Global terrorism index report 2014

2014
MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING
THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

QUANTIFYING PEACE AND ITS BENEFITS
The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the
world’s focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.
IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring
peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better
understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.
IEP has offices in Sydney, New York and Oxford. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates
with intergovernmental organizations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.
For more information visit www.economicsandpeace.org
SPECIAL THANKS to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
headquartered at the University of Maryland for their cooperation on this study and for providing the Institute for
Economics and Peace with their Global Terrorism Database (GTD) datasets on terrorism.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2014
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2
ABOUT THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 8
RESULTS 12
Global Terrorism Index Map 8
Terrorist Incidents Map 10
Global Levels of Terrorism 12
Ten Countries Most Impacted by Terrorism 15
TRENDS 26
Largest Increases and Decreases in Terrorism, 2012 to 2013 26
Patterns and Characteristics of Terrorist Activity since 2000 29
Trends and Patterns of Suicide Attacks 32
Terrorism in the OECD 35
ASSESSING TERRORISM RISK 38
Terrorism in Countries with Ongoing Conflict 40
Terrorism in Countries without Ongoing Conflict 40
'Black Swan' Attacks 42
Economic Costs of Terrorism 45
TERRORIST GROUP CASE STUDIES 48
Comparing Terrorist Organisations 50
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 52
Boko Haram 53
Al-Qa’ida 54
Taliban 55
CORRELATES OF TERRORISM 59
Global Terrorism Index vs. Global Peace Index 60
Multivariate Analysis 63
EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS 64
Larry Attree, Saferworld & David Keen, London School of Economics
Envisaging more Constructive Alternatives to the Counter-Terror Paradigm 64
Henry Dodd & Steven Smith, Action on Armed Violence
Anatomy of a Suicide Bombing 69
Ekaterina Stepanova, Institute of World Economy & International Relations
Transnational Islamist Terrorism 74
Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Nuclear Nightmares 79
APPENDICES 82
Appendix A: GTI Ranks and Scores, 2014 82
Appendix B: 50 Worst Terrorist Attacks, 2013 84
Appendix C: Global Terrorism Index Methodology 85
Appendix D: Verifying the Increase in Terrorism from 2011 to 2012 87
Endnotes 90
1

OTHER PUBLICATIONS FROM
THE INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE
2014 Global Peace Index Report
Institute for Economics and Peace
– February 2014
The 2014 GPI Report analyses the
state of peace around the world and
identifies countries most at risk of
becoming less peaceful.
The Economic Cost of
Violence Containment
– February 2014
A new methodology that calculates
the cost of preventing and containing
violence in over 150 countries.
Mexico Peace Index
– November 2013
The Mexico Peace Index measures the
state of peace in all 32 Mexican states
analysing trends and drivers of peace
over the last ten years.
Pillars of Peace
– September 2013
Pillars of Peace is a new conceptual
framework for understanding and
describing the factors that create a
peaceful society.
Global Peace Index 2013
– June 2013
The 2013 GPI Report analyses the
state of peace around the world,
identifying trends in violence and
conflict, as well as the key drivers
of peace.
GLOBAL PEACE INDEX 2013 /01/ RESULTS, FINDINGS & METHODOLOGY
1
GLOBAL
PEACE
INDEX
2013
MEASURING THE STATE OF GLOBAL PEACE
United Kingdom Peace Index 2013
Institute for Economic and Peace
– April 2013
The UK Peace Index report analyses
the fabric of peace in the UK over
the last decade and has found that
since 2003 the UK has become more
peaceful.
Global Terrorism Index 2012
Institute for Economic and Peace –
December 2012
The Global Terrorism Index is the
first index to systematically rank and
compare 158 countries according to
the impact of terrorism.
Violence Containment Spending
in the United States
– September 2012
Violence Containment Spending
provides a new methodology to
categorise and account for the
public and private expenditure on
containing violence.
Global Peace Index 2012
– June 2012
The Global Peace Index is the world’s
preeminent measure of peacefulness.
This is the 6th edition of the Global
Peace Index.
United States Peace Index 2012
– April 2012
The 2012 United States Peace Index
has found that the U.S. is more
peaceful now than at any other time
over the last twenty years.
Economic Consequences of War
on the U.S. Economy
– February 2012
The Economic Consequences of
War on the U.S. Economy analyses
the macroeconomic effects of U.S.
government spending on wars
since World War II.
Measuring Peace in the Media 2011
Institute for Economics and Peace and
Media Tenor – January 2012
For the second year, IEP and Media
Tenor have jointly analysed global
television networks’ coverage of
peace and violence issues; it covers
over 160,000 news items from 31 news
and current affairs programs that air
on four continents.
Available for download at www.economicsandpeace.org

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This is the second edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
report which provides a comprehensive summary of the key
global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 14 years
beginning in 2000 and ending in 2013.
Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP),
the GTI is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) which is collected and collated by the National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START). The GTD is considered to be the most
comprehensive dataset on terrorist activity globally and has
codified over 125,000 terrorist incidents.
The report summarises trends in terrorism over time and
analyses its changing patterns in terms of geographic
activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the
national economic and political context. The index has also
been compared to a range of socio-economic indicators to
determine the key factors most closely associated with
terrorism.
In 2013 terrorist activity increased substantially with the total
number of deaths rising from 11,133 in 2012 to 17,958 in 2013,
a 61 per cent increase. Over the same period, the number of
countries that experienced more than 50 deaths rose from
15 to 24. This highlights that not only is the intensity of
terrorism increasing, its breadth is increasing as well.
Terrorism is both highly concentrated as well as a globally
distributed phenomenon. Over 80 per cent of the lives lost
to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in only five countries -
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. However,
another 55 countries recorded one or more deaths from
terrorist activity.
Since 2000 there has been over a five-fold increase in the
number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,361 in 2000
to 17,958 in 2013. However for four years, starting in 2007,
there had been modest decreases in terrorist deaths and
also a slight decrease in the number of countries
experiencing greater than 50 deaths from terrorism per
annum. The latest jump in terrorist activity coincided with
the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.
The threat of terrorist activity is a major if not the major
national security risk for many countries. The recent rise of
ultra-violent groups such as ISIL in Syria and Iraq is
underpinned by greater territorial ambitions in the Levant
which include the countries of Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan,
Palestine, as well as Southern Turkey, thereby increasing the
risk of further destabilisation in the Middle East region.
The majority of claimed deaths from terrorist attacks, 66 per
cent in 2013, are claimed by only four terrorist organisations;
ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida and its affiliates.
Variations of religious ideologies based on extreme
interpretations of Wahhabi Islam are the key commonality
for all four groups; however their strategic goals are not
necessarily the same. To counteract the rise of religious
extremism, moderate Sunni theologies need to be cultivated
by credible forces within Islam. The current political context
underscores the importance of moderate Sunni countries
SINCE 2000 THERE HAS
BEEN OVER A FIVE-FOLD
INCREASE IN THE
NUMBER OF PEOPLE
KILLED BY TERRORISM.
82% KILLED IN TERRORIST
ATTACKS WERE IN
JUST FIVE COUNTRIES:
IRAQ
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
NIGERIA
SYRIA
2

and not outside influences leading such a response. One
such example was the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim
Societies led by Shaykh Abdallah Bin Bayyah in March 2014
which brought together 250 Islamic scholars to promote a
unified peaceful response to the current violence issuing a
Fatwa in response to ISIL.
Religious ideology as the motivation for terrorism is only
partly a global phenomenon. While it is predominant in
Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and South Asia, in the rest of the
world terrorism is more likely to be driven by political or
nationalistic and separatist movements. These forms of
terrorism have remained fairly constant over the last 14 years
and are still substantial.
While drivers of terrorist activity are often complex and
multidimensional, there are several generalised and
significant socio-economic correlates of terrorism. Countries
with higher levels of terrorism were found to have three
statistically significant factors:
Greater social hostilities between different ethnic,
religious and linguistic groups, lack of intergroup
cohesion and high levels of group grievances.
Presence of state sponsored violence such as extrajudicial
killings, political terror and gross human rights abuses.
Higher levels of other forms of violence including deaths
from organised conflict, likelihood of violent
demonstrations, levels of violent crime and perceptions of
criminality.
Importantly, poverty and many other economic factors have
little explanatory power on the onset of terrorism. This
includes several broader development factors such as mean
years of schooling and life expectancy. This underpins the
fact that weak political systems, a lack of political legitimacy
and the presence of state-sponsored violence are more
influential for explaining the rise of terrorist organisations
than the broader economic environment.
The strong relationship between terrorism and other forms
of violence underlines how the persistent targeting of police
forces and instability generated by terrorist activity can
undermine the rule of law and lead to increases in other
forms of violence.
There are many peaceful Muslim majority countries that do
not suffer from terrorism such as Qatar, the U.A.E. and
Kuwait, underscoring how there are other social, political
and geopolitical factors at play other than religion in
breeding terrorist activity.
The findings in this report are also helpful in providing
guidance for assessing the risk of future terrorist attacks in
countries where there are currently low levels of activity. By
measuring and comparing various political, social and
violence indicators, countries at risk of a substantial increase
in terrorism can be identified. This report has highlighted 13
countries as being at risk. These countries are Angola,
Bangladesh, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire,
Ethiopia, Iran, Israel, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and
Uganda.
The two most successful strategies for ending terrorist
groups since the late 1960s have been either policing or the
initiation of a political process. These strategies were the
main reason for the ending of over 80 per cent of terrorist
organisations that ceased operation. Only ten per cent of
terrorist groups could be said to have achieved their goals
and only seven per cent were eliminated by full military
engagement.
Over the last 14 years five per cent of all terrorist deaths
have occurred in OECD countries. Excluding the United
States on September 11, Turkey and Israel experienced the
highest number of deaths. There were eight OECD countries
that experienced deadly attacks in 2013, this compares to 20
OECD countries which have had deadly attacks since 2000.
Although terrorism is on the increase and a major concern
compared to other forms of violence, it is relatively small
when compared to the 437,000 people killed by homicides
in 2012, this being 40 times greater.
The findings of this report emphasise the increasing intensity
and spread of terrorist activity globally and highlight the key
underlying factors that give rise to terrorism. Short term
counter-terrorism and policing strategies can often be
critical to prevent the potential of large and unexpected acts
of mass violence; however, longer term approaches are
essential. These longer term priorities include the need to
address group grievances, ending gross physical rights
abuses by the state and improving access to justice and the
rule of law. Extremist Islamic movements that encourage the
use of terrorism need to be counteracted with moderate
theologies within Islam that advocate other non-violent
methods of addressing legitimate political grievances.
3

Correlates of terrorism
From thousands of socio-economic, governance
and attitudinal variables analysed, three
groupings of indicators show a multivariate
significant relationship with the GTI:
—Political stability
—Intergroup cohesion
—Legitimacy of the state
There is no systematic link to poverty measures,
nor to several broader economic development
factors such as the Human Development Index or
its subcomponents such as mean years of
schooling, or life expectancy. Similarly economic
indicators such as year to year GDP growth do not
correlate.
Trade as a percentage of GDP is the only
economic indicator to show moderate
correlation at R= -0.40.
Tactics and patterns
The primary target of terrorism has consistently
been private property and citizens.
60 per cent of all attacks involve the use of
explosives, 30 per cent use firearms and 10 per
cent used other tactics including incendiary
devices, melee attacks and sabotage of
equipment.
Religion as a driving ideology for terrorism has
dramatically increased since 2000. Prior to 2000
nationalist separatist agendas were the biggest
drivers of terrorist organisations.
Political and national separatist movements are
still significant in 2013 but have seen little change
over the 14 year period.
Explosives accounted for the majority of attacks,
while suicide bombings accounted for less than
five per cent of all terrorist attacks since 2000.
Risk of terrorism
IEP has identified the following 13 countries as
being at risk of increased terrorist activity from
current levels:
—Angola
—Israel
—Bangladesh
—Mali
—Burundi
—Mexico
—Central African Republic
—Myanmar
—Cote d’Ivoire
—Sri Lanka
—Ethiopia
—Uganda
—Iran
Putting terrorism in context
Around five per cent of all the 107,000 terrorist
fatalities since 2000 have occurred in OECD
countries.
Homicide claims 40 times more people globally
than terrorism with 437,000 lives lost due to
homicide in 2012, compared to 11,000 terrorist
deaths in 2012.
Approximately 50 per cent of terrorist attacks
claim no lives.
The long term indirect costs of terrorism can be 10
to 20 times larger than the direct costs.
Key trends
In 2013 more than 80 per cent of the lives lost to
terrorism occurred in only five countries; Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria.
The largest year-on-year increase in deaths from
terrorism was recorded between 2012 and 2013
increasing from 11,133 to 17,958.
102 of 162 countries covered in this study
experienced no deaths from terrorism in 2013,
while 60 countries recorded one or more deaths
from terrorism.
87 countries experienced a terrorist incident in
2013, slightly up from 81 in 2012.
The number of countries experiencing over 50
deaths in one year hit an all-time high in 2013 at
24, five greater than the previous high of 19
countries in 2008.
4

The Results Section summarises overall trends in terrorism
and includes detailed country profiles for the ten countries
with the highest levels of terrorist activity in 2013. These
countries experienced 90 per cent of global terrorist
activity. This section also provides an overview of the
global trends in terrorism and details the significant
increases since 2000.
The Trends Section highlights the countries that have had
the largest improvements and deteriorations in terrorist
activity and maps in detail the patterns and characteristics
of terrorist activity in terms of its targets, weapons used
and ideological drivers. This section includes a brief
statistical summary of the patterns and prevalence of
suicide attacks as a terrorist tactic, trends in terrorist
activity among OECD countries, and also compares this to
other forms of violent activity. The key terrorist actors
operating in OECD nations are also mapped and
summarised.
The Risk Section assesses the risk of countries
experiencing high levels of terrorism. The research utilises
GTI data and other existing datasets to statistically analyse
the future likelihood of terrorist activity based on an
analysis of the socio-economic conditions most closely
associated with terrorism. A brief literature review assesses
the economic costs of terrorism and the potential direct
and indirect costs as well as an analysis of the effects of
terrorism on foreign direct investment.
The Terrorist Group Case Studies Section focuses on the
four major terrorist groups covering their ideology, history,
capacity and resources with key networks described as
well. The numbers of foreign fighters from several OECD
countries and the Middle East are outlined based on
existing research highlighting both high and low estimates.
This section also references existing research on how
terrorist groups end and the tactics and strategies that
have been successful for addressing this form of violence
in the past.
The Correlates of Terrorism Section uses multivariate
statistical analysis and other statistical techniques to
derive the key socio-economic correlations associated with
terrorism and to better understand the factors most
closely associated with terrorist environments.
The Expert Contributions Section includes four essays
from leading academics and applied researchers in the
fields of development, public policy, peace and conflict
and terrorism studies.
Larry Attree from Saferworld and David Keen from the
London School of Economics, outline a series of counter-terrorism
approaches that should be scaled back and
present six constructive alternatives that could help
reverse the alarming rise in global terrorism.
Henry Dodd and Steve Smith from Action on Armed
Violence, provide an important contribution from another
perspective to the research provided in this report.
They detail the horrific human impact of a single suicide
attack in a Pakistan marketplace in 2009, contextualising
the broader physical, psychological and financial
consequences of this form of violence.
Ekaterina Stepanova from the Institute of World Economy
International Relations, outlines a shift in two main
trends, the broader network fragmentation of the global
jihadi movement and shift from top-down to bottom-up
regionalization of violent Islamic groups. She also tracks
the complex evolution of ISIL as a regional force in the
Middle East, and what its continued growth means for the
world and region.
Finally, Samantha Pitts-Kiefer from the Nuclear Threat
Initiative, outlines the history and current reality of a
nuclear terrorist threat, suggesting approaches for
strengthening global nuclear security, highlighting the
urgent need to improve global nuclear security.
ABOUT THE REPORT
5

ABOUT THE GLOBAL
TERRORISM INDEX
The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) is a comprehensive study
that accounts for the direct and indirect impact of
terrorism in 162 countries in terms of lives lost, injuries,
property damage and the psychological after-effects of
terrorism. This study covers 99.6 per cent of the world’s
population.
It aggregates the most authoritative data source on
terrorism today, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into
a composite score in order to provide an ordinal ranking
of nations on the negative impact of terrorism. The GTD is
unique in that it consists of systematically and
comprehensively coded data on domestic as well as
international terrorist incidents and now includes more
than 125,000 cases.
Given the resources committed to counter-terrorism
efforts internationally, it is important to analyse and
aggregate available data related to terrorism to better
understand its various properties such as:
The differing socio-economic conditions under which it
occurs.
The geopolitical drivers associated with terrorism and
ideological aims of terrorists groups.
The types of strategies deployed, tactical terrorist
targets and how these evolve over time.
In this context, one of the key aims of the GTI is to
examine these trends to help inform a positive and
practical debate about the future of terrorism and the
required policy responses.
The GTI was developed in consultation with the GPI
Expert Panel, and in particular with the advice of Expert
Panel member and terrorism expert Dr Ekaterina
Stepanova, Head of the Peace and Conflict Studies Unit at
the Institute of World Economy International Relations.
Defining terrorism is not a straightforward matter. There is
no single internationally accepted definition of what
constitutes terrorism, and the terrorism literature abounds
with competing definitions and typologies. IEP accepts
the terminology and definitions agreed to by the authors
of the GTD, the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
researchers and its advisory panel. The GTI therefore
defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of
illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear,
coercion, or intimidation.” This definition recognises that
terrorism is not only the physical act of an attack, but also
the psychological impact it has on a society for many
years after.
In order to be included as an incident in the GTD the act
has to be: “an intentional act of violence or threat of
violence by a non-state actor.” This means an incident has
to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a
terrorist act:
6

THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX IS A COMPREHENSIVE
STUDY THAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT
IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN 162 COUNTRIES IN TERMS OF
LIVES LOST, INJURIES, PROPERTY DAMAGE AND THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL AFTER-EFFECTS OF TERRORISM.
THIS STUDY COVERS 99.6 PER CENT OF THE
WORLD’S POPULATION.
1. The incident must be intentional – the result of a
conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
2. The incident must entail some level of violence or
threat of violence — including property violence, as well
as violence against people.
3. The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national
actors. This database does not include acts of
state terrorism.
In addition to this baseline definition, two of the following
three criteria have to be met in order to be included in the
START database from 1997:
The violent act was aimed at attaining a political,
economic, religious, or social goal.
The violent act included evidence of an intention to
coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a
larger audience (or audiences) other than the
immediate victims.
The violent act was outside the precepts of
international humanitarian law.
In cases where there is insufficient information to make a
definitive distinction about whether it is a terrorist
incident within the confines of the definition, the database
codes these incidents as ‘doubt terrorism proper’. In
order to only count unambiguous incidents of terrorism,
the GTI does not include doubted incidents.
It is important to understand how incidents are counted.
According to the GTD codebook: “incidents occurring in
both the same geographic and temporal point will be
regarded as a single incident, but if either the time of the
occurrence of the incidents or their locations are
discontinuous, the events will be regarded as separate
incidents.” Illustrative examples from the GTD codebook
are as follows:1
Four truck bombs explode nearly simultaneously in
different parts of a major city. This represents four
incidents.
A bomb goes off, and while police are working on the
scene the next day, they are attacked by terrorists with
automatic weapons. These are two separate incidents,
as they were not continuous, given the time lag
between the two events.
A group of militants shoot and kill five guards at a
perimeter checkpoint of a petroleum refinery and then
proceeds to set explosives and destroy the refinery.
This is one incident since it occurred in a single location
(the petroleum refinery) and was one continuous event.
A group of hijackers diverts a plane to Senegal and,
while at an airport in Senegal, shoots two Senegalese
policemen. This is one incident, since the hijacking was
still in progress at the time of the shooting and hence
the two events occurred at the same time and in the
same place.
7

1 Iraq 10
2 Afghanistan 9.39
3 Pakistan 9.37
4 Nigeria 8.58
5 Syria 8.12
6 India 7.86
7 Somalia 7.41
8 Yemen 7.31
9 Philippines 7.29
10 Thailand 7.19
11 Russia 6.76
12 Kenya 6.58
13 Egypt 6.5
14 Lebanon 6.4
15 Libya 6.25
16 Colombia 6.24
17 Turkey 5.98
18 Democratic Republic of the Congo 5.9
19 Sudan 5.77
20 South Sudan 5.6
21 Algeria 5.52
22 Mali 5.29
23 Bangladesh 5.25
24 Nepal 5.23
25 China 5.21
26 Central African Republic 5.19
27 United Kingdom 5.17
28 Iran 4.9
29 Greece 4.73
30 United States 4.71
31 Indonesia 4.67
32 Israel 4.66
32 Mexico 4.66
34 Bahrain 4.41
35 Myanmar 4.24
36 Mozambique 4.01
36 Sri Lanka 4.01
38 Rwanda 4
39 Burundi 3.97
40 Cote d’Ivoire 3.76
41 Tanzania 3.71
42 Ethiopia 3.7
43 Paraguay 3.63
44 Norway 3.57
45 Senegal 3.55
46 Tunisia 3.29
47 Ireland 3.09
48 Malaysia 3.04
48 South Africa 3.04
50 Peru 2.96
51 Ukraine 2.95
52 Uganda 2.93
53 Belarus 2.85
54 Kosovo 2.73
55 Saudi Arabia 2.71
56 France 2.67
10
8
6
4
57 Guatemala 2.61
58 Chile 2.59
58 Niger 2.59
60 Bulgaria 2.58
60 Georgia 2.58
62 Italy 2.55
63 Eritrea 2.45
64 Honduras 2.38
65 Kazakhstan 2.37
66 Cyprus 2.3
67 Morocco 2.11
68 Tajikistan 1.99
69 Spain 1.84
70 Jordan 1.76
71 Argentina 1.73
72 Brazil 1.72
73 Republic of the Congo 1.59
74 Trinidad and Tobago 1.54
75 Cameroon 1.45
75 Macedonia (FYR) 1.45
77 Switzerland 1.34
78 Madagascar 1.26
79 Ecuador 1.18
80 Zimbabwe 1.16
81 Guinea 1.12
82 Sweden 1.07
83 Germany 1.02
84 Canada 0.95
RANK COUNTRY SCORE
.01
0
Highest impact
of terrorism
Lowest impact
of terrorism
No impact of
terrorism
2
No records
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
INDEX 2014
8

85 Czech Republic 0.81
86 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.76
87 Burkina Faso 0.7
87 Montenegro 0.7
89 Netherlands 0.58
89 Serbia 0.58
91 Mauritania 0.56
92 Venezuela 0.54
93 Belgium 0.53
94 Dominican Republic 0.47
95 Angola 0.41
95 Australia 0.41
97 Guinea-Bissau 0.35
98 Cambodia 0.31
98 Taiwan 0.31
100 United Arab Emirates 0.29
101 Moldova 0.28
102 Armenia 0.27
103 Austria 0.24
103 Bolivia 0.24
105 Croatia 0.23
105 Portugal 0.23
107 Albania 0.19
107 Denmark 0.19
109 Bhutan 0.16
109 Estonia 0.16
111 Uzbekistan 0.14
112 Kyrgyzstan 0.1
113 Iceland 0.08
113 Laos 0.08
113 Liberia 0.08
116 Hungary 0.07
117 Azerbaijan 0.06
118 Chad 0.05
119 Kuwait 0.04
119 Panama 0.04
121 Equatorial Guinea 0.01
121 Japan 0.01
121 Lesotho 0.01
124 Benin 0
124 Botswana 0
124 Costa Rica 0
124 Cuba 0
124 Djibouti 0
124 El Salvador 0
124 Finland 0
124 Gabon 0
124 Gambia 0
124 Ghana 0
124 Guyana 0
124 Haiti 0
124 Jamaica 0
124 Latvia 0
124 Lithuania 0
124 Malawi 0
124 Mauritius 0
10
8
6
4
124 Mongolia 0
124 Namibia 0
124 New Zealand 0
124 Nicaragua 0
124 North Korea 0
124 Oman 0
124 Papua New Guinea 0
124 Poland 0
124 Qatar 0
124 Romania 0
124 Sierra Leone 0
124 Singapore 0
124 Slovakia 0
124 Slovenia 0
124 South Korea 0
124 Swaziland 0
124 Timor-Leste 0
124 Togo 0
124 Turkmenistan 0
124 Uruguay 0
124 Vietnam 0
124 Zambia 0
RANK COUNTRY SCORE
.01
0
Highest impact
of terrorism
Lowest impact
of terrorism
No impact of
terrorism
2
No records
GLOBAL
TERRORISM
INDEX 2014
9

All attacks since 2000 scaled
by number of fatalities
Worst attacks in 2013 TERRORIST
INCIDENTS MAP
2000-2013
DATE COUNTRY LOCATION F* I* GROUP DESCRIPTION
17/09/2013 Nigeria Beni Shiek 142 - Boko Haram Gunmen dressed in military uniforms set up illegal
checkpoints and shot civilians.
22/07/2013 Syria Khan Al-Assal 123 - Al-Nusrah Front Assailants attacked soldiers and civilians in the
town of Khan al-assal.
10/01/2013 Pakistan Quetta 107 169 Lashkar-E-Jhangvi Suicide bombers detonated inside of a snooker hall
and attacked responders to the first explosion.
16/08/2013 Pakistan Quetta 91 169 Lashkar-E-Jhangvi An explosives-laden water tanker detonated in a
vegetable market.
22/09/2013 Pakistan Peshawar 87 131 Jundallah Two suicide bombers detonated outside of all saints
church in Peshawar City.
2/08/2013 Afghanistan Sherzad District 82 - Taliban Assailants ambushed a joint military and police
convoy.
18/08/2013 Afghanistan Gulistan District 82 22 Taliban Assailants attacked a police convoy in Gulistan
district.
21/09/2013 Kenya Nairobi 72 201 Al-Shabaab
Assailants with automatic weapons and grenades
attacked the westgate mall in Nairobi and held
patrons hostage.
11/06/2013 Syria Hatla 70 - Al-Nusrah Front Gunmen attacked the shiite village of Hatla.
20/12/2013 Nigeria Bama 70 - Boko Haram 300 Assailants attacked a Nigerian army barracks
and kidnapped some soldiers.
16/01/2013 Algeria In Amenas 69 8
Al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam
Brigade (Those who
Sign with Blood)
Terrorists seized a British Petroleum gas complex
and held 800 people hostage.
THE 20 WORST ATTACKS OF 2013
* F= FATALITIES, I = INJURIES
10

All attacks since 2000 scaled
by number of fatalities
Worst attacks in 2013 TERRORIST
INCIDENTS MAP
2000-2013
DATE COUNTRY LOCATION F* I* GROUP DESCRIPTION
5/12/2013 Yemen Sanaa 68 215
Al-Qa'ida
in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP)
A suicide bomber then 12 gunmen attacked the
Ministry of Defense.
21/02/2013 Syria Damascus 62 201 Unknown A car bomb exploded near the baath party offices
in Damascus City.
6/02/2013 Syria Al-Buraq 61 - Al-Nusrah Front An explosives-laden vehicle detonated at a bus stop
near a military factory killing civilian employees.
5/12/2013 Central African
Republic Bangui 54 - Anti-Balaka Militia Gunman attacked a mosque in km-five
neighborhood, Bangui City.
3/04/2013 Afghanistan Farah 53 95 Taliban
A suicide bomber and nine assailants dressed as
soldiers and armed with guns and grenades
attacked a courthouse.
21/03/2013 Syria Damascus 50 84 Unknown A suicide bomber detonated himself
at al-eman mosque in Damascus City.
24/04/2013 Iraq Mosul 46 - Unknown Assailants attacked a police headquarters and held
17 hostage.
6/07/2013 Nigeria Mamudo 46 4 Boko Haram Assailants set fire to a school and shot at students
and staff who were fleeing the burning building.
3/03/2013 Pakistan Karachi 45 151 Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP)
An explosives-laden car detonated
in outside a shiite mosque.
11

RESULTS
In total there have been over 48,000 terrorist incidents
over the last 14 years claiming over 107,000 lives. Terrorism
has increased dramatically with even conservative estimates
suggesting a fivefold surge since the year 2000. 2
In 2013 alone, almost 10,000 terrorist incidents were
recorded, resulting in approximately 18,000 deaths. The
significant majority of these incidents, over 60 per cent,
occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria.
The increase is due mainly to terrorist activity within these
five countries. As a consequence, these countries have
experienced a dramatic increase in the loss of life in 2013
with fatalities reaching 14,722 collectively.
Excluding these five countries in 2013, there were almost
4,000 attacks in the rest of the world killing 3,236 people.
This represents an increase of 54 per cent over the
prior year.
Other than the five most affected countries, the trend over
the last 14 years is upward with terrorist attacks substantially
increasing by 180 per cent. Furthermore, terrorists are
largely successful in carrying out their tactical objectives.
Figure 3 shows that in 2013 the success rate was over 85 per
cent. However this does represent a decrease since 2011
when over 90 per cent of attacks were successful.
The rise in terrorist activity coincided with the US invasion of
Iraq. This created large power vacuums in the country
allowing different factions to surface and become violent.
Despite the fact that a government was formed and
elections held, the country and region has been unstable
ever since.
In 2006 Nouri al-Maliki was appointed Prime Minister of Iraq.
In the following year amid sectarian tensions Iraq suffered
the worst year of terrorist activity recorded since 2000. It
was only in 2013 with the rise of ISIL that Iraq suffered this
same level of terrorism again.
Terrorism has also been increasing on the borders of
Pakistan and Afghanistan where the Taliban has escalated
attacks over the last three years. Tensions in Pakistan
escalated in 2007 when Presidential candidate Benazir
Bhutto was assassinated, and deaths have increased by
20 per cent over the last two years. In India, there remains
significant terrorist activity, including on the border between
India and Pakistan.
The rise of terrorism in Nigeria is largely centred around the
terrorist group Boko Haram which started to engage in
significant violence from 2009 onwards. As a result, Nigeria
has had the fourth highest number of deaths from terrorism
over the last three years. Figure 1 plots these events against
trends in terrorism since 2000.
GLOBAL LEVELS OF
TERRORISM
COUNTRIES WITH GREATER
THAN 50 TERRORIST DEATHS
In 2013 the number of countries that lost over 50 lives to
terrorist attacks reached 24, the most it has been in the 14
years covered in this report. It also represents an
additional nine countries when compared to 2012. These
countries are Algeria, Central African Republic, China,
Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan. This
is a notable change from the 2008 trend that showed that
the number of countries with greater than 50 deaths had
been decreasing while the overall 12 year trend to 2012
was basically flat.
Terrorism is a global phenomenon and in 2013 attacks
were carried out in 87 countries with 60 of these
experiencing deaths from terrorism.
12

FIGURE 1 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM, 2000–2013
The number people who have died from terrorist activity has increased fivefold since the year 2000.
Usama bin Ladin killed.
Syrian Civil War begins.
Bhutto assasinated in Pakistan.
YEAR
20,000
16,000
12,000
8,000
4,000
0
Global total
Iraq,
Afghanistan,
Pakistan,
Nigeria Syria
ISIL capture large parts
Source: GTD Notes: The dashed part of the trend line represents a change in data collection methodology for terrorist acts. The methodology change did not materially
alter the results as the increase in terrorism is verifiable, see methodological note in Appendix C for further details.
FIGURE 2 TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 2000–2013
In 2013, 60 per cent of all attacks occurred in five countries; Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria. However the rest of the
world suffered a 54 per cent increase in terrorist incidents in 2013.
YEAR
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
Source: GTD
0
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
Global total
Iraq,
Afghanistan,
Pakistan,
Nigeria Syria
Rest of the world
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
NUMBER OF DEATHS
Rest of the world
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
of Syria and Iraq
September 11.
War begins in Afghanistan.
Iraq Prime Minister appointed.
War begins in Iraq. Arab Uprising.
Precursor of ISIL begin to
launch attacks in Syria and Iraq.
13

FIGURE 3 SUCCESS RATES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS
In 2013 over 85 per cent of all recorded incidents were successful. This represents an improvement from 2011 when over
90 per cent of attacks were successful.
100% 12,000
YEAR
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
90%
70%
60%
30%
Percentage of successful incidents
Total
Successful
Source: GTD Note: Success is defined in respect to the tangible effects of an incident, not the overall strategic goal. For example, a bomb attack is deemed successful
if the bomb is detonated regardless of whether the detonation achieves greater aims such as destroying a building or killing a specific person.
FIGURE 4 NUMBER OF COUNTRIES THAT EXPERIENCE SEVERE LOSSES FROM TERRORISM
The number of counties that have lost more than 50 lives hit an all-time high in 2013.
20
10
Source: GTD
YEAR
25
15
5
0
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WITH GREATER
THAN 50 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
80%
50%
40%
20%
10%
0%
PERCENTAGE OF SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
14

TEN COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM
The ten countries ranked at the top of the 2014 Global Terrorism
Index have all suffered from terrorism for many years. Every one
of the ten most affected countries, with the exception of Syria,
has had terrorist attacks consecutively for at least fifteen years.
In 2013 the most impacted five countries accounted for more
than 80 per cent of all terrorist deaths.
The overwhelming majority of deaths from terrorism in 2013
occurred in Iraq, accounting for 35 per cent of all deaths. In nine
out of the last ten years Iraq has been the country with the most
deaths from terrorism. The only exception was in 2012 when
Afghanistan had 300 more deaths than Iraq.
Syria is the country that has had the largest percentage increase
in terrorism, with a combined total of 27 deaths from 1998 to
2010. Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syria has had
over a hundred deaths from terrorism in both 2011 and 2012,
jumping to over 1,000 deaths in 2013.
FIGURE 5 COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF DEATHS BY TERRORISM, PERCENTAGE
OF GLOBAL TERRORIST DEATHS FOR 2013
Five countries account for more than 80 per cent of global terrorist deaths.
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
4,000
2,000
Source: GTD
0
NUMBER OF DEATHS
35.4%
Iraq
17.3%
Afghanistan
13.1.%
Pakistan
10.2%
Nigeria
6%
Syria
2.3%
Somalia
2.2%
India
1.6%
Philippines
1.6%
Yemen
1.1%
Rest of the world
Thailand
10%
15

2,492 INCIDENTS
IRAQ DEAD 6,362
Private citizens property
Police
Government (general)
Other
Iraq continues to be the country that is most impacted by
terrorism. Terrorist incidents have increased significantly in Iraq in
2013 with the number of deaths rising 162 per cent from 2012. No
group claimed responsibility for the majority of terrorist activity.
However, six terrorist groups were responsible for the 1,670
claimed deaths. These groups are all Islamic extremist with
relatively short histories. 77 per cent of attacks for which a group
claimed responsibility were conducted by ISIL. The oldest group,
Ansar al-Islam, was formed in 2001 but has subsequently joined
ISIL. Some of the groups are relatively new such as Mukhtar Army,
a Shia Iraqi militia group formed in early 2013, and Al-Nusrah
Front, a branch of al-Qa'ida formed in 2012.
The majority of terrorist groups in Iraq are Sunni and are opposed
to the Shia dominated government. In the 2014 parliamentary
elections 53 per cent of the seats were won by Shia parties as
opposed to just 11 per cent of seats for Sunni parties. The
remaining seats were won by Kurds or secular parties. The
demographic split between Shia and Sunni is 66 per cent and 34
per cent respectively.
As is characteristic of terrorist attacks generally, the majority of
incidents were not claimed by any group. In 2013, 4,660 people
were killed by terrorist acts by unknown actors, representing 73
per cent of all attacks. The tactics used by terrorist groups in Iraq
remain almost exclusively confined to bombings and explosions.
This method was responsible for 87 per cent of deaths and 97 per
INCREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002
+6,352
2002 2014
cent of injuries. Suicide attacks also continue to be used with a
very high cost on human lives, with an average of over seven
deaths per suicide attack. There were 232 suicide attacks, which
were responsible for 27 per cent of fatalities. ISIL took
responsibility for the majority of suicide bombings, averaging
nearly 10 deaths and 18 injuries per attack.
Political assassinations were less likely to be successful,
accounting for nearly half of the 165 failed terrorist attacks.
There were more than 430 casualties from attempted political
assassinations. The majority of assassinations targeted political
figures, but police, private citizens and leaders of other terrorist
groups were also targeted.
Of all terrorist attacks, 25 per cent took place in Baghdad, with
Mosul, Baqubah, Kirkuk and Tuz Khormato also experiencing
considerable activity. There were 135 cities that had one
terrorist attack and 115 cities that had two or more attacks. This
demonstrates how widespread terrorism is across the country.
Of the 19 provinces in Iraq, 17 experienced terrorism. The two
provinces without terrorism were both in the Iraqi Kurdistan
region. There were 1,424 attacks and 3,414 deaths in the four
provinces of Al Anbar, Diyala, Nineveh and Saladin. These four
provinces also had more than twice as many terrorist attacks
than the capital of Baghdad. The number of attacks in these
provinces doubled in 2013 while the number of deaths was two
and a half times higher.
Unknown
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
Al-Qa’ida in Iraq
Other
INJURED
14,947
WORST ATTACK
47 killed and 85 injured when a
suicide bomber targeted Shiite
pilgrims. ISIL suspected.
GTI RANK: 1
GTI SCORE: 10/10
MAJOR ATTACK
16

Police
Other
Terrorism is increasing in Afghanistan, with ten per cent more
terrorist attacks and 13 per cent more fatalities in 2013 than
2012. Whilst there were seven different terrorist groups active in
Afghanistan, one group, the Taliban, was responsible for the
majority of attacks and casualties. The Taliban remains one of
the most deadly terrorist groups in the world. In both 2012 and
2013 the Taliban was responsible for 75 per cent of all terrorist
fatalities in Afghanistan. In 2013 unknown actors accounted for
23 per cent of deaths by terrorism. The remainder of fatalities
were claimed by six terrorist groups.
In 2013 there were terrorist acts in over 440 different cities
in Afghanistan, clearly highlighting the breadth of terrorism
across the country. However 304 cities suffered only one
terrorist attack. There were 36 attacks in the capital Kabul and
25 attacks in the old capital of Kandahar. Police are the targets
of most attacks, being targeted 46 per cent of the time and
suffering 53 per cent of the deaths. Private citizens are the
second biggest target group, with 21 per cent of attacks and
19 per cent of deaths.
Although attacks on schools and educational institutions
account for only two per cent of attacks they result in one of the
highest injury rates per attack averaging nearly ten injuries but
only one death. The Taliban is opposed to the education of girls
and when in power banned girls above the age of eight from
attending school. In 2013 the Taliban conducted at least seven
MAJOR ATTACK
attacks targeting girls attending school, mostly in the north,
resulting in over 160 casualties.
Bombings and explosions were the most common tactic used in
Afghanistan, accounting for over half of all attacks and fatalities.
A quarter of all terrorist attacks were armed assaults, with 37
per cent of deaths attributed to this tactic. Almost all armed
assaults were with firearms, although there were a few instances
of knives and axe attacks with at least 19 beheadings. There
were over 100 suicide bombings in 2013, mostly by the Taliban.
Suicide bombings were very deadly, averaging five deaths and
ten injuries per attack.
AFGHANISTAN
Taliban
Unknown
Hizb-i-Islami
Other
DEAD 3,111
INJURED 3,721
+3,057
2002 2014
GTI RANK: 2
GTI SCORE: 9.39/10
1,148 INCIDENTS
WORST ATTACK
98 killed when the Taliban
targeted a tribal elder and
security personnel who
responded to the scene.
17

1,933 INCIDENTS
PAKISTAN
DEAD 2,345
GTI RANK: 3 INJURED 5,035
GTI SCORE: 9.37/10
Police
Other
Terrorism in Pakistan is strongly influenced by its proximity to
Afghanistan with most attacks occurring near the border
involving the Taliban. Like in Afghanistan, terrorism increased
significantly in Pakistan in 2013, with a 37 per cent increase in
deaths and 28 per cent increase in injuries since 2012. Nearly half
of all attacks had no groups that have claimed responsibility. The
deadliest group in Pakistan in 2013, responsible for almost a
quarter of all deaths and 49 per cent of all claimed attacks, is
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban.
Terrorism in Pakistan has a diverse array of actors. In 2013 there
were 23 different terrorist groups, down from 29 groups in 2012.
However, 11 groups account for the majority of the 270 claimed
attacks. While many of these groups are Islamist there are also
other organisations such as separatist movements for Baloch, the
Bettani tribe and Sindhi people.
Over 60 per cent of fatalities were from bombings and explosions
and around 26 per cent from firearms. A quarter of targets and
deaths were against private citizens, with police accounting for
20 per cent of targets and deaths. The deadliest attacks were
against religious figures and institutions which, on average, killed
over five people and injured over 11 per attack. This includes the
killing of 87 people attending All Saints Church in Peshawar city
from two suicide bombs by a sub-group of the Pakistani Taliban.
MAJOR ATTACK
The Pakistani Taliban also, like the Taliban in Afghanistan, is
opposed to the western education and the education of girls and
has targeted schools and advocates of equal education. This issue
gained worldwide recognition in October 2012 when a 15 year old
school girl and advocate of female education, Malala Yousafzai,
was shot by gunmen from the Pakistani Taliban on a school bus in
the northwest. In 2014 Malala Yousafzai, along with the Indian
activist Kailash Satyarthi campaigning against forced childhood
labour, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Despite the
international attention brought to the issue, violence continues
and in 2013 there were over 100 attacks on educational
institutions, with a total of 150 casualties. Suicide bombings were
used by the Pakistani Taliban and three other groups, all of which
have some affiliation with the Pakistani Taliban. In 2013 there were
71 suicide attacks responsible for around 2,740 casualties.
More than 500 cities in Pakistan had at least one terrorist incident
in 2013, with two or more incidents occurring in 180 cities. Of all
attacks 16 per cent occurred in the largest city of Karachi in the
south. However, the majority of attacks occurred in the north
closer to the border with Afghanistan. This includes cities such as
Peshawar, Quetta and Jamrud, which combined, had more
attacks than Karachi. The city of Parachinar in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, the closest point in Pakistan to Kabul
in Afghanistan, has among the highest rates of deaths per
incident in Pakistan with 87 people killed from seven incidents.
Unknown
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Other
+2,243
2002 2014
WORST ATTACK
119 killed and 219 injured when two
suicide bombers targeted a crowd.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi responsible.
18

Police
Other
The dramatic increase in terrorism in Nigeria can be attributed
to the rise of Boko Haram. Boko Haram can be translated to
mean ‘western education is forbidden’. In 2013 this Islamist
terrorist group killed at least 1,587 people and claimed
responsibility for nearly 90 per cent of all terrorist acts in
Nigeria. They are one of the most deadly terrorist groups in
the world with an average of close to eight deaths per
terrorist attack.
The nature of terrorism in Nigeria is different to Iraq,
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Terrorist activity in Nigeria has
more in common with the tactics of organised crime and
gangs, focusing on armed assaults using firearms and knives
than the bombing or suicide tactics of other large terrorist
groups. Armed assault has claimed 85 per cent of deaths in
Nigeria while bombings or explosions account for five per
cent of deaths. Suicide attacks are very rare, approximately
12 per cent of terrorist attacks are kidnappings or
hostage takings.
The majority of these kidnappings are by Boko Haram. In 2013
targets included business leaders such as the Manager of the
Nigerian Flour Mills; senior police officers such the Divisional
Police Officer of Borno State; people with government
connections like the former minister of Petroleum Resources;
DEAD 1,826
MAJOR ATTACK
members of the military; and women and children. This
includes the more than 200 Chibok girls kidnapped in
northern Nigeria in early 2014 from their school. Boko Haram
announced the girls were to become slaves and wives for
their members.
Most terrorist attacks were in the northeast of Nigeria where
Boko Haram is based, with 16 per cent of attacks in the
regional capital of Maiduguri.
Apart from Boko Haram, six other terrorist groups were
responsible for attacks in 2013. Three of these groups are
Islamist and the other groups are separatists or oppositional
groups. One of the largest terrorist groups in Nigeria, with an
estimated membership of 15,000, is the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta, who were responsible for 14
fatalities in 2013. This group has been active since 2004 and
aims to force oil revenues to be shared with impoverished
regions. Whilst they have a larger membership than Boko
Haram, they are responsible for fewer deaths, killing 268
people since 2006.
NIGERIA
GTI RANK: 4
GTI SCORE: 8.58/10
303 INCIDENTS
+1,812
2002 2014
Boko Haram
Unknown
Fulani militants
Other
INJURED 457
WORST ATTACK
142 killed and 100 shops
damaged when gunmen
attacked civilians in a village.
Boko Haram responsible.
19

Journalists media
Other
The dramatic rise of terrorism in Syria is a direct result of the
Syrian civil war. There were no recorded acts of terrorism in the
two years prior to the civil war commencing in 2011. By 2012
there were 136 terrorist attacks and over 600 deaths. In 2013,
this has increased to 217 attacks and over 1,000 deaths. There
are at least ten different terrorist groups active in Syria, many
of which are Sunni and opposed to the Alawite Assad regime.
It is estimated that the civil war has led to between 180,000
and 260,000 deaths and the displacement of over 35 per cent
of the population of the country. The majority of these deaths
are classified as a result of conventional warfare rather than
acts of terrorism. However, terrorism has been deployed as a
tactic by some of the rebel forces to bring about a political,
economic, religious, or social goal rather than purely
military objectives.
It is unknown which group was responsible for half of the
terrorist attacks in Syria in 2013, and as a result of the civil war
the number of attacks may be underreported. Some of the
biggest groups in Syria include ISIL, the Free Syrian Army,
Hizballah and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
Gen Cmd (PFLP-GC).
The Sunni and al-Qa’ida linked Al-Nusra Front claimed
responsibility for more than 40 per cent of deaths from
terrorism in 2013. This group regularly uses suicide attacks,
employing suicide bombing in nearly a third of their attacks.
They are also one of the most deadly groups, averaging nearly
19 deaths per attack.
The most common form of terrorist attacks are bombings or
explosions, which account for 70 per cent of attacks that are
generally targeted at private citizens. Kidnappings account for
18 per cent of all incidents. Most of the kidnappings are of
journalists, although NGO workers and UN Peacekeepers have
all been kidnapped in 2013. Syria is the only country among
those most impacted by terrorism where journalists are a major
target of terrorist attacks. Nearly 70 per cent of all journalists
killed last year in Syria were Syrian citizens.
In 2013 at least 16 European journalists were kidnapped,
including Danish, French, Italian, Polish, Spanish and Swedish
journalists. Two American journalists who were kidnapped in
Syria, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, were both murdered in
late 2014 by ISIL.
Although the entire country is affected by a very severe civil
conflict, terrorism is largely centralised. There were 57 cities
that had a terrorist attack, of which only 16 cities had more
than one attack. Terrorism is largely concentrated around large
cities, with 42 per cent of attacks taking place in the capital of
Damascus and 12 per cent in the largest city of Aleppo.
SYRIA
MAJOR ATTACK
WORST ATTACK
123 killed when assailants attacked
soldiers and civilians in a town centre.
Known as the Khan al-Assal massacre.
Al-Nusrah Front responsible.
Unknown
Al-Nusrah Front
Liwa al-Haqq
Other
DEAD 1,078 INJURED 1,776
+1,078
2002 2014
GTI RANK: 5
GTI SCORE: 8.12/10
217 INCIDENTS
20

624 INCIDENTS
DEAD 404 INJURED 719
2002 2014
MAJOR ATTACK
Police
Other
Terrorism increased by 70 per cent in India from 2012 to 2013,
with the number of deaths increasing from 238 to 404. The
number of attacks also increased, with 55 more attacks in 2013
than 2012. However, the majority of terrorist attacks in India have
low casualties. In 2013 around 70 per cent of attacks were
non-lethal. There were attacks by 43 different terrorist groups
who can be categorised into three groups: Islamists; separatists;
and communists.
Communist terrorist groups are by far the most frequent
perpetrators and the main cause of deaths in India. Three Maoist
communist groups claimed responsibility for 192 deaths in 2013,
which was nearly half of all deaths from terrorism in India. Police
are overwhelmingly the biggest targets of Maoists, accounting
for half of all deaths and injuries. This is mainly through armed
assaults, which killed 85, and bombings and explosions, which
killed 43. Kidnapping is also a common tactic of the Maoists
where it is often used as political tool to force the government
to release Maoist prisoners. The majority of Maoist attacks
occurred in the provinces of Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.
Generally, the dispute with Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is
the source of Islamic terrorism. In 2013 three Islamist groups
were responsible for around 15 per cent of deaths. This includes
Hizbul Mujahideen, an Islamist group allegedly based in Pakistan
with a membership of around 15,000. This group was the only
group in India to use suicide tactics in 2013. Islamist groups in
India commonly use armed assaults targeting the police or
bombings targeting private citizens. The majority of attacks
occur in Hyderabad in the south, a city with a 40 per cent
Muslim population, and Jammu and Kashmir in the north, an
area which is nearly two thirds Muslim. In September 2014
al-Qa’ida announced a presence in India, hoping to unite other
Islamist groups.
India’s north east region has for the last three decades seen
continual ethno-political unrest from ethnic secessionist
movements. Separatist groups including in Assam, Bodoland,
Kamtapur and Meghalaya were responsible for 16 per cent of
deaths. Targeting private citizens, police and businesses, attacks
are generally restricted to the geographic region as most of
these groups are relatively small and have local claims.
INDIA
Maoists
Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-M)
Unknown
Other
WORST ATTACK
17 killed and 32 injured when
100 gunmen ambushed and
kidnapped government officials.
The Communist Party of India -
Maoist (CPI-M) responsible.
DECREASE IN DEATHS SINCE 2002
-87 GTI RANK: 6
GTI SCORE: 7.86/10
21

197 INCIDENTS
SOMALIA INJURED 492
MAJOR ATTACK
Military
Other
Somalia continues to face violence in the south with rebel forces
and terrorist groups using terrorist tactics. The number of
people killed in Somalia from terrorism increased by 32 per cent
from 2012 to 2013. 2013 has been the deadliest year of the past
14 years with 405 people killed, up from 307 in 2012.
In 2013, the Al-Shabaab group was responsible for all claimed
attacks. This militant group is allied with Al-Qa’ida and has an
estimated 4,000 to 6,000 soldiers. Unlike some other Al-Qa’ida
affiliates, there has been infighting in Al-Shabaab over whether
it should focus on local and regional objectives rather than
transcontinental jihad. Notably, this was one of the reasons why
the American recruit to Al-Shabaab, Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki,
was killed by Al-Shabaab in 2013 as he criticised the group for
being too focused on Somalian outcomes to the detriment of
international jihad. Nevertheless, Al-Shabaab has attracted
foreign fighters and has partnered with other groups.
Al-Shabaab was responsible for the Westgate shopping mall
attack in September 2013 in Kenya, which resulted in 67 deaths
and 175 injuries. This was reportedly in retaliation for the
involvement of the Kenyan military in a military operation to
eradicate the group in Somalia. The leadership of Al-Shabaab
contains many Somalis trained in the Iraq and Afghani conflicts.
Many of the organisation’s leaders have been killed, including
the overall leader, Moktar Ali Zubeyr killed by a U.S. drone strike
in September 2014. There have been reports that members of
Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have trained together. Al-Shabaab
has controlled several areas of Somalia including the capital
Mogadishu in 2010. In recent times African Union support for the
Somalia government has restricted their military operations.
Al-Shabaab generally uses guerrilla warfare and is structured as
an insurgency force in three parts: intelligence gathering; law
enforcement; and a military arm. Most of the attacks are
bombings or explosions which average around two and a half
deaths per attack. One in ten attacks are suicide bombings.
Suicide assault teams have become a feature in attacks by
Al-Shabaab. Suicide bombings are much more deadly than
other explosions, with an average of nine and a half deaths per
attack. Such attacks have been used primarily against the
government but also the military and police. Private citizens are
generally not the target of suicide bombings. Armed assaults
are used nearly 20 per cent of the time and are mainly used
against private citizens.
Southern Somalia has 90 per cent of attacks, with most of the
remaining attacks occurring in Puntland in the north-east.
Somaliland to the north-west saw the least terrorist activity.
Almost half of all attacks were in the largest city and capital
Mogadishu and 15 per cent of attacks in the port city of Kismayo
in the south. Al-Shabaab announced it would further target the
government in Puntland, with terrorist attacks in the Bari region
increasing threefold from 2012 to 2013.
Al-Shabaab
Unknown
DEAD 405
WORST ATTACK
an explosives-laden vehicle
detonated outside a courthouse.
Al-Shabaab responsible.
+399
2002 2014
GTI RANK: 7
GTI SCORE: 7.41/10
22

MAJOR ATTACK
WORST ATTACK
68 killed, 215 injured when a suicide
bomber detonated an explosives-laden
vehicle at the entrance of a government
building. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) responsible.
Utilities
Police
Other
Terrorist attacks and injuries increased by 50 per cent between
2012 and 2013. However, the attacks were less fatal with a 15 per
cent reduction in fatalities to 291. Whilst there were nine different
groups active in Yemen in 2013, two major terrorist groups
committed over 80 per cent of terrorist acts. The other groups
include tribesmen and separatists. It is unknown who committed
16 per cent of attacks in 2013. The two most active terrorist
groups are the Houthis and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). The Houthis are the smaller group and claimed
responsibility for 20 per cent of deaths in 2013 with 18 separate
attacks, whereas AQAP claimed responsibility for 60 per cent of
attacks in 2013 with 83 separate attacks. Both groups in Yemen
are in conflict with the government and deploy terrorist tactics.
Despite this, the Houthis and AQAP are opposed to each other
and are based in separate parts of the country.
AQAP is an al-Qa’ida affiliate which is currently being led by Nasir
al-Wuhayshi who was Usama bin Ladin’s former secretary. The
group was responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000
which resulted in the deaths of 17 U.S. soldiers. It is considered to
be one of the most active al-Qa’ida affiliates.3 AQAP mainly has
operated in the south of Yemen and has been the target of U.S.
predator drone attacks since 2002. AQAP are responsible for
over 850 deaths from 300 terrorist attacks in the last four years.
In 2013 they killed 177 people and they were the only group in
Yemen to use suicide bombings. Suicide bombings were very
deadly, with an average of 11 deaths and nearly 30 injuries per
attack. These bombings overwhelmingly targeted the
government. This includes the bombing of the Ministry of
Defence in Sana’a city, which resulted in 68 deaths and 215
injuries. AQAP focused attacks on Sana’a and the city of
Dhamar in south-west Yemen.
The other major terrorist group, the Houthis, is a militant Islamist
insurgency made up of followers of a Shia sect known as Zaydi.
The Houthis are in conflict with the Yemen government opposing
the Sunni-majority government and military. In September of
2014, the Houthis invaded the capital city demanding a change
of government.
The Houthis are also opposed to AQAP, a Sunni group, and there
have been several major battles between the two groups. Since
2009 the Houthis have killed 200 people in terrorist attacks from
28 separate attacks. The Houthis are a deadly terrorist group
averaging over six deaths per attack. Their most deadly attack
occurred in 2010 when 30 people were killed when they attacked
pro-government Bin Aziz tribesmen. Most attacks by the Houthis
target the capital city Sana’a, with all but one attack in 2013
occurring in Sana’a or in the administrative centre of Amanat Al
Asimah. In late 2014 the Houthis had administrative control over
parts of north-west Yemen including partial or full control over
the governorates of Al Jawf, Al Mahwit, ‘Amran, Hajjah, Saada
and Sana’a.
YEMEN
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Houthis
Unknown
Other
DEAD 291 INJURED 583
2002 2014
+287
295 INCIDENTS
GTI RANK: 8
GTI SCORE: 7.31/10
23

Business
Other
Terrorism has increased significantly in the Philippines between
2012 and 2013, with almost twice as many incidents. The number
of deaths has also more than doubled in this period increasing
from 122 to 292. Terrorism in the Philippines is intrinsically tied
with nationalist and separatist claims by people living in
provinces in southern Philippines. However, terrorism is spread
across the country. There were 438 cities that suffered a terrorist
attack in 2013 of which only 104 had one attack. The city that
saw the highest number of terrorist attacks was Cotabato City in
Mindanao with 11 separate attacks that killed 11 people. 83 per
cent of the 81 provinces of the Philippines had at least one
terrorist attack in 2013.
Whilst there were seven known groups that carried out a
terrorist act in 2013 most activity is carried out by the New
People’s Army, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The largest individual group was the
New People’s Army, a communist organisation, which claimed
responsibility for 30 per cent of deaths in 2013. Armed assault
represented nearly half of all fatalities, followed by
assassinations, which constituted a quarter of all fatalities. This
differs from many other parts of the world where use of
explosives and bombings are more common.
499 INCIDENTS
Assassinations were prominent with 56 per cent of attempts
successful. In total, 103 people were killed by assassinations in
2013 which is more than five times higher than 2012. The use of
these tactics and targets demonstrates that many of the
terrorist groups in the Philippines are seeking to directly change
the political system. Around 34 per cent of deaths from terrorist
attacks were targeting the government, with business leaders,
private citizens and police representing between ten and
seventeen per cent of deaths. Only the Islamist Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) engaged in suicide bombing.
PHILIPPINES
Unknown
New People’s Army (NPA)
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement (BIFM)
Other
DEAD 292
WORST ATTACK
9 killed and 7 injured when police
were targeted with a bomb and
shooting. New People’s Army
(NPA) suspected.
INJURED 444
+210
2002 2014
GTI RANK: 9
GTI SCORE: 7.29/10
MAJOR ATTACK
24

THAILAND DEAD 131 INJURED 398
Business
Police
Other
In 2013 Thailand saw the lowest number of deaths from
terrorism since 2005. The number of deaths from 2012 to 2013
decreased from 171 to 131. However, there were 116, or 54 per
cent more terrorist attacks over this period. Three quarters of
terrorist attacks were not claimed nor attributed to any group.
Terrorist activity is overwhelmingly confined to the south of the
country where there is an ongoing insurgency between Muslim
separatists and the Thai government, with Malay Muslims
opposed to the Thai Buddhist minority and supporters of the
government. This conflict has been ongoing since 2004 with
estimates of 5,000 deaths and 10,000 casualties. The majority
of attacks have historically occurred in the four southern
border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Yala.
Terrorist activity is so localised that out of the seventy-six
provinces of Thailand, only 11 suffered from attacks. Five
provinces only had one attack and six provinces had more than
one attack. Peace talks hosted in Malaysia resumed in August
2014 after leaders of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)
called to continue dialogue.
WORST ATTACK
4 gunmen on motorcycles
opened fire on a grocery
store. Unknown, but Barisan
Revolusi Nasional suspected.
It is suspected that the majority of attacks are committed by a
group of young independent militants not tied to any particular
group. Militants are often young and are accordingly called
Juwae. Older and more organised groups rarely claim
responsibility for attacks. There is less evidence of groups
working together, with groups appearing to be more fractured
than in previous years.4
Only four terrorist groups are known to have committed
terrorist attacks in 2013. BRN is the largest of these groups.
Operating in the South, BRN is a separatist group with a
membership estimated at 1,000. This group was responsible for
12 deaths from four attacks in 2013. Other separatist groups
active in Southern Thailand include the Aba Cheali Group and
Runda Kumpalan Kecil, both splinter groups of BRN. Armed
assaults were much more deadly than bombings or explosions.
The number of bombings increased 50 per cent between 2012
and 2013, with 170 separate bomb attacks. However, the
majority of bomb attacks resulted in no fatalities with 44 total
deaths as opposed to 77 deaths by firearms. The biggest
targets were businesses followed by police. The majority of
terrorist attacks in Thailand have relatively low death rates,
with an average of 1.2 deaths per attack. No attack killed more
than six people in 2013.
Unknown
Separatists
Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN)
Other
2002 2014
+115
332 INCIDENTS
GTI RANK: 10
GTI SCORE: 7.19/10
MAJOR ATTACK
25

TRENDS
LARGEST INCREASES AND
DECREASES IN TERRORISM
2012 TO 2013
Analysis of the year-to-year trends in terrorist attacks
underscores its dynamic nature showing it can quickly
intensify yet also fall away. As has been highlighted in the
results section, the majority of terrorist attacks are
concentrated in a small number of countries and this is
where most of the year-to-year change is observed.
While this section focuses on number of deaths, this is not
always perfectly reflective of changes in overall terrorist
impact as some countries may experience more incidents
but fewer deaths, as was the case in Yemen in 2013.
In 2013, 102 of the 162 countries included in this report did
not experience a fatal terrorist attack. Of the remaining 60
countries, 40 experienced an increase in the number of
fatalities when comparing 2012 to 2013. Conversely, there
were 26 countries that had fewer deaths from terrorism in
2013 than 2012.
Eighty-seven countries experienced a terrorist incident in
2013, only slightly up from 81 in the 2012. This trend has
remained fairly stable over the last 14-year period reflecting
the fact that many terrorist incidents can manifest
themselves in very small, non-lethal attacks.
The five countries with the biggest increases in deaths from
2012 to 2013 are also the countries most impacted by
terrorism. The number of deaths in these five countries has
increased by 52 per cent over this period. The country with
the biggest increase in deaths was Iraq, which saw nearly
4,000 more fatalities from terrorism in 2013 than 2012,
representing a 164 per cent increase. The reason for the
increase in Iraq is largely due to the actions of ISIL.
The country with the second largest increase in the numbers
of deaths was Pakistan. However, Pakistan saw a much
smaller increase than Iraq with 520 more deaths in 2013 than
2012. Pakistan saw a substantial increase in the number of
deaths per attack. In particular, the second and third biggest
terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundallah, averaged
20 more fatalities per attack in 2013 than the previous year.
This highlights the growing lethality of the groups.
Syria saw the third largest increase in the number of deaths
between 2012 and 2013, increasing by 71 per cent. The
increase in deaths in Syria is partly a result of the ongoing
civil war which has displaced millions since its start in 2011.
Most of the deaths in Syria have been classified as war
deaths rather than terrorist deaths.
The increase in terrorism in Nigeria is due to Boko Haram
which has increased in both members and resources. There
was a significant increase in terrorism from 2009 after the
founder and leader of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf,
was killed.
The country with the fifth largest increase in deaths from
terrorism is Afghanistan, where there was an increase of 13
per cent or 350 deaths from 2012 to 2013. This increase is
largely due to further activity by the Taliban, which killed
almost 2,350 in 2013 up from 2,050 in 2012.
26

FIGURE 6 LARGEST INCREASES IN DEATHS FROM 2012 TO 2013
The five biggest increases in deaths were in the countries where terrorism has the biggest impact.
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
INCREASE IN DEATHS FROM TERRORISM
+3956
+354
+519 +449 +422
Country Iraq Pakistan Syria Nigeria Afghanistan
Source: GTD
164%
Percentage
change
28% 71% 30% 13%
FIGURE 7 LARGEST REDUCTIONS IN DEATHS FROM 2012 TO 2013
Countries with the largest reduction in deaths from terrorism have all had relatively high
historical rates of terrorism.
Percentage
change -48% -43% -23% -85%
Country Yemen Colombia Turkey Thailand Cote d’Ivoire
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
DECREASE IN DEATHS FROM TERRORISM
Source: GTD
-15%
-52
-22.5
-50
-43 -40
27

The five countries with the biggest decrease in deaths from
2012 to 2013 still maintain high levels of terrorist activity,
with Yemen and Thailand being amongst the ten countries
suffering the most from terrorism.
The country with the biggest fall in deaths was Yemen,
falling by 52, or 15 per cent. However, that does not mean
that terrorism is no longer a significant threat. There were
nearly 100 more attacks in 2013 than 2012. Similarly, the
number of injuries from terrorism in Yemen increased from
2012 by 56 per cent to nearly 600. Yemen continues to
confront a dual terrorist threat from the Houthis in the north
of the country and al-Qa’ida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) in
the south.
Colombia experienced the second biggest improvement,
with the death rate decreasing by 48 per cent to 55 deaths
from 105 in 2012. This represents a substantial improvement
over the decade average which was three times higher,
averaging approximately 150 per year. The Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest terrorist
group, have been in peace talks with the Colombian
Government since 2013 and have substantially reduced the
number of people they have killed.
The third biggest improvement was seen in Turkey, which
experienced 57 deaths from terrorism in 2013, down from
100 in 2012. The decline in Turkey was largely due to the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) decreasing terrorist attacks
in Turkey in 2013. In 2012 the PKK killed 86 people, whereas
in 2013 the PKK was responsible for only one death.
However, the emergence of ISIL, which killed at least 53
people in Turkey in 2013, is a significant concern.
The fourth biggest improvement occurred in Thailand which
saw 23 per cent less deaths in 2013 than 2012. At 131 deaths,
2013 was the lowest number of fatalities from terrorism in
Thailand since 2005.
The fifth biggest improvement occurred in Cote d’Ivoire,
which saw deaths decrease by 85 per cent with only four
fatalities in 2013 compared to 27 in 2012. 2012 was the
deadliest year for terrorists in Cote d’Ivoire since 2005.
Terrorism in Cote d’Ivoire sometimes takes the form of
periodic attacks with high casualties. This was the case in
2012 when a group loyal to the former President Gbagbo,
who was arrested and imprisoned by the International
Criminal Court, attacked a UN peacekeeping patrol and
killed ten people.
FIGURE 8 TARGETS OF TERRORISM, 2000-2013
The primary target of terrorism has historically been private property and citizens. However since 2009 there has been a substantial
proportional upsurge in incidents targeting police.
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
Source: GTD
Religious figures/institutions
YEAR
PROPORTIONS OF ANNUAL ATTACKS
0
Police
Business
Government
Transportation
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
28

PATTERNS AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY SINCE
2000
This section summarises the overarching patterns and
characteristics of terrorist activity over the last 14 years in
terms of targets, weapons used, tactics, lethality, ideology
and location.
The primary target of terrorism has been private property
and citizens, followed by attacks on police. In MENA and
South Asia explosives are primarily used, while in Central
America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, firearms
are more regularly used. In North America, incendiary
devices/firebombs are common.
Suicide attacks have been used in five per cent of all
incidents since 2000.
Most terrorist attacks do not result in heavy loss of life. In
2013 over 50 per cent of all attacks claimed no fatalities and
only 10 per cent claimed more than five lives. The most
lethal terrorism occurs in MENA, South Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa.
Around five per cent of all deaths from terrorism since 2000
have occurred in OECD countries.
Over the past 14 years there has been a large increase in
religion as the motivator for terrorist activity. However in
2000, nationalist separatist movements were a more
prominent motivation for terrorism than religion. Today,
political and national separatist aims are still a significant
driver of terrorism but unlike religion, they have seen
comparatively little change over the period.
Figure 8 highlights that the primary target of most terrorist
attacks has been private property and citizens, however
from 2009 onwards the preferred target group gradually
switched to police. These two groups in 2013 accounted for
around 50 per cent of all incidents. Attacks on private
property and citizens decreased from 35 per cent of total
attacks to 25 per cent, while attacks on police increased
from 10 per cent of total attacks in 2009 to 24 per cent in
2013. The trends of these two target groups show large
fluctuations since 2000 rising and falling with subsequent
events in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
FIGURE 9 WEAPONS TRENDS IN TERRORISM, 2000-2013
The proportion of weapons used in terrorist acts has remained relatively constant globally with approximately 60 per cent of all
attacks using explosives, 30 per cent using firearms and 10 per cent using other weapons.
Explosives
Firearms
All others
Suicide attacks
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
YEAR
PROPORTIONS OF INCIDENTS
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
Source: GTD Note: Suicide attacks are dashed to indicate that they are included regardless of weapon used and therefore should not be included when adding
proportions to total 100 per cent.
29

FIGURE 10 WEAPONS TYPES IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY REGION, 2000-2013
Explosive weapons are the predominant tactic used by terrorists in South America, MENA, Russia and the CIS, South Asia and Europe.
Terrorists in Central America, the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa largely use firearms.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite Firearms Incendiary Other
Over the 14-year period attacks on business, transportation
and religious figures have all been significant but
proportionally have remained roughly the same. These
trends are once again largely driven by events in the five
countries with the highest levels of terrorism.
Figure 9 highlights that explosives have consistently been
the most prevalent type of weapon used in attacks
accounting for over 60 per cent of all incidents globally.
Firearms are the next most common weapon being used
around 30 per cent of the time. Only 10 per cent of attacks
used some other form of weapon in 2013. Once again these
global trends are highly dependent on the five countries
with the highest levels of terrorism.
In North America, for example, incendiary weapons have
been the primary mode of attack, with 132 instances since
2000. In Sub-Saharan Africa, firearms are far more
prominent than explosives. This is highlighted with the
recent upsurge in Boko Haram, which has used firearms in
over 50 per cent of their attacks since 2009.
Figure 9 also highlights that only five per cent of all terrorist
attacks in 2013 have been suicide attacks. Suicide attacks
peaked in 2007 largely due to unrest in Iraq between
terrorist groups and the then recently-formed Maliki
Government, where 13 per cent of all terrorist incidents were
suicide attacks.
Europe
South America
Central America
Caribbean
Whilst the total number of attacks using suicide bombing, as
well as the numbers of terrorist attacks in general has risen
substantially in 2012 and 2013, suicide attacks have
decreased as a proportion of total attacks. In 2012 and 2013
suicide attacks constituted five and six per cent respectively
of all terrorist incidents compared to 2007 when suicide
attacks accounted for 11 per cent of all attacks.
Figure 12 highlights the changes in ideological drivers of
terrorist organisations since 2000. Grouping over 350 of the
most active organisations in the world into either religious,
political or nationalist separatist groups shows that religious
organisations have seen the largest rise in activity over the
period.5 The prevalence of nationalist separatist and political
terrorist organisations has remained relatively stable by
comparison. Notably, religious ideology in the year 2000
was less a motivation for terrorism than nationalist
separatism.
Once again, these global trends are dominated by the five
countries with the highest levels of terrorism. Figure 13
highlights that each region has its own profile. Since 2000,
Source: GTD
South Asia
MENA
Asia-Pacific
Sub-Saharan Africa
Russia CIS
North America
30

FIGURE 11 LETHALITY TRENDS IN TERRORISM, 2000-2013
Since 2007, there have been proportionally fewer incidents recorded that have killed more than five people while the per cent
of non-fatal attacks has increased.
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
Source: GTD
YEAR
PROPORTIONS OF FATALITIES IN AN INCIDENT
0
No fatalities
1–5 fatalities
5 fatalities
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
FIGURE 12 TRENDS IN TERRORIST GROUP IDEOLOGY, 2000-2013
Religion as a driving ideology for terrorism has dramatically increased since 2000. However, in 2000 Nationalist Separatist
movements were more prominent. Political and National Separatist movements are still significant in 2013 but have seen little change
in activity over the period.
Religious
Political
Nationalist separatist
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
YEAR
NUMBERS OF INCIDENTS
2000
1750
1500
1250
1000
750
500
250
0
Source: GTD Note: Only 358 of the most active terrorist organisations have been classified in this analysis. Therefore, the number of incidents will not match the total
numbers shown in previous figures.
31

FIGURE 13 TRENDS IN REGIONAL TERRORIST IDEOLOGIES, 2000-2013
Religious ideologies as a motivation for terrorism is not a global phenomenon. While it is predominant in Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA
and South Asia, in the rest of the world terrorism is more likely to be driven by political or nationalistic and separatist movements.
Source: GTD
South Asia
MENA
Sub-Saharan Africa
Asia-Pacific
Political Religious Nationalist separatist
Europe
Russia CIS
South America
Central America
Caribbean
North America
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0
terrorist activity in Europe, Central and South America has
been almost entirely due to nationalist separatist movements
and political organisations.
Due to the conflict with Chechnya and Georgia, terrorism in
Russia has been largely separatist in nature. In China and the
Asia-Pacific, terrorist activity is approximately evenly split
between all three ideological strains. Domestic terrorist
incidents in North America have been primarily of a
political nature.
TRENDS AND PATTERNS
OF SUICIDE ATTACKS
Suicide attacks in general are confined to only a few
countries. Figure 14 shows that of the 2,500 suicide
attacks since 2000, over 90 per cent occurred in MENA
and South Asia. In these two regions, suicide attacks
average between 11 and 13 fatalities per incident. These are
the highest averages for all regions with the exception of
North America due to the attacks of September 11.
Overall, suicide attacks average 11 deaths per attack while
other terrorist attacks average two. By these numbers it
can be derived that suicide attacks are on average four and
a half times more lethal than other forms of terrorism.
Statistically, suicide bombing assassination attempts are
less successful than other forms, with 56 per cent of
assassination attempts using suicide bombing ending in
failure. Six per cent of suicide attacks are assassination
attempts. However, suicide attacks are much more deadly
than other forms of terrorism.
RELIGION AS A
DRIVING IDEOLOGY
FOR TERRORISM
HAS INCREASED
SINCE 2000.
32

FIGURE 14 SUICIDE ATTACKS BY REGION FROM 2000 TO 2013
Since 2000, only five per cent of all incidents have been suicide attacks. Of these 2,500 events, over 90 per cent of attacks occurred in
South Asia and MENA.
Source: GTD
Suicide attacks 2% 1%
MENA
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Russia CIS
Other
Southeast Asia
4% 3%
53%
37%
All other attacks
TABLE 1 NUMBER OF SUICIDE ATTACKS BY ORGANISATION FROM 2000 TO 2013
The Taliban, al-Qa’ida and ISIL have claimed the most suicide attacks in the period. However Hamas has proportionally used suicide attacks
the most since 2000.
ORGANISATION LAST ATTACK
HAMAS (ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT)
AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE
AL-QA’IDA IN IRAQ
ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT
AL-QA`IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)
TEHRIK-I-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)
LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE)
AL-SHABAAB
BOKO HARAM
SUICIDE ATTACKS SINCE 2000
195
152
579
492
298
778
499
630
750
46
35
105
84
42
97
35
43
37
24%
23%
18%
17%
14%
12%
7%
7%
5%
2008
2008
2013
2013
2013
2013
2009
2013
2013
Total number
of attacks
Number of
suicide attacks Percentage
33

The Taliban, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and ISIL have used
suicide bombing the most since 2000, with a combined
total of approximately 2,000 attacks. For these groups this
represents between 12 and 18 per cent of their total attacks.
All three of these organisations used suicide attacks in
2013.
Whilst suicide attacks constitute a minority of total terrorist
attacks, different terrorist groups use it as a tactic
proportionally more than others. Hamas has historically had
the highest prevalence of suicide attacks in their operations
with 24 per cent of all incidents being suicide attacks. The
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, another group based in the West
Bank and Gaza, have used suicide attacks the second most
at 23 per cent. However, neither Hamas nor the Al-Aqsa
Martyrs Brigade has used this tactic since 2008.
The majority of suicide attacks have been committed by
jihadist groups in the Middle East. Whilst many of the
groups which employ suicide tactics are associated with
al-Qa’ida in some way, suicide bombing is not necessarily
directed by al-Qa’ida.6 Many jihadists follow their family
and peers rather than orders from afar.7
Over the last 14 years the numbers of suicide attacks have
increased and the areas where the majority of attacks
occurred have changed. From 2000 to 2003 the majority of
suicide attacks occurred in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.
A truce started in 2003 and led to the gradual decline of
attacks and it wasn’t till 2006 when Hamas won a majority in
the Palestinian legislative election and denounced the use of
suicide bombing that the tactic ended. In 2003, with the
invasion of Iraq and subsequent war, suicide bombing
started in Iraq. Iraq accounts for 43 per cent of all deaths
from suicide attacks in the last decade. Proportionally
however suicide attacks still remain low.
SINCE 2000, OVER 90%
OF SUICIDE ATTACKS TOOK
PLACE IN MENA AND
SOUTH ASIA.
FIGURE 15 NUMBER OF DEATHS FROM SUICIDE ATTACKS, 2000 - 2013
After 2002 the number of suicide attacks in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza significantly declined, whereas the attacks that occurred
in Iraq drastically increased.
500
400
300
200
100
Source: GTD
Iraq
YEAR
DEATHS FROM SUICIDE ATTACKS
0
Total attacks
Israel, West Bank Gaza
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
34

TABLE 2 DEATHS FROM TERRORISM IN 2013
FOR OECD COUNTRIES
Terrorism killed 57 people in Turkey and 40 people in Mexico in
2013. The United States, United Kingdom, Greece, Israel, Chile
and the Czech Republic also had fatal terrorist attacks,
collectively losing 16 lives.
ATTACKS
DEATHS
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
COUNTRY
ATTACKS
DEATHS
COUNTRY
Turkey 34 57 Germany 0 0
Mexico 4 40 Netherlands 0 0
United States 9 6 Belgium 0 0
UK* 131 3 Australia 0 0
Greece 53 2 Austria 0 0
Israel 28 2 Portugal 0 0
Chile 4 2 Estonia 0 0
Czech Republic 1 1 Iceland 0 0
Ireland 24 0 Hungary 0 0
Italy 7 0 Japan 0 0
France 5 0 Finland 0 0
Spain 5 0 New Zealand 0 0
Canada 3 0 Poland 0 0
Switzerland 2 0 Slovakia 0 0
Denmark 1 0 Slovenia 0 0
Norway 0 0 South Korea 0 0
Sweden 0 0
TERRORISM IN THE OECD
Since 2000, seven per cent of all terrorist incidents and five per
cent of all fatalities have occurred in OECD countries resulting in
4,861 deaths from 3,151 attacks. Excluding the September 11
attacks, OECD countries on average suffered approximately 229
attacks annually and lost on average 130 lives per year to
terrorist acts.
The U.S. accounted for the largest loss of life with 3,042 fatalities,
however the September 11 attacks accounted for 2,996 of these
deaths. Israel was the country with next highest number of
fatalities at 841 representing 17 per cent of total fatalities followed
by Turkey with 445 fatalities, representing 9 per cent of OECD
fatalities.
Excluding the September 11 attacks, there were still 1,865 deaths
from terrorism in OECD countries over the 14 years from 2000 to
2013. Luxembourg is the only OECD country not to be covered
by the GTI.
Although OECD countries represent a minority of terrorist
attacks globally, they have suffered from several of the most
deadly attacks of the last 14 years. This includes the September
11 attacks which killed nearly 3,000 people, the Madrid train
bombings which killed 191, the Norwegian massacre which killed
77 and the London bombings which killed 56.
As the security situation varies from nation to nation, this report
does not provide a detailed analysis of each individual country;
instead it analyses the overall level of activity in OECD countries,
which organisations historically have presented the greatest
FIGURE 16 TERRORIST FATALITIES IN OECD
COUNTRIES, 2000-2013
Five per cent of all 107,000 terrorist fatalities since 2000 have
occurred in OECD countries.
Source: GTD
Rest of the world
95%
OECD
5%
risks and what are the most common types of attacks.
In 2013 Turkey and Mexico were the countries in the OECD with
the highest number of deaths from terrorism losing 57 and 40
lives respectively; however the UK recorded the highest number
of incidents at 131 of which 88 per cent occurred in Northern
Ireland.
Other countries which suffered fatalities from terrorism were the
United States, United Kingdom, Greece, Israel, Chile and the
Czech Republic, collectively losing a total of 16 lives. Terrorist
incidents were much higher in European OECD countries than
North American and Latin American countries with 244 and 20
incidents recorded respectively in 2013.
According to data from the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), of the 34 OECD
countries, 20 are believed to have citizens fighting in Syria
against the Assad Government.8 Figure 26 (on page 57)
summarises available data from a variety of sources on
foreign fighters.
35

THE MOST ACTIVE TERRORIST
GROUPS IN THE OECD
This section of the report covers the last five years in which
447 people died from terrorism in the OECD from 1,284
incidents. During the five years from 2009 to 2013, terrorism
in the OECD was predominately concentrated in two
countries, Turkey and Mexico, which had 58 per cent of all
deaths over the last five years.
Lone individuals who were not affiliated with any terrorist
group accounted for 25 per cent of the deaths in OECD
countries over the last five years with for 113 fatalities. The
four groups covered below as well as individual actors
accounted for 338 deaths or 76 per cent of all deaths from
terrorism in OECD countries over the last five years.
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
OECD countries attacked in last five years: Turkey
Incidents in last five years in OECD countries: 156
Fatalities in last five years in OECD countries: 129
Injuries in last five years in OECD countries: 303
The PKK are responsible for the most terrorist deaths
in the OECD in the last five years. They were
established in 1978 and initially sought an
independent Kurdish state.9 However, in recent years
the group has focussed more or Kurdish autonomy
within a Turkish state. Operating primarily in Turkey
and Iraq, waves of violence waged by the PKK in the
1990’s are estimated to have caused approximately
40,000 casualties.10 In the past five years the PKK
has been responsible for 29 per cent of all deaths
from terrorism in the OECD.
Individual Actors
OECD countries attacked in last five years:
Belgium, France, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden
and the United States.
Incidents in last five years: 35
Fatalities in last five years: 113
Injuries in last five years: 144
Individual actors are the second major cause of
terrorist deaths in the OECD in the last five years.
They are people who are not formally members of a
terrorist group but may work in cooperation with
one. In the last five years individual actors have been
responsible for over a quarter of all terrorist deaths in
OECD countries. These individuals could either be
attempting to promote their own cause or to support
another group. One prominent example of lone wolf
terrorism occurred in Norway in July 2011 when a
right-wing extremist killed 77 and injured over 300 in
two attacks in part to promote his manifesto.
Another example is in 2013 with the Boston
Marathon Bombing on April 15 which was conducted
by two brothers who learned ideology and terrorist
tactics from al-Qa’ida publications.11
36

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Over the last five years ISIL was responsible for a
quarter of all deaths from terrorism in Turkey. This
makes them the fourth most active group in the
OECD. What is striking is that they have not been
active in Turkey for long and in a short period of time
have replaced the PKK as the most deadly group in
the country killing 53 people in 2013. It is important
to note that these numbers only count up to the
end of 2013.
Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Cephesi
(DHKP/C)
The DHKP/C, a Marxist-Leninist party formed in
Turkey in 1978 is the fifth most active terrorist group
in the OECD over the past five years.14 It aims to
establish a socialist state within Turkey and is
strongly opposed to the United States, NATO and
Turkish establishment.15 They have claimed
responsibility for the suicide bombing outside the
U.S. Embassy in Ankara in 2013 which killed an
embassy guard and injured one.16
Individualidades Tendiendo a lo Salvaje
(Individuals Tending Toward Savagery)
OECD countries attacked in last five years: Mexico
This group, based in Mexico, have branded
themselves as anarchist eco-terrorists opposed to
nanotechnology.12 They have claimed responsibility
for an explosion at the Pemex state oil company
offices which killed 37 people in January 2013. They
have also claimed responsibility of shooting a
biotechnology researcher, Ernesto Mendez Salinas to
death in 2011.13 If responsible for both attacks then
they are the fourth most deadly terrorist group in the
OECD in the last five years. Deaths from the drug
wars which have been active in Mexico over the last
decade are not classified as terrorism because they
are organised criminal groupings without unified
political or ideological objectives.
LONE INDIVIDUALS WHO
WERE NOT AFFILIATED
WITH ANY TERRORIST
GROUP ACCOUNTED FOR 25
PER CENT OF THE DEATHS
IN OECD COUNTRIES.
37

ASSESSING
TERRORISM RISK
This section describes how the results of the statistical
analysis carried out for the GTI can be used to develop a
quantitative understanding of the future risk of terrorism.
Using terrorist incidents and events data dating back to 1970
and comparing it to over 5,000 socio-economic, political
and conflict indicators, three groups of factors related to
terrorist activity have been identified. Countries that are
weak on these factors and do not have high levels of
terrorism are assessed as being at risk.
The correlations section of this report details the most
significant socio-economic correlates with terrorism. There
are three groups of factors:
Social hostilities between different ethnic, religious and
linguistic groups, lack of intergroup cohesion and
group grievances.
Measures of state repression such as extrajudicial
killings, political terror and gross human rights abuses.
Other forms of violence such violent crime, organised
conflict deaths and violent demonstrations.
Terrorism risk can be clearly grouped into three categories
or contexts:
1. The risk of terrorism in the context of a larger ongoing
conflict.
2. The risk of terrorism in countries without conflict.
3. The risk of ‘black swan’ attacks.
This analysis finds that meaningful risk factors can be
identified for two of the three risk categories, (1) risk of
terrorism in a context of a larger conflict, and (2) risk of
terrorism in countries without conflict. ‘Black Swan’ events
are by their nature very difficult to predict, but statistical
analysis can provide important context to their overall
likelihood. The methodology for conceptualising each
category of risk is detailed further within this section.
Understanding the statistical patterns of terrorist activity
and its socio-economic drivers is a useful starting point for
conceptualising the key risk factors. Over 5,000 datasets,
indexes and attitudinal surveys were statistically compared
to the GTI to find the most significant socio-economic
factors linked to terrorist activity. This process identified
several key indicators which were significantly correlated to
terrorism.
These factors were compared to the literature on the
conditions that are considered conducive for breeding
terrorist violence. There was significant overlap between the
IEP statistical analysis and the literature.17 Several key
variables were then chosen and a multivariate analysis was
performed to understand key causal factors. This process is
further detailed in the correlations section. Key factors
analysed were:
Weak state capacity.
Illegitimate and corrupt governments.
Powerful external actors upholding corrupt regimes.
Extremist ideologies.
Historical violence and conflict.
Inequality in power.
Repression by foreign occupation or colonial powers.
Discrimination based on ethnic or religious origin.
Failure of the state to integrate dissident groups of
emerging social classes.
Social injustice.
To determine which countries are most at risk of a large
increase in terrorism, the 162 countries covered in the GTI
were compared to these factors to find which countries
performed poorly on these measures and were not already
suffering from high levels of terrorism.
38

KEY FINDINGS
Based on measuring these factors IEP has identified the
following 13 countries as being at risk of substantial
increased terrorist activity from current levels:
—Angola
—Bangladesh
—Burundi
—Central African Republic
—Cote d’Ivoire
—Ethiopia
—Iran
—Israel
—Mali
—Mexico
—Myanmar
—Sri Lanka
—Uganda
Countries with higher levels of terrorism perform
significantly worse on the Pillars of Peace, a framework
developed by IEP to assess the positive peace factors
that create peaceful societies. The ten countries with the
most deaths from terrorism in 2013 performed 26 per
cent worse on the Pillars of Peace compared to the
international average. These countries performed
particularly poorly on three out of the eight Pillars of
Peace. These three Pillars are:
Free flow of information, which captures the extent to
which citizens can gain access to information, whether
the media is free and independent. Peaceful countries
tend to have free and independent media, which
disseminate information in a way that leads to greater
openness and helps individuals and civil society work
together. This leads to better decision-making and
rational responses in times of crisis.
Good relations with neighbours, which refers to the
relations between individuals and between
communities as well as to cross-border relations. Some
of the countries with the highest levels of terrorism
border each other.
Acceptance of the rights of others, which includes
both the formal laws that guarantee basic freedoms as
well as the informal social and cultural norms that
relate to behaviours of citizens. Yemen is the worst
performing country in this Pillar, with Nigeria and
Pakistan also performing in the bottom ten.
The countries with the highest rates of terrorism also
have certain commonalities in behaviours and attitudes.
Corruption is generally higher among the 10 countries
with the highest number of deaths from terrorism.
According to the Gallup World Values Survey, these
countries experience 11 per cent more people facing a
bribe situation than the international average. All ten
countries have significant Muslim populations and there
are relatively more people expressing the view that the
West is in conflict with the Muslim world. The rates of
political terror and political instability are also
significantly higher in these ten countries than the
international average.
BOX 1 TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND THE PILLARS OF PEACE
One of the most important findings in this report is that
there is not a strong statistical link between poverty and
terrorism.18 Many people who join terrorist groups in wealthy
countries are well educated and come from middle class
families.19 A detailed understanding of what is statistically
associated with terrorism is contained in the correlates
section of this report. Other measures which didn’t correlate
include life expectancy, mean years of schooling and
economic factors such as GDP growth.
In comparison to other forms of violence, in 2012 the
number of people killed by homicide was 40 times greater
than those killed by terrorism. Furthermore, terrorist
incidents that kill more than 100 people are rare and
represent only 1 in 1000 terrorist incidents. The required
resources and the planning needed to conduct such attacks
are more likely to be outside the capabilities of most
existing groups.
39

TERRORISM IN COUNTRIES
NOT IN CONFLICT
TERRORISM IN THE COUNTRIES
WITH ONGOING CONFLICT
In contrast to countries immersed in significant conflict, there
are terrorist activities in countries where there is no ongoing
conflict. Two factors with a strong statistical relationship in
these environments are political terror and low levels of
intergroup cohesion.
To further explore these linkages, IEP has compared the levels
of political terror and intergroup cohesion of countries since
1996 that have suffered a major terrorist attack.22 Of the 6,100
major terrorist acts analysed, over 90 per cent occurred in
countries which at the time were in the lowest quartile of
societal group cohesion as measured by the Indices of Social
Development.23 A similar statistic exists when looking at
political terror with over 90 per cent of the countries that
suffered major terrorist incidents having the highest levels of
political terror and political instability. High levels of extrajudicial
killings and disappearances were common in about 70 per cent
of the countries targeted by major terrorist attacks.
The most common context for the onset of terrorist violence is
within an ongoing conflict. According to the GTD there were
around 40,000 terrorist attacks in which at least one person
was killed between 1970 and 2013. This number spans 178
countries. Of these 40,000 terrorist attacks, around 70 per cent
occurred in countries that were at the time already immersed in
serious political, civil, ethnic or international conflicts.20 This
statistic remains true even if you remove terrorist attacks that
have occurred in MENA and South Asia.
Table 3 lists countries that are currently suffering from ongoing
conflict of this nature.21 Of these, only six are not in the twenty
countries with the highest levels of terrorism, Central African
Republic, Ethiopia, Israel, Mali, Mexico and Myanmar.
TABLE 3 COUNTRIES THAT MAY EXPERIENCE
INCREASES IN TERRORISM DUE TO ONGOING
CONFLICT
The following countries are currently suffering from ongoing conflict.
Of these only six are not in the twenty countries with the highest
levels of terrorism as measured by the GTI. These six are determined
at risk of increases in terrorist activity.
COUNTRY
Afghanistan Myanmar*
Central African Republic* Nigeria
Colombia Pakistan
Democratic Republic of the Congo Philippines
Egypt Russia
Ethiopia* Somalia
India South Sudan
Iraq Sudan
Israel* Syria
Mali* Thailand
Mexico* Turkey
Yemen
*Note: not in the twenty countries with the highest levels of
terrorism as measured by the GTI.
FIGURE 17 PER CENT OF TERRORIST ATTACKS
DURING ONGOING CONFLICT 1970-2012
Over 70 per cent of terrorist attacks occur within a country
during periods of major conflict.
During a period of major
conflict.
72%
Outside of a period of
major conflict.
28%
Source: GTD and Center for Systemic Peace,
Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2013
40

BOX 2 DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WARTIME ACTIVITY
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)
classify terrorism as actions outside the context of
legitimate warfare activities. That means only acts
which are contrary to international humanitarian law,
such as the deliberate targeting of civilians, conducted
by sub-national actors are viewed as terrorism. The
actions of governments do not get counted in the GTD
and are therefore not included in the GTI. The GTD and
START do not count state terrorism and only record
incidents by sub-national actors.
Battle deaths when state actors are involved are not
defined as acts of terrorism, but rather the result of war.
As such, a group such as ISIL attacking a Syrian Army
regiment would not be classified as terrorism by either
side but as a wartime activity. Terrorism often invokes a
distinct political or ideological message to be conveyed
to a larger audience than the immediate victims, which is
another reason that battle conflicts are not regarded as
terrorism.
Political terror refers to human and physical rights abuses as
measured by Amnesty International and the U.S. State
Department. This includes violations of human rights, state-sanctioned
killings, torture and political imprisonment.24
Intergroup cohesion refers to relations of cooperation and
respect between identity groups within a society.25 A
breakdown of this social fabric increases the risk of violent
conflict between groups within a country. Importantly, poverty
and other development indicators do not show strong
relationships to high levels of terrorism. Both of these findings
are corroborated with literature in the field.
By analysing the countries that are in a state of peace but have
high levels of political terror and low levels of intergroup
cohesion it is possible to identify countries that have the risk of
increased terrorist activity. IEP has analysed the most up-to-date
data on these factors globally. Table 4 lists countries that
are currently not in outright war or conflict but have the
characteristics of those countries that suffer from high levels of
terrorism and are outside of the 20 countries with the highest
levels of terrorism in the GTI 2014.
TABLE 4 COUNTRIES NOT IN CONFLICT BUT AT
RISK OF HIGHER LEVELS OF TERRORISM
The following countries exhibit traits that are normally associated
with countries with higher levels of terrorism.
COUNTRY EXTRAJUDICIAL
KILLING
LACK OF
WOMEN’S
POLITICAL
RIGHTS
LACK OF
INTERGROUP
COHESION
POLITICAL
INSTABILITY
RANK
IN GTI
2014
Bangladesh 9 9 9 9 23
Iran 9 9 9 28
Sri Lanka 9 9 9 9 37
Burundi 9 9 9 39
Cote
d’Ivoire
9 9 9 9 40
Uganda 9 9 9 9 52
Angola 9 9 9 9 95
*Note: ticks show where countries score in the bottom 25 per cent globally.
41

Not all terrorist incidents are equally devastating, and not
all terrorist groups are equally effective. ‘Black Swan’ events
are by their nature, unknown, unpredictable and devastating.
Understanding the statistical properties and patterns of
these attacks in the context of all terrorist attacks can
provide information that can help with prediction and
risk assessment.
Whilst the fear of large scale and unpredicted black swan
terrorist incidents loom large in the public imagination, the
reality is that most terrorist incidents result in no deaths.
Only one terrorist attack has resulted in more than a
thousand deaths, that being the attacks of September 11th,
with 49 attacks resulting in more than one hundred deaths.
Just over half of all terrorist attacks recorded in the GTI led
to one or more deaths, with the vast majority of those
resulting in less than ten deaths.
The majority of terrorist organisations are relatively
ineffective, with the vast majority of deaths from terrorism
being the responsibility of the four largest terrorist
organisations in the world, each of which has the resources,
manpower, experience, and expertise in order to carry out
successful attacks. Even with these resources, most large
terrorist organisations have had very limited success in
pulling off large scale attacks, especially beyond the
territories in which they operate.
By analysing the distribution and intensity of terrorist
activity it can be seen that the majority of deaths from
terrorism occur from a relatively small percentage of attacks.
Figure 18 shows in fact around 50 per cent of all incidents
claim no lives and most of the remainder claim less than ten.
By analysing the cumulative distribution of deaths Figure 19
shows that 80 per cent of all deaths were caused by only 17
per cent of all the attacks since 2000. Such statistical
properties lead to the observation that deaths from
terrorism follows a power-law probability distribution.
Based on purely mathematical assumption of the power-law
distribution there may even have been slightly fewer terrorist
attacks claiming between 100 and 1000 casualties than
expected. Logical explanations for this include successful
counter-terrorism efforts, or that large scale terrorist
organisations focus on encouraging either small or
independent terrorist cells to pursue smaller scale attacks.
If deaths from terrorism do follow a power-law distribution,
it is expected to see a logarithmic relationship between
deaths in a given incident and the number of incidents with
at least that many deaths. This is indeed what is observed, as
shown in figure 20. Large scale terrorist attacks like the
September 11 attacks, 7/7 London attack, the Madrid train
bombing, or the Beslan hostage crisis are rare but not
completely unexpected.
Terrorism as a tactic of sustained mass destruction on a
large scale is mostly ineffective. However, large scale
explosions and mass deaths cause large, unpredictable and
unintended consequences whereas individual deaths have
much smaller flow-on effects. Therefore comparing ‘black
swan’ events with smaller incidents is difficult as these large
events can be profoundly course changing and result in
significant domestic and international consequences well
beyond their initial impact.
‘BLACK SWAN’ ATTACKS
FIGURE 18 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
CATEGORISED BY DEATHS.
Just half of all terrorist incidents result in no fatalities.
100–1000 Deaths
1,000 Deaths
No deaths
24,413
10–100 Deaths
2,427
1–10 Deaths
22,470
49
1
Source: GTD
42

FIGURE 19 CUMULATIVE DEATHS FROM TERRORISM SINCE 2000
80 per cent of all deaths have occurred from only 17 per cent of all attacks.
ATTACK RANK BASED ON FATALITIES
60%
FIGURE 20 NUMBER OF DEATHS PER INCIDENT VS NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
WITH AT LEAST THAT MANY DEATHS
Terrorist incidents with extremely high casualties rarely occur.
100,000
10,000
1,000
100
10
1
1 10 100 1,000 10,000
NUMBER OF ATTACKS WITH AT LEAST THIS MANY DEATHS
Source: GTD Note: Log Scale
NUMBER OF DEATHS IN A SINGLE INCIDENT
100%
80%
40%
20%
0%
1 8330 24413 49360
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FATALITIES
Four fifths of all fatalities since 2000
were caused by the top 8,330 most lethal
terrorist attacks.
Therefore 80 per cent of fatalities come
from about 17 per cent of the attacks.
43

Comparing the number of deaths from homicide versus the
number of deaths from terrorism from 2000 to 2011 in the
four countries that experienced ‘black swan’ events it is
possible to compare the ratio between homicides and
terrorism. Four examples of significant ‘black swan’ incidents
since 2000 include the 2011 Norway attack, the 2004 Madrid
bombings, the 2005 7/7 London attacks and September 11.
A comparison of deaths from these four events to national
homicides of each country over the period of 2000 to 2011 is
shown in Table 5. What is apparent is that even in countries
which have experienced a devastating terrorist attack in the
last ten years; significantly more people were killed by
homicide than by terrorism over the period.
At the global level, the difference between deaths from
intentional homicide and terrorism is very significant. Figure
21 shows that in 2012 a total of around 437,000 lives were
lost due to homicide, by contrast in the same year, a total of
11,000 people were killed from terrorism representing a
number 40 times less than homicide.26 Therefore the
likelihood of being killed through intentional homicide is
much greater than being killed in a terrorist attack.
Of course while it should be noted that while terrorism may
claim fewer lives, its effect on a community is traumatic,
creating fear, changing daily habits and producing
substantial economic costs.
x40
TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATHS 2000 - 2011
FIGURE 21 NUMBER OF DEATHS BY HOMICIDES
VS. TERRORISM GLOBALLY, 2012
Around 40 times more people were killed globally by
homicide than terrorism in 2012.
DEATHS IN 2012
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
437,000
Homicides
Terrorism
Source: GTD, UNODC Global Study on Homicide 2013
11,000
COMPARING HOMICIDE TO
TERRORIST DEATHS
TABLE 5 DEATHS BY HOMICIDE VS. DEATHS FROM
FOUR LARGE ‘BLACK SWAN’ EVENTS
Even in countries which have experienced a devastating terrorist
attack in the last ten years; significantly more people were killed by
homicide than by terrorism over the 2000-2011 period.
Country Deaths from
terrorism (T)
Homicides (H)
[1]
Ratio = (H – T)/
(T)
Norway 75 518 1:6
Spain 249 5,897 1:23
United Kingdom 57 10,776 1:188
United States 3029 195,948 1:64
Source: UNODC, Homicide Statistics, http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html ,2013,
(accessed 7 October 2014).
AN INDIVIDUAL IS 40
TIMES MORE LIKELY
TO BE A VICTIM OF
HOMICIDE THAN
BE KILLED IN A
TERRORIST ATTACK.
44

The economic costs of terrorism go further than the
destruction of property and the loss of life. The increased
costs of security, military expenditure and insurance often
outweigh the original attack. Further, terrorist activities
increase uncertainty in the market, decrease foreign
investment, alter trade and change consumption and
savings behaviour.27 Long run effects can be long lasting
and have a significantly larger effect on the economies of
developing economies.
In 2001 the IMF estimated that terrorism cost the U.S. 0.75
per cent of GDP or approximately US$75 billion per year,
while increases in terrorism in Nigeria in 2010 was
associated with a decline of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) by 30 per cent the following year.28
The total costs of terrorism can be divided into two
categories, primary or direct costs and secondary or
indirect costs. Primary costs refer to the immediate
damage caused by an act of terrorism. For example, the
primary costs include the loss of life, injury and damage to
infrastructure. These are the immediate costs in the
aftermath of an event. Secondary costs are more
complicated and can span a greater time period. These are
disruptions to an economy due to a terror event or threat.
This may take the form of increased security costs,
changed consumption patterns, decreased FDI, decreased
trade, and decreased tourism.
Trying to quantify the total global cost of terrorism is
difficult. While direct costs of terrorism are largely agreed
upon in the literature, secondary costs, however, are wide
ranging. For example, studies trying to assess the cost of
the September 11 attack have estimates ranging from $35
billion to $109 billion.29 In addition, terrorism as a term
covers such a vast array of attacks that generalisation is
almost impossible. For example a bioterrorist attack could
be delivered using a poison, virus or bacteria, each of which
would have varying degrees of damage. The estimated
economic cost of such an attack could range from $477.7
million to $26.2 billion for every 100,000 persons
exposed.30
Other economic costs of terrorism included in a report
published by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade which estimated in 2013 the extra trade costs
due to terrorism alone could be as high as $180 billion. A
report by RAND published in 2011 outlined three different
levels of terrorism and associated costs within the U.S.
These were moderate, severe and nuclear. Table 6 is a
rough estimate of the associated direct costs of each
category of an attack according to their calculations.
TABLE 6 RAND ESTIMATED DIRECT COSTS OF
TERRORIST ATTACKS WITHIN THE U.S.
A RAND study published in 2011, estimated the costs of terrorist
attacks on the US economy by dividing attacks into three groups.
Severe attacks such as the 9/11 bombings are estimated to cost
the economy 1 per cent of GDP, while a nuclear attack would double
this. These are rough estimations and the location of the attack
would have major effects on the outcome.
MODERATE SEVERE NUCLEAR
Cost per year $11 billion $183 billion $465 billion
Cost of life $4 million per
person
$4 million per
person
$4 million per
person
Cost of injury $40,000 per
person
$40,000 per
person
$40,000 per
person
Annual resource cost $10 billion $200 billion $300 billion
GDP 0.05% 1% 2%
The primary costs of terrorism can incur huge totals,
especially large scale events such as the London and Madrid
bombings and the September 11 attacks. The large loss of
life and destruction of infrastructure from September 11
totalled $55 billion in New York alone, while secondary
effects such as increased security ($589 billion), decreased
economic activity ($123 billion) and other costs have been
totalled to as much as $3.3 trillion.31
ECONOMIC COST OF
TERRORISM
THE LONG TERM
INDIRECT COSTS OF
TERRORISM CAN BE
TEN TO 20 TIMES
LARGER THAN THE
DIRECT COSTS.
45

Trade and FDI are negatively affected by acts of terrorism.
However there are exceptions, single incidents, even when
major events, do not seem to affect FDI. Studies have shown
that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had little effect on U.S. FDI,32
while FDI in Spain actually increased by $6 billion in 2005
following the 2004 Madrid train bombings and by another
$11 billion in 2006.33
Decreased FDI flows due to terrorism were recorded in
Greece and Spain in the 1980s and 1990s and were worth up
to half a billion for each nation.34 The effect has been more
dramatic in Nigeria where it has been estimated that FDI
flows dropped $6.1 billion in 2010 due to Boko Haram’s acts
of terrorism.35 This represents a decline of almost 30 per
cent from the previous fiscal year. This is shown in Figure 22.
As developing economies or fragile states are generally
more volatile, investment comes at a higher risk. As a result,
terrorism in high risk countries drastically lowers investment.
These acts also increase the security premium, further
increasing the cost of economic activity and leading
investors to look elsewhere. This is one reason why acts of
terror within developing nations have a more drastic effect
on FDI than in developed nations.
The average FDI within the ten countries most affected by
terrorism is less than half of that of OECD countries. Trade
as a per cent of GDP is 51 per cent for these countries,
while OECD countries are on average 87.5 per cent.36 As
many developing economies depend on trade flows with
the developed world and rely on FDI inflows, these
decreases have substantial long-term economic and
developmental effects.
Figure 23 shows the correlation between terrorist incidents
and trade activity as a per cent of GDP in Colombia. While
not all change can be attributed terrorism, it demonstrates
there can be a notable potential impact.
TERRORISM,
INVESTMENT AND
TRADE
Increased costs of insurance
Following the 9/11 attacks, insurance premiums on large
infrastructure within the U.S. skyrocketed, Chicago’s
O’Hare airport annual insurance policy increased in cost
from $125,000 to $6.9 million while its insurance
coverage for terrorism decreased from $750 million to
$150 million per annum.37 This resulted on the creation of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which was
passed resulting in the government reimbursing up to 85
per cent of losses due to acts of terrorism. Similar
policies have been seen in Australia following the Bali
bombings, the UK, Germany and France.
GDP Decrease
Changes in consumer behaviour, decreased investment,
and decreased trade, destruction of human and physical
capital all combine to decrease a country’s GDP.
Increased government spending
Governments often have to take on the financial burden
of any terrorist acts which result in damage to property
or people. The opportunity cost of such large scale
expenditure has the potential to take funding away from
other infrastructure investments and social investments in
education, the health sector, transport and RD.
Changes in consumer behaviour
The way people act within an economy changes as a
result of terrorism. Consumption patterns change,
people invest more wealth into insurance which as a
result is diverted from other expenditure. In extreme
cases individuals are reluctant to move in public spaces
due to the fear of attack thereby decreasing expenditure
and economic activity.
BOX 3 OTHER FLOW-ON COSTS OF TERRORISM
46

FIGURE 22 CHANGES IN FDI AS A PER CENT OF GDP IN NIGERIA AND BENIN, 2006-2013
Since increased violence from Boko Haram in 2009, FDI in Nigeria has decreased sharply from five per cent of GDP to just one per cent,
while FDI in neighbouring Benin has shown increases.
5
4
3
0
Source: World Bank
Boko Haram
increases in activity.
FDI (NET INFLOWS) PER CENT OF GDP
Benin
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2
1
-1
Nigeria
YEAR
FIGURE 23 COLOMBIA: TERRORIST INCIDENTS COMPARED TO TRADE AS PER CENT OF GDP, 2008–2013
While a large drop in trade in 2008 was attributed to the global financial crisis, there is a significant statistical relationship between
trade and terrorism of –R=0.79 over the last 6 years.
TRADE AS PER PER CENT OF GDP
160
120
80
40
0
Source: World Bank Data, GTD
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
ACTS OF TERRORISM
r=0.79
Trade as % of GDP
Acts of terrorism
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
47

TERRORIST GROUP
CASE STUDIES
In 2013 four terrorist groups were responsible for 66 per
cent of all deaths from claimed terrorism incidents. These
four groups are the most deadly terrorist groups in the last
fifteen years, and have killed at least 25,000 people in a
decade. The deadliest terrorist group is the Taliban and the
TTP, which has killed over 12,000 people, closely followed by
al-Qa’ida and its major affiliates that have killed at least
8,585 people.
The two other largest terrorist groups have shorter histories.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Boko Haram
both became more active in 2009, which was the first year
that either group killed over 300 people. Based on data up
to the end of 2013, these two groups have killed in excess of
3,000 people in four years, half of which was in 2013 alone.
The ten largest terrorist groups have varying agendas and
are a combination of religiously motivated groups, separatist
movements and ideological groups wanting a change of
system. The four most deadly organisations all ascribe
broadly to the Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam and have an
association with al-Qa’ida.
The origins of al-Qa’ida can be traced to the Soviet war in
Afghanistan, where they were one of the many groups
fighting the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Taliban was involved
in opposing Soviet forces in Afghanistan.
The two groups have had close ties since 1996 when they
trained together in Afghanistan. In recent times al-Qa’ida has
decentralised and its direct affiliates continue to be
significant. Of its major branches or affiliated organisations
al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) has been responsible for the most
deaths. Following the death of AQI’s leader and a split over
tactics, Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) emerged from AQI. ISI was
renamed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and is
the biggest terrorist group operating in Iraq today. It has
since adopted the name of Islamic State, but this report uses
the ISIL designation.
Other large affiliates of al-Qa’ida include al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen which has been
responsible for nearly 1,000 deaths and al-Qa’ida in the
Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM) based in Algeria and
48

responsible for over 500 deaths. There have been reports
that Boko Haram is affiliated with al-Qa’ida, with founding
member Mohamad Yusuf reportedly receiving early funding
from Usama bin Ladin.38 There are only two other terrorist
groups among the ten most deadly groups which are also
motivated by religion. The Lord’s Resistance Army in
Uganda and South Sudan is driven in part by Christian
fundamentalism.39 The other religiously motivated group,
Al-Shabaab in Somalia, is an al-Qa’ida affiliate.
Al Qa’ida affiliates are defined as either being an ally or as
having a familial relationship to al-Qa’ida. The activity of
these 30 organisations span South Asia, MENA, Europe,
Africa, North America and the Asia-Pacific and have
claimed 27,169 lives over the period. Activity since 2009 has
been largely in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria
and Nigeria.
The changing name of ISIL reflects the many changes of
the organisation. Originally al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), the
group changed their name to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)
when they split off from al-Qa’ida. In April 2013 the group
changed its name to Islamic state of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
to reflect that it was engaged in the Syrian civil war. Due
to translation ambiguities it is also known as the Islamic
State of or Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In June 2014 the
group solely referred to itself as the Islamic State or IS
reflecting its shift of focus from a regime change in Syria
to a desire to create a ‘caliphate’ or sovereign state. It has
been referred to as Da’ish (or Daesh) as that is the Arabic
acronym, although ISIL supporters dislike this name in
part because it sounds similar to unpleasant words in
Arabic.40 This report uses the ISIL designation.
FIGURE 24 10 MOST DEADLY TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS BY NUMBERS KILLED (2000-2013)
The four biggest terrorist groups in 2013 are also the deadliest groups of the last fifteen years.
Taliban* Boko Haram Indian Maoists
8,000
4,000
Source: GTD Note: Taliban includes Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban.
Al-Shabaab
Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC)
12,000
10,000
6,000
2,000
0
FATALITIES
Al-Qa'ida ISIL
(all major affiliates)
Lord's Resistance Army
Tamil Tigers
Chechen Rebels
BOX 4 THE MANY NAMES OF ISIL
49

COMPARING TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS
INCIDENTS, DEATHS INJURIES In 2013 these four groups are responsible for 66 per cent of all
deaths from terrorist attacks in which the perpetrator is known.
Deaths from other groups operating in Pakistan, Syria, Somalia,
India, and Kenya account for a further 21 per cent of deaths in the
same year. Prominent groups operating in these countries include
the Al-Nusrah Front in Syria, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya,
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Pakistan and Maoists in India.
Al-Qa’ida 66% Taliban *
ISIL
Boko
Haram
Of all attacks in 2013 in
which the perpetrator was
known, these four groups
were responsible for 66 per
cent of all resulting deaths.
*Includes both Afghanistan
and Pakistan Taliban.
9115
12185
3111
Al-Qa’ida Taliban Boko Haram ISIL
8081
492
3440
1759
750
8763
2757
8585
1089
Total, 2000-2013
Incidents
Deaths
Injuries
TRENDS, 2000-2013
Boko Haram
ISIL Al-Qa'ida (all major affiliates)
YEAR
NUMBER OF DEATHS
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
Taliban
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
50

TARGETS TACTICS, 2000-2013
FREQUENCY AND TYPES OF ATTACKS / / /
Al-Qa’ida Taliban
740 /268 / 81
Firearms Explosives Others Key 1 icon = 50 incidents
TARGETS OF ATTACKS / / / /
ISIL
420 / 51 / 21
270 / 375 / 105
622 / 1612
133 / 390
Boko Haram
Al-Qa’ida
289 / 520 / 35 / 245
Taliban
Taliban
ISIL
Al-Qa’ida
Note: al-Qa’ida includes al-Qa’ida and all major affiliates.
* Sources detailed in endnotes.
Boko Haram
156 / 307
150 / 137
1345 / 966 / 446
ISIL
219 / 158
30 / 85
Private citizens
property
Government,
police military
Others
Educational
religious institutions
CAPACITY, NUMBER OF FIGHTERS*
0 20,000 40,000
36,000-60,000
20,000-30,500
3,700-19,000
500-9000
60,000
Boko Haram
High Estimate
Low Estimate
NUMBER OF FIGHTERS
51

ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND
THE LEVANT (ISIL)
Iraq’s wheat growing land. The second main source of revenue is
through foreign investors.44 The third revenue stream is through
looting and controlling resources. Kidnapping and extortion, as
well as the charging of electricity, fines and religious taxes, are
also major revenue streams for ISIL.45
MEMBERSHIP
Recent estimates suggest that ISIL has access to up to 31,500
soldiers.46 This represents up to a fifteen fold increase on the
numbers of AQI in 2011 which the U.S. Department of State
estimated at 1,000 to 2,000.47 The majority of these soldiers are
from Syria and Iraq, attracted in part by steady wages. ISIL
reportedly pays soldiers $400 per month and a bonus every year
with added premiums for a dependant which is a good wage for
the region.48 ISIL actively recruits foreign fighters, posting on
social media in multiple languages and publishing its propaganda
magazine, Dabiq, in English. The war in Syria has attracted at
least 12,000 foreign fighters. As the Syrian civil war has
continued, foreign fighters have been more attracted to
extremist groups like ISIL over more mainstream rebel groups.49
ACTIVITIES
The military and intelligence wings remain significant as ISIL
attempt to gain and maintain control over land. Military
operations include training camps as well as military incursions
and terrorist activity. Terrorist activity takes the form of
bombings targeting private citizens, police and businesses. In
2013 there were 350 terrorist attacks by ISIL which killed 1,400
people and injured 3,600. ISIL conducted over 50 suicide
bombings which killed an average of nine and injured 17 people.
ISIL is both an insurgency and a quasi-government for the
regions it controls in both Iraq and Syria. ISIL has developed a
governing bureaucracy since shifting its focus from overthrowing
the Assad regime in Syria to establishing a state. There are
departments which draft and implement ISIL policies.
Responsibilities include developing laws, recruitment, controlling
financial matters including a 410 page annual report and oil and
weapon sales, propaganda and media outreach. As well as
internal organisational roles, councils have adopted governance
responsibilities including the establishment of Islamic courts as
well as policing and punishment. There are also reports that ISIL
have taken on service delivery functions including electricity,
repairing roads, food kitchens and, in some areas, post offices.50
HISTORY
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has emerged as
the largest Sunni terrorist organisation active in the Middle East.
The group was originally al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). However
following the death of the head of AQI, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
and disagreements over tactics, a group split from AQI and
formed the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).
ISIL became known for extreme violence and terror tactics as a
major actor in the Syrian civil war in 2013 and with its rapid
expansion into Syria and then Iraq in 2014. In February 2014
al-Qa’ida formally broke ties with ISIL, with leader Ayman
al-Zawahiri stating ISIL disobeyed directions from al-Qa’ida to kill
fewer civilians.
IDEOLOGY
ISIL is an extremist Wahhabi insurgency with the primary goal of
establishing a regional caliphate, or state, under Salafist oriented
Islamic law.41 The group promotes violence to those who do not
adhere to its interpretations. ISIL aspires to control the Levant
region which includes Israel, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It is
opposed to the Alawite Assad regime and the Shia Iraqi
Government of both former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his
successor Haider al-Abadi. ISIL has also claimed to be fighting a
holy war against Shia Muslims, Christians and Yezidis, a Kurdish
ethno-religious group in Iraq and Syria.
LEADERSHIP
The entire organisation is led by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi who is
known as the Caliph or political successor. The ‘governor’ of the
Syrian territories of ISIL is run by Abu Ali al-Anbari, a former
Major General under the Hussein regime. The ‘governor’ of the
Iraqi territories of ISIL is run by another former army General
under Hussein, Abu Muslim al Turkmani. Both men engage in
military strategy and govern areas through the oversight of local
councils.
FUNDING
ISIL has emerged as one of the wealthiest terrorist organisations,
with at least three main revenue streams. The first is through
selling what they have captured. This includes oil sales to local
consumers, the Syrian regime and black marketers as well as
exporting crude oil to Turkey.42 It is believed that ISIL controls a
dozen oil fields and refineries in Iraq and Syria generating
revenues of between one to three million U.S. dollars per day.43
ISIL captured some of the oil fields from Al-Nusrah Front in 2014.
As well as oil, it is believed that ISIL has access to 40 per cent of
52

BOKO HARAM
HISTORY
Boko Haram is a Nigerian based terrorist group founded in 2002.
The name has been interpreted to mean ‘Western education is
sin’ or ‘Western Civilisation is forbidden.’ The group began as
members of a mosque in the north-east which sought to
implement a separatist community under Wahhabi principles.51
Boko Haram was founded as a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist sect
advocating a strict form of sharia law and developed into a
Salafist-jihadi group in 2009, influenced by the Wahhabi
movement.52 After a dispute with police which killed 70
members, a new group was formed under Imam Mohamad Yusuf
who built a new mosque for the group. Following the death of
Mohammed Yusuf while he was in police custody in 2009 the
group became markedly more violent. Before 2009 the group
engaged in few acts of violence, but it has been responsible for
3,500 civilian deaths since.53
IDEOLOGY
The group is Sunni Islamist and seeks to abolish the secular
system of government to implement Wahhabi interpretations of
Sharia law in Nigeria.54 Sharia law is fully implemented in nine and
partially implemented in three of the 36 states of Nigeria, all of
which are in northern Nigeria. However, Boko Haram is seeking
full implementation of Sharia throughout the entire country.
They aim to use acts of terror to further the social divide
between Muslim, Christian groups and the Federal Government.
As such, they have issued an ultimatum to Christians living in
north-east Nigeria to ‘leave or die.’55 The group is against any
Western influence and, like the Taliban, attacks educational
institutions to highlight its opposition to western education.56
LEADERSHIP
After the death of founder Mohamad Yusuf in 2009, deputy
leader Abubakar Shekau took over until he was killed by Nigerian
forces on 26 September 2014. The group is largely decentralised.
Different states host cells which often have little communication
with each other. Hence it is difficult to dissect the organisational
structure, size and leadership. What is known is that Boko Haram
has two main sections: the larger section is focused on
discrediting the Nigerian government; whereas the smaller
section is more focused on conducting increasingly sophisticated
and lethal attacks.57
FUNDING
Boko Haram has multiple revenue streams. This includes the sale
of goods, extracting the profits of supportive businesses, child
beggars which are also used as spies for the organisation,
extorting local traders and cross-border smuggling of arms and
cash.58 They also receive funding from wealthy members and
supportive benefacttors. There are also major narcotic trafficking
routes to Europe in West Africa and it is suspected that Boko
Haram has links with al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in
trafficking narcotics as another major source of revenue.59
MEMBERSHIP
The exact number of Boko Haram members is unknown60
however higher estimates are around 9,000.61 Recruitment has
targeted disaffected youths in the poorest areas of Nigeria,
namely Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Borno and Kaduna all in the north.
The 12 most northern states where Boko Haram operates have
almost double the poverty rates and four times the child
malnutrition rates of the rest of the country.62 Members are often
disaffected youths, unemployed graduates and members of
Almajiris which are homeless youth supposedly under religious
guidance.
ACTIVITIES
Boko Haram wants to bring about Sharia law rather than control
areas and service delivery. As such, the majority of its activity is
aimed at destabilising the Nigerian Government and increasing
religious tensions rather than becoming the government. Apart
from recruitment, fundraising and increasing political influence,
Boko Haram is predominantly engaged in terrorist activity. The
group has been increasing its deadliness each year, with 2013
being four times as deadly as 2009. In the period between 2009
and 2012, over 3,500 Nigerians have been killed by the group
through shootings and bombings.63 Around 60 per cent of
attacks and fatalities are armed assaults using guns, with a
quarter of attacks and fatalities from bombings. They have used
at least 35 suicide bombings, 28 of which occurred in 2012.
Suicide bombings account for five per cent of all attacks.
Boko Haram is known for instigating sectarian violence between
Christian and Muslim groups and has attacked both churches
and mosques in an attempt to instigate hatred and unrest among
the two groups. In 2013 Boko Haram killed 64 people who were
attending services in mosques and 16 attending church services
in over 11 separate attacks. In 2013 there were 11 private citizens
who were beheaded.
Like other large terrorist groups, Boko Haram shows concern
over the way it is depicted in the media. The group has specific
journalists which they contact directly to claim responsibility for
various attacks. They regularly release videos online, including
in response to the international ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ campaign
which was started in protest of the school girls kidnapped
in Chibok. 53

AL-QA’IDA
HISTORY
Al-Qa’ida was formed in 1988 by Usama bin Ladin, a Saudi
Arabian who was killed in 2011, and Abdullah Azzam, a
Palestine Sunni scholar who was killed in 1989. The group, like
the Taliban, rose during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. It strives
for international jihad, and is the only international jihadi group
to have successfully conducted large scale attacks in the West.
The group was responsible for large scale attacks in New York,
London and Madrid and were a main target of the NATO-led
War on Terror following September 11. As a result, many of
al-Qa’ida’s leadership have been killed and al-Qa’ida now
adopts a decentralised structure using regional cells and
affiliated organisations instead of a centrally controlled
organisation. While direct acts of terrorism attributed to
al-Qa’ida have been relatively lower since 2011, activity by
al-Qa’ida affiliated groups has risen.
IDEOLOGY
Al-Qa’ida is a Salafi jihadist group inspired by the teachings of
Wahhabism and seeks to use armed conflict to advance Islam.
The group is opposed to other forms of Islam including Shia,
and other major religions well as Judaism. Al-Qa’ida also views
the West as allied to Israel, and determines this relationship as
responsible for the poverty of many Muslim countries.64 The
organisation seeks to rid the Muslim world of any western
influence and implement an Islamic caliphate, or state, under
sharia law.65
LEADERSHIP
Following the capture or assassination of many of the group’s
leaders, the structure and leadership of the organisation has
decentralised into regional cells. The current leader is Ayman
al-Zawahiri, who reportedly was one of the architects of the
September 11 attacks and served as bin Ladin’s physician in the
1980s. His whereabouts have remained unknown since he went
into hiding following the overthrow of the Taliban.
Nasser Abdul Karim al-Wahuyshi is the leader of al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active franchise of
al-Qa’ida. Khalid al-Habib was named as the organisation’s
military commander after it was falsely believed he had been
killed in U.S. drone strokes in 2006. He is believed to oversee
internal operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
FUNDING
Originally the organisation was funded by bin Ladin’s personal
wealth and fundraising as well as through the opium trade.66
Recently, ransoms for hostages have been a major source of
revenue for al-Qa’ida. According to a New York Times report,
al-Qa’ida has raised $125 million from ransoms since 2008, with
$66 million from 2013 alone.67 The source of the majority of
ransom payments is reportedly European governments and
companies.
MEMBERSHIP
The size of al-Qa’ida is hard to measure as many significant
leaders from al-Qa’ida have been killed or imprisoned and the
organisation is largely decentralised. The central organisation
has decreased in size in recent years, with the former CIA
Director, Leon Panetta, claiming in mid-2010 that there were
fewer than 100 al-Qa’ida members in Afghanistan. However, its
affiliation with other organisations and reach, especially in
Africa, has increased.68 Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates are estimated
to have 3,700 to around 19,000 members. 69 70
While the organisation is split into sects such as al-Qa’ida in the
Islamic Maghreb, al-Qa’ida in Syria, al-Qa’ida in Somalia,
al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula, the organisation is also indirectly affiliated with at
least 18 other terrorist groups and has connections with Boko
Haram and Al-Shabaab.
ACTIVITIES
Prior to the death of bin Ladin the group were responsible for a
number of high profile attacks within western countries such as
September 11, the London and Madrid bombings, as well as a
string of smaller attacks. However, recently it hasn’t committed
large scale acts of terror. This may be because of the much
reduced organisational capacity. Other attacks such as suicide
bombings, armed attacks, IEDs, kidnapping and hijackings have
also been employed by the organisation. The number of terrorist
attacks attributed to al-Qa’ida dropped significantly in 2013 to
166 from 405 in 2012, while the organisation was still responsible
for the death of 559 people and injury of 1,245 others.
54

TALIBAN
HISTORY
Founded in 1994 by Mohamad Omar, the group were originally a
mixture of Mujahedeen who fought against the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in the 1980s and a group of Pashtun tribesmen.
The Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996 and ruled until
2001, when they were overthrown by the American-led invasion
of Afghanistan. They have since regrouped as an insurgency
movement to fight the now former Karsai administration and the
NATO-led International Security Forces (ISAF). Now known as
the ‘Neo-Taliban’ or the Quetta Shura Taliban due to the current
location of their leadership, the organisation has rebranded itself
as an independence movement in an attempt to gain support as
it endeavours to recapture and take control of Afghanistan.
IDEOLOGY
Its beliefs are a mixture of Wahhabism, Deobandi, a form of
Hanafi Sunni Islam, and Pashtun local tribe codes known as
Pashtunwali.71 The group has rebranded itself as an
independence movement rather than a fundamentalist
organisation.72 The new structure forcibly recruits men and
children into their ranks.
LEADERSHIP
Since the collapse of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2001,
the leadership of the Taliban is based in Quetta, Pakistan, known
as the Quetta Shura Taliban. Mullah Omar who began his
involvement with the Taliban in 1996 is said to head the
organisation. While there have been several reports of his death,
none have been confirmed.
FUNDING
Al-Qa’ida had provided the Taliban with financial support and
imported fighters from Arab countries and Central Asia. While
also dependant on smuggling and drug trafficking, opium and
heroin production is believed to be the equivalent to four per
cent of Afghanistan’s GDP and the global heroin trade has
historically been a major source of revenue for the Taliban.73 74 In
2008 it was estimated that the opium trade financed as much as
40 per cent of the Taliban’s activities.75 The U.S. has also
accused Iran for supplying militants with Iranian-made weapons
including road side bombs, one of the main forms of attacks
used by the Taliban.76
MEMBERSHIP
In 2010 the estimated size of the Taliban was said to be 36,000
to 60,000.77 78
ACTIVITIES
While the Taliban has been responsible for 75 per cent of civilian
casualties in Afghanistan since 2010, its main targets are
government administration, police and military personnel,
specifically targeting coalition and Afghan forces as it stages an
insurgency campaign to recapture the state. In 2013 the Taliban
were responsible for 649 acts of terrorism with 234 associated
deaths. While suicide bombings are used for around 10 per cent
of attacks the majority of Taliban incidents have been via
roadside bombs, explosive devices or armed attacks. There has
been an increase in targeting of military and police in recent
years.
Major attacks in 2013 included:
A suicide bomber detonated a bomb outside of Kabul’s
Supreme Court killing 17 and wounding 40.
In December 2013 an armed assault on Afghan security
forces in Jurn district, Badakhshan province, Afghanistan
killed a total of 19 people including two soldiers.
In November of 2013 an assault on the national army in
Bala Morgab district, Badgis province, Afghanistan killed
eight people including two soldiers and injuring 23 others.
No group claimed responsibility; however the attack was
attributed to the Taliban.
The organisation has been using Twitter and text
messages to communicate with the media and claim
responsibility for attacks as well as operating a
clandestine radio station “voice of the Shariat” to claim
responsibility for attacks and spread their agenda.79
55

BOX 5 FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA
Following the beginning of the Syrian war there is growing
interest surrounding the increases in foreign fighters,
particularly ‘western’ born jihadists. Central to this interest is
the concern that foreign fighters returning from the conflicts
in Iraq and Syria will commit terrorist attacks once they have
returned to their country of origin. Statements made by ISIL
have said that they wish to encourage ‘lone wolf’ terrorism
committed by fighters once they return home.
As a result of these concerns, there has been a great deal of
debate regarding the number of foreign fighters currently
fighting for ISIL. Estimates vary depending on sources, with
some counting total numbers, including those killed in
action or those who have returned home, whilst others try
to estimate only the number of currently active fighters
only. Figure 26 shows an estimate of the total number of
active foreign fighters in Syria based on government
reports and the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalism (ICSR). High and low estimates are provided by
ICSR as well as a comprehensive account of how these
estimates were derived.
The vast majority of foreign fighters in Syria came from
surrounding Middle Eastern countries. Low estimates
suggest that there were four times as many foreign fighters
from the Middle East and North Africa, compared to Western
European countries.
BOX 6 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END
Comprehensive counter-terrorism efforts are concerned
not only with stopping specific terrorist attacks, but also
disrupting, breaking up, and eventually ending terrorist
groups. Thus, it is important to understand how,
historically, terrorist groups come to an end in order to
hasten the demise of currently active terrorist groups.
A report by the RAND Corporation, which looked at
terrorist groups over a forty year period, found that the
majority of terrorist groups ended by either joining the
political process, meaning either the whole organisation,
or via a political wing of the organisation and becoming
became a legitimate political party, or were destroyed by
policing and intelligence agencies breaking up the group
and either arresting or killing key members. Military force
in of itself was rarely responsible for ending terrorist
groups, as shown in Figure 25.
The report also found that the manner in which a
terrorist organisation developed was closely related to
the goals of that organisation. Terrorist groups with
narrow goals were much less likely to engage in
widespread violence, were more likely to find common
ground or at least negotiate a settlement with the acting
government, and thus more likely to seek legitimisation
through the political process. Conversely, groups with
broad goals or those groups with an international focus
and a religious orientation were much less likely to
achieve their goals, and are more likely to continue
operating, increase in size, and need military intervention
to halt them. Of all the terrorist groups tracked in the
report between 1968 and 2006, 62 per cent ended, but
of these only 32 per cent of religious terrorist groups
ceased operating.
FIGURE 25 HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END,
268 TERRORIST GROUPS (1968-2006)
Political engagement and policing were the most successful
strategies in combating terrorist groups in the long run.
Military force
Achieved goals
Source: RAND
Politicisation
43%
Policing
40%
10%
7%
56

FIGURE 26 ACTIVE FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN SYRIA
Most foreign fighters come from surrounding Middle-Eastern countries.
0 500 1000 1500
2000 2500 3000
NEAR NEIGHBOURS
ICSR Low estimate (Dec 2013)
ICSR High estimate (Dec 2013)
Govt. Agency Estimates (Feb-April 2014)
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Tunisia
Saudi Arabia
Jordan
Morocco
Lebanon
Libya
Turkey
Egypt
Iraq
Algeria
Palestine
Sudan
Kuwait
Qatar
U.A.E.
Bahrain
Mauritania
Oman
Russia
France
UK
Belgium
Germany
Netherlands
Kosovo
Denmark
Spain
Sweden
United States
Austria
Indonesia
Italy
Norway
Finland
Ireland
Canada
Switzerland
Kyrgyzstan
Luxembourg
Singapore
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
6664
1846 1930
396
Europe MENA
FOREIGN FIGHTERS
ICSR Low estimate (Dec 2013)
ICSR High estimate (Dec 2013)
Govt. Agency Estimates (Feb-April 2014)
Source: ICSR Data. Report: ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise Among Western Europeans (http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-
syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/); Govt. Agency Data. Report: Foreign Fighters in Syria, The Soufan Group
(http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf).
Note: Data refers to fighters in total, does not subtract for fighters who have been killed, or who have returned to their home countries. Other estimates exist in the media, these
two sources represent the most reliable estimates at the time of publication. Not every foreign fighter in Syria is a terrorist or joined with the explicit desire to fight for ISIL.
However, as the conflict has gone, foreign fighters have tended to become more radical.
57

THE RISE AND FALL
OF TERRORIST GROUPS
SINCE SEPTEMBER 11
The RAND study on how terrorist groups end focuses on the
period 1968 to 2006 as outlined in Box 6 on page 56.
However, there has been a tremendous growth in the total
level of terrorist activity in the last decade with a shift from
small nationalist and ethnic terrorist groups towards large
scale groups or even insurgencies with broad religious and
political based goals.
Despite this increase, there are some large terrorist groups
that have seen significant declines in terrorist activity over
the last six years, when compared to total terrorist activity in
the prior six years from 2002 to 2007.
Of the 20 terrorist groups which saw the largest declines in
activity over this period:
Ten are still active to some degree, although most of them
are operating with much reduced capacity.
Nationalist and separatist terrorist groups had the biggest
decreases in terrorist activity, the key developments were:
—FARC in Colombia have seen large declines in
activity by partially entering a political process.
—The Tamil Tigers were defeated by the military in
Sri Lanka.
—Activity by the Chechen Rebels has declined partly
due to military intervention but also due to the
dispersion of members into other terrorist groups.
—In Israel, a combination of political process and
counterterrorism activities has led to a significant
reduction in terrorist activity from Hamas, the
Al-Asqa Martyr’s Brigade, and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad. This is based on data up to the end of 2013.
—There was also a significant reduction in terrorism
in India by Maoist separatists but that trend has
since plateaued.
However, most of the religiously motivated terrorist groups
with broad goals which had large decreases in terrorist
activity either merged with other terrorist groups or
morphed into slightly different organisations. For instance:
Tawid and Jihad, a terrorist organisation founded by
al-Zarqawi in 1999, began operating in Iraq in 2002 before
becoming known as Al-Qa’ida in Iraq. It has merged with
other groups several times, and was the precursor to ISIL.
Similarly, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC) which was active in Algeria from 1998 to 2006,
became known as Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb in
2007, after a loss of popular support saw its resources
dwindle.
The pattern of terrorist group declines in the last decade
follows the outline suggested in the RAND study on how
terrorist groups end. Nationalist groups have either partially
entered a political process or been completely defeated,
whilst those groups with mixed ideologies and broad goals
have mutated or merged with other groups. In some areas,
ethnically motivated groups have been displaced by
religious groups with links to broader terrorist networks, and
even when efforts to quell these groups have been
successful, they have been able to draw upon networks of
likeminded groups to rebrand and help rebuild resources
and capacity.
IN THE LAST DECADE THERE
HAS BEEN A SHIFT FROM
SMALL NATIONALIST AND
ETHNIC TERRORIST GROUPS
TOWARDS LARGE GROUPS
WITH BROAD RELIGIOUS AND
POLITICAL GOALS.
58

CORRELATES
OF TERRORISM
The most significant socio-economic correlates with
terrorism can be grouped into three main factors.
Measures of social hostilities between different ethnic,
religious and linguistic groups, lack of intergroup
cohesion and group grievances.
Measures of state sponsored violence such as extrajudicial
killings, political terror scale and poor human rights.
Measures of other forms of violence including
perceptions of criminality, violent demonstrations and
levels of violent crime.
Importantly, there is no systematic link to poverty measures,
and several broader economic development factors such as
the Human Development Index or its subcomponents such
as mean years of schooling or life expectancy. Similarly,
economic indicators such as GDP growth also do not
correlate.
When conducting a more in-depth multivariate analysis it
can be seen that the measures of violence, state-sponsored
violence, social hostility indicators and governance
indicators have the most significant explanatory relationship
with the GTI. This suggests, as shown in the previous
correlations, that political violence in combination with social
hostilities is the dominating factor which influences the level
of terrorism within a country.
Table 7 highlights the correlations of the 2014 GTI with a
range of indexes and indicators associated with the level of
terrorism. Social hostilities and political violence are the key
correlates of terrorism. While these figures only show
correlation, not causation, the results provide evidence as to
the factors that are associated with terrorist activity. Social
hostilities, ongoing conflict, a lack of social cohesion, and a
lack of political stability have a strong statistical relationship
to the GTI.
Terrorism can be linked to a range of factors which span
economic, social and political dimensions. However there is
not one predominant variable responsible for spawning
terrorist activity. There are a range of factors which jointly
develop the climate for terrorist activity to thrive.
TABLE 7 THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONS
WITH THE GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX
The most statistically significant correlates with terrorism include
measures of social hostilities and lack of intergroup cohesion
and group grievances, but also measures of state sponsored
violence such as extrajudicial killings, political terror scale and
poor human rights.
INDICATOR STRENGTH OF
CORRELATION
NUMBER OF
COUNTRIES
Social Hostilities Index 0.75 155
Political stability -0.72 162
Ongoing conflict 0.7 162
Intergroup cohesion -0.69 153
Security effectiveness 0.68 161
Deaths in conflict 0.68 151
Global Peace Index 0.65 162
Security legitimacy 0.61 161
Extrajudicial killing -0.61 160
Political Terror Scale 0.6 162
Were there crimes, malicious acts or
0.59 161
violence motivated by religious hatred or
bias?
Physical Integrity Rights Index -0.59 160
Guerrilla acts per capita (log) 0.59 158
Did organised groups use force or coercion
0.58 161
in an attempt to dominate public life with
their perspective on religion, including
preventing some religious groups from
operating in the country?
Was there mob violence related to
religion?
0.56 161
Were there acts of sectarian or communal
violence between religious groups?
0.55 161
Group grievances 0.54 157
Religious tensions rating -0.53 133
Order and security -0.52 96
59

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX
VS GLOBAL PEACE INDEX:
HOW DOES TERRORISM RELATE
TO OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE?
When the GTI is correlated with the indicators in the Global
Peace Index (GPI), other forms of violence which are related
to acts of terrorism can be further assessed. Out of the 22
indicators used to calculate the GPI, several are highly
significant with the GTI. As would be expected, levels of
terrorism correlates strongly with internal deaths from
conflict and levels of political terror.
Levels of internal organised conflict, likelihood violent
demonstrations, violent crime, and deaths from conflict are
all significantly related to levels of terrorism. This highlights
how the persistent targeting of police forces and instability
generated by terrorism can possibly undermine rule of law
and lead to the increase in other forms of violence.
Table 8 continued.
POLITICAL TERROR AND EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
The level of political violence and terror that a country
experiences in a particular year is measured by the Political
Terror Scale developed by Wood and Gibney based on U.S.
State Department and Amnesty International human rights
reports. The data is presented on a 1 to 5 ‘terror scale’, 5
being the highest level of political terror. Terrorism correlates
significantly with the Political Terror Scale with r= 0.59.
This can be viewed in two ways. Either increased terrorism
leads governments to implement stricter, authoritarian and
illegal acts toward its citizens through torture or state
violence, or the repression results in terrorist acts as
TABLE 8 CHANGE IN CORRELATION BETWEEN
GTI AND GLOBAL PEACE INDEX INDICATORS.
The correlation between the GPI and GTI is very strong indicating
the link between terrorism and broader societal peacefulness.
GLOBAL PEACE
INDICATORS
CORRELATION
2013
CORRELATION
2014
CHANGE IN
CORRELATION
2013-2014
Safety security 0.53 0.51 -0.02
Militarization 0.43 0.45 0.02
Ongoing conflict 0.66 0.65 -0.01
Internal peace 0.59 0.58 -0.02
External peace 0.48 0.50 0.02
Deaths from conflict
(internal) 0.66 0.70 0.04
Political terror scale 0.63 0.59 -0.04
Level of organised
conflict (internal) 0.56 0.57 0.00
Likelihood of violent
demonstrations 0.33 0.38 0.05
Level of violent crime 0.37 0.38 0.01
Perceptions of
criminality in society 0.32 0.36 0.04
Access to small arms
and light weapons 0.43 0.35 -0.07
Nuclear and heavy
weapons capability 0.26 0.33 0.07
Military expenditure
(% of GDP) 0.11 0.33 0.22
Displaced people
(% population) 0.32 0.33 0.01
Deaths from conflict
(external) 0.13 0.32 0.19
Relations with
neighbouring countries 0.29 0.32 0.02
Total conflicts
(internal and external) 0.33 0.31 -0.02
Political instability 0.29 0.27 -0.02
Homicide rate
(per 100,000 people) 0.28 0.18 -0.10
UN peacekeeping data 0.16 0.11 -0.05
Armed services
personnel
0.10 0.10 0.01
(per 100,000 people)
Police (per 100,000
people) -0.01 0.01 0.01
Incarceration rate
(per 100,000 people) -0.02 -0.01 0.01
Weapons exports
(per 100,000 people) -0.03 -0.02 0.00
Weapons imports
(per 100,000 people) -0.03 -0.08 -0.05
OVERALL GPI SCORE 0.65 0.64 -0.01
60

FIGURE 27 GROUP GRIEVANCES VS. GTI
Group Grievances are positively correlated with the GTI. This shows increased tension and violence between ethnic, religious
and social groups isrelated to increased levels of terrorism.
Colombia
Greece
Indonesia
Ukraine Mexico
Philippines
Syria
Germany
Hungary Norway
Switzerland
Japan
0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
NO TERRORISM GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX (GTI)
LOW HIGH
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
Source: IEP, Failed States Index
HIGH LEVELS OF TERRORISM
GROUP GRIEVANCES
2
1
r=0.54
United Kindgom
United States
Mozambique
Iran
Nepal Egypt
Russia
India
Nigeria Pakistan
Afganistan
Israel South Sudan
Sri Lianka
Chad
Serbia
Jordan
Spain
Canada
Denmark
Portugal
Iceland Sweden
Ireland
retaliation. This can create a vicious cycle of violence making
it difficult to clearly identify causality.
Extrajudicial killings measured by the CIRI data project hold a
significant correlation of r=-0.61 with the GTI. Extrajudicial
killings measure the killings by government officials without
due process of law. This also includes murders by private
groups that have been instigated by the government.
SOCIAL FACTORS, SOCIAL COHESION,
GROUP GRIEVANCES
The group grievance indicator correlates significantly with
the GTI with an r= 0.54. The positive correlation means that
high levels of group grievances are associated with higher
levels of terrorism. Conversely, low levels of group grievances
are associated with low levels of terrorism.
The intergroup cohesion indicator is compiled by the Institute
of Social Studies (ISS). The indicator measures the relations
of cooperation with respect between identity groups within
a society. When cooperation breaks down between
prominent identity groups, there is the potential for conflict
including killings, assassinations, rioting, and acts of
terrorism. ISS measures intergroup cohesion using
composite data on ‘inter-group disparities, perceptions of
being discriminated against, and feelings of distrust against
members of other groups’.
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
While countries that record high levels of terrorism tend to
be under-developed, development indicators do not
correlate with levels of terrorism globally. This suggests
that while these characteristics such as poor life expectancy,
educational attainment and GNI per capita may be common
in areas with increased levels of terrorism, they are not
unique to them.
TABLE 9 CORRELATION WITH HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS AND THE GTI
While a negative relationship is shown, suggesting that high
levels of terrorism are related to low development, none of the
relationships are significant, suggesting that development is not
a major contributor to the development of terrorist activity.
HDI INDICATORS CORRELATION
Human Development Index (HDI) -0.20
Life expectancy at birth -0.14
Mean years of schooling -0.27
Expected years of schooling -0.21
Gross national income (GNI) per capita -0.24
61

TABLE 10 CORRELATION BETWEEN GTI
AND KEY ECONOMIC STATISTICS, 2012 - 2014
While the GTI shows negative relationships with the economic
statistics below, the correlations are not significant. However,
trade as a per cent of GDP notably correlates.
ECONOMIC STATISTICS 2012 2014
FDI net inflows 0.10 -0.07
Trade as a % of GDP -0.41 -0.40
Natural resources as a % of GDP
(2012)
-0.06 -0.09
Youth unemployment -0.14 -0.02
Male youth unemployment -0.18 -0.08
GDP growth -0.01 -0.05
FINANCE AND TRADE
While the table below shows a negative relationship with
the GTI for five of the six economic, trade and investment
indicators, there is only one moderately strong statistical
relationship; trade as a per cent of GDP with a R= -0.40.
The 2012 GTI was correlated with 2013 economic statistics
to see if terrorist activity has an effect on future economic
indicators. While there was a stronger relationship
between the GTI and decreased levels of economic
activity, the relationships were not significant.
FIGURE 28 TRADE AS A PERCENT OF GDP VS. GTI
Trade as a per cent of GDP shows a negative correlation with the level for terrorism. While this is not overly significant, it does suggest
that acts of terrorism could affect trade.
Afganistan
Canada
0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
NO TERRORISM GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX (GTI) HIGH LEVELS OF TERRORISM
TRADE AS PER CENT OF GDP
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
0
Source: IEP, World Bank
r=-0.40
Belgium
Malaysia
Ukraine
United Kindgom
Columbia
Philippines
India Nigeria Pakistan
Iraq
Lebanon Thailand
Mozambique
Chile
Argentina
Australia
Saudi Arabia
62

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
This section seeks to explore what explanatory power a
range of variables have on the GTI. This is done through
multivariate regression analysis, a statistical tool which
enables comparison against multiple variables. The
multivariate regression analysis reveals the interplay
between the GTI and 11 different variables, such as economic
performance, governance and violence, demonstrating the
nature of the relationship between various indicators. IEP
does not suggest that these are the only indicators which
affect the level of terrorism, these were selected due to the
strength of statistical relationship with the GTI and the
literature review of the factors that create terrorism.
The economic indicators used in the analysis are foreign
direct investment (net inflows) and trade as a per cent of
GDP. Both indicators are taken form the World Bank data
bank. Political stability, legitimacy of the state, the level of
human rights and the number of refugees and IDPs are
taken from a range of sources. The police rate, homicide
rate and incarceration rate per 100,000 people are based on
GPI data.
Of the indicators used in this analysis, only three show a
multivariate significant relationship with the GTI:
Political stability
Intergroup cohesion
Legitimacy of the state
Surprisingly, while none of the violence or economic
indicators are significant, three political indicators are
significantly related to terrorism. This suggests that a weak
political system and a lack of legitimacy of the government
combined with group grievances may be more influential in
the rise of terrorist organisations than economic
performance or violence.
TABLE 11 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Governance and intergroup cohesion related indicators are the
only indicators to show a significant relationship with the GTI.
This suggests that the political climate in combination with
intergroup cohesion is the dominating factor which influences
the level of terrorism within a country.
GTI ESTIMATE
(Intercept) 9.48E+00***
Trade as a present of GDP -4.40E-03
FDI -2.68E-12
Political stability -1.88E+00**
Intergroup cohesion -8.26E+00*
Refugees and IDPs -2.46E-01
Group grievance 2.47E-01
Legitimacy of the state -5.65E-01**
Human rights 2.50E-01
Police per 100.000 people 1.40E-03
Homicide rate per 100.000 people. -7.12E-03
Incarceration rate per 100.000 people 3.72E-05
Adjusted R-squared 0.71
A WEAK POLITICAL SYSTEM
AND A LACK OF LEGITIMACY
OF THE GOVERNMENT
COMBINED WITH GROUP
GRIEVANCES ARE MORE
INFLUENTIAL IN THE RISE OF
TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS
THAN ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE OR EXISTING
LEVELS OF VIOLENCE.
63

EXPERT
CONTRIBUTIONS
According to the findings of the Global Terrorism Index, the level of global
terrorist activity has greatly increased in the last decade. Most of the public
conversation about terrorism has focused on conventional counter-terrorism
efforts: intelligence gathering, policing, and military force. However, such
efforts are often ineffective, and even counterproductive. In this essay, Larry
Attree from Saferworld and David Keen from the London School of Economics,
outline six conventional approaches that should be scaled back and six
constructive alternatives to conventional counter-terrorism that could help
reverse the alarming rise in global terrorism.
ENVISAGING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE COUNTER-TERROR PARADIGM
Larry Attree, Head of Policy, Saferworld David Keen, Political Economist and Professor
of Complex Emergencies, London School of Economics
‘Terrorism’ has come to dominate current
affairs in the western world, and dealing with it
is one of the foremost priorities on the
domestic and foreign policy agendas of
western nations. As IEP’s valuable work has
highlighted, the urgency surrounding the
agenda has not always facilitated sober
reflection on the available facts regarding the
nature of the problem and what they show us.
The urgent priority afforded to counter-terror
has impacted on the actions of practitioners
in many walks of public life. Particularly
affected by the imperatives of counter-terrorism
and its conceptual framing have
been stabilisation and statebuilding—those
emerging fields poised at the intersection of
defence, foreign affairs, intelligence,
peacebuilding and development. Building on
a forthcoming discussion paper prepared for
Saferworld by Prof. David Keen (LSE), this
paper identifies some key questions about
how counter-terrorism, and related
stabilisation and statebuilding efforts, are
being pursued, and suggests some
constructive peacebuilding alternatives.
The public debate on how to respond to
‘terrorist’ threats tends to revolve around the
most horrific outrages and sensational crises.
Whether the option in question is to bomb a
reviled spoiler, to arm those opposing an evil
regime, or to sponsor a regional partner to
take on the dangerous militants, public
debate tends to focus minds on apparently
simple choices between action and inaction.
In this climate, the pressure on leaders to
appear strong and act decisively—especially
in the face of violent provocation—is very
powerful. However, when the media directs its
fickle gaze to newer stories, the success or
failure of policy responses to ‘terrorism’
threats overseas over the long term is rarely
publicly discussed.
For this reason, it is perhaps not widely
known that:
In Somalia, thousands of weapons and
hundreds of vehicles and high-frequency
radios provided by the international
community as security assistance during the
1990s ended up in the hands of local militias.
In addition, from 2004 onwards over 14,000
Somali soldiers trained by Ethiopia reportedly
defected or deserted with their weapons and
uniforms, while UN-trained police were
implicated in violent abuses against civilians;1
In Iraq, heavy handed military action, such
as the assault on Falluja in the wake of the
INTRODUCTION
64

lynching of four American security
contractors in April 2004, resulted in the
deaths of hundreds of people, including
many women and children, and served to
fuel further insurgency;2
In Afghanistan, because of local codes of
revenge in Pashtun areas, killing insurgents
has often served ‘to multiply enemies
rather than subtract them’.3 Studies have
also ‘found little evidence that aid projects
are “winning hearts and minds”’ in the
country: ‘instead of contributing to stability,
in many cases aid is contributing to conflict
and instability’;4
In Yemen, external counter terror support
served to reduce the Saleh regime’s need
to be responsive to its own constituents
and institute reforms.5
It is remarkable that such failures have led
neither to detailed public debate on how
peace can best be achieved in the wake of
‘terrorist’ violence, nor to any serious
accountability for the leaders and officials that
presided over them. But what is even more
striking is that the mistakes of the present
echo those of past decades: for example, the
practice of bombing large swathes of the
countryside and the diversion of aid to corrupt
purposes that fed public support for the Viet
Cong in Vietnam;6 or the government
emergency measures, including the attempt to
use ‘development’ and forced relocation as
instruments of counterinsurgency, that
strongly fuelled the Mau Mau insurgency
under British rule in Kenya during the 1950s.7
While such problems are, tragically, familiar to
scholars and experts working to document
the track record of counter-terror,
stabilisation and statebuilding approaches
around the world, attention to the lessons of
the past is strikingly absent from the public
debate on how to do better in future.
In recent months, Saferworld has attempted to
take the long view on efforts to deal with
conflicts related to rebel or ‘terrorist’ groups
and their sponsors in past decades, considering
contexts as diverse as Afghanistan, Cambodia,
DRC, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Pakistan, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Vietnam,
and Yemen. Despite the investment of huge
resources in such contexts by Western
governments, the results have been mixed
at best: the current long-term instability of
the Middle East, North and East Africa,
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the spread of
al-Qa’ida into multiple new regions, and the
mushrooming of other transnational militant
groups suggest that something is seriously
wrong with the Western response to such
problems.
Long-standing problems appear to lie in three
main areas. Firstly, by setting national security
above human security objectives the West
has – whether directly or through proxies—
too frequently responded to the threat of
‘terrorism’ with the use of violence. Such
violence has, all too often, been
indiscriminate, and has had a tendency to
exacerbate conflict dynamics rather than
contribute to sustainable peace. Secondly,
counter-terrorism efforts and related actions
taken under the label of ‘stabilisation’ and
‘statebuilding’ have often failed to address
drivers of conflict in meaningful ways. In fact,
they often clumsily reinforce the most serious
drivers of conflict – especially patterns of
abusive and exclusive governance and
corruption. Thirdly, the Western response has
typically neglected to focus on sustainable
solutions to conflict that involve and respond
to the concerns, priorities and potentials of
conflict-affected people in constructive ways.
There is much detail that could be added to
this critique, and many examples that could
be offered of these shortcomings in action
and their impacts. If policy alternatives are to
be brought to the fore, more thorough
analysis is needed to examine why similar
shortcomings are repeated from one decade
to the next with diminishing public scrutiny.
However, what is perhaps more challenging,
and more useful, is to envisage what
constructive alternatives are available.
One caveat before discussing these
alternatives: all approaches to peacebuilding
have shortcomings, and the challenges of
conflict frequently present choices between
a range of sub-ideal alternatives. The policy
directions that are set out in this paper are
neither a call to side with the ‘enemy’, nor to
evade the imperatives to respond to conflict
swiftly and effectively. Instead, they are a call
for the lessons of the past and the available
alternatives to be more carefully considered,
with the overarching objective of working
towards long term peace in mind.
SIX THINGS TO DO LESS OFTEN
1 THINKING SHORT TERM
There needs to be more effort to avoid
investing in short-term reactions with no
clear long-term solution in mind—especially
when there are clear risks of contributing
to long-term drivers of conflict through
short-term action. Similarly, more thought
needs to be put into whether approaches
require long-term commitment to be
sustainable, and whether such commitment
is feasible.
2 REINFORCING POOR
GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION
Governance deficits are perhaps the single
most significant factor in driving conflict.
This means that support for repressive and
corrupt actors and regimes needs, as a
priority, to be avoided because of its
potential to lessen accountability and
worsen governance deficits. Governance
deficits known to have a significant role in
driving conflict include corruption,
violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law, and exclusive political
systems. Importantly, where international
actors support leaders, governments and
security forces that are not committed to
addressing these failures, they reduce the
pressure on them to be inclusive,
accountable, responsive and fair toward
their own societies. This in turn tends to
fuel conflict. The apparent strategic
advantage to be gained from alliances with
regimes not committed to inclusive, fair,
responsive and accountable governance is
often illusory—not least because such
alliances typically stoke the grievances that
fuel insecurity.
3 MISTAKING PARTNERS’ MOTIVES
Past experience shows that assumptions
about the motives and behaviours of
apparent ‘allies’ in counter-terror,
stabilisation and state-building endeavours
need to be interrogated more deeply. The
consequences of working with allies whose
motives differ from one’s own have
included appalling abuses against civilian
populations, the diversion of money, arms
and other resources into fuelling conflict,
and the reinforcement of corruption, bad
governance and grievances. All of these are
known drivers of conflict. One of the
clearest lessons from past failures is that
the motives of ‘allies’ are hard to
understand clearly: they may differ
between individuals and across institutions,
and can shift over time. An expressed aim
of defeating terrorism, for example, may
differ dramatically from the actual aims of
any given actor. Importantly, the actions of
‘allies’ are also affected by the resources on
offer for counter-terror, stabilisation and
statebuilding processes, which may even
serve as an incentive for prolonging
conflict. Conflict sensitivity requires much
more careful monitoring of these issues
65

and more determination to minimise harm
by factoring this better into decision-making.
4 USING AID IN THE SERVICE OF
COUNTER-TERRORISM
Casual assumptions about aid contributing
to counter-terrorism, stabilisation and
statebuilding objectives are called into
question by the significant evidence that
the use of aid to reinforce military action
and stabilisation efforts has in many
contexts proved either ineffective or
harmful. In particular there is a need to
revisit the assumption that local action to
address socio-economic drivers of
radicalisation can provide an adequate
solution when wider structural drivers of
conflict are not simultaneously addressed—
including the role of international actors
and their proxies in contributing to
grievances and injustice. While
development processes are likely part of
the solution to the conflicts that are being
defined as problems of ‘terrorism’,
‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’, the holistic
pursuit of positive peace should include a
wider range of measures, including
avoidance of policies and actions that
create the grievances that fuel conflict.
A related issue is the tendency to overlook
the way in which aid and other resources
(such as military equipment) provided to
allies is diverted for harmful or corrupt
purposes by conflict actors. Because
corruption is known to be such a visible
driver of conflict, and diversion of resources
away from their intended purpose is such a
common failing, corruption and diversion
need to be more systematically prevented
and monitored – even when they involve
apparent ‘allies’ of the international
community. Too often, declaring a
particular government to be an ‘ally’ has
given it a green light for corruption and
abuse. In practice, there has often been
much more concern about the way aid
might be misused by ‘terrorists’ than the
way it is being misused by governments.8
Attempts to co-opt aid agencies into
support for any particular side in a
conflict—as providers of intelligence, as
offering relief and assistance only to one
group or side – are also counterproductive:
they compromise the principle of
impartiality, render assistance ineffective,
alienate the local population, and make aid
agencies a target for attack.
5 USING FORCE
International actors should be much less
ready to use force to resolve conflict. In
particular, more caution is needed in
designating any particular actor as a
‘spoiler’. The staying power of ‘spoilers’
needs to be assessed much more
realistically, and greater awareness is
needed of the potential for conflict
dynamics to spin out of control as a result
of intervention. In particular, military force
should not be used simply to demonstrate
the resolve or power to retaliate in
response to violent provocation—indeed,
military responses of this kind often play
into the intentions of ‘terrorists’.9
6 LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR ABUSES
Significant efforts are also needed to
strengthen adherence to international
humanitarian and human rights law by
international actors and those they
co-operate with: torture and indiscriminate
use of violence are not only wrong in
principle – they also deepen the
grievances that can fuel violence and make
sustainable peace much harder to achieve.
Demonstrating full accountability for
irresponsible use of force and abuses that
have taken place is vital to efforts to
minimise grievances.
SIX DIRECTIONS FOR
CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES
1 A DIFFERENT CONCEPTUAL
FRAMING AND APPROACH
The first and most important shift in the
pursuit of constructive alternatives to the
counter-terrorism paradigm should be to
reaffirm long-term sustained peace for all
actors involved as the overall objective—
rather than ‘victory’ over a particular enemy
or ‘national security’ defined in narrow
terms. To construct a strategy oriented
towards lasting and positive peace it is then
crucial – especially in relation to conflicts
involving the most reviled of ‘spoilers’—
to develop an impartial picture of all
dimensions of the conflict. One key starting
point for achieving this is perhaps offered
by developing a conflict analysis.
Conflict analysis can provide an important
opportunity to avoid biased actor analysis
and narrow analysis of the causes of a
conflict. In the counter-terrorism paradigm,
designating certain actors as ‘spoilers’,
‘radicals’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘extremists’ risks
framing the problem from the outset as
lying with those actors alone – the solution
being to change their wrong-thinking (or
physically eliminate them) rather than
seeking to identify what all relevant
actors—including national, regional and
international governments—can change to
contribute towards lasting peace.
Similarly, approaching conflict as a problem
of ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalisation’ has
sometimes encouraged a focus on the
socio-economic disadvantages experienced
by the individuals who perpetrate acts of
violence. Looking at local poverty or
unemployment may be helpful, but it must
not preclude a focus on other causes of
conflict – including the actions of
governments enjoying various degrees of
immunity to international criticism.
Grievances created by powerful political
actors at national, regional or international
levels may well prove especially important in
driving conflicts defined as ‘terrorism’,
‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. Framing the
problem impartially as one of ‘conflict’ may
enable much more comprehensive
identification of causes that require fresh
approaches – not only by extremists and
local actors but also by national, regional
and international leaders, governments,
security forces and so on.
Conflict analysis may also provide an
opportunity to connect apparently local or
national dynamics to transnational factors: it
may be crucial to recognise that ‘extremism’
is not only driven by the transnational
spread of problematic ideologies based on
misperceptions, but also by the moral
objection of conflict actors in one country to
policies and actions taken in other countries,
which are indeed unjust or unlawful and
which they feel powerless to change
through constructive means. Peacebuilding
strategies in such contexts could valuably
include the creation of effective channels for
grievances to be constructively raised and
addressed.
Given the need to avoid the common
challenges of short-term thinking, failure to
learn from past mistakes and incoherence
between development, diplomatic,
economic and military-security approaches,
conflict analysis also provides opportunities
to consider how different responses to
conflict will play out through the
development of forward-looking scenarios,
examine lessons from past engagement, and
facilitate diverse actors to recognise their
roles and responsibilities within a shared
long-term peacebuilding strategy.
66

2 CHANGING INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL POLICIES THAT HAVE
FUELLED GRIEVANCES
If conflicts defined as stemming from
‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’ or ‘terrorism’
are driven in part by moral objections to
policies and actions which are unjust or
unlawful, part of the strategy for achieving
sustainable peace should be to reconsider
those policies and actions. Just as
apartheid needed to be brought to an end,
and many former colonies were awarded
their independence following struggles by
rebel organisations now viewed as
liberation movements, in the same way
there is a need to examine the justice of
policies that are the focus of rebellion and
protest around the world.
Such unjust policies may be military
(indiscriminate use of violence, military aid
to actors who are perpetrating abuses),
economic (sanctions perceived to be
unjust, failure to regulate markets in goods
and resources from conflict-affected
countries, imposition of unequal trade
rules, or prioritisation of natural resource
access over other priorities), diplomatic
(support for allies who are violating human
rights and/or international law), or
developmental (further support for such
allies). A greater effort to demonstrate
consistent support for international law
and human rights is surely one of the most
promising options for reducing the
grievances of the victims of unjust
international policies and practices, and
those who claim to represent them.
3 SEEKING TO NEGOTIATE PEACE
– AND BUILDING TOWARDS
INCLUSIVE AND JUST POLITICAL
SETTLEMENTS
There are many challenges inherent in
deciding whether and how to negotiate
peace. Overall, however, negotiating
solutions is currently a less favoured option
than it was during the 1990s. Clearly it is
neither desirable nor practical to welcome
every militant or rebel group into a
power-sharing deal. Both inviting and
excluding rebel movements to the dialogue
table has incentivised armed violence in the
past. At the same time, long-term peace
can of course be undermined when only a
relatively narrow and elite group is
accepted into negotiations and into the
political settlement that results.
While the dilemmas involved are complex,
the counter-terrorism paradigm has in
certain contexts ruled out the possibility of
negotiation with (or even assistance to)
large sections of whole societies (as in
Somalia and Afghanistan). In this context,
it seems important to reflect that long-term
peace will eventually be sustainable only if
those who survive the conflict are prepared
to accept the eventual settlement that is
made. Moreover, as Greenhill and Solomon
argue, even an apparently ‘implacable’
spoiler may sometimes change – in new
circumstances – into a less violent entity.10
In this context, alongside the inclusion in
peace processes of those who have not
resorted to violence, and ongoing efforts to
ensure broader inclusion in political
settlements of the public, including women,
youth and any marginalised groups, more
effort is needed to pursue communication
with and understand all actors involved in
any given conflict – even those ‘terrorists’,
‘violent extremists’, ‘radicalised groups’ and
‘spoilers’ that are most reviled.
4 USING LEGAL-JUDICIAL
RESPONSES AND TARGETED
SANCTIONS
An important option for approaching
conflict is to use the law (national or
international) to punish and deter violence
and to protect those who may otherwise
feel marginalized and resort to violence as
a last resort. Legal approaches to insecurity
are complex, and only a few points can be
made here. Prosecutions offer the prospect
of reducing impunity, deterring violence
(both within a particular country and more
broadly), and of course incarcerating those
responsible for violence (and thus taking
them ‘out of the game’). In many cases,
a policing response to disorder
(apprehending and trying criminal
suspects) will be more appropriate than
a military response. Sometimes, it is a
heavy-handed military response that turns
a small rebellion into a large one or gives
life to a weakening ‘terrorist’ movement.
When due process is applied and the rights
of defendants to fair trials are visibly
upheld, legal approaches offer the
considerable advantage of guaranteeing
rights of defendants and their equal
treatment before the law—thereby helping
to dispel perceptions of discrimination
against particular groups.
The option to deploy sanctions comes with
certain drawbacks. Sanctions can be used
by those targeted to shore up their
economic advantages and their political
support base. They can also do great harm
to the general population and create
grievances among those they were
intended to help. Yet, when they are
carefully targeted, sanctions can offer an
important option for pressurising conflict
actors, including armed groups, to change
their approach.
5 SUPPORTING TRANSFORMATIVE
GOVERNANCE EFFORTS
Of course, governance reforms are
explicitly part of the stabilisation and
statebuilding policy agenda. However, this
policy agenda is typically coloured by the
imperatives provided by counter-terrorism
to boost a counterinsurgency or a new
political order with external aid or military
support. Likewise, the international
discourse on peacebuilding and
statebuilding enshrines ownership of
processes by nation states in a way that
tends towards the exclusion of other actors
and far-reaching reforms in practice. The
‘mainstream’ approach to all three
(counter-terrorism, stabilisation and
statebuilding) thus leans visibly towards
aligning behind and reinforcing the
capacities of the state as it is (including
states recently installed by military action)
rather than prioritising wider social
empowerment models that seek to
transform the state from within and foster
lasting and positive peace.
Peace indeed cannot be built in the absence
of institutional capacities, but these
capacities also need to be oriented towards
beneficial purposes. This makes the
objective of achieving wider reform and the
transformation of state-society relations
(widely acknowledged in policy discourse
but rarely pursued effectively in practice)
absolutely central to efforts to respond to
conflicts labelled as ‘terrorism’,
‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. After all,
such conflicts often emerge from the
grievances and injustice that are created by
poor governance, and prove difficult to
manage in the wake of institutional
breakdown and civic unrest.
Past research by Saferworld11 suggests that
to support lasting peace, transformative
governance reform should include
significant efforts to:
Ensure inclusive political dialogue and
decision making
Provide people-focused security and justice
67

Reduce corruption and bribery in
conflict-sensitive ways
Offer fair access to social services,
resources and opportunities to all social
groups
Resolve grievances and disputes
constructively
An example of the shift that is needed can
be found in the security sector. While much
development work is oriented to social
empowerment and community driven
models, when it comes to responding to
conflict and insecurity, bottom-up
approaches are not pursued on the scale
that is required to achieve a transformative
effect. Thus ‘Security Sector Reform’ and
efforts to negotiate peace settlements tend
to be relatively top-down and exclusionary.
Therefore, to a certain extent, they tend to
lack the legitimacy to be both successful
and sustainable. Application of ‘community
security’ approaches at a greater scale has
the potential to deliver a different kind of
result.12
6 BRINGING A PEACEBUILDING
PERSPECTIVE TO THE FORE IN
PUBLIC DEBATE
One of the challenges inherent in trying to
move beyond mainstream approaches is
the way in which problems of ‘rogue
regimes’, ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’ and
‘extremism’ and relevant responses are
presented in public debate. Leaders,
journalists and news outlets are in some
ways responsible for establishing prevailing
notions of enmity, while at the same time
public interest and public opinion has a role
in shaping and underpinning policy
directions that leaders come under
pressure to adopt. Thus the success of
peace efforts partly depends on much
more systematic questioning of the
fault-lines of conflict, the prevailing
definitions of the enemy, and the impacts
of potential policy responses. Demonising
particular enemies too often serves as
‘cover’ for those claiming to confront them;
but those making these claims may not
only be failing to confront these enemies
but even actively reinforcing them in
various ways.
In many contexts, the declaration of a ‘war
on terror’ remains a convenient banner to
call for public unity in support of a common
enemy, bolstering the power base of
political leaders. When the status of an
‘enemy’ has been well established in public
discourse, this seems to lead to journalistic
failures to question the tactics to be used,
the allies to be supported, and the
coherence of longer term strategies.
A further problem is that, especially within
conflict-affected contexts, those who
oppose an officially-approved persecution
or question the approved ‘fault-lines’ in a
conflict, risk themselves being labelled as
‘enemies’, ‘terrorists’ and so on—and
sometimes face intimidation, violence or
prosecution as a result. This affects the
willingness to speak out not only of
journalists, the public and local activists but
also international aid agencies and
multilateral bodies. Particular definitions of
the enemy have often been ‘policed’ in this
way, and those who are in a position to
question these definitions have a particular
responsibility to do so.
While politicians, diplomats and human
rights organisations tend to remain vigilant
and critical regarding human rights in
conflict situations, much more systematic
efforts are needed to question the
definitions of enmity that create—and
recreate—mass violence, as well as to
challenge the methods that are justified
through this discourse at different levels.
CONCLUSION
This paper has offered a summary of
constructive alternatives to the counter-terrorism
paradigm and to some of the
approaches taken to stabilisation and
statebuilding under the influence of this
paradigm. Alongside these, it is important to
mention one further option, noting: that in
some cases ‘terrorist’ atrocities frequently
produce a sense of revulsion even among
those the terrorists claim to represent; that if
conflict resolution demands reform (as
suggested above), the best way to encourage
this may in some circumstances be not to
provide support to the current leadership and
institutions in conflict-affected contexts; and
that international actors may not be able to
influence the dynamics of each and every
conflict effectively. Given these points, in
some contexts choosing not to engage should
be considered a valid option.
These issues will be discussed in more detail in
Saferworld’s forthcoming research studies on
constructive alternatives to counter-terrorism
in a range of different country contexts.
NOTES
1. Bryden M, ‘Somalia Redux’, (CSIS, August 2013),
pp 9-10, citing M Bryden et al, ‘‘Report of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security
Council resolution 1811 (2008)’, (New York, UN
Security Council, 10 Dec 2008), p.12.
2. Hills, Alice, ‘Fear and Loathing in Falluja’, Armed
Forces and Society, 32 (2006), 623-639; Barnard
A, ‘Death toll near 500 in Fallujah, Baghdad’,
Boston Globe, 22 April 2004; Dodge, Toby,
testimony to US Committee on Foreign Relations
on ‘The Iraq Transition’ (20 April 2004).
3. The words are those of Major General Michael
Flynn, United States’ deputy chief of staff for
intelligence in Afghanistan: see Flynn, Major Gen.
Michael, Captain Matt Pottinger and Paul
Batchelor, ‘Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making
Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan’, Center for a
New American Security, Washington DC (2010),
p.8.
4. Wilder, Andrew, ‘A “weapons system” based on
wishful thinking’, Boston Globe (16 September
2009); Thompson, Edwina, Report on Wilton Park
Conference 1022, Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in
Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of
Development Aid in COIN Operations, 11–14 March
2010 (1 April 2010).
5. S Philips, ‘Yemen: Developmental dysfunction and
division in a crisis state’, (DLP Researhc paper 14,
February 2011).
6. Sheehan, Neil, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul
Vann and America in Vietnam, New York: Picador
(1990); Bilton, Michael and Kevin Sim, Four Hours
in My Lai, London: Penguin (1993); Hunt, David,
‘Dirty Wars: Counterinsurgency in Vietnam and
Today’, Politics and Society, 38:1 (2010), pp.
35–66, p.36; Corson, William, The Betrayal, New
York: W. W. Norton and Co. (1968).
7. Berman, Bruce, ‘Bureaucracy and Incumbent
Violence: Colonial Administration and the Origins
of the “Mau Mau” Emergency in Kenya’, British
Journal of Political Science, 6:2 (April 1976), pp.
143–75.
8. See, for example, D Keen, When ‘Do No Harm’
Hurts, 6 November 2013.
9. Just as, according to Osama Bin Laden’s son it
was ‘my father’s dream was to get America to
invade Afghanistan’ (BBC2, Afghanistan: War
Without End (22 June 2011), it is clear that Islamic
State militants intended to provoke further direct
military action in Iraq by Western powers through
their beheading of Western citizens in 2014.
10. See Greenhill, Kelly and Soloman Major, ‘The Perils
of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of
Intrastate Peace Accords’, International Security,
31, 3, (winter 2006/7), 7-40; Stedman, Stephen,
‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’,
International Security, 22, 2, 5-53 (1997).
11. See Saferworld, ‘Addressing conflict and violence
from 2015 – Issue Paper 2: What are the key
challenges? What works in addressing them?’,
(November 2012).
12. See Saferworld, ‘Community Security Handbook’,
(Saferworld, 2014).
68

The methodology for the Global Terrorism Index incorporates a lagged
scoring system, in which a single terrorist incident is not only counted in
the year that it was committed, but also for five years afterwards, in
order to reflect the lingering emotional, social, structural, and economic
impact of terrorism. This essay, from Action on Armed Violence, traces
the long term impact of a suicide bombing in a busy marketplace, which
occurred in Lahore, Pakistan in December 2009.
ANATOMY OF A SUICIDE BOMBING
MOON MARKET ATTACK, LAHORE, PAKISTAN
Henry Dodd, Senior Weapons Researcher, Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)
Edited by: Steven Smith MBE, Chief Executive, AOAV
BACKGROUND THE BLAST
For the last three years, Action on Armed
Violence (AOAV) has been monitoring the
levels of harm caused by explosive weapons
around the world. In this time, we have
watched the recorded toll continue to climb,
year-on-year. Perhaps most startling is the fact
that by far the greatest proportion of
casualties are civilians. For example, in 2013,
82% of the total reported casualties from
explosive weapons were civilians. Another
statistic of major concern is the rise in
casualties attributable to improvised explosive
devices (IEDs). While IEDs are often seen as
being the weapons of choice for non-state
actors against conventional military forces, the
staggering fact is that they are far more likely
to kill civilians than soldiers. In 2013, 73% of
civilian casualties (22,829) from all forms of
explosive violence were caused by IEDs.1
But the bare casualty figures alone only show
part of the picture. Reports in the immediate
aftermath of attacks tend to provide the
number of fatalities, sometimes the number
of injured, a description of the scene of the
blast, and some reaction quotes. Small attacks
barely warrant a mention. Little or no focus is
directed at the wider effects of explosive
violence. What does it mean for a health system
to receive over 100 trauma patients within just a
few minutes? What happens to a market that
has witnessed a major blast, and is forever
associated with the tragedy? Who supports a
family when they lose their principal earner, or
when a relative suffers complex injuries? In
order to answer these questions and more,
AOAV returned to the scene of a double-suicide
bombing attack that had been inflicted on a
busy market in Lahore, Pakistan, in 2009.
The Moon Market, in Iqbal, in the south-west
of Lahore, is considered to be the second
busiest market in the city after the more
fashionable Liberty market. Stalls and shops
are closely packed together, leaving a narrow
pathway for shoppers to squeeze through.
Spread across two floors, the top floor has a
selection of beauty salons and a gym, as well
as the upper storeys of the largest and most
prosperous market businesses. The lower
floor has a selection of shops selling fabrics,
children’s clothes, jewellery, books, furniture,
shoes, and pharmaceuticals. Each shop has
around five or six stalls, most only a few feet
wide, pitched in front. Stall owners pay a few
rupees to hook a wire up to their shops to
power a bare bulb over their wares.
The scene is vibrant and congested.
There had been warning signs before that
69

the Moon Market might be a target for
violence. The previous year, on 14 August
—the eve of Pakistani Independence Day—
a suicide bomber had approached a police
line at the roundabout by the market and
detonated his explosive vest. Eight people
were killed, but it would have been more, had
not a policeman bravely wrestled the bomber
away from the crowd, losing his own life in
the process.2
2009 had been another violent year across
Pakistan. Bomb blasts at a funeral in Dera
Ishmail Khan, in February, had killed over
thirty people, and left hundreds more
injured.3 In October, 55 people were killed in
a blast at the Khyber Bazaar in Peshawar.
A few days later, the same city also saw over
a hundred people killed by a car bomb at the
Meena Bazaar.4
Attacks like these, on targets seemingly
unconnected to the sectarian violence in
Pakistan, may have provided a warning to
the Moon Market shoppers. However, even
with such threats ever-present, people need
to live their lives, buy clothes for their
children, and prepare for weddings.
The first blast happened at 8.40 pm on
7 December 2009, when the market was at
its busiest. At an intersection of three roads,
the first bomber detonated a vest containing
10kg of high explosive and ball bearings.
As people ran from the area in panic, they
were funnelled by the narrow streets into a
tightly-packed crowd. Around a minute after
the first explosion, a second bomber
detonated an identical explosive vest outside
the National Bank in the corner of the market.
It was this second bomb, surrounded by
people, unprotected, in the open, which
caused the most casualties.5
The first explosion started fires, which spread
rapidly. Electrical points in the market are
stuffed with wires, and the electrical fire
moved quickly into shops and stalls. The fires
were fed by the fuel of the many generators in
the market and by the petrol in the hundreds
of motorbikes parked nearby. Combined with
the highly flammable clothes and textiles
inside the shops and stalls, a massive blaze
quickly started. People who sought shelter
inside shops were trapped by flames, and
many died from smoke inhalation.6
At 20:42, the 1122 Rescue Service received
a call reporting that there had been an
explosion.7 There is a rescue station, with
ambulances and fire engines, approximately
100 metres from the market, so emergency
responders were able to reach the scene
within a minute of the call being received.
That’s where the good luck ended.
The fire engines were unable to reach the
blast site, as shopkeepers had placed bollards
and barricades around the market to prevent
cars entering. The rescue services then had
to use cranes to remove obstacles and cut
through iron bars to get close to the fire.
A collapsed electricity transformer meant that
that the closest fire hydrants could not be
used. Hoses had to be run to hydrants further
away from the market.
Rescue workers were further hampered by an
uncooperative crowd. At one point, the crowd
burst through the police cordon and
demanded that the rescuers deal with the
dead bodies that were being left behind.
As families heard the news, they rushed to
the scene, causing traffic jams that hampered
rescue vehicles. It took two hours to put the
fires out and another hour to rescue people
from the rubble.8
DEATHS AND INJURIES
It is likely that around 60 people died as a
result of the Moon Market bombings. The
death toll was initially reported as 34, but this
number quickly rose.9 The official record of
casualties maintained by the City District
Government documented 49 people killed
and 131 injured. These figures were obtained
from hospitals and mortuaries four days after
the bombing. They do not include victims
who did not seek treatment at hospitals.
In addition to the 49 people officially
recorded as being killed in the blast,
there were a further three dead who were
suspected as being perpetrators. In
addition, the mortuary of King Edward’s
Medical University received a shopping bag
filled with limbs two days after the incident.
These body parts were not counted in
government records.
After four days, around half of the injured
(66) had been discharged from hospitals.
However, some of those recorded as injured in
the initial assessment eventually succumbed
to their wounds. For example, at the Sheik
Zayed hospital, a state hospital near the blast,
which received the largest number of
casualties, eight of those admitted died over
the following weeks.10
One family told AOAV that their son, Shahn,
who owned a stall selling children’s clothes,
could only be identified by his underwear.
Shahn received burns to 70% of his body and
had seven pieces of shrapnel in his chest.
He was in hospital for 26 days before he
eventually died following complications
during his second surgery.
Victims were taken to a variety of hospitals,
with some of the closest facilities quickly
overwhelmed and forced to divert casualties.
Dr Sajud Sharif, the consultant in charge of
the Accident and Emergency department at
the Sheikh Zayed hospital, said the biggest
challenge his department faced was keeping
track of who had received what treatment.
The situation was made more difficult by
overcrowding. As well as receiving over
50 casualties in just a few hours, the hospital
was packed with families looking for relatives,
and with media reporting on the attack.
In Pakistan, it is quite normal for camera
crews to come right inside the hospital to film
victims receiving treatment. Zafari Iqbal,
a security guard in the hospital, remembers
having to break up scuffles between the
crowds and trying to placate devastated
families searching for someone to blame.
Within this chaos was the additional challenge
of tackling the complex nature of the wounds
suffered by the victims. Professor Maheed,
Trauma Surgeon at the Sheikh Zayed hospital,
who operated on many of the injured, explained
that bomb blasts present a particular series of
challenges. Unlike in the case of gunshot
victims, bomb blast patients arrive with multiple
traumatic injuries. Their treatment is therefore
more complicated and their condition harder to
manage. Maheed also acknowledged that it is
possible to miss injuries or trauma.
Victims of the Moon Market blast in Sheikh
Zayed hospital were treated for: penetrating
injuries from ball bearings, and even from
other people’s bone fragments; blunt trauma
injuries; severe burns and smoke inhalation;
collapsed lungs; amputations; eardrum
damage and eye injuries.11
Salman Zaib was a 21-year-old student at the
time of the attack. He was at the Moon
Market to collect money from a jeweller for
his father, and was standing about a metre
away from the second bomb when it
detonated. He was spared almost certain
death when a woman happened to walk in
front of him just as it exploded.
Zaib had to have stitches on his back for injuries
from shrapnel and pieces of the woman’s
bones. Both his legs were broken. They were so
badly damaged that they required expensive
plastic surgery and bone grafts. He was in bed
for 4-5 months, and it took over one and a half
years before he was able to walk again. Even
70

four years later, he is unable to put in the same
hours at his father’s furniture business or move
around easily.
The day after the bomb blast, Zaib was due to
take the final exams for his accountancy
qualification. The time he spent in hospital
recovering from his injuries meant that he fell
behind with his studies and eventually had to
drop out.12
PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM
Other injuries can be less visible, but have
equally devastating effects. Witnessing horrific
violence and seeing the bloody aftermath can
lead to psychological trauma and impact
negatively on psycho-social wellbeing.
Many of the people who AOAV spoke to had
displayed symptoms associated with post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) at some point
in the years following the bombing. People
complained of unending headaches, reliving the
event through flashbacks, and feeling
constantly on guard. Some described the
incident in vivid terms, and were clearly
overwhelmed by the sudden change in their
physical surroundings. Some people found their
entire moods changed after the blast.
Muhammad Arif Saleem was visiting the
market with his wife to buy new school
uniforms for his children, as the weather was
getting colder. He received a deep cut to the
head and damaged his hearing, but these
physical injuries were treated within a week.
Emotionally though, he was deeply disturbed.
Saleem went back to working in a restaurant
a few weeks after the bombing, but was still
having nightmares about the attack. He found
that his temper had changed since the
incident, and lost his job as a result. His
restaurant sent him home as he had clearly
not fully recovered. When he came back after
a few days, his job had been given to
someone else.13
INDIRECT EFFECTS
ON HEALTHCARE
Responding to bombings like the one in the
Moon Market, and preparing for the possibility
of future attacks, have deep consequences.
These activities drain hospitals of resources
and have knock-on effects on their patients.
A few hours after the bombing, hospitals
received calls from government officials
telling them that treatment for all victims
of the bombing should be provided free
of charge. In most cases, this meant that
victims received free treatment and
medication, at least initially, unless they went
to private hospital.
In practice, this gesture is less generous than
it first appears. The free treatment and
medication provided by the hospitals was
not met with extra money from the
government. The additional costs that
emerged had to be absorbed by the existing
budgets. According to senior hospital
officials, no additional funds were offered by
the government to either the Jinnah or
Sheikh Zayed hospitals, which had received
the majority of victims after the Moon
market bombing.
In order to respond to future incidents of the
scale of the Moon Market blast, hospitals
have had to purchase specialist medical
equipment for trauma patients, like chest
tubes for up to 50 patients. Staff members
have also had to receive extra training for
responding to mass casualty disasters.14
General concerns about the security situation
in Pakistan mean that hospitals also invest
heavily in defending themselves from
potential attacks. For instance, the Sheikh
Zayed hospital currently employs 104
security guards, costing around 1% of its
annual budget. Hospitals in Pakistan are
further hampered by difficulties in retaining
their best and brightest doctors, who are
keen to move abroad because of the security
situation across the whole of the country.
Police search through the ashes of the market for evidence
71

DAMAGE TO THE MARKET
The Moon Market bombing had severe
economic effects on both the businesses in
the market and on families of victims. Before
the attack, the Moon Market was one of the
busiest markets in Lahore, with several
hundred shops, stalls and restaurants. There
are 18 plazas in the market, and each
contains around 70-80 shops and stalls.
Shoppers would travel from across the city
to buy goods, conduct business and meet
with friends.
According to Abdul Jabar, President of the
Traders’ Union in the market, 61 shops were
damaged, along with 90 smaller stalls. Jabar
was on the committee with government
officials to determine how compensation was
awarded to businesses in the market. He
claimed that businesses in the market
suffered for 3-6 months after the blast, when
it was partially closed. He argued that they
are now trading at roughly the same level as
before the bombing. Part of the reason for
this, he suggested, was that the Punjab
provincial government awarded
compensation ranging from Rs150,000 and
Rs1.5 million (US$2,100 to US$21,000).15
However, not everyone interviewed was as
positive about the market’s recovery, and
some were critical of the process for awarding
compensation to businesses. Rao Mubarak,
Executive Vice President of the rival Quami
Tajir Ittehad traders’ Union, claimed that the
money provided by the government was well
short of the Rs500 million (US$6.9 million) of
damage estimated by the District
Coordinator’s Office. He claimed that some
money was paid to bogus claimants. In
Mubarak’s estimation, the market is trading at
around 30% of the level it was before the
bombing. While small eateries are doing well,
the cloth and jewellery shops are suffering.
Many traders would have left, but are forced
to stay because the value of their assets has
decreased so much that they do not want to
sell for a loss.16
Some relatives of the stall owners who were
killed in the bombing missed out on the
compensation to which they were entitled.
The family of Shanh, the young stall-holder
who was in hospital for 26 days before he
died from his injuries, were told by the market
union that they had applied late, and were not
awarded any compensation for the
approximate Rs300,000 (US$2,550) of stock
which was lost. The family said that they were
anxious not to appear greedy, or somehow
not sufficiently mournful, at the death of their
son, which is why they did not apply for
money straight away, so missed the deadline
for applications.
LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON FAMILIES
It was not just businesses in the Moon market
that suffered economically after the blast.
Many victims and their families were left with
their primary earner either injured or killed.
Some people lost jobs because they could no
longer work. Despite help with initial medical
treatment, most people also faced large
medical bills for subsequent treatment.
Victims of the bombing were entitled to
compensation from the provincial
government. Families who lost loved-ones
received Rs500,000 (US$4,350). People who
were severely injured received Rs200,000
(US$1,650), and those with slight injuries
Rs50,000 (US$450). Compensation was only
given to those with physical injuries.
Government officials acknowledge that this
system of flat rates of compensation was
imperfect, and did not address the fact that
some injuries are more debilitating and
long-lasting than others. However, it was
felt that devising a new system based on
needs would be subjective, overly
complicated and expensive.
For most of the families AOAV spoke to, the
support offered did not come close to
covering the losses and expenses they
endured following the bombing. In
particular, there was a collective failure by
government and civil society to appreciate
just how long-lasting the effects of the
bombing were. The uncle of one victim said,
‘You can’t give a man a meal for a day. After
a week, he’ll starve.’
Abdul Qadir, who works at a stall selling
children’s shoes in the market, received
shrapnel injuries to his stomach, and his had
was cut by broken glass. He had to have a
colostomy operation, and his large intestine
was shut down for 4-5 months. When AOAV
visited, four years later, he was still in pain,
and had recently been told that he needed
more surgery. Most of the treatment that he
received in the hospital was free, even in the
months after the blast. However, he did have
to pay around Rs4,000 (US$45) for the
colostomy bags, which needed to be changed
four times a week for several months. Qadir’s
stall was completely destroyed in the blast,
and he was awarded Rs100,000 (US$900) for
the damage. He took the difficult decision to
rebuild his stall. He started his business up
again, but had to buy all his supplies on credit
Rescuers were quick to the scene of the incident but faced a number of difficulties in fighting the fire
72

and now works off a smaller stall that has
cheaper rent.17
Some victims AOAV spoke to found that after
their recovery they had no jobs to return to or
they were no longer able to perform them.
THE PERPETRATORS
Nearly four years after the bombing, no
convictions have been made in relation to
the Moon Market attacks. Pakistan has been
widely criticised for failing to successfully
prosecute people accused of involvement in
bombings like the one at Moon Market.18 Out
of the 559 cases brought against alleged
terrorists in Punjab Province in 2012, 414
(71%) were acquitted.19
In part, these figures are misleading. Unlike in
other countries, the Pakistani justice system does
not allow for prosecutors to drop a case, even if
they think the evidence is insufficient to go to
trial. However, lawyers AOAV spoke to identified
several areas that made securing convictions
particularly difficult for prosecutors in Pakistan.20
Firstly, they have repeatedly found that
witnesses are reluctant to testify. With no
witness protection programme in Pakistan, they
are especially vulnerable to threats and
intimidation by militant groups.
Secondly, the quality of evidence obtained by
police investigating the bombing is not of a
high enough quality to be admissible.
Sometimes, this is due to the high standards
demanded of the evidence, but at other times,
it is because the police are either under-resourced
or poorly-trained.
Finally, with the actual perpetrators of the
bombing killed in the blast, it is difficult to
link members of the same group to that
particular incident.
CONCLUSION
AOAV’s research has shown that IED attacks
in Pakistan have an impact far beyond the
headline casualty figures. Alongside those
directly killed and injured are the countless
others who suffer psychologically and
financially: the children who are terrified when
a firework goes off; the hospital staff who
cannot eat barbecued food again after
smelling the burning flesh of the victims; the
stall owner whose takings are down now that
the market is less popular.
The stories of the people impacted by the
Moon Market bombings are just a few of
thousands. There were 22 suicide bomb
attacks in Pakistan in 2012; five of them
occurred in markets. The whole of Pakistani
society is impacted, and vital resources are
having to be diverted to help victims and to
prevent future violence.
But this is not just Pakistan’s problem. It is one
that is proliferating world-wide. The
humanitarian harm to civilians is catastrophic,
and states must take action to address it.
Responses should not be restricted purely to
preventative security measures; they should
also embrace: stigmatisation; the robust
application of international humanitarian law;
better control of the trade in components,
such as detonators and explosive materials;
tighter stockpile controls; addressing the
financing of non-state actors; ensuring that
the needs of victims are properly met; and
embarking on campaigns of education and
outreach. The annual civilian deaths from IEDs
world-wide already vastly exceed those from
landmines. This is a global problem that needs
to be addressed now.
NOTES
1. Dodd, H. and Perkins, R. (2014), Explosive Events,
AOAV, April 2014, available at: http://aoav.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2014/05/AOAV-Explosive-
Events-2013.pdf, accessed10 December 2013.
2. Ali, Muhammad Faisal (2008), ‘Bomber draws
blood on Independence Day eve’, DAWN, 14
August 2008, available at: dawn.com/
news/316472/bomber-draws-blood-on-independence-
day-eve, accessed 10 December
2013.
3. Shah, Pir Zubair (2009), ‘Pakistan bombing kills
more than 30’, The New York Times, 20 February
2009, available at:
nytimes.com/2009/02/21/world/asia/21pstan.
html, accessed
10 December 2013.
4. ‘Blast in Peshawar’. Geo TV, 30 October 2009,
available at:
geo.tv/important_events/2009/Peshawar_
blast28oct/pages/English_news.asp, accessed
10 December 2013.
5. Interviews with victims of the blast, conducted
by AOAV in November 2013.
6. Interview with the Civil Defence Department
Headquarters,
6 November 2013.
7. Interview with the Punjab Emergency Service,
6 November 2013.
8. Interviews with victims of the blast, conducted
by AOAV in November 2013
9. Associated Press (2009), ‘Lahore bomb attack
kills 34’,
The Guardian, 7 December 2009, available at:
theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/07/
lahore-maket-bomb-attack, accessed
9 December 2013.
10. AOAV examination of official records in the
Sheikh Zayed Hospital.
11. Interview with Professor Maeed, 9 November
2013.
12. Interview with Salman Zaib, November 2013.
13. Interview with Muhammad Arif Saleem, November
2013.
14. Twenty-five hospital staff from across the Punjab
were sent on 15-day training courses organised by
the WHO in Nepal in 2011 and 2013.
15. Interview with Abdul Jabar, November 2013.
16. Interview with Rao Mubarak, November 2013.
17. Interview with Abdul Qadir, November 2013.
18. Nelson, D. (2011), ‘Pakistan incapable of
prosecuting terror suspects’, The Telegraph,
31 August 2011, available at:
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
pakistan/8733203/Pakistan-incapable-of-prosecuting-
terrorists.html, accessed
10 December 2013.
19. Mir-Khan, Aetekah (2013), ‘Prosecuting terrorists:
Out of 599 cases in 2012, suspects acquitted in
414’, The Express Tribune,
1 April 2013, available at: http://tribune.com.pk/
story/529353/prosecuting-terrorists-out-of-599-
cases-in-2012-suspects-acquitted-in-414/
accessed 1 December 2013.
20. Interview with the office of the Prosecutor-
General of Punjab Province, 12 November 2013.
73

The 2014 Global Terrorism Index tracks the rise and fall of the world’s
largest terrorist organisations since 1998. Whilst the vast majority of
terrorist groups are only responsible for a handful of deaths, a select
few are responsible for the majority of death and destruction caused by
terrorism in the last fifteen years. ISIL, which emerged out of Al-Qa’ida
in Iraq, is one such group. In this essay, terrorism expert Ekaterina
Stepanova from the Institute of World Economy International
Relations, outlines a shift in two main trends, the broader network
fragmentation of the global jihadi movement and the shift from top-down
to bottom-up regionalization of violent Islamic groups. She also
tracks the complex evolution of ISIL as a regional force in the Middle
East, and what its continued growth means for the world and region.
TRANSNATIONAL ISLAMIST TERRORISM
NETWORK FRAGMENTATION AND BOTTOM-UP REGIONALIZATION
Ekaterina Stepanova, Head, Peace and Conflict Studies Unit, Institute of World
Economy International Relations (IMEMO)
The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Levant (ISIL)1 occurred in the broader context
of the dominance of radical Islamist
organizations among the world’s most lethal
militant-terrorist groups in the Middle East,
Asia and Africa and the occasional outbreaks
of homegrown, but transnationally inspired
jihadist terrorism in the West. The ISIL
phenomenon has also featured a higher-than-usual
inflow of jihadists from other conflict
hotspots and non-Muslim states. All this adds
to the overall confusion about the different
types and levels of transnational terrorism of
radical Islamist bent and reinforces the
demand for overly simplistic explanations. For
instance, in official circles and media
discourse both in the West and in the rest of
the world the main direction of
transnationalisation of Islamist terrorism is
often still interpreted as the top-down
regionalization of al-Qaeda-centered ‘global
jihad’ movement.
This article argues instead that the evolution
of transnational Islamist terrorism is more
complex and non-linear. Its cutting edge may
be formed by two ideologically linked, but
distinct and only partially overlapping
processes:
the network fragmentation of the global
jihad movement, including in the West;
the bottom-up, rather than top-down,
regionalization of violent Islamism in the
world’s heavily internationalized centers of
militant-terrorist activity in the Greater
Middle East.
MAIN TRENDS IN TRANSNATIONAL
TERRORISM
Of all trends in contemporary terrorism, the
following three are of particular relevance to
the evolution of transnational Islamist
terrorism.
(1) Sharp increase in terrorist activity in the
recent years, coupled with its
disproportionately high concentration in two
regions and two major trans-border conflict
areas. No current international security crisis
– from the outbreak of Ebola to the crisis
around and conflict in Ukraine as the
dominant European security issue – can undo
or overshadow one simple fact: 2013 was the
peak year in global terrorist activity not only
in the early 21st century, but also for the entire
period since 1970 that is covered by available
74

statistics. Disturbingly, the previous highs for
terrorist incidents were recorded in 2011 and
2012 and for fatalities – in 2012.2
While terrorist activity is at its historical peak
and continues to increase, it is very unevenly
distributed around the world, with the bulk of
it concentrated in just a handful of countries.
The post-9/11 global terrorism statistics is
heavily dominated by two regions (the Middle
East and South Asia). The bulk of terrorist
activity there is, in turn, accounted for by two
regional centers of gravity – major armed
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan (and, more
recently, in the broader Afghanistan-Pakistan
and the Iraq-Syria contexts). The heavily
internationalized wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
both involved armed insurgent/terrorist
movements in Muslim countries directed
primarily against Western troops backing
weak local governments. The Western
withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan and
changing forms of internationalization of the
respective conflicts did not improve the
situation.
(2) The general dominance of region-based
radical Islamist groups and movements
among the most active and lethal militant-terrorist
groups. In 2012, the top 6 terrorist
groups – all of the radical Islamist type –
accounted for almost half (around 5000) of
all terrorist fatalities in the world.3 In 2013, all
of the most lethal terrorist groups in the
world were radical Islamist organizations,
including the Taliban in Afghanistan, ISIL (in
Iraq and Syria), “Tehrik-e-Taleban” (Pakistan),
“Boko Haram” (Nigeria), “Lashkar-e-Jangvi”
(Pakistan), “Djabhat an-Nusrah” (Syria),
“ash-Shabab” (Somalia). Remarkably, these
groups, in addition to the use of terrorist
means, have also been active combatants –
military parties to major armed conflicts in
respective states. All of them have or acquire
a major trans-border dimension and evolve in
the direction of further regionalization of
militant and terrorist activity. In contrast to
these groups, for instance, al-Qaeda as such
has not committed a single terrorist act in
2012–2013.
(3) Further transnationalisation of terrorism
at different levels that could be
distinguished primarily by the ultimate scale
of a group’s end goal(s) – local, regional
or global. At the present stage of
globalization, terrorism at different levels of
world politics from local to global differs
more in terms of degree and quality of
transnationalisation, than by whether or not it
is transnationalised. Furthermore,
transnationalisation primarily manifests itself
in qualitative rather than quantitative terms.
Despite the fact that out of a couple of
thousands of terrorist groups tracked by the
Global Terrorism Dataset (GTD) only few
attack soft targets on foreign territory,4 the
very boundary between ‘domestic’ and
‘international’ terrorism gets increasingly
blurred. Even terrorist groups with localized
political agenda tend to increasingly
transnationalise some or most of their
logistics, fund-raising, propaganda and
training activities. Terrorist actors of certain
motivational/ideological types, such as the
jihadist cells and individuals in the West, may
address their terrorist acts to ‘the world as
whole’ and act to advance explicitly
transnationalised or global goals, even as they
rely primarily or solely on local resources and
do not necessarily travel out of their country
of citizenship. In addition, in today’s
globalized world, transnationalisation does
not exclude – and is often dynamically
interlinked with – the fragmentation of
terrorism and other forms of collective
violence.
In sum, as all terrorism today is
transnationalised to some degree, of critical
importance is to distinguish between different
levels and qualities of transnational terrorism.
In the world where even a group with
localized agenda can develop a wide
transnational fund-raising network or hit
citizens of many states by attacking civilians
in major urban centers, the main criterion to
establish the qualitative level of
transnationalisation of terrorism is the scale
of an organization’s ultimate goals and
agenda – local, regional or global.
NETWORK FRAGMENTATION OF
‘GLOBAL JIHAD’
The bulk of terrorist activity in the world is
accounted for by militant actors that pursue
relatively limited goals in local or regional
contexts. In contrast, the more recent
phenomenon of ‘global terrorism’ associated
primarily with al-Qaeda advances an explicitly
universalist agenda and ultimately pursues
existential, non-negotiable and unlimited
goals. Such terrorism is truly extraterritorial:
while it is not specifically tied to any single
local or regional political context, it does not
have to be global in its physical reach to have
a global impact. Despite minimal number of
incidents, operatives and ideologues,
al-Qaeda continued to attract
disproportionately high attention well after
9/11. This may be partly explained by the fact
that most of its high-profile targets have been
either located in or associated with the
developed Western world, partly – by the
significant anti-system potential of the
supranational ideology of global jihad that
offers a very radical and reactionary response
to very modern challenges of a globalizing
world.
However, in the mid-2010s, following a
massive anti-al-Qaeda campaign and
liquidation of most of its first generation
leaders, including Osama bin Laden, the
following question seems appropriate. How
come that the al-Qaeda-centred global jihad
is still considered to pose the main terrorist
threat to international security, if in the early
2010s, al-Qaeda as such did not even make it
into the top 20 most dangerous terrorist
groups (in 2011, it was responsible just for one
kidnapping out of over 5000 terrorist
incidents5 and, in 2012-2013, did not commit
any terrorist attacks)?6 The answer is complex
and linked the dynamic structural
transformation of the global jihad movement
and its adaptation to changing circumstances.
There are two main interpretations of the
evolution of the global jihad movement. While
both imply a degree of fragmentation of the
original ‘al-Qaeda’, the first framework
interprets this process as top-down
regionalization. Since the late 2000s, this
approach has prevailed in mainstream expert
and political discourses in the United States
and in the West at large. It disaggregates
‘global jihad’ into three levels. First, it leaves
some direct strategic command and control
role to what remains of the ‘al-Qaeda core’
based in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Second, it
argues that the movement’s main center of
gravity has shifted towards several large,
well-structured and organizationally coherent
regional affiliates in Muslim regions
(ultimately subordinate to ‘al-Qaeda Central’).
This usually refers to ‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula’, ‘al-Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb’, ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ and even
‘al-Qaedas’ in the Horn of Africa and in
Southeast Asia. The third level is formed by
al-Qaeda’s ‘ideological adherents’ – small cells
and individuals, most active in the West itself,
who ‘know the group only through its
ideology to carry out violence in its name.’7
The loose network of these micro-cells,
however, is commonly interpreted as a sign of
al-Qaeda’s organizational degradation that is
claimed to have resulted primarily from
counterterrorist pressure by the United States
and its allies.
The alternative approach promoted in this
article emphasizes the genuine ‘network
fragmentation’ of global jihad as the cutting
75

edge of the movement’s evolution.8 It denies
residual strategic command functions for ‘the
al-Qaeda core’ at the present stage, beyond
the symbolic and inspirational role of its
ideology and remaining leaders such as
Ayman az-Zawahiri. This approach does not in
principle deny the existence of al-Qaeda’s
regional affiliates in Muslim regions (this role
best fits ‘al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula’
that retains a genetic link with the original
al-Qaeda and, to a lesser extent – ‘al-Qaeda in
the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb’). It does,
however, question the vision of global jihad as
the ‘top down’, hierarchically integrated
‘Islamist International’ clearly divided into
large well-structured regional affiliates. It
points at the fact that most of the so-called
regional affiliates have long and solid local
pre-history and strong homegrown roots.
Their main agendas and priorities are
inextricably tied to respective regional
contexts and local/regional armed conflicts.
When they upgrade and expand their activity
to the regional level, it is by following the
‘bottom-up’ logic rather than any ‘top-down’
impulse or command from some master HQs.
These groups’ occasional statements of
support or even pledges of loyalty to
al-Qaeda have been more of a symbolic and
declaratory than substantive nature.
Instead, smaller autonomous cells9 that are
linked by a loose ideological network, are
active in several dozen countries and promote
an explicitly globalist agenda are seen as the
most committed ideological adepts of global
jihad and as the cutting edge of the evolution
of its organizational patterns. Such network
fragmentation was best captured by Abu
Musab as-Suri’s theory of ‘jihad by individual
cells’ (and, in the West, by the ‘leaderless
jihad’ theory).10 Network fragmentation does
not imply aggressive recruitment into a
pre-existing framework – rather, adepts are
encouraged to start their own cells to further
the shared ideology and the movement’s
ends. The idea of starting a violent cell
appeals as much to young people’s desire for
glory and personal conscience as to their
political or ideological beliefs. In contrast to
Islamist groups and movements tied to the
specific local/regional contexts and armed
conflicts in the Middle East, Asia or Africa, this
type of cell is truly extraterritorial in its
outlook and goals, with most of such actors
emerging in Western rather than Muslim
states. These cells display diverse
radicalization paths and are often not linked
to one another in any formal way, but they
share the ideology of global jihad and
together form – and see themselves as part of
– an adaptive and resilient transnational
network-type movement.
Despite its marginality, this movement can
still pose a serious terrorist threat to
international security in two main ways.
First, there has been a gradual rise in
homegrown jihadist terrorism in the West,
despite continuing fragmentation of such
violence underscored by dominance of
mini-cells and the growing proportion of
single actors. Some of them – the so-called
‘lone wolves’ – act entirely on their own (e.g.,
Nidal Hasan in the 2010 Fort Hood shooting),
others act either as network agents or on
their own initiative, but with some operational
or other network connections.11 Fragmented
jihadist terrorism in the West is hard to track
as individuals or cells may not be in contact
with other/known terrorist actors, do not
necessarily get external training, and often
acquire weapons and materials independently
and from open sources. However, it also tends
to produce a mismatch between the Western
jihadists’ high ideological ambition and their
relatively limited capacity to launch terrorist
attacks (they generally lack experience in
violence unless a group involves a veteran/
returnee from a foreign armed conflict or
have got some professional training). This
mismatch often results in failure and partly
explains why, while half of jihadist plots in the
West involved plans to cause mass casualties,
very few have led to actual mass-casualty
attacks.12
Secondly, the fragmented network of ‘global
jihad’ adepts forms a natural pool for influx of
Western jihadist fighters to various conflicts in
the Muslim world. More limited connections
– a few foreign contacts and visits to
conflict-torn regions for ideological
inspiration, sometimes also in hope to get
some training – while not a must for
jihadists13 in the West, have not been
uncommon either. The two-way nature of
such flows and links has become more
disturbing than ever in view of the rise of
radical Islamist organizations in the Iraq-Syria
context (such as ‘Jabhat an-Nusrah’ and,
above all, ISIL). They have attracted more
foreign Islamist fighters than any other
theater since Afghanistan in the 1980s, with
Western, mainly European, fighters
comprising no less than a quarter of all
foreign jihadists – a disproportionately high
share. For the West, this has alarming
implications. Possible return of some of these
seasoned fighters could stimulate new
extremist networks and do a lot to bridge the
mismatch between jihadists terrorists’
ambition and qualification (even as only a
limited percentage of such returnees from
previous conflicts have turned back to
terrorism so far).14
While certainly a serious concern, the network
fragmentation of global jihad (that manifests
itself more in the West than anywhere else) is
a less critical international security problem
than the challenge posed by the bottom-up
regionalization of Islamist militancy and
terrorism.
BOTTOM-UP REGIONALIZATION:
ISIL
Regionalization of territorially based
insurgent-terrorist Islamist groups could be
traced in various regions. However, it only
tends to become an issue of major
international concern in regional contexts
characterized by a combination of chronic
state weakness or failure, protracted major
conflicts and all-out civil wars and high
degree of transnationalisation and/or even
formal internationalization (foreign military
presence). It is in these conditions that
regionalization of a more localized movement
is coupled with consolidation rather than
fragmentation of its military-political potential
and with a qualitative upgrade of its militant/
terrorist activity, rather than decline in its
intensity. Nowhere does this trend manifest
itself better than in the context of the
ongoing crisis in and around Iraq and the
trans-border ISIL phenomenon.
Iraq has led the list of countries most affected
by terrorism since the mid-2000s – well
before ISIL has taken full shape (in the first
post-9/11 decade Iraq alone accounted for
over third of all terrorism-related fatalities
worldwide).15 However, a decade later, it is
the activity of ISIL and some smaller radical
Islamist groups in the extended, cross-border
Iraq-Syria context that has become the main
impulse and driver of anti-government
militancy, terrorism and sectarian violence in
the region. Acting in two (semi-)failed state
contexts – in Iraq as a chronically failing
post-intervention state and in Syria seriously
weakened by an ongoing bloody civil war –
ISIL provides an even more impressive
example of the full regionalization of a
militant-terrorist movement with a powerful
ideology, major state-building ambitions and
quasi-state potential than the cross-border
activity and phenomenon of the Taliban in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan context.
The emergence and evolution of ISIL in the
direction of ‘bottom-up regionalization’ has to
be addressed in two main contexts: (1)
76

internal dynamics and conflicts in Iraq and
Syria, including the overlap with intra-regional
dimension and (2) broader links and
connections to transnational Islamism.
First, no other major regionalizing Islamist
movement has been so strongly driven by
intra-state and intra-regional factors, even as
these dynamics were partly distorted,
stimulated or set in motion by previous
external intervention in Iraq. The informal
transnationalisation of a civil war in Syria on
both sides has also largely, although not
exclusively, been a product of intra-regional
dynamics.
Of all the factors and conditions that can
explain the rise of ISIL and its major military
and modest state-building successes since
the summer of 2014, the more specific and
directly relevant ones are internal to the
countries and the region in question. They
include the genuine discontent by very
diverse groups of Iraqi Sunnis – from the
former Baathists to tribal groups to radical
Islamists – with their growing political and
socio-economic marginalization and
repression. This rising discontent had earlier
helped feed the anti-U.S. insurgency, but
continued to accumulate during the rule of
the increasingly sectarian al-Maliki
government. That was coupled with the
general limited functionality and low
legitimacy of the unpopular, but increasingly
authoritarian Iraqi regime inherited from the
times of the foreign security presence. The
bloody civil war that erupted in the
neighboring Syria provided an ideal ‘window
of opportunity’ to ISIL as the most radical
part of the Iraqi Sunni opposition to get a
haven, secure the second country-base,
continue fighting and acquire financial
self-sufficiency through control of the
cross-border smuggling of oil and almost
anything else, even before it shifted its main
center of activity back to Iraq.
Not surprisingly, the worst and most direct
implications of the ISIL activity once it has
taken its full shape affect, first and foremost,
the region itself. The ISIL phenomenon
threatens to deal a massive, if not necessarily
final, blow to at least two already failing or
seriously weakened states at once, adding
new quality to the broader destabilization in
the region that has already for over a decade
been the world’s main center of terrorist and
militant activity.
Second, ISIL’s links to transnational Islamist
terrorism remain a contested issue. In policy
and media circles ISIL, as well as its previous
‘editions’, are often portrayed not as
self-sufficient organizations but as a branch
of al-Qaeda-inspired ‘global jihad’. This
interpretation usually emphasizes two issues:
(a) ISIL’s pre-history in Iraq, with a focus on
the so-called ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’ and (b) the
unprecedentedly large presence of foreign
jihadist fighters among ISIL’s command and
rank-and-file alike.
The Islamist core of what is now known as
ISIL (and was previously known as Islamic
State in Iraq and earlier as ‘al-Qaeda in Iraq’)
formed in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led
intervention in the course of escalating and
radicalizing resistance to foreign forces and
their local allies. A few statements of support
and loyalty to al-Qaeda made by the group’s
first leader Abu Musab az-Zarqawi (a
controversial figure with ambiguous
connections in and beyond jihadist circles),
the reference to al-Qaeda in the group’s name
under Zarkawi (removed shortly after his
death in 2006) and his increasing reliance on
demonstrative use of mass-casualty terrorist
sufficed to degrade the group to little but
‘al-Qaeda off shoot’. While this might have
served well to discredit the genuine nature of
the armed Sunni opposition to the US
presence in Iraq, it did not reflect the real
nature and composition of the group. Its main
goal remained the liberation of Iraq and the
establishment of an Islamist state in Iraq and
the overwhelming majority of militants and
commanders were Iraqi (while the proportion
of foreign fighters did not exceed 4–10 per
cent).16 By the end of 2006, the group
became one of the largest insurgency forces
in Iraq, formed the core of the coalition of the
anti-government Islamist actors and renamed
itself into Islamic State of Iraq.
The intensifying pressure by the US forces
and some loyal Sunni tribes, as part of the
‘surge’ campaign of the late 2000s, and later
also by the government and its Shia allies
pushed part of the movement out of Iraq to
the neighboring Syria. The escalating civil war
there since 2011 gave the group a major boost
and upgraded it to one of the largest forces
on the radical Islamist flank of the armed
opposition. While the group had joined the
Syrian civil war on the side of the jihadist part
of the opposition, after it upgraded itself to
the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant and tried
to unite other Islamist groups under its
control, it fell out with the another largest
jihadist organization ‘Jabhat an-Nusrah’.
Remarkably, in the conflict between ISIL and
‘an-Nusrah’ in Syria the political and
ideological support of ‘al-Qaeda Central’ was
not on the ISIL side. As the ISIL shifted the
main focus of its activity back to Iraq and
seized upon the rising tensions between the
al-Maliki government and the Iraqi Sunnis,
al-Qaeda’s main voice Ayman az-Zawahiri
formally denied any support or affiliation to
ISIL in February 2014, months before its
victorious march deeper into Iraq.17
The absence of al-Qaeda blessing did not
stop thousands of foreign fighters (some of
whom switched the front from Syria) from
joining ISIL, increasingly well-funded and well-organized
militarily. Their overall numbers,
proportion and composition are dynamic and
yet to be clarified, but two preliminary
conclusions can be made even on the basis of
available information. First, while the ISIL
army-style combat potential is largely
attributed to the presence of the Iraqi
ex-Baathist professional security and military
cadre (who may comprise up to a third of
ISIL’s leader al-Baghdadi’s deputies), foreign
jihadists appear to play a disproportionately
large role in the ISIL terrorist attacks and
other atrocities, including beheadings.
Second, it is the influx of ‘global jihad’ fighters
from the West in particular, with their
distinctively universalist agenda, that may
provide the region-based ISIL with its main
link to a truly globalized agenda. In this
respect, they may play an even larger role
than either the ideological symbolism of the
historical al-Qaeda core or the influence of
jihadists from other local/regional ‘fronts’
(that range from major conflicts in failed
states such as Afghanistan, Somalia or Yemen
to peripheral Islamist/separatist insurgencies
in many fully functional states in Asia and
Eurasia).
***
Obsessive attempts to trace or link any
Islamist insurgency/terrorist movements in
areas of heavily transnationalised armed
conflicts to the ‘core al-Qaeda’ in line with the
strict ‘top-down regionalization’ scheme
might have played their own part in
overlooking the rise of ISIL. This trans-border,
regional movement is not only extremely
radical in ideological outlook and methods,
but also efficient in combat and, potentially,
basic governance and quick to adapt to the
limited anti-ISIL air campaign launched by the
US-led coalition of Western and Arab states.
The regionalization of ISIL largely followed
the ‘bottom-up’ rather than ‘top-down’
pattern and was primarily driven by intra-regional
dynamics, state weakness and
sectarianism (exacerbated by previous
international interventions). ISIL’s main link to
77

the ‘global jihad’ agenda and ideology is
provided by the significant presence of
foreign fighters, especially Western jihadists
with their markedly universalist outlook.
However, in contrast to al-Qaeda or ‘global
jihad’ adepts in and beyond the West, ISIL
does not appear to pursue or prioritize totally
abstract and utopian global goals. It is
precisely the fact that ISIL is fully mired in the
regional context, sets up more tangible and
realistic goals and does not (dis)miss a
chance of building a trans-border regional
Islamic state here and now that makes it
today a no lesser, or even a greater, challenge
to international security than al-Qaeda and its
direct off-shoots and self-generating
micro-clones.
Whether the ISIL phenomenon is more of an
outlier or signals a broader trend may yet to
be seen. However, some of the deadliest
Islamist militant-terrorist groups in the world’s
worst conflicts (ranging from the Afghan and
Pakistani Taliban to ‘Boko Haram’ in Nigeria or
‘ash-Shabab’ in Somalia) – appear to or may
evolve in the same direction, especially if a
combination of dysfunctional or failing states,
deep regional divisions and unsuccessful past
of present external interventions is in place.
This provides sufficient grounds to consider
the ‘bottom-up regionalization’ as one of the
most potentially disturbing trends in
transnational Islamist terrorism.
NOTES
1. On 29 June 2014, the movement changed the
name to Islamic State (IS), but is more widely
known in English as ISIL or ISIS – Islamic State of
Iraq and Sham (the Arabic for Levant) or Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria.
2. 2013 is the last year for which full GTD statistics
was available at the time of writing. Global
Terrorism Database (GTD) / National Consortium
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism (START), University of Maryland. http://
www.start.umd.edu/data/gtd.
3. Testimony by W. Braniff, Executive Director,
START, University of Maryland, before the U.S.
House Armed Services Committee Hearing on the
State of Al Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Associated
Groups: View From Outside Experts. Washington,
DC: United States House of Representatives, 4
Feb. 2014, P. 3.
4. Global Terrorism Database 2014.
5. Global Terrorism Index: Capturing the Impact of
Terrorism in 2002-2011 (Sydney; N.Y.: Institute for
Economics and Peace, 2012), p. 6 http://www.
visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/2012_
Global_Terrorism_Index_Report.pdf
6. Testimony by W. Braniff. p. 3.
7. National Strategy for Counterterrorism
(Washington D.C.: The White House, 28 June
2011), p. 19.
8. Stepanova E., ‘The evolution of the al-Qaeda-type
terrorism: networks and beyond’, in L. Bossi et al.
(ed.), Dynamics of Political Violence: A
Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization
and the Escalation of Political Conflict (Farnham,
VA: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 288–305.
9. Al-Suri A.M., The Call to Global Islamic Resistance.
CENTRA Technology, Inc. / trans. From Arabic
(DCIA Counterterrorism Center, Office of
Terrorism Analysis, 2004), pp. 1367–1368.
10. Sageman M. Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in
the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).
11. See, e. g., Nesser P., ‘Single actor terrorism: scope,
characteristics and explanations’, in Perspectives
on Terrorism, vol. 6, no. 6 (2012), pp. 61–73.
12. There were only 4 rarely successful mass-casualty
jihadist attacks in the West after 2001: the 2004
Madrid bombings, the 2005 London bombings,
the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and the 2013
Boston Marathon bombings.
13. For numbers on Syria, see Zelin A.Y., ‘Up to 11,000
foreign fighters in Syria; steep rise among
Western Europeans’, ICSR Insight, 17 December
2013. Estimated numbers for foreign fighters in
ISIL in the Iraq-Syria context are higher, but vary
significantly.
14. For more detail, see Hegghammer T., “Should I
stay or should I go? Explaining variation in
Western jihadists’ choice between domestic and
foreign fighting,” in American Political Science
Review, vol. 107, no. 1 (Feb. 2013), p. 10.
15. Global Terrorism Index 2012, p. 12.
16. Baker J., Hamilton L. The Iraq Study Group Report
(Washington D.C.: Iraq Study Group, 2006).
17. Bayoumi A., Harding L., “Mapping Iraq’s fighting
groups”, Al-Jazeera (27 June 2014); The Evolution
of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL):
Relationships 2004-2014, START Fact Sheet, June
2014.
78

Terrorism in all its forms is a major threat to national security. Nuclear
terrorism however is the most serious possible terrorist threat. Samantha
Pitts-Kiefer from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, outlines the history and
current reality of a nuclear terrorist threat, highlighting the urgent need
to better strengthen global nuclear security. This contribution
summarises the key global initiatives focused on this task and how the
NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index aims to provide better evidence to
measure amongst countries of the world, the quantities, security and
control measures, global norms, domestic commitments and capacity
and risk environment for nuclear materials.
NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES
Samantha Pitts-Kiefer, Senior Project Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
Thirteen years after the 9/11 attacks stunned
the world and nearly a decade after the
subsequent attacks in London, Madrid, and
Bali made global terrorism a painful reality,
public concern and awareness about the
terrorist threat had started to fade. But the
emergence this year of the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), most notably with
gruesome videotaped beheadings, has once
again captured the attention of citizens across
the globe.
Images of the barbaric ritualistic killings of
American journalists and British aid workers
sparked international outrage. At the same
time, however, in many parts of the world, a
sense remains that these kinds of deeply
troubling events take place only in remote and
far-off lands, and pose little threat closer to
home. Unfortunately, it is naïve to think so. ISIL
has tens of thousands of fighters, is well-financed,
pays little respect to international
borders and, in addition to individual acts of
barbarism, engages in large-scale attacks on
civilians. Al Qaeda leaders made it clear they
were seeking weapons of mass destruction,
including nuclear weapons. What if ISIL
decides it too wants them? World leaders and
their publics have a duty to ask such
“what-ifs.” What if ISIL, al Qaeda, or some
other yet-as-unknown terrorist group obtained
nuclear materials and fashioned a crude
improvised nuclear device? What if they were
able to ship it, undetected, through one of the
world’s porous ports? What if they succeeded
in detonating it in one of the world’s cities?
This is not just the stuff of Hollywood. Such
“what-ifs” must be treated in capitals with
seriousness and resolve from Washington, DC,
to Moscow and beyond. World leaders,
including U.S. presidents Barack Obama and
George W. Bush, have identified nuclear
terrorism as the number one security threat
and have taken steps to address the threat
through the Nuclear Security Summit process
and other programs such as the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the
G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
But much more needs to be done. Until all the
materials needed to make a bomb are
properly secured, the world will not be safe
from terrorists bent on unleashing
unimaginable horror.
THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR
TERRORISM
During the Cold War, the United States and
the Soviet Union built up vast amounts of
nuclear weapons and materials. The Cuban
Missile Crisis heightened fears that the nuclear
arms race could result in destruction on a
massive scale, whether as a result of an
intentional or accidental launch and
detonation of a nuclear bomb. As the Cold
War came to a close, a new threat emerged:
nuclear terrorism. With the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons and
79

materials were left scattered across hundreds
of sites in former Soviet states prompting
urgent concern that smugglers or terrorists
would steal enough material for a bomb.
Russia and the United States worked together,
through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, to dismantle and destroy
thousands of weapons and to ensure that the
nuclear materials from those weapons were
disposed of safely. Despite all that has been
achieved, the security of weapons-usable
nuclear materials remains an urgent concern,
while at the same time terrorist groups have
grown more sophisticated and more adept at
carrying out mass-casualty attacks.
So, today’s leaders and citizens face a chilling
prospect: the detonation of a crude nuclear
weapon built by terrorists with materials
stolen or purchased on the black market.
Though the al Qaeda that attacked the United
States on 9/11 has been much diminished, al
Qaeda affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula and
Northern Africa, ISIL, and terrorist
organizations like al-Shabaab in Somalia
remind us that the terrorist threat is dynamic,
constantly evolving, and, most of all, enduring.
At the same time, the materials needed to
build a bomb are spread around the world.
Globally, there are approximately 2,000 metric
tons of weapons-usable nuclear material
(plutonium and highly enriched uranium or
HEU) located at hundreds of sites—some of
them poorly secured—scattered across
twenty-five countries. Building one bomb
requires only enough HEU to fill a five-pound
bag of sugar or a quantity of plutonium the
size of a grapefruit. Terrorists also have
access to the technology and know-how
needed to build a crude nuclear device, and a
number of terrorist groups have in the past
stated a desire to acquire and use a nuclear
bomb. The consequences of detonating such a
bomb in a major city would be staggering:
hundreds of thousands of casualties;
long-lasting environmental damage; economic
losses in the hundreds of billions; and
considerable political and social ramifications.
No matter where a bomb is detonated, the
consequences would reverberate around the
globe.
To build a bomb the biggest challenge
terrorists face is obtaining enough HEU or
separated plutonium. Every step after
acquiring the material—building the bomb,
transporting it, and detonating it—is easier for
terrorists to take and harder for the
international community to stop. So it is
imperative that terrorists don’t get a hold of
the materials.
Today, there are myriad ways that a well-organized
and sufficiently-funded terrorist
group could seize the materials they need to
build an improvised nuclear device that would
destroy the heart of a city. They could send a
team of armed assailants to overwhelm guards
at an understaffed nuclear facility or to attack
a convoy transporting weapons-usable nuclear
materials from one facility to another. A
terrorist or criminal network could corrupt
insiders or use a cyberattack to defeat
security controls.
That is why ensuring that all weapons-usable
nuclear material is properly secured to the
highest standards is the key to preventing
nuclear terrorism.
BUILDING A STRENGTHENED
GLOBAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
SYSTEM
The Nuclear Security Summits, launched by
the United States in 2010, have brought
high-level attention to the threat of nuclear
terrorism and have catalyzed actions by the
54 participating states to strengthen their own
security and work collectively to strengthen
global security. As a result of the Summit
process, states have strengthened their
nuclear security laws and regulations, signed
on to international treaties that require them
to secure nuclear materials and criminalize
acts of nuclear terrorism, and provided
financial or other assistance to states to help
them secure their materials. Significantly, since
the Summit process was launched in 2009,
twelve countries have eliminated all of their
inventories of these dangerous materials.
Yet, despite these important efforts, there is
still no global system for securing all material.
Incredibly, the security of some of the world’s
most dangerous material is not subject to any
common international standards or “rules of
the road” that all states must follow. Indeed,
security practices vary widely across states.
While several elements for guiding states’
nuclear security practices do exist, they fall
short of what is needed. In particular:
The international legal agreement for
securing nuclear materials—the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (CPPNM) and its 2005
Amendment—does not define standards
and best practices and the 2005
Amendment, which strengthens the overall
scope of the CPPNM, has not yet entered
into force. Entry into force must be a
priority and the United States, which has
so far failed to complete ratification of the
2005 Amendment, must act swiftly to
do so.
Nuclear security recommendations and
guidelines issued by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are not
mandatory and are implemented
inconsistently.
Existing legal agreements and guidelines
cover only 15 percent of all global stocks of
weapons-usable nuclear material: those
used in civilian programs. The remaining
85% are considered “military material” and
are not subject even to those limited
practices.
Not only is the current system devoid of an
agreed-upon set of international standards or
best practices, there is no governing body
tasked with holding states accountable for lax
security and no expectation that states should
take steps to build confidence in others that
they are effectively securing their materials.
Even though poor security in one state can
result in the detonation of a nuclear bomb
anywhere else in the world, many states still
consider nuclear security solely a sovereign,
not a shared, responsibility, and continue to
simply say, “Trust me.”
NUCLEAR SECURITY LAGS BEHIND
OTHER INDUSTRIES
The lack of global standards, information
sharing, or accountability mechanisms in
nuclear security is in stark contrast to other
high-risk global enterprises, such as civil
aviation, where public safety and security is at
stake and where states understand and accept
that all parties have an interest in the
performance of others. In the case of aviation,
for example, almost all states are members of
the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), which sets safety and security
standards for all airlines, conducts audits, and
shares security concerns with others states.
Yet with weapons-usable nuclear materials,
where poor security can lead to a nuclear
catastrophe with global consequences, there
is no shared system of standards, assurance,
or accountability.
If the threat of nuclear terrorism is to be taken
seriously and all weapons-usable nuclear
material secured, there must be a global
system of international standards and best
practices that covers all materials, including
military materials, and provides mechanisms
for states to be held accountable and to build
confidence in their security practices. In
addition, sates must reduce risk by minimizing
and, where possible, eliminating their stocks of
80

weapons-usable nuclear materials, for
example by converting power and research
reactors that use HEU fuel to low enriched
uranium fuels.
STRENGTHENING GLOBAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY
Securing vulnerable nuclear materials has
been a priority at the Nuclear Threat Initiative
(NTI) since its founding in 2001. In recent
years, NTI’s work in this area has followed two
tracks: a public initiative that focused
worldwide attention on the status of nuclear
materials security, and a separate effort to
engage governments and experts to shape the
agendas and outcomes of the Nuclear
Security Summits.
In January 2014, NTI published the second
edition of the NTI Nuclear Materials Security
Index (NTI Index), a unique public assessment
of nuclear security conditions in 176 countries.
The NTI Index provides a framework for
analysis that has sparked international
discussions about priorities for strengthening
security. The NTI Index assesses 25 countries
with one kilogram or more of weapons-usable
nuclear material (HEU or separated plutonium)
across five categories:
Quantities and Sites: the quantities of
material, number of sites at which the
material is located, and whether material
quantities are decreasing or increasing;
Security and Control Measures: whether
certain physical protection, control, and
accounting measures are required by
national laws and regulations;
Global Norms: whether a state has joined
international treaties, undertaken voluntary
measures to support global efforts, and
taken steps to build confidence in the
security of its material;
Domestic Commitments and Capacity:
whether a state has implemented its
international obligations; and
Risk Environment: factors that though not
directly related to the security of nuclear
materials may still impact a state’s ability
to maintain appropriate security, including
political instability, ineffective governance,
corruption, and the presence of groups
interested in illicitly acquiring material.
The NTI Index assesses an additional 151
countries with less than one kilogram of
weapons-usable nuclear materials, or none at
all, on the last three of these categories. These
states are included in the NTI Index because
all states, not just those with materials, have a
responsibility to prevent nuclear terrorism by
ensuring that their territories are not used as
safe havens, staging grounds, or transit points
for terrorist operations. NTI plans to release a
third edition of the NTI Index in early 2016.
SETTING PRIORITIES
One of NTI’s recommendations in the 2012 NTI
Index was the need for a dialogue on priorities
for securing nuclear materials. Although the
2010 Summit had resulted in important
commitments by states to strengthen their
own security and support global nuclear
security efforts, these commitments were not
driven by an agreed set of priorities. To
address this challenge, in July 2012, NTI
convened the first of a series of meetings
called the Global Dialogue on Nuclear Security
Priorities, a Track 1.5 dialogue among
government officials, experts, nuclear security
practitioners, and other stakeholders to build
consensus on the need for a strengthened
global nuclear security system and the
elements of that system. Leading up to the
2014 Nuclear Security Summit, participants in
the Global Dialogue developed the following
set of principles that define such a system:
Comprehensiveness: All weapons-usable
nuclear materials and facilities should be
covered by the system, including the 85%
of all global stocks that are military
materials.
International Standards and Best
Practices: All states and facilities with
those materials should adhere to
international standards and best practices.
Building Confidence: States should help
build confidence in the effectiveness of
their security practices and take reassuring
actions to demonstrate that all nuclear
materials and facilities are secure (e.g.,
through peer review, best practice
exchanges, and sharing of non-sensitive
security information).
Material Minimization and Elimination:
States should work to reduce risk through
minimizing or, where feasible, eliminating
weapons-usable nuclear materials stocks
and the number of locations where they
are found.
The 2014 Summit Communiqué made
significant headway on several of these fronts,
calling for a strengthened international nuclear
security architecture and emphasizing the
value of countries building the confidence of
others in the security of their weapons-usable
nuclear materials. In addition, 35 countries
(two-thirds of Summit participants) agreed to
put principles into practice by joining the
“Strengthening Nuclear Security
Implementation” initiative, pledging to meet
the intent of the IAEA’s voluntary guidelines
through implementing national regulations,
committing to improve their nuclear security
through internal assessments and peer
reviews, and ensuring that those responsible
for nuclear security are “demonstrably
competent.”
Despite this importance progress, challenges
remain. The security of military material has
largely remained unaddressed by the
Summits. In addition, despite progress on
minimizing stocks of HEU, discussions of the
minimization and management of plutonium
have been stymied by political and other
challenges. Finally, at what is presumed to be
the final Summit scheduled for 2016, leaders
will need to agree on a way to sustain the
nuclear security mission beyond 2016 or risk
much of the positive work to strengthen
nuclear security going unfinished or, worse,
backsliding. To address these challenges, NTI
has once again convened the Global Dialogue
to continue our efforts to strengthen the
global system in support of the 2016 Summit.
LOOKING AHEAD
Terrorism in all its forms presents a major
threat to global security. Yet, the prospect of a
terrorist using a nuclear bomb to destroy a
city, killing and injuring hundreds of
thousands, is the threat most likely to keep
leaders and global experts awake at night. A
nuclear nightmare like the kind seen in horror
movies and television dramas could become a
reality if the world does not do what we
already know must and can be done to secure
the materials that could be used in a nuclear
bomb.
With the final Nuclear Security Summit
approaching, the window of opportunity to
put in place the global system necessary to
get the job done is closing. We cannot stand
aside and let the window close. States must
agree to a path forward for sustaining the
nuclear security mission and for building a
truly global system for securing all nuclear
materials—a system where materials are
secured according to international standards
and best practices, where states take actions
to build the confidence of others that they are
properly securing their materials, and where
states continue to minimize and eventually
eliminate stockpiles of weapons-usable
nuclear materials.
81

APPENDIX
APPENDIX A: GTI RANKS
AND SCORES, 2014
GTI
RANK
COUNTRY 2014 GTI SCORE
(OUT OF 10)
CHANGE IN SCORE
(ACTUAL YEAR
2012 TO 2013)
1 Iraq 10 0.5
2 Afghanistan 9.39 0.26
3 Pakistan 9.37 0.23
4 Nigeria 8.58 0.34
5 Syria 8.12 0.6
6 India 7.86 0.01
7 Somalia 7.41 0.17
8 Yemen 7.31 0.15
9 Philippines 7.29 0.56
10 Thailand 7.19 0.03
11 Russia 6.76 -0.09
12 Kenya 6.58 0.52
13 Egypt 6.5 1.63
14 Lebanon 6.4 1.97
15 Libya 6.25 1.54
16 Colombia 6.24 -0.15
17 Turkey 5.98 -0.12
18 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 5.9 -0.05
19 Sudan 5.77 -0.15
20 South Sudan 5.6 1.28
21 Algeria 5.52 0.23
22 Mali 5.29 1.42
23 Bangladesh 5.25 1.27
24 Nepal 5.23 0.28
GTI
RANK
(OUT OF 10)
CHANGE IN SCORE
(ACTUAL YEAR
2012 TO 2013)
25 China 5.21 0.38
26 Central African Republic 5.19 1.35
27 United Kingdom 5.17 0.72
28 Iran 4.9 -0.1
29 Greece 4.73 0.44
30 United States 4.71 0.85
31 Indonesia 4.67 0.03
32 Israel 4.66 -0.46
32 Mexico 4.66 1.53
34 Bahrain 4.41 0.89
35 Myanmar 4.24 0.02
36 Mozambique 4.01 2.89
36 Sri Lanka 4.01 -0.76
38 Rwanda 4 0.04
39 Burundi 3.97 -0.41
40 Cote d’Ivoire 3.76 -0.37
41 Tanzania 3.71 3.65
42 Ethiopia 3.7 -0.38
43 Paraguay 3.63 1.61
44 Norway 3.57 -0.68
45 Senegal 3.55 -0.12
46 Tunisia 3.29 1.56
47 Ireland 3.09 0.15
48 Malaysia 3.04 1.13
48 South Africa 3.04 0.79
50 Peru 2.96 0.17
51 Ukraine 2.95 -0.18
52 Uganda 2.93 -0.78
53 Belarus 2.85 -0.73
54 Kosovo 2.73 0.22
55 Saudi Arabia 2.71 -0.17
56 France 2.67 -0.41
57 Guatemala 2.61 1.02
58 Chile 2.59 0.33
58 Niger 2.59 0.57
60 Bulgaria 2.58 -0.57
60 Georgia 2.58 -0.43
62 Italy 2.55 -0.09
63 Eritrea 2.45 -0.71
64 Honduras 2.38 0.99
65 Kazakhstan 2.37 -0.47
66 Cyprus 2.3 2.14
67 Morocco 2.11 -0.69
68 Tajikistan 1.99 -0.67
69 Spain 1.84 -0.53
70 Jordan 1.76 -0.28
82

GTI
RANK
(OUT OF 10)
CHANGE IN SCORE
(ACTUAL YEAR
2012 TO 2013)
71 Argentina 1.73 0.3
72 Brazil 1.72 1.02
73 Republic of the Congo 1.59 1.59
74 Trinidad and Tobago 1.54 1.54
75 Cameroon 1.45 -0.45
75 Macedonia (FYR) 1.45 -0.77
77 Switzerland 1.34 0.87
78 Madagascar 1.26 0.16
79 Ecuador 1.18 0.69
80 Zimbabwe 1.16 0.52
81 Guinea 1.12 1.12
82 Sweden 1.07 -0.7
83 Germany 1.02 -0.7
84 Canada 0.95 0
85 Czech Republic 0.81 0.55
86 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.76 0.17
87 Burkina Faso 0.7 0.7
87 Montenegro 0.7 0.7
89 Netherlands 0.58 -0.71
89 Serbia 0.58 -0.84
91 Mauritania 0.56 -0.7
92 Venezuela 0.54 -0.72
93 Belgium 0.53 -0.68
94 Dominican Republic 0.47 0.47
95 Angola 0.41 -0.6
95 Australia 0.41 -0.62
97 Guinea-Bissau 0.35 -0.47
98 Cambodia 0.31 0.25
99 Taiwan 0.31 0.29
100 United Arab Emirates 0.29 0.03
101 Moldova 0.28 -0.31
102 Armenia 0.27 0.19
103 Austria 0.24 -0.43
103 Bolivia 0.24 -0.24
105 Croatia 0.23 0.19
105 Portugal 0.23 -0.24
107 Albania 0.19 0.13
107 Denmark 0.19 0.11
109 Bhutan 0.16 -0.38
109 Estonia 0.16 -0.15
111 Uzbekistan 0.14 -0.13
112 Kyrgyzstan 0.1 -0.1
113 Iceland 0.08 -0.08
113 Laos 0.08 -0.08
113 Liberia 0.08 -0.08
116 Hungary 0.07 -0.11
GTI
RANK
(OUT OF 10)
CHANGE IN SCORE
(ACTUAL YEAR
2012 TO 2013)
117 Azerbaijan 0.06 -0.29
118 Chad 0.05 -3.48
119 Kuwait 0.04 -0.04
119 Panama 0.04 -0.04
121 Equatorial Guinea 0.01 -0.01
121 Japan 0.01 -0.05
121 Lesotho 0.01 -0.01
124 Benin 0 0
124 Botswana 0 0
124 Costa Rica 0 0
124 Cuba 0 0
124 Djibouti 0 0
124 El Salvador 0 0
124 Finland 0 -0.03
124 Gabon 0 0
124 Gambia 0 0
124 Ghana 0 0
124 Guyana 0 -0.42
124 Haiti 0 0
124 Jamaica 0 0
124 Latvia 0 0
124 Lithuania 0 0
124 Malawi 0 0
124 Mauritius 0 0
124 Mongolia 0 0
124 Namibia 0 0
124 New Zealand 0 -0.05
124 Nicaragua 0 0
124 North Korea 0 0
124 Oman 0 0
124 Papua New Guinea 0 0
124 Poland 0 0
124 Qatar 0 0
124 Romania 0 -0.02
124 Sierra Leone 0 0
124 Singapore 0 0
124 Slovakia 0 0
124 Slovenia 0 0
124 South Korea 0 0
124 Swaziland 0 -0.03
124 Timor-Leste 0 -0.07
124 Togo 0 0
124 Turkmenistan 0 0
124 Uruguay 0 0
124 Vietnam 0 0
124 Zambia 0 0
83

APPENDIX B: 50 WORST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN 2013
RANK COUNTRY DATE CITY ORGANISATION F I WEAPON TYPE
1 Nigeria 17/09/2013 Beni Shiek Boko Haram 142 0 Firearms
2 Nigeria 24/10/2013 Damatura Boko Haram 125 0 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
3 Syria 22/07/2013 Khan al-Assal Al-Nusrah Front 123 0 Firearms
4 Pakistan 10/01/2013 Quetta Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 119 219 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
5 Afghanistan 2/08/2013 Sherzad district Taliban 98 0 Firearms
7 Pakistan 22/09/2013 Peshawar Jundallah 87 131 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
8 Afghanistan 18/08/2013 Gulistan district Taliban 82 22 Firearms
9 Kenya 21/09/2013 Nairobi Al-Shabaab 72 201 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
10 Nigeria 20/12/2013 Bama Boko Haram 70 0 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
11 Syria 11/06/2013 Hatla Al-Nusrah Front 70 0 Firearms
12 Algeria 16/01/2013 In Amenas al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade (Those who Sign with Blood) 69 8 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
13 Yemen 5/12/2013 Sanaa Al-Qaìda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 68 215 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
14 Syria 21/02/2013 Damascus Unknown 62 201 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
15 Pakistan 26/07/2013 Parachinar Mujahideen Ansar 61 151 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
16 Syria 6/02/2013 Al-Buraq Al-Nusrah Front 61 0 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
17 Nigeria 7/05/2013 Bama Boko Haram 55 0 Firearms
18 Central African Rep. 5/12/2013 Bangui Anti-Balaka Militia 54 0 Firearms
19 Turkey 11/05/2013 Reyhanli Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 53 140 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
20 Afghanistan 3/04/2013 Farah Taliban 53 95 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
21 Syria 21/03/2013 Damascus Unknown 50 84 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
22 Lebanon 23/08/2013 Tripoli Islamic Unification Movement 47 300 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
23 Iraq 5/10/2013 Baghdad Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 47 85 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
24 Nigeria 6/07/2013 Mamudo Boko Haram 46 4 Firearms
25 Iraq 24/04/2013 Mosul Unknown 46 0 Firearms
26 Pakistan 3/03/2013 Karachi Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 45 151 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
27 Iraq 21/09/2013 Baghdad Unknown 45 80 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
28 Iraq 25/12/2013 Baghdad Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 44 71 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
29 Nigeria 11/08/2013 Konduga Boko Haram 44 26 Firearms
30 Pakistan 29/09/2013 Peshawar Unknown 43 101 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
31 Iraq 23/01/2013 Tuz Khormato Al-Qaìda in Iraq 43 75 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
32 Iraq 12/07/2013 Kirkuk Unknown 42 35 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
33 Iraq 29/09/2013 Musayyib Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 41 50 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
34 Syria 1/08/2013 Homs Liwa al-Haqq 40 160 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
35 Iraq 17/05/2013 Baqubah Unknown 40 57 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
36 Nigeria 29/09/2013 Gujba Boko Haram 40 18 Firearms
37 Dem. Rep. of Congo 25/12/2013 Kamango Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 40 16 Firearms
38 Nigeria 18/03/2013 Kano Boko Haram 39 75 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
39 Pakistan 8/08/2013 Quetta Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 39 50 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
40 Somalia 13/04/2013 Mogadishu Al-Shabaab 38 58 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
41 Mexico 31/01/2013 Mexico City Individuals Tending Toward Savagery 37 101 Incendiary
42 Iraq 20/10/2013 Baghdad Unknown 37 50 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
43 Iraq 3/02/2013 Kirkuk Al-Qaìda in Iraq 36 70 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
44 Pakistan 18/06/2013 Mardan Unknown 35 43 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
45 Nigeria 19/08/2013 Baga Boko Haram 35 14 Incendiary
46 Pakistan 2/02/2013 Serai Naurang Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 35 8 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
47 Iraq 14/11/2013 Sadiyah Unknown 33 80 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
49 Iraq 14/03/2013 Baghdad Al-Qaìda in Iraq 32 50 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
50 Pakistan 10/01/2013 Mingora Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 31 70 Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
84

APPENDIX C: GLOBAL TERRORISM
INDEX METHODOLOGY
The GTI ranks 162 countries based on four indicators weighted
over five years. The Occupied Palestinian Territories is the only
region that records notable amounts of terrorism that is not
included in the index.80
The GTI score for a country in a given year is a based on a
unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of
incidents in the year.
The four factors counted in each country’s
yearly score, are:
Total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
Total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in
a given year
Total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a
given year
A measure of the total property damage from
terrorist incidents in a given year.
Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three and a
five year weighted average is applied to try and reflect the
latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time. The
weightings shown in Table 12 was determined by consultation
with the GPI Expert Panel.
The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality. It should be
noted the property damage measure is further disaggregated
into four bands depending on the measured scope of the
property damage inflicted by one incident. These bandings are
shown in Table 13, whereby incidents causing less than US$1
million are accorded a weighting of 1, between $1 million and $1
billion a 2, and more than $1 billion a 3. It should be noted a
great majority of incidents are coded in the GTD as ‘unknown’,
thus scoring nil, with ‘catastrophic’ events being extremely rare.
TABLE 12 INDICATOR WEIGHTS USED IN THE
DIMENSION WEIGHT
Total number of incidents 1
Total number of fatalities 3
Total number of injuries 0.5
Sum of property damages
measure
Between 0 and 3 depending
on severity
TABLE 13 PROPERTY DAMAGE LEVELS AS
DEFINED IN THE GTD AND WEIGHTS USED IN THE
CODE/ WEIGHT DAMAGE LEVEL
0 Unknown
1 Minor (likely $1 million)
2 Major (likely between $1 million and $1 billion)
3 Catastrophic (likely $1 billion)
TABLE 14 HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRY TERRORIST
ATTACKS IN A GIVEN YEAR
DIMENSION WEIGHT NUMBER OF RECORDS
FOR THE GIVEN YEAR
CALCULATED
RAW SCORE
Total number of
incidents
1 21 21
Total number of
fatalities
3 36 108
Total number of
injuries
0.5 53 26.5
Sum of property
damages measure
2 20 40
Total raw score 195.5
HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY’S GLOBAL
TERRORISM INDEX SCORE
To assign a relative number to how a country has been directly
impacted by terrorism in any given year, for every incident
recorded the GTI calculates a weighted sum of all indicators. To
illustrate, assume Table 14 depicts a hypothetical country’s
records for a given year.
Given these indicator values, the country for that year would be
assessed as having an impact of terrorism of 195.5.
85

FIVE YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE
To account for the lingering effect terrorist attacks have on a
society in terms of fear and subsequent security response, the
GTI takes into consideration the events of previous years as
having a bearing on a country’s score in the current year. For
instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway will
continue to have a psychological impact on the population for
many years to come. The scoring system presented here is a
simple attempt to account for this by weighting the country’s
previous scores using the values shown in Table 15.
LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10
The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout
the world; there are a handful of countries with very high levels
of terrorism compared to many countries which experience
only very small amounts, if not zero terrorism. Hence, the GTI
uses a base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at
0.5 intervals.
As shown in Table 16, mapping the scores in this way yields the
total number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size
0.5 within the scale of 0-10. In order to band these scores the
following method is used:
1. Define the Minimum GTI score across all countries as
having a banded score of 0
2. Define the Maximum GTI score across all countries as
having a banded score 10
3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores
and calculate r by:
a. root = 2*(Highest GTI banded score - Lowest
GTI banded score) = 20*(10-0) =20
b. Range = 2*(Highest recorded GTI raw score –
Lowest recorded GTI raw score)
c. r = root ȼ Range
The mapped band cut-off value for bin n is
calculated by rn.
Following this method produces mapping of GTI scores to the
set bands as defined in Table 16.
In following this method of scoring, weighting and banding, the
GTI can be seen as a relative indicator of how terrorism impacts
a country compared to all other countries in the GTD. This
importantly recognises that there are diminishing returns to
terrorism in terms of its psychological, economic, political and
cultural impact. Simply, a terrorist incident killing one person is
likely to have a greater psychological impact in a country with
zero terrorist incidents than in a country like Iraq where
terrorism is a regular, if not daily occurrence.
YEAR WEIGHT % OF SCORE
Current year 16 52%
Previous year 8 26%
Two years ago 4 13%
Three years ago 2 6%
Four years ago 1 3%
TABLE 15 TIME WEIGHTING OF HISTORICAL SCORES
YEAR WEIGHT % OF SCORE
Current year 16 52%
Previous year 8 26%
Two years ago 4 13%
Three years ago 2 6%
Four years ago 1 3%
TABLE 16 BANDS USED IN THE GTI
BAND NUMBER BANDS BAND CUT OFF
VALUES
1 0 0.00
2 0.5 1.64
3 1 2.69
4 1.5 4.42
5 2 7.25
6 2.5 11.89
7 3 19.52
8 3.5 32.03
9 4 52.55
10 4.5 86.23
11 5 141.48
12 5.5 232.15
13 6 380.93
14 6.5 625.06
15 7 1025.63
16 7.5 1682.91
17 8 2761.41
18 8.5 4531.07
19 9 7434.84
20 9.5 12199.51
21 10 20017.65
86

APPENDIX D: VERIFYING THE INCREASE
IN TERRORISM FROM 2011 TO 2012
Until 2011 data collection for this exercise was largely a manual
process with START employing many people to trawl through
media articles and code each terrorist event by hand into the
database. Since 2012 however, START began using automated
machine coding to add new events to the database. This new
technology not only increased the efficiency of the data entry
process but also allowed more sources to be searched
increasing coverage of terrorism at the global scale. While
this new technology means that the GTD is now a more
comprehensive data source, the change in the data collection
methodology does create difficulties in analysing
longitudinal trends.
There has been a large increase in the number of incidents since
1998. There has been a patricularly significant increase in the
number of recorded terrorist events since 2011. However, the
change of methodology offers two possible reasons for such an
increase.
1. The increase is a reflection of real-world events or
2. The increase is a product of more efficient database coding.
In regards to this, START report that their analysis suggests a
combination of these two factors are the explanation for the
dramatic increase in recorded terrorist events. The problem is
how to estimate the percentage that can be attributed to factors
(1) and (2). In turn an estimate can be assigned to the “real
world” proportional increase in terrorism.
It is not possible to say exactly how much terrorism has
increased given the changed methodology, however it is
possible to give statistical estimates to this increase by only
using data from 2012 that would have been collected in 2011
using the old methodology. What the analysis finds is that the
dramatic increase from 2012 to 2013 is valid and that there is
strong evidence indicating a large increase in terrorism from
2011 to 2013.
To estimate what the increase could have been based on the
previous methodology, IEP used geospatial analysis to filter out
events in regions of the world that previously had never been
covered prior to the change in methodology. This represents a
lower bound estimate because events in previously uncovered
regions may actually be real increases, however, given the
change of methodology it is not possible to say for certain.
The GTD geo-codes events with a latitude and longitude
wherever possible. For data prior to 2011, around 75 per cent of
the events within GTD are geocoded. Where the GTD has not
geo-coded events, IEP has assigned a latitude and longitude to
an event by the following process:
1. Matched the city name where the event occurred
with two separate large world city databases to
estimate a location for each event (19 per cent of
events coded in this step).
2. Where (1) is not possible, IEP locates the event to
the centre of the country that it occurred
(remaining six per cent of events coded in this step).
Figure 29 highlights the results of this geocoding process for
events between 1998 and 2011. During this period events were
coded manually and so offer the baseline coverage to compare
data from 2012 onwards. The assumption here is that if an
incident occurs in 2012 that is near any other incident that was
coded prior to 2012, then it would have been coded even if
START had not introduced the more efficient data collection
method. If an incident occurs in 2012 that is in a completely new
location that has never before seen terrorist activity, there is no
precedent to assume that it would have been included using the
old data collection methodology. This technique has been
developed by IEP and is referred to as the geospatial filtering
approach (GFA).
87

SELECTING A FILTERING RADIUS
To implement the GFA all incidents recorded in 2012 have been
compared to the incident closest to it from the set of all
incidents occurring between 1998 and 2011. This process follows
the steps:
Select Incident A from 2012 GTD
Select the closest incident to Incident A from all
incidents recorded in the GTD between 1998 and
2011, call this Incident B
If A is within x kms of B then include Incident A in
the calculation of the percentage increase in
terrorism between 2011 and 2012
If A is greater than x kms away from B, exclude A
from further analysis
Repeat for all incidents recorded in 2012.
TABLE 17 CONVERGENCE OF THE GFA WITH
PREVIOUS KNOWN YEAR ON YEAR PERCENTAGE
YEAR GFA FILTER RADIUS TO CONVERGE TO WITHIN 5% OF
TRUE PERCENTAGE INCREASE (KMS)
2001 90
2002 44
2003 60
2004 22
2005 41
2006 28
2007 21
2008 52
2009 19
2010 21
2011 26
There are shortfalls with this. Namely, it ignores the possibility
of terrorism arising in new parts of the globe. While
methodologically this is an issue, in regards to the nature of
terrorism and the data collection from media, this is not believed
to be a significant factor due to the following reasons:
1. Since 2002, most terrorism has occurred in five
countries, all of which have had good coverage in
the GTD throughout the period.
2. What would be generally termed “Black Swan”
events occur in countries where terrorism is not a
constant threat. The Madrid and London train
bombings and the 2011 Norway attacks are
examples of these. However, countries such as
these have good media coverage and so it is very
unlikely that these would be excluded using the
geospatial filtering approach.
Before applying the GFA it is therefore necessary to define what
distance radius is to be used as the filtering mechanism. In
essence this step makes an assumption of the coverage of
media sources used in the GTD prior to 2012. To do this trials
were run over all known year on year increases since 2000 using
distances between 0 and 100 kms. Table 17 shows the filtering
distance that provided an estimate that was within 5 per cent of
the known year on year increase. The most restrictive filtering
radii occurred in 2009 when 95 per cent of the increase in
terrorism occurred within 19 kms of attacks that occurred in
2008.
Figure 29 plots the results from applying the GFA to 2011 to
2012 data and the baseline case of 2008 - 2009. If we assume
that the GFA converges to within 5 per cent of the true increase
at the baseline radii 19km, then the estimated like for like
increase in terrorism between 2011-2012 is around 20% +
5% = 25%.
While the GFA only provides an estimate, it does suggest that a
large part of the calculated increase in terrorism between 2011
and 2012 is due to real world events. These results concur with
START’s analysis.81 However, Table 18 shows that even if a
conservative approach is taken by assuming there was no
increase between 2011 and 2012, terrorism would still have
increased fivefold since 2000. Using a 45 per cent increase
between 2011 and 2012, this statistic rises to being seven fold.
88

FIGURE 29 CONVERGENCE OF THE GFA FOR 2011-2012.
The Geospatial Filtering Approach estimates a 25% increase in terrorist incidents between 2011-2012.
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
-30%
Source: GTD
At a radius of 19km filtering the GFA converges to the correct increase of 20% between 2011-2012
RADIUS USED FOR ESTIMATE (KMS)
ESTIMATE INCREASE IN TERRORISM 2011-2012
Estimated Baseline Increase of 25% in 2011-2012
At a radius of 19km filtering the GFA converges to the correct increase of 0% between 2008-2009
-40%
GFA applied to 2011-2012 Increase
GFA applied to 2008-2009 Increase
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
YEAR ASSUME NO INCREASE IN
2011 TO 2012 (6)
ASSUME 25% INCREASE IN
2011 TO 2012 (6)
ASSUME 45% INCREASE IN
2011 TO 2012 (6)
2012 Use 0.00% - conservative Use 25.00% - GFA estimate Use 45.00% -upper bound
Total % estimate of increase since 2011
44% 59% 109%
Formula = ʌ (1+6)-100% for all year on year changes since 2000
Terrorism in 2013 as a percentage of 2000
Formula = ʌ (1+6) % for all year on year changes since 2000
475%
(approximately five fold)
594%
(approximately six fold)
689%
(approximately seven fold)
TABLE 18 ESTIMATES OF THE INCREASE OF TERRORISM SINCE 2000
Estimates of the increase in terrorism range from five to seven fold since 2000.
89

1. Global Terrorism Database, ‘Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables’,
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf, 2012,
2. See methodological note.
3. Masters, J. Laub, Z., ‘Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’, Council on
Foreign Relations, 22 August 2013, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-
peninsula-aqap/p9369, (accessed 3 October 2014).
4. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC), Thailand threat
assessment, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/region/threatened/1062,
(accessed 7 October, 2014).
5. Global Terrorism Database, ‘Terrorist Group Profiles’, http://www.start.umd.
edu/tops/, (accessed 7 October 2014).
6. Atran. S., ‘The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism’, The Washington
Quarterly, vol. 29, no.2, 2006, p. 132.
7. Ibid.
8. The International Centre for the study of Radicalisation and Political Violence,
Countering Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 2014, http://icsr.
info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-
europeans/, (accessed 3 October 2014).
9. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013, http://www.
state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm, (accessed 3 October 2014).
10. Ibid.
11. Teich, S., Trends and Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western
World, International Institute for Counter Terrorism, 2013, http://i-hls.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Lone-Wolf-Sarah-Teich-2013.pdf (accessed 24
October 2014).
12. Phillips, L., ‘Nanotechnology: Armed Resistance’, Nature, Vol 488 No. 7413,
2012, http://www.nature.com/news/nanotechnology-armed-resistance-1.11287,
13. ‘Por sobres-bomba y homicidio de académico: Van por ala terrorista de
anarquistas’, Diario 24 Horas, 26 February 2013.
14. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013, http://www.
state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224829.htm, (accessed 3 October 2014).
15. Ibid.
16. US Department of State Overseas Advisory Council, Message for U.S. Citizens:
Ankara (Turkey): Embassy will open and Additional Security Information,
Istanbul, 2013, https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.
aspx?cid=13550, (accessed 3 October 2014).
17. Gupta, D., ‘Exploring roots of terrorism’, in Bjorgo, T.,(ed.), Root Causes of
Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, New York, Routledge,2005.
18. Maleckova, J., ‘Impoverished terrorists: stereotype or reality?’, in Bjorgo,
T.,(ed.), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, New York,
Routledge,2005.
19. Ibid
20. Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP), ‘Major episodes of political violence,
1946-2013’, 2013, www.systemicpeace.org/warlist/warlist.htm, (accessed 3
October 2014). This dataset assesses the severity of each instance of political
violence on an eleven point scale with 0 being no political violence and 10
being “annihilation and extermination”. On this scale terrorist campaigns such
as Northern Ireland and the Cuban Revolution are assessed as being severity
score 2. Analysis provided uses all incidents ranked above a level 2 in this
dataset.
21. Political Instability Task Force, ‘State Failure Dataset 1955-2013’, 2013, http://
www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/PITFProbSetCodebook2013.pdf, (accessed 3
October 2014).
22. Terrorist attacks from 1996 was selected due to data availability of political
terror and group cohesion measures. A major terrorist attack is defined by one
that claims the lives of over five people.
23. International Institute of Social Studies, Intergroup Cohesion, http://www.
indsocdev.org/intergroup-cohesion.html, (Accessed 6th October 2014).
24. Gibney, M. M. Dalton, ‘The Political Terror Scale’ In David L. C. (ed.), Human
Rights and Developing Countries, Greenwich: JAI,1996.
25. International Institute of Social Studies. Intergroup Cohesion, http://www.
indsocdev.org/intergroup-cohesion.html, (Accessed 6th October 2014).
26. UNODC, Global Study on Homicide, http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/
pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf, 2013, (accessed 7 October
2014).
27. Frey, B. et al., ‘Calculating tragedy: Assessing the costs of Terrorism’, Journal of
Economic Surveys, vol.21, no.1, 2007.
28. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook: The Global Economy
After September 11, Washington DC, 2001.
29. Rose, A. Z. B. S. Blomberg,’Total Economic Consequences of Terrorist
Attacks: Insights from 9/11’, Create Homeland and Security Center, Paper 190,
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30. Kaufman, A, F, and M. I., Meltzer, and G., P., Schmid, ‘The economics impact of a
bioterrorist attack: Are prevention and Postattack Intervention programs
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31. Stiglitz, J. E. L. J. Bilmes, The three trillion dollar war: The true cost of the
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33. World Bank Data
34. Enders, W. T., Sandler, ‘Terrorism and Foreign Direct Investment in Spain and
Greece’, Kyklos, vol. 49, no.3, 1996, pp.331-52.
35. Adebayo, A.A., ‘Implications of Boko Haram Terrorism on National
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36. Calculations from World Bank data.
37. Kunreuther, H and M, Erwann, ‘Policy Watch: Challenges for terrorism risk
insurance in the United States’, http://www.nber.org/papers/w10870.pdf,
38. International Crisis Group, ‘Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram
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39. Doom, R. K. Vlassenroot, ‘Kony’s Message: A New Koine? The Lord’s
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40. The Economist, ‘The many names of ISIS’, The Economist, 28 September 2014,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/09/economist-explains-
19, (accessed 7 October 2014).
41. Kirkpatrick, D., ‘ISIS Harsh Brand of Islam Is Rooted in Austere Saudi Creed’,
The New York Times, 24 September 2014.
42. Marcel, V., ‘ISIS and the Dangers of Black Market Oil’, Chatham House, 21 July
2014, http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/15203, (accessed 7
October, 2014).
43. Johnson, K., ‘The Islamic State Is the Newest Petrostate’, The Foreign Policy, 28
July 2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/07/28/baghdadis_
hillbillies_isis_iraq_syria_oil_terrorism_islamic_state , (accessed 7 October
2014 ).
44. Shatz, H.J., ‘How ISIS funds its Reign of Terror’, RAND, 8 September 2014,
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45. Opperman, J., ‘Leadership Structure of Islamic State’, Terrorism Research and
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ENDNOTES
90

47. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, 31 July 2012.
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm#AQI ,(accessed 7 October
2014 ).
48. Chulov, M., ‘Syrian city of Raqqa gripped by fear of US air strikes on Isis’, The
Guardian, 16 September 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
sep/15/syria-raqqa-fear-us-air-strikes-isis , (accessed 7 October 2014).
49. Barrett, R., ‘Foreign Fighters in Syria’, The Soufan Group, http://soufangroup.
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf pp.6,
24, (accessed 7 October 2014).
50. Opperman, J. ‘Leadership Structure of Islamic State’, Terrorism Research and
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Icons sourced from The Noun Project (see p. 54,55) include:
Firecracker by Maximilian Becker from The Noun Project
Book by Mateo Zlatar from The Noun Project
People by Wilson Joseph from The Noun Project
91

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