Deterrence .pptx
- 1. EVOLUTION AND DIMENSION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGYAND DETERRENCE THEORY Instructor: Dr Kalim Ullah kalimullah@ndu.edu.pk
- 2. The concept of deterrence • the act or process of deterring • the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.
- 3. Example of deterrence • First, by increasing the certainty of punishment, potential offenders may be deterred by the risk of apprehension. For example, if there is an increase in the number of state troopers patrolling highways on a holiday weekend, some drivers may reduce their speed in order to avoid receiving a ticket.
- 4. 3 elements of deterrence • In the criminal deterrence literature, three elements, combined, produce an expected cost of punishment: • the probability of arrest, • the probability of conviction, • and the severity of punishment.
- 5. Difference between deterrence and compellence • Deterrence is conservative: it seeks to protect the status quo. It is also, like defense, essentially a waiting game: • the opponent has to move before a reaction is triggered. Compellence aims to persuade the opponent to change his behavior. • Compellence involves the use of military force, • while deterrence involves only nonmilitary measures.
- 6. Is deterrence a defense? • Deterrence has always been the first line of defense. Preventing conflict, when possible, is greater than engaging, • said the secretary of defense. • "The cornerstone of America's defense is still deterrence, ensuring that our adversaries understand the folly of outright conflict," Secretary of Defense Lloyd J.
- 7. How does NATO use deterrence? • NATO's first strategic concept also introduced a second pillar of deterrence: deterrence by denial through positioning adequate forces to defend allied territory against invasion. In other words: if you want peace, prepare for war. • NATO's first Strategic Concept • The document stated that the primary function of NATO was to deter aggression and that NATO forces would only be engaged if this primary function failed and an attack was launched. Complementarity between members and standardization were also key elements of this draft.
- 8. Is NATO a deterrent to Russia? • Before Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, there were no Allied troops in the eastern part of the Alliance. In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO has significantly reinforced its deterrence and defence posture, including with four new battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance.
- 9. Can NATO stop nuclear weapons? • Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence, alongside conventional and missile defence forces. NATO is committed to arms control, disarmament and non- proliferation, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance.
- 10. Deterrence as a distinct subfield of study • Deterrence as a distinct subfield of study recently celebrated its seventy-fifth birthday. Over the past three- quarters of a century, it has co-evolved with changing strategic conditions to address the pressing strategic challenges of the day. • In the third decade of the twenty-first century, its use continues to confuse strategists even if its efficacy under different conditions has not always been firmly established. • That is why we need to continue studying.
- 11. • In a 2012 article, Patrick Morgan attempted to take stock of deterrence, in theory and practice, to assess where it is now and where it might be headed in security affairs’. • Morgan observed the cooperative nature of the relations between leading powers and observed how they had ‘remained relatively cooperative and remarkably free of profound security concerns’. • As a result, deterrence had become ‘less central and salient’, especially in the nuclear realm with nuclear weapons having been ‘downgraded by most nuclear powers to residual functions, primarily hedging against the possible return of serious conflicts.’
- 12. • At the same time the principal remaining threats, according to Morgan, were failed, weak, and rogue states alongside non-state actors. As a result, deterrence had become much more complicated and difficult to achieve. • It had become more of a ‘tactical resource’ than a fundamental building block of a more general security strategy. • Deterrence was also affected by other developments, both technological and ideological. Increased precision in long-range weapons on the one hand, and the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with conventional warheads on the other, alongside the parallel emergence of strategic cyberattack capabilities, posed a considerable challenge to deterrence stability.
- 13. • Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner edited a timely study on the nexus of deterrence and terrorism, • Lukas Kello published a great analysis on the impact of cyber capabilities on international order, • Kelly Greenhill and Peter Krause addressed a range of topics also highlighted by Morgan in their volume Coercion, The Power to Hurt, • and Eric Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay have analyzed the dynamics of deterrence across traditional and new domains. • More recently think tanks and research institutes have produced a stream of more policy-oriented studies analyzing deterrence in the context of hybrid conflict and gray zone competition.
- 14. Deterrence look like in the twenty-first century • Ten years after Morgan, the use and utility of deterrence in today’s strategic environment, therefore, continues to be a topic of paramount concern to scholars, strategists, and policymakers. Because of a combination of military-strategic, technological, and social–political developments, contemporary conflict actors exploit a wider gamut of coercive instruments which they apply across a wider range of domains for strategic gain. • These encompass both nuclear and conventional military instruments, but also include non-military instruments of state power that are deployed in grey zone conflicts under the threshold of military violence. • The grey-zone (also grey zone, gray zone, and gray-zone) describes the space in between peace and war in which state and non-state actors engage in competition.
- 15. what does effective deterrence look like in the twenty-first century? • Answering that question requires a re-appraisal of key theoretical concepts and dominant strategies of the deterrence literature in order to assess how they hold up in today’s world.
- 16. Four waves in deterrence research • The second article that this volume takes as a point of departure is Jeffrey Knopf’s article of 2010 in which he usefully distinguishes between four waves in deterrence research. • The initial wave of deterrence theorizing appeared after the Second World War prompted by the need to respond to a real- world problem—the invention of the atom bomb. • The second wave came in the late 1950s and 1960s was dominated by formal theorems that sprang from deductive reasoning and game theory. • Starting in the 1960s but really taking off in the 1970s, the third wave used statistical and case-study methods to empirically test deterrence theory. The case-study literature also challenged rational actor assumptions employed in second- wave deterrence theory.
- 17. • Following the end of the Cold War, forth wave emerged that focused on asymmetric deterrence especially in the context of the question how to deter so called rogue states and their leaders, and, post 9/11, terrorist groups. • Core concepts and assumptions concerning the role of credibility and reputation were reassessed in light of real world deterrence cases between Western states and political leaders such as Milosevic, Ghaddafi, and Saddam Hussein. • Studies suggested that deterrence outside of the realm of nuclear peer-competition involving threats with conventional weapons in situations in which relative limited vital interests were at stake, is distinctly more complex and dynamic than traditional first and second wave assumed. • Overall these four waves were partly reflective of the strategic issues of the day and partly of the dominant methodological orientation of the field.
- 18. Fifth wave of deterrence • Our course surveys the current state of the field to examine whether a fifth wave of deterrence theory is emerging—both in the Western world but also outside of it—to address the pressing strategic challenges of today.
- 19. Concepts of Deterrence: Historical, Conceptual, Conventional, Nuclear, Extended, Cross-domain • Our course is thematically structured. Following an elegant overview of the evolution of deterrence strategy and research by Sir Lawrence Freedman that concludes with a warning not to over-estimate what deterrence can be expected to achieve, initial classes explore our understanding of familiar deterrence concepts, assumptions, and strategies.
- 20. Non-Western Concepts of Deterrence • Later we will cover fascinating panorama of the ways in which deterrence is conceptualized and operationalized in different strategic cultures. • Russian and Chinese conceptualizations of deterrence look dramatically different from their Western equivalents, which may translate into dramatic misunderstandings in the real world.
- 21. Deterrence of Non-State Actors • In third phase we will examine deterrence against non- state actors. • Eitan Shamir provided an overview of various deterrence strategies against violent non-state actors and analyzes how these have been employed by Israel. • Once again, like previous section, his argument forces us to acknowledge the limits of classical Western Cold War conceptualizations of absolute deterrence.
- 22. New Instruments and Domains of Deterrence • New technologies and instruments are the subjects of our last quarter. • Francesco Giumelli very informatively brings together the sanctions and deterrence literature. Sanctions often precede and accompany deterrent efforts with military threats, yet they are generally ill-understood in terms of what the aims of sanctions are, and what is to be expected of them. • Giumelli details how the use of sanctions has evolved since the 1990s from comprehensive sanctions to targeted sanctions both to mitigate the humanitarian suffering associated with comprehensive sanctions and to • be more effective in coercing target actors.
- 23. Conclusion: Insights from Theory and Practice • The conclusion synthesizes key insights that have emerged from the different contributions, evaluates their relevance to deterrence theory and practice, and considers to what extent research and current strategic issues give credence to the notion that a fifth wave is emerging. • On that basis, this course offers an appraisal of contemporary deterrence thinking and it outlines avenues for future research going forward.