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2. CEO Compensation: Facts. (2023). Clementi, Gian Luca ; Cooley, Thomas.
   In: Review of Economic Dynamics.
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3. Do Boards Govern Executive Remuneration in Indian Banks? An Econometric Exploration. (2022). Gulati, Rachita ; Bhatia, Madhur ; Duppati, Geeta.
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4. A disequilibrium mechanism: When managerial decisions cause macroeconomic instability. (2019). Mariusz, Maziarz.
   In: Economics and Business Review.
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5. Commitment and Competition. (2019). Quadrini, Vincenzo ; Cooley, Thomas ; Marimon, Ramon.
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6. Disentangling managerial incentives from a dynamic perspective: the role of stock grants. (2016). Laussel, Didier ; van Long, Ngo ; Hili, Amal.
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7. Disentangling Managerial Incentives from a Dynamic Perspective: The Role of Stock Grants. (2016). Laussel, Didier ; van Long, Ngo ; Hili, Amal.
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8. Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Top Executives. (2015). Prados, María José ; Olivetti, Claudia ; Albanesi, Stefania.
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9. Gender and dynamic agency: theory and evidence on the compensation of top executives. (2015). Prados, María José ; Olivetti, Claudia ; Albanesi, Stefania.
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10. Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Top Executives. (2015). Prados, María José ; Olivetti, Claudia ; Albanesi, Stefania.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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11. The Complexity of CEO Compensation. (2014). Jarque, Arantxa.
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12. Risky Investments with Limited Commitment. (2013). Quadrini, Vincenzo ; Cooley, Thomas ; Marimon, Ramon.
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13. Risky Investments with Limited Commitment. (2013). Quadrini, Vincenzo ; Marimon, Ramon.
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14. Evaluating Executive Compensation Packages. (2013). Jarque, Arantxa ; John, Muth .
    In: Economic Quarterly.
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15. Compromises and Incentives. (2013). Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Itza T. Q. Curiel-Cabral, .
    In: Working Papers.
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16. Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs. (2013). Giat, Yahel ; Subramanian, Ajay.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:12:p:2833-2861.

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17. Risky Investments with Limited Commitment. (2013). Quadrini, Vincenzo ; Cooley, Thomas F ; Marimon, Ramon.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9725.

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18. Risky Investments with Limited Commitment. (2012). Quadrini, Vincenzo ; Marimon, Ramon.
    In: 2012 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed012:603.

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19. The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation. (2012). Chaigneau, Pierre.
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20. Pareto Frontier of a Dynamic Principal–Agent Model with Discrete Actions: An Evolutionary Multi-Objective Approach. (2012). Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Rodriguez, Katya ; Herrera, Juan ; Curiel, Itza .
    In: Computational Economics.
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21. Cooperative CEO Identity and Efficient Governance: Member or Outside CEO?. (2012). Liang, Q. X. ; Hendrikse, G. W. J., .
    In: ERIM Report Series Research in Management.
    RePEc:ems:eureri:37879.

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22. Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model. (2011). wang, cheng.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
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23. Risk sharing, investment, and incentives in the neoclassical growth model. (2010). Sanchez, Juan ; Espino, Emilio.
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24. Hidden effort, learning by doing, and wage dynamics. (2010). Jarque, Arantxa.
    In: Economic Quarterly.
    RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2010:i:4q:p:339-372:n:v.96no.4.

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25. The optimal timing of executive compensation. (2010). Chaigneau, Pierre.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:119081.

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26. Executive Compensation: Facts. (2009). Clementi, Gian Luca ; Cooley, Thomas.
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    RePEc:ste:nystbu:09-16.

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27. A Theory of Firm Decline. (2009). Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Clementi, Gian Luca ; Cooley, Thomas F..
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    RePEc:ste:nystbu:09-05.

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28. Executive Compensation: Facts. (2009). Clementi, Gian Luca ; Cooley, Thomas F..
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29. A Theory of Firm Decline. (2009). Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Clementi, Gian Luca.
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30. A Theory of Firm Decline. (2008). Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Cooley, Thomas ; Clementi, Gian Luca.
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    RePEc:rim:rimwps:33_08.

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31. Total Executive Compensation. (2008). Cooley, Tom ; di Giannatale, Sonia ; Clementi, Gian Luca.
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    RePEc:red:sed008:906.

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32. Optimal CEO compensation and stock options. (2008). Jarque, Arantxa.
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    RePEc:ivi:wpasec:2008-04.

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33. CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation. (2008). Jarque, Arantxa.
    In: Economic Quarterly.
    RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2008:i:sum:p:265-300:n:v.94no.3.

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34. A Theory of Firm Decline. (2008). Di Giannatale, Sonia ; Cooley, Thomas ; Sonia Di Giannatale Menegalli, ; Clementi, Gian Luca.
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35. Moral hazard and persistence. (2007). Jarque, Arantxa ; Hopenhayn, Hugo.
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    RePEc:fip:fedrwp:07-07.

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36. Stock grants as a commitment device. (2006). wang, cheng ; Clementi, Gian Luca.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:30:y:2006:i:11:p:2191-2216.

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37. Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Female Top Executives. (2006). Olivetti, Claudia ; Albanesi, Stefania.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-061.

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38. Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts. (2006). Newman, Andrew ; Bond, Philip.
    In: Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2006-060.

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39. When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts. (2005). wang, cheng ; Spear, Stephen.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:120:y:2005:i:2:p:239-256.

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40. Stock Grants as a Committment Device. (2004). Clementi, Gian Luca ; Wang, Chen.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ste:nystbu:04-24.

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41. Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard. (2004). Quadrini, Vincenzo.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:51:y:2004:i:4:p:713-751.

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42. Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: With an application to deposit insurance. (1998). wang, cheng.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:42:y:1998:i:2:p:207-240.

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