Ch10 final
- 2. Chapter Ten The Efficient Market Hypothesis
- 3. Slide 10–3
- 4. Topics Covered • We Always Come Back to NPV • What is an Efficient Market? – Random Walk – Efficient Market Theory – The Evidence on Market Efficiency • Puzzles and Anomalies • Six Lessons of Market Efficiency Slide 10–4
- 5. Return to NPV • The NPV (Net Present Value) of any project is the addition to shareholder wealth that occurs due to undertaking the project • In order to increase shareholder wealth, only undertake projects that have a higher return than the return required by the shareholders (assume the firm is all equity financed). • Positive NPV investment decisions often rely on some sustainable competitive advantage, such as patents, expertise or reputation • Positive NPV financing decisions are much harder to find, since a positive NPV to the issuer of a security implies a negative NPV to the buyer of the security Slide 10–5
- 6. Return to NPV Example The government is lending you $100,000 for 10 years at 3%. They require interest payments only prior to maturity. Since 3% is obviously below market, what is the value of the below market rate loan? Assume the market return on equivalent risk projects is 10%. 10 3,000 100,000 NPV = 100,000 − ∑ t − t =1 (1.10) (1.10)10 = 100,000 − 56,988 = $43,012 Slide 10–6
- 7. What is an Efficient Market? • 1953 – Maurice Kendall, a British statistician, presents a paper to the Royal Statistical Society on the behavior of stock & commodity prices • He had expected to find regular & predictable price cycles, but none appeared to exist • Kendall’s results had been proposed by a French doctoral student, Louis Bachelier, 53 years earlier. • Bachelier’s accompanying development of the mathematics of random processes preceded by five years Einstein’s work on the random Brownian motion of colliding gas molecules. Slide 10–7
- 8. What is a Random Walk? • Stocks follow a random walk if the movement of stock prices from day to day DOES NOT reflect any pattern. • Statistically speaking, the movement of stock prices is random, albeit with a positive skewness (technically known as a submartingale) Slide 10–8
- 9. Random Walk Theory Coin Toss Game Heads $106.09 Heads $103.00 $100.43 Tails $100.00 Heads $100.43 $97.50 Tails $95.06 Tails Slide 10–9
- 10. The Coin Toss Game • You start with $100 • At the end of each week, a coin is tossed • If the coin comes up heads, you win 3% of your investment • If the coin comes up tails, you lose 2.5% • The process is a random walk with a positive drift of 0.25% per week (the drift is equal to the expected outcome – (0.5)(3%) + (0.5)(-2.5%) = 0.25% • It is a random walk because the change in price next week is independent of the change in price this week Slide 10–10
- 11. Random Walk Theory S&P 500 Five Year Trend? or 5 yrs of the Coin Toss Game? Level 130 80 Month Slide 10–11
- 12. Random Walk Theory S&P 500 Five Year Trend? or 5 yrs of the Coin Toss Game? 230 Level 180 130 80 Month Slide 10–12
- 13. Why Does a Random Walk Theory Make Sense for Stock Prices • If we assume that stock prices are based on information . . . • Then stock prices should change on the receipt of new information • Since by definition new information arrives in a random & unpredictable fashion, stock prices should change in a random & unpredictable fashion Slide 10–13
- 14. Efficient Market Theory Microsoft Stock Price $90 Actual price as soon as upswing is recognized 70 50 Cycles disappear once identified Last This Next Month Month Month Slide 10–14
- 15. Random Walk Theory: Microsoft Stock Price Changes from March 1990 to May 2004 For Microsoft stock over the period March 1990 to May 2004, the correlation between a price change on day t and a price change on day t+1 was +0.025. Slide 10–15
- 16. Random Walk Theory: Weekly Returns, May 1984 – May, 2004 FTSE 100 (correlation = -.08) FTSE is an Return in week t + 1, (%) independent company owned by The Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange. Their sole business is the creation and management of indices and associated data services, on an international scale. Return in week t, (%) Slide 10–16
- 17. Random Walk Theory: Weekly Returns, May 1984 – May, 2004 Nikkei 500 (correlation = -.06) Return in week t + 1, (%) Return in week t, (%) Slide 10–17
- 18. Random Walk Theory: Weekly Returns, May 1984 – May, 2004 DAX 30 (correlation = -.03) Return in week t + 1, (%) Return in week t, (%) Slide 10–18
- 19. Random Walk Theory: Weekly Returns, May 1984 – May, 2004 S&P Composite (correlation = -.07) Return in week t + 1, (%) Return in week t, (%) Slide 10–19
- 20. Efficient Market Theory • First use of the term, “efficient markets” appears in a 1965 paper by Eugene Fama • Three forms of market efficiency: – Weak Form Efficiency • Current market price captures all information contained in past stock price & volume data – Semi-Strong Form Efficiency • Current market price captures all publicly available information – Strong Form Efficiency • Current market price captures all information, both public and private Slide 10–20
- 21. Efficient Market Theory • Technical Analysts – Forecast stock prices based on the watching the fluctuations in historical prices & volumes (thus “wiggle watchers”) watchers – Should have no marginal value if the market is weak form efficient! Slide 10–21
- 22. Efficient Market Theory • Fundamental Analysts – Research the value of stocks using NPV and other measurements of cash flow – Should have no marginal value if the market is semi- strong form efficient! Slide 10–22
- 23. Testing the Efficient Market Hypothesis • To test the Efficient Market Hypothesis, you measure the abnormal return around an announcement date Abnormal return = Actual return – expected return = rActual − (α + BrMarket ) • Graph on the next page shows the average impact on the price of 194 firms that were takeover targets • Patell & Wolfson found that when new information is released, the major part of the adjustment in price occurs within 10 minutes of the announcement Slide 10–23
- 24. Efficient Market Theory Announcement Date 39 Cumulative Abnormal Return 34 29 24 19 (%) 14 9 4 -1 -6 -11 -16 Days Relative to annoncement date Slide 10–24
- 25. Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence that Markets are Efficient • Mark Carhart analyzed 1,493 mutual funds to see if professional money managers could out-perform the market • He found that, on average, mutual funds earn a lower return than the benchmark after expenses and roughly match the benchmark before expenses • In Canada, the average equity mutual fund MER is between 2 – 2.5% • Over long periods of time, the loss of return due to expenses will reduce terminal wealth significantly • Result: US corporate pension funds now invest over 25% of their equity holdings in index funds Slide 10–25
- 26. Efficient Market Theory Average Annual Return on 1493 Mutual Funds and the Market Index 40 30 20 Return (%) 10 0 -10 -20 Funds Market -30 -40 62 77 92 19 19 19 Slide 10–26
- 27. Puzzles & Anomalies • The new issue puzzle – when firms issue an IPO, investors typically rush to buy. • Those lucky enough to receive stock often obtain an immediate capital gain. However, later these often turn into losses • Suppose you had bought stock immediately following each IPO & then held that stock for five years. • Over the period 1970 – 2002, your average annual return would have been 4.2% less than the return on a portfolio of similar-sized stock Slide 10–27
- 28. Efficient Market Theory IPO Non-Excess Returns 20 IPO Matched Stocks Average Return (%) 15 10 5 Year After 0 Offering First Second Third Fourth Fifth Slide 10–28
- 29. Evidence Against Efficient Market Hypothesis • Anomalies 1. Small-firm effect: small firms have abnormally high returns 2. January effect: high returns in January 3. Monday effect – one day returns highest on Friday; lowest on Monday (Monday returns often negative) 4. Market overreaction 5. Excessive volatility 6. Mean reversion 7. New information is not always immediately incorporated into stock prices 8. Chaos and fractals Slide 10–29
- 30. Mark Twain Effect • The name comes from the following quote of Mark Twain – October. This is one of the peculiarly dangerous months to speculate in stocks. The others are July, January, September, April, November, May, March, June, December, August, and February. • Evidence in support of this effect was provided by Cadsby (1989) based on data on the Canadian Stock Market. Slide 10–30
- 31. Irrational Exuberance & the Dot.Com Bubble • The NASDAQ Composite Index rose 580% from January 1, 1995 to its peak in March, 2000 • By October, 2002 the NASDAQ index had fallen 78% • Yahoo! shares appreciated more than 1,400% in four years, making the company worth more than GM, Heinz & Boeing combined • In Irrational Exuberance, Robert Shiller argues that as the bull market developed, it generated optimism about the future, which stimulated further demand for shares • As individuals made large profits, they became more confident of their opinions • Why didn’t professional money managers bring rationality to the market? Slide 10–31
- 32. Irrational Exuberance & the Dot.Com Bubble In 2000, the total dividends paid by companies in the S&P500 totaled $154.6 million. If investors required a 9.2% return and they believed that the dividends would grow at 8%, the total value of the index would be $12.8 Billion, which was approximately equal to the value of the index at that time. By October, 2002, the value of the index had fallen to approximately $8.6 Billion. Div 154.6 PV ( S & P index) March 2000 = = = 12,883 r − g .092 − .08 Div 154.6 PV ( S & P index) October 2002 = = = 8,589 r − g .092 − .074 Slide 10–32
- 33. Six Lessons of Market Efficiency Markets have no memory – price changes tomorrow are independent of price changes today Trust market prices – in an efficient market, the current market price will capture all (publicly available) information. Thus it is impossible for the average investor to consistently out-perform the market Read the entrails – if the market is efficient, it can tell us a great deal about a company’s future prospects Slide 10–33
- 34. Six Lessons of Market Efficiency There are no financial illusions – investors only care about cash flow. Accounting changes should be irrelevant. The do it yourself alternative – Investors won’t pay firms to do what they can do more cheaply (such as diversification) Seen one stock, seen them all – most stocks are close substitutes for other stocks. Thus if the return on Company A’s stock falls relative to its risk, investors will sell it and purchase the stock of Company B Slide 10–34
Editor's Notes
- #12: This is a graph of the S&P500 from March 1997 to March 2002. The next page is a graph of the coin toss game.