01 book one summary

OPEN STUDIES
Plato’s Republic

Book One Summary

1. Plato (c.428 – 347 BC) is one of the two candidates for the greatest philosopher of all
time (the other candidate being his pupil, Aristotle). The Republic – written around 380 BC –
is his greatest, and most influential work. ‘Republic’ is a later, Latin title for the text; Plato’s
own title is Politeia. Politeia is defined as ‘the conditions and rights of the citizen, or
citizenship’. As will become clear, Plato’s reach in this text is synoptic – but its primary focus
is political, taking as its central question: ‘what ought to be the relationship between the state
and the individual?’.

2. Plato’s teacher was Socrates (470 – 399 BC). So great is Socrates’ contribution to
philosophy that the entire period which precedes him is designated ‘pre-Socratic’, and the
philosophers of this period ‘the pre-Socratics’. Pre-Socratic philosophy tended to be what
Aristotle would later term ‘Natural Philosophy’; their concern was cosmological – asking
questions such as ‘of what is everything ultimately made?’. One of Socrates’ innovations is to
employ philosophical enquiry to address questions of more immediate human concern.
Socrates, in other words, inaugurates philosophical sub disciplines such as moral philosophy
and political philosophy. The Republic thus continues a tradition established by Socrates, in
taking as its subject matter justice.

3. Socrates’ teaching method is also distinctive. Socrates employs dialectic (from the
Greek dialegesthai – ‘dialogue’). Rather than impart information – ‘filling empty vessels’ –
Socrates interrogates his students, asking questions such as ‘what is justice?’. The student
will at first produce responses which are vague, or inconsistent, or clearly false; Socrates will
challenge the response, whereupon the student will refine or adapt that response – and so
the procedure goes on. The objective of this dialectical approach is to lead the student from
initial uncertainty or confusion to eventual clarity and truth. Plato himself had learnt to
philosophise under this rigorous Socratic regime.

4. In 399 BC Socrates was put on trial, on charges of impiety and corruption of the
youth of Athens. He was found guilty, and sentenced to death. The death sentence was to be
self-administered: he had to drink hemlock. The impact of the trial and death of Socrates is
apparent in much of Plato’s writing; it seems safe to say that Plato never really forgave
Athens for its treatment of Socrates (and allusion to the trial appears at various points in the
Republic). Plato’s career extends over some decades – and inevitably his work matures and
changes over that time. What are taken to be the ‘Early’ texts are written in the form of
dialogues (so that the text is an imitation of Socratic teaching). Here Plato may be rehearsing
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philosophical positions which the historical Socrates had held . In the ‘Middle’ period texts,
dialogue is reported (rather than being set out in the manner of a play). More importantly, by
the middle period Plato has developed his own distinctive philosophy – ‘Platonism’. Socrates
continues to dominate the texts of this period, but he now has the role of spokesman for
Plato, enunciating positions which the historical Socrates had not held. The Republic is from
this period. Plato’s ‘Late’ texts – notably the Parmenides and Laws (the latter thought to be
the last text) – relegate Socrates: he is bested in argument by Parmenides, and is completely
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absent from the Laws . These texts also mark a shift away from Platonism, as Plato
apparently comes to recognize some key flaws in the philosophical thesis which is introduced
in the Republic, and which dominates the key central chapters of this text. Plato’s texts thus
memorialize his beloved teacher – but the relationship between Socrates and the texts goes
further than this. Most importantly, Socrates instantiates both philosophical virtues such as
intellectual curiosity, argumentative rigour, an unflagging questioning spirit, and desire for the
truth – however challenging it may be.

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This cannot be known with certainty, as Socrates did not write – preferring to teach.
2
Many of Plato’s texts – such as Parmenides, Gorgias, and Meno – take their titles from the
2
Many of Plato’s texts – such as Parmenides, Gorgias, and Meno – take their titles from the
names of individuals who engage in debate with Socrates.

5. The Oxford World’s Press edition of the Republic, translated by Robin Waterfield,
entitles Book One ‘Convention Under Attack’. It should be emphasized that neither the
division of the text into ten books, nor, therefore, the associated chapter headings, originates
with Plato. The divisions between books are in some cases quite arbitrary – and probably
reflect the divisions which resulted from the text’s being written on rolls of papyrus.
Waterfield’s title is, however, very apt: a key question which is raised from the outset of the
Republic is: should the state be run according to the dictates of convention?

6. This question relates to the problem of political justification. The problem of political
justification is the problem of saying what justifies the state – what legitimizes the state’s
exercise of authority over its citizens. There are, in effect, two approaches to legitimation:

We should adopt the norms We should aim to discover
and values of convention – first principles, and from
nomos – and this should these derive arrangements
regulate the relationship for the exercise of state
between the state and the authority, regardless of what
individual. convention dictates.

This is in effect a division between conservative and radical positions. As will quickly become
clear, Socrates is a radical, who will use the dialectic in an attempt to arrive at first principles
which may be agreed by all who participate in the debate.

7. The Republic opens with a seemingly unremarkable observation: ‘Yesterday I went
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down to the Piraeus with Glaucon …’ (327a) . As is often the case with this text, the
seemingly unremarkable may conceal a great deal. Piraeus is to this day the port of Athens. It
is both downhill from, and due South of, Athens – so that anyone making this trip would likely
think of themselves as ‘going down’. Going down has, however, a resonance in Greek
thought generally. In Homer’s Odyssey, Odysseus journeys down to the land of the dead –
the underworld, where the shades of the dead dwell. Plato will employ a variation on this
motif: in the Republic, ‘going down’ will generally be associated with moving from knowledge,
truth or clarity into ignorance, error and confusion. By extension, ‘going up’ will, in this text,
mark intellectual progress. The relevance of this to the opening sentence resides in three key
facts about Piraeus. Firstly, Piraeus is a seaport – and as is the case with all seaports, it has
a large cohort of foreigners living there. Foreigners have their own conventions (note how the
ostensible reason for Socrates’ visit is that he wants to see the festival which is being held
there for a new – Thracian – god, Bendis). This admixture of cultures will be accompanied by
cultural relativism. It will quickly become clear that Socrates is vehemently opposed to
relativism (of course – he is committed to the discovery of first principles which will transcend
all cultural boundaries). Secondly, the philosophical schools are in Athens – so that the visit to
Piraeus involves leaving the centre of learning and wisdom, and engaging with people whose
learning and wisdom is at best dubious (this also quickly becomes clear). Finally, the Piraeus
is, at the time at which Plato is writing, associated with democracy. At the end of the
Peloponnesian War in 404 BC, Athens was subjected to tyrannical rule by the Tyranny of
Thirty (who were pro-Spartan). There was a democratic opposition movement centred in
Piraeus (and one of the members of this opposition group – who in fact died fighting for
democracy – was Polemarchus, who appears in Book One of the Republic). So the visit to
Piraeus will involve Socrates’ meeting acquaintances whose politics do not comport with his
own; Socrates is a trenchant opponent of democracy (as is Plato: it was, after all, under a
democratic regime that Socrates was executed). Finally, it should be noted that in typical
Middle Period style, the text opens with the word ‘Yesterday’. The speaker is Socrates, and
he will now relate a series of discussions which occurred the day before.

8. The first significant discussion in the text is between Socrates and the elderly
Cephalus. Socrates asks what seems a very brusque question: what is it like to be elderly,

3
Quotations from Plato are by convention located in the text by ‘Stephanus number’. Henri
Estienne was a French classical scholar who translated Plato’s works in the late sixteenth
century; ‘Stephanus’ is the Latin version of his name. The opening sentence of the Republic
was on page 327 of Estienne’s text, and the suffix ‘a’ identifies the top left section of the page.

and close to death? Cephalus presents what may seem a reassuring response: old age
brings welcome relief from sexual desire, which is, Cephalus asserts, ‘a rabid and savage
master’. Cephalus goes on to evince calmness in the face of death: he has no need to fear
the afterlife, as he has always kept his promises and paid his debts. Cephalus thus
represents convention: the view that to live well was to keep one’s promises and honour
one’s debts was apparently central to popular morality of the time.

9. Socrates, it will be recalled, is concerned to discover the first principles of justice –
and so of the ideal state. In what may seems a rather eccentric move, Socrates now
attributes to Cephalus a definition of ‘justice’ as ‘truthfulness and giving back anything one
has borrowed from someone’ (331c). Cephalus has made no more than casual remarks;
Socrates suggests that for Cephalus this will be a definition of justice ‘without any
qualification’. The phrase ‘without any qualification’ is important: what Socrates is aiming for is
a definition of justice in itself. Such a definition will thus reveal the essence of justice – what
any just action or just institution or just decision must embrace in order for it to be just.

10. This raises a crucial element of Platonism. Socrates’ demand for a definition of justice
in itself presupposes that there is such a definition, which will be incontestable, at all times,
and in all places – so that every single particular instance of justice will instantiate this
definition. To assume that this is possible is to assume that justice is absolute – a universal. If
we consider a different question: ‘what is a circle?’, we can see that in this case there is a
definition which is universal. All circles have the property of all of the points on the
circumference being equidistant from the centre; any plane figure which does not instantiate
this is just not a circle, without qualification. Plato will, in the Republic, assume that what goes
for mathematical objects such as circles also goes for justice, and goodness, and beauty.
There may be many different views about what is just or what is beautiful – but at most only
one of those views is actually correct (i.e. the one which corresponds to the universal). So at
this early point in the text we can detect a key element of Platonism.

11. One of the basic tools in the philosopher’s toolbox is the counter-example. If
someone suggests that (for example) all instances of giving back what is owed are instances
of justice being done, then if the philosopher can cite just one hypothetical case in which
giving back what is owed would be wrong – unjust – then the mooted definition of ‘justice’ is
erroneous (and so it does not pick out the universal). Socrates provides just such a counter-
example. Suppose, he suggests, you borrow a dangerous weapon from someone whom you
subsequently discover to be a dangerous maniac. When the dangerous maniac asks that you
now honour your promise to return the weapon, ought you to comply? Socrates’ interlocutor
has no hesitation in agreeing that we should not comply – and so the definition of justice (the
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first to be presented in the text) falls .

12. One of Cephalus’ house guests is Thrasymachus – who is openly hostile to Socrates.
Thrasymachus makes some telling points. Firstly, he observes that Socrates only seems ever
to ask questions, and never to offer answers himself (336c). This is, of course, intrinsic to the
Socratic method. Secondly, Socrates feigns ignorance (337a). It is a basic tenet of Socrates
that the wise man knows how little he knows (so that by extension, the foolish man will
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wrongly take himself to know much more than he actually does) . Thrasymachus also
upbraids Socrates for wanting to learn without having to pay (337d). Thrasymachus is himself

4
This may be the first ever instance of the appearance of utilitarianism in Western
philosophy. The utilitarian holds that on any occasion for moral choice, the right thing to do is
to act so as to bring about the best possible consequences. Cephalus leaves the discussion,
to be replaced by his son Polemarchus. Polemarchus modifies the definition, in the light of
th th
Socrates’ objection. The modified version is derived from the 6 /5 century poet Simonides.
This is revealing in two respects: firstly, it shows how in the Pre-Socratic period, it was poets
rather than philosophers who were regarded as authoritative on moral matters. Secondly, it
again shows how convention is being put under skeptical scrutiny by Socrates in this text. I
propose to gloss over Polemarchus’ definition (which is only a slight modification of that of his
father), and the frankly rather uninteresting critique to which Socrates subjects it.
5
In the Apology, Plato notes that ‘the wisest is he who realizes, like Socrates, that in respect
of wisdom he is worthless’ (Apology 23b).

a teacher – but whereas Socrates refused to charge for his teaching, Thrasymachus is a
professional teacher who, we may assume, charged high fees for his tuition. Thrasymachus is
a sophist – a professional teacher of rhetoric, or the art of persuasion. The contrast between
Thrasymachus and Socrates is important: while the former aims to be persuasive, Socrates
aims for truth (whether or not this is persuasive to others). Socrates (who, it will be recalled, is
relating the previous day’s dialogue) notes that when it came to offering his definition of
‘justice’, Thrasymachus wanted to be heard ‘since he thought he had an impressive position
which would win him acclaim’ (338a). There is a competitive market for sophists in Athens –
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so Thrasymachus needs to advertise his rhetorical skill . Thrasymachus’ delivery of his
definition is amusing: ‘Morality is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger party …
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Well, why aren’t you applauding?’ (338c) .

13. Thrasymachus’ definition is in fact another aspect of Greek convention – the
convention of ‘Might is Right’. This is discussed in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian
War, where the Athenians seek to justify their decision to kill the men of Melos, and enslave
the women, on the grounds that they have the power to do so. This is the notorious ‘Melian
Dialogue’. The view that ‘might is right’ is a relativistic view – and as such it is typically
sophistical. It is therefore no surprise that Thrasymachus expounds this view. Given his
absolutist position on justice, it is equally no surprise that Socrates will attack it.

14. To see how Thrasymachus’ view is relativistic, we should consider two contrasting
regimes:

1. A regime with popular 2. A regime with a tyrannical
sovereignty – where leader – where the leader’s
ultimate and every whim is translated
unchallengeable authority into public policy, without
lies with the people, and any heed to what the
public opinion is translated people actually want.
into public policy.

In both regimes there will be a prevailing system of justice. But the systems will likely be
radically at odds with each other. In regime (1), for example, it is likely that justice will include
a notion of private property rights (the people will want their property to be protected by law,
and it will thus be deemed unjust for property to be taken from an individual, without regard to
property rights). In regime (2), by contrast, justice will be whatever the tyrannical leader
chooses – and he may well pursue his own self-aggrandisement, depriving others of their
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property, and using the legal system to legitimize this (i.e. the declare it just) . On
Thrasymachus’ view, there is no absolute fact of the matter regarding what is just. In regime
(1) the people collectively are the ‘stronger party’, and so justice there is what is in their
interest; in regime (2) the tyrant is the stronger party, and so his interests determine what is
just. Thrasymachus’ definition is, in other words, regime-relative.

15. Relativism is central to sophism. If there is no absolute fact about what is just, then
what matters is not the truth about justice – but rather what people happen to find persuasive.

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The market is in Athens because Athens is at the time a democracy, in which all native
freeborn Athenian males have the right to speak and to vote in the assembly. Clearly in such
an assembly it is important to be able to make persuasive speeches. The clients of sophists
such as Thrasymachus were wealthy young aristocrats who aspired to make a name for
themselves on the political stage. Sophists were widely held to be capable of ‘making the
weaker argument seem the stronger’ – and for this they were held in contempt by Socrates.
The Thrasymachus episode in Book One makes it clear that this antipathy was mutual.
7
Waterfield uses the terms ‘justice’, morality’, and ‘doing right’ interchangeably. Nothing
hangs on this for our purposes.
8
Consider, for example, the plight of white farmers under the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe.
Mugabe insisted that confiscation of their land was just.

If people accept the tyrant’s view of justice, then it has credibility. Different conventions of
‘justice’ can exist in different places, depending on what can be enforced – but if no one finds
a given definition of ‘justice’ persuasive, then that particular definition will not be enforceable.
Sophists such as Thrasymachus, who teach ambitious young would-be politicians the art of
persuasion, thus have a vested interest in the tenability of convention, and the related power
of persuasion. There is much that is compressed into Thrasymachus’ definition of ‘justice’.

16. Socrates, predictably, attacks Thrasymachus’ definition – and does so by posing a
question: ‘are you claiming that obedience to the government is right?’ (339b). Thrasymachus
confirms that this is what he is saying (of course – this is consistent with his definition). So
Thrasymachus is a legal positivist. Legal positivists defer to convention, by suggesting that
what is just is whatever is decided by those who make the rules.

17. Socrates has backed Thrasymachus into a corner. This is exactly who the elenchus
works. Elenchus is questioning someone, with a view to testing the credibility or cogency of
their position. It is central to the Socratic method, and is generally intended to reveal
confusion in his opponent’s viewpoint. Socrates now asks Thrasymachus: are rulers capable
of error? Then, as now, it is impossible to deny that rulers are indeed capable of error
(Thrasymachus seems reluctant to concede this: ‘yes, I suppose so’ (339c). Perhaps he can
see what is coming?). Socrates now delivers the coup de grace: in that case, he suggests,
‘when they get it wrong, the laws will be to their disadvantage’ (339c).Thrasymachus has
been caught in self-contradiction: on his definition, justice is action both to the advantage of
the ruler, and to the disadvantage of the ruler – and this is incoherent.

18. After some ineffectual attempts at revising his position, Thrasymachus – who is
clearly rattled – changes his definition of ‘justice’. He now argues that injustice is actually
better than justice: ‘You fool, Socrates, don’t you see? In any and every situation, a moral
person is worse off than an immoral one’ (343d). Justice is, on this account, for mugs – for
those who don’t have the independence of mind, and the wit, to be immoral and to get away
with it. This goes to the heart of a debate between two great nineteenth century German
philosophers, Marx and Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, ‘justice’ is a human creation, intended to
protect the weak by constraining the strong. Marx agrees that ‘justice’ is a human creation –
but he thinks that ‘justice’ is devised to protect the (economically) strong against the weak.
Socrates would disagree with both of them, of course: for Socrates, justice is an absolute –
and so is discovered, not invented. Marx and Nietzsche both take a relativistic position.

19. This takes us into the main task of the Republic. The discovery what is truly,
universally, just, is a philosophical discovery. Socrates must now provide the universal
definition of justice. He must also rise to the challenge which Thrasymachus has just set, by
proving that justice is superior to injustice. It is to that latter task that the text turns in Book
Two.

JG Jan 12

01 book one summary

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