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AMEC is a large UK-based engineering firm with over 27,000 employees working in 40+ countries. It has extensive experience in nuclear power projects dating back to the 1950s, having played strategic roles in the design and construction of all civil nuclear power plants built in the UK. Some key points discussed include AMEC's involvement in introducing pressurized water reactor (PWR) technology to the UK through the Sizewell B project, changes made to generic nuclear designs through regulatory approval processes, and the importance of the licensee retaining primary responsibility for safety.
1 3 amec
- 1. AMEC experience in nuclear power related projects VII International School on Nuclear Power, Warsaw David Boath Vice President / Chief Engineer, AMEC
- 2. 2 Content Who is AMEC AMEC nuclear history and activities Case study on introducing PWR technology into the UK (Sizewell B) Current UK position International harmonisation Nuclear Safety responsibilities Challenges for Owners / Licensees Personal insights
- 3. 3 AMEC at a Glance UK listed Market cap c.£3.6 billion Revenues ~ £4 billion Employees ~27 000 Working in Around 40 countries * 2013 full year results AMEC is one of the world’s leading engineering, project management and consultancy companies We design, deliver & maintain strategic assets for our customers, offering services which extend from environmental and front-end engineering design before the start of a project to decommissioning at the end of an asset’s life Clean Energy Nuclear Renewables/Bioprocess Power Transmission & Distribution Mining Environment & Infrastructure Water/Municipal Transportation/Infrastructure Government Services Industrial/Commercial Oil & Gas Conventional and unconventional
- 4. 4 UK Commercial Reactor History 1990 1980 1955 1960 1970 Berkeley Magnox Reactors NPPC EE/BW/TW APCGEC/SCAEI/JT LATINA BERKELEY HINKLEYASIZEWELLA WYLFA BRADWELL TRAWSFYNYDD HUNTERSTONA TOKAI MURA Heysham 1 AGR Dungeness A Magnox Reactors TNPG OLDBURY HEYSHAM1 DUNGENESSA HINKLEYPOINTB HUNTERSTONB HARTLEPOOL DUNGENESSB APC NDC BNDC Sizewell B PWR Torness AGR Heysham 2 AGR HEYSHAM2 TORNESS NNC SIZEWELL B Westinghouse JV AMEC
- 5. 5 AMEC Nuclear Pedigree . . . . 3,000 nuclear professionals . . . . . . . . a Nuclear New Build partner for 60 yrs . . . . 1955 1990 1980 1970 1960 2000 2010 EDF Partnership Sizewell B Westinghouse JV NSS/NCL Canada AMEC Czech Republic NCI South Africa AMEC Slovakia Growth in Clean-Up NMP Sellafield AGR Station Design & Construction (all Consortia) Magnox Station Design & Construction (all UK Consortia) Sizewell B PWR Heysham 1 AGR Dungeness A - Magnox Sellafield Bruce CANDU Tokai 1 . . . . . a strategic role on every civil NPP ever built in the UK . . . . . . . . a growing international presence AMEC Romania Mactec (US) AES (US) ESRC (Serco) (UK) GDA – EPR, AP1000, ABWRHinkley Point C Ignalina RBMK AMEC France
- 6. 6 Research reactors decommissioning Magnox decommissioning (UK, France, Japan, Italy) Legacy clean-up - Sellafield - AWE Vendor - independent support O&M optimisation Periodic Safety Reviews PLEX CANDU restarts Safety upgrades, on-site assistance Technology assessments - post Sizewell - Utility preparedness & selection Vendor design support UK Generic Design Assessments - EPR, AP1000, ABWR ESBWR, ACR Owner’s / Architect Engineer Engineering & Consultancy Technology assessments HTR/VHTR PBMR Fast Reactors Fusion / ITER Nuclear reactor evolution – AMEC activities
- 7. 7 Sizewell B
- 8. 8 Introduction of PWR technology • In 1978, the UK Government announced the intent to order a PWR station, provided design work was satisfactorily completed and all necessary Government and other consents and safety clearances were obtained • CEGB issued an Enquiry Specification for Sizewell B in April 1980. • This specified the use of a 4-loop Westinghouse NSSS (Nuclear Steam Supply System) and two turbines. • CEGB applied to the Department of Energy for Section 2 consent and deemed planning permission for Sizewell B in January 1981 • The Pre-construction Safety Report and the reference design for Sizewell B were published in April 1982 • The project application was subject to a public inquiry under the Town and Country Planning Act and the Electricity Act (Section 2 consent).
- 9. 9 Introduction of PWR technology • The inquiry was held under the 1971 Town and Country Planning Act which included provision for a special, more wide-ranging inquiry where there were either considerations of national or regional importance or complex technical or scientific aspects • Public Inquiry started in January 1983. It was expected to be a long inquiry (lasting 9 -12 months). It actually lasted much longer. • The Inquiry addressed a number of issues the principal ones being: – The need and economic justification for Sizewell B – The choice of design – The safety and environmental impact of the plant – Local issues • Inspector reported to the Secretary of State, recommending consent in 1987. • In parallel the licensing process had proceeded and NII issued an amendment to the Site Licence in 1987. • Preliminary site work started with first structural concrete being poured in July 1988.
- 10. 10 Sizewell design changes Changes to SNUPPS design: • additional provisions to reduce operator radiation exposure • the adoption of two turbines • coastal rather than inland site • electrical frequency difference • desire to use equipment of UK manufacture whenever possible • include OEF and lessons learned from TMI-2, • internal and external hazards - four train systems in the Sizewell B design compared to two trains for the original SNUPPS design • pressure vessel integrity requirements • enhanced radiological protection standards • introduction of secondary containment • low cobalt materials • reliability requirements - use of diverse as well as redundant equipment • etc,etc,etc
- 11. 11 A Changing world…. Past: • Investment by state-owned utilities in regulated markets • Investment by national players • Well established national suppliers • ‘Custom-made’ reactors Present - Future: • Investment by privately-owned utilities in highly competitive markets • More complex risk allocation in with more complex contractual models • Emergence of national/ multinational utilities choosing among a smaller number of international designs • Standardisation is required to facilitate new build on a global world wide basis with safer plants 11
- 12. 12 EPR GDA changes • Changes to the architecture of the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems • Additional or suitably classified diverse reactor protection system trip signals • Improvements to the spent fuel cooling pool • Changes to essential support systems • Classification methodology and upgrade of the safety classification of Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) important to safety • Automation of certain actions • Other modifications that provide additional diversity, defence in depth, or other safety improvements
- 13. 13 AP1000 GDA changes •Categorisation of systems as safety or non-safety •Inclusion of all radioactive materials in the Deterministic Safety Assessment and PSA •Design codes and standards, particularly the justification of the Modular design and Civil structural codes •Design of the secondary containment against aircraft crash •Use of Metric SI units in the GDA application / conversion of all US (imperial units) •Safety claims on computer control systems
- 14. 14 •Applicable and internationally recognised set of safety requirements •IAEA standards underpin safety in all countries • Higher level in standards hierarchy, not enforceable • Supplemented by enforceable national regulations • Need harmonised set of more detailed requirements International Harmonisation 14
- 15. 15 The CORDEL Working Group • Founded in January 2007 • Main aim: promoting international standardisation • Membership: - all major vendors - utilities interested in new build - service companies • Observers from international organisations (SDOs, IAEA, EPRI, MDEP, WANO, others) 15
- 16. 16 Phase 3. Issuing international design certification Phase 2. Validating and accepting design approvals of other countries Phase 1. Sharing design reviews and assessments “Internationalisation” of DESIGN APPROVAL process CORDEL Roadmap
- 17. 17 IAEA Fundamental Safety Principle 1 “The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organisation responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.” 3.5 The licensee retains the prime responsibility for safety throughout the lifetime of facilities and activities, and this responsibility cannot be delegated. Other groups, such as designers, manufacturers and constructors, employers, contractors, and consignors and carriers, also have legal, professional or functional responsibilities with regard to safety.
- 18. 18 IAEA Fundamental Safety Principle 1 “The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organisation responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.” 3.6 The licensee is responsible for: Establishing and maintaining the necessary competences; Providing adequate training and information; Establishing procedures and arrangements to maintain safety under all conditions; Verifying appropriate design and the adequate quality of facilities and activities and of their associated equipment; Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive material that is used, produced, stored or transported; Ensuring the safe control of all radioactive waste that is generated.
- 19. 19 Regulator’s expectations “The licensee shall retain primary responsibility for the safety of its licensed facility, including responsibility for those activities of contractors and subcontractors which might affect safety.” “The regulatory body should, through its regulatory activities, provide assurance that the licensee meets its responsibilities for the safety of its facility. This includes assuring that the licensee provides the appropriate level of oversight of all contractors and subcontractors, commensurate with the safety significance of the activity.”
- 20. 20 Regulator’s expectations “It is essential that the licensee retains the capability to be: • The “controlling mind” of those core activities for which the licence has been granted. Ceding that control to other parties would not be consistent with the principle that the licensee retains primary responsibility for safety. • The “design authority” which understands the basis of the safety case, and the significance of ensuring that all activities are designed so as to keep the facility within the boundaries of the safety case. • An “intelligent customer” or “smart buyer” for the goods and services being procured.
- 21. 21 Design authority “11. An operating organization must set up internally a formal process to maintain the design integrity as soon as it takes control of the plant. This may be achieved by setting up a design capability within the operating organization, or by having a formal external relationship with the original design organizations or their successors. There must be a formally designated entity within the operating company that takes responsibility for this process. This entity needs to formally approve all design changes. To do this, it must have sufficient knowledge of the design and of the overall basis for safety. In addition, it must have access through a formal process to all the underlying design knowledge to ensure that the original intent of the design is maintained.”
- 22. 22 UK regulatory approach to Design Authority Design Authority – the defined function of a licensee’s organisation with the responsibility for, and the requisite knowledge to maintain the design integrity and the overall basis for safety of its nuclear facilities throughout the full lifecycle of those facilities. Design Authority relates to the attributes of an organisation rather than the capabilities of individual post holders. Responsible Designer(s) – organisations which have a formal responsibility for maintaining detailed, specialised knowledge of all the systems and components important to safety, and a core capability in the detailed design process.
- 23. 23 UK concept of design authority – intelligent customer The design authority may assign responsibility for the design of specific parts of the plant to other organisations, known as responsible designers. Ref: ONR NS-TAST-GD-079 Rev 2
- 24. 24 Design knowledge required The Design Authority should have the following knowledge: A detailed understanding of why the design is as it is with knowledge of the underpinning experimental/ research programme The design inputs such as basic functional requirements, performance requirements, safety goals and safety principles The applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements, design conditions, loads such as seismic loads, interface requirements etc The design outputs such as specifications, design limits, operating limits, safety limits, failure or fitness for service criteria A detailed knowledge of the design calculations which demonstrate the adequacy of the design An understanding of the inspections, analysis, testing, computer code validation and acceptance criteria used by the plant designer to verify that the design output meets the design requirements The assumptions made in all the steps above, including assumptions related to operating modes or procedures and expected life history The implications of operating experience on the design
- 25. 25 Increasing demands on safety documentation No of safety related documents 10,000 - 5,000 - 1,000 - 1960s Magnox 1970s AGR 1980s AGR PWR 1990s PWR 2000+ Windscale TMI Chernobyl Fukushima Standardisation /Harmonisation
- 26. 26 Some challenges for owners Future vendor status Limits on in-house capability (existing nuclear operator): - loss of expertise, ageing of personnel with key experience - stretch due to large concurrent programmes; plant life extension/ upgrade especially with planned new build - increasing demands from licensing authority; greater volume and complexity of documents - potential impact on design authority/ intelligent customer capability For future licensees with no or very limited experience of nuclear power plant operation: - recruitment and capacity building - safety culture and reliance on NPP designers/ supply chain - technology challenges - regulatory regime / international implications Maintaining and/or increasing competition to reduce risk - quality, budget and schedule Access to expert nuclear services with global experience increasingly important for world leading performance
- 27. 27 Strategic and Technical support
- 28. 28 Benefits brought by Independent Engineer Pool of suitably qualified expertise across nuclear skill-sets, including niche skills Independent of NPP designer; verification, peer review, independent assessment Innovation due to wider experience; global projects, other sectors Reference capability and projects check Greater certainty on cost & schedule outcomes Resource planning benefits Allows licensee to focus on building or maintaining design authority / intelligent customer key roles
- 29. 29 Insights on the benefits of the right nuclear consultancy support Understanding and managing regulatory expectations is the first essential Ensure country context is fully incorporated Understand the intelligent customer relationship early on to plan an effective organisational trajectory The design of the Intelligent Customer relationships is key The supply chain are crucial in developing technical knowledge transfer The procurement strategy must allow for the access to the relevant IPR at the right time The transfer of Design Authority experience takes time There are never enough SQEPs available to recruit directly Its important that global and local suppliers are embedded into the technical support infrastructure to give lasting legacy in operations