantic Economic Journal.
    RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:26:y:1998:i:4:p:397-412.

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42. A reputation for being a nuisance: frivolous lawsuits and fee shifting in a repeated play game. (1998). Pecorino, Paul ; Farmer, Amy.
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43. Stylised Fact of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership. (1998). Schankerman, Mark ; Lanjouw, Jean Olson .
    In: STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers.
    RePEc:cep:stieip:20.

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44. Stylized Facts of Patent Litigation: Value, Scope and Ownership. (1997). Schankerman, Mark ; Lanjouw, Jean O..
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    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6297.

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45. The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature. (1997). Lerner, Josh ; Lanjouw, Jean O..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6296.

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46. Litigation, experimentation, and reputation. (1996). Yang, Bill Z..
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:4:p:491-502.

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47. In defense of criminal defense expenditures and plea bargaining. (1996). Kobayashi, Bruce ; Lott, John Jr., .
    In: International Review of Law and Economics.
    RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:4:p:397-416.

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48. The Legal Battle. (1996). Hirshleifer, Jack ; Osborne, Evan.
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49. Suit Versus Settlement When Parties Seek Nonmonetary Judgements. (1992). Shavell, Steven.
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50. A Note on Optimal Public Enforcement with Settlements and Litigation Costs. (1986). Polinsky, A. Mitchell ; Rubinfeld, Daniel L..
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