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2. Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model. (2007). Wen, Quan ; Houba, Harold.
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3. Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks. (2007). Bagwell, Kyle ; Athey, Susan.
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4. Stochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion. (2006). Gerlach, Heiko.
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5. Private Observation, Tacit Collusion and Collusion with Communication. (2006). Mouraviev, Igor .
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6. Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline. (2006). Versaevel, Bruno ; van Norden, Simon ; Gagne, Robert.
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7. The advantage of transparency in monetary policy instruments. (2006). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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8. Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences. (2006). Smith, Lones ; Prokopovych, Pavlo ; Chade, Hector.
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9. Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration. (2006). Obara, Ichiro.
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10. The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information. (2005). Miller, David.
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11. Bank Credit Cycles. (2005). He, Ping ; Gorton, Gary.
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12. Collusion under Monitoring of Sales. (2005). Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Harrington, Joseph.
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13. Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games. (2004). Smith, Lones ; Prokopovych, Pavlo.
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20. Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks. (2004). Bagwell, Kyle ; Athey, Susan.
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21. Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient. (2004). Takahashi, Satoru ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
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22. An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy. (2003). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
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23. An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy. (2003). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
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24. Sticky prices, coordination and enforcement. (2003). Driscoll, John ; Ito, Harumi .
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25. Competitive Risk Sharing Contracts with One-Sided Commitment. (2003). Uhlig, Harald ; Krueger, Dirk.
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26. What Determines Cartel Success?. (2002). Suslow, Valerie ; Levenstein, Margaret.
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28. The Advantage of Transparent Instruments of Monetary Policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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29. The advantage of transparent instruments of monetary policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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30. On the optimality of transparent monetary policy. (2001). Kehoe, Patrick ; Athey, Susan ; Atkeson, Andrew.
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39. Collusion in a Model of Repeated Auctions. (1999). Johnson, P. ; Robert, J..
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