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Collusion in supply functions under technology licensing. (2022). Saglam, Ismail ; Celen, Ihsan.
In: Managerial and Decision Economics.
RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:43:y:2022:i:5:p:1362-1378.

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  1. Settlements in the presence of leniency programs: Costs and benefits. (2025). Ross, Thomas W ; Chen, Zhiqi ; Strathearn, Matthew.
    In: Managerial and Decision Economics.
    RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:4:p:2044-2063.

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  2. Monopoly Persistence under the Threat of Supply Function Competition. (2022). Saglam, Ismail.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:111829.

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References

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  23. Saglam, I. (2021). Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition. Unpublished Manuscript.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  24. Sweeting, A. (2007). Market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market. Economic Journal, 117, 654–685. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02045.x.

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