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20. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Dorr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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21. WHAT BIRD IS THAT? CENTRAL BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS. (2019). masciandaro, donato.
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22. Comparative political economy and varieties of macroeconomics. (2018). Baccaro, Lucio ; Pontusson, Jonas.
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23. How Central Bankers Learned to Love Financialization: The Fed, the Bank, and the Enlisting of Unfettered Markets in the Conduct of Monetary Policy. (2018). Walter, Timo ; Wansleben, Leon.
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24. Private Sector Policymaking. (2018). Szakonyi, David.
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25. Inferring hawks and doves from voting records. (2018). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
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26. Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence. (2017). Qureshi, Irfan.
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27. Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence. (2017). Qureshi, Irfan.
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28. Central Banks: Evolution and Innovation in Historical Perspective. (2017). Siklos, Pierre ; Bordo, Michael.
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29. Central Banks: Evolution and Innovation in Historical Perspective. (2017). Siklos, Pierre ; Bordo, Michael.
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30. The Shanghai Effect: Do Exports to China Affect Labor Practices in Africa?. (2017). Quince, Vanessa ; Adolph, Christopher ; Prakash, Aseem.
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31. Does central bank governors term in office matter for macroprudential policies? Evidence from MENA banks. (2017). Ghosh, Saibal.
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32. Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies. (2017). Potrafke, Niklas.
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33. Allies or commitment devices? A model of appointments to the Federal Reserve. (2017). Schnakenberg, Keith E ; Turner, Ian R ; Uribe-McGuire, Alicia.
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34. Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence. (2017). Qureshi, Irfan.
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35. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
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36. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
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37. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
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38. The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation. (2016). Jäger, Kai ; Jager, Kai.
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39. The politics of central bank independence. (2016). de Haan, Jakob.
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40. Missing Areas in the Bureaucratic Reputation Framework. (2016). Maor, Moshe.
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41. Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points. (2016). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
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42. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Raes, L. B. D., ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., .
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43. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Raes, L. B. D., ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., .
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44. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Raes, L. B. D., ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., .
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45. Estimating Central Bank Preferences Combining Topic and Scaling Methods. (2015). Baerg, Nicole ; Lowe, Will.
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46. The geography of the European Central Bank: form, functions and legitimacy. (2015). Clark, Gordon L.
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47. The Federal Reserve as global lender of last resort, 2007-2010. (2015). Broz, Lawrence .
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48. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, .
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49. Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey. (2014). Dumiter, Florin Cornel.
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50. Conventional and Unconventional Votes: A Tale of Three Monetary Policy Committees. (2014). Spencer, Christopher.
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