1. Information, Party Politics, and Public Support for Central Bank Independence. (2025). Garriga, Ana Carolina ; Digiuseppe, Matthew ; Kern, Andreas.
   In: SocArXiv.
   RePEc:osf:socarx:trpgz_v1.

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2. The impact of populism on central bank communication: Analyzing theoretical developments and the case of Hungary. (2024). Follot, Maxence.
   In: European Journal of Comparative Economics.
   RePEc:liu:liucej:v:21:y:2024:i:1:p:65-95.

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3. The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum. (2024). Diaconaşu, Delia ; Pohoa, Ion ; Negru, Ioana ; Diaconau, Delia-Elena.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04183244.

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4. Preaching to the agnostic: Inflation reporting can increase trust in the central bank but only among people with weak priors. (2024). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Hayo, Bernd ; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume.
   In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
   RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:142:y:2024:i:c:s026156062400024x.

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5. The independence of central banks: a reductio ad absurdum. (2024). Delia-Elena, Ion Pohoa.
   In: The Journal of Philosophical Economics.
   RePEc:bus:jphile:v:17:y:2024:i:1:n:4.

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6. Central Bank Independence and Inflation in India: The Role of Financial Development. (2023). Khan, Javaid ; Bhat, Sajad Ahmad.
   In: Studies in Economics and Econometrics.
   RePEc:taf:rseexx:v:47:y:2023:i:4:p:392-407.

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7. Preaching to the agnostic: Inflation reporting can increase trust in the central bank but only among people with weak priors. (2023). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Hayo, Bernd ; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume.
   In: Working Papers CEB.
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8. Preaching to the Agnostic: Inflation Reporting Can Increase Trust in the Central Bank but Only among People with Weak Priors. (2023). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Hayo, Bernd ; Meon, Pierre-Guillaume.
   In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10636.

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9. The case for independence: Does central bank independence curb the spread of the underground economy?. (2023). Saunoris, James ; Berdiev, Aziz N.
   In: Kyklos.
   RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:76:y:2023:i:3:p:407-435.

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10. Preaching to the agnostic: Inflation reporting can increase trust in the central bank but only among people with weak priors. (2022). Méon, Pierre-Guillaume ; Hayo, Bernd ; Mon, Pierre-Guillaume.
    In: MAGKS Papers on Economics.
    RePEc:mar:magkse:202245.

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11. Political voice on monetary policy: evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank. (2022). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato ; Moschella, Manuela ; Ferrara, Federico M.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:114278.

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12. Political voice on monetary policy: Evidence from the parliamentary hearings of the European Central Bank. (2022). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato ; Moschella, Manuela ; Ferrara, Federico M.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:74:y:2022:i:c:s0176268021001178.

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13. What Drives Inflation and How: Evidence from Additive Mixed Models Selected by cAIC. (2022). Rossi, Enzo ; Baumann, Philipp ; Volkmann, Alexander.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2006.06274.

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14. What drives inflation and how? Evidence from additive mixed models selected by cAIC. (2021). Rossi, Enzo ; Volkmann, Alexander.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:snb:snbwpa:2021-12.

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15. Stable money and central bank independence: implementing monetary institutions in postwar Germany. (2021). Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: Public Choice.
    RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:186:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00734-z.

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16. The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence. (2021). Kern, Andreas ; Rau-Gohring, Matthias ; Reinsberg, Bernhard.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:68:y:2021:i:c:s017626802030135x.

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17. De Jure and De Facto Institutions: Implications for Law and for Economics. (2021). Metelska-Szaniawska, Katarzyna ; Lewkowicz, Jacek.
    In: Ekonomista.
    RePEc:aoq:ekonom:y:2021:i:6:p:758-776.

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18. Money and monetary stability in Europe, 1300–1914. (2020). Pamuk, Sevket ; Karaman, Kıvanç ; Yildirim-Karaman, Seil.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:115:y:2020:i:c:p:279-300.

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19. The ECB monetary strategy: A critical assessment. (2019). Marrero, David Padron ; Rodriguez, Carlos J.
    In: Revista de Economia Critica.
    RePEc:ret:ecocri:rec27_03.

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20. Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany. (2019). Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: MAGKS Papers on Economics.
    RePEc:mar:magkse:201924.

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21. IMF conditionality and central bank independence. (2019). Kern, Andreas ; Rau-Gohring, Matthias ; Reinsberg, Bernhard.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:212-229.

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22. Stable Money and Central Bank Independence: Implementing Monetary Institutions in Postwar Germany. (2019). Hefeker, Carsten.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7892.

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23. WHAT BIRD IS THAT? CENTRAL BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS. (2019). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19127.

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24. POPULISM, ECONOMIC POLICIES, POLITICAL PRESSURE AND CENTRAL BANK (IN)DEPENDENCE. (2019). masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp19111.

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25. The powers that are: central bank independence in the Greenspan era. (2018). Kuper, Gerard.
    In: Empirical Economics.
    RePEc:spr:empeco:v:54:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00181-016-1225-y.

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26. Central bank transparency and inflation (volatility) – new evidence. (2018). Weber, Christoph.
    In: International Economics and Economic Policy.
    RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:15:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10368-016-0365-z.

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27. Money and Monetary Stability in Europe, 1300-1914. (2018). Pamuk, Sevket ; Karaman, Kıvanç ; Yildirim, Secil.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12583.

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28. Financial Inequality, group entitlements and populism. (2018). masciandaro, donato ; Faveretto, Federico.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1892.

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29. POPULISM, FINANCIAL INEQUALITY AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A POLITICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH. (2018). Passarelli, Francesco ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1874.

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30. Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence. (2018). Romelli, Davide ; masciandaro, donato.
    In: BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers.
    RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1871.

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31. Prosperity-Enhancing Institutions: Towards a Comprehensive Composite Index. (2017). Helfer, Helena.
    In: Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement.
    RePEc:spr:soinre:v:134:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11205-016-1466-3.

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32. Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?. (2017). Ftiti, Zied ; Aguir, Abdelkader ; Smida, Mounir.
    In: Post-Print.
    RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01746100.

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33. Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?. (2017). Ftiti, Zied ; Smida, Mounir ; Aguir, Abdelkader.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:67:y:2017:i:c:p:215-227.

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34. The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation. (2016). Jäger, Kai ; Jager, Kai.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:79-96.

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35. Central Bank Transparency and Inflation (Volatility) – New Evidence. (2016). Weber, Christoph.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:bav:wpaper:163_weber.

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36. Social market economy: Towards a comprehensive composite index. (2015). Helfer, Helena.
    In: CIW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:62015.

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37. The German Public and its Trust in the ECB: The Role of Knowledge and Information Search. (2014). Hayo, Bernd ; Neuenkirch, Edith.
    In: VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy.
    RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100312.

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38. A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks Conservatism. (2014). Lucotte, Yannick ; Levieuge, Grégory.
    In: Southern Economic Journal.
    RePEc:wly:soecon:v:81:y:2014:i:2:p:409-434.

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39. Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects. (2014). Mazhar, Ummad ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: Open Economies Review.
    RePEc:kap:openec:v:25:y:2014:i:4:p:739-770.

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40. Social trust and central-bank independence. (2014). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Berggren, Niclas ; Hellstrom, Jorgen.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:34:y:2014:i:c:p:425-439.

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41. Are public preferences reflected in monetary policy reaction functions?. (2014). Neuenkirch, Matthias.
    In: Journal of Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:60-68.

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42. The German public and its trust in the ECB: The role of knowledge and information search. (2014). Hayo, Bernd ; Neuenkirch, Edith.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:47:y:2014:i:c:p:286-303.

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43. Economic Growth and Judicial Independence, a Dozen Years On: Cross-Country Evidence Using an Updated Set of Indicators. (2014). Voigt, Stefan ; Gutmann, Jerg ; Feld, Lars.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5010.

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44. REAVALIANDO A RELAÇÃO ENTRE INDEPENDÊNCIA DO BANCO CENTRAL E CUSTOS DE DESINFLAÇÃO: UMA ANÁLISE DE VIÉS DE SELEÇÃO. (2014). Duarte, Pedro ; DANILO JOSe RODRIGUES PASSOS, .
    In: Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting].
    RePEc:anp:en2013:040.

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45. Unkonventionelle Geldpolitik: Warum die Europäische Zentralbank ihre Unabhängigkeit nicht verloren hat. (2013). Schwabe, Carsten.
    In: CIW Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:ciwdps:32013.

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46. Recovering from the Global Financial Crisis: achieving financial stability in times of uncertainty. (2013). Ojo, Marianne.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:47350.

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47. Recovering from the Global Financial Crisis: achieving financial stability in times of uncertainty. (2013). Ojo, Marianne.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:46609.

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48. Central bank independence: monetary policies in selected jurisdictions (III). (2013). Ojo, Marianne ; Ayadi, Felix .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:45722.

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49. The German Public and its Trust in the ECB: The Role of Knowledge and Information Search. (2013). Hayo, Bernd ; Neuenkirch, Edith.
    In: MAGKS Papers on Economics.
    RePEc:mar:magkse:201347.

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50. Are Central Bank Independence Reforms Necessary for Achieving Low and Stable Inflation?. (2013). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Rudholm, Niklas ; Landstrom, Mats.
    In: HUI Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0095.

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51. Does greater central bank independence really lead to lower inflation? Evidence from panel data. (2013). Posso, Alberto ; TAWADROS, George B..
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:33:y:2013:i:c:p:244-247.

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52. A simple empirical measure of central banks conservatism. (2012). Levieuge, Grégory ; Lucotte, Yannick.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:46836.

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53. A simple empirical measure of central banks conservatism. (2012). Levieuge, Grégory.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:38424.

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54. Explicit inflation targets and central bank independence: friends or foes?. (2012). Libich, Jan.
    In: Economic Change and Restructuring.
    RePEc:kap:ecopln:v:45:y:2012:i:4:p:271-297.

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55. Central Bank Behavior and Statutory Independence. (2012). Hueng, C..
    In: Atlantic Economic Journal.
    RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:40:y:2012:i:2:p:111-126.

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56. Social trust and central-bank independence. (2012). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Berggren, Niclas ; Hellstrom, Jorgen.
    In: HUI Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:huiwps:0066.

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57. The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence. (2012). Markwardt, Gunther ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:3:p:286-301.

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58. Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries. (2012). Potrafke, Niklas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:31:y:2012:i:5:p:1126-1139.

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59. Central Bank Independence and its Effect on Inflation in the ESCWA Countries. (2011). Abou, Mohamad A.
    In: EconStor Preprints.
    RePEc:zbw:esprep:193661.

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60. Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects. (2011). Mazhar, Ummad ; Hayo, Bernd.
    In: MAGKS Papers on Economics.
    RePEc:mar:magkse:201140.

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61. Political cycles under external economic constraints: Evidence from Cyprus. (2011). Efthyvoulou, Georgios.
    In: Journal of Economics and Business.
    RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:63:y:2011:i:6:p:638-662.

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62. Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy?: A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries. (2011). Potrafke, Niklas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin.
    RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1180.

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63. The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence. (2011). Markwardt, Gunther ; Hielscher, Kai .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3396.

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64. Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler. (2011). Mietzner, Mark ; Schiereck, Dirk.
    In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
    RePEc:bla:perwir:v:12:y:2011:i:1:p:92-100.

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65. Central bank independence and ageing. (2010). Héricourt, Jérôme ; Farvaque, Etienne ; Gaël Lagadec, .
    In: Applied Economics Letters.
    RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:17:y:2010:i:12:p:1167-1171.

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66. Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence. (2010). Honig, Adam ; Alpanda, Sami.
    In: Journal of International Money and Finance.
    RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:29:y:2010:i:6:p:1003-1023.

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67. Optimal monetary policy regime for oil producing developing economies: Implications for post-war Iraq. (2010). Tas, Bedri ; Tas, Bedri Kamil Onur, ; Togay, Selahattin.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:27:y:2010:i:5:p:1324-1336.

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68. Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries. (2009). Potrafke, Niklas ; Belke, Ansgar.
    In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:rwirep:94.

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69. Measuring US Presidents Political Commitment for Fiscal Discipline between 1920 and 2008. (2009). Pujol, Francesc.
    In: Faculty Working Papers.
    RePEc:una:unccee:wp0109.

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70. Does Government Ideology Matter in Monetary Policy? – A Panel Data Analysis for OECD Countries. (2009). .
    In: Ruhr Economic Papers.
    RePEc:rwi:repape:0094.

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71. Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance. (2009). Anastasiou, Athanasios.
    In: Cyprus Economic Policy Review.
    RePEc:erc:cypepr:v:3:y:2009:i:1:p:123-156.

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72. Central bank independence and ageing. (2008). Héricourt, Jérôme ; Farvaque, Etienne ; Hericourt, Jerome ; Lagadec, Gael.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:13076.

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73. Fiscal-monetary policy coordination and debt management: a two-stage analysis. (2008). Di Gioacchino, Debora ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni.
    In: Empirica.
    RePEc:kap:empiri:v:35:y:2008:i:4:p:433-448.

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74. Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union. (2007). Ullrich, Katrin.
    In: Open Economies Review.
    RePEc:kap:openec:v:18:y:2007:i:3:p:239-262.

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75. The political economy of monetary policy conduct and central bank design. (2006). Gärtner, Manfred ; Gartner, Manfred.
    In: University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006.
    RePEc:usg:dp2006:2006-25.

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76. Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?. (2006). Libich, Jan.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
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77. Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece. (2006). Panagiotidis, Theodore ; TRIAMPELLA, Afroditi.
    In: Revista de Economía del Rosario.
    RePEc:col:000151:002112.

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78. FISCAL-MONETARY POLICY COORDINATION AND DEBT MANAGEMENT: A TWO STAGE DYNAMIC ANALYSIS. (2005). Di Gioacchino, Debora ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504024.

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79. Perspektiven einer Asiatischen Währungsunion. (2005). Hayo, Bernd.
    In: Marburg Working Papers on Economics.
    RePEc:mar:volksw:2000508.

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80. Fiscal- Monetary Policy and Debt Management: a Two Stage Dynamic Analysis. (2004). Di Gioacchino, Debora ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni.
    In: Working Papers in Public Economics.
    RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp74.

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81. Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank. (2003). Ullrich, Katrin.
    In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
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82. Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators. (2003). Voigt, Stefan ; Feld, Lars.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:eee:poleco:v:19:y:2003:i:3:p:497-527.

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83. Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators. (2003). Voigt, Stefan ; Feld, Lars.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_906.

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84. Optimal Fiscal Stabilization Policy With Credible Central Bank Independence.. (2002). Rovelli, Riccardo ; Lambertini, Luca.
    In: Working Papers.
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