SlideShare a Scribd company logo
WHEN PANDAS ATTACK 
HOW TO DETECT, ATTRIBUTE, AND RESPOND TO 
MALWARE-FREE INTRUSIONS 
Dmitri Alperovitch - Chris Scott - Adam Meyers
TODAY’S SPEAKERS 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 2 
@DMITRICYBER 
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
DMITRI ALPEROVITCH | CO-FOUNDER & CTO 
Dmitri Alperovitch is the Co-Founder and CTO of CrowdStrike. A 
renowned computer security researcher, he is a thought-leader on cybersecurity 
policies and state tradecraft. Prior to founding CrowdStrike, Dmitri was a Vice 
President of Threat Research at McAFee, where he led the company’s global 
internet threat intelligence analysis and investigations. In 2010 and 2011, 
Alperovitch led the global team that investigated and brought to light Operation 
Aurora, Night Dragon and Shady RAT groundbreaking cyberespionage intrusions, 
and gave thoses incidents their names.
TODAY’S SPEAKERS 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 3 
@NETOPSGURU 
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
CHRIS SCOTT | DIRECTOR, SERVICES 
Christoper Scott has over 15 years of Fortune 500/DoD/DIB 
business proficiency, including more than 7 years of targeted threat detection 
and prevention expertise. As a Director at CrowdStrike Services, Christopher 
supports a variety of engagements that include: security reviews, incident 
response, data loss prevention, insider threat analysis and engineering threat 
detection systems, business continuity and disaster recovery processes. In 
addition, Christopher assists in building risk recognition systems and advancing 
the CrowdStrike Services practice.
TODAY’S SPEAKERS 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 4 
@ADAM_CYBER 
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
ADAM MEYERS | VP, INTELLIGENCE 
Adam Meyers has over a decade of experience within the 
information security industry. He has authored numerous papers that have 
appeared at peer reviewed industry venues and has received awards for his 
dedication to the field. At CrowdStrike, Adam serves as the VP of Intelligence. 
Within this role it is Adam’s responsibility to oversee all of CrowdStrike’s 
intelligence gathering and cyber-adversarial monitoring activities. Adam’s Global 
Intelligence Team supports both the Product and Services divisions at CrowdStrike 
and Adam manages these endeavors and expectations.
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
ADVANCED ATTACKERS EVADE 
IOC-BASED DETECTION 
HOW CAN YOU FIND AN ATTACK WHEN THERE 
IS NO MALWARE, NO COMMAND AND CONTROL, 
AND NO FILE-BASED ARTIFACTS? 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 5
REAL-WORLD CASE STUDIES 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 6
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 7 
LET’S DIVE IN… 
WHO’S BEHIND THE ATTACK?
UNCOVER THE ADVERSARY @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
RUSSIA 
Energetic Bear: Oil and Gas 
Companies 
HACTIVIST/TERRORIST 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 8 
CHINA 
Comment Panda: Commercial, Government, Non-profit 
Deep Panda: Financial, Technology, Non-profit 
Foxy Panda: Technology & Communications 
Anchor Panda: Government organizations, Defense & 
Aerospace, Industrial Engineering, NGOs 
Impersonating Panda: Financial Sector 
Karma Panda: Dissident groups 
Keyhole Panda: Electronics & Communications 
Poisonous Panda: Energy Technology, G20, 
NGOs, Dissident Groups 
Putter Panda: Governmental & Military 
Toxic Panda: Dissident Groups 
Union Panda: Industrial companies 
Vixen Panda: Government 
IRAN 
INDIA 
Viceroy Tiger: Government, Legal, 
Financial, Media, Telecom 
NORTH KOREA 
Silent Chollima: 
Government, Military, 
Financial 
Magic Kitten: Dissidents 
Cutting Kitten: Energy Companies 
CRIMINAL 
Singing Spider: Commercial, Financial 
Union Spider: Manufacturing 
Andromeda Spider: Numerous 
Deadeye Jackal: Commercial, Financial, 
Media, Social Networking 
Ghost Jackal: Commercial, Energy, 
Financial 
Corsair Jackal: Commercial, Technology, 
Financial, Energy 
Extreme Jackal: Military, Government
PARCEL ISLANDS 
Disputed Territory 
• 16°40′N 112°20′E 
• Claimed by: 
– Vietnam (Hoàng Sa Archipelago) 
– Peoples Republic of China (Xisha Islands) 
– Taiwan 
• Originally occupied by French in 1938, 
the islands were taken by Japan and 
then China post World War II 
• In 1974 armed conflict saw the 
occupation of the islands by victorious 
PLA forces over ARVN. Unified 
Socialist Vietnam renewed claims 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 9
HAIYANG SHIYOU 981 
May 2, 2014 
• Owned by: CNOOC Group 
– Displacement: 30,670 tons 
– Length: 114 meters 
– Beam: 90 meters 
– Speed: 8 knots 
– Crew: 160 
• Mission: Evaluate potential for Oil 
Reserves 
• In theater 2 May – 16 Jul 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 10
CHINESE INTRUSION ACTIVITY 
May/June 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 11 
CHINESE INTRUSION ACTIVITY 
Increasing activity as conflict escalates
Increasing tensions and intrigue 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 12 
HD981 OPERATIONS MAY - JULY 
2 May 
HD981 
deployed 
near Parcel 
Islands 
26 May 
Vietnamese 
fishing boat 
sinks after 
confrontation 
with Chinese 
vessels 
June tensions 
continue to 
rise as HD981 
moves closer 
to Parcel 
Islands and 
conducts 
drilling 
16 July 
HD981 leaves 
the Parcel 
Islands in 
advance of 
typhoon 
season and 
to ‘review 
data’ from 
drilling 
operations
Mid June 2014 
• Sunni extremists from the ISIS begin 
advance on key Iraqi industrial city Baiji 
• 12 June, ISIS vehicles and personnel burn 
down courthouse and police station, and 
release prisoners from jail 
• 18 June ISIS insurgents begin attacking Baiji 
refinery the largest in Iraq, this has the 
capability to refine over 300,000 barrels of oil 
per day 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 13 
ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) 
Baiji
Top Oil Imports 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 14 
CHINA OIL AT RISK
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 15 
WHAT HAPPENED? 
THIS IS A STORY OF THE INCIDENT… 
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 16 
CASE STUDY: WEBSHELL ATTACK 
• Suspicious Logins Detected within Environment 
• Falcon Host Deployed to the Network with CSOC Monitoring 
– Deployment Time is now Hours not Days 
– The Cloud Allows Rapid Deployment and Increased Visibility 
• Not Dependent on Hardware 
• No Infrastructure to Standup 
• Visibility on Adversary Actions 
– Webshell Deployments and Usage 
– Usage of Sticky Keys 
– Usage of PowerShell with Custom Encryption
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 17 
CASE STUDY: WEBSHELL ATTACK 
• Watching the Adversary Change TTPs in Real-time 
– Uploading New Tools, Monitoring for Logons 
• Security Teams able to Respond within Minutes 
– Removal of Infected Machines 
– Memory Capture with Attacker Tools Running 
• Reduction in Incident Response Timing 
– Remediate Quicker 
– Reduce the Need for Deep Dive Forensics 
– Reduce the Cost of Incident Response 
• Continued Visibility Going Forward 
– Detections Allowing Security Teams to Prevent Attacker Foothold
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 18 
ADVERSARIES 
ADJUSTING TTPS 
Changes to Persistence 
• Moving from Workstations back to Servers 
• Reducing Footprint 
Forensic Evidence Reduction 
• Utilizing Memory for Execution, Compression, 
Exfiltration 
• Automated Cleanup Processes 
Simplified Toolsets and Communication 
Webshells 
• Compiled on the Fly, Direct to Memory 
• Utilize SSL Certificates on External Accessible Sites 
• Utilize Custom Encryption within Microsoft 
PowerShell
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 19 
SECURITY TEAMS 
MUST ADJUST 
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
New Detection Methods 
• Must be Realtime or Near-Realtime, Sweeping for 
IOCs is a Losing Proposition 
• Must Detect Credential Theft as it Happens 
• Must Capture Adversaries Commands as Forensics 
are Being Reduced 
Benefits of Detection Methods 
• Able to Respond Quicker 
• Reduce Exposure and Loss 
• Allow Security Teams to Adjust to Adversary TTPs on 
the Fly 
• Increasing Costs to the Adversary
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 20 
NOW WHAT? 
HOW DID WE DETECT AND ATTRIBUTE 
THIS MALWARE-FREE INTRUSION? 
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS 
FALCON HOST CORE COMPONENTS 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 21 
FALCON HOST TECH OVERVIEW 
CLOUD-BASED 
APPLICATION 
HOST-BASED 
DETECTION SENSOR 
DETECT: 
STATEFUL EXECUTION INSPECTION 
RECORD: 
ENDPOINT ACTIVITY MONITORING 
INTELLIGENCE: ATTRIBUTION ENGINE
REAL-TIME STATEFUL EXECUTION INSPECTION 
Email 
Received 
Process Silently 
Executed 
Executable 
Hides Itself From 
Task Manager 
Executable 
Call Out to 
the Internet 
Email Attachment 
Opened in 
Acrobat Reader 
Executable Saved in 
Windows/System32 
Folder 
Executable 
Modifies Windows 
Registry to Autostart 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 22
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 23 
LET’S TAKE A LOOK… 
ENDPOINT PROTECTION 
DEMO 
@CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
Q&A @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 
Please enter all questions 
in the Q&A panel of 
GoToWebinar 
For information on the CrowdStrike 
Falcon Platform or CrowdStrike Services, 
contact sales@crowdstrike.com 
Q&A 
2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 24
CrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas Attack

More Related Content

PDF
CrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing Intelligence
PDF
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
PDF
You Can't Stop The Breach Without Prevention And Detection
PDF
DEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORM
PDF
Hacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted Threats
PDF
Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns
PDF
Bear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence Operations
PDF
CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem
CrowdCast Monthly: Operationalizing Intelligence
CrowdCasts Monthly: Going Beyond the Indicator
You Can't Stop The Breach Without Prevention And Detection
DEFENDING AGAINST THREATS TARGETING THE MAC PLATFORM
Hacking Exposed Live: Mobile Targeted Threats
Cyber Security Extortion: Defending Against Digital Shakedowns
Bear Hunting: History and Attribution of Russian Intelligence Operations
CrowdCasts Monthly: You Have an Adversary Problem

What's hot (20)

PDF
Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint Security
PDF
How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike
PDF
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
PDF
CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...
PDF
Understanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop Them
PDF
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting
PDF
How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike
PPTX
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident Response
PPTX
Evolving Cybersecurity Threats
PDF
In search of unique behaviour
PDF
An Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware Outbreak
PDF
State of Endpoint Security: The Buyers Mindset
PDF
Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning
PPTX
Cyberextortion
PPTX
DevTalks 2021 Cloud Engineering @Crowdstrike
PDF
[CB19] Cyber Threat Landscape in Japan – Revealing Threat in the Shadow by C...
PDF
CSF18 - Guarding Against the Unknown - Rafael Narezzi
PDF
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
PDF
OFFENSIVE IDS
PDF
NTXISSACSC4 - Detecting and Catching the Bad Guys Using Deception
Cloud-Enabled: The Future of Endpoint Security
How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike
CrowdCasts Monthly: Mitigating Pass the Hash
CrowdStrike CrowdCast: Is Ransomware Morphing Beyond The Ability Of Standard ...
Understanding Fileless (or Non-Malware) Attacks and How to Stop Them
Proactive Threat Hunting: Game-Changing Endpoint Protection Beyond Alerting
How to Replace Your Legacy Antivirus Solution with CrowdStrike
CrowdStrike Webinar: Taking Dwell-Time Out of Incident Response
Evolving Cybersecurity Threats
In search of unique behaviour
An Inside Look At The WannaCry Ransomware Outbreak
State of Endpoint Security: The Buyers Mindset
Battling Unknown Malware with Machine Learning
Cyberextortion
DevTalks 2021 Cloud Engineering @Crowdstrike
[CB19] Cyber Threat Landscape in Japan – Revealing Threat in the Shadow by C...
CSF18 - Guarding Against the Unknown - Rafael Narezzi
Symantec Webinar | How to Detect Targeted Ransomware with MITRE ATT&CK
OFFENSIVE IDS
NTXISSACSC4 - Detecting and Catching the Bad Guys Using Deception
Ad

Viewers also liked (19)

PDF
Be Social. Use CrowdRE.
PDF
I/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of Bootkits
PDF
Java Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging Java
PDF
Venom
PDF
End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family
PDF
TOR... ALL THE THINGS
PDF
End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family Whitepaper
PPTX
BSides 2016 Presentation
PPTX
Hunting gh0st rat using memory forensics
PPTX
The Enemy Within: Stopping Advanced Attacks Against Local Users
PDF
IDAの脆弱性とBug Bounty by 千田 雅明
PPTX
Tracking Exploit Kits - Virus Bulletin 2016
ODP
Pycon Sec
PDF
Hunting For Exploit Kits
PPTX
Open source network forensics and advanced pcap analysis
PDF
TOR... ALL THE THINGS Whitepaper
PPTX
Open Source Malware Lab
PPTX
Tcpdump hunter
PDF
Security Analytics using ELK stack
Be Social. Use CrowdRE.
I/O, You Own: Regaining Control of Your Disk in the Presence of Bootkits
Java Journal & Pyresso: A Python-Based Framework for Debugging Java
Venom
End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family
TOR... ALL THE THINGS
End-to-End Analysis of a Domain Generating Algorithm Malware Family Whitepaper
BSides 2016 Presentation
Hunting gh0st rat using memory forensics
The Enemy Within: Stopping Advanced Attacks Against Local Users
IDAの脆弱性とBug Bounty by 千田 雅明
Tracking Exploit Kits - Virus Bulletin 2016
Pycon Sec
Hunting For Exploit Kits
Open source network forensics and advanced pcap analysis
TOR... ALL THE THINGS Whitepaper
Open Source Malware Lab
Tcpdump hunter
Security Analytics using ELK stack
Ad

Similar to CrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas Attack (20)

PPTX
Operationalizing Threat Intelligence to Battle Persistent Actors
PDF
Brian Isle: The Internet of Things: Manufacturing Panacea - or - Hacker's Dream?
PDF
Cyber as WMD- April 2015- GFSU
PDF
[CLASS 2014] Palestra Técnica - Fabio Rosa
PPTX
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by Downloads
PDF
Webinar: Why evasive zero day attacks are killing traditional sandboxing
PPTX
Year of pawnage - Ian trump
PDF
Cyber Resilience
PPT
Quant & Crypto Gold
PPT
Have the Bad Guys Won the Cyber security War...
PPTX
Retail Cyberthreat Summit: Insights and Strategies from Industry Experts
PPTX
Good Guys vs Bad Guys: Using Big Data to Counteract Advanced Threats
PPTX
SIEM Fundamentals-Session 1 presentations
PDF
Sqrrl 2.0 Launch Webinar
PPTX
CRI Retail Cyber Threats
PPTX
Threat Intelligence + SIEM: A Force to be Reckoned With
PDF
Cross Border Cyber Attacks: Impact on Digital Sovereignty
PDF
UMS Cybersecurity Awareness Seminar: Cybersecurity - Lessons learned from sec...
PPTX
Cybersecurity Critical Infrastructure Threats and Examples 2022- Presentation...
PDF
Webinar: Can a Light Bulb Really Pose a Security Threat? A Practical Look at ...
Operationalizing Threat Intelligence to Battle Persistent Actors
Brian Isle: The Internet of Things: Manufacturing Panacea - or - Hacker's Dream?
Cyber as WMD- April 2015- GFSU
[CLASS 2014] Palestra Técnica - Fabio Rosa
Stop Watering Holes, Spear-Phishing and Drive-by Downloads
Webinar: Why evasive zero day attacks are killing traditional sandboxing
Year of pawnage - Ian trump
Cyber Resilience
Quant & Crypto Gold
Have the Bad Guys Won the Cyber security War...
Retail Cyberthreat Summit: Insights and Strategies from Industry Experts
Good Guys vs Bad Guys: Using Big Data to Counteract Advanced Threats
SIEM Fundamentals-Session 1 presentations
Sqrrl 2.0 Launch Webinar
CRI Retail Cyber Threats
Threat Intelligence + SIEM: A Force to be Reckoned With
Cross Border Cyber Attacks: Impact on Digital Sovereignty
UMS Cybersecurity Awareness Seminar: Cybersecurity - Lessons learned from sec...
Cybersecurity Critical Infrastructure Threats and Examples 2022- Presentation...
Webinar: Can a Light Bulb Really Pose a Security Threat? A Practical Look at ...

Recently uploaded (20)

PDF
Mobile App Security Testing_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
PPTX
Digital-Transformation-Roadmap-for-Companies.pptx
PDF
Per capita expenditure prediction using model stacking based on satellite ima...
PDF
Encapsulation_ Review paper, used for researhc scholars
PDF
TokAI - TikTok AI Agent : The First AI Application That Analyzes 10,000+ Vira...
PPTX
20250228 LYD VKU AI Blended-Learning.pptx
PDF
Architecting across the Boundaries of two Complex Domains - Healthcare & Tech...
PDF
Bridging biosciences and deep learning for revolutionary discoveries: a compr...
PDF
Machine learning based COVID-19 study performance prediction
PDF
Spectral efficient network and resource selection model in 5G networks
PDF
Diabetes mellitus diagnosis method based random forest with bat algorithm
PPTX
PA Analog/Digital System: The Backbone of Modern Surveillance and Communication
PPTX
MYSQL Presentation for SQL database connectivity
PDF
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
PPTX
A Presentation on Artificial Intelligence
PPT
Teaching material agriculture food technology
PDF
Building Integrated photovoltaic BIPV_UPV.pdf
PPTX
Big Data Technologies - Introduction.pptx
PDF
Empathic Computing: Creating Shared Understanding
PDF
Review of recent advances in non-invasive hemoglobin estimation
Mobile App Security Testing_ A Comprehensive Guide.pdf
Digital-Transformation-Roadmap-for-Companies.pptx
Per capita expenditure prediction using model stacking based on satellite ima...
Encapsulation_ Review paper, used for researhc scholars
TokAI - TikTok AI Agent : The First AI Application That Analyzes 10,000+ Vira...
20250228 LYD VKU AI Blended-Learning.pptx
Architecting across the Boundaries of two Complex Domains - Healthcare & Tech...
Bridging biosciences and deep learning for revolutionary discoveries: a compr...
Machine learning based COVID-19 study performance prediction
Spectral efficient network and resource selection model in 5G networks
Diabetes mellitus diagnosis method based random forest with bat algorithm
PA Analog/Digital System: The Backbone of Modern Surveillance and Communication
MYSQL Presentation for SQL database connectivity
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
A Presentation on Artificial Intelligence
Teaching material agriculture food technology
Building Integrated photovoltaic BIPV_UPV.pdf
Big Data Technologies - Introduction.pptx
Empathic Computing: Creating Shared Understanding
Review of recent advances in non-invasive hemoglobin estimation

CrowdCasts Monthly: When Pandas Attack

  • 1. WHEN PANDAS ATTACK HOW TO DETECT, ATTRIBUTE, AND RESPOND TO MALWARE-FREE INTRUSIONS Dmitri Alperovitch - Chris Scott - Adam Meyers
  • 2. TODAY’S SPEAKERS 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 2 @DMITRICYBER @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS DMITRI ALPEROVITCH | CO-FOUNDER & CTO Dmitri Alperovitch is the Co-Founder and CTO of CrowdStrike. A renowned computer security researcher, he is a thought-leader on cybersecurity policies and state tradecraft. Prior to founding CrowdStrike, Dmitri was a Vice President of Threat Research at McAFee, where he led the company’s global internet threat intelligence analysis and investigations. In 2010 and 2011, Alperovitch led the global team that investigated and brought to light Operation Aurora, Night Dragon and Shady RAT groundbreaking cyberespionage intrusions, and gave thoses incidents their names.
  • 3. TODAY’S SPEAKERS 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 3 @NETOPSGURU @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS CHRIS SCOTT | DIRECTOR, SERVICES Christoper Scott has over 15 years of Fortune 500/DoD/DIB business proficiency, including more than 7 years of targeted threat detection and prevention expertise. As a Director at CrowdStrike Services, Christopher supports a variety of engagements that include: security reviews, incident response, data loss prevention, insider threat analysis and engineering threat detection systems, business continuity and disaster recovery processes. In addition, Christopher assists in building risk recognition systems and advancing the CrowdStrike Services practice.
  • 4. TODAY’S SPEAKERS 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 4 @ADAM_CYBER @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS ADAM MEYERS | VP, INTELLIGENCE Adam Meyers has over a decade of experience within the information security industry. He has authored numerous papers that have appeared at peer reviewed industry venues and has received awards for his dedication to the field. At CrowdStrike, Adam serves as the VP of Intelligence. Within this role it is Adam’s responsibility to oversee all of CrowdStrike’s intelligence gathering and cyber-adversarial monitoring activities. Adam’s Global Intelligence Team supports both the Product and Services divisions at CrowdStrike and Adam manages these endeavors and expectations.
  • 5. @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS ADVANCED ATTACKERS EVADE IOC-BASED DETECTION HOW CAN YOU FIND AN ATTACK WHEN THERE IS NO MALWARE, NO COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND NO FILE-BASED ARTIFACTS? 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 5
  • 6. REAL-WORLD CASE STUDIES 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 6
  • 7. @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 7 LET’S DIVE IN… WHO’S BEHIND THE ATTACK?
  • 8. UNCOVER THE ADVERSARY @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS RUSSIA Energetic Bear: Oil and Gas Companies HACTIVIST/TERRORIST 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 8 CHINA Comment Panda: Commercial, Government, Non-profit Deep Panda: Financial, Technology, Non-profit Foxy Panda: Technology & Communications Anchor Panda: Government organizations, Defense & Aerospace, Industrial Engineering, NGOs Impersonating Panda: Financial Sector Karma Panda: Dissident groups Keyhole Panda: Electronics & Communications Poisonous Panda: Energy Technology, G20, NGOs, Dissident Groups Putter Panda: Governmental & Military Toxic Panda: Dissident Groups Union Panda: Industrial companies Vixen Panda: Government IRAN INDIA Viceroy Tiger: Government, Legal, Financial, Media, Telecom NORTH KOREA Silent Chollima: Government, Military, Financial Magic Kitten: Dissidents Cutting Kitten: Energy Companies CRIMINAL Singing Spider: Commercial, Financial Union Spider: Manufacturing Andromeda Spider: Numerous Deadeye Jackal: Commercial, Financial, Media, Social Networking Ghost Jackal: Commercial, Energy, Financial Corsair Jackal: Commercial, Technology, Financial, Energy Extreme Jackal: Military, Government
  • 9. PARCEL ISLANDS Disputed Territory • 16°40′N 112°20′E • Claimed by: – Vietnam (Hoàng Sa Archipelago) – Peoples Republic of China (Xisha Islands) – Taiwan • Originally occupied by French in 1938, the islands were taken by Japan and then China post World War II • In 1974 armed conflict saw the occupation of the islands by victorious PLA forces over ARVN. Unified Socialist Vietnam renewed claims 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 9
  • 10. HAIYANG SHIYOU 981 May 2, 2014 • Owned by: CNOOC Group – Displacement: 30,670 tons – Length: 114 meters – Beam: 90 meters – Speed: 8 knots – Crew: 160 • Mission: Evaluate potential for Oil Reserves • In theater 2 May – 16 Jul 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 10
  • 11. CHINESE INTRUSION ACTIVITY May/June 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 11 CHINESE INTRUSION ACTIVITY Increasing activity as conflict escalates
  • 12. Increasing tensions and intrigue 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 12 HD981 OPERATIONS MAY - JULY 2 May HD981 deployed near Parcel Islands 26 May Vietnamese fishing boat sinks after confrontation with Chinese vessels June tensions continue to rise as HD981 moves closer to Parcel Islands and conducts drilling 16 July HD981 leaves the Parcel Islands in advance of typhoon season and to ‘review data’ from drilling operations
  • 13. Mid June 2014 • Sunni extremists from the ISIS begin advance on key Iraqi industrial city Baiji • 12 June, ISIS vehicles and personnel burn down courthouse and police station, and release prisoners from jail • 18 June ISIS insurgents begin attacking Baiji refinery the largest in Iraq, this has the capability to refine over 300,000 barrels of oil per day 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 13 ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) Baiji
  • 14. Top Oil Imports 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 14 CHINA OIL AT RISK
  • 15. 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 15 WHAT HAPPENED? THIS IS A STORY OF THE INCIDENT… @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
  • 16. 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 16 CASE STUDY: WEBSHELL ATTACK • Suspicious Logins Detected within Environment • Falcon Host Deployed to the Network with CSOC Monitoring – Deployment Time is now Hours not Days – The Cloud Allows Rapid Deployment and Increased Visibility • Not Dependent on Hardware • No Infrastructure to Standup • Visibility on Adversary Actions – Webshell Deployments and Usage – Usage of Sticky Keys – Usage of PowerShell with Custom Encryption
  • 17. 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 17 CASE STUDY: WEBSHELL ATTACK • Watching the Adversary Change TTPs in Real-time – Uploading New Tools, Monitoring for Logons • Security Teams able to Respond within Minutes – Removal of Infected Machines – Memory Capture with Attacker Tools Running • Reduction in Incident Response Timing – Remediate Quicker – Reduce the Need for Deep Dive Forensics – Reduce the Cost of Incident Response • Continued Visibility Going Forward – Detections Allowing Security Teams to Prevent Attacker Foothold
  • 18. @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 18 ADVERSARIES ADJUSTING TTPS Changes to Persistence • Moving from Workstations back to Servers • Reducing Footprint Forensic Evidence Reduction • Utilizing Memory for Execution, Compression, Exfiltration • Automated Cleanup Processes Simplified Toolsets and Communication Webshells • Compiled on the Fly, Direct to Memory • Utilize SSL Certificates on External Accessible Sites • Utilize Custom Encryption within Microsoft PowerShell
  • 19. 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 19 SECURITY TEAMS MUST ADJUST @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS New Detection Methods • Must be Realtime or Near-Realtime, Sweeping for IOCs is a Losing Proposition • Must Detect Credential Theft as it Happens • Must Capture Adversaries Commands as Forensics are Being Reduced Benefits of Detection Methods • Able to Respond Quicker • Reduce Exposure and Loss • Allow Security Teams to Adjust to Adversary TTPs on the Fly • Increasing Costs to the Adversary
  • 20. 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 20 NOW WHAT? HOW DID WE DETECT AND ATTRIBUTE THIS MALWARE-FREE INTRUSION? @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
  • 21. TECHNOLOGY COMPONENTS FALCON HOST CORE COMPONENTS 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 21 FALCON HOST TECH OVERVIEW CLOUD-BASED APPLICATION HOST-BASED DETECTION SENSOR DETECT: STATEFUL EXECUTION INSPECTION RECORD: ENDPOINT ACTIVITY MONITORING INTELLIGENCE: ATTRIBUTION ENGINE
  • 22. REAL-TIME STATEFUL EXECUTION INSPECTION Email Received Process Silently Executed Executable Hides Itself From Task Manager Executable Call Out to the Internet Email Attachment Opened in Acrobat Reader Executable Saved in Windows/System32 Folder Executable Modifies Windows Registry to Autostart 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 22
  • 23. 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 23 LET’S TAKE A LOOK… ENDPOINT PROTECTION DEMO @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS
  • 24. Q&A @CROWDSTRIKE | #CROWDCASTS Please enter all questions in the Q&A panel of GoToWebinar For information on the CrowdStrike Falcon Platform or CrowdStrike Services, contact sales@crowdstrike.com Q&A 2014 CrowdStrike, Inc. All rights reserved. 24