1. Inflation Targeting Skepticism: Myth or Reality? A Way Forward for Pakistan (Article). (2022). Hayat, Zafar ; Masood, Saher.
   In: The Pakistan Development Review.
   RePEc:pid:journl:v:61:y:2022:i:1:p:1-27.

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2. Inflation targeting & implications of oil shocks for inflation expectations in oil-importing and exporting economies: Evidence from three Nordic Kingdoms. (2020). Yarovaya, Larisa ; Nasir, Muhammad Ali ; Huynh, Toan ; Duc, Toan Luu.
   In: International Review of Financial Analysis.
   RePEc:eee:finana:v:72:y:2020:i:c:s1057521920302027.

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3. Anchoring inflation expectations in the face of oil shocks & in the proximity of ZLB: A tale of two targeters. (2020). Nasir, Muhammad Ali ; Huynh, Toan ; Duc, Toan Luu ; Balsalobre-Lorente, Daniel.
   In: Energy Economics.
   RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:86:y:2020:i:c:s0140988320300013.

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4. Optimal reputation building in the New Keynesian model. (2016). Pasten, Ernesto ; Lu, Yang K ; King, Robert G.
   In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
   RePEc:eee:moneco:v:84:y:2016:i:c:p:233-249.

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5. .

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6. Central Bank Transparency and Financial Market: Evidence for the Brazilian Case. (2011). de Mendonça, Helder ; Filho, Jose Simo ; de Mendona, Helder Ferreira.
   In: Brazilian Review of Finance.
   RePEc:brf:journl:v:9:y:2011:i:1:p:51-67.

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7. Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy. (2009). Mihailov, Alexander ; Arestis, Philip.
   In: Economic Issues Journal Articles.
   RePEc:eis:articl:209arestis.

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8. Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees. (2008). Mihailov, Alexander.
   In: Economics Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2008-72.

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9. Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees. (2007). Ullrich, Katrin ; Mihailov, Alexander.
   In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:zbw:zewdip:5870.

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10. Flexible Rules cum Constrained Discretion: A New Consensus in Monetary Policy. (2007). Mihailov, Alexander ; Arestis, Philip.
    In: Economic Analysis Research Group Working Papers.
    RePEc:rdg:eargwp:earg-wp2007-13.

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11. Does Instrument Independence Matter under the Constrained Discretionof an Inflation Targeting Goal? Lessons from UK Taylor Rule Empirics. (2007). Mihailov, Alexander.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006.
    RePEc:mmf:mmfc06:95.

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12. Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem. (2003). Driffill, Edward ; Rotondi, Zeno.
    In: Computing in Economics and Finance 2003.
    RePEc:sce:scecf3:292.

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13. Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem. (2003). Driffill, Edward ; Rotondi, Zeno.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3923.

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14. When should central bankers be fired?. (2002). Walsh, Carl.
    In: Economics of Governance.
    RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:3:y:2002:i:1:p:1-21.

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15. Inflation Targeting as a Coordination Device. (2002). Viegi, Nicola.
    In: Open Economies Review.
    RePEc:kap:openec:v:13:y:2002:i:4:p:341-362.

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16. Credibility of optimal monetary delegation: do we really need prohibitive reappointment costs?. (2000). Rotondi, Z..
    In: Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics.
    RePEc:stn:sotoec:0003.

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17. Political Macroeconomics: A Survey of Recent Developments.. (2000). Gartner, Manfred.
    In: Journal of Economic Surveys.
    RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:5:p:527-61.

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18. Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates. (1999). .
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:49:y:1999:i:1:p:31-50.

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19. Fiscal Policy and Imperfectly Credible Inflation Targets: Should We Appoint Expenditure-Conservative Central Bankers?. (1997). Tirelli, Patrizio ; Natale, Piergiovanna ; Lossani, M..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:gla:glaewp:9707.

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1. Optimal Disinflation with Delegation and Limited Credibility. (2023). Rojas, Luis ; Duggal, Mridula.
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2. Discretion rather than rules? Outdated optimal commitment plans versus discretionary policymaking. (2020). Jensen, Christian ; Christian, Jensen.
   In: The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics.
   RePEc:bpj:bejmac:v:20:y:2020:i:1:p:9:n:17.

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3. Verifying time inconsistency of the ECB monetary policy by means of a regime-switching approach. (2017). Beccarini, Andrea.
   In: Empirica.
   RePEc:kap:empiri:v:44:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10663-016-9316-8.

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4. Discretion Rather than Rules? Binding Commitments versus Discretionary Policymaking. (2016). Jensen, Christian.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:76838.

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5. Commitment in utility regulation: A model of reputation and policy applications. (2013). Wren-Lewis, Liam.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:89:y:2013:i:c:p:210-231.

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6. A reputation strategic model of monetary policy in continuous-time. (2009). Tian, Guoqiang ; Li, Jingyuan ; Liu, Yongming.
   In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
   RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:31:y:2009:i:4:p:523-533.

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7. Quantifying and sustaining welfare gains from monetary commitment. (2008). Pearlman, Joseph ; McAdam, Peter ; Levine, Paul.
   In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
   RePEc:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:7:p:1253-1276.

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8. Lobbies, delegation and the under-investment problem in regulation. (2008). Trillas, Francesc ; Levine, Paul ; Evans, Joanne.
   In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
   RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:1:p:17-40.

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9. Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy. (2007). Hahn, Volker ; Gersbach, Hans.
   In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
   RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:39:y:2007:i:1:p:133-149.

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10. Lobbies, Delegation and the Under-investment Problem in Regulation. (2006). Trillas, Francesc ; Levine, Paul ; Evans, Joanne.
    In: School of Economics Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:sur:surrec:2006.

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11. Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?. (2006). Libich, Jan.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5470.

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12. A model of monetary unification under asymmetric information. (2005). Kobayashi, Teruyoshi.
    In: International Review of Economics & Finance.
    RePEc:eee:reveco:v:14:y:2005:i:1:p:1-15.

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13. Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games. (2004). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:20:y:2004:i:3:p:695-707.

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14. Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games. (2002). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Working Papers in Public Economics.
    RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp49.

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15. Reconsidering central bank independence. (2002). Hefeker, Carsten ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:4:p:653-674.

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16. The case for a populist Central Banker. (1999). Guzzo, Vincenzo ; Velasco, Andres.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:43:y:1999:i:7:p:1317-1344.

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17. Optimal monetary policy delegation to conservative central banks. (1999). Schellekens Ph., .
    In: Working Papers.
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18. Inflation Targeting as a Way of Precommitment.. (1998). .
    In: Oxford Economic Papers.
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19. The Case for a Populist Banker. (1998). Guzzo, Vincenzo ; Velasco, Andres.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
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20. The New Political Macroeconomics. (1998). al-Nowaihi, Ali ; Garratt, Dean.
    In: Discussion Papers in Economics.
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21. Confident expectations, rational expectations and the optimal conduct of monetary policy. (1998). Maabeta, Henrich ; Sell, Friedrich L..
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:15:y:1998:i:4:p:519-541.

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22. The credibility of policy announcements: Greek evidence. (1997). Apergis, Nicholas ; Velentzas, Kostas ; Papanastasiou, John .
    In: Applied Economics.
    RePEc:taf:applec:v:29:y:1997:i:6:p:699-705.

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