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Van Nieuwerburgh, S. and L. Veldkamp (2008), Information Acquisition and Under-Diversiâcation, Stern-NYU working paper. Estimates from the Numerical Exercise Managerâs risk aversion coe cient a 2 3 4 5 6 Panel A: The ârst best contract AF B 66.67 57.14 50.00 44.44 40.00 eF B 50.00 56.06 61.80 67.26 72.47 Panel B: The third best contract AT B 73.66 65.14 58.00 54.44 51.00 HT B 06.31 07.24 10.17 10.97 11.48 Panel C: The third best eort eT B 10.96 13.77 15.53 17.36 18.75 eT B 06.61 08.42 08.52 12.36 15.03 Panel D: The third best CEW CEW(AT B ; HT B ) 01.65 02.35 02.67 02.85 02.97 CEW(AT B ; HT B ) 00.49 00.75 00.91 01.39 01.74 Panel E: Eort maximizing H H-75.70-44.76-29.82-18.03-10.52 e(AT B ; H ) 12.56 14.85 16.41 17.97 19.19