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2. Navigating Global Monetary Interdependencies: A Comprehensive Analysis of ECB Rate Hikes on China’s Technology-Driven Economy. (2024). Luo, Fangyong ; Bo, Lan ; Chen, Xiaoxian ; Huo, Weidong.
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3. One money, one voice? Evaluating ideological positions of euro area central banks. (2024). Feldkircher, Martin ; Hofmarcher, Paul ; Siklos, Pierre L.
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   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:85:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000843.

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4. Monetary and macroprudential policies: How to Be green? A political-economy approach. (2024). Masciandaro, Donato ; Russo, Riccardo.
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5. The (not so) quiet period: Communication by ECB decision-makers during monetary policy blackout days☆. (2023). Rieder, Kilian ; Gnan, Phillipp.
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   RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:130:y:2023:i:c:s0261560622001474.

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6. Central bank communication by ??? The economics of public policy leaks. (2023). Rieder, Kilian ; Ehrmann, Michael ; Gnan, Phillipp.
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   RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20232846.

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7. Who Should You Listen to in a Crisis? Differences in Communication of Central Bank Policymakers. (2022). Lehtimäki, Jonne ; Palmu, Marianne ; Lehtimaki, Jonne.
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   RePEc:cbk:journl:v:11:y:2022:i:3:p:33-57.

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8. Who Talks During Monetary Policy Quiet Periods, and Why? Evidence from the European Central Banks Governing Council. (2021). Rieder, Kilian ; Gnan, Phillipp.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15735.

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12. The Revolving Door and Regulatory Enforcement: Firm-Level Evidence on Tax Rates and IRS Audits. (2019). , Benjamin.
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13. How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector. (2019). Reshef, Ariell ; Mishra, Prachi.
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14. Some Reflections on the Political Economy of Monetary Policy. (2019). de Haan, Jakob ; Jakob, De Haan.
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15. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Doerr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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16. Political polarization, term length and too much delegation. (2019). Hefeker, Carsten.
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17. Masters of the ‘masters of the universe’? Monetary, fiscal and financial dominance in the Eurozone. (2019). Diessner, Sebastian ; Lisi, Giulio.
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18. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Dorr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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19. The Central Bank Governor and Interest Rate Setting by Committee. (2019). Piccillo, Giulia ; van Ommeren, Emile.
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20. Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries. (2019). Potrafke, Niklas ; Dörr, Luisa ; Dorr, Luisa ; Cahan, Dodge.
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21. WHAT BIRD IS THAT? CENTRAL BANKING AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS. (2019). masciandaro, donato.
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22. Comparative political economy and varieties of macroeconomics. (2018). Baccaro, Lucio ; Pontusson, Jonas.
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23. How Central Bankers Learned to Love Financialization: The Fed, the Bank, and the Enlisting of Unfettered Markets in the Conduct of Monetary Policy. (2018). Walter, Timo ; Wansleben, Leon.
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24. Private Sector Policymaking. (2018). Szakonyi, David.
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25. Inferring hawks and doves from voting records. (2018). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
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26. Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence. (2017). Qureshi, Irfan.
    In: The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS).
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27. Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence. (2017). Qureshi, Irfan.
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28. Central Banks: Evolution and Innovation in Historical Perspective. (2017). Siklos, Pierre ; Bordo, Michael.
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29. Central Banks: Evolution and Innovation in Historical Perspective. (2017). Siklos, Pierre ; Bordo, Michael.
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30. The Shanghai Effect: Do Exports to China Affect Labor Practices in Africa?. (2017). Quince, Vanessa ; Adolph, Christopher ; Prakash, Aseem.
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31. Does central bank governors term in office matter for macroprudential policies? Evidence from MENA banks. (2017). Ghosh, Saibal.
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32. Partisan politics: The empirical evidence from OECD panel studies. (2017). Potrafke, Niklas.
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33. Allies or commitment devices? A model of appointments to the Federal Reserve. (2017). Schnakenberg, Keith E ; Turner, Ian R ; Uribe-McGuire, Alicia.
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34. Monetary Policy Shifts and Central Bank Independence. (2017). Qureshi, Irfan.
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35. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
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36. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
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37. The Politics of Central Bank Independence. (2016). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; de Haan, Jakob.
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38. The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation. (2016). Jäger, Kai ; Jager, Kai.
    In: European Journal of Political Economy.
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39. The politics of central bank independence. (2016). de Haan, Jakob.
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40. Missing Areas in the Bureaucratic Reputation Framework. (2016). Maor, Moshe.
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41. Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points. (2016). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester.
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42. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Raes, L. B. D., ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., .
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43. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Raes, L. B. D., ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., .
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44. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Raes, L. B. D., ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., .
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45. Estimating Central Bank Preferences Combining Topic and Scaling Methods. (2015). Baerg, Nicole ; Lowe, Will.
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46. The geography of the European Central Bank: form, functions and legitimacy. (2015). Clark, Gordon L.
    In: Journal of Economic Geography.
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47. The Federal Reserve as global lender of last resort, 2007-2010. (2015). Broz, Lawrence .
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48. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, .
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49. Central Bank Independence, Transparency and Accountability Indexes: a Survey. (2014). Dumiter, Florin Cornel.
    In: Timisoara Journal of Economics and Business.
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50. Conventional and Unconventional Votes: A Tale of Three Monetary Policy Committees. (2014). Spencer, Christopher.
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