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27. INFLEXIBILITY OF INFLATION TARGETING REVISITED: MODELING THE ANCHORING EFFECT. (2006). Libich, Jan.
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28. Imperfectly Credible Disinflation under Endogenous Time-Dependent Pricing. (2005). Carvalho, Carlos ; Bonomo, Marco.
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29. Endogenous Time-Dependent Rules and the Costs of Disinflation with Imperfect Credibility. (2005). Carvalho, Carlos ; Bonomo, Marco.
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30. Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-ependent pricing. (2005). Carvalho, Carlos ; Bonomo, Marco.
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31. Monetary policy and the exchange rate during the Asian crisis: identification through heteroscedasticity. (2005). Demetriades, Panicos ; cipollini, andrea ; Caporale, Guglielmo Maria.
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32. Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 2004 an Finn E. Kydland and Edward C. Prescott. (2004). Setzer, Ralph.
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33. Partisan Preferences and Political Institutions: Explaining Fiscal Retrenchment in the European Union. (2004). .
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34. High public debt in currency crises: fundamentals versus signaling effects. (2004). Missale, Alessandro ; Benigno, Pierpaolo.
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35. New Macroeconomics and Credibility Analysis. (2004). Bonini, Patricia.
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36. Monetary Policy and the Exchange Rate During the Asian Crisis: Identification Through Heteroscedasticity. (2003). Demetriades, Panicos ; Caporale, Guglielmo Maria ; Cipollini, Andrea.
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37. Rules vs. Discretion after Twenty-Five Years. (2003). Stokey, Nancy L..
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38. Central Banker Contracts, Incomplete Information, and Monetary Policy Surprises: In Search of a Selfish Central Banker?. (2002). Miller, Stephen ; Chortareas, Georgios.
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39. Central Bank Financial Strength, Transparency, and Policy Credibility. (2002). Stella, Peter.
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40. An anticipative feedback solution for the infinite-horizon, linear-quadratic, dynamic, Stackelberg game. (2002). Zadrozny, Peter ; Chen, Baoline.
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41. Checks and balances, private information, and the credibility of monetary commitments. (2001). Keefer, Philip ; Stasavage, David.
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42. The Theory of Credibility and the Reputation-bias of Policy. (2001). Forder, James.
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43. The Regime-Dependent Determination of Credibility: A New Look at European Interest Rate Differentials. (2001). Tillmann, Peter.
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44. Monetary policy regimes and beliefs. (2001). Gomme, Paul ; Andolfatto, David.
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45. Credibility of a new monetary regime: The currency board in Bulgaria. (2001). Valev, Neven ; Carlson, John A..
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46. Could Reputation-Bias be a Bigger Problem than Inflation-Bias?. (2000). Forder, James.
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47. The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence. (2000). Mash, Richard .
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48. Credibility may require discretion, not rules. (2000). Glazer, Amihai ; Cowen, Tyler ; Zajc, Katarina.
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49. Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model. (2000). Lansing, Kevin ; Huh, Chan G..
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50. Capital flows to Emerging Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility. (1998). van Wincoop, Eric ; Bacchetta, Philippe.
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51. Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility. (1998). van Wincoop, Eric ; Bacchetta, Philippe.
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52. Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting and Volatility. (1998). van Wincoop, Eric ; Bacchetta, Philippe.
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53. Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination. (1997). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco.
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54. Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals,. (1997). Stacchetti, Ennio ; Pearce, David.
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55. Structural uncertainty and subsidy removal for economies in transition. (1997). Spagat, Michael ; Bertocchi, Graziella.
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56. Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example. (1996). Svensson, Lars ; Persson, Mats.
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57. Credibilidad, Problema Peso y Comportamiento de las Tasas de Interés: Chile 1979-1982. (1991). Hernandez, Le onardo.
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58. Signalling, Wage Controls and Monetary Disinflation Policy. (1989). van Wijnbergen, Sweder ; Persson, Torsten.
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59. Trade Policy under Endogenous Credibility. (1987). Kletzer, Kenneth ; Engel, Charles.
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60. Monopolistic Competition, Credibility and the Output Costs of Disinflation Programs: An Analysis of Price Controls. (1987). van Wijnbergen, Sweder.
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61. Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information. (1986). Barro, Robert.
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62. Real Balances, the Exchange Rate and Indexation: Real Variables in Disinflation. (1984). Fischer, Stanley.
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63. Monetary policy games and the role of private information. (1983). Canzoneri, Matthew.
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64. Zero Inflation Targets: Central Bank Commitment and Fiscal Policy Outcomes. (). Scarth, William M. ; Stemp, Peter J..
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