10 ers. Although one can learn definitions favor- able to .docx

10
ers. Although one can learn definitions favor-
able to crime from law-abiding individuals,
one is most likely to learn such definitions
fiom delinquent friends or criminal family
A Theory of sociation members. with These delinquent studies
typically others find is the that best as-
Differential predictor of crime, and that these delinquent others
partly influence crime by leading the
individual to adopt beliefs conducive to
Association crime (see Agnew, 2000; Akers, 1998; Akers and
Sellers, 2004; Waw, 2001 for summaries
of such studies).
Sutherland 's theory has also inspired
Edwin H. Sutherland dnd much additional theorizing in
criminology.
Theorists have attempted to better describe
Donald R. Cressey the nature ofthose definitions favorable to
vi-
olation of the law (see the next selection in
Chapter 11 by Sykes and Matza). They have
Before Sutherland developed his theory, attempted to better
describe the processes by
crime was usually explained in t e r n ofmul- which we learn
criminal behavior from oth-

tiple factors-like social class, broken homes, ers (see the
description o f social learning the-
age, race, urban or rural location, and mental ory by Akers in
Chapter 12). And they have
disorder. Sutherland developed his theory of drawn on
Sutherland in an effort to explain
differential association in an effort to explain group differences
in crime rates (see the Wolf-
why these various factors were related to gang and Ferracuti
and Anderson selections
crime. In doing so, he hoped to organize and in this part).
Sutherland's theory o f differen-
integrate the research on crime u p to that tial association, then,
is one of the enduring
point, as well as to guide future research. classics in
criminology (for excellent discus-
Sutherlandk theory is stated in the f o m o f sions ofthe current
state o f differential asso-
nine propositions. He argues that criminal ciation theory, see
Matsueda, 1988, and Waw,
behavior is learned by interacting with oth- 2001).
ers, especially intimate others. Criminals
learn both the techniques of committing
crime and the definitions favorable to crime References
from these others. The s k t h proposition> Agnew Robe*.
'2000. "Sources of Mminality:
which f o r n the heart of the theory, states Strain and
Subcultural Theories." In Joseph F.
that 'h person becomes delinquent because of Sheley (ed.),
Criminology: A Contemporary ,
an excess of definitions favorable to law vio- Handbook, 3rd
edition, pp. 349-371. Belmont,
lation over definitions unfavorable to viola- CA: Wadsworth.
tion oflaw."According to Sutherland, factors Akers, Ronald L.
1998. Social Learning and So-

such as social class, race, and broken homes cia1 Structure: A
General Theory of Crime and
influence crime because they affect the likeli- Deviance.
Boston: Northeastern University
hood that individuals willdssociate with oth- Press.
ers who present definitions favorable to Akers, Ronald L. and
Christine S. Sellers. 2004. .
crime. ' Criminological Theories: Introduction and
Sutherlandk theory has had a tremendous Evaluation, 4th
edition. Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing.
influence on crime research and it remains Matsueda, Ross L.
1988. dThe State of
one o f the dominant theories of crime. Differential Association
Theory." Crime and
Studies on the causes of crime routinely at- Delinquency 34:
277-306.
tempt to determine whether individuals are wan; Mark. 2001.
he Social Origins of Crime:
associating with delinquent or criminal oth- Edwin Sutherland
and the Theory of Differen-
122
Chapter 10 + A Theory of DzfferentialRrsociation 123
tial ~ssociation." In Raymond Paternoster
and Ronet Bachman (ed.), Explaining Cn'mi-
nab and Crime, pp. 182-191. Los Angeles:
~ ~ ~ b u q Publishing.
T h e following statement refers to the pro-
eess by which a particular person comes to
Engage in criminal behavior.
- 1. Criminal behavior is learned. Nega-

tively, this means that criminal behavior is
jaot inherited, as such; also, the person who
already trained in crime does not in-
vent criminal behavior, just as a person does
not make mechanical inventions unless he
has had training in mechanics.
I 2. Criminal behavior is learned in interac-
tion with other persons in a process of com-
tion. This communication is verbal
in many respects but includes also "the
communication of gestures."
- 3. The principal part of the learning of
dminal behavior occurs within intimate
personal groups. Negatively, this means that
. -he impersonal agencies of communication,
such as movies and newspapers, play a rela-
tively unimportant part in the genesis of
criminal behavior.
- ,+, 4. When criminal behavior is learned, the
teaming includes (a) techniques of commit-
ting the crime, which are sometimes very
complicated, sometimes very simple; (b) the
specific direction of motives, drives, rational-
izations, and attitudes.
, 5. The specific direction of motives and
{ ~ v s is learned from definitions of the legal
codes as favorable or unfavorable. In some
societies an individual is surrounded by
persons who invariably define the legal
codes as rules to be observed, while in oth-

@ eys he is surrounded by persons whose defi-
nitions are favorable to the violation of the
legal codes. In our American society these
definitions are almost always mixed, with
the consequence that we have culture con-
ac t in relation to the legal codes.
rson becomes delinquent because of
cess of definitions favorable to violation
over definitions unfavorable to viola-
law. This is the principle of differen-
tial association. It refers to both criminal
and anti-criminal associations and has to
do with counteracting forces. When per-
sons become criminal, they do so because
of contacts with criminal patterns and also
because of isolation from anti-criminal pat-
terns. Any person inevitably assimilates the
surrounding culture unless other patterns
are in conflict; a Southerner does not pro-
nounce "r" because other Southerners do
not pronounce "r." Negatively, this proposi-
tion of differential association means that
associations which are neutral so far as
crime is concerned have little or no effect on
the genesis of criminal behavior. Much of
the experience of a person is neutral in this
sense, e.g., learning to brush one's teeth.
This behavior has no negative or positive ef-
fect on criminal behavior except as it may
be related to associations which are con-
cerned with the legal codes. This neutral be-
havior is important especially as an occu-
pier of the time of a child so that he is not in

contact with criminal behavior during the
time he is so engaged in the neutral behav-
ior.
7. Differential associations may vary in
frequency, duration, priority, and intensity.
This means that associations with criminal
behavior and also associations with anti-
criminal behavior vary in those respects.
"Frequency" and "duration" as modalities
of associations are obvious and need no ex-
planation. "Priority" is assumed to be im-
portant in the sense that lawful behavior de-
veloped in early childhood may persist
throughout life, and also that delinquent
behavior developed in early childhood may
persist throughout life. This tendency, how-
ever, has not been adequately demon-
strated, and priority seems to be important
principally through its selective influence.
"Intensity" is not precisely defined but it has
to do with such things as the prestige of the
source of a criminal or anti-criminal pat-
tern and with emotional reactions related to
the associations. In a precise description of
the criminal behavior of a person these mo-
dalities would be stated in quantitative
form and a mathematical ratio be reached.
formula in this sense has not been devel-
124 Part IV + Learning to Be a Criminal
. .
? "

: i]'
,
1, '!
4 ,.
: " ' : ' ; ; I
! ",'
1 , '
.I 1 .
: ,.:I
. . '3'
, ,.,
, j ,
2 : ',.I
! . , ., ' : !
' , '! 1.
1 . ; " , . ,
i , ',:;
' ' I ' ,I
i ' , , :
, , . . . I :/
, I , , ,
. I I , , , , , ,
i
, 1 ; '
: (. 1 .

1 1 ,
j . 3 , , .. .
, ,. . ' I
, i l ;;:,: ,
: , I : ,
; 1 '
I I, .).
,
. . .
:I ' ,.. '
8 , ..,
t ' . , I, :!;
I! , ,,
1 , . ,;
I . . . 1 ;
. , I
# I
, I '
, . ' I ' ,:
I / . !
, ; , I!:,!
>,./ . . ! :, :: . . , ; ; I , :!
I . ' . :
> I < .,
j[ili .;

oped, and the development of such a for-
mula would be extremely difficult.
8. The process of learning criminal behav-
ior by association with criminal and anti-
criminal patterns involves all of the mecha-
nisms that are involved in any other learning.
Negatively, this means that the learning of
criminal behavior is not restricted to the
process of imitation. A person who is se-
duced, for instance, learns criminal behav-
ior by association, but this process would
not ordinarily be described as imitation.
9. While criminal behavior is an expres-
sion of general needs and values, it is not ex-
plained by those general needs and values
since. non-criminal behavior is an expression
of the same needs and values. Thieves gener-
ally steal in order to secure money, but like-
wise honest laborers work in order to se-
cure money. The attempts by many scholars
to explain criminal behavior by general
drives and values, such as the happiness
principle, striving for social status, the
money motive, or frustration, have been
and must continue to be futile since they ex-
plain lawful behavior as completely as they
explain criminal behavior. They are similar
to respiration, which is necessary for any
behavior but which does not differentiate
criminal from non-criminal behavior.
It is not necessary, at this level of explana-
tion, to explain why a person has the associ-
ations which he has; this certainly involves

a complex of many things. In an area where
the delinquency rate is high, a boy who is
sociable, gregarious, active, and athletic is
very likely to come in contact with the other
boys in the neighborhood, learn delinquent
behavior from them, and become a gang-
ster; in the same neighborhood the psycho-
pathic boy who is isolated, introverted, and
inert may remain at home, not become ac-
quainted,with the other boys in the neigh-
borhood, and not become delinquent. In
another situation, the sociable, athletic, ag-
gressive boy may become a member of a
scout troop and not become involved in de-
linquent behavior. The person's associations
are determined in a general context of so-
cial organization. A child is ordinarily
reared in a family; the place of residence of
the family is determined largely by family
income; and the delinquency rate is in many
respects related to the rental value of the
houses. Many other aspects of social orga-
nization affect the kinds of associations a
person has.
The preceding explanation of criminal
behavior purports to explain the criminal
and non-criminal behavior of individual
persons. As indicated earlier, it is possible to
state sociological theories of criminal be-
havior which explain the criminality of a
community, nation, or other group. The
problem, when thus stated, is to account for
variations in crime rates and involves a
comparison of the crime rates of various

groups or the crime rates of a particular
group at different times. The explanation of
a crime rate must be consistent with the ex-
planation of the criminal behavior of the
person, since the crime rate is a summary
statement of the number of persons in the
group who commit crimes and the fre-
quency with which they commit crimes.
one of the best explanations of crime rates
from this point of view is that a high crime
rate is due to social disorganization. The
term "social disorganization" is not entirely
satisfactory and it seems preferable to sub-
stitute for it the term "differential social or-
ganization." The postulate on which this
theory is based, regardless of the name, is
that crime is rooted in the social organiza-
tion and is an expression of that social orga-
nization. A group may be organized for
criminal behavior or organized against
criminal behavior. Most communities are
organized both for criminal and anti-crimi-
nal behavior and in that sense the crime
rate is an expression of the differential
group organization. Differential group or-
ganization as an explanation of variations
in crime rates is consistent with the differ-
ential association theory of the processes by
which persons become criminals.
Reprinted from Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R.
Cressey, "A Theory of Differential Association" in
-Principles of Criminology, 6th edition. Copyright O 1960
by Elaine S. Cressey. Reprinted by permission of Elaine
S. Cressey.

Chapter 10 + A Theory of Dt~ererztialRFsociution 125
Discussion Questions 3. Strain theorists, described in the next
section, argue that frustration is a ma-
1. What does Sutherland mean by "defini- jor cause of crime.
How would Suther-
tions favorable to violation of law"? land respond to this
argument?
Give examples of such definitions. 4. What policy
recommendations might
2. &cording to Sutherland, our associa- Sutherland have made
for controlling
tions do not carry equal weight; some crime? +
are more influential than others. What
types of associations carry the greatest
weight in influencing our behavior?
Techniques of
Neutralization
Gresham M. Sykes and
David Matm
Sykes and Matza, like Sutherland, feel that
criminal behavior is learned. And like Suther-
land, they feel that part of that learning in-
volves "motives, drives, rationalizations, and
attitudes favorable to violation o f law." They
state, however, that the specific content of
these rationalizations, attitudes, etc. has not

received much attention. When they wrote
their article in 1957, the dominant view was
that delinquents held values which were the
opposite of middle-class values. Delinquents,
in particular, were said to generally approve
of acts such as theft and fighting. This posi-
tion, represented in the work ofAlbert Cohen
(see Chapter 16 in Part V), is attacked by
Sykes and Matza (also see Matza, 1964).
The first part of their article presents evi-
dence suggesting that delinquents do not gen-
erally approve of delinquency. The second
part of their article presents an alternative
formulation, in which they contend that de-
linquents are able to engage in delinquency by
employing certain "techniques o f neutraliza-
tion." Although delinquents believe that de-
linquency is generally bad, they claim that
their delinquent acts are justified for any one
o f several reasons (e.g., the Qictim had it com-
ing, they didn't really hurt anybody). These
justifications are said to be used before the
delinquent act, and they make the delinquent
act possible by neutralizing the individual2
belief that it is bad.
Data provide some support for neutraliza-
tion theory. Much evidence suggests that of-
fenders commonly justify or excuse their .
crimes using the neutralizations described by
Sykes and Matza, as well as additional neu-
tralizations identified by others (see Maruna
and Copes, 2005). This is true of rapists
(Scully and Marolla, 1984), white-collar

criminals (Benson, 1985), and others. Fur-
ther, studies indicate that individuals differ in
the extent to which they accept the neutraliza-
tions. Those individuals who accept more
neutralizations usually engage in more
crime. Some argue that this is because of-
fenders use neutralizations to justify or ex-
cuse their crimes after the fact, but a few
studies using longitudinal data have found
that individuals who accept more neutraliza-
tions engage in more subsequent crime (see
Agnew, 1994). Studies also suggest that the
effect of neutralizations on crime is influ-
enced by several factors (see Agnew, 1994).
Neutralizations, for example, are more likely
to lead to crime among individuals who asso-
ciate with delinquent peers. Such findings re-
flect the fact that neutralizations do not so
much cause crime as make it easier for moti-
vated individuals to engage i n crime (by re-
ducing their guilt).
The data, then, do suggest that the tech-
niques of neutralization may well be a "cru-
cial component" of Sutherland's "definitions
favorable to violation of law." Maruna and
Copes (2005) provide a n excellent overview
of the research on neutralization theory and
provide several suggestions for further re-
search. For example, they suggest that some
neutralizations may be more likely than oth-
ers to foster crime.
References
Agnew, Robert. 1994. "The Techniques of Neu-

tralization and Violence." Criminology 32:
555,580.
Benson, Michael L. 1985. "Denying the Guilty
Mind: Accounting for Involvement in White-
Collar Crime." Criminology 23: 583-608.
Maruna, Shadd, and Heith Copes. 2005. "What
Have We Learned From Five Decades of Neu-
trali2ation Research?" Crime and Justice 32:
221-320.
Matza, David. 1964. Delinquency and Drift. New
York: Wiley.
Y
4-
La
ts
zr
r-
in
a-
re
re
)f-
X-
!W
zd
;a-
'ee
he

24-
-
?ly
;0-
re-
SO
)ti-
re-
:h-
ru-
V'ls
.nd
ew
;nd
re-
me
cth-
feu-
32:
lilty
~ite-
{hat
leu-
32:
ilew
Chapter 11 + Techniques of Neutralization 127
n

Scully, Diana, and Joseph Marolla. 1984. "Con-
victed Rapists' Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses
and Justifications." Social Problems 3 1 : 530-
' " 544.
I n attempting to uncover the roots of juve-
nile delinquency, the social scientist has
long since ceased to search for devils in the
mind or stigma of the body. It is now largely
agreed that delinquent behavior, like most
social behavior, is learned and that it is
learned in the process of social interaction.
The classic statement of this position is
found in Sutherland's theory of differential
association, which asserts that criminal or
, delinquent behavior involves the learning of
(a) techniques of committing crimes and (b)
motives, drives, rationalizations, and atti-
tudes favorable to the violation of law. Un-
fortunately, the specific content of what is
learned-as opposed to the process by
which it is learned-has received relatively
little attention in either theory or research.
Perhaps the single strongest school of
thought on the nature of this content has
centered on the idea of a delinquent sub-
culture. The basic characteristic of the de-
linquent sub-culture, it is argued, is a sys-
tem of values that represents an inversion of
the values held by respectable, law-abiding
society. The world of the delinquent is the
world of the law-abiding turned upside
down and its norms constitute a counter-

vailing force directed against the conform-
ing social order. Cohen sees the process of
developing a delinquent sub-culture as a
matter of building, maintaining, and rein-
forcing a code for behavior which exists by
opposition, which stands in point by point
contradiction to dominant values, particu-
larly those of the middleqclass. Cohen's por-
trayal of delinquency is execut
good deal of sophistication, an f he with care- a
fully avoids overly simple explanations such
as those based on the principle of "follow
the leader" or easy generalizations about
yemotional disturbances." Furthermore, he
does not accept the delinquent sub-culture
as something given, but instead systemati-
cally examines the function of delinquent
values as a viable solution to the lower-
class, male child's problems in the area of
social status. Yet in spite of its virtues, this
image of juvenile delinquency as a form of
behavior based on competing or counter-
vailing values and norms appears to suffer
from a number of serious defects. It is the
nature of these defects and a possible alter-
native or modified explanation for a large
portion of juvenile delinquency with which
this paper is concerned.
The difficulties in viewing delinquent be-
havior as springing from a set of deviant
values and norms-as arising, that is to say,
from a situation in which the delinquent de-
fines his delinquency as "right"-are both
empirical and theoretical. In the first place,

if there existed in fact a delinquent sub-cul-
ture such that the delinquent viewed his il-
legal behavior as morally correct, we could
reasonably suppose that he would exhibit
no feelings of guilt or shame at detection or
confinement. Instead, the major reaction
would tend in the direction of indignation
or a sense of martyrdom. It is true that some
delinquents do react in the latter fashion, al-
though the sense of martyrdom often seems
to be based on the fact that others "get away
with it" and indignation appears to be di-
rected against the chance events or lack of
skill that led to apprehension. More impor-
tant, however, is the fact that there is a good
deal of evidence suggesting that many de-
linquents d o experience a sense of guilt or
shame, and its outward expression is not to
be dismissed as a purely manipulative ges-
ture to appease those in authority. Much of
this evidence is, to be sure, of a clinical na-
ture or in the forrn of impressionistic judg-
ments of those who must deal first hand
with the youthful offender. Assigning a
weight to such evidence calls for caution,
but it cannot be ignored if we are to avoid
the gross stereotype of the juvenile delin-
quent as a hardened gangster in miniature.
In the second place, observers have noted
that the juvenile delinquent frequently ac-
cords admiration and respect to law-abid-
ing persons. The "really honest" is often re-
vered, and if the delinquent is sometimes

128 Part N + Learning to Be a Criminal
overly keen to detect hypocrisy in those who
conform, unquestioned probity is likely to
win his approval. A fierce attachment to a
humble, pious mother or a forgiving,
upright priest (the former, according to
many observers, is often encountered in
both juvenile delinquents and adult crimi-
nals) might be dismissed as rank sentimen-
tality, but at least it is clear that the delin-
quent does not necessarily regard those
who abide by the legal rules as immoral. In
a similar vein, it can be noted that the juve-
nile delinquent may exhibit great resent-
ment if illegal behavior is imputed to "sig-
nificant others" in his immediate social
environment or to heroes in the world of
sport and entertainment. In other words, if
the delinquent does hold to a set of values
and norms that stand in complete opposi-
tion to those of respectable society, his
norm-holding is of a peculiar sort. While
supposedly thoroughly committed to the
deviant system of the delinquent sub-cul-
ture, he would appear to recognize the
moral validity of the dominant normative
system in many instances.
In the third place, there is much evidence
that juvenile delinquents often draw a sharp
line between those who can be victimized
and those who cannot. Certain social
groups are not to be viewed as "fair game"
in the performance of supposedly approved
delinquent acts while others warrant a vari-

ety of attacks. In general, the potentiality
for victimization would seem to be a func-
tion of the social distance between the juve-
nile delinquent and others and thus we find
implicit maxims in the world of the delin-
quent such as "don't steal from friends" or
"don't commit vandalism against a church
of your own faith." This is all rather obvi-
ous, but the impli~ations~have not received
sufficient attention. The fact that suppos-
edly valued behavior tends to be directed
against disvalued social groups hints that
the "wrongfulness" of such delinquent be-
havior is more widely recognized by delin-
quents than the literature has indicated.
When the pool of victims is limited by con-
siderations of kinship, friendship, ethnic
group, social class, age, sex, etc., we have
reason to suspect that the virtue of delin-
quency is far from unquestioned.
In the fourth place, it is doubtful if many
juvenile delinquents are totally immune
from the demands for conformity made by
the dominant social order. There is a strong
likelihood that the family of the delinquent
will agree with respectable society that de-
linquency is wrong, even though the family
may be engaged in a variety of illegal activi-
ties. That is, the parental posture conducive
to delinquency is not apt to be a positive
prodding. Whatever may be the influence of
parental example, what might be called the
"Fagin" pattern of socialization into delin-
quency is probably rare. Furthermore, as

Red1 has indicated, the idea that certain
neighborhoods are completely delinquent,
offering the child a model for delinquent be-
havior without reservations, is simply not
supported by the data.
The fact that a child is punished by par-
ents, school officials, and agencies of the
legal system for his delinquency may, as a
number of observers have cynically noted,
suggest to the child that he should be more
careful not to get caught. There is an equal
or greater probability, however, that the
child will internalize the demands for con-
formity. This is not to say that demands for
conformity cannot be counteracted. In fact,
as we shall see shortly, an understanding of
how internal and external demands for con-
formity are neutralized may be crucial for
understanding delinquent behavior. But it
is to say that a complete denial of the valid-
ity of demands for conformity and the sub-
stitution of a new normative system is
improbable, in light of the child's or adoles-
cent's dependency on adults and encircle-
ment by adults inherent in his status in the
social structure. No matter how deeply en-
meshed in patterns of delinquency he may
be and no matter how much this involve-
ment may outweigh his associations with
the law-abiding, he cannot escape the con-
demnation of his deviance. Somehow the
demands for conformity must be met and
answered; they cannot be ignored as part of
an alien system of values and norms.

In short, the theoretical viewpoint that
sees juvenile delinquency as a form of be-
Chapter 11 + Techniques of Neutralization 129
hador based on the values and norms of a
deviant sub-culture in precisely the same
way as law-abiding behavior is based on the
values and norms of the larger society is
open to serious doubt. The fact that the
world of the delinquent is embedded in the
larger world of those who conform cannot
be overlooked nor can the delinquent be
equated with an adult thoroughly socialized
into an alternative way of life. Instead, the
juvenile delinquent would appear to be at
least partially committed to the dominant
social order in that he frequently exhibits
p i l t or shame when he violates its proscrip-
tions, accords approval to certain conform-
ing figures, and distinguishes between ap-
propriate and inappropriate targets for his
deviance. It is to an explanation for the ap-
parent paradoxical fact of his delinquency
that we now turn.
As Morris Cohen once said, one of the
most fascinating problems about human
behavior is why men violate the laws in
which they believe. This is the problem that
confronts us when we attempt to explain
why delinquency occurs despite a greater or
lesser commitment to the usages of confor-
mity. A basic clue is offered by the fact that
social rules or norms calling for valued be-

havior seldom if ever take the form of cate-
gorical imperatives. Rather, values or
norms appear as qualified guides for action,
limited in their applicability in terms of
time, place, persons, and social circum-
?stances. The moral injunction against kill-
ing, for example, does not apply to the
enemy during combat in time of war, al-
though a captured enemy comes once again
under the prohibition. Similarly, the taking
and distributing of scarce goods in a time of
,acute social need is felt by many to be right,
although under other circumstances pri-
vate property is held inviolable. The norma-
tive system of a society, then, is marked by
what Williams has termed flexibility; it does
not consist of a body of rules held to be
binding under all conditions.
'b. This flexibility is, in fact, an integral part
'of the criminal law in that measures for "de-
fenses to crimes" are provided in pleas such
as nonage, necessity, insanity, drunkenness,
compulsion, self-defense, and so on. The in-
dividual can avoid moral culpability for his
criminal action-and thus avoid the nega-
tive sanctions of society-if he can prove
that criminal intent was lacking.
It is our argument that much delinquency
is based on what is essentially an unrecog-
nized extension of defenses to crimes, i n the
form of justifications for deviance that are
seen as valid by the delinquent but not by the
legal system or society at large.

These justifications are commonly de-
scribed as rationalizations. They are viewed
as following deviant behavior and as pro-
tecting the individual from self-blame and
the blame of others after the act. But there
is also reason to believe that they precede
deviant behavior and make deviant behav-
ior possible. It is this possibility that
Sutherland mentioned only in passing and
that other writers have failed to exploit
from the viewpoint of sociological theory.
Disapproval flowing from internalized
norms and conforming others in the social
environment is neutralized, turned back, or
deflected in advance. Social controls that
serve to check or inhibit deviant motiva-
tional patterns are rendered inoperative,
and the individual is freed to engage in de-
linquency without serious damage to his
self image. In this sense, the delinquent
both has his cake and eats it too, for he re-
mains committed to the dominant norma-
tive system and yet so qualifies its impera-
tives that violations are "acceptable" if not
"right." Thus the delinquent represents not
a radical opposition to law-abiding society
but something more like an apologetic fail-
ure, often more sinned against than sinning
in his own eyes. We call these justifications
of deviant behavior techniques of neutral-
ization; and we believe these techniques
make up a crucial component of Suther-
land's "definitions favorable to the violation
of law." It is by learning these techniques
that the juvenile becomes delinquent,
rather than by learning moral imperatives,

values or attitudes standing in direct con-
tradiction to those of the dominant society.
In analyzing these techniques, we have
found it convenient to divide them into five
major types.
130 Part IV + Learning to Be a Criminal
The Denial of Responsibility
In so far as the delinquent can define
himself as lacking responsibility for his de-
viant actions, the disapproval of self or oth-
ers is sharply reduced in effectiveness as a
restraining influence. As Justice Holmes
has said, even a dog distinguishes between
being stumbled over and being kicked, and
modern society is no less careful to draw a
line between injuries that are unintentional,
i.e., where responsibility is lacking, and /
those that are intentional. As a technique of
neutralization, however, the denial of re-
sponsibility extends much further than the
claim that deviant acts are an "accident" or
some similar negation of personal account-
ability. It may also be asserted that delin-
quent acts are due to forces outside of the
individual and beyond his control such as
unloving parents, bad companions, or a
slum neighborhood. In effect, the delin-
quent approaches a "billiard ball" concep-
tion of himself in which he sees himself as
helplessly propelled into new situations.
From a psychodynamic viewpoint, this ori-

entation toward one's own actions may rep-
resent a profound alienation from self, but
it is important to stress the fact that inter-
pretations of responsibility are cultural
constructs and not merely idiosyncratic be-
liefs. The similarity between this mode of
justifying illegal behavior assumed by the
delinquent and the implications of a "socio-
logical" frame of reference or a "humane"
jurisprudence is readily apparent. It is not
the validity of this orientation that concerns
us here, but its function of deflecting blame
attached to violations of social nonns and
its relative independence of a particular
personality structure. By learning to view
himself as more acted upon than acting, the
delinquent prepares the way for deviance
from the dominant normative system with-
out the necessity of a frontal assault on the
norms themselves.
The Denial of Injury
A second major technique of neutraliza-
tion centers on the injury or harm involved
in the delinquent act. The criminal law has
long made a distinction between crimes
which are mala in se and mala prohibita-
that is between acts that are wrong in them-
selves and acts that are illegal but not im-
moral-and the delinquent can make the
same kind of distinction in evaluating the
wrongfulness of his behavior. For the delin-
quent, however, wrongfulness may turn on
the question of whether or not anyone has

clearly been hurt by his deviance, and this
matter is open to a variety of interpreta-
tions. Vandalism, for example, may be de-
fined by the delinquent simply as "mis-
chief'-after all, it may be claimed, the
persons whose property has been destroyed
can well afford it. Similarly, auto theft may
be viewed as "borrowing," and gang fight-
ing may be seen as a private quarrel, an
agreed upon duel between two willing par-
ties, and thus of no concern to the commu-
nity at large. We are not suggesting that this
technique of neutralization, labelled the de-
nial of injury, involves an explicit dialectic,
rather, we are arguing that the delinquent
frequently, and in a hazy fashion, feels that
his behavior does not really cause any great
harm despite the fact that it runs counter- to
law. Just as the link between the individual
and his acts may be broken by the denial of
responsibility, so may the link between acts
and their consequences be broken by the
denial of injury. Since society sometimes
agrees with the delinquent, e.g., in matters
such as truancy, "pranks," and so on, it
merely reaffirms the idea that the delin-
quent's neutralization of social controls by
means of qualifying the norms is an exten-
sion of common practice rather than a ges-
ture of complete opposition.
The Denial of Victim
Even if the delinquent accepts the re-
sponsibility for his deviant actions and is
willing to admit that his deviant actions in-

volve an injury or hurt, the moral indigna-
tion of self and others may be neutralized
by an insistence that the injury is not wrong
in light of the circumstances. The injury, it
may be claimed, is not really an injury;
rather, it is a fonn of rightful retaliation or
Chapter 1 1 + Techniques of Neutralization 13 1
wshrnent . By a subtle alchemy the delin-
quent moves himself into the position of an
-avenger and the victim is transformed into a
wrong-doer. Assaults on homosexuals or
suspected homosexuals, attacks on mem-
/ bers of minority groups who are said to have gotten "out of
place," vandalism as re-
f venge on an unfair teacher or school offi-
- cial, thefts from a "crooked store owner-
! may be hurts inflicted on a transgressor,
t in the eyes of the delinquent. As Orwell has
pointed out, the type of criminal admired by
h e general public has probably changed
over the course of years and Raffles no lon-
ger serves as a hero; but Robin Hood, and
his latter day derivatives such as the tough
detective seeking justice outside the law,
i capture the popular imagination, and
the delinquent may view his acts as part of a
similar role. To deny the existence of the vic-
tim, then, by transforming him into a per-
son deserving injury is an extreme form of a

phenomenon we have mentioned before,
namely, the delinquent's recognition of ap-
propriate and inappropriate targets for his
- delinquent acts. In addition, however, the
existence of the victim may be denied for
the delinquent, in a somewhat different
sense, by the circumstances of the delin-
quent act itself. Insofar as the victim is
physically absent, unknown, or a vague ab-
straction (as is often the case in delinquent
acts committed against property), the
awareness of the victim's existence is weak-
ened. Internalized norms and anticipations
bf the reactions of others must somehow be
activated, if they are to serve as guides for
behavior; and it is possible that a dimin-
ished awareness of the victim plays an im-
Portant part in determining whether or not
this process is set in motion.
The ~ondemktion of
the Condemners
A fourth technique of neutralization
would appear to involve a condemnation of
the condemners or, as McCorkle and Korn
have phrased it, a rejection of the rejectors.
The delinquent shifts the focus of attention . .
,. born his own deviant acts to the motives
and behavior of those who disapprove of his
violations. His condemners, he may claim,
are hypocrites, deviants in disguise, or im-
pelled by personal spite. This orientation to-

ward the conforming world may be of par-
ticular importance when it hardens into a
bitter cynicism directed against those as-
signed the task of enforcing or expressing
the norms of the dominant society. Police, it
may be said, are corrupt, stupid, and brutal.
Teachers always show favoritism and par-
ents always "take it out" on their children.
By a slight extension, the rewards of confor-
mity-such as material success-become a
matter of pull or luck, thus decreasing still
further the stature of those who stand on
the side of the law-abiding. The validity of
this jaundiced viewpoint is not so impor-
tant as its function in turning back or de-
flecting the negative sanctions attached to
violations of the norms. The delinquent, in
effect, has changed the subject of the con-
versation in the dialogue between his own
deviant impulses and the reactions of oth-
ers; and by attacking -others, the wrongful-
ness of his own behavior is more easily re-
pressed or lost to view.
The Appeal to Higher Loyalties
Fifth, and last, internal and external so-
cial controls may be neutralized by sacrific-
ing the demands of the larger society for the
demands of the smaller social groups to
which the delinquent belongs such as the
sibling pair, the gang, or the friendship
clique. It is important to note that the delin-
quent does not necessarily repudiate the
imperatives of the dominant normative sys-
tem, despite his failure to follow them.

Rather, the delinquent may see himself as
caught up in a dilemma that must be re-
solved, unfortunately, at the cost of violat-
ing the law. One aspect of this situation has
been studied by Stouffer and Toby in their
research on the conflict between particular-
istic and universalistic demands, between
the claims of friendship and general social
obligations, and their results suggest that "it
is possible to classify people according to a
predisposition to select one or the other
132 Part TV + Learning to Be a Criminal
horn of a dilemma in role conflict." For our
purposes, however, the most important
point is that deviation' from certain norms
may occur not because the norms are re-
jected but because other norms, held to be
more pressing or involving a higher loyalty,
are accorded precedence. Indeed, it is the
fact that both sets of norms are believed in
that gives meaning to our concepts of di-
lemma and role conflict.
The conflict between the claims of hiend-
ship and the claims of law, or a similar di-
lemma, has of course long been recognized
by the social scientist (and the novelist) as a
common human problem. If the juvenile
delinquent frequently resolves his dilemma
by insisting that he must "always help a
buddy" or "never squeal on a friend," even
when it throws him into serious difficulties
with the dominant social order, his choice

remains familiar to the supposedly law-
abiding. The delinquent is unusual, per-
haps, in the extent to which he is able to see
the fact that he acts in behalf of the smaller
social groups to which he belongs as a justi-
fication for violations of society's norms,
but it is a matter of degree rather than of
kind.
"I didn't mean it." "I didn't really hurt
anybody." "They had it coming to them."
"Everybody's picking on me." "I didn't do it
for myself." These slogans or their variants,
we hypothesize, prepare the juvenile for de-
linquent acts. These "definitions of the situ-
ation" represent tangential or glancing
blows at the dominant nonnative system
rather than the creation of an opposing ide-
ology; and they are extensions of patterns of
thought prevalent in society rather than
something created de novo.
Techniques of neutralization may not be
powerful enough to fully shield the individ-
ual from the force of his 'own internalized
values and the reactions of conforming oth-
ers, for as we have pointed out, juvenile de-
linquents often appear to suffer from feel-
ings of guilt and shame when called into
account for their deviant behavior. And
some delinquents may be so isolated from
the world of conformity that techniques of
neutralization need not be called into play.
Nonetheless, we would argue that tech-
niques of neutralization are critical in

lessening the effectiveness of social controls
and that they lie behind a large share of de-
linquent behavior.
Empirical research in this area is scat-
tered and fragmentary at the present time,
but the work of Redl, Cressy, and others has
supplied a body of significant data that has
done much to clarify the theoretical issues
and enlarge the fund of supporting evi-
dence. Two lines of investigation seem to be
critical at this stage. First, there is need for
more knowledge concerning the differential
distribution of techniques of neutralization,
as operative patterns of thought, by age,
sex, social class, ethnic group, etc. On a pri-
ori grounds it might be assumed that these
justifications for deviance will be more
readily seized by segments of society for
whom a discrepancy between common so-
cial ideals and social practice is most appar-
ent. It is also possible however, that the
habit of "bending" the dominant normative
system-if not "breaking" it--cuts across
our cruder social categories and is to be
traced primarily to patterns of social inter-
action within the familial circle. Second,
there is need for a greater understanding of
the internal structure of techniques of neu-
tralization, as a system of beliefs and atti-
tudes, and its relationship to various types
of delinquent behavior. Certain techniques
of neutralization would appear to be better
adapted to particular deviant acts than to
others, as we have suggested, for example,
in the case of offenses against property and

the denial of the victim. But the issue re-
mains far from clear and stands in need of
more information.
In any case, techniques of neutralization
appear to offer a promising line of research
in enlarging and systematizing the theoreti-
cal grasp of juvenile delinquency. As more
information is uncovered concerning tech-
niques of neutralization, their origins, and
their consequences, both juvenile delin-
quency in particular, and deviation from
normative systems in general may be illu-
minated.
Chapter 1 1 + Techniques of Neutralization 133
F.
I Reprinted from Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza,
! "Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delin-
! - quency" in the American Sociological Review 22. Copy-
right O 1957.
Discussion Questions
1. In their article, Sykes and Matza para-
phrase Monis Cohen: "one of the most
fascinating problems about human be-
havior is why men violate the laws in
which they believe." What solution do
Sykes and Matza offer to this problem?
2. Most students disapprove of cheating
on exams, but many nevertheless cheat.

List possible justifications such stu-
dents might give for their cheating be-
havior. Which techniques of neutraliza-
tions do these justifications illustrate?
3. Sykes and Matza argue that the tech-
niques of neutralization are learned from
others. They do not, however, describe
those groups or types of individuals that
are most likely. to employ the tech-
niques of neutralization. What groups
or categories of individuals do you
think are most likely to employ the tech-
niques of neutralization (and why)? +
; the
-01s."
7.
,993.
zing
vard
Lives
)urse
? Pre-
in a
1" In
I n s of
son.
:ssey.
ition.

, and
Vork-
y 38:
te So-
York:
2005.
rol in
1 Test
: Low
2. +
Social b Bond
,' Theory I
&though Causes of Delinquency is a com-
plex book filled with intricate theoretical dis-
cussions and numerous statistical analyses,
~ i ~ s c h i k theory has an appealing quality: It
can be simply stated and thus easily under-
stood and studied by criminologists. Indeed,
his theory can be reduced to two proposi-
tions. First, delinquency and social bonds are
inversely related. Second, the concept of so-
cial bonds has four elements-attachment,
commitment, involvement, and belief-
which independently and in combination re-
strain criminal conduct.
But how exactly do these bonds exert con-
trol over youngsters? Hirschi argued that
youths could be attached to peers, teachers,
and other adults, although relationships with
parents are most crucial. Attachment in-
volves an emotional connection to another

person. When such a relationship exists,
youths will be more likely to care what that
other person thinks of them. In turn, when in
a situation where the opportunity for trouble
presents itself; they will be restrained from de-
linquency if they are concerned that such ac-
tion will disappoint the other person or dis-
rupt this relationship.
The importance of attachment is that dur-
ing the teenage years, yoyths are frequently
outside their parents' watchful eyes. In such
instances, parents cannot exert "direct con-
trol"-that is, personally supervise their chil-
dren and punish misconduct when it occurs.
They can, however, exert 'lindirect control" if
youths take into account theirparents'prefer-
ences. When attachment is strong, observed
Hirschi, "the parent is psychologically pres-
ent when temptation to commit a crime ap-
pears. If; in the situation of temptation, no
thought is given to parental reaction, the
child is to this extent free to commit the act"
(1 969: 88).
Much like rational choice theory (see Part
X), Hirschi suggested that there is a "rational
component" to conformity, which he calls
l'commitment.'l Juveniles who are doing well
in school and have bright prospects ahead are
less likely to engage in acts that will jeopar-
dize their future. Conversely, uncommitted
youths-those with little or no stake in con-
formity-have nothing t o lose and thus are
freer to break the law.

Hirschi also contended that the mere in-
volvement in conventional activities facili-
tates control. If idleness presents opportuni-
ties for crime, filling up a youth's day with
wholesome activities-such as school and
recreational pursuits-leaves little time for
getting into trouble.
Finally, Hirschi (1 969: 26) argued that
youths who believe that they should "obey the
rules of society" are less likely to violate them.
The social bond of "belief' is controversial be-
cause such beliefs or "definitions" are also
central to differential association theory (or
what Hirschi called "cultural deviance" the-
ory). Hirschi contended, however, that an im-
portant analytical distinction could be made:
While cultural deviance theorists like Suther-
land (Chapter 10) focus on beliefs that posi-
tively value crime ("definitions favorable to
violation of the law'y, control theorists focus
on beliefs that proscribe crime. "Delinquency
is not caused by beliefs that require delin-
quency," noted Hirschi (1 969: 198)) "but
rather made possible by the absence of (effec-
tive) beliefs that forbid delinquency."
'Hirschik social bond theory has been sub-
jected to numerous empirical tests-perhaps
more than any other theory. Although empiri-
cal confirmation of the theory varies by such
factors as a study's methodology (Agnew,
1985; Costello and Vowell, 1999; Kempf;
1993; Krohn, 2000), overall there is fairly
consistent support for the general thesis that

weak social bonds increase the risk of being
involved in criminal behavior (Akers and
Sellers, 2004; Sampson and h u b , 1993
220 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theory
[Chapter 22 in this part]). Hirschik claim
that competing perspectives-especially "cul-
tural deviance" theories--are not empirically
viable, however, is mistaken (Akers and
Sellers, 2004; Krohn, 2000). A further limita-
tion is that HirschiS approach is largely
astructural and ahistorical. Unlike Shaw and
McKay (Chapter 7)) he does not examine how
macrosocial changes occurring in the United
States affect the strength of social bonds for
people located in different sectors of Ameri-
can society (see also, Sampson and Wilson,
1995 [Chapter 8 in this volume]; Sampson
and h u b , 1994).
References
Agnew, Robert. 1985. "Social Control Theory
and Delinquency: A Longitudinal Test." Crimi-
nology 23: 47-6 1.
Akers, Ronald L. and Christine S. Sellers. 2004.
Criminological Theories: Introduction, Evalua-
tion, and Application, 4th edition. Los Angeles:
Roxbury.
Costello, Barbara J. and Paul R. Vowell. 1999.
"Testing Control Theory and Differential Asso-
ciation: A Reanalysis of the Richmond Youth

Project.Data." Criminology 37: 8 15-842.
Hirschi, Travis. 1969. Causes o f Delinquency.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kempf, Kimberly L. 1993. "The Empirical Sta-
tus of Hirschi's Control Theory." In Freda
Adler and William S. Laufer (eds.), New Direc-
tions in Criminological Theory: Advances in
Crimino2ogical Theory, Volume 4, pp. 143-185.
New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Krohn, Marvin. 2000. "Control and Deterrence
Theories of Criminality." In Joseph F. Sheley
(ed.), Criminology: A Contemporary Handbook,
3rd edition, pp. 372-399. Belmont, CA: Wads-
worth.
Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub. 1993.
Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning
Points Through Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
-. 1994. "Urban Poverty and the Family Con-
text of Delinquency: A New Look at Structure
and Process in a Classic Study." Child Develop-
ment 65: 523-540.
Sampson, Robert J. and William Julius Wilson.
1995. "Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and
Urban Inequality." In John Hagan and Ruth D.
Peterson (eds.), Crime and Inequality, pp. 36-
54. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Three fundamental perspectives on delin-
quency and deviant behavior dominate the

current scene. According to strain or moti-
vational theories, legitimate desires that
conformity cannot satisfy force a person
into deviance. According to control or bond
theories, a person is free to commit delin-
quent acts because his ties to the conven-
tional order have somehow been broken.
According to cultural deviance theories, the
deviant conforms to a set of standards not
accepted by a larger or more powerful soci-
ety. Although most current theories of
crime and delinquency contain elements of
at least two and occasionally all three of
these perspectives, reconciliation of their
assumptions is very difficult. If, as the con-
trol theorist assumes, the ties of many per-
sons to the conventional order may be weak
or virtually nonexistent, the strain theorist,
in accounting for their deviance, builds into
his explanation pressure that is unneces-
sary. If, on the other hand, it is reasonable to
assume with the strain theorist that every-
one is at some point strongly tied to the con-
ventional system, then it is unreasonable to
assume that many are not (control theo-
ries), or that many are tied to different "con-
ventional" systems (cultural deviance theo-
ries). . . .
Control theories assume that delinquent
acts result when an individual's bond to so-
ciety is weak or broken. Since these theories
embrace two highly complex concepts, the
bond of the individual to society, it is not
surprising that they have at one time or an-
other formed the basis of explanations of

most forms of aberrant or unusual behav-
ior. It is also not surprising that control the-
ories have described the elements of the
bond to society in many ways, and that they
have focused on a variety of units as the
point of control. . . .
Elements of the Bond
Attachment
In explaining conforming behavior, soci-
ologists justly emphasize sensitivity to the
opinion of others. Unfortunately, as sug-
elin-
z the
noti-
that
rson
3ond
.elin-
wen-
)ken.
;, the
3 not
soci-
!S of
Its of
?e of
their
con-
' per-
weak
orist,

; into
eces-
de to
very-
con-
~ l e to
theo-
"con-
theo-
pent
;o SO-
:ones
5, the
s not
)r an-
ns of
ehav-
11 the-
,f the
t they
.s the
soci-
:o the
; sug-
gested in the preceding chapter, they tend to
suggest that man is sensitive to the opinion
of others and thus exclude sensitivity from
their explanations of deviant behavior. In
explaining deviant behavior, psychologists,
in contrast, emphasize insensitivity to the
opinion of others. Unfortunately, they too
tend to ignore variation, and, in addition,

they tend to tie sensitivity inextricably to
other variables, to make it part of a syn-
drome or "type," and thus seriously to re-
duce its value as an explanatory concept.
The psychopath is characterized only in
part by "deficient attachment to or affection
for others, a failure to respond to the ordi-
nary motivations founded in respect or
regard for one's fellows"; he is also charac-
; terized by such things as "excessive aggres-
I siveness," "lack of superego control,'' and
"an infantile level of response." Unfortu-
. nately, too, the behavior that psychopathy is
used to explain often becomes part of the
definition of psychopathy. As a result, in
: Barbara Wootton's words:
t. [The psychopath] is . . . par excellence,
and without shame or qualification, the
model of the circular process by which
mental abnormality is inferred from an-
- ti-social behavior while anti-social be-
havior is explained by mental abnormal-
ity.
The problems of diagnosis, tautology,
and name-calling are avoided if the dimen-
sions of psychopathy are treated as causally
and therefore problematically interrelated,
rather than as logically and therefore neces-
sarily bound to each other. In fact, it can be

argued that all of the characteristics attrib-
uted to the psychopath follow from, are ef-
fects of, his lack of attachment to others. To
say that to lack attachment to others is to be
free from moral restraints is to use lack of
attachment to explain the guiltlessness of
. the psychopath, the fact that he apparently
has no conscience or superego. In this view,
lack of attachment to others is not merely a
symptom of psychopathy, it is psychopathy;
lack of conscience is just another way of
saying the same thing; and the violation of
; . norms is (or may be) a consequence.
Chapter 20 + Social Bond Theory 221
For that matter, given that man is an ani-
mal, "impulsivity" and "aggressiveness" can
also be seen as natural consequences of
freedom from moral restraints. However,
since the view of man as endowed with nat-
ural propensities and capacities like other
animals is peculiarly unpalatable to sociolo-
gists, we need not fall back on such a view to
explain the amoral man's aggressiveness.
The process of becoming alienated from
others often involves or is based on active
interpersonal conflict. Such conflict could
easily supply a reservoir of socially derived
hostility sufficient to account for the ag-
gressiveness of those whose attachments to
others have been weakened.
Durkheim said it many years ago: "We

are moral beings to the extent that we are
social beings." This may be interpreted to
mean that we are moral beings to the extent
that we have "internalized the norms" of so-
ciety. But what does it mean to say that a
person has internalized the norms of soci-
ety? The norms of society are by definition
shared by the members of society. To violate
a norm is, therefore, to act contrary to. the
wishes and expectations of other people. If
a person does not care about the wishes and
expectations of other people-that is, if he
is insensitive to the opinion of others-then
he is to that extent not bound by the norms.
He is free to deviate.
The essence of internalization of norms,
conscience, or super-ego thus lies in the at-
tachment of the individual to others. This
view has several advantages over the con-
cept of internalization. For one, explana-
tions of deviant behavior based on attach-
ment do not beg the question, since the
extent to which a person is attached to oth-
ers can be measured independently of his
deviant behavior. Furthermore, change or
variation in behavior is explainable in a way
that it is not when notion of internalization
or superego are used. For example, the di-
vorced man is more likely after divorce to
commit a number of deviant acts, such as
suicide or forgery. If we explain these acts
by reference to the superego (or internal
control), we are forced to say that the man
"lost his conscience" when he got a divorce;

222 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theov
and, of course, if he remarries, we have to The idea, then, is
that the person invests
conclude that he gets his conscience back. time, energy,
himself, in a certain line of ac-
his dimension of the bond to conven- tivity-say, getting an
education, building
tional society is encountered in most social up a business,
acquiring a reputation for
control-oriented research and theory. F. virtue. When or
whenever he considers de-
Ivan Nye's "internal control'' and "indirect viant behavior, he
must consider the costs
control" refer to the same element, al- of this deviant behavior,
the risk he runs of
though we avoid the problem of explaining losing the
investment he has made in con-
changes over time by locating the "conventional labor.
science" in the bond to others rather than If attachment to others
is the sociological
making it part of the personality. Attach- counterpart of the
superego or conscience,
ment to others is just one aspect of Albert J. commitment is the
counterpart of the ego
Reiss's "personal controls"; we avoid his or common sense. To
the person committed
problems of tautological empirical obsewa- to conventional
lines of action, risking one
tions by making the relationship between to ten years in prison
for a ten-dollar holdup
attachment and delinquency problematic is stupidity, because to
the committed per-
rather than definitional. Finally, Scott Briar son the costs and

risks obviously exceed ten
and Irving Piliavin's "commitment" or dollars in value. (To the
psychoanalyst, such
"stake in conformity" subsumes attach- an act exhibits failure to
be governed by the
ment, as their discussion illustrates, al- "reality-principle.") In
the sociological con-
though the terms they use are more closely trol theory, it can be
and is generally as-
associated with the next element to be dis- sumed that the
decision to commit a crimi-
nal act may well be rationally detennined-
that the actor's decision was not irrational
Commitment I given the risks and costs he faces. Of course, ,
"Of all passions, that which inclineth as Becker points out, if
the actor is capable i
men least to break the laws, is fear. Nay, ex- of in some sense
calculating the costs of a
cepting some generous natures, it is the line of action, he is also
capable of calcula-
only thing, when there is the appearance of tional errors:
ignorance and error return, in
profit or pleasure by breaking the laws, that the control theory,
as possible explanations
makes men keep them." Few would deny of deviant behavior.
that men on occasion obey the rules simply The concept of
commitment assumes
from fear of the consequences. This rational that the

organization of society is such that
component in conformity we label commit- the interests of most
persons would be en-
ment. What does it mean to say that a per- dangered if they
were to engage in criminal
son is committed to conformity? In Howard acts. Most people,
simply by the process of
S . Becker's formulation it means the follow- living in an
organized society, acquire
goods, reputations, prospects that they do
not want to risk losing. These accumula-
First, the individual is in a position in tions are society's
insurance that they will
which his decision with regard to some abide by the rules. Many
hypotheses about
particular line of action has conse- the antecedents of
delinquent behavior are
quences for other interests and activities based on this premise.
For example, Arthur
not necessarily [directly] related to it. L. Stinchcombe's
hypothesis that "high
Second, he has placed himself in that school rebellion . . .
occurs when future sta- position by his own prior actions. A
third element is present though so obvi- tus is not clearly
related to present perfor-
ous as not to be apparent: the committed mance" suggests that
one is committed to
person must be aware [of other inter- conformity not only by
what one has but
ests] and must recognize that his deci- also by what one hopes
to obtain. Thus "am-

sion in this case will have ramifications bition" and/or
"aspiration" play an impor-
tant role in producing conformity. The per-
:sts
ac-
ing
for
de-
)Sts
j of
on-
ical
Ice,
ego
:ted
one
UP
3er-
ten
uch
the
:on-
as-
imi-
:d-
ma1
rse,
able .
of a
ula-

I, in
ions
mes
that
: en-
linal
;s of
uire
Y do
~ula-
will
bout
: are
thur
high
: sta-
rfor-
!d to
, but
'am-
lpor-
per-
son becomes committed to a conventional
line of action, and he is therefore commit-
C'
ted to conformity.
Most lines of action in a society are of
course conventional. The clearest examples
are educational and occupational careers.
Actions thought to jeopardize one's chances
in these areas are presumably avoided. In-

terestingly enough, even nonconventional
commitments may operate to produce con-
" ventional conformity. We are told, at least,
that boys aspiring to careers in the rackets
or professional thievery are judged by their
"honesty" and "reliabilityn-traits tradition-
ally in demand among seekers of office
boys.
Involvement
Many persons undoubtedly owe a life of
virtue to a lack of opportunity to do other-
wise. Time and energy are inherently lim-
ited: "Not that I-would not, if I could, be
both handsome and fat and well dressed,
and a great athlete, and make a million a
. year, be a wit, a bon vivant, and a lady killer,
. - - as well as a philosopher, a philanthropist, a
statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as
well as a 'tone-poet' and saint. But the thing
is simply impossible." The things that Wil-
- liam James here says he would like to be or
do are all, I suppose, within the realm of
conventionality, but if he were to include il-
licit actions he would still have to eliminate
some of them as simply impossible.
Involvement or engrossment in conven-
tional activities is thus often part of a con-
trol theory. The assumption, widely shared,
is that a person may be simply too busy

doing conventional things to find time to
engage in deviant behavior. The person in-
volved in conventional activities is tied to
appointments, deadlines, working hours,
plans, and the like, so +e opportunity to
commit deviant acts rarely arises. To the ex-
tent that he is engrossed in conventional ac-
tivities, he cannot even think about deviant
acts, let alone act out his inclinations.
- This line of reasoning is responsible for
. the stress placed on recreational facilities in
many programs to reduce delinquency, for
[ much of the concern with the high school
dropout, and for the idea that boys should
be drafted into -ihe Army to keep them out of
trouble. So obvious and persuasive is the
idea that involvement in conventional activ-
ities is a major deterrent to delinquency
that it was accepted even by Sutherland:
In the general area of juvenile delin-
quency it is probable that the most sig-
nificant difference between juveniles
who engage in delinquency and those
who do not is that the latter are provided
abundant opportunities of a conven-
tional type for satisfying their recre-
ational interests, while the former lack
those opportunities or facilities.
The view that "idle hands are the devil's
workshop" has received more sophisticated

treatment in recent sociological writings on
delinquency. David Matza and Gresham M.
Sykes, for example, suggest that delin-
quents have the values of a leisure class, the
same values ascribed by Veblen to the lei-
sure class: a search for kicks, disdain of
work, a desire for the big score, and accep-
tance of aggressive toughness as proof of
masculinity. Matza and Sykes explain delin-
quency by reference to this system of val-
ues, but they note that adolescents at all
class levels are "to some extent" members of
a leisure class, that they "move in a limbo
between earlier parental domination and
future integration with the social structure
through the bonds of work and marriage."
In the end, then, the leisure of the adoles-
cent produces a set of values, which, in
turn, leads to delinquency.
Belief
Unlike the cultural deviance theory, the
control theory assumes the existence of a
common value system within the society or
group whose norms are being violated. If
the deviant is committed to a value system
different from that of conventional society,
there is, within the context of the theory,
nothing to explain. The question is, "Why
does a man violate the rules in which he be-
lieves?" It is not, "Why do men differ in their
beliefs about what constitutes good and de-
sirable conduct?" The person is assumed to

224 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theo y
have been socialized (perhaps imperfectly)
into the group whose rules he is violating;
deviance is not a question of one group
imposing its rules on the members of an-
other group. In other words, we not only as-
sume the deviant has believed the rules, we
assume he believes the rules even as he vio-
lates them.
How can a person believe it is wrong to
steal at the same time he is stealing? In the
strain theory, this is not a difficult problem.
(In fact, as suggested in the previous chap-
ter, the strain theory was devised specifi-
cally to deal with this question.) The moti-
vation to deviance adduced by the strain
theorist is so strong that we can well under-
stand the deviant act even assuming the de-
viator believes strongly that it is wrong.
However, given the control theory's assump-
tions about motivation, if both the deviant
and the nondeviant believe the deviant act is
wrong, how do we account for the fact that
one commits it and the other does not?
Control theories have taken two ap-
proaches to this problem. In one approach,
beliefs are treated as mere words that mean
little or nothing if the other forms of control
are missing. "Semantic dementia," the dis-
sociation between rational faculties and
emotional control which is said to be char-
acteristic of the psychopath, illustrates this
way of handling the problem. In short, be-

liefs, at least insofar as they are expressed in
words, drop out of the picture; since they do
not differentiate between deviants and non-
deviants, they are in the same class as "lan-
guage" or any other characteristic common
to all members of the group. Since they rep-
resent no real obstacle to the commission of
delinquent acts, nothing need be said about
how they are handled by those committing
such acts. The control theories that do not
mention beliefs (or valqes), and many do
not, may be assumed to take this approach
to the problem.
The second approach argues that the de-
viant rationalizes his behavior so that he
can at once violate the rule and maintain his
belief in it. Donald R. Cressey has advanced
this argument with respect to embezzle-
ment, and Sykes and Matza have advanced
it with respect to delinquency. In both Cres-
1
1 sey's and Sykes and Matza's treatments,
these rationalizations (Cressey calls them i "verbalizations,"
Sykes and Matza term
them "techniques of neutralization") occur
prior to the commission of the deviant act.
~f the neutralization is successful, the per-
son is free to commit the act(s) in question.
Both in Cressey and in Sykes and Matza, the
strain that prompts the effort at neutraliza-
tion also provides the motive force that re-
sults in the subsequent deviant act. Their
theories are thus, in this sense, strain theo-

ries. Neutralization is difficult to handle
within the context of a theory that adheres
closely to control theory assumptions, be-
cause in the control theory there is no spe-
cial motivational force to account for the
neutralization. This difficulty is especially
noticeable in Matza's later treatment of this
topic, where the motivational component,
the "will to delinquency" appears after the
moral vacuum has been created by the tech-
niques of the neutralization. The question
thus becomes: Why neutralize?
In attempting to solve a strain theory
problem with control theory tools, the con-
trol theorist is thus led into a trap. He can-
not answer the crucial question. The
concept of neutralization assumes the exis-
tence of moral obstacles to the commission
of deviant acts. In order plausibly to ac-
count for a deviant act, it is necessary to
generate motivation to deviance that is at
least equivalent in force to the resistance
provided by these moral obstacles. How-
ever, if the moral obstacles are removed,
neutralization and special motivation are
no longer required. We therefore follow the
implicit logic of control theory and remove
these moral obstacles by hypothesis. Many
persons do not have an attitude of respect
toward the rules of society; many persons
feel no moral obligation to conform regard-
less of personal advantage. Insofar as the
values and beliefs of these persons are con-
sistent with their feelings, and there should
be a tendency toward consistency, neutral-

ization is unnecessary; it has already oc-
curred.
Does this merely push the question back
a step and at the same time produce conflict
with the assumption of a common value
:s,
rn
m
UT
3.
fr-
ln.
he
:a-
:e-
:ir
:o-
ile
XS
3e-
?e-
:he
J ~ Y
his
.nt,
the
ch-
ion
D r y
on-

an-
rhe
xis-
ion
ac-
to
; at
nce
OW-
led,
are
the
love
.any
pect
ions
ard-
the
:on-
~u ld
tral-
' OC-
system? I think not. In the first place, we do
not assume, as does Cressey, that neutral-
ization occurs in order to make a specific - criminal act
possible. We do not assume, as
do Sykes and Matza, that neutralization oc-
curs to make many delinquent acts possi-
ble. We do not assume, in other words, that
the person constructs a system of rational-
izations in order to justify commission of
acts he wants to commit. We assume, in
contrast, that the beliefs that free a man to

deviant acts are unmotivated in the
sense that he does not construct or adopt
them in order to facilitate the attainment of
illicit ends. In the second place, we do not
assume, as does Matza, that "delinquents
concur in the conventional assessment of
delinquency." We assume, in contrast, that
there is variation in the extent to which peo-
ple believe they should obey the rules of so-
ciety, and, furthermore, that the less a per-
son believes he should obey the rules, the
more likely he is to violate them.
In chronological order, then, a person's
beliefs in the moral validity of norms are,
- - for no teleological reason, weakened. The
probability that he will commit delinquent
acts is therefore increased. When and if he
commits a delinquent act, we may justifi-
ably use the weakness of his beliefs in ex-
plaining it, but no special motivation is re-
quired to explain either the weakness of his
beliefs or, perhaps, his delinquent act.
5 The keystone of this argument is of
course the assumption that there is varia-
tion in belief in the moral validity of social
- rules. This assumption is amenable to di-
rect empirical test and can thus survive at
least until its first confrontation with data.
For the present, we must return to the idea
of a common value system with which this
Section was begun.

- The idea of a common (or, perhaps better,
a single) value system is consistent with the
fact, or presumption, of variation in the
i strength of moral beliefs. We have not sug-
1 gested that delinquency is based on beliefs
E counter to conventional morality; we have
not suggested that delinquents do not be-
'(. -%e delinquent acts are wrong. They may
well believe these acts are wrong, but the
meaning and efficacy of such beliefs are
contingent upon other beliefs and, indeed,
on the strength of other ties to the conven-
tional order.
Where Is the Motivation?
The most disconcerting question the con-
trol theorist faces goes something like this:
"Yes, but why do they do it?" In the good old
days, the control theorist could simply strip
away the "veneer of civilization" and expose
man's "animal impulses" for all to see.
These impulses appeared to him (and ap-
parently to his audience) to provide a plau-
sible account of the motivation to crime and
delinquency. His argument was not that de-
linquents and criminals alone are animals,
but that we are all animals, and thus all nat-
urally capable of committing criminal acts.
It took no great study to reveal that chil-

dren, chickens, and dogs occasionally as-
sault and steal from their fellow creatures;
that children, chickens, and dogs also be-
have for relatively long periods in a per-
fectly moral manner. Of course the acts of
chickens and dogs are not "assault'' or
"theft," and such behavior is not "moral"; it
is simply the behavior of a chicken or a dog.
The chicken stealing corn from his neigh-
bor knows nothing of the moral law; he
does not want to violate rules; he wants
merely to eat corn. The dog maliciously de-
stroying a pillow or feloniously assaulting
another dog is the moral equal of the
chicken. No motivation to deviance is re-
quired to explain his acts. So, too, no special
motivation to crime within the human ani-
mal was required to explain his criminal
acts.
Times changed. It was no longer fashion-
able (within sociology, at least) to refer to
animal impulses. The control theorist
tended more and more to deemphasize the
motivational component of his theory. He
might refer in the beginning to "universal
human needs," or some such, but the driv-
ing force behind crime and delinquency
was rarely alluded to. At the same time, his
explanations of crime and delinquency left
the reader uneasy. What, the reader asked,
is the control theorist assuming? Albert K.
226 Part VI + Varieties of Control Theory

Cohen and James F. Short answer the ques-
tion this way:
. . . it is important to point out one
important limitation of both types of
theory. They [culture conflict and social
disorganization theories] are both con-
trol theories in the sense that they ex-
plain delinquency in terms of the ab-
sence of effective controls. They appear,
therefore, to imply a model of motiva-
tion that assumes that the impulse to de-
linquency is an inherent characteristic
of young people and does not itself need
to be explained; it is something that
erupts when the lid-i.e., internalized
cultural restraints or external author-
ity-is off.
There are several possible and I think
reasonable reactions to this criticism. One
reaction is simply to acknowledge the as-
sumption, to grant that ,one is assuming
what control theorists have always assumed
about the motivation to crime-that it is
constant across persons (at least within the
system in question):
There is no reason to assume that only
those who finally commit a deviant act
usually have the impulse to do so. It is
much more likely that most people expe-
rience deviant impulses frequently. At
least in fantasy, people are much more
deviant than they appear.

There is certainly nothing wrong with mak-
ing such an assumption. We are free to as-
sume anything we wish to assume; the truth
of our theory is presumably subject to em-
pirical test.
A second reaction, involving perhaps
something of a quibble, is to defend the
logic of control theory and to deny the al-
leged assumption. We can say the fact that
control theory suggests the absence of
something causes delinquency is not a
proper criticism, since negative relations
have as much claim to scientific acceptabil-
ity as do positive relations. We can also say
that the present theory does not impute an
inherent impulse to delinquency to anyone.
That, on the contrary, it denies the necessity
of such an imputation:
The desires, and other passions of man,
are in themselves no sin. No more are
the actions, that proceed from those pas-
sions, till they know a law that forbids
them.
A third reaction is to accept the criticism
as valid, to grant that a complete explana-
tion of delinquency wodd provide the nec-
essary impetus, and proceed to construct an
explanation of motivation consistent with
control theory. Briar and Piliavin provide
situational motivation:
We assume these acts are prompted by
short-term situationally induced desires

experienced by all boys to obtain valued
goods, to portray courage in the pres-
ence of, or be loyal to peers, to strike out
at someone who is disliked, or simply to
"get kicks."
. . . There are several additional accounts
of "why they do it" that are to my mind per-
suasive and at the same time generally com-
patible with control theory. But while all of
these accounts may be compatible with
control theory, they are by no means deduc-
ible from it. Furthermore, they rarely im-
pute built-in, unusual motivation to the de-
linquent: he is attempting to satisfy the
same desires, he is reacting to the same
pressures as other boys (as is clear, for ex-
ample, in the previous quotation from Briar
and Piliavin). In other words, if included,
these accounts of motivation would serve
the same function in the theory that "ani-
mal impulses" traditionally served: they
might add to its persuasiveness and plausi-
bility, but they would add little else, since
they do not differentiate delinquents from
nondelinquents.
In the end, then, control theory remains
what it has always been: a theory in which
deviation is not problematic. The question
"Why do they do it?" is simply not the ques-
tion the theory is designed to answer. The
question is, "Why don't we do it?" There is
much evidence that we would if we dared.
Reprinted by permission of Transaction Publishers.

Travis Hirschi, "Social Bond Theory" from Causes of
Delinquency. Copyright O 1969 by Transaction Pub-
lishers.
Discussion Questions
Why does Hirschi say that the key ques-
tion for criminologists to answer is
"Why don't they do it?" as opposed to
'Why do they do it?"
How does control theory differ from
strain theory and cultural deviance (i.e.,
differential association) theory?
What are the four elements of the social
bond? How does each one help to con-
trol a youth from engaging in delin-
quency?
What factors in American society might
cause social bonds to be weaker in
inner-city neighborhoods? +
Lec-
.ylva-
" *om-
ress.
1994.
l o f a
ban-

"De-
rmal
ti.
Primary and
Secondary
Deviance
Edwin M. Lemert
Although LemertS (1 951) Social Pathology
was over 450 pages long, it was his short dis-
cussion of primary and secondary deviance
that, ironically, proved to be the lasting con-
tribution of this volume. Not surprisingly,
then, Lemert eventually addressed these con-
cepts in considerably more detail in a later
work, Human Deviance, Social Problems,
and Social Control (1972). I n the process,
k m e r t both advanced and criticized labeling
theory.
Lemert realized that in cruder versions of
labeling theory, people were portrayed as in-
nocent victims who, unfairly labeled by oth-
ers, are driven in a very deterministic way
into a life in crime. For Lemert, however, be-
coming firmly rooted in crime or deviance
was not a random occurrence in which the
labeled person played no role. Instead, Lemert
envisioned an interactionist process in which
individuals deviated, were sanctioned by oth-
ers, made choices that further embedded
them in deviance, experienced more reactions
fiom others, and eventually came to accept

and act consistently with their public desig-
nation as a "deviant."
In Lemert's (1972: 62) framework, pri-
mary deviance "is polygenic, arising out of a
variety o f social, cultural, psychological, and
physiological factors." This kind of wayward-
ness "has only marginal implications for the
status and psychic structure of the person
concerned" (p. 62). Deviations have more
profound impacts o n people S lives, however,
when they inspire societal reactions. As peo-
ple are stigmatized, punished, segregated, and
controlled, the "general effect is to differenti-
ate the symbolic and interactional environ-
ment to which the person responds, so that
early or adult socialization is categorically
changed" (p. 63). They now come to be de-
fined differently, which in turn affects their
identity or conceptions of themselves and
narrows their ability to choose conventional
over wayward paths. Their "life and identity
are organized around the facts of deviance," a
reality that makes continued deviation likely
(p. 63). Lemert calls their deviance "second-
ary," because this conduct is not generated by
the original causes of primary deviance but
rather falls into a "special class of socially de-
fined responses which people make to prob-
lems created by the societal reaction to their
deviance" (p. 63).
The distinction between primary and sec-
ondary deviance is conceptually appealing,
but Lemertk assertion that they have different

causes is problematic. Similar to other label-
ing theory arguments, a key issue is whether
societal reaction is in fact required to create
offenders who are deeply embedded-both
psychological1y and behaviorally-in a crimi-
nal lifestyle. Current criminologi~al theory
and research would suggest that stable in-
volvement in crime is rooted more fully in in-
dividual differences and in family, school,
and community life (see, e.g., Gottfredson
and Hirschi, 1990 [Chapter 211; Mofitt, 1993
[Chapter 441; Sampson and h u b , 1993
[Chapter 221). Still, societal reaction is not
inconsequential. While it may not be the
main source of persistent criminality, soci-
etal reaction can reinforce a criminal lifestyle
and make desistance from crime more diffi-
cult.
References
Gottfredson, Michael R. and Travis Hirschi.
1990. A General Theory o f Crime. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Lemert, Edwin M. 195 1. Social Pathology: A Sys-
tematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic
Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill.
274 Part VII + Labeling, Intermtion, and Crime
- 1972. Human Deviance, Social Problems,
and Social Control, 2nd edition. Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub. 1993.
Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning
Points Through Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Types of Deviation
T h e r e has been an embarrassingly large
number of theories, often without any rela-
tionship to a general theory, advanced to ac-
count for various specific pathologies in hu-
man behavior. For certain types of
pathology, such as alcoholism, crime, or
stuttering, there are almost as many theo-
ries as there are writers on these subjects.
This has been occasioned in no small way
by the preoccupation with the origins of
pathological behavior and by the fallacy of
confusing original causes with effective
causes. All such theories have elements of
truth, and the divergent viewpoints they
contain can be reconciled with the general
theory here if it is granted that original
causes or antecedents of deviant behaviors
are many and diversified. This holds espe-
cially for the psychological process leading
to similar pathological behavior, but it also
holds for the situational concomitants of
the intitial aberrant conduct. A person may
come to use excessive alcohol not only for a
wide variety of subjective reasons but also
because of diversified situational influ-
ences, such as the death of a loved one, busi-
ness failure, or participating in some sort of
organized group activity calling for heavy

drinking of liquor. Whatever the original
reasons for violating the norms of the com-
munity, they are important only for certain
research purposes, such as,assessing the ex-
tent of the "social problem'' at a given time
or determining the requirements for a ratio-
nal program of social control. From a nar-
rower sociological viewpoint the deviations
are not significant until they are organized
subjectively and transformed into active
roles and become the social criteria for as-
signing status. The deviant individuals must
react symbolically to their own behavior ab-
errations and fix them in their sociopsycho-
logical patterns. The deviations remain pri-
mary deviations or symptomatic and situa-
tional as long as they are rationalized or
otherwise dealt with as functions of a so-
cially acceptable role. Under such condi-
tions normal and pathological behaviors re-
main strange and somewhat tensional
bedfellows in the same person. Undeniably
a vast amount of such segmental and par-
tially integrated pathological behavior ex-
ists in our society and has impressed many
writers in the field of social pathology.
Just how far and for how long a person
may go in dissociating his sociopathic ten-
dencies so that they are merely troublesome
adjuncts of normally conceived roles is not
known. Perhaps it depends upon the num-
ber of alternative definitions of the same
overt behavior that he can develop; perhaps
certain physiological factors (limits) are

also involved. However, if the deviant acts
are repetitive and have a high visibility, and
if there is a severe societal reaction, which,
through a process of identification is incor-
porated as part of the "me" of the individ-
ual, the probability is greatly increased that
the integration of existing roles will be dis-
rupted and that reorganization based upon
a new role or roles will occur. (The "me" in
this context is simply the subjective aspect
of the societal reaction.) Reorganization
may be the adoption of another normal role
in which the tendencies previously defined
as "pathological" are given a more accept-
able social expression. The other general
possibility is the assumption of a deviant
role, if such exists; or, more rarely, the per-
son may organize an aberrant sect or group
in which he creates a special role of his own.
When a person begins to employ his deviant
behavior or a role based upon it as a means o f
defense, attack, or adjustment to the overt
and covert problems created by the conse-
quent societal reaction to him, his deviation
is secondary. Objective evidences of this
change will be found in the symbolic appur-
tenances of the new role, in clothes, speech,
posture, and mannerisms, which in some
cases heighten social visibility, and which in
Chapter 24 4 Primavy and Secondary Deviance 275
)n
n-

le
ot
n-
ne
PS
.re
:ts
nd
:h,
)r-
id-
lat
is-
on
in
2ct
on
ole
led
Pt -
r a1
ant
ler-
'UP
Nn.
ant
s of
lert
zse-
ion
:his
)ur-
:ch,
)me
h in

some cases serve a-s symbolic cues to profes-
sionalization.
llir.
Role Conceptions of the
Individual Must Be Reinforced by
Reactions of Others
It is seldom that one deviant act will pro-
voke a sufficiently strong societal reaction
to bring about secondary deviation, unless
f in the process of introjection the individual imputes or
projects meanings into the social situation which are not
present. In this
case anticipatory fears are involved. For ex-
ample, in a culture where a child is taught
sharp distinctions between "good" women
and "bad" women, a single act of question-
able morality might conceivably have a pro-
found meaning for the girl so indulging.
However, in the absence of reactions by the
person's family, neighbors, or the larger
community, reinforcing the tentative "bad-
girl" self-definition, it is questionable whether
a transition to secondary deviation would
take place. It is also doubtful whether a tem-
porary exposure to a severe punitive reac-
tion by the community will lead a person to
identify himself with a pathological role,
unless, as we have said, the experience is
highly traumatic. Most frequently there is a
progressive reciprocal relationship between

the deviation of the individual and the soci-
etal reaction, with a compounding of the so-
cietal reaction out of the minute accretions
in the deviant behavior, until a point is
reached where ingrouping and outgrouping
between society and the deviant is manifest.
At this point a stigmatizing of the deviant
occurs in the form of name calling, labeling,
or stereotyping.
The sequence of interaction leading to
secondary deviation is roughly as follows:
(1) primary deviation; (2') social penalties;
(3) further primary deviation; (4) stronger
penalties and rejections; (5) further devia-
tion, perhaps with hostilities and resent-
ment beginning to focus upon those doing
the penalizing; (6) crisis reached in the tol-
erance quotient, expressed in formal action
by the community stigmatizing of the devi-
ant; (7) strengthening of the deviant con-
duct as a reaction to the stigmatizing and
penalties; (8) ultimate acceptance of devi-
ant social status and efforts at adjustment
on the basis of the associated role.
As an illustration of this sequence the be-
havior of an errant schoolboy can be cited.
For one reason or another, let us say exces-
sive energy, the schoolboy engages in a
classroom prank. He is penalized for it by
the teacher. Later, due to clumsiness, he cre-
ates another disturbance and again he is
reprimanded. Then, as sometimes happens,
the boy is blamed for something he did not

do. When the teacher uses the tag "bad boy"
or "mischief maker" or other invidious
terms, hostility and resentment are excited
in the boy, and he may feel that he is
blocked in playing the role expected of him.
Thereafter, there may be a strong tempta-
tion to assume his role in the class as de-
fined by the teacher, particularly when he
discovers that there are rewards as well as
penalties deriving from such a role. There
is, of course, no implication here that such
boys go on to become delinquents or crimi-
nals, for the mischief-maker role may later
become integrated with or retrospectively
rationalized as part of a role more accept-
able to school authorities. If such a boy con-
tinues this unacceptable role and becomes
delinquent, the process must be accounted
for in the light of the general theory of this
volume. There must be a spreading corrob-
oration of a sociopathic self-conception and
societal reinforcement at each step in the
process.
The most significant personality changes
are manifest when societal definitions and
their subjective counterpart become gener-
alized. When this happens, the range of
major role choices becomes narrowed to
one general class. This was very obvious in
the case of a young girl who was the daugh-
ter of a paroled convict and who was attend-
ing a small Middle Western college. She
continually argued with herself and with
the author, in whom she had confided, that
in reality she belonged on the "other side of

the railroad tracks" and that her life could
be enormously simplified by acquiescing in
I !',I
l { t , l 276 Part VII + Labeling, Interaction, and Crime
1 1 1 ,
this verdict and living accordingly. While in Discussion
Questions
her case there was a tendency to dramatize
her conflicts, nevertheless there was
enough societal reinforcement of her self- 1. What is the
difference between primary
ent she received in and secondary deviance?
er father and On 2. What is meant by the concept of a "soci-
o lend it a painful eta1 reaction"? How do the reactions of
! I , ~ L L L LLVGU W ~ L I I LLGI LaLucl, WILV w a a
VLLGLL ILL a
I ? drunken condition, they abruptly stopped in Lemert's words,
to "secondary devi- 11 ;I seeing her again or else became
sexually ance"?
I -
, I ! , presumptive. . . . , , 3. What are the policy implications of
! Lemert's theory? For example, what
Reprinted from Edwin M. Lemert, "Primary and Sec-
ondary Deviance" in Social Pathology. Copyright O would be
the best way to respond to
1952 by The McGraw-Hill Com~anies. Re~rinted bv youths who
are caught committing de- ,
permisiion of The McGraw-Hill 'Cornpanie;.

-
linauent acts? +
CHAPTER
Sociological Theories
of CriDle II: CriDle and
Social Processes
This chapter might well have been titled "Learning to be
Criminal," because it
focuses on theories of crime that emphasize the role of social
learning or socialization in
the development of criminal behavior. Sociologists define
socialization as the process
of social interaction through which a society's culture is taught
and learned and human
personalities are developed (Renzetti & Curran, 2000).
Although we typically associ-
ate socialization with early childhood, it is actually an ongoing
process that continues
throughout an individual's life. The fact that socialization is a
process of social interac-
tion tells us that it occurs through communication with other
people; itis not something
we do on our own, in isolation. What is taught-that is, the
content of socialization-
varies across societies, communities, and social groups. Those
who do the socializing;
whom sociologists call agents of socialization, also vary.
Agents of socialization
influence us over the course of our lives: they are individuals,

groups, and institutions
that have as one of their primary functions the socialization of
members of a society by
providing explicit instruction in or modeling of social
expectations (Renzetti & Cur-
ran, 2000).
Criminologists who emphasize the importance of socialization
in the etiology of
crime study how various agents of socialization-especially the
family, the school, the
peer group, and, more recently, the media-affect an individual's
likelihood of pursu-
ing criminal or noncriminal activities. These theorists maintain
that what distinguishes
a criminal from a noncriminal is not physiology, genetics,
mental disorder, race, sex, or
even social class, but rather socialization experiences. The first
criminologist to forward
this argument as a systematic theory of crime was Edwin H.
Sutherland. Thus, our
exploration of the relationship between crime and social
processes begins with his work.
'.
Sutherland's Differential Association Theory
Edwin H. Sutherland (1883-1950) is generally regarded as the
leading criminologist of
his generation (Martin et aI., 1990). Sutherland is best known
for his study of white-
collar crime (1949), his life-history analysis of a professional
thief (193 7), and his devel-
opment of the theory ofdifferential association, which is the
focus of our discussion here.

135
136 CHAPTER 5
Sutherland made his first formal statement of the theory of
differential associa-
tion in 1939 in the third edition of his textbook, Principles
ofCriminolog;y. For the fourth
edition, published in 1947, he revised the theory slightly as a
result of his own rethink-
ing and in response to the criticisms and suggestions of his
colleagues. 1 By this time,
however, the theory was "considered to be one of the best
known and most systematic
and influential of the interpersonal theories" (Martin et al.,
1990, p. 155). According to
Matsueda (1988), "The theory was instrumental in bringing the
perspective of sociol-
ogy to the forefront of criminology" (p. 277).
Sutherland was critical of biological and psychiatric theories of
crime, but he was
also dissatisfied with the eclectic and disorganized nature of the
prevalent sociological
explanations of the time, which took a multi-factor approach to
crime causation. In
developing his own perspective, Sutherland drew on the work
ofa variety of scholars.
In our examination of differential association theory we will see
the influence of Gabriel
Tarde (1843-1904), whose "laws ofimitation" included the
postulate that people "imi-
tate one another in proportion as they are in close contact"

(1912, p. 326). It has been
argued, too, that the work of John Dewey was a source of
inspiration for Sutherland
(Martin et al., 1990).
Clearly, however, Sutherland was most strongly and directly
influenced by the
writings and research of his friends, colleagues, and associates
at the University of
Chicago. First, we will recognize in differential association
theory the idea of cultural
transmission (see Chapter 4). Second, we will find that the work
of the symbolic inter-
actionists George Herbert Mead, W 1. Thomas, and others was
influential. As VoId and
Bernard (1986) explain, the symbolic interactionists argue that:
people construct relatively permanent "definitions" of their
situation out of the mean-
ings they derive from their experiences. That is, they derive
particular meanings from
particular experiences but then generalize them so that they
become a set way of look-
ing at things. On the basis of those different definitions, two
people may act toward
similar situations in very different ways. (p. 211)
Although we will discuss symbolic interactionism later in the
chapter when we consider
labeling theory, suffice it to say here that the interactionists'
focus on how individuals
construct social reality through communication with one another
is also a concern that
underlies the theory of differential association.
Finally, the notion of culture conflict is a theme in differential

association theory.
Sociologist Thorsten Sellin argued in the late 1930s that crime
is an outcome of a clash
between cultures. According to Sellin (1938), in a homogeneous
society the "conduct
norms" that are codified into law represent a consensus of the
society's members. But
in a heterogeneous society that contains many diverse
subcultures, the law represents
the conduct norms of the dominant culture only, and members
of various subcultures
may violate the law when they follow their groups' indigenous
conduct norms. From
these ideas, Sutherland developed the concepts of differential
social organization and dif-
ferential group organization. He utilized these concepts to
explain variations in crime
rates across countries, cities, and groups (Cressey, 1960). Let us
turn, now, to the the-
ory of differential association itself.
Sociological Theories of Crime IT: Crime and Social Processes
137
Sutherland's Nine Propositions
Students usually have little difficulty learning differential
association because Suther-
land presented it in the form of nine, fairly straightforward
propositions, each followed
by a brief explanatory statement. These nine propositions are:
1. Criminal behavior is learned.
2. Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons

in a process of
communication.
3. The principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs
within intimate
personal groups.
4. When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes (a)
techniques of com-
mitting the crime, which are sometimes very complicated and
sometimes very
simple; (b) the specific direction of motives, drives,
rationalizations, and attitudes.
5. The specific direction of motives and drives is learned from
definitions of legal
codes as favorable and unfavorable.
6. A person becomes delinquent because of an excess of
definitions favorable to vio-
lation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.
7. Differential association may vary in frequency, duration,
priority, and intensity.
8. The process oflearning criminal behavior by association with
criminal and anti-
criminal patterns incorporates all the mechanisms that are
involved in any other
learning.
9. Although criminal behavior is an expression of general needs
and values, it is not
explained by those general needs and values since noncriminal
behavior is an

expression of the same needs and values. (Sutherland, 1947, pp.
6-8)
From the outset: Sutherland makes it clear that criminality is
not inherited.
Rather, it is learned in the same way that any other behavior is
learned: through inter-
personal communication and social interaction in intimate
groups-what sociologists
call primary groups (including family and friends). What is
learned through this process
includes particular attitudes and motivations as well as
techniques for committing
crimes. However, being exposed to criminal attitudes and
motivations and even know-
ing how to commit a crime does not mean that a person will
engage in criminal activ-
ity. Many people who desperately need money and who know
various illegal ways to
obtain it nevertheless persevere in solving their financial
problems through entirely
legal means. Indeed, to become a criminal or a delinquent, one
also must learn specific
situational meanings or definitions. To quote Sutherland, "A
person becomes delin-
quent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation
of law over definitions
unfavorable to ~olation of law." Sutherland called the process
of social interaction by
which such definitions are acquired differential association.
Sutherland chose the term differential association to emphasize
that, "In any soci-
ety, the two kinds of definitions of what is desirable in
reference to legal codes exist side
by side, and a person might present contradictory definitions to

another person at dif-
ferent times and in different situations" (Cressey, 1960, p. 2).
All associations are not
equal. In fact, Sutherland specified that associations vary in
frequency, duration, priority,
· 138 CHAPTER 5
and intensity. In other words, associations that occur often
(frequency) and are long-
lasting (duration) will have a greater impact on an individual
than brief, chance
encounters. Associations that occur early in a person's life,
especially in early child-
hood, are more important than those that occur later on
(priority). And associations
with prestigious people or with those one holds in high esteem
will be more influen-
tial than associations with those for whom one has little regard
or who are socially dis-
tant in one's life (intensity).
The theory of differential association is an explanation of how
individuals
become criminal or delinquent. It is important to keep in mind,
however, that Suther-
land wished to explain not only differences in individuals'
participation in criminal
activity, but also group and societal variations in crime rates.
To go beyond the indi-
vidual level, Sutherland originally utilized the concepts of
culture conflict and social dis-
organization (see Chapter 4). In his 1947 statement of the
theory, though, he used the

terms differential social organization and differential group
organization instead of social
disorganization. Sutherland's objective in making this revision
was to point out that
areas with high crime rates are not unorganized, but rather are
composed of various
groups with divergent standards of conduct, which increases the
probability that mem-
bers of some groups living there will learn definitions favorable
to law violation. As
Cressey (1960) explains, "In a multi-group type of social
organization ... there are
alternative educational processes in operation, varying with
groups, so that a person
may be educated in either conventional or criminal means of
achieving success" (p. 2).
Put somewhat differently, "Sutherland's theory, then, states that
in a situation of
differential social organization and [culture] conflict,
differences in behavior, includ-
ing criminal behaviors, arise because of differential
associations" (Void & Bernard,
1986, p. 213).2
Differential association theory is valuable. It addresses
questions that the strain,
subcultural, and opportunity theories left unanswered. For
instance, how can we
account for the fact that individuals who have equal
opportunities to commit crimes do
not all engage in criminal activity? Why is it that individuals
who are equally pressured
toward nonconformity by factors such as poverty do not all
become nonconformists?
And why do some individuals who appear to have all their
material needs met-mem-

bers of the upper- and upper-middle classes-nevertheless
embezzle business funds,
defraud consumers, and participate in price fixing schemes and
insider stock trading,
as well as other criminal practices? For Sutherland, the answer
was clear: differential
association. 3 Other criminologists, however, were less certain,
and Sutherland's work
became-and to some extent, remains-at the center of
controversy.
Strengths and Weaknesses of Differential
Association Theory
You will recall from Chapter 1 that one essential criterion for
determining the
strength of a theory is the extent to which it is supported by
empirical testing. Conse-
quently, perhaps the most damaging criticism of differential
association theory is that
it is untestable (see, for example, Adams, 1974; Glueck, 1956;
Hirschi, 1969; Korn-
139
hauser, 1978). Sutherland (1947) argued that ideally the
propositions of the theory
could be "stated in quantitative form and a mathematical ratio
[of an individual's expo-
. sure to weighted definitions favorable and unfavorable to law
violation] be reached"
(p. 7). However, he acknowledged that developing such a

formula would be extremely
difficult.
Matsueda (1980) argues, however, that specific hypotheses,
propositions, and
empirical implications of the theory are testable, and he as well
as others have under-
taken such tests. For example, DeFleur and Quinney (1966)
used the mathematical
model of set theory to determine if empirically verifiable
hypotheses can be derived
from the theory. They claim that, "Those who have declared
Sutherland's theory to be
incapable of generating testable hypotheses appear to have
underestimated it. In fact,
it can generate more hypotheses than could be adequately
studied in several lifetimes"
(DeFleur & Quinney, 1966, p. 20; see also Orcutt, 1987). The
question remains, how-
ever, as to how one can measure or observe an excess
ofdefinitions favorable to law viola-
tion. It appears that, despite DeFleur and Quinney's claim, the
key variable in the
theory is difficult to operationalize. In fact, Cressey considered
this to be one of the
most serious weaknesses in differential association theory
(Akers, 1996).
Still, criminologists have developed various ways to empirically
test differential
association theory. One popular method is to ask a sample of
juveniles or adults not
only about their own values and behavior, but also those of their
friends (for example,
"How many of your friends have been arrested in the past
year?" "To what extent do

you think your friends approve of [a specific deviant behavior]?
"How many of your
friends have done any of the following [deviant behaviors] in
the past year?"). The
underlying assumption of this approach is that an individual
will most likely learn
delinquency or criminality from friends who approve of
delinquent or criminal behav-
ior and who engage in such behavior themselves. This, then,
may serve as an indirect
measure of the acquisition of definitions favorable to law
violation. Various measures
of the frequency, duration, priority, and intensity of peer
associations also are often
used in these studies.
Overall, this research lends support to the theory of differential
association,
showing a strong correlation between individuals' associations
with delinquent or
criminal peers and their own likelihood of engaging in
delinquent or criminal activi-
ties (Cheung & Ng, 1988; Matsueda & Heimer, 1987; Orcutt,
1987; Tittle et al.,
1986). In fact, "the best predictor of the extent of an
adolescent's involvement in delin-
quent behavior is ... the number of the youth's delinquent
associations" (Johnson et
al., 1987). Such findings, however, do not demonstrate the
validity of the theory. "In
other words, the data indicate a relationship between delinquent
[or criminal] behav-
ior and interaction with others, but they do not demonstrate that
it is in fact the con-
tact with these 'certain others that causes the behavior. Causal
sequence is not

established nor are other potential factors ruled out" (Martin et
al., 1990, p. 166; see
also Costello & Vowell, 1999). We cannot pinpoint through
such research whether
delinquent or criminal values were actually transmitted from
delinquent or criminal
peers. It may also be the case that those who already hold
delinquent or criminal val-
ues seek out peers like themselves or, as Sheldon and Eleanor
Glueck put it, "birds of
140 - C HAP T E R 5
a feather flock together." The problem of temporal sequence is
made worse by the fact
that most of these studies rely on cross-sectional data, which do
not allow researchers
to decipher the temporal sequence of the learning/action
process.
One recent study, conducted by Warr and Stafford (1991),
addresses the issue of
temporal sequence utilizing data from the National Youth
Survey, a five-year panel
study of a national probability sample of youths who were aged
eleven to seventeen in
1976. These researchers uncovered both positive and negative
evidence relative to dif-
ferential association theory. They found, as Sutherland had
argued, that "The attitudes
of adolescents are influenced by the attitudes ... of their peers,
and those attitudes in
turn affect delinquency" (p. 162). They also discovered,
however, that the behavior of

friends has a strong effect on adolescents' behavior independent
of attitudes, indicat-
ing that Sutherland's theory may be incomplete because of its
emphasis on the trans-
mission of definitions favorable to law violation. More
specifically, Warr and Stafford
(1991) found that:
First, the effect of friends' attitudes and friends' behavior is in
fact enhanced when the
two are consistent. Friends who behave as well as think in a
delinquent fashion produce
the most delinquent associates. However, when the attitudes and
behavior of peers are
inconsistent, the behavior of peers appears to outweigh or
override the attitudes of
peers. The actions of peers, it seems, speak louder than their
attitudes. (pp. 859-860)
Importandy, these findings were obtained when the data were
analyzed longitudinally
as well as cross-sectionally. Costello and Vowell (1999) also
found that friends' delin-
quent behavior had a greater effect on research subjects' own
delinquent behavior than
did definitions favorable to law violation.
In another study, Johnson and his associates (1987) examined
factors that influ-
ence adolescents' use of drugs. They, too, found support for
differential association,
but at the same time, they identified an intervening variable.
Johnson et al. report that
parents' use of drugs and parents' prodrug definitions have
relatively litde impact on
adolescents' drug use. "By the time a child reaches adolescence,

all of the direct
parental influences seem to play only minor roles in
determining his or her drug use"
(p. 333). Instead, the most significant factor influencing
adolescents' drug use is the
proportion of the adolescent's best friends who use drugs. This
variable itself had a
fairly strong effect on friends' prodrug definitions which, in
tum, had a moderate
influence on drug use. However, regardless of friends' prodrug
definitions, friends'
actual use of drugs had the strongest effect of all the variables
tested.
Johnson et al. (1987) explain this finding by arguing that it is
situation pressures to
use drugs, not I?eers' prodrug definitions, that play the
dominant mediating role in
adolescents' drug use. "In other words, most of the impact from
friends' drug behav-
ior to personal behavior seems to bypass the definitions or
attitudes variable. It is not
so much that adolescents use drugs because the drug use of their
friends makes drug
use seem right or safe; rather, they apparently use drugs simply
because their friends do"
(p. 333, authors' emphasis).
Differential association theory has been criticized for several
other reasons as
wel1.4 One ongoing debate, for instance, centers on the role of
the media in crime cau-
sation. Sutherland (1947) argued that crime is learned within

intimate personal groups
and that "impersonal agencies of communication [such as the
media], playa relatively
unimportant part in the genesis of criminal behavior" (p. 6). Of
course, when Suther-
land wrote this statement, the media, especially television, were
not very influential in
adults' and children's everyday lives. However, as we see in Box
5.1, contemporary
researchers disagree about the relationship between media
consumption and crime, a
topic that is widely researched and highly controversial today.
Sociological Theeries of Crime II: Crime and Social Processes
(continued)
141
(Media Report to Women [MRTW] , 1993). In
contrast, in the United States, little action has
been taken to curb media violence. In 1993, the
chief executives of the major national networks
agreed to air parental advisories before programs
the networks considered violent, and in 1997,
the networks instituted a. six-category ratings
system to advise viewers fifteen seconds before
the start of a program as to appropriate viewer
ages for the program. However, research shows
that in the following year, 1998, the number of
violent programs increased (Mifflin, 1998).
The debate over the effects of violent
viewing is periodically fueled by incidents
involving viewers acting out what they have seen
in a program or film. In one case, for example, a

five-year-old Ohio boy set fire to his family's
mobile home after watching the MTV cartoon
Beavis and Butthead, in which the characters
depicted setting fires as fun. The boy's two-
year-old sister died in the fire. The films Natural
Born Killers, The Program, Colors, and Taxi Dri-
ver have also been implicated in murders and
other violent crimes (Mifflin, 1998). Still, despite
literally thousands of studies, we are no closer to
definitively answering the question, "Does vio-
lent viewing cause violent behavior in viewers?"
To summarize this voluminous research, it can
be said that there is a strong correlation between
violent viewing and violent behavior, but a corre-
lation between two variables does not necessarily
mean that one causes the other.
CONTROVERSY AND DEBATE
Do We Learn to Behave Violently by Watching
Violent Media?
BOX 5.1
In the 1930s, when Sutherland was about to pub-
lish his theory of differential association for the
first time, it was argued by some that motion pic-
tures were a major contributing factor to delin-
quency. During the late 1940s, when Sutherland
was revising his theory, a controversy raged over
whether comic books contributed to delin-
quency. In both cases, claims were made that
these media graphically depicted crime, violence,
and sex in such ways that viewers or readers,
especially the impressionable young, could be
led into crime or "sexual deviation" by imitating
the behavior of their movie or comic strip heroes

or heroines. In each case, a multitude of studies
(
was undertaken, and the bulk of the research
indicated that there was no empirical evidence
supporting a causal relationship between media
depictions of crime and violence and people's
actual behavior. Even today, however, the
media's role in the etiology of crime and anti-
social behavior continues to be debated.
In 1993, the Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission issued
strict rules regulating the broadcast of violent
programming. These rules include a ban on the
depiction of gratuitous violence, a limitation of
the time that adult programming (including ads
and promotions) containing violence can be
broadcast (between 9 P.M. and 6 A.M.), and a total
ban on any violent depictions in children's pro-
grams that minimize the effects of violence or
that encourage or promote imitation of violence
142 CHAPTER 5
BOX 5.1 Continued
There are three major explanations of this
relationship (Vivian, 1993). One emphasizes the
cathartic effect of violent viewing, stating that
viewing violence can actually reduce the violent
drives of viewers because watching allows them
to fantasize about violence, thereby releasing

tensions that may lead to real-life aggression. It .
has also been argued that this catharsis may lead
viewers to take positive rather than violent
action to remedy the problem. For instance,
Vivian (1993) reports that following the broad-
cast of the television movie, The Burning Bed, in
which a severely abused woman ultimately kills
her batterer-husband by setting fire to his bed
while he sleeps, domestic violence agency hot-
lines were flooded with calls from battered
women seeking help.
Vivian also notes, however, that The
Burning Bed may have also inspired some people
to take violent action. One man, for instance, set
his estranged wife on fire and another severely
beat his wife, both claiming'Lhey were motivated
by the movie. Such acts of direct imitation are at
the heart of a second explanation that focuses on
the modeling effect of violent viewing. Put simply,
this explanation maintains that media violence
teaches viewers to behave violently through imi-
tation or modeling, a concept that we will dis-
cuss in greater detail later in this chapter. Suffice
it to say here that despite the sensationalism sur-
rounding individual acts of direct imitation, they
are very rare. Moreover, there are several inter-
vening factors that influence whether a specific
act will be imitated. These include the model's
and the learner's relative age and sex, the
model's objective status and her or his status in
the eyes of the learner, and whether the model is
rewarded or punished for engaging in the
behavior in question.

These and other factors are considered by
researchers who propose a third explanation that
emphasizes the catalytic effect of violent viewing.
This position says that if certain conditions are
present, viewing violence may prompt real-life
violence. The emphasis is on probabilistic causation
rather than direct causation. The violent viewing
"primes" the viewer for violent behavior; it
increases the risk of violent behavior just like cig-
arette smoking increases the risk of developing
cancer. If the violence is portrayed as realistic or
exciting, if the violence succeeds in righting a
wrong, if the program or film contains characters
or situations that are similar to those the viewer
actually knows or has experienced, and if the
viewer's media exposure is heavy, the probability
of the viewer behaving violently increases (Bok,
1998; Mifflin, 1998; Vivian, 1993).
It is doubtful that the federal government
will enact legislation to curb violent program-
ming any time soon. Previous government
attempts to regulate broadcast hours in order to
prevent children from viewing programs or
films with adult themes have been struck down
by the courts as a violation of the First Amend-
ment (see, for example, Lewis, 1993). What is
more certain, however, is that the majority of
U.S. households will continue to fulfill the last
condition of the catalytic effect: frequency of
viewing. It is estimated that by the time a thild
leaves elementary school, he or she will have
watched 8,000 murders and more than 100,000
violent acts on television (Bok, 1998).
A final criticism of differential association theory comes

primarily from those
interested in the psychological underpinnings of human
behavior. These critics main-
tain that Sutherland's conception of learning is too simplistic.
Although Sutherland
said that the process of learning both criminality and law
abiding behavior involves all
the mechanisms of learning, his propositions only vaguely
outline how learning occurs.
This criticism is significant not only because it highlights an
area that Sutherland
neglected, but also because it prompted a number of
criminologists to develop new
Sociological Theories of Crime II: Crime and Social Processes
143
positions that utilize many of the principles of differential
association while incorpo-
rating more complex work of various learning theorists. Let's
examine, then, some of
the theoretical offshoots of differential association theory.
Sutherland's Legacy
Akers's Social Learning Theory
First developed in the 1960s by Robert L. Burgess and Ronald
L. Akers (1966) and later
elaborated by Akers (1973; 1998), social learning theory is a
revision of Sutherland's work
that utilizes the central concepts and principles of modern
behaviorism. 5 According to
Akers (1994, p. 101), the theory is a "general processual

explanation of all criminal and
delinquent behavior." Like Sutherland, Akers maintains that
criminal behavior is
learned. However, the way it is learned, he argues, is through
direct operant condition-
ing and imitation or modeling of others.
The principle of operant conditioning is probably familiar to
you; most of us
have heard of Pavlov's dogs who were trained or conditioned to
salivate when they
heard a bell ring. In this kind of conditioning-ealled classical
conditioning-the behav-
ioral response is elicited by a prior stimulus. According to
Akers, though, the form the
behavior takes and its frequency of recurrence depend on
instrumental conditioning;
that is, the behavior is learned or conditioned as a result of the
effects, outcomes, or
consequences it has on an individual's environment.
Operants are not automatic responses to eliciting stimuli;
instead, they are capable of
developing a functional relationship with stimulus events. They
are developed, main-
tained, and strengthened (or conversely are repressed or fail to
develop), depending on
the feedback received or produced from the environment.
(Akers, 1985, p. 42)
There are two major processes involved in instrumental
conditioning-reinforce-
ment and punishment, and each of these may take two forms
(see Table 5.1). Behavior
is reinforced when the consequences it has or the reactions of
others encourage an

TABLE 5.1 Akers's Social Learning Perspective of Deviant
Behavior
Stimulus
+
'.
Behavior increases-
reinforcement
Positive reinforcement
(reward received)
Negative reinforcement
(punisher removed or
avoided)
Behavior decreases-
punishment
Positive punishment
(punisher received)
Negative punishment
(reward removed or lost)
Source: Ronald L. Akers (1985). Deviant Behavior: A Social
Learning Approach (3rd ed.).
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, p. 45. Reprinted with permission of
the author.
144 CHAPTER 5

individual to do the same thing again when confronted with
similar circumstances. In
other words, reinforcement causes a behavior to increase in
frequency. Sometimes this
occurs by rewarding the behavior (positive reinftrcement).
However, a behavior may also
be reinforced if engaging in it allows a person to prevent or
avoid an unpleasant or
painful stimulus (negative reinftrcement). Punishment also may
be positive or negative
but, unlike reinforcement, the goal of punishment is to weaken a
behavior or to extin-
guish it altogether. When an unpleasant or painful response
(such as a slap) follows a
behavior, the punishment is considered positive punishment. If
a privilege or reward is
taken away in response to a behavior, this is negative
punishment.
Besides direct instrumental conditioning, we noted that
behavior may also be
developed or extinguished through imitation or modeling.
Models may be real or fic-
titious, and observers may be passive onlookers or active
participants in activities with
the models but, Akers (1985) cautions, modeling is "a more
complicated process than
'monkey see, monkey do'" (p. 46). A number of factors
influence the modeling process.
For instance, one tends to imitate those one likes, respects, or
admires. Imitation is also
more likely if the observer sees the model being reinforced, if
the model displays plea-
sure or enjoyment, or if imitating the model in itself is being
rewarded. An observer,

though, may do the reverse or opposite of what a model does if
he or she dislikes the
model, sees the model punished, or if imitation of the model is
being punished.
According to Akers and his colleagues (1979), "Whether deviant
or conforming
behavior is acquired and persists depends on past and present
rewards or punishments
for the behavior and the rewards and punishments attached to
alternative behavior" (p.
638). This is the principle of differential reinforcement.
"Differential reinforcement
operates when both acts are similar and both are rewarded, but
one is more highly
rewarded. But differential learning of this kind is most dramatic
and effective when the
alternatives are incompatible and one is rewarded while the
other is unrewarded"
(Akers, 1985, p. 47).
Differential reinforcement is largely a social process; it takes
place primarily in the
context of interaction with others. Here Akers utilizes
Sutherland's concept of differ-
ential association. Those with whom one has the greatest
contact-those who rein-
force or punish a person the most-will have the greatest
influence over that
individual. Typically, these will be a person's family and
friends, but may also include
media personalities and institutional agents, such as school
perS01ll1el, employers or co-
workers, and government and law enforcement. These sources
of differential rein-
forcement also provide definitions of or give normative

meanings to behaviors as either
right or wrong. "Therefore, deviant behavior can be expected to
the extent that it has
been differentially reinforced over alternative behavior ... and is
defined as desirable
or justified" (AkeJ.;s et al., 1979, p. 638).
Social learning theory has the advantage that it is more readily
testable than dif-
ferential association theory. In fact, Akers (1998) presents an
impressive array of stud-
ies that have used field research methods and surveys to test
hypotheses derived from
the theory. The results of these studies are supportive of social
learning theory. For
example, Akers and his colleagues (1979) surveyed over 3,000
male and female
teenagers from seven communities in the Midwest about a
common form of adolescent
deviance: the use of alcohol and drugs. They found, as the
theory predicts, that the
145
teenagers in their sample used drugs or alcohol to the extent
that s.uch behavior was
reinforced by their peers (especially those peers they most
admired) and was defined by
peers as desirable, or at least as justified as abstinence.
However, the relationship
between the differential reinforcement-differential association
variables and alcohol
and drug abuse were considerably weaker. Similar results were

obtained in a longitudi- '
nal study of cigarette smoking among adolescents (Spear &
Akers, 1988) and a study
of drinking among the elderly (Akers et al., 1989).
These findings, however, raise one potential weakness in social
learning theory.
Specifically, most attempts to test the theory have examined
relatively minor forms of
deviation and offending. Some criminologists question whether
the theory will be sup-
ported in studies of serious criminal offending. Boeringer
(1992) did test the theory in
his study of rape and sexual coercion by male college students
and obtained supportive
findings (see also Boeringer et al., 1991). Nevertheless, it
remains to be seen if the the-
ory can adequately explain other forms of serious criminal
offending.
Social learning theory has been praised for its practical
implications in the areas
of counseling and corrections. For example, many correctional
facilities have adopted
behavior modification treatment programs based on operant
conditioning principles
for at least some types of offenders. The difficulty here,
however, is that evidence
regarding the effectiveness of such "treatments" is
contradictory, and some observers
have raised serious ethical concerns about a number of these
programs.6
One final criticism of social learning theory is that it does not
address the ques-
tion of how or where criminal or deviant definitions and labels

originate. Akers (1985)
admits, "The theory is ... incapable of accounting for why
anyone or anything is
socially defined as undesirable.... The theory does not say how
or why the culture,
structure, and social patterning of society sets up and
implements certain sets and
schedules of reactions to given behavior and characteristics" (p.
43). Although the the-
ory recognizes that some reinforcers exert greater influence on
individuals' behavior
than others, it nevertheless overlooks the differential access of
certain groups to a soci-
ety's resources and rewards, as well as their differential power
to escape punishment,
to punish others, and to label others criminal or deviant. This,
in fact, is a criticism that
may be leveled against a majority of the theories we have
discussed so far in this text,
and it is an issue that will be raised again in this chapter and
especially in Chapter 6.
However, it must also be noted that Akers (1994, 1999) is
optimistic about the possi-
bility of integrating theories that do address these issues (e.g.,
social disorganization,
anomie, and conflict theories) with social learning theory.
Differential Identification and
Differential Anticipation,
The notion of differential identification, developed by Daniel
Glaser (1956; 1973),
derives not only from the principle of modeling, but also from
reference group theory.
People belong to and orient themselves toward many different
groups. The groups

with whom they identify are their reference groups, whether
they are actually members
of these groups or not. One may, for instance, aspire to
membership in a group with
higher social status than the groups to which one belongs, or
identify with the lifestyle
146 CHAPTER 5
of a group portrayed in the media. In any event, individuals tend
to judge themselves
relative to the norms and values of these groups and try to
emulate or model their
behavior after those group members whom they most respect or
admire. Criminality
or deviance, then, results when an individual develops greater
identification with mem-
bers of criminal or deviant groups than with members of
conformist groups.
The theory of differential identification is appealing for several
reasons. First, it
recognizes that people can learn from one another without
having direct intimate con-
tact or association. In addition, it concurs with our personal
experiences and observ-a-
tions. We know that people generally adopt particular images
and incorporate them
into their everyday lives. We are likely to recognize, for
example, an "executive look"
and a "grunge look"; each signifies a set of values and norms
for behavior to which the
individuals who adopt these models try hard to conform. At the
same time, however,

the theory is too simplistic in its depiction of identification; to
reiterate Akers (1985),
modeling is "a more complicated process than 'monkey see,
monkey do'" (p. 46). Why
are some groups more appealing to certain individuals than
other groups? In what ways
are one's choice of models limited or constrained? Why do some
people who are
repeatedly exposed to deviant or criminal images reject crime
and deviance in favor of
conformity?
To an extent, Glaser (1978) answered at least two of these
questions by forward-
ing a second theory, differential anticipation theory. In this
approach, Glaser argues
as Akers does, that people are likely to engage in behaviors
from which they expect to
obtain the greatest rewards and the least punishment. These
expectations derive from
three sources: differential learning, perceived opportunities, and
social bonds. Differ-
entiallearning refers to the process by which one develops
tastes, skills, and rational-
izations about whether he or she can best gratify himself or
herself through criminal or
noncriminal activities. Perceived opportunities reflect an
individual's evaluation of his or
her circumstances as well as the advantages and risks of
engaging in criminal or alter-
native activities. Social bonds, "both anticriminal and
procriminal ... create stakes in
conforming to the conduct standards of others so as to please
rather than alienate
them" (Glaser, 1978, p. 126). According to Glaser (1978),
"Differential anticipation

theory assumes that a person will try to commit a crime
wherever and whenever the
expectations of gratifications from it-as a result of social bonds,
differential learning,
and perceptions of opportunities-exceed the unfavorable
anticipations from these
sources" (p. 127).
The major weakness in differential anticipation theory is the
same one that
plagues differential association theory: It is difficult, at best, to
test it. More specifically,
how does a researcher measure differential anticipation? The
theory implies that one
cim add up an individual's anticipations unfavorable to law
violation and subtract them
from all the indiVidual's anticipations favorable to law violation
and, if the result is pos-
itive, a crime will be committed. Needless to say, this is
impossible and, consequently,
the theory is tautologiGal.
The development of differential anticipation theory was an
attempt to integrate
the central ideas of a variety of criminological perspectives into
one general theory of
crime. We recognize in it, for example, aspects of the strain
theories that we discussed
in Chapter 4, the principles of operant conditioning that we
reviewed in this chapter,
147

and elements of rational choice theory which was presented in
Chapter 1. The empha-
sis on social bonds comes from a theory that has enjoyed
tremendous popularity in
criminology: control theory.
Control Theory
Although criminologists historically have been interested in the
issue of social control,
specific theories of social control became especially popular
during the 1940s and again
in the 1970s and 1980s. There are, in fact, numerous theories
that may be classified
as control theories (see, for example, Briar & Pilliavin, 1965,
Nye; 1958; Reiss, 1951;
Toby, 1957).7
Virtually all of the theories we have discussed so far in this text
focus on answer-
ing the question, "Why do some people commit crimes?" In
contrast, control theorists
adopt a Hobbesian view of human nature; to them, everyone is
basically criminal at
heart. Everyone is equally motivated to commit crimes because
fulfilling one's desires
usually can be done most effectively, efficiently, and
pleasurably by violating the law.
Unlike subcultural and differential association theorists who
focus on the problem of
culture or normative conflict among diverse groups, control
theorists assume that soci-
ety is characterized by a single, conventional moral order. To
the control theorist,
then, the question criminologists must answer is "Why do
people obey the rules oftheir soci-

ety?" In answering this question, control theorists argue that it
is a person's ties-or,
depending on the individual theorist, a person's links,
attachments, binds, or bonds-
to conventional social institutions, such as family and school,
that inhibit him or her
from acting on criminal motivations (Liska & Reed, 1985).
Although there are many control theories, the one that
undoubtedly has enjoyed
the greatest popularity and had the greatest influence is that
developed by Travis
Hirschi in 1969. Consequently, it is to that brand of control
theory that we will devote
our attention here.
Hirschi's Control Theory
In his book, Causes ofDelinquency, Travis Hirschi (1969)
presented his own version of
control theory, along with an analysis of the empirical data he
had gathered to test it.
Like other control theorists, Hirschi begins with the assumption
that "delinquent
acts result when an individual's bond to society is weak or
broken" (p. 18). Conversely,
individuals with strong social bonds are unlikely to engage in
delinquency. Hirschi
specifies four elements of the social bond: attachment,
commitment, involvement,
and belief. '
The most important element of the bond is attachment.
Attachment refers to an
individual's sensitivity to the feelings of others. "If a person
does not care about the

wishes and expectations of other people-that is, if he [sic] is
insensitive to the opin-
ion of others-then he is to that extent not bound by the norms.
He is free to deviate"
(p. 18). Thus, attachment to others facilitates the internalization
of society's norms and
the development of a conscience.
148 C HAP T E R 5
Hirschi refers to the second element of the bond, commitment,
as the "rational
component in conformity." The underlying idea of commitment
is that people develop
a stake in playing by the rules. They invest their time, energy,
money, emotions, and
so on in pursuing a specific activity (such as getting an
education, building a career, and
establishing themselves as respected members of their
communities). When consider-
ing whether to commit a crime, individuals must factor in what
they stand to lose if
they get caught. "Most people, simply by the process of living
in an organized society,
acquire goods, reputations, prospects that they do not want to
risk losing. These accu-
mulations are society's insurance that they will abide by the
rules" (p. 21).
Involvement is an opportunity element of the bond. The premise
underlying
involvement is straightforward: If a person is engrossed in
conventional activities (such
as studying, working, or playing a sport), he or she simply will

not have time to partic-
ipate in deviant or criminal activities. This is a commonly held
view and one that pro-
vides the rationale for many recreation-oriented delinquency
prevention programs,
such as the Police Athletic League (PAL).
The final element of the bond identified by Hirschi, belief,
refers to the extent to
which an individual believes he or she should obey the rules of
society. As noted pre-
viously, control theorists do not recognize variations in
normative belief systems
among different groups in society. Hirschi, like other control
theorists, maintains that
all individuals are socialized into a common value system. What
Hirschi argues, how-
ever, is that there is variation in belief in the moral validity of
social rules. The less a
person believes a rule should be obeyed-the lower the person's
belief in the moral
validity of the rule-the greater the likelihood that he or she will
violate that rule. 8
In addition, Hirschi recognized that the four elements of the
social bond are
interrelated. Thus, an individual who is strongly attached to his
or her parents and
cares about their feelings will also be likely to express a strong
belief in the moral
validity of social rules. Likewise, an individual who has a high
stake in conformity (that
is, a high level of commitment) is also likely to be actively
involved in conventional
activities. Still, each element of the bond is analytically distinct
and "should affect

deviance uniquely and additively" (Matsueda, 1989, p. 430).
Thus, if we hold three of
the elements constant, the remaining element should, by itself,
inhibit delinquent or
criminal activity.
The majority of Causes ofDelinquency is devoted to Hirschi's
empirical test of his
theory. Hirschi surveyed a sample of more than 4,000 junior and
senior high school
boys in Contra Costa County in the San Francisco Bay area of
California. Included in
the questionnaire were items that measured the youths'
relationships with their par-
ents, teachers, and peers; their attitudes toward school; how
frequently they engaged
in such activities as working, studying, reading books, and
dating; and whether during
the past year they had stolen anything worth less than $2, stolen
anything worth
between $2 and $50, stolen anything worth more than $50, taken
a car without the
owner's permission, damaged or destroyed another person's
property, or had beat up
or deliberately hurt someone other than a sibling. These last six
items together formed
Hirschi's index of delinquency.
Most of Hirschi's findings support his control theory. In
particular, he found that
youths who had strong attachments to their parents and who
cared about their teach-

149
ers' opinions were less likely to be delinquent than youths
without such ties, irrespec-
tive of the delinquent activities of their friends. Indeed, Hirschi
argued that attachment
itself appears to be critical; those boys with strong attachments
to their friends were
less likely to be delinquent than unattached boys, even if their
friends were delinquent.
This does not mean that association with delinquent peers would
never lead to delin-
quency, but rather that such associations per se are not
sufficient to cause delinquency.
Delinquent boys, Hirschi found, have only weak and distant
relations with others,
including their peers.
Hirschi also found that the more committed a youth was and the
stronger his
belief in conventional morality and the legitimacy of law, the
less likely he was to be
delinquent. However, Hirschi's data were equivocal with respect
to the relationship
between involvement in conventional activities and
delinquency. Specifically, Hirschi
found that the boys who reported a high frequency of working,
dating, reading books,
watching television, and playing games were also more likely to
be delinquent. Accord-
ing to Hirschi (1969), the data indicate that control theory
"overestimated the signifi-
cance of involvement in conventional activities" and, further,
did not take into account
how some delinquent activities may contribute to an individual's
self-concept or self-

esteem, an issue to which we will return later in the chapter (pp.
230-231).
Among Hirschi's most important findings were that there was no
relationship
between social class an~ reported delinquency, and there was
only slight variation in
reported delinquency by race, despite the significant racial
disparity in official arrest
records. The attachment relationships he discovered held
regardless of the boys' race
or social class, and he found no evidence of a lower class
subculture (see Chapter 4).
Instead, he found that academic achievement was related to
belief in conventional val...
ues: Those boys who did well academically, whatever their
objective socioeconomic
position, held what Hirschi labeled "middle-class" values,
whereas those who per-
formed poorly academically held values that previously were
identified as part of a
"lower-class subculture." Concluded Hirschi (1969):
[T]he values in question are available to all members of
American society more or less
equally; they are accepted or rejected to the extent they are
consistent or inconsistent
with one's realistic position in that society. They are not, in
other words, "class" values
in the sense that they are transmitted by class culture.
In short, the data suggest, there are no groups of substantial
proportions in
American society that positively encourage crime in the sense
that those belonging to
the groups in question would prefer their children to follow

their own rather than a
conventional way of life. In fact, on the basis of the data
presented here, it appears there
are no groups of substantial proportions in American society
whose values are neutral
with respect to crime. (p. 230)
'.
These findings were good news to criminologists who objected
to the class
biases and racism of many sociological theories of crime. This
is not to say, though,
that Hirschi's control theory, as well as his research to test it,
were accepted uncriti-
cally in the criminological community. As noted earlier,
Hirschi's work has drawn
more ~ttention, both positive and negative, than any of the other
perspectives that fall
into the category of control theories. It certainly has been the
most extensively tested
150 CHAPTER 5
(Stitt & Giacopassi, 1992). Let's turn our attention now to some
of this empirical
research.
Involvement, Belief, and Delinquency. Recall that Hirschi's
hypothesis about the
relationship between involvement in conventional activities and
delinquency was not
supported by his data. The young men in Hirschi's study who
reported high levels of

involvement also reported high levels of delinquent activity.
One recent study under-
took a reexamination of the involvement-delinquency
relationship by focusing on ado-
lescents' leisure activities (Agnew & Petersen, 1989). Leisure
may indirectly influence
all four of the bonds identified by Hirschi (that is, participating
in enjoyable leisure
activities with parents may strengthen adolescents' attachment
to their parents). How-
ever, it has its most obvious and direct impact on involvement.
Adolescents whose free
time is consumed by legitimate leisure activities will not have
much chance to engage
in delinquency.
Recognizing that some leisure activities may be considered
more pleasurable
than others by adolescents and that some leisure activities,
rather than inhibiting delin-
quency, may actually promote it, Agnew and Petersen
considered not only types of
leisure activities (that is, sports versus hobbies versus work or
chores, and organized
versus unsupervised activities), but also with whom the
adolescents engaged in each
activity (parents or peers) and the extent to which they liked
each activity. They also
examined the relationship between these variables and serious
(stole a car) and minor
(stole from a store) delinquency.
Among Agnew and Petersen's (1989) findings were that
organized leisure activ-
ities, passive entertainment, and noncompetitive sports were
negatively related to delin-·

quency, whereas "hanging out" with friends and unsupervised
social activities with
peers were positively related to delinquency (the former with
total and serious delin-
quency, the latter with total and minor delinquency). They also
found that time spent
in most favorite leisure activities with parents was unrelated to
delinquency, but time
spent in least favorite leisure activities with parents was
positively related to delin-
quency. In general, however, it appeared that the extent to
which a leisure activity was
liked was unrelated to delinquency.
Agnew and Peterson (1989) report that, "Overall, the leisure
variables explain
approximately 6 percent of the variance in total and minor
delinquency, and 4 percent
in serious delinquency" (p. 347). In other words, the leisure
variables account for only
a small amount of delinquent activity. Although the researchers
argue that these figures
"are comparable to the effects of variables measuring other
institutional spheres, such
as family and school ... [and that] the effect of certain leisure
variables ... is as large
or larger than t:1¥t of many traditional predictors of
delinquency" (p. 347), such claims
do not necessarily bolster their position. Looking at the glass
half empty instead of
half full, one might just as aggressively argue that most of the
variables traditionally
examined-school, family, leisure, or other measures-.are all
rather poor predictors of
delinquency. 9

Other researchers have concentrated on the belief component of
the social bond.
'What is the empirical relationship between belief in the moral
validity of conventional
social rules and delinquent activity? Typically, belief is
measured by asking a sample of
151
respondents questions about honesty (such as "Is it a good thing
to always tell the truth
even though it may hurt oneself or others?").
Using such measures, several studies have found support for
Hirschi's hypothe-
sis that the stronger one's belief in the moral legitimacy of
social norms, the lower
one's participation in delinquent or criminal activities (Costello
& Vowell, 1999;
Krohn & Massey, 1980; Minor, 1984; Wiatrowski et al., 1981).
Matsueda (1989) has
criticized this research, however, because the samples from
which the data were col-
lected were usually small in size, limited to a single
geographical area, and drawn from
a "captive" population such as the student body of a school.
Moreover, the research
designs were cross-sectional, looking at attitudes and activities
at one point in time;
thus, they were unable to specify the causal ordering of any
observed relationships. In
other words, if the participants in such a study who were higWy
delinquent were also

low on measures of belief, the argument that involvement in
delinquency led them to
alter their support for conventional rules is at least as plausible
as Hirschi's position. In
any event, cross-sectional studies cannot demonstrate otherwise.
In his examination of the relationship between moral beliefs and
delinquency,
Matsueda (1989) developed a complex research design that
utilized longitudinal data
collected over a period of eight years from a national
probability sample of boys who
were in the tenth grade in the fall of 1966. Because other
studies had shown that con-
trol theory explains minor offenses better than it explains
serious crimes-a point to
which we will return shortly-Matsueda, using questions about
honesty as indicators
of moral belief, examined the incidence of five nonserious
forms of youthful deviation:
being suspended or expelled from school; skipping a day of
school; running away from
home; staying out past curfew; and fighting with parents. As
Matsueda (1989) reports,
"The results fail to replicate previous research which found
support for social control
theory's stipulation of the relationship between belief and
deviance. Contrary to pre-
vious results of cross-sectional studies, the effect of belief on
deviance is relatively
small and dwarfed by the effect of deviance on belief" (p.
428).10
Matsueda believes that participation in deviant activity may
affect belief through
two social psychological processes: cognitive dissonance

reduction and self-perception for-
mation. First, social psychologists tells us that when we act in a
way that goes against
an internalized belief, 'we experience psychological discomfort
called cognitive disso-
nance. One way to reduce this discomfort is to change the
belief-or our support for
the legitimacy of the belief-so that our belief system is
consistent with our behavior.
In self-perception formation, our behavior provides us with
clues about who we are-
about the elements of our self-identities, including our
individual belief systems. "In
short," Matsueda maintains, "belief and deviance should be
specified as reciprocally
causally related in a dynamic causal model" (p. 434).
Similarly, Agnew (1985) also reports that in his longitudinal
research, all of the
control variables (involvement, belief, commitment, and
attachment measures)
together explained' only 1 to 2 percent of the variance in future
delinquency (see also
Agnew, 1991; 1993; Paternoster et al., 1983). He attributes this,
at least in part, to the
impact that delinquency has on these variables, in particular on
involvement, school
attachment, and belief. Delinquency did not impact parental
attachment, however-a
finding supported by additional research, as we will soon see.
152 CHAPTER 5
School, Family, and Delinquency. The two remaining elements

of the social bond
are attachment and commitment. These elements are typically
studied in terms of
individuals' relationships with family members, teachers, and
peers, as well as in terms
of attitudes toward education. We will discuss school variables
first and then take a
look at research incorporating the more complex array of family
variables.
It is a well-established fact that failure in school is related to
delinquency and
crime, but the precise nature of this relationship is not clearly
understood (see also
Chapter 2). Children who do poorly in school are more likely to
engage in delin-
quency and to be arrested as adults than those who do well in
school (Jassim, 1989;,
Rosenbaum & Lasley, 1990; Thornberry et al., 1985). Moreover,
a good deal of crime,
including serious violent crime, takes place at school
(Applebome, 1996; Chandler et
al., 1998; Kozol, 1991; Lively, 1997; Schwartz & DeKeseredy,
1997). Does early expo-
sure to and involvement in delinquency interfere with children's
learning activities,
thereby lowering their motivation and achievement? Or, do
children turn to delin-
quency and crime when they reap few rewards in the classroom
and grow increasingly
alienated from school?
In Hirschi's model, children who care about what their teachers
think of them
and who value their teachers' opinions (indicating high
attachment) are less likely to

engage in delinquency. In addition, Hirschi (1969) postulates
that children who have
high educational aspirations, who value good grades, and who
say they work hard in
school (indicating high commitment) also are unlikely to pursue
delinquent activities.
While Hirschi himself found support for these hypotheses in his
own research, have
other criminologists replicated his results?
In a recent study ofJapanese youth, Tanioka and Glaser (1991)
found fairly strong
support for Hirschi's position. Japanese students who stated that
they liked school had
much lower delinquency rates than students who disliked
school. However, the extent
to which students cared about what their teachers thought of
them was related only to
rates of minor status offenses, not more serious crimes, and the
relationship was weak.
Nevertheless, when T anioka and Glaser examined all of the
school attachment variables
simultaneously, they explained 14 percent of the variation in
delinquency rates, twice
the rate explained by parental attachment variables. Similarly,
the school commitment
variables showed a strong inverse relationship with
delinquency. The higher the stu-
dents' educational aspirations and scores on an educational
"Achievement Index," the
lower their rates of self-reported delinquency (see also Tanioka,
1992).
There are, of course, particular features ofjapanese society that
make it signifi-
cantly different from the United States. Among these are a

stronger educational sys-
tem, greater government support of education in terms of both
regulations and
funding, a greater certainty of employment for students once
they complete their
schooling, a sub~bintially lower poverty rate, and a much
higher frequency of extended
family households in which not just two adults, but often three
or four adults reside
with the children (Upham, 1987; White, 1987). Such factors
alone or in combination
might account for greater attachment and commitment to school
and low rates of devi-
ation among Japanese youth.
In the United States, where control theory originated, the
research findings on
school attachment and commitment and delinquency have been
somewhat less affirm-
Sociological Theories· of Crime II: Crime and Social Processes
153-
ing. For instance, in their analysis of self-report data from
1,508 high school students,
Rosenbaum and Lasley (1990) discovered that increases in
positive attitudes toward
school and educational achievement resulted in significant
reductions in delinquent
activity only fOr the males in their sample. Although we will
examine the issue of sex dif-
ferences more carefully in the next section, suffice it to say here
that in Rosenbaum and
Lasley's research, a commitment to success in school had only a

minimal impact on
female delinquency.
In a study of a school-based delinquency prevention program,
Gottfredson
(1986) examined the effects of several factors that should have
led to increased 'school
attachment and commitment among participating students. The
factors included:
involvement of school staff, students, and community members
in planning and imple-
menting a school improvement initiative; changed disciplinary
procedures; an
enhanced educational program that included activities designed
to raise achievement
and create a more positive atmosphere in the school; and special
services for high-risk
students designed to improve their self-concepts, increase their
success experiences,
and strengthen their bond to school. The program slightly
reduced delinquency and
misconduct among the general student body at participating
schools, but not among
high-risk students. The findings show that high-risk students'
commitment to educa-
tion-as measured by dropout, retention, and graduation rates, as
well as by standard-
ized achievement test scores-did increase; however, their rates
of delinquency and
misconduct simply did not decline.
Liska and Reed's (1985) research may help to explain such
anomalous findings.
Liska and Reed hypothesized that there is a reciprocal
relationship between attach-
ment and delinquency; that is, they argued that delinquency is

as likely to affect attach-:
ment as attachment is to affect delinquency (see also Matseuda
& Anderson, 1998). In
fact, their findings showed that most of the negative
relationship between school
attachment and delinquency that other studies have found is the
result of delinquency's
effect on school attachment, not vice versa. At the same time,
however, their findings
did support Hirschi's hypothesized relationship between
parental attachment and
delinquency: "most of the observed negative relationship
between parental attachment
and delinquency comes about because of the effect of parental
attachment on delin-
quency" (p. 537).
Liska and Reed explain these findings by noting first that
attachment between
parents and children is less conditional on the behavior of either
party than attachment
between teachers/school personnel and students. Moreover, as
we have already noted,
much juvenile misconduct, including criminal violations, takes
place in school or on
school grounds. "This leads to reactions by teachers and school
administrators, which
in turn decrease,school attachment" (p. 557). Also, in response
to a question we raised
at the outset of this section, Liska and Reed argue that
"adolescents involved in delin-
quency simply have less time for school; thus, delinquency,
independent of teacher
reactions, may decrease school attachment" (p. 557).
Liska and Reed rightly conclude that, "Generally, it is all too

clear that the causal
structure underlying the relationship between social attachment
and delinquency is
not as simple as implied in theories of social control" (p. 559).
Their findings indicate
that it is strong attachment to parents that lowers delinquency,
but that delinquency
154 CHAPTER 5
lo~ers school attachment which, in turn, may weaken parental
attachment. Their find-
ings point to parents, not schools, as the major institutional
sources of social control.
Do other researchers agree with them?
In examining how children's relationships with their parents
might affect their
delinquency rates, one must also consider a variety of
methodological issues. Studies
that attempt to measure parental attachments often use
adolescents' reports of their
parents' behaviors or attitudes. Can we be certain that children
correctly perceive,
accurately recall, and honestly report their parents' behavior or
attitudes (McCord,
1991)? In addition, researchers have operationally defined
parental attachments in a
wide variety of ways, including questions about "affection and
love, interest and con-
cern, support and help, trust, encouragement, lack of rejection,
desire for physical
closeness, amount of interaction or positive communication, and
'identification,' " as

well as with variables measuring direct controls, such as
monitoring or supervision and
punishment or disciplinary techniques (Rankin & Wells, 1990,
p. 142). The question,
of course, arises as to whether all of these variables are actually
measures of parental
attachment. Nevertheless, the correlation between parent-ehild
relationships and
crime is one of the most extensively researched in the
criminological literature.
Rankin and Wells (1990) have examined the effects of both
indirect and direct
parental controls on the behavior of male children. Indirect
control through parental
attachment was measured by two indices: (1) identification,
which included questions
regarding how much the youth likes his mother and father, how
close he feels to each
parent, how much he wants to be like each parent, and how
much time he spends with
his father; and (2) positive communication, which included
items about how much
influence the youth has in family decisions, how often his
parents listen to his side of.
things in arguments, how often his parents talk over important
family matters with
him, and how often his parents respond fairly and reasonably to
his requests. Direct
control of the youth by parents was measured in terms of:
supervision (the extent to
which parents determined their child's friends and activities-
with whom he socializes,
where he may go, and what he may do); strictness; contingency
of punishment (how
often the parents completely ignore instead of punish the child's

misbehavior); and
strength of punishment (how often parents use yelling, slapping,
threats of slapping,
and withdrawal of privileges as punishments). Their sample
included 1,886 boys who
had participated in the Youth in Transition Study, the same data
source used in the
Liska and Reed (1985) study we discussed earlier.
In general, Rankin and Wells's findings confirm that both direct
controls and
indirect controls (that is, attachment) are negatively related to
delinquency (see also
Wiatrowski et al., 1981). However, these researchers found that
as parental discipline
increases, delinquency does not necessarily decrease.
"Punishment that is too strict,
frequent, or severe can lead to a greater probability of
delinquency regardless of
parental attachments. That is, a strong parent-ehild bond will
not lessen the adverse
impact of punishment that is too harsh" (p. 163). Rankin and
Wells (1990) found that
while punishment that is consistent is negatively related to
delinquency, punishment
that is severe is positively related to delinquency. In terms of
strictness, there was a
curvilinear relationship; medium levels of parental strictness
were most effective in
Sociological Theories of Crime IT: Crime and Social"Processes
155
lowering delinquency, whereas both low and high levels of

parental strictness increased
delinquency (see also Straus & Sugarman, 1997).
Similar studies that have focused on child-rearing techniques,
monitoring and
other forms of direct parental control over children's behavior,
and quality of family
interaction, have arrived at similar findings. McCord (1991), for
instance, reports that
mothers judged to be competent (self-confident, affectionate,
consistently nonpunitive
in their disciplinary style, and providing leadership to their
children) seemed to be able
to insulate their children against criminogenic influences even
in high-crime neigh-
borhoods. Boys who had competent mothers and who grew up in
households in which
there were high family expectations (children were expected to
do well in school) had
low rates of juvenile delinquency which, McCord argues,
reduces their probability of
adult criminality (see also Larzelere & Patterson, 1990; Laub &
Sampson, 1988).
However, McCord also found that, compared with mothers'
influences, fathers' influ-
ences are not significant early on, but increase as boys grow
older. According to
McCord (1991):
Fathers who interact with their wives in ways exhibiting high
mutual esteem, who are
not highly aggressive, and who generally get along well with
their wives provide models
for socialized behavior. Conversely, fathers who undermine
their wives, who fight with
the family, and who are aggressive provide models of antisocial

behavior. Both types of
fathers, it seems, teach their sons how to behave when they
become adults. (p. 412)
Thus, fathers, unlike mothers, appear to have more of a direct
effect on adult crimi-
nality than on juvenile delinquency, at least among males. This,
McCord maintains,
indicates that the causes of crime are not identical across age
groups, a point that will
be raised again later in this chapter.
Before moving on to other issues accounted for (or overlooked)
by control the-
ory, one final dimension of parental attachment deserves our
attention: family struc-
ture. The "broken home hypothesis" is the notion that children
from single-parent
homes are more likely to become involved in delinquent
activities than children from
tWo-parent homes. The common rationale offered for this
hypothesis is that one par-
ent is simply less effective in monitoring children's behavior
than two parents. A sec-
ond rationale, however, derived from the 1965 Moynihan Report
in which it was argued
that delinquency rates are higher among Black youth than
among White youth because
of "a tangle of pathology" growing out of life in matriarchal
(female-headed) house-
holds, high rates of births to unwed mothers, high
unemployment, and differential
socialization. Thus, this perspective attempted to explain "the
joint relationships
between race, broken homes and delinquency" (Matseuda &
Heimer, 1987, p. 826).11

In general, it can be said that there is little evidence in support
of the broken
home hypothesis, although it has managed to repeatedly find its
way into public pol-
icy debates over the past several decades (see, for example,
"OJJDP Model Programs
1990," 1992). Although official statistics show that those youth
most likely to be
processed through the criminal justice system do come from
broken homes, findings
from self-report studies indicate little or no relationship
between family intactness and
156 CHAPTER 5
delinquency (Johnson, 1996). Given that single-parent, female-
headed households are
one of the fastest growing types of family structures in the
United States, this is a sig-
nificant finding.
There are, however, several factors that complicate the family
structure-delin-
quency relationship. Van Voorhis and her colleagues (1988), for
instance, found that
family structure seemed to be related only to incidence of status
offenses andwas unre-
lated to overall home quality. Overall home quality, though,
regardless of family struc-
ture, was a stro~g predictor of delinquency, but the analysis
failed to identify specific
aspects of family functioning that contributed most to
delinquent activity.

Matsueda and Heimer (1987) have addressed the race-broken
homes-delin-
quency relationship. They found that although broken homes
have a greater effect on
delinquency rates among Black youth than among White youth,
this effect, along with
the effects of attachment to parents and peers, were mediated by
learning definitions
favorable to delinquency. In other words, their work appears to
support differential
association theory more than control theory. Matsueda and
Heimer argue, however,
that differences in crime rates by race should be examined in
the context of the "his-
torical emergence of social and economic structures that give
rise to distinct racial pat-
terns of social organization" and that reflect a history of racial
discrimination (p.
837)-a point that we will take up again later in this chapter and
in Chapter 6.
It is also important to note that there are different types of
intact families as well
as different types of single-parent families. Many researchers,
for example, have docu-
mented negative effects on children when they live in homes
where parents are con-
stantly arguing (Barber & Eccles, 1992; Hetherington et al.,
1989; Wallerstein &
Blakeslee, 1989). In addition, Johnson (1986) found that family
structure was unrelated to
frequency or seriousness of delinquency, except in
mother/stepfather homes where boys
had an unusually high involvement in delinquent activity.
Johnson, however, found some

important sex differences: Although boys, but not girls, in
mother/stepfather house-
holds reported high levels of delinquency, officials were more
likely to respond to the
misbehavior of children-especially female children-living in
mother-only families.
Thus, the myth of the broken home-delinquency relationship
appears prevalent
among law enforcers, which may account, at least in part, for
the higher official delin-
quency rates of both boys and girls from single-parent female-
headed households.
Johnson's research highlights the importance of considering sex
differences when
evaluating any theory of crime. Most tests of control theory
have utilized all-male
samples, as Hirschi's (1969) study did. In addition to sex, there
are several other factors
worth considering in our assessment of control theory, such as
age and seriousness
of offense.
'.
Sex, Age, and Other Factors Affecting Deviation. As we have
already noted, Hirschi
(1969) tested his theory by surveying a sample of high school
boys, reporting in a foot-
note that in the analysis, "the girls disappear" (p. 36). Several
subsequent tests of social
control theory have included females in their samples and, like
Johnson (1986) cited
previously, these studies reveal significant sex differences in
their results. It has been
argued by some that control theory actually does a better job of
explaining female

delinquency than male delinquency (see Jensen, 1990; Krohn &
Massey, 1980). Cem-
157
kovich and Giordano (1987), though, also report that the extent
to which control the-
ory accounts for sex differences in delinquency depends to some
degree on how the
elements of the social bond are operationalized. For instance,
they used a multidimen-
sional measure of attachment and found that "although the total
explained variance is
similar among males and females, the relative importance of the
variables is not"
(p. 315). For males, the dimensions that were most strongly
associated with delin-
quencywere control and supervision, intimate communication,
and instrumental com-
munication, whereas for girls, the most important dimensions
were identity support,
conflict, instrumental communication,· and parental disapproval
of peers. According to
Cernkovich and Giordano (1987), "This seems to suggest that
while family attachment
is important in inhibiting delinquency among all adolescents,
the various dimensions
of this bond operate somewhat differently among males and
females" (p. 315).
Researchers have also found that attachment to peers operates
differently for
males and females. Hirschi (1969) made the controversial

argument that attachment to
peers, even if peers were delinquent, inhibited delinquency.
Others' research has not
suP?orted this position. Giordano and her colleagues (1986), for
instance, found that
boys in peer groups feel considerable pressure from their
friends to engage in risk-
taking behavior, including delinquency. Girls' groups, in
contrast, function differently;
girls interact with friends in ways that encourage self-disclosure
and foster intimacy.
Thus, while boys' attachment to peers may promote
delinquency, girls' attachment to
peers may inhibit it (see also Fordham, 1996; Gilligan et a1.,
1995; Matsueda & Ander-
son, 1998).
Farnworth (1984) has found that among African American
youth, problems in
school predict delinquency better than family problems for
girls; but for boys, family
problems seem to be better predictors than school problems.
Rosenbaum and Lasley r
(1990) also examined the school-delinquency relationship and
found several significant
sex differences. They report, as we noted earlier, that positive
attitudes toward school
and school achievement inhibit delinquency more for boys than
girls. Boys, they argue,
appear to have a greater stake in future success predicated on
strong school perfor-
mance than girls do. However, among those girls who did very
well in school, "atti-
tudes toward achievement and school seem to have the same
insulating effect from
delinquency as for males" (p. 510). Rosenbaum and Lasley also

found that increased
involvement in school activities, as well as positive attitudes
toward teachers, inhibited
delinquency more for girls than boys. Finally, Rosenbaum and
Lasley found social class
to be an important intervening variable, with differences in
social class producing more
significant changes in the school-delinquency relationship for
females than for males.
They conclude on the basis of this finding that "school
conformity will be instilled
socially in fem~les and in middle/upper class youths more
strongly than in males and
in youth from the lower class" (p. 511).
Several researchers have argued that findings such as these,
which show differ-
ential access to opportunities and rewards on the basis of sex
and social class, point to
the need to examine power differences between the sexes and
classes when attempting
to explain crime and delinquency (see Chesney-Lind, 1997).
This will be a major
theme in Chapters 6 and 7. For now, however, let us conclude
our evaluation of con-
trol theory by considering two other factors: age and
seriousness of offense.
158 CHAPTER 5
Hirschi concentrated on minor delinquent acts committed by
male high school
students, and most subsequent tests of his theory have taken a
similar approach. A

number of criminologists, however, have argued that this focus
is too limited. Can con-
trol theory account for offending by adults as well as by
juveniles? And is control the-
ory, as Matsueda (1989, p. 432) has argued, best at explaining
only "trivial impulsive
deviant acts, such as status offenses ... rather than serious
event-like offenses, such as
crimes against persons"? "Whitehead and Boggs (1990) offer an
answer to both ques-
tions. They studied recidivism among a sample of adult felony
probationers in New
Jersey, operationalizing attachment by marital status and
offender'sliving arrange-
ments; commitment by years of schooling and percentage of
time employed during the
two years prior to the current offense; and involvement by
whether the offender was
either in school or employed at the time of the offense. 12
Whitehead and Boggs report
that their "most dramatic finding is the lack of impact of most
of the control theory
variables.... This analysis was hard pressed to find significant
effects of control the-
ory variables" (p. 4). Only two control theory variables-those
used to measure com-
mitment-were significant in explaining recidivism by the adult
felony probationers.
Most of the recidivism was accounted for instead by legal
variables (previous convic-
tions) and by demographic variables (race and age).
Other studies have obtained support for the applicability of
control theory to
adults for certain types of offenses, such as white-color crimes,
and when the adult

offenders were misdemeanants, not felons. Agnew's (1985)
research further shows that
apart from the age of the offender, control theory appears to
apply only to minor
forms of delinquency; "the explanatory power of the theory
diminishes as we focus on
more serious forms of delinquency" (p. 58).
The wealmesses of control theory that we have discussed here
and in previous
sections are serious, but not fatal. The theory, in fact, may be a
very good one, but with
limited utility. Certainly, the research conducted thus far has
done more to fuel this
debate than to settle it. In the meantime, several criminologists,
including Hirschi
himself, have developed revisions of control theory with wider
applicability. Let's look
at these theories now.
Tittle's Control Balance Theory
In 1995, Charles Tittle published Control Balance, in which he
offers an important revi-
sion of traditional control theory. Tittle accepts Hirschi's
proposition that control is
the major component of conformity, but he argues that it is not
control per se that
counts, but rather maintaining a balance between the amount of
control one is subject
to at the hands of others and the amount of control one can
exercise over others. This
relationship can be expressed as a ratio, where the numerator is
the control to which
one is subject and the denominator is the control one exercises.
If the numerator

exceeds the denominator, or vice versa, a control imbalance
occurs. Control imbalances
can result in deviant behavior, including in some cases crime.
Tittle identifies two types of control imbalances. The first type
of control imbal-
ance is a control deficit, whereby the amount of control to
which one is subjected exceeds
the amount of control one can exercise over others. A control
deficit, Tittle believes,
;
~
!
159
I
i
J
I
t
I
I
~
I

produces repressive deviance. There are three forms of
repressive deviance, each of
which helps individuals escape control deficits and restore
balance to their control
ratios. The first type of repressive deviance is predation, which
involves physical vio-
lence and is intended to harm others. Predation includes many
criminal acts, such as
sexual assault and robbery, but also includes many types of
property crime, such as
theft. The second type of repressive deviance is defiance, or
deviation that challenges
dominant norms but typically does not inflict harm on others.
Included in the category
of defiance are behaviors such as truancy, having sex with
multiple partners simulta-
neously, and vandalism. The third type of repressive deviance is
submission, which
involves "passive, unthinking, slavish obedience to the
expectations, commands, or
anticipated desires of others" (Tittle, 1995, p. 13 9). Tittle
includes in this category
repressing other people to please someone perceived to be more
powerful (e.g., writ-
ing racial slurs on the dorm room door of a Latino student to
curry favor with mem-
bers of the all-White, elite fraternity on campus). This category
also includes allowing
oneself to be physically abused, humiliated, or degraded (e.g.,
being tied up and
whipped for the sexual pleasure of another person).
The second type of control imbalance, which Tittle
conceptualizes as a control
surplus, occurs when the amount of control a person exercises
over others exceeds the

amount of control others impose on her or him. According to
Tittle, a control surplus
leads to a different kind of deviance, autonomous deviance,
which helps the individ-
ual further extend control over others and thereby increase her
or his control surplus.
There are three kinds of autonomous deviance. The first kind is
exploitation, which is
an indirect form of predation that includes such behaviors as
hiring someone to injure
a rival before a competition. The second kind of autonomous
deviance is plunder,
which is engaged in by individuals or organizations who want to
further their own
goals while ignoring or trampling the rights and safety of
others. For example, plun-
der occurs when a corporation knowingly sells a faulty product
overseas after it was
banned for sale in the United States just so it can extend its
markets and reap profits.
Tittle also includes genocide under the heading plunder. The
third type of
autonomous deviance is decadence, irrational acts engaged in on
a whim or the spur of
the moment, such as humiliating another person for one's own
pleasure.
Clearly, Tittle's control balance theory is designed to cover a
wide variety of
behaviors, not all of which are criminal. In fact, Tittle is careful
to point out that a con-
trol imbalance does not inevitably produce deviance of any
kind. Tittle draws on a
number of theories to specify which conditions are likely to
result in deviance when a
control imbalance occurs. Whether a control imbalance

produces a deviant outcome
depends on an individual's predispositional motivations,
situational motivations, con-
straint, and opportunity. Each of these, like control itself, exists
along a continuum,
varying in form, frequency, and intensity. Tittle conceives of
predispositional motiva-
tions as natural, the products of one's innate physical and
psychological needs and
desires, including what he characterizes as the "almost
universal" desire for autonomy.
Even if one is predisposed to crime or deviance, one must
become aware of the con-
trol imbalance, and this awareness develops from situational
provocations, such as
being turned down for a date, fired from a job, or insulted by a
friend, relative, or
stranger. Although Tittle sees predispositional and situational
motivations as being
160 C HAPTE R 5
strong precipitators of deviance, he nevertheless believes that
deviance still may not
occur if the individual faces a high internal or external level of
constraint. A quick-
tempered person who has just been cut off on the highway by
another driver may be
motivated to run that fellow driver off the road, but the police
car in the rearview mir-
ror constrains him or her. "[C]onstraint refers to the actual
probability that potentially
controlling reactions will be forthcoming" (Tittle, 1995, p. 167).
Of course, even if one

is motivated and constraint is low, deviance still may not occur
if there is no opportu-
nity to deviate. Realistically, though, Tittle recognizes that the
opportunity for some
kind of deviation is almost always available.
Tittle's control balance theory gives us much food for thought.
One strength of
the theory is that, unlike many of the theories we have
discussed so far in this text, con-
trol balance theory does not concentrate on traditional street
crime, but explains as
well "hidden offending;" such as dating violence, white-collar
crimes (e.g., fraud hy
computer, insider stock trading), and organizational and
governmental crimes (e.g.,
sale of unsafe or banned products, human rights violations).
Like all theories, however,
control balance theory must be subjected to the test of empirical
research to determine
its validity, a task made all the more difficult by a fact about
which Tittle (1997) him-
self cautions us: There are no secondary data sets currently
available that will allow us
to calculate anyone's control ratio. Tests of control balance
theory will have to be
undertaken "from scratch," with researchers designing
appropriate research instru-
ments and systematically collecting and analyzing original data.
At least one study has
already made an attempt, though limiting itself to a test of two
types of repressive
deviance (predation and defiance) using a questionnaire
administered to a sample of
college students (piquero & Hickman, 1999). In this study,
Piquero and Hickman

found support for control balance theory, but contrary to Tittle's
predictions, both
control deficits and control surpluses appeared to lead to
predation and defiance.
Piquero and Hickman suggest that perhaps control balance
theory is incorrect in pre-
dicting that one type of imbalance will lead to a specific type of
deviation, but correct
in predicting that an imbalance can lead to deviation.
A number of criminologists have raised concerns about the
basic propositions of
control balance theory, ranging from the difficulty in specifying
cut-offs for small,
medium, and large imbalances, to overlap in the types of
deviance specified in the the-
ory, to the theory's neglect of the fact that specific behaviors
are evaluated differently
by different individuals and groups of people (see Braithwaite,
1997; Jensen, 1999;
Savelsberg, 1999; for responses, see Tittle, 1997; 1999). Given
the newness of the the-
ory, we hope this debate will motivate criminologists to develop
useful strategies for
empirically testing the control balance perspective (see, for
example, Curry, 1999).
'.
Self-Control and Crime
We have already noted that one of the most consistent findings
in the research litera-
ture is that relationships between parents and children are
strongly associated with
delinquent and criminal behavior. Unfortunately, the precise

nature of this association
remains unclear. Family structure appears to be far less
important than emotional ties
between members of all types of families. Various child-rearing
methods, such as the
degree and form of discipline that parents use in responding to
their children's misbe-
havior, also seem to playa prominent role.
In their book, A General Theory of Crime, Michael Gottfredson
and Travis
Hirschi (1990) zero in on ineffective child rearing as the
primary cause of all types of
deviance, from smoking to victimization to unwanted pregnancy
to white-collar crime.
Most of the theories we have examined so far in this chapter
maintain that crime is
learned, but Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that crime is a
product of a lack of social-
ization or learning. They accept the classical assumption that
"crime is the natural con-
sequence of unrestrained human tendencies to seek pleasure and
avoid pain" (p. xiv).
Although they state that their theory also incorporates aspects
of modern positivism,
especially positivistic research on the role of the family in
crime causation, Gottfred-
son and Hirschi place themselves squarely in the tradition of the
classical school of
criminology and the rational-choice model.
To fully understand Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) position,
we must con-

sidEr their definition of crime. Crimes, they tell us, are "acts of
force or fraud under-
taken in pursuit of self-interest" (p. 15). According to
Gottfredson and Hirschi, all
crimes share certain common characteristics: They provide easy
and immediate grat-
ification of desires; they are exciting, risky, and thrilling; they
offer few, if any, l~:>ng-
term benefits; they require little skill, planning, or specialized
knowledge; and they
often cause pain or discomfort for the victims. What kind of
person, then; would
engage in such activities? According to Gottfredson and
Hirschi, it would be a person
with low self-control.
People who deviate-whether that deviation is drinking too much
or driving
recklessly, assaulting someone or embezzling from an
employer-lack self-control.
Compare Gottfredson and Hirschi's list of the characteristics of
crime presented pre-
viously with their list of the characteristics of people with low
self-control. People lack-
ing self-control: have a concrete "here and now" orientation and
have difficulty
deferring gratification; tend to lack diligence, tenacity, or
persistence in a course of
action; are adventuresome, active, and physical; tend to have
unstable marriages,
friendships, and employment histories, and are uninterested in
or unprepared for long-
term occupational pursuits; neither possess nor value cognitive
or academic skills, nor
do they necessarily have good manual skills; tend to be self-
centered, and indifferent or

insensitive to the needs of others. When individuals low in self-
control are presented
with opportunities to commit crimes, they more likely than not
will commit the crime.
Low self-control, as we have already implied, is a result of
ineffective or inade-
quate socialization. Gottfredson and Hirschi maintain that in
order for effective social-
ization to occur and, consequently, for strong self-control to
develop, someone who
cares about the child must be responsible for meeting three
basic conditions: (1) mon-
itoring the child's behavior; (2) recognizing when the child
deviates; and (3) punishing
the deviation. Since parents or guardians are typically a child's
first socializers, the two
theorists lay the blame for inadequate socialization with them.
It's not that parents or
guardians prefer their children to be unsocialized or to lack
self-control; Gottfredson
and Hirschi (1990) "rule out in advance the possibility of
positive socialization to unso-
cialized behavior (as cultural or subcultural deviance theories
suggest)" (p. 98). Rather,
1
I
161
162 C HAP T E R 5

certain factors may inhibit or prevent parents or guardians from
sufficiently socializing
their children:
First, the parents may not care for the child (in which case none
of the other conditions
would be met); second, the parents, even if they care, may not
have the time or energy
to monitor the child's behavior; third, the parents, even if they
care and monitor, may
not see anything wrong with the child's behavior; finally, even
if everything else is in
place, the parents may not have the inclination or the means to
punish the child. (Gott-
fredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 98)
Gottfredson and Hirschi cite in support of their position various
studies that
show, for example, that parents who are hostile or indifferent
toward their children are
more likely to have children who become delinquent. They
further point out that
crime appears to be concentrated in certain families not because
of heredity or explicit
parental encouragement, but because parents who are
themselves criminal-that is,
who themselves lack self-control-are not adept at instilling self-
control in their chil-
dren. These parents may not even recognize criminal behavior
in their children and
tend to be lax in discipline or to use punishments that are "easy,
short-term, and insen-
sitive" (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 101).
Ineffective socialization may be especially likely to occur in
families with large

numbers of children, in single-parent and stepparent families,
and in families in which
the mother works outside the home. In the first instance, parents
often do not have the
time or energy to adequately monitor and discipline their
children. The single parent
shares this problem, but it is compounded by the fact that the
single parent has less
psychological and social support than co-parents have. The
problem in stepfamilies is
that stepparents are less likely to have "parental feelings"
toward their stepchildren. In
households where the mother works outside the home, adequate
supervision is again
the concern.
Of course, it might be argued that if parents are inadequate
socializers, teachers
and school personnel can serve as substitutes, especially since
the school is a social
institution officially charged with socializing children.
Unfortunately, according to
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), "The evidence suggests ... that
in contemporary
American society the school has a difficult time teaching self-
control" (pp. 105-106).
They attribute this not to a lack of adequate educational
resources or to poorly paid
and often poorly trained teachers, but rather to a lack of
cooperation and support from
parents who have already failed in their socialization duties.
Although the school may
have some positive impact on some students, "self-control
differences seem primarily
attributable to family socialization practices. It is difficult for
subsequent institutions to

make up for de.ficiencies, but socialization is a task that, once
successfully accom-
plished, appears to be largely irreversible" (Gottfredson &
Hirschi, 1990, p. 107).
Does this mean then that if a child is not adequately socialized
by his or her par-
ents, all is lost, that he or she will be deviance-prone and there
is nothing anyone can
do to prevent or halt the behavior? What are the implications of
Gottfredson and
Hirschi's position for public policy? First it should be said that
Gottfredson and
Hirschi do not claim that crime is an inevitable outcome of low
self-control. While they
maintain that criminality is stable over time-that is, there is
little or no change among
163
1
f

r
I
f
individuals from high self-control to low self-control-they also
point out that social-
ization is ongoing throughout an individual's life. Consequently,
the number of

offenders or deviants declines as a cohort ages. "Even the most
active offenders burn
out with time, and the documented number of 'late-comers' to
crime, or 'good boys
gone bad,' is sufficiently small to suggest that they may be
accounted for in large part
by misidentification or measurement error'" (Gottfredson &
Hirschi, 1990, pp. 107-
108). A decrease in the number of crimes committed by people
with low self-control
occurs as they get older in large part because of the exigencies
of aging and, to a much
lesser extent, because of ongoing socialization.
In terms of public policy, Gottfredson and Hirschi eschew law
enforcement and
crime control programs that involve building more prisons,
employing more police, or
enacting gun control laws. Rather they argue that crime
prevention efforts should be
targeted at parents and other adults with responsibility for
raising children and should
concentrate on teaching them how to be alert to and recognize
signs of low self-control
and how to punish children when they display these signs. As
Gottfredson and Hirschi
(1990) put it:
We offer an alternative view, a view in which the state is
neither the cause nor the solu-
tion to crime. In our view, the origins of criminality or low self-
control are to be found
in the first six to eight years of life, during which time the child
remains under the con-
trol and supervision of the family or a familial institution. Apart
from the limited ben-

efits that can be achieved by making specific criminal acts more
difficult, policies
directed toward enhancement of the ability of familial
institutions to socialize children
are the only realistic long-term policies with potential for
substantial crime reduction.
(pp.272-273) .
Gottfredson and Hirschi's argument is a seductive one in a
society such as ours
that places a great deal of faith in the power of socialization to
bring about social
change. But to what extent has the theory been empirically
verified?
A General Theory of Crime or a Limited One?
Recall that Gottfredson and Hirschi maintain that theirs is a
general theory of crime,
capable of explaining all forms of deviation, not just criminal
offenses. All crimes are
pretty much the same, they tell us; crimes are spontaneous acts
that require no spe-
cialized knowledge and that yield short-term, simple
gratifications. Much of Part ill of
their book is devoted to reviewing research that supports their
claims (see also Hirschi
& Gottfredson, 2000; LeBlanc & Kaspy, 1998), and this is
where much of the criticism
of Gottfreds(~mand Hirschi's argument has centered. The most
frequent criticisms of
Gottfredson and Hirschi's work claim that they tailored the facts
of crime to fit their
theory and that they selectively overlooked abundant evidence
that does not support
their position (Geis, 2000).

Polk (1991), for instance, takes issue with their characterization
of homicide as
being of two basic varieties: (1) those that result from a heated
argument that goes too
far, involving two people who know one another and who have
argued frequently in
the past; and (2) those that occur during a robbery or, less often,
during a miscalculated
II
I1
Ii
164 CHAPTER 5
burglary in which the victim turns out to be home. According to
Polk's own extensive
research in this area, however, homicides are far more varied:
Many are carefully
planned or premeditated; others include "parents starving a
child to death in a belief
that fasting would cure the child's cold, young girls who cannot
face the reality of preg-
nancy and so the infant dies at birth from neglect," those who
kill because "voices" tell
them they must, and "criminals who kill a friend because of the
possibility that the
friend may give vital evidence against them in a forthcoming
trial" (polk, 1991, p. 577).
In fact, Polk's research leads him to conclude that there
probably is no "typical" homi-
cide. Some homicides are like those characterized as typical by

Gottfredson a.Q.d Hirschi
but, as Polk (1991) points out, "Gottfredson and Hirschi do not
offer us a general the-
ory of some crime, it is a general theory of crime. Ifthe actual
empirical nature of crime
is not as Gottfredson and Hirschi describe it, then the theory
must collapse" (p. 577).
Similar critiques have been made with respect to Gottfredson
and HirsdV's
analysis of white-collar crime. The two theorists focus on
white-collar crime because
they correctly note that positivistic theories have failed to
adequately explain it and that
many criminologists have come to see it as a unique form of
offending that is different
from other types of crimes. In contrast, they see white-collar
crime as relatively
uncommon in occurrence, but as conforming to the same age
and race distributions as
other crimes, and sharing other crimes' characteristics:
spontaneity, quickness, requir-
ing no specialized knowledge, yielding limited profits for
offenders. They rely on FBI
Crime Report data (see Appendix, pp. 243-245) to specify the
types and incidence of
offenses that constitute the category white-collar crime, and
thus focus on embezzle-
ment, fraud, and forgery.
There are several major wealu"1esses with such an analysis, not
the least of which
stems from their operationalization of white-collar crime. The
crimes they have cho-
sen do readily fit their definition of crime in general, but they
hardly encompass the

full array of offenses that constitute white-collar crime. In
particular, they overlook
organizational, corporate, and governmental offending. The
VCR data are biased
toward minor, low-level offenses, particularly because they
reflect arrests; simple
offenses are more likely to be detected and result in successful
prosecution, whereas
more sophisticated crimes are likely to be underrepresented in
the VCR. Such crimes
include terrorism for political goals, securities fraud, antitrust
violations of pollution
laws. Numerous studies show that these types of crimes are
complex, involve a high
level of technical detail, and are difficult to detect and
prosecute (Calavita & Pontell,
1983; Geis, 2000; Reed & Yeager, 1996). Reed and Yeager
(1996) further point out
that a number of sociolegal processes operate in such a way that
corporate offenses are
screened out of the criminal justice system. These include
interagency disagreements
and rivalries, qut especially the ability of powerful corporations
and governments to
influence the very definition of lawlessness and compliance.
One may also question Gottfredson and Hirschi's
characterization of white-
collar crime on at least six other major points, all of which
revolve around the inclusion
of corporate and business offenses in the definition of this type
of crime. First, is white-
collar crime really uncommon or as infrequent as these theorists
claim? Although it is
difficult at best to know for certain how many white-collar
offenses are committed each

r
I
165
year, given the difficulties with regard to detection raised
previously, some researchers
argue that such offenses are at least as common, and perhaps
more common, than con-
ventional street crime (Reed & Yeager, 1996).
Second, are white-collar offenses quick and spontaneous acts?
Again, available
evidence indicates that, to the contrary, some corporate offenses
are carefully planned
and executed over an extended period of time in the interests of
continued or future
viability of a single business or an entire industry. Long-term
price-fixing conspiracies
illustrate this point well. These offenses are usually motivated
by the rational pursuit
of corporate goals rather than by an impulsive pursuit of
immediate self-gratification
by an undersocialized individual (Reed & Yeager, 1996).
This raises a third issue: Do white-collar crimes typically yield
low profits for
offenders? If one examines only the offenses Gottfredson and
Hirschi consider to be
white-collar crimes, the answer is yes. In contrast, if one
includes corporate, business,
and government offenses, the answer is an unequivocal no.

Consider, for example, the
savings and loan fraud of the 1980s, which is expected to cost
taxpayers between $300
billion and $473 billion by 2021 (Calavita & Pontell, 1993).
Fourth, can anyone, without any specialized knowledge, commit
a white-collar
offense? The answer, of course, is that it depends. No
specialized knowledge is needed
to write a bad check or to take money out of a cash register.
However, it certainly can-
not be claimed that specialized knowledge is not required to
commit such crimes as
computer fraud or insider stock trading. It seems equally
unlikely that such white-
collar offenders are interchangeable in this sense with street
offenders-that is, that
"today's burglar is yesterday's insider trader and tomorrow's
rapist." Rather, such
white-collar offenders engage almost solely in financial crimes.
13 .
Fifth, are the age and race distributions of white-collar
offenders the same as the
age and race distributions of more conventional street
offenders? Polk (1991) points
out that if one uses Gottfredson and Hirschi's operational
definition of white-collar
crime, more Blacks are arrested for such offenses than Whites.
However, given the
underrepresentation of African Americans and other racial
minorities in the upper
echelons of corporate America, it is highly unlikely that they
are engaged in insider
trading, price fixing, military contract fraud, or similar crimes.
If newspaper photos

may be trusted, such offenders are invariably White. Moreover,
given the educational
and experiential requirements of their positions, it is also likely
that they are older than
conventional offenders (Steffensmeier, 1989).
Finally, in light of the characteristics of major white-collar
crimes and criminals
outlined here, would crime prevention programs aimed at
teaching parents and other
adults how to spot and punish low self-control in their children
be successful? One
wonders to what extent such programs would be effective in
preventing even most con-
ventional street crime. To support such a claim requires us to
discount the roles that
factors such as poverty, unemployment, homelessness, and
institutional discrimination
play in promoting criminal activity. As we will see in Chapter
6, available data do not
permit us to make such a quantum leap of faith.
Gottfredson and Hirschi (2000) .have responded to some of the
criticisms of
self-control theory and continue to cite studies that support it.
Nevertheless, even in
III
II
Ii
II
166 CHAPTER 5

studies that affirm the theory, the findings are modestly
supportive at best, explaining
just 3-11 percent of the variation in deviance and criminal
offending (Longshore,
1998). As Polk (1991) concludes, "too much crime falls outside
the boundaries of [Gott-
fredson and Hirschi's] definition for this general theory to be of
much use" (p. 579).
I
II
I!
I·
I I
I I
i
I
I
,i ,
I:I
II
Ii:
'Ii
I, I
Neutralization Theory
The theories we have discussed so far have highlighted
differences between criminals

and noncriminals, and delinquents and nondelinquents. A
different approach was pro-
posed by Gresham Sykes and David Matza (1957; Matza, 1964).
Sykes and Matza
pointed out that if traditional positivist theories of crime are
correct, some individuals
would be criminal all the time, whereas others would never
deviate. They observed,
however, that even the most active delinquents spend most of
their time in noncrimi-
nal pursuits (see also Brunson & Miller, 2001). They were
especially critical of the
notion of the delinquent subculture which, as we noted earlier,
depicts offenders as
having a value system at odds with that of the dominant culture.
Were this the case,
Sykes and Matza argue, delinquents would show no remorse for
their behavior and
would not view it as wrong. When detected and apprehended,
though, delinquents
typically exhibit guilt and shame over their behavior. Although
some skeptics might see
such expressions as an attempt to appease those in authority,
Sykes and Matza take
these youthful offenders at their word. 14
Instead of seeing delinquency as a rejection of societal norms,
Sykes and Matza
view it as the endproduct of a process they call neutralization.
To understand neutral-
ization, one must also understand the concept of drift.
According to Sykes and Matza,
adolescent behavior runs along a continuum, with total freedom
at one end and total
constraint at the other. Rather than locate themselves
consistently at one pole or the

other, adolescents vacillate between these two extremes. "The
delinquent transiently
exists in a limbo between convention and crime, responding in
turn to the demands of
each, flirting now with one, now the other, but postponing
commitment, evading deci-
sion. Thus, he [sic] drifts between criminal and conventional
action" (Matza, 1964, p.
28, author's emphasis). The drift into delinquency is facilitated
by learning justifica-
tions or rationalizations that neutralize the constraint of
society's norms of behavior
and thus legitimate deviation. Sykes and Matza called these
justifications or rational-
izations techniques of neutralization.
Sykes and Matza identified five basic types of techniques of
neutralization:
denial oj responsibility-The deviant disavows personal
responsibility for the
offense, claiming that it was not his or her fault. Barterers, for
example, fre-
quently deny responsibility for an abusive incident by claiming
they were drunk.
denial ofinjury-The deviant maintains that an offense didn't
really occur because
no one was harmed by his or her actions. Thus, individuals
arrested for illegal
gambling will sometimes maintain their innocence on the
ground that "nobody
gets hurt" from what they do.

167
denial ofvictim-By maintaining that their victims deserve what
happens to them,
offenders may also justify or legitimate their offending. A
defense attorney at a
recent rape trial, for instance, argued that his client should be
acquitted because
the woman he raped was dressed provocatively and, therefore,
"deserved it."
condemnation ofcondemners-An offender legitimates his or her
behavior by claim-
ing that his or her accusers, judges, or others in authority are
corrupt and, there-
fore, also guilty. For example, a child whose parent catches him
or her smoking
marijuana may argue, "Why shouldn't I smoke pot? You drink,
and everybody
lmows alcohol is worse for you than marijuana."
appeal to higher loyalties-In this case, the offender disavows
personal benefit or
gain from his or her behavior, claiming that he or she didn't do
it for themselves,
but for others. A fraternity member, for instance, was recently
apprehended
while breaking into a professor's office in whose class he was
not even enrolled.
During questioning, he admitted that he was planning to steal an
exam, but that
he was doing this not for his own benefit; but for "his brothers."
In considering these techniques of neutralization, two important
points must be

made. First, although many of the illustrations offered here are
after-the-fact justifica-
tions for misbehavior, Sykes and Matza maintain that
techniques of neutralization
occur prior to the commission of a deviant act. They serve to
motivate or facilitate devi-
ation by loosening moral constraints on individuals. Second, we
can see here a close
resemblance between techniques of neutralization and what is
defined in law as miti-
gating circumstances (including self-defense, accident, and
insanity). This is no comci-
dence. Because delinquents understand and (usually) adhere to
the society's normative
value system, they also understand and concur with the law,
which allows for extenu-
ating circumstances that negate an offense. Although they agree
that people should be
held responsible for their actions, they also know that there are
conditions under which
infractions are excusable and sometimes even permissible.
Techniques of neutraliza-
tion are expansions and distortions of the same conditions that
excuSe the accused in
law (Matza, 1964).
Once the restraints of social norms are temporarily neutralized,
individuals are
free to drift into delinquency. They may, of course, be diverted,
but because they now
feel they have no control over their circumstances, that what
lies ahead is destiny, they
are motivated to act or to make something happen. It is this
sense of desperation that
provides the will to commit new infractions. "The will to repeat
old infractions requires

nothing very dramatic or forceful. Once the bind of the law has
been neutralized and
the delinqueIt put into drift, all that seems necessary to provide
the will to repeat old
infractions is preparation" (Matza, 1964, p. 184, emphasis
added).
Before moving to an assessment of neutralization theory, one
final question
needs to be addressed. As Sykes and Matza pointed out, "This
approach to delin-
quency centers its attention on how an impetus to engage in
delinquent behavior is
translated into action. But it leaves unanswered a serious
question: What makes delin-
quency attractive in the first place?" (Matza & Sykes, 1961, p.
712). Their emphasis
on the similarity between delinquent values and the values of
the dominant culture
j ,
I I
I I
jl
I'
II .:
I ;, '
I
'll!
: I"

II·
I
I
168 CHAPTER 5
informs their response. According to Sykes and Matza,
coexisting with the explicit or
official values of society are a set of subterranean values-
"values, that is to say, which
are in conflict with other deeply held values but which are still
recognized and
accepted by many" (Matza & Sykes, 1961, p. 716). These are
not the conflicting val-
ues of two opposing groups, but rather they exist within a single
individual. Subter-
ranean values include the element of adventure (displays of
daring and the search for
excitement and thrills), the desire for a "soft" job where one
earns money as quickly
and painlessly as possible, the pursuit of conspicuous
consumption, and an acceptance
of aggression and violence (the ability to "take it and hand it
out," to defend one's
rights and one's reputation with force, and "to prove one's
manhood with hardness
and physical courage").
Sykes and Matza maintain, then, that these subterranean values
are widely held
in U.S. society, but that their manifestations are usually
confined to certain circum-
stances deemed "appropriate" or "proper" (such as sporting
events, conventions, or
"the big night on the town"). Delinquent youth conform to these

values, and fre-
quently accentuate them. Trouble often arises not only because
of this accentuation,
but also because young people are notoriously poor judges of
appropriate times and
situations.
In short, we are arguing that the delinquent may not stand as an
alien in the body of
society, but may represent instead a disturbing reflection or a
caricature. His [sic]
vocabulary is different to be sure, but kick, big-time spending,
and rep have immediate
counterparts in the value system of the law-abiding. (Sykes &
MatL;a, 1961, p. 717)
1
I, I
,
i I :
I
I ,
! I,
I .
I ,
I I
I II
..II it
Evaluating Neutralization Theory
The validity of neutralization theory has been challenged by a

number of criminolo-
gists working from various perspectives. One question that has
been raised, for exam-
ple, is if delinquents and nondelinquents are no different, can
variations in delinquency
rates among youths be attributable only to some individuals'
greater capability to neu-
tralize or to the fact that they just frequently happen to be in
situations or with people
who promote the will to deviate? How does one explain
persistent serious offending
and youths who grow up to pursue criminal careers as adults?
Sykes and Matza acknowledge the problem of the "hardcore"
delinquent and the
persistent offender, but they maintain that their numbers are
small and that it may be
necessary to explain their behavior in other ways (such as social
and personal isolation).
Most young people are pretty conventional and most "age out"
of delinquency. They
come to learn the appropriate times and places to pursue
subterranean values and, as
they grow older and acquire greater responsibilities and lose a
good deal of leisure
time, offending is harder to justify. To some critics, though, this
response is unsatis-
factory since it appears to undermine the theory: The theorists
are distinguishing types
of delinquents when their goal is to show that there is really no
difference between
delinquents and nondelinquents (see, for example, Taylor et aI.,
1973).

169
Research on the process of neutralization has produced
inconsistent findings,
although it must also be noted that many of these studies have
serious methodological
problems, such as the use of small, unrepresentative samples
(see, for example, Ball,
1966; Hindeglang, 1970; Minor, 1980, 1981; Regoli & Poole,
1978; see also the
Appendix). Hamlin (1988) has persuasively argued that the
do not precede deviant behavior, but rather follow it. According
to Hamlin:
Motives are utilized and changed in the process of legitimating
social action and have
very little to do with the actual cause of the action. We generate
motive in response to a
"question situation" and, through our (read: white, Western,
male) perceived progres-
sive linear time, logically put the motive prior to the action.
This prior sequencing is a
fallacy. Motives are a product of social action. It is not until
after a social action, or more
precisely, not until action needs to be legitimized, that motives
are produced. (p. 431)
Hamlin's critique raises questions not only about the process of
neutralization,
but also about techniques of neutralization themselves. Some
critics point out that
one weakness in neutralization theory is the implicit idea that
all techniques are equal;
they all neutralize the bind of social norms in the same way.

Some techniques, how-
ever, do not just extend conventional morality, but rather
challenge it. An example
will make the point clearer: "A homosexual who says he cannot
help being a homo-
sexual because he is sick is very different from a homosexual
who denies the fact of
harm to the victim, who declares 'gay is good' and that his
partner agrees" (Taylor et
al., 1973, p. 184).
Of course, that various techniques of neutralization may be
valued differentlyby
different individuals or social groups at different times and in
different circumstances
does not negate the importance of Sykes and Matza's work in
identifying the existence
of these techniques in the first place. There is evidence, in fact,
that techniques of neu-
tralization may be more widely used than Sykes and Matza first
proposed and that their
typology of techniques should be expanded. Coleman (1987),
for example, found six
techniques of neutralization that are commonly used by white-
collar offenders, and he
notes that most white-collar employees report that their
workplace culture is imbued
with a set of expectations that encourage unethical and even
criminal business prac-
tices. Hagan and his colleagues (1998) believe that these
grow directly out of the cultural value placed on individualized
competition for mate-
rial success-or what they call hierarchic self-interest-that is
inherent in market soci-
eties. In fact, they hypothesize that societies experiencing rapid

economic change to a
capitalist market economy are especially likely to feel the
effects of hierarchic self-
interest expre~sed through techniques of neutralization that
encourage criminal and
delinquent behavior. Hagan et al.'s (1998) research in Germany
supports this argu-
ment. Box 5.2 looks at another possible site for testing their
hypothesis.
Box 5.2 is also important because it highlights the gendered
nature of crime and
deviance. Like most traditional criminological theories, Sykes
and Matza's neutraliza-
tion theory was developed through research that included only
males. Few tests of the
theory have looked at female offending (for an exception, see
Ball, 1977). However,
170 CHAPTER 5
given research indicating that females may use a different
vocabulary of motives than
males (Gilligan, 1982), studies designed to test the accuracy and
pervasiveness of neu-
tralization theory must include women and girls. IS
While the parents' motive for selling their
children is arguably understandable on some
level, how do most customers rationalize their
behavior? One rationalization offered by many
customers is that they are helping the children
(denial-of injury). They argue that they are pro-
viding them with much-needed money for their

families and preventing them from having to
work at even more dangerous or menial occupa-
tions. The customers also often rationalize that
children from impoverished countries become
sexually active at earlier ages anyway.
Another motivation of customers seeking
out young children is the belief that child pros-
titutes are less likely than adult prostitutes to be
infected with HN, the virus that causes AIDS
(Sherry et al., 1995). According to international
health experts, AIDS is spreading rapidly among
prostitutes in many countries, especially in Asia.
It is also spreading from country to country
because of international trafficking in prostitutes
and because of travelers who contract the dis-
ease abroad and bring it home with them. Pros-
titutes report that few of their customers wear
condoms, and the younger the prostitute, the
more powerless she is to insist that a condom be
worn. However, rationalizations for crime and
deviance are often not grounded in fact. Accord-
ing to health experts, child prostitutes are at
g;reatest risk of contracting HN because of their
age. A child's vagina or anus is more easily torn
from intercourse, causing open cuts, sores, and
bleeding that facilitate HIV transmission (Lim,
1998). In fact, health experts expect the inci-
dence of AIDS in Asia as well as Latin America
to continue to rise, with children making up an
increasing percentage of those who become
infected and eventually die from the disease.
HOW THE WORLD SEES IT
Sex Tourism

BOX 5.2
According to children's rights advocates, an
increasing number of children in countries such
as Brazil, the Philippines, and Cambodia are
being kidnapped and forced into prostitution or
sold to pimps by their parents, most of whom
are desperate for income. The children may be
locked in the brothels if they are considered
likely to try to escape, but usually such measures
are unnecessary; beatings and threats are usually
enough to convince the children to stay (Lim,
1998). Accurate estimates of the number of child
prostitutes are difficult to come by, with some
experts setting the lower limit in the tens of
thousands and others saying it is at least one mil-
lion (Lim, 1998). The children involved, the vast
majority of whom are girls, are as young as six
and as old as fifteen (the age of consent in most
. countries is sixteen) (Goering, 1996; Kristof,
1996; Sherry et al., 1995).
Who are the customers of these child
prostitutes? Some are local men, neighbors of
the children, to whom the children are "rented
out" by their parents. Parents often rationalize
their behavior by appealing to higher loyalties:
Selling their children's bodies provides desper-
ately needed income for the entire family. Even
greater financial gains can be had, however, if
the children are sold to foreign businessmen and
tourists. Some of these men are individual trav-
elers, but others travel on organized sex tours.
The tours, which first began in Japan, are now
sold in countries such' as Great Britain, South

Korea, and Taiwan. If a child is a virgin, the fee
may be as much as $500, but immediately fol-
lowing the loss of her virginity, a young girl may
be hired for anywhere from $2 to $10, depend-
ing on her age and experience (Kristof, 1996;
Lim, 1998; Sherry et al., 1995).
Ii
II,,.
I
I I
I I
Self-Esteem and Crime
171
It is a widely accepted belief that how we behave depends, in
large part, on whether we
think positively or negatively about ourselves. Ifwe are self-
confident and feel capable
and in control of our lives-that is, if we have high self-esteem-
we will probably
behave responsibly and treat others respectfully. Conversely, if
we see ourselves as
losers or as failures-that is, if we have low self-esteem-we are
likely to become with-
drawn or to do something to try to pick ourselves up, if only for
a short time; we may
even engage in some form of self-destructive behavior.

Moreover, most of us also
know the kinds of experiences that lower self-esteem: "constant
failures and a constant
bombardment with the message that one does not count as a
person or with others"
(Smelser, 1989, p. 7).
Given the intuitive appeal of these ideas, it is not surprising that
several social sci-
entists have postulated a causal relationship between self-
esteem and criminal behav-
ior, and numerous crime prevention and rehabilitation programs
are premised on the
notion that deviance is a direct outgrowth of the devalued or
disvalued self (pollack,
1998). However, it is Howard B. Kaplan's (1975, 1980)
formulation that is considered
by many criminologists to be the most comprehensive and most
widely tested theoret-
ical statement of the self-esteem model of crime and
delinquency, and so we will con-
centrate primarily on Kaplan's work in this section.
Kaplan begins with the fundamental sociological obserVation
that we develop our
sense of self through interaction with others in the groups to
which we belong (our
family, our peers). We learn to place a particular value on
ourselves as persons and on
our-behavior through others' reactions to us. Over time, these
others need not even be
present; we internalize their responses so that our mere
imagination of them influences
our self-concepts, or "self-attitudes" as Kaplan puts it.
According to Kaplan (1975),
"persons who in the course of their group experiences have

developed relatively nega-
tive self-attitudes are significantly more likely to adopt deviant
response patterns in a
specified future period than persons who in the course of their
group experiences have
developed relatively positive self-attitudes" (p. 51). For
individuals with low self-
esteem, crime and delinquency may come to be viewed as self-
enhancing opportuni-
ties. This is not to say that all individuals with low self-esteem
will commit crimes;
rather, their low self-esteem predisposes them toward deviant
activity. "Whether
deviant behavior is adopted and which type is chosen depend on
circumstances-what
kinds of deviant activity are visible and available, the perceived
attractiveness of these
opportunities, and so on. Whether the involvement is continued
... depends in turn
on the extent to which deviant activity is in fact felt to be self-
enhancing or self-
derogating" (Scheff et al., 1989, p. 171).
It is disappointing to report that, despite its widespread intuitive
support-
indeed, Wells (1989) argues that the idea of a causal link
between self-esteem and
crime is so well accepted that it seems a "truism"-the empirical
support for Kaplan's
theory has been weak and often contradictory. Kaplan's (1980)
own test of the the-
ory-a longitudinal survey of more than 3,000 seventh-grade
male and female students
who were questioned each year for three years-initially yielded
supportive findings.
In this study, those adolescents with initially low levels of self-

esteem, as well as those
I I,.
I, I:
11
11.:....! I",
III,':
II'i
I I .. 'I
11,1
172 CHAPTER 5
who subsequently experienced increases in self-rejecting
attitudes, were more likely
than the other adolescents surveyed to later engage in deviant
activity. Additional lon-
gitudinal tests of other data by other researchers, however,
failed to confirm the self-
enhancing effects of delinquent behavior and showed negligible
or nonexistent direct
effects of self-esteem on deviance (see, for example, BYllller et
al., 1981; McCarthy &
Roge, 1984; Wells & Rankin, 1983).
In subsequent analyses, Kaplan and colleagues (1986, 1987)
respecified some of
the variables and elaborated the self-enhancement model to take
into account addi-
tional factors, such as "early involvement in deviant activities"

(reported during the
first round of questioning) and "deviant peer associations" (as
reported during the sec-
ond round of questioning). These studies, as well as those of
others, have shown that
the relationship between self-esteem and deviance may be more
complex than Kaplan's
theory originally conveyed. In some of the research, low self-
esteem had both a posi-
tive and a negative effect on subsequent deviance. Individuals
with pathologically low
levels of self-esteem seem to experience self-enhancement
through deviant activity.
Others, whose self-esteem levels are within the normal range of
low-high variation,
experience lowered feelings of efficacy as a result of their
deviation which, in turn,
increases their need to conform and inhibits future deviance.
Paradoxically, however,
some studies also show that individuals with exceptionally high
levels of self-esteem
may experience self-enhancement through deviance-a finding
that cannot be
explained by Kaplan's theory since it says nothing about
motivational dynamics at the
extreme upper-end of the self-esteem continuum (Evans et aI.,
1991; Pollack, 1998;
Wells, 1989). Pollack (1998), for example, reports that female
inmates whom she inter-
viewed explained their offending in terms of high self-esteem.
As one woman told,the
interviewer, "I love myself, that's why I did this. I wanted
money, that's why I did this"
(quoted in Pollack, 1998, p. 5, author's emphasis).
Pollack (1998) points out another serious weakness in self-

esteem theory: Focus-
ing on low self-esteem as the cause of crime individualizes the
crime problem and
decontextualizes offenders from the social, political, and
economic constraints they
face in their everyday lives. Offending becomes a psychological
problem, while oppres-
sion in the form of classism, racism, and sexism are ignored as
contributing factors.
"[T]he problem, and the solution to the problem, lie within the
individual" (pollack,
1998, p. 3).
We will return to the question of how oppression contributes to
crime in the next
chapter. Now, however, we will take another look at the
relationship between low self-
esteem and crime. Individuals may engage in a deviant act for
any number of reasons,
but if their deviance is detected and elicits a negative reaction,
they may internalize the
stigma, develop a negative self-concept, and engage in future
deviation because they
have come to see themselves as deviants. This idea is one of the
central tenets of the
final theoretical perspective we will discuss in this chapter,
labeling theory.
Crime and Stigma: The Labeling Perspective
Labeling theory, or social reaction theory as it is sometimes
called, was developed in rebel-
lion against the dominance of the positivist paradigm in
criminology. At the same

r Sociological Theories of Crime II: Crime and Social Processes
173
time, however, although one of its goals was to assert the
rational element of deviation,
it also would be inappropriate to consider it a descendant of the
classical school. Label-
ing theory does not fall within the boundaries of the Marxist
paradigm either, but it is
perhaps best to characterize it, as some observers have, as a
bridge or link to the radi-
cal criminological theories we will examine in the next chapter
(Martin et al., 1990).16
Labeling theory constituted a bold new approach to explaining
crime. It gained
popularity understandably during a period of sweeping social
change-the 1960s and
1970s-when questioning authority and the status quo was
widespread (see Chapter 1).
Whereas most criminological theories focused on criminal
behavior, labeling theorists
struck out in a new direction; their emphasis was on how certain
behaviors come to be
defined as criminal and the consequences of these definitions
for individuals found to
be engaging in such activities. To understand their approach
more clearly, let's begin
with a discussion of labeling theorists' views of crime itself.
The Relativity of Crime
Up to this point, the theories we have discussed have held an
absolutist view of crime;
that is, crime is behavior that violates a law, an agreed-upon
rule. From this perspec-

tive, there are some behaviors whose characteristics inherently
make them criminal;
rape and homicide are two frequently cited examples. If one
accepts this position, then
the logical course of action is to identify those who break the
law and try to discover
what it is about them (biological and psychological theories) or
about their environ-
ments, life conditions, or circumstances (sociological theories)
that would lead them to
commit crimes.
In contrast, labeling theorists see crime from a relativist point
of view. An act
becomes criminal or deviant only when it is defined as such by
a group of observers. As
Howard Becker (1973) put it in a much-quoted passage from his
book, Outsiders:
[S]ocial groups create deviance by making the rules whose
infraction constitutes deviance, and by
applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as
outsiders. From this
point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person
commits, but rather a con-
sequence of the application by others of rules or sanctions to an
"offender." The deviant
is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant
behavior is behavior
that people so label. (p. 9; author's emphasis)
There are several aspects of this view of crime that deserve to
be highlighted.
First, labeling theorists are pointing out that what is defined as
criminal or deviant
depends on a number of factors, including the situational and

historical contexts in
which the behavior occurs, the characteristics of the individual
engaged in the behav-
ior, and the cnaracteristics of the definers. Say, for example,
someone sees your lips
moving as if you are having a conversation, but there is no one
visibly present to whom
you could be speaking. The observer asks you what you are
doing, and you reply that
you are talking to God. Ifyou are in a church, synagogue, or
other official place of wor-
ship, such a response probably would not be considered deviant.
If, however, you are
at the neighborhood deli eating lunch, it might be viewed at
least as unusual or odd.
Similarly, many behaviors formerly against the law are now
legal and vice versa. In the
nineteenth century, for instance, there were state and local laws
that prohibited women
I,
I
I
j",I
l
I
ii,
174 CHAPTER 5
from phoning men for dates, undressing in front of a photograph

of a man, and appear-
ing on a public highway wearing a bathing suit (unless they
were accompanied by at
least two officers or anned with clubs). Surely, today we would
consider these laws, not
the behaviors they prohibit, deviant.
The characteristics of the actors and definers are also
significant. Labeling theo-
rists are quick to point to the preoccupation among
criminologists and law enforce-
ment agents with street crimes, while overlooking or
downplaying most forms of
high-level white-collar crime, including corporate and
governmental deviance. There
are, of course, significant differences, including racial and
social class differences,
between street offenders and corporate rulebreakers. The
relative powerlessness of the
former makes it highly likely that they will be apprehended and
processed through the
criminal justice system, while the status of the latter allows
them to escape being iden-
tified and labeled criminal (Becker, 1970). Some groups-what
Becker (1973) refers to
as moral entrepreneurs-are also better able to get their interests
represented in law,
thus ensuring that certain behaviors (read: not their own) get
defined as criminal, while
others do not.
This brings us to a second major point of labeling theory's view
of crime: It sees
crime as the product of social interaction. What is crucial is not
that an individual vio-
lates a rule or a law, but rather that others respond to that

individual's behavior, label-
ing him or her a criminal or deviant. This may be done
informally, but of greater
significance to labeling theorists is when this process takes
place in what they refer to
as public status dep;radation ceremonies, such as court hearings
or trials (Garfinkel, 1965).
With the label attached, the individual undergoes a fundamental
change in identity.
Indeed, the labels criminal and deviant constitute a master
status-a status that takes
precedence over all other statuses or characteristics of the
individual. Others, who
have deeply ingrained, proconceived ideas of what a criminal is
like-untrustworthy,
unpredictable, sinister-begin to structure their interactions with
the labeled individ-
ual on the basis of these stereotypes (for example, they stop
doing business or socializ-
ing with him or her). They may even redefine past behavior on
the part of this
individual so that it conforms to stereotypes attached to the
deviant label (for example,
the routine hug upon greeting an old friend is seen in a new
light after the friend comes
out as gay or lesbian).
If we imagine for a moment what such experiences may be like
for the labeled
person, it is not difficult to understand that eventually he or she
may come to accept
the label and begin to alter his or her behavior to confonn to it
(Crocker et al., 1998).
What occurs is a self-fulfilling prophecy: expectations about
how the individual will
behave are fulfilled, not so much because the person is truly

"bad" or "abnonnal," but
because both the person and others have come to believe he or
she is "bad" or "abnor-
mal" and they act accordingly.16
In short, labeling theorists see social reaction as the key
element in crime and
deviance causation. As Edwin Lemert (1967), whose work is
part of the foundation of
labeling theory, put it:
This is a large turn away from older sociology which tended to
rest heavily upon the
idea that deviance leads to social control. I have come to
believe that the reverse idea,
r Sociological Theories of Crime IT: Crime and Social
Processes 175
i.e., that social control leads to deviance, is equally tenable and
the potentially richer
premise for studying deviance in modern society. (p. v)
Lemert's controversial statements raise the issue of the
consequences of social reaction
for the labeled individual, a point that we have already touched
upon, but which war-
rants closer consideration.
Social Reaction and Conunitment to a Deviant Career
A useful way of understanding labeling theory's view of the
impact of social reaction on
the labeled individual is to consider Lemert's (1951) distinction
between primary devi-

ation and secondary deviation. Primary deviation is simply rule
breaking. An individ-
ual may engage in primary deviation for any number of reasons
that may be social,
economic, or political. He or she may be acting on a hedonistic
impulse or out of des-
perate need for money to buy food or to satisfy a drug habit.
Whatever the specific
causal factors that give rise to it, primary deviation is of little
concern to labeling the-
orists unless it is detected and elicits a reaction.
Secondary deviation is deviation that results from societal
reaction. As we noted
previously, when an individual's deviation elicits, in particular,
a formal, public reac-
tion, the reaction process can lead to a total reorientation of the
individual's self-
perceptions. As Cohen (1966) wrote:
The label-the name of the role-does more than signify one who
has committed
such-and-such a deviant act. Each label evokes a characteristic
imagery. It suggests
someone who is normally or habitually given to certain kinds of
deviance; who may be
expected to behave in this way; who is literally a bundle of
odious or sinister qualities.
It activates sentiments and calls out responses in others:
rejection, contempt, suspicion,
withdrawal, fear, hatred. (p. 24, author's emphasis)
In other words, others' reactions may close off legitimate or
nondeviant opportunities
and interactions for the labeled individual. The alcoholic, for
example, may not be

invited to parties or to friends' homes anymore, thus adding to
his or her isolation. The
ex-convict may face tremendous difficulty in getting a good-
paying job.
This closing off of legitimate opportunities and interactions,
coupled with the
destruction of one's public image and character, may leave the
labeled individual with
little choice but to seek out deviant associations and to pursue
deviant or criminal
opportunities. The reaction process, then, may cause the
resocialization of the labeled
individual toward acceptance of and conformity to the role
attached to the deviant
label. That is: the labeled individual becomes committed to a
deviant identity and
embarks on a deviant career. This secondary deviation is
essentially a defensive and
adaptive strategy on the part of the labeled individual; it is an
effort to survive and "a
means of sustaining a 'social self' in the face of exclusion and
stigmatization" (Taylor
etal., 1973,p.151;seealsoLemert, 1951).
The relationship between primary and secondary deviation is
represented sche-
matically in Figure 5.1. Notice here that typically primary
deviation goes undetected
"I
176 CHAPTER 5

(a) primary deviation ----'~~ no social reaction ~ no secondary
deviation
(b) primary deviation ~ mild social reaction ~ no secondary
deviation
(c) primary deviation ~ strong and/or public social reaction -+-
secondary deviation
(d) primary deviation X. secondary deviation
FIGURE 5.1 The Relationship between Primary Deviation and
Secondary Deviation
iI ~
!
I'
"
Ii.
I·.
(a). Even if it is detected, the response may be mild or rather
limited, leading to no fur-
ther deviation (b). The more dramatic the response, though, the
more likely that sec-
ondary deviation will be the outcome (c). However, there can be
no secondary deviation
without social reaction (d).
It is not difficult to see why the labeling perspective ignited a
fierce debate among
criminologists and polieymakers alike. Let's examine first some

of the empirical
research that has attempted to test the basic tenets of the theory,
and then move on to
consider the policy implications of this perspective.
The Empirical Validity of Labeling Theory
The majority of the research on labeling theory has focused on
the phenomenon of
secondary deviation and the extent to which the social reaction
process affects or alters
the labeled individual's self-concept and behavior. Much of the
early criticism of the
perspective focused on its determinism. A5 Akers (1962)
expressed it, "One sometimes
gets the impression from reading this literature that people go
about minding their
own business, and then-'wham'-bad society comes along and
slaps them with a stig-
matized label" (p. 465). To such a critique, Becker (1973) has
replied:
[T]he act oflabelling [sic], as carried out by moral
entrepreneurs, while important, can-
not possibly be conceived as the sole explanation of what
alleged deviants actually do.
It would be foolish to propose that stick-up men stick people up
simply because some-
one has labelled them stick-up men, or that everything a
homosexual does results from
someone having called him [sic] homosexual. Nevertheless, one
of the most important
contributions of this approach has been to focus attention on the
way labelling places
the actor in circumstances which make it harder for him to
continue the normal rou-

tines of everyday life and thus provoke him [sic] to "abnormal"
actions ... The degree
to which labelling has such effects is, however, an empirical
one, to be settled by
research into specific cases rather than by theoretical fiat. (p.
179)
'.
The question remains, then, has the notion of secondary
deviation been empirically
verified?
The answer to this question is largely no. For one thing, many
studies have failed
to show that being labeled criminal or delinquent leads to a
negative self-image on the
part of those so labeled (Evans et a1., 1991; Martin, 1985;
Shoemaker, 1984). At best,
researchers have found only weak support for a relationship
between labels and sec-
177
ondary deviance (Gold, 1970; Gold & Williams, 1969;
McEachern, 1968, Smith &
Paternoster, 1990). A number of researchers have even reported
that informal labels,
imposed early in one's life, especially by parents, have a far
greater impact on individ-
uals' self-concepts than formal public "degradation ceremonies"
that may not occur
until adolescence (paternoster & Triplett, 1988).

A second difficulty with this perspective highlighted by the
research is that label-
ing theorists depict individuals as being rather passive during
the labeling process,
when, in fact, the imposition of a deviant label is often
strenuously resisted by those
being labeled. Moreover, there is evidence that deviant labels
are not indelible. Indi-
viduals can, and often do, overcome stigma (prus, 1975; Rogers
& Buffalo, 1974).
Third, in some cases, the deviant label is valued and even
sought after. Akers
(1968) uses the example of gang members whose deviant
identityis formed before they
are ever officially labeled. We might also consider political
terrorists and rebels, who
adopt a deviant identity to set themselves apart from the
authorities they challenge.
The process of officially being labeled deviant by these
authorities is often to them a
-symbol of accomplishment. Mankoff (1971), in particular, has
argued that one of the
most significant weaknesses of labeling theory is its failure to
recognize that individu-
als may choose to embark on a criminal or deviant career
without ever having experi-
enced social reaction to their behavior.
Among the other criticisms that have been leveled against
labeling theory are
those that have to do with its position on who is most likely to
get labeled deviant or
criminal. Siegel (1992), for example, argues that while labeling
theory leads us to

believe that it is the poor and powerless who are most likely to
get (unfairly) labeled
deviant or criminal, the justice system is not consistently unfair
and biased against the
poor or in favor of the rich. However, Taylor, Walton, and
Young (1973) are critical
of labeling theory because of its failure to more fully examine
"the way in which
deviance and criminality are shaped by society's larger structure
of power and institu-
tions" (p. 169).
This disagreement forms the core of a debate that we will take
up again in Chap-
ter 6. To conclude the present chapter, however, we will
examine the policy implica-
tions of the labeling perspective. It is in this area that some of
the strongest criticisms
of the theory have been centered.
What Is to Be Done?
Labeling theorists' response to the question that serves as the
title of this section would
undoubtedly be "nothing," or at most, "very little." Keeping in
mind that labeling the-
ory sees deviance as being amplified and promoted by labeling
and that processing
through the ctiminal justice system, as one of the strongest and
most public social reac-
tions, generates secondary or career deviance, it is no wonder
that labeling theorists
argue, as Wright (1991) puts it, that less is best when it comes
to punishing offenders.
Labeling theorists favor, for example, the legalization of
"victimless crimes," such as

prostitution and drug offenses, pointing out that such laws are
incredibly difficult to
enforce and, rather than reducing crime, simply engender
greater deviation (including
bribery and police corruption; public disrespect for the law,
given widespread demand
1
:,1.
1
'j
!
,",
: .j"
,
I
I
'II.
11 ,',
I !:
II
" ', "
178 CHAPTER 5
for particular illegal goods and services; and secondary
offending, such as when a drug

addict takes to stealing to support his or her habit) (see, for
example, Schur, 1965).
However, the most hotly debated policy recommendation of the
labeling theo-
rists is noninteroention. This position was promoted most
strongly by Edwin Schur
(1973) in his discussion of the treatment of juvenile offenders.
He argued that the state
should legalize many acts currently considered delinquent and
ignore most others.
Only the most serious infractions should reach the attention of
the courts, but in any
event, even these offenders should not be committed to
correctional facilities. Indeed,
Schur advocates abolishing juvenile correctional institutions
and replacing them with
noninstitutional programs that are largely voluntary. In Schur's
(1973) own words, the
tenet that should guide polieymakers and those working in the
juvenile justice system
is "leave kids alone wherever possible" (p. 155).
We have already reviewed a considerable amount of research
that shows that
support for the proposition that labeling causes secondary
deviation is rather weak
and inconsistent. In addition, there is a body of evidence that
indicates that offenders
who are formally processed through the criminal justice system
are actually less likely
to recidivate than those who are treated informally or who are
simply ignored
(Wright, 1991).
Wright (1991) also makes the point that social reaction in the

form of official
processing serves two important crime-reduction purposes: (1)
incapacitation-if
offenders are incarcerated in correctional facilities they Carlnot
engage in secondary
deviant activities; and (2) general deterrence-although some
offenders may be "hard-
ened"by labeling and incarceration, others in the society at large
may see through their
example that "crime doesn't pay" and be inhibited from
offending. Although there is
ample data that call into question the effectiveness of both the
incapacitation and
deterrence functions of imprisonment, Wright's critical
assessment of nonintervention
policies that have been implemented gives one reason to pause
and carefully reconsider
the wisdom and long-term efficacy of such an approach. Thus,
even if social reaction
produces some secondary deviation, the question arises as to
whether it may actually
reduce crime more than it creates it.
More recently, some researchers have tried to identify those
conditions under
which social reaction may be beneficial to offenders. Australian
criminologist John
Braithwaite (1989) argues, for example, that the key to
beneficial social reaction lies in
the process of shaming. Braithwaite (1989) defines shaming as
social disapproval with
the "intention or effect of invoking remorse in the person being
shamed and/or con-
demnation by others who become aware of the shaming" (p.
100). According to Braith-
waite, "Societies with low crime rates are those that shame

potently and judiously" (p.
1). What about labeling theorists' contentions that shaming-or,
as they would put it,
stigmatizatioh-pushes offenders into criminal or deviant
subcultures and launches
them on a criminal or deviant career? In response, Braithwaite
makes a distinction
between disintegrative and reintegrative shaming.
Disintegrative shaming is counterproductive and may lead to
further criminality
because it separates offenders from the community and treats
them as outcasts. In
such cases, "punishment erects barriers between the offender
and the punisher through
transforming the relationship into one of power assertion and
injury" (Braithwaite,
r Sociological Theories of Crime II: Crime and Social Processes
179
1989, p. 73). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that
offenders who experience
disintegrative shaming are highly likely to recidivate and to
become members of crim-
inal or deviant subcultures, since within these groups they at
least receive some social
support and self-validation.
In contrast, reintegrative shaming is first of all an expression of
disappointment in
the individual who has done wrong. Rather than treating the
offender as a "bad per-
son," reiIltegrative shaming actually reaffirms the offender's
morality; the disappoint-

ment stems from the fact that a "good person" would do
something wrong.
"Reintegrative shaming means that expressions of community
disapproval, which may
range from mild rebuke to degradation ceremonies, are followed
by gestures of reac-
ceptance into the community of law-abiding citizens"
(Braithwaite, 1989, p. 55).
Importantly, the offender is encouraged to assume the role of
repentant.
Braithwaite maintains that reintegrative shaming is most likely
to be found in
societies characterized by a strong sense of community and a
high level of interdepen-
dency among its members. Braithwaite believes that
contemporary Japanese society fits
this description, although he recognizes that Japanese culture.
and traditions cannot
simply be transposed onto other societies. However, among
Braithwaite's policy rec-
ommendations for all societies are an increased use of informal
institutions of social
control that can best employ techniques of reintegrative
shaming; the integration of
the repentant role (similar to that used at Alcoholics
Anonymous and other twelve-step
programs) into rehabilitation programs; and more media
coverage not only of wrong-
doing by individuals and corporations, but also of corporate and
individual offenders
who can be held up as models of reform following their
wrongdoing.
Braithwaite's idea of reintegrative shaming understandably has
drawn consider-

able attention from criminologists (see, for example, Hay, 1998;
see also Chapter 6).
Undoubtedly, it will be the subject of debate and the focus of
extensive research in the
years to come, much the same way labeling theory was during
the 1960s and 1970s.
Summary and Conclusion
The focus of this chapter has been on theories that emphasize
the role of learning or
socialization in the etiology of crime. Using only the length of
the chapter as a gauge,
it is easy to perceive the popularity of this approach
Nevertheless, we have seen that
there is tremendous diversity among the many perspectives that
may be considered
learning theories of crime.
The commonalities of the theories, and the intuitive appeal of
many of them,
have led some criminologists to develop integrative
perspectives that combine elements
of two or more ofthe theories, such as differential association
and social control, or
social control and labeling (see, for example, Elliott et aI.,
1985; Triplett, 1990). Other
criminologists, however, maintain that despite their promise of
providing a truly social
analysis of crime causation, these theories fall far short of that
mark by ultimately
drawing one's attention back to characteristics of individual
offenders and their social
psychological development. Such a focus is inevitable as long
as one operates within a
positivist framework, as many social learning theorists do. From

the point of view of
180 CHAPTER 5
critical criminologists, then, social theories of crime must be
developed within a com-
pletely different framework and, for many of them, this
framework is the Marxist par-
adigm. We take up their work in the next chapter of this text.
KEY TERMS
agents of socialization-individuals, groups, and
institutions that have as one of their primary
functions the socialization of members of a soci-
ety by providing explicit instruction in or mod-
eling of social expectations.
autonomous deviance-deviance produced by a con-
trol surplus, which helps an individual further
extend control over others and thereby increase
his or her control surplus.
differential anticipation theory-the view that peo-
ple are likely to engage in behaviors from which
they expect to obtain the greatest rewards and
the least punishment.
differential association-the process of social interac-
tion by which individuals acquire definitions
favorable and unfavorable to law violation.
differential identification-the process by which
criminality develops because of an individual's

greater identification with members of criminal
or deviant groups as opposed to members of
conformist groups.
differential reinforcement-the process by which
deviant or conforming behavior is acquired and
internalized through past and present rewards
and punishments attached to one form ofbehav-
SUGGESTED READINGS
Akers, R. L. (1998). Social learning and social structure: A
general theory of crime and deviance. Boston:
Northeastern University Press. Akers's most
recent, and most extensive, discussion of his
social learning theory.
Braithwaite, J. (1989). Crime, shame, and reintegration.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Braithwaite introduces his idea of reintegrative
shaming and examines contemporary Japanese
society in support of his position.
Ermann, M. D., & Lundman, R. J. (Eds.). (1996). Cor-
porate and governmental deviance. New York:
Oxford University Press. A collection of articles
ior relative to those attached to the alternative
behavior.
drift-the process of vacillation along the behav-
ioral continuum of total freedom versus total
constraint.
master status-a status that takes precedence over all
other characteristics or statuses of an individual.

primary deviation-rule breaking, which may be
caused by any number of individual, social, eco-
nomic, or political factors.
repressive deviance-deviance produced by a control
deficit as an individual attempts to escape the
deficit and restore balance to his or her control
ratios.
secondary deviation---<l.eviation that results from the
process of being labeled.
self-fulfilling prophecy-expectations that are fulfilled
not because of true causes, but because people
believe them to be true and act accordingly.
socialization-the process of social interaction
through which a society's culture is taught and
learned and human personalities are developed.
techniques of neutralization-a priori justifications
or rationalizations that legitimate and, there-
fore, facilitate deviation.
that examines various forms of business and
political crime, from the Challenger disaster to
police use of force in the Rodney King case.
Read it and decide for yourself how well these
data support some of the theories discussed in
this chapter.
Meier, R. F., & Geis, G. (1997). Victimless crime? Los
Angeles: Roxbury. An analysis of four topics
(prostitution, drugs, homosexuality, and abor-
tion) that have been hotly debated with regard

to whether the behaviors associated with them
should be considered criminal and how the legal
system should deal with them, if at all.
NOTES
1. Sutherland's Principles of Criminology was first
published in 1924. Mer Sutherland's death in
1950, his close friend and leading proponent,
Donald Cressey, who also became a prominent
criminologist, took the textbook through six
subsequent editions; the tenth was published in
1978. In these editions and other publications,
Cressey offered what he considered clarifica-·
tions, not revisions of the theory. Following
Cressey's death, David Luckenbill revised the
text, but not the theory, for an eleventh edition
of Principles of Criminology, published in 1992.
2. VoId and Bernard (1986) actually use the term
normative conflict instead of· culture conflict
because after Sutherland's death, Cressey made
this substirotion. Cressey made the change, he
said, to bring greater clarity and specificity to
the theory. "Culture" is a broad term that
encompasses not only a group's or society's
norms, but also many other things, material
(objects) and nonmaterial (beliefs). Norms, on
the other hand, are simply rUles of behavior.
Normative conflict occurs when various groups
in a social setting hold divergent views about
what is "correct" or appropriate behavior in a

given siroation. According to Cressey, the term
normative conflict more accurately conveys the
meaning of Sutherland's position.
3. Sutherland was highly critical of those theorists
who associated the causes of crime with such
factors as poverty and "broken homes." He
argued that criminal behavior is found among
all social classes; only its forms vary across class
groups. He frequently cited his study of white-
collar crime (1949) to support this position.
4. Some criminologists argue that many of these
criticisms are based on misinterpretations of
the theory and misreadings of Sutherland's and
others' work. See, for example, the exchanges
between Akers (1996) and Hirschi (1996), and
between Matsueda (1997) and Costello (1998).
When the theory was first published, it also
received extensive acclaim and criticism. For a
detailed discussion of these early critiques as
well as a careful response to them, see Cressey,
1960.
5. For a more detailed discussion of behaviorism,
see Akers, 1998; Bandura, 1977; Lefton, 2000;
and Skinner, 1953. Akers's social learning the-
ory was originally called differential association-
reinfOrcement theory, an indication of its strong
181
affiliation with Sutherland's differential associa-
tion theory.
6. For instance, the use of particular behavioral

modification techniques in corrections and
counseling has been challenged in the courts.
See Mackey v. Procunier (1973) and Kamowitz v.
Michigan Department ofMental Health (1973).
7. Walter Reckless's (1961) containment theory is
also a form of control theory. In addition, some·
theorists consider Sykes and Matza's (1957) drift
theory, to be discussed later in this chapter, a
form of control theory;
8. Some observers have likened Hirschi's beliefs
element of the social bond to Sutherland's
notion of definitions favorable or unfavorable to
law violation. However, Costello and Vowell
(1999) make an important distinction between
the two ideas by pointing out that Hirschi and
Sutherland specified different learning
processes. Sutherland maintained that defini-
tions regarding law violation were learned
through interaction with others, indicating that
the individual is integrated into the social group.
In contrast, Hirschi's control theory makes the
claim that "tolerant attirodes toward law viola-
tion are more reflective of a lack of social inte-
gration than the result of learning definitions
through integration into deviant groups"
(Costello & Vowell, 1999, p. 834).
9. One might also take issue with Agnew and
Petersen's (1989) distinction between serious
and minor delinquency. Although it is obvious
that using a knife or gun to get something
should be weighted more in terms of seriousness
than stealing an expensive car part, the differ-
ence between hurting someone badly (weighted

four in terms of seriousness) and serious fighting
(weighted two) is less clear. Moreover, "hit
mother," "hit father," and "hit instructor or
supervisor" are all weighted two without taking
into account the degree of harm done. Can we
assume that adolescents who completed the self-
report delinquency scale on which these items
appeared would report such hitting as "hurt
someone badly" if injury had occurred during
the incident?
10. However, Costello and Vowell (1999, p. 834)
argue that "because most srodies of delinquency
are conducted with respondents old enough to
have already established attachments, commit-
ments, involvements, and beliefs, it is unlikely
182 CHAPTER 5
that even longitudinal studies can untangle the
true temporal priority of each dimension of the
bond. Thus, it makes sense to conceptualize
these dimensions as contemporaneous rather
than try to specify one element as a cause of
another."
11. Importantly, Hirschi (1969) hypothesized that
single-parem households have rates of delin-
quency comparable to two-parent households
because, all things being equal, one parent can as .
effectively socialize children as two parents can.
However, as Matsueda and Heimer (1987) point
out, all things are rarely, if ever, equal in single-
parent households, especially those headed by

women, relative to two-parent households. This
does not mean, however, that the absence of one
of two parents from the home causes delinquency
or that delinquency is an inevitable outcome of
growing up in asingle-parent family (see also
Demo & Acock, 1992). For a discussion of the
difficulties faced by single-parent families, par,-
ticularly those headed by women, see Renzetti
and Curran, 1999.
12. Whitehead and Boggs (1990) decided not to
measure the belief element of the social bond in
their study because their sample was composed
of people who had already violated the law:
known felony offenders.
13. Several researchers point out that even "ordi-
nary" street offenders often specialize in partic-
ular types of crimes. See, for example, Benson
and Moore, 1992, and Wright et al., 1995.
14. Matza, in particular, is committed to a method-
ological approach he calls naturalism, which he
defines as remaining true to that which one is
studying. Matza believes that most researchers'
'.
explanations of deviance distort or contradict
the explanations deviants themselves would give
of their behavior. Researchers, Matza says,
should let deviants speak for themselves. See
Matza (1964) for a fuller treatment of natural-
ism. See Taylor et al. (1973) for a sympathetic
critique of this approach.

15. Hagan and his colleagues (1998) suggest that
their concept of hierarchic self-interest may be
helpful in explaining gender differences in
offending. They hypothesize that males are
more susceptible to hierarchic self-interest than
females. Their research in Germany offers
strong support for this hypothesis and will hope-
fully encourage additional research on this topic.
16. Many of those who are identified as labeling
theorists resist reference to labeling as a theory,
preferring instead to call it "a way of looking at
a general area of human activity; a perspective
whose value will appear, if at all, in increased
understanding of things formerly obscure"
(Becker, 1973, p. 181). Becker, who is one of the
founders of labeling, has also argued that he
prefers to call it an interactionist theory of
deviance, but conventionally it continues to be
referred to as labeling theory or social reaction
theory.
17. For one classic analysis of the self-fulfilling
prophecy in education, see Rosenthal andJacob-
son (1968). However, the application of the self-
fulfilling prophecy to crime and deviance is not
a unique contribution of contemporary labeling
theorists. It was flctually raised in the 1930s by
Frank Tannenbaum (1938), who warned against
the negative consequences of what he called "the
dramatization of evil."
Chapter outline

Introduction
Durkheim and criminology
Durkheim and social change
Durkheim, suicide and anomie
Assessing Durkheim
Merton and anomie
Anomie and the ‘American dream’
Assessing Merton’s anomie theory
Later strain theory
Cloward and Ohlin
General strain theory
Messner and Rosenfeld
Assessing strain theory
Questions for further discussion
Further reading
Websites
9
Durkheim, anomie
and strain

9 · Durkheim, anomie and strain182
CHAPTER
SUMMARY
In previous chapters we have explored some ways in which
positivism has
shaped and infl uenced criminology. In particular, the last two
chapters were
concerned with approaches that were predominantly
individualistic in focus –
biological and psychological positivism. Here we shift focus to
look at the
emergence of sociological criminology. Of the three main
‘founding fathers’ of
sociology, it was only Émile Durkheim who discussed the
subject of crime at
any length.
In this chapter we explore:
elements of Durkheim’s thought and the infl uence this has had
on later
criminological writing;
the linked concepts of anomie and strain;
how these concepts have been utilised by various writers to
help us organise
our thinking about the nature of crime in modern society.
Introduction
Though Marx has had a considerable infl uence on
criminological thought, he had little directly to say

about crime. Émile Durkheim, by contrast, had a
considerable amount to say about crime. His ideas
can be said to have had a signifi cant bearing on the
Chicago School (see Chapter 10), on Robert Mer-
ton and strain theory, and on more contemporary
theories of punishment (see Chapter 23). Indeed, a
convincing case can be made that Durkheim is one
of the great underestimated fi gures in criminology
(Smith, 2008). As with the rest of his work, Durkheim’s
preoccupation was with the ways in which the
social aspects of phenomena might be understood
and illustrated. His major writings on crime emerge
from his work on the division of labour and on the
nature of social solidarity.
Durkheim and criminology
Crime, for Durkheim, was those actions that offended
against collective feelings or sentiments. Crime is
not something that is unchanging, or has some
essence. Rather, the notion of ‘crime’ refl ects par-
ticular social conventions and these vary according
to time and place. Moreover, it is not the case that
‘crimes’ are everywhere equally harmful to society;
that is, crimes cannot be conceived as matters that
are specifi cally injurious to the wider community.
Rather, they are best understood, he argued, as vio-
lations of a moral code – what he referred to as the
CH10
CH23
conscience collective of society. It is because this
moral code is violated that punishment is required.
As Garland (1990: 30) explains it:

The criminal act violates sentiments and emo-
tions which are deeply ingrained in most
members of society – it shocks their healthy con-
sciences – and this violation calls forth strong
psychological reactions, even among those not
directly involved. It provokes a sense of outrage,
anger, indignation, and a passionate desire for
vengeance.
According to Durkheim a certain amount of crime
is normal in any society:
Crime is present not only in the majority of soci-
eties of one particular species but in all societ-
ies of all types. There is no society that is not
confronted with the problem of criminality. Its
form changes; the acts thus characterized are
not the same everywhere; but, everywhere and
always, there have been men who have behaved
in such a way as to draw upon themselves penal
repression.
(Durkheim, 1938: 65–66)
Crime, for Durkheim, plays a number of important
functions. First, it has an adaptive function in that
it introduces new ideas and practices into society,
thereby ensuring that there is change rather than
stagnation. It also has a boundary maintenance func-
tion, reinforcing social values and norms – crudely,
through its stimulation of collective action against
deviance, it helps to reaffi rm the difference between
Durkheim and criminology 183

right and wrong. To this extent crime should be
considered to be a normal element in any properly
functioning society.
Let us make no mistake. To classify crime among
the phenomena of normal sociology is not to say
merely that it is an inevitable, although regret-
table phenomenon, due to the incorrigible wick-
edness of men; it is to affi rm that it is a factor
in public health, an integral part of all societies.
(Durkheim, 1938: 67)
His phrase – crime ‘is a factor in public health’ –
seems odd at fi rst sight. Surely, crime is bad, nega-
tive, unhelpful, destructive? Durkheim’s argument
was intended as a corrective to those views that
took crime to be entirely anti-social, strange or par-
asitic. Rather, he pointed out that it had a social
role. However unpalatable it may seem, sociologically
we must recognise the functions it performs. It is,
for example, part of our social ‘glue’. By proscrib-
ing certain forms of behaviour we simultaneously
indicate what acceptable behaviour looks like.
By punishing, we reinforce legal and moral rules.
Thus, by implication, too little crime could be as
concerning as too much. This is an observation of
huge importance to criminologists. As Durkheim
observes in an important passage, there is no pros-
pect of crime disappearing:
In a society in which criminal acts were no
longer committed, the sentiments they offend
would have to be found without exception in
all individual consciousnesses, and they must

be found to exist with the same degree as senti-
ments contrary to them. Assuming that this con-
dition could actually be realized, crime would
not thereby disappear; it would only change its
form, for the very cause which would thus dry
up the sources of criminality would immediately
open up new ones.
(Durkheim, 1938: 67)
In the opening chapter of this book we discussed
what is meant by this thing we call ‘crime’. Very
quickly it becomes clear in such a discussion that
crime has no essence. It varies by time and by place.
The sociological study of crime, therefore, immedi-
ately must become much more than simply look-
ing at patterns and trends, discussing practical
responses to crime and how they might be altered
or improved. Crime, in the hands of a sociologist
such as Durkheim, becomes an important tool that
can tell us much about the nature of the social
order in which we live. The types of behaviours that
we legislate against – and call crimes – and the spe-
cifi c ways in which we respond to them – the types
and amounts of punishment – are indicators of the
nature of our society.
One of the clearest illustrations of this style of
sociological thinking can be found in Durkheim’s
focus on the importance of the nature of social
reactions to crime. Here, Durkheim was highlight-
ing what has become an important criminological
truth:
We must not say that an action shocks the con-

science collective because it is criminal, but
rather that it is criminal because it shocks the
conscience collective. We do not condemn it
because it is a crime, but it is a crime because we
condemn it.
(Durkheim, 1972: 123–124)
As we will see in subsequent chapters (and Chap-
ter 11 in particular), this observation runs through
much criminological theory, not least labelling the-
ory, some radical criminologies and, indeed, con-
trol theory.
Durkheim and social change
If crime and punishment have the ability to pro-
vide us with important insights into the nature
and functioning of society, the periods of dramatic
social change will surely be refl ected in the penal
sphere. In The Division of Labour in Society Durkheim
analysed and sought to understand the profound
changes affecting modern industrial societies. What
occurred as relatively primitive societies was super-
seded by more complex ones. In his analysis, Dur-
kheim identifi ed two ideal typical social formations,
which he terms ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’, each
typifying differing forms of social solidarity.
Ideal types are abstractions designed to help iden-
tify and explain patterns that appear in the real
world, rather than straightforward, faithful descrip-
tions of that world. Max Weber described ideal
types as one-sided accentuations, and as syntheses
of particular phenomena, arranged in order to pro-
vide a unifi ed construct useful for analysis. These
terms – ‘mechanical’ and ‘organic’ solidarity – and

other ideal types that we will meet, are best seen
as explanatory or didactic models, used to help us
understand particular social phenomena by focus-
ing on certain core characteristics.
In more primitive societies, characterised by
mechanical solidarity, there is, he argued, a rela-
tively undifferentiated division of labour. People
CH11
live fairly common, shared lives in which work is
generally identical and values are shared. Under
conditions of mechanical solidarity, he argued, the
social order was largely organised through similar-
ity, and social norms were enforced through retrib-
utive sanctions. Such sanctioning served to identify
and exclude offenders, to treat them as outsiders.
Such societies are gradually superseded by more
complex formations characterised by what Durkheim
referred to as organic forms of solidarity. Within such
societies there is a relatively highly differentiated
division of labour, and social solidarity is organised
around difference rather than similarity. Such social
transformation is refl ected in the systems of law and
punishment characteristic of the different types of
social solidarity. Under mechanical solidarity the pri-
mary function of law is to enforce uniformity and to
limit or even prevent deviation from the common
pattern. Under conditions of organic solidarity on the
other hand the primary function of law is to regulate

the interactions between the different parts of society
and between members.
What we have here, then, is a sophisticated attempt
to examine how social bonds and reciprocal ties and
obligations are maintained (a) in times of very rapid
social change and (b) in societies that are highly
internally differentiated. Durkheim was writing in
the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, in a period
in which all major writers (as varied as Karl Marx
and Charles Dickens) were struggling to understand
the nature of the social transformation in front of
them. In this regard, Durkheim confronted head-on
one of the great questions of the moment: what is
it that will provide social solidarity and coherence
in these new times? One can see similar questions
being asked of globalisation now. Is the new global
order breaking down all the old certainties? Will
these new social arrangements bring with them the
collapse of social structures? Are we losing the abil-
ity to regulate behaviour and maintain order?
The transformation of social systems toward
those characterised by organic solidarity is accom-
panied by a decline in retributivism. This is viewed
by Durkheim as involving an increasing valua-
tion of human dignity – akin to what Elias (1978)
referred to as a ‘civilizing process’ (see Chapter 23).
Now, for Durkheim, the modernisation of society,
involving a shift from mechanical to organic soli-
darity, is far from straightforward. In particular,
there is a danger, Durkheim argued, that the forms
of regulation that bound less complex societies
together wouldn’t be replaced quickly and effec-
tively enough by new forms of moral regulation.

One potential consequence of this is what he refers
to as anomie , where moral constraints are insuffi -
cient effectively to limit individual desires. The link
with crime and deviance should be clear. We return
to anomie below.
CH23
Émile Durkheim (1858–1917)
Born in eastern France, Durkheim was the son of a
rabbi. Indeed, not only his father, but his grandfather
and great-grandfather had been rabbis also, and it was
expected that Émile would also follow this path.
He studied at the École Normale Supérieure and
in his early twenties became a teacher of philosophy.
By the age of 29 he got a job at the University of Bor-
deaux, where he taught the very fi rst sociology course
in France. It wasn’t until 1902, when Durkheim was 44,
that he became a Professor of Philosophy and Educa-
tion at the University of Paris.
The Division of Labour in Society, arguably Dur-
kheim’s greatest work, was published in 1893, and
this was quickly followed by The Rules of Sociological
Method (1895), Suicide: A Study in Sociology (1897) and,
later, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912).
Durkheim died in 1917 not long after his son, also a
gifted academic, had been killed in the First World War. Émile
Durkheim, one of the ‘founding fathers’ of
sociology.

Durkheim, suicide and anomie
For our purposes here Durkheim’s other centrally
important piece of work concerned suicide and how
this apparently most individual of acts might be used
as an indicator of how sociological analysis might be
undertaken. Suicide was chosen as a subject of study
for a number of reasons. At the time Durkheim was
writing, suicide was a crime in most of Europe – and
was generally considered a deviant act. Moreover,
as remains the case today, it was generally viewed
as an individual rather than a social phenomenon.
Suicide, for Durkheim, therefore provided the basis
for illustrating the sociological aspect of even the
apparently most individualised forms of deviance.
Durkheim’s focus was upon suicide rates , using
offi cial records, and he sought to explain how pat-
terns of suicide might be explained by reference
to such sociological phenomena as religion, social
structure, economic conditions and so on. The
study of suicide rates threw up a number of inter-
esting features. He found, for example, that:
Rates of suicide were higher in Protestant than
Catholic countries.
Single people were more prone to suicide than
those who were married.
Suicide among military personnel was higher
than among civilians.
Suicide rates drop in times of war.

Suicide rates were higher in times of economic
crisis than economic stability.
In explaining the patterns he observed, Durkheim
identifi ed four ‘ideal types’ of suicide. We met this
term earlier in relation to the two main types of social
solidarity identifi ed by Durkheim. Consequently,
these types, he argued, are rarely found in their
‘pure’ form. The four types he called altruistic, egois-
tic, anomic and fatalistic (though he felt this last type
to be of little importance at the time he was writing) .
The rates of suicide, he argued, could be explained by
the degree of social solidarity, and he distinguished
two aspects of solidarity: integration into social groups
and regulation by social norms (see Table 9.1).
Anomic suicide, as Table 9.1 suggests, arises
where the degree of regulation is insuffi cient (as also
happens potentially during the shift from mechan-
ical to organic solidarity). Central to Durkheim’s
sociology was the assumption that one of the keys
to successful social integration was the regulation of
human desires and that, where this was problem-
atic, individuals experienced a form of ‘normless-
ness’. This had, he felt, an obvious link to suicide:
With increased prosperity, desires increase . . .
Overweening ambition always exceeds the results
obtained, great as they may be, since there is no
warning to pause here . . . since this race for an
unattainable goal can give no other pleasure but
that of the race itself . . . once it is interrupted
the participants are left empty-handed . . . How
could the desire to live not be weakened under

such conditions?
(Durkheim, 1897/1951: 253)
To reiterate, Durkheim’s view was that social soli-
darity was a product of two forces:
integration – social cohesion brought about
by shared beliefs and practices; the forces of
attraction that bring people together;
regulation – the constraints that limit human
behaviour and desires.
He related this to the study of suicide by show-
ing how variation in integration and regulation
(too much or too little of each) is linked with rates
of suicide at particular times. Too little regulation –
where the individual is insuffi ciently regulated by
the group – produces high levels of what he called
anomic suicide. However, Durkheim also uses the
term anomie in another context, and arguably in
a slightly different way. For Durkheim, regulation
becomes increasingly important as societies become
Type Degree of solidarity Psychological state
Egoistic Lack of integration Suicides of Protestants and single
people
Anomic Lack of regulation Suicides during economic crisis
Altruistic Excessive integration Suicides in primitive societies,
military suicides
Fatalistic Excessive regulation Suicide of slaves

Table 9.1 Durkheim’s typology of suicide
more complex. As was suggested earlier, in times of
rapid social change – such as that from mechanical
to organic solidarity – systems of regulation may
be insuffi cient. Where this is so, what emerges is
a state of anomie or the anomic form of the divi-
sion of labour. This, in some respects, is a critique of
modern industrialism and the failure of its systems
of moral regulation to keep pace with changes in
the economic and occupational structure of soci-
ety. Individual desires, ambitions and appetites are
stimulated but insuffi ciently controlled or limited. It
is this argument, as we will see below, that, largely
as a result of the work of Robert Merton, has become
deeply embedded in contemporary criminology.
Assessing Durkheim
It is not only through the notion of anomie that Dur-
kheim has exerted a very particular and profound
infl uence over criminological theory. More gener-
ally, his observations about the ‘normality’ of crime,
and the importance of societal reaction in framing
what is to be considered criminal, are now corner-
stones of the sociological approach to the study of
crime and crime control. Smith (2008: 339) argues
that the following seven key insights in criminology
arguably have their origins in Durkheim’s work:
Deviance is, in part, the product of weak moral
integration and poor social regulation.

Deviance is a social fact that is patterned and
regular when viewed in aggregate. In a sense
we can think of a certain amount of crime
as ‘normal’ and ‘inevitable’, perhaps even as
‘useful’ for any given social organisation.
Defi nitions of deviance and perceptions of its
severity are cross-culturally variable.
Social change, such as the transition to
modernity, can often generate anomie and with
this an increase in levels of crime.
The law refl ects the cultural values of a society,
although the strength of this connection can, of
course, vary.
Crime is meaningful. It generates emotional
responses and is perceived as a violation of a
moral code.
Punishment has a ritual and expressive
dimension.
Before moving on, however, there are a number of
criticisms of Durkheim’s work that have been made
and which we must briefl y consider. First, Dur-
kheim’s work arguably underplays the way in which
systems of punishment are shaped by the nature and
distribution of power within society. That is to say, it
is possible, as radical critics might argue, that rather
than punitive responses tending to be directed at
actions which transgress generally held social norms,
it is actions which run counter to the interests of par-

ticular groups that tend to be punished. Second, but
relatedly, the assumption of consensus which under-
pins the notion of conscience collective is precisely
that, an assumption, rather than something that
Durkheim demonstrated empirically.
Third, it is debatable whether Durkheim’s argu-
ments about the functional utility of crime actu-
ally apply to all types of crime. Thus, it is possible
to identify criminal acts that simply don’t call
forth the type of moral outrage that Durkheim
took to be illustrative of challenges to the collec-
tive conscience. Finally, critics have also pointed
to the circularity in the functionalist character of
elements of Durkheim’s explanation of why laws
are enacted and criminals punished. As Garland
(1983: 52–53) notes:
The discussion of crime reproduces all the cir-
cularity of Durkheim’s basic arguments. We are
told that crime consists in acts ‘universally dis-
approved by members of each society’. Clearly,
as an empirical statement this is questionable;
one must presume that the offenders themselves
do not wholly partake in this universal spirit of
disapproval. However, Durkheim tells us that
he refers only to healthy consciences, that is,
to those which share the sentiments of the col-
lective conscience. But since violation of the
collective conscience is the very quality which
gives certain acts the attribute of criminality, the
appeal to ‘healthy consciences’ as a proof is an
empty form of tautology.
Review questions

1 What are the main characteristics of mechanical
and organic solidarity?
2 Why does anomie occur in the process of
social change?
3 What are the four main types of suicide
identifi ed by Durkheim?
4 What are the key criminological insights
that might be said to have their origins in
Durkheim’s work?
Merton and anomie
One infl uential commentator judged Robert K.
Merton’s anomie theory ‘the single most infl uential
formulation in the sociology of deviance’ (Clinard,
1964: 10). It has however fallen ‘distinctly out of
fashion, perhaps permanently so in any explicit
form. Like functionalism, from which it derives, it
has become a routine conceptual folly for students
to demolish before moving on to more rewarding
ground’ (Downes and Rock, 2003: 104). Indeed,
Downes and Rock argue that it has been Robert
Merton’s version of anomie theory that has been
subject to the most vociferous criticism, rather than
Durkheim’s approach.
Although Durkheim was by no means entirely
consistent in his portrayal of anomie, as we have
seen he viewed it as the product of rapid social
change unaccompanied by corresponding growth

in systems of moral regulation. Anomie for Dur-
kheim, then, is that state of affairs brought about by
insuffi cient normative regulation. Building on this
idea, but within the specifi c context of having lived
through the Depression experienced by America in
the 1930s, Robert Merton saw anomie as resulting
from the absence of alignment between socially
desired aspirations, such as wealth, and the means
available to people to achieve such objectives. Mer-
ton, like the researchers of the Chicago School that
we will meet in the next chapter, sought a more
sociological explanation of crime as a corrective to
the generally individualised explanations that still
tended to dominate. Merton’s aim was to:
discover how some social structures exert a defi -
nite pressure upon certain persons in the society
to engage in non-conforming rather than con-
forming conduct. If we can locate groups pecu-
liarly subject to such pressures, we should expect
to fi nd high rates of deviant conduct in these
groups, not because the human beings comprising
them are compounded of distinctive biological
tendencies but because they are responding nor-
mally to the social situation in which they fi nd
themselves.
(Merton, 1969: 255)
Crowds form outside as the Brooklyn branch of the Bank of the
United States closes its doors, 11 December 1930. The
mismatch between aspiration and reality was central to the
development of sociological concepts of anomie and strain
theory during the period of the Depression in the United States.

Merton’s theory was built on a critique of particu-
lar elements of American culture. The emphasis
on consumption and the tendency towards greed,
ever-increasing material desires and dissatisfaction,
which some critics would take to be defi ning nega-
tive characteristics of modern capitalism, also lie at
the heart of much of anomie theory’s portrayal of
the sources of deviance. It was this focus that dis-
tinguished it from the ecological approach adopted
by many of the Chicago School sociologists with
their concern with neighbourhoods and the social
structure of the city. In an oft-quoted statement,
Merton observed that ‘a cardinal American vir-
tue, ambition, promotes a cardinal American vice,
deviant behaviour’ (Merton, 1949: 137, quoted in
Downes and Rock, 2003: 94). At the heart of this is
the ‘American dream’.
Anomie and the ‘American dream’
At the core of the ideology of the American dream
was the idea that prosperity and success were avail-
able to all those who worked hard. The Depression
of the 1930s, however, had given the lie to the
idea of America as a prosperous, egalitarian society,
though President Roosevelt’s New Deal sought to
maintain faith in the vision of opportunity for all.
Mertonian anomie theory emerged in this period.
It got a further boost in the early 1960s from the
Kennedy government and its concern with civil
liberties and opportunity. According to Merton any
society identifi es certain culturally preferred goals.
In American society this is material success:

It would of course be fanciful to assert that accu-
mulated wealth stands alone as a symbol of
success just as it would be fanciful to deny that
Americans assign it a high place in their scale of
values. In some large measure money has been
consecrated as value in itself . . . [However it is]
acquired, fraudulently or institutionally, it can
be used to purchase the same goods and services.
(Merton, 1968: 190)
However, not everyone can realistically achieve
such goals. There is not the means for everyone to
succeed. The dissonance between socially desired
ends and limited means produces a ‘strain to ano-
mie’ – effectively a range of behavioural adaptations
to these social and psychological circumstances. In
Merton’s terms this strain to anomie is the product
of the ‘contradiction between the cultural emphasis
on pecuniary ambition and the social bars to full
opportunity’. Merton summarised his argument as
follows:
The dominant pressure of group standards of
success is, therefore, on the gradual attenuation
of legitimate, but by and large ineffective, striv-
ings and the increasing use of illegitimate, but
more or less effective, expedients of vice and
crime. The cultural demands made on persons
in this situation are incompatible. On the one
hand, they are asked to orient their conduct
toward the prospect of accumulating wealth
and on the other, they are largely denied effec-
tive opportunities to do so institutionally. The
consequences of such structural inconsistency

are psychopathological personality and/or anti-
social conduct, and/or revolutionary activities.
(Merton, 1938: 71)
The bulk of individuals will continue to conform,
he suggested, despite the strain to anomie. How-
ever, ‘certain phases of social structure generate
the circumstances in which infringement of social
codes constitutes a “normal” response’ (Merton,
1938: 672). The strain to anomie is stronger for
certain social groups than others. The social struc-
ture effectively limits the possibilities for some
groups more than it does for others – in short, the
lower classes. In this fashion, it has been argued
that Merton is forwarding a cultural argument to
explain the nature of crime in American society
and a structural argument to explain its uneven
distribution (Vold et al. , 2002).
For those who don’t conform there are four devi-
ant adaptations: innovation, ritualism, retreatism and
rebellion. These are distinguished by whether cul-
turally prescribed goals and institutionally available
means are accepted or rejected. The fi ve sets of rela-
tionships can be illustrated as shown in Table 9.2.
Mode of
adaptation
Culture goals Institutionalised
means
I Conformity + +
II Innovation + –

III Ritualism – +
IV Retreatism – –
V Rebellion +/– +/–
Table 9.2 Merton’s typology of modes of
individual adaptation
Innovation is the application of illegitimate means
to the achievement of socially approved and legiti-
mate ends. The innovator accepts the social goal of
material success, but has not the legitimate means
for achieving it: ‘such anti-social behaviour is in a
sense “called forth” by certain conventional values
of the culture and by the class structure involving
differential access to the approved opportunities
for legitimate, prestige-bearing pursuit of the cul-
ture goals’ (Merton, 1938: 679). Deviance is the
consequence.
In this sense, much organised crime shares both
the overall aims, and indeed many of the means,
of standard capitalist activity. It differs in that it
operates outside the law in some important ways.
Innovators accept the cultural goals, but don’t use
the standard institutionalised means. The pro-
tagonists in a number of Hollywood portrayals of
American mafi osi – Francis Ford Coppola’s God-
father fi lms and Martin Scorsese’s Goodfellas , for
example – continue to espouse many traditional

values and goals whilst using culturally illegiti-
mate means for their achievement. Confronted
with the ‘absence of realistic opportunities for
advancement’, Merton argued, some people are
particularly vulnerable to the ‘promises of power
and high income from organized vice, rackets and
crime’ (Merton, 1968: 199).
Arguably, it is in the area of corporate and
white-collar crime that this particular adaptation
often appears. Accounts of insider trading, corpo-
rate fraud, major failures in industrial health and
safety are all replete with illustrations of individu-
als focused upon achieving material and career suc-
cess, whilst failing to operate within rules and laws.
Protagonists like Gordon Gekko in the 1987 fi lm
Wall Street and Sherman McCoy in Tom Wolfe’s
novel Bonfire of the Vanities , published in the same
year, captured the greed and rampant materialism
of that era – a period many critics felt promoted the
idea of success at all costs (Downes, 1989).
By contrast, ritualism concerns those circum-
stances in which the cultural goals disappear – they
are lost sight of – whilst attachment to the institu-
tional means becomes seemingly ever stronger. It
is deviant because, although the means conform to
social expectations, the search for the socially val-
ued goal of fi nancial success has been abandoned.
This is a routinised nature of elements of bourgeois
life, a sticking to the rules at all costs, and a scal-
ing down of aims to the point where they can be
achieved effortlessly. Merton’s example here was
the bureaucratic mindset.

Retreatism, the least common of the adapta-
tions according to Merton, involves the rejection
of both the objectives and means, and concerns
people who ‘are in society but not of it’. Mer-
ton’s examples are the hobo, the drug taker and
Marlon Brando as Don Corleone in the fi lm The Godfather:
a man with seemingly traditional values and many
legitimate aspirations, all achieved through violence and
racketeering – an example of ‘innovation’ in terms of
Merton’s typology.
Merton saw Charlie Chaplin’s comic tramp fi gure as a
supreme form of ‘retreatism’ in terms of his typology –
rejecting both society’s goals and the means of achieving
them, and hence unlikely to engage in criminal activity.
elements of the tramp played so famously by
Charlie Chaplin: ‘always the butt of a crazy and
bewildering world in which he has no place and
from which he constantly runs away into a con-
tented do nothingness’ (Merton, 1949: 251). As
such, it may be characterised by drug use/addic-
tion, alcoholism, homelessness and so on. It is an
adaptation, Merton felt, that tends not to involve
the victimisation of others, and is often a private,
rather than a public, response. Retreatism became
something of a subcultural style in the 1960s with
the advent of the hippie movement.
The fi nal adaptation is rebellion . This is a more
radical alternative, seeking to replace both the

means and the ends as a way of resolving the strain
to anomie. This might be the political radical pro-
posing an entirely new set of culturally approved
goals and means for their achievement. Unlike
some criminological theories, Merton was explicit
in his acknowledgement that anomie theory was
‘designed to account for some, not all, forms of
deviant behaviour customarily described as crimi-
nal or delinquent’ (Merton, 1968: 195).
Assessing Merton’s anomie theory
Despite its enormous infl uence, it was some two
decades before Merton’s famous article began to
resonate powerfully through criminology. It did so
partly as a result of Albert Cohen’s Delinquent Boys
(1955) , Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin’s Delin-
quency and Opportunity (1960) , as well as Merton’s
reworking of the original article. As Downes and
Rock argue, anomie theory has had an odd shelf
life: for its fi rst few decades after Merton’s original
exposition in 1938 it was accepted rather uncriti-
cally. Since the early 1960s, however, the reverse
has been true, with its rejection arguably being more
critical than is deserved. Again, rather like function-
alism, anomie theory may not be referred to explic-
itly very much these days, but seasoned observers
can see its footprints everywhere:
Robert K. Merton (1910–2003)
Born Meyer Robert Schkolnick in Philadelphia on
American Independence day 1910, Merton’s parents
were working-class Jewish immigrants from Eastern
Europe. The family lived above the father’s dairy prod-
ucts shop in South Philadelphia. It was common at this

time to Americanize names and Merton initially changed
his to Robert K. Merlin (as a young man he worked as a
magician) before a friend advised him that it was rather
‘hackneyed’.
Inquiring as to why Merton should have focused his
attention on the unintended consequences of the Ameri-
can dream, Lilly and colleagues point to his social ori-
gins. Born into considerable poverty, Merton gained a
scholarship to Temple University in Philadelphia, pub-
lished his famous article ‘Social Structure and Anomie’
whilst teaching at Harvard University, aged 28, and
became a professor at Columbia University three years
later. Though speculative, ‘this personal journey’, they
suggest, ‘may have helped focus Merton’s attention
on the prominent role in the national culture of social
ascent’ (Lilly et al., 2002: 53).
Among others, he coined the phrases ‘self-fulfi lling
prophecy’, ‘role model’ and ‘reference group’. Merton
is also credited with being the creator of the idea of
focus groups as a research tool. Merton’s son, Robert C.
Merton, won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1997.
Robert K. Merton (1910–2003): born into impoverished
circumstances in Philadelphia, he captured part of the
dark side of the American dream in his work on anomie.
It has an anonymous presence in Jock Young’s
essay in labelling theory, The Drugtakers, and
appears under its own name as one of the prin-
cipal themes in his account of the making of left

realism in the 1980s. It is the invisible prop to
the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cul-
tural Studies’ radical work on class, youth, and
deviance in Britain.
(Downes and Rock, 2003: 105)
Numerous potential shortcomings have been identi-
fi ed in Merton’s anomie theory (we return to this at
the end of the chapter). As Akers and Brezina (2010:
97) observe, ‘surprisingly, Merton’s theory has not
been well tested. A proper test of theory would
require measures of the relative emphasis placed on
monetary success and the extent to which individu-
als achieved or expected to achieve such success.’
Although Merton’s work and Durkheim’s were
only ‘loosely coupled’ (Cullen and Messner, 2011),
some of the criticisms of Mertonian anomie theory
refl ect differences between the two uses of the term
‘anomie’. There was, as we have seen, something
of a shift in the use of the term anomie, which is
neatly captured in the following passage from Ste-
ven Box (1981: 97–98):
Merton’s analysis . . . appears to follow Dur-
kheim’s usage of the concept of anomie. But the
appearance is, I think, deceptive, for during the
argument Merton shifts his meaning of anomie
away from a Durkheimian position towards one
which is peculiarly his own. Initially, Merton
appears to be discussing the emphasis on normative
means of achieving cultural values . . . However,
later in his analysis, Merton appears to shift the
focus of his attention away from an emphasis on
normative means to differential access to opportunity

structures, such as schools and employment organ-
izations, through which cultural values can be
properly and legally realized . . . The emphasis on
normative means is fundamentally Durkheimian
because, by implication, it suggests that human
aspirations have to be regulated and channelled.
Merton’s initial use of the term was faithful to this
conception, Box argues, in that at its core the empha-
sis is upon an overriding cultural goal – worldly
material success. The diffi culty for Merton was how
to explain the apparent over-involvement of people
from lower social classes in criminal and deviant
activity if this cultural goal was universally accepted.
Merton needed to transform the conception
of anomie; he did this by shifting from an
under-emphasis on normative means to a dis-
cussion on the differential access to legitimate
opportunity structures, particularly education
and occupational opportunities. Anomie was no
longer a condition of deregulation or normless-
ness, but one of relative deprivation. Individual
motivation behind deviant behaviour emerged
out of the frustrations of such deprivations and
these emotions existed because individuals had
internalized the ‘American Dream’.
(Box, 1981: 99–100)
Competition and frustration around status have been
suggested as being a key to understanding youthful
delinquency – and stealing from cars is seen as a means
of achieving status for young people who feel excluded
from more conventional means of doing so.

Review questions
1 What were Merton’s main criticisms of
American culture?
2 What are the main forms of adaptation
described by Merton?
3 What is meant by relative deprivation?
Later strain theory
It was Albert Cohen’s work which picked up on
Merton’s theory and introduced the notions of cul-
ture and subculture to the study of delinquency.
Cohen was critical of Merton’s approach because
of its failure in his eyes to explain the nature or
content of juvenile delinquency. Relative depri-
vation, identifi ed as the major impetus to adult
deviance in Merton’s usage of the term anomie, is
less useful, Cohen argued, in explaining juvenile
motivations. Crucially, rather than being oriented
towards the legitimate goals of adult society, many
young people engage in behaviour which is ‘non-
utilitarian, malicious and negativistic’ (1955: 25). It
is not material success that delinquents are search-
ing for, but meaning in some other way. We return
to this idea in greater detail in the next chapter,
when we consider subcultural theory.
Rather than anomie, Cohen suggests that com-
petition and frustration around status are the key to

understanding youthful delinquency. It is here the
parallels with Merton are visible. Cohen argues that
in contemporary society issues of status are largely
settled according to criteria such as educational
success. However, not everyone is equally placed
in this competition. The terms and criteria used by
teachers and others are far from straightforwardly
objective and they distinguish between children in
both moral and social terms, i.e., crudely, according
to middle-class standards. Signifi cant proportions
of working-class children are therefore faced with
a number of status diffi culties and linked feelings
of shame or guilt on the one hand and resentment
on the other. These young people are placed under
severe strain . The issue is how such diffi culties can
be resolved. One solution is to form attachments
with others in similar situations, to form gangs or
other groupings and to reject some of the core adult
values. This is the basis, in Cohen’s terms, for the
formation of delinquent youth subcultures.
Cloward and Ohlin
Infl uenced by Merton and by Albert Cohen, as well
as by Edwin Sutherland’s notion of differential
association, the next milestone in strain theory was
Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin’s Delinquency and
Opportunity, published in 1960. Their debt to Mer-
ton can be seen in one of their central questions
(1960: 32): ‘Under what conditions will persons
experience strains and tensions that lead to delin-
quent solutions?’ At the heart of their answer is the
observation that in ‘a system that stresses ability
as the basis of advancement, the failures who view
themselves as equal in ability to those who succeed
tend to feel unjustly deprived’ (1960: 117). That

is to say, where people are led to believe that the
ability they have will enable them to gain access
to education and thereby to occupational success,
but where opportunities are limited and decisions
are frequently based on other criteria such as class,
ethnicity and sex, the outcome is that a proportion
of the population feel anger at their unreasonable
exclusion. The solution again is the rejection of
core middle-class values.
However, as we noted earlier, Cloward and Ohlin
also sought to incorporate elements of Sutherland’s
differential association theory. They do so by argu-
ing that there are numerous means of resolving
the adjustment or strain problems. The particular
delinquent solution adopted will depend upon the
nature of illegal or criminal means available in the
particular environment. In this way:
The concept of differential opportunity struc-
tures permits us to unite the theory of anomie,
which recognizes the concept of differentials in
access to legitimate means, and the ‘Chicago tra-
dition’, in which the concept of differentials in
access to illegitimate means is implicit . . . The
approach permits us to ask, for example, how
the relative ability of illegitimate opportunities
affects the resolution of adjustment problems
leading to deviant behaviour.
(Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; reproduced in
Jacoby, 2004: 286–287)
We return to Cloward and Ohlin and the subcul-
tural elements of the approach in Chapter 10.
Strain theory was remarkably infl uential in its time.

Lloyd Ohlin, for example, was appointed by Robert
Kennedy when he was Attorney General, to help
develop federal crime policy, and his and Cloward’s
work later formed the basis for much of President
Lyndon Johnson’s action in the war on poverty
in the mid-1960s. The apparent lack of success of
many of these programmes led President Nixon to
abandon them and led many critics to focus their
attention on strain theory.
General strain theory
More recently, Robert Agnew has sought to build
on Merton’s ideas. Agnew suggests that there are at
least four reasons why strain theory has declined
in popularity:
CH10
Later strain theory 193
It has tended to focus on lower-class
delinquency.
It has neglected all but the most conventional
goals (middle-class status and wealth).
It overlooked barriers to achievement other
than social stratifi cation (these might include
gender, race, intelligence and many others).
It has found it diffi cult to explain why some
people who experienced strain didn’t turn
to criminal activity. Arguably, strain and
frustration are experienced by many who

continue to conform.
As a consequence Agnew sought to develop a more
general strain theory, though his specifi c focus was
upon adolescent delinquency and drug use. His
extension and elaboration of strain theory involves
the identifi cation of two types of strain over and
above the central problem of failing to achieve
one’s personal goals. The fi rst, slightly at variance
with Merton’s theory, he suggests arises from the
‘actual or anticipated removal (loss) of positively
valued stimuli from an individual’ (1992: 57). The
withholding of something that is valued – privi-
leges, opportunities, relationships – is the source
of strain. The second form of strain is the result of
‘actual or anticipated presentation of negative or
noxious stimuli’ (1992: 58) such as relationships at
home, work or elsewhere that are abusive.
The greater the extent of strain, the more likely
the adaptive response is to be deviant. In this con-
text, delinquency and drug use are means of cop-
ing with negative relationships and emotions. The
likelihood of deviant adaptations may be offset,
Agnew argues, by the existence of support from
other sources, the availability of alternative goals,
and personal characteristics such as high levels of
self-control and fear of adverse consequences. Relat-
edly, Agnew (2001) identifi es a number of factors
that increase the likelihood that strain will lead to
crime and delinquency:
Where the strain is perceived to be ‘unjust’;
where people feel that they have been treated
unfairly, they are more likely to become angry,
and anger, according to Agnew’s strain theory,

is linked with increased likelihood of offending.
When strain is high in magnitude, it is more
diffi cult to ignore and to manage in ways that
are legitimate.
Where the strain is caused by, or is associated
with, low social control, it is more likely to
result in a deviant adaptation.
Strains may also lower levels of social control.
Where the strain creates pressure to engage in
‘criminal coping’ – such as strain induced by
criminal victimisation leading to a desire for
revenge.
Figure 9.1 The central propositions of general strain theory
Source: Agnew (2006: 19).
The major strains:
Individuals are treated in
a negative manner by others
Individuals lose something Negative emotions Crime
they value
Individuals are unable to achieve
their goals
Factors influencing the effect of
strains and negative emotions on
crime
Ability to cope with strains in a

legal manner
The costs of criminal coping
Disposition for criminal coping
General strain theory identifi es a range of strains
that are particularly conducive to crime (Akers and
Brezina, 2010: 103–104):
Parental rejection – Parents who reject their
children do not express love or affection for
them, show little interest in them, provide little
support to them, and often display hostility
toward them
Supervision/discipline that is erratic,
excessive, and/or harsh (use of humiliation/
insults, threats, screaming, and/or physical
punishments).
Child abuse and neglect , including physical
abuse; sexual abuse; and the failure to provide
adequate food, shelter, medical care, and
affection/attention (neglect).
Negative secondary school experiences , including
low grades, negative relations with teachers,
and the experience of school as boring and a
waste of time.
Abusive peer relations , including insults, ridicule,

threats, attempts to coerce, and physical
assaults.
Work at jobs in the secondary labour market – Such
jobs commonly involve unpleasant tasks,
little autonomy, coercive control, low pay,
few benefi ts, little prestige, and very limited
opportunities for advancement.
Unemployment , especially when it is chronic and
blamed on others.
Marital problems , including frequent confl icts
and verbal and physical abuse.
The failure to achieve selected goals , including
thrills/excitement, personal autonomy,
masculine status and the desire for much
money in a short period of time.
Criminal victimisation .
Residence in severely deprived communities , which
is associated with exposure to a host of strains –
including criminal victimisation and economic
problems.
Homelessness .
Discrimination based on characteristics such as
race/ethnicity, gender, and religion.
What is particularly problematic is chronic or
repeated strains. Agnew argues that such chronic
strains are likely to create a predisposition to crime.
They do this in a number of ways. Through repeti-

tion they reduce the ability of individuals to cope
with strain. Thus, if one is regularly bullied, it may,
over time, become increasingly diffi cult to resist
resorting to violence in response. Chronic strains
may lead to the development of negative emotional
traits such as anger, depression, fear and frustration,
each of which may be conducive to crime. Agnew
quotes a passage from Elijah Anderson’s Code of the
Street in support of this:
Frustrations mount over bills, food, and, at times,
drink, cigarettes, and drugs. Some tend toward
self-destructive behaviour; many street-oriented
women are crack-addicted (‘on the pipe’), alco-
holic, or repeatedly involved in complicated
relationships with the men who abuse them.
In addition, the seeming intractability of their
situation, caused in large part by the lack of
well-paying jobs and the persistence of racial dis-
crimination, has engendered deep-seated bitter-
ness and anger in many of the most desperate and
poorest blacks, especially young people . . . the
frustrations of persistent poverty shorten the fuse
in such people, contributing to a lack of patience
with anyone, child or adult, who irritates them.
(Anderson, 1990: 10–11)
Agnew summarises these arguments in Figure 9.2.
Chronic or
repeated
strains
Reduce ability to legally cope

Negative emotional states
Negative emotionality/low constraint
Reduce social control
Foster the social learning of crime
Predisposition
for crime
Figure 9.2 The mechanisms by which chronic or repeated strains
increase the predisposition for crime
Source: Agnew (2006).
Later strain theory 195
Messner and Rosenfeld
A variant on Agnew’s general strain theory, called
institutional anomie theory, is proposed by Messner
and Rosenfeld (2001). Focusing, like Merton, on the
‘American Dream’ they suggest an anomic society
has been created which privileges success over all
other socially approved goals:
A primary task for noneconomic institutions
such as the family and schools is to inculcate
beliefs, values and commitments other than
those of the marketplace. But as these noneco-
nomic institutions are relatively devalued and
forced to accommodate to economic consider-
ations, and as they are penetrated by economic
standards, they are less able to fulfi l their distinc-
tive socialization functions successfully.
(Messner and Rosenfeld, 2001: 150)

At its simplest, their argument is that ‘the Ameri-
can Dream itself exerts pressures toward crime by
encouraging an anomic cultural environment, an
environment in which people are encouraged to
adopt an “anything goes” mentality in the pursuit
of personal goals’ (2001: 61). There are a number of
specifi c features of the American dream, they sug-
gest, that are crucial. These are:
the emphasis on achievement and on the winner-
takes-all mentality;
the individualism that focuses attention on
rights rather than responsibilities;
the materialism that fetishises wealth;
the fact that these values permeate the whole of
society – which they call universalism .
The effect of these cultural values is to privilege
economic goals over others – for example, educa-
tion becomes increasingly devoted to servicing the
labour market and the family becomes increasingly
dominated by work. The tendency to focus on ends
rather than means makes it increasingly diffi cult
for institutions such as schools and families to exert
appropriate social control. Messner and Rosen-
feld’s argument owes much to earlier strain theory
but also refl ects the critical criminologist’s discon-
tent with the nature of contemporary capitalism.
In addition, they refl ect Durkheim’s central point
about the normality of crime:
There is nothing necessarily ‘sick’, pathological,

dysfunctional, or disorganized about a society
organized to produced high rates of crime . . . a
particular level and type of crime are a normal
outcome of a specifi ed set of cultural and social
arrangements . . . A low level of predatory crime
would be a sign of ‘something wrong’ with a
society that places a premium on the individual
competitive pursuit of fi nancial gain, encourages
people to create ever more effi cient means of best-
ing others, and offers comparatively little protec-
tion or comfort to the unsuccessful. We would be
on the lookout for something out of the ordinary,
something abnormal, about unusually low or fall-
ing crime rates in a society organized for crime.
(Rosenfeld and Messner, in Henry
and Lanier, 2005: 168)
In contemporary society, crime, for Messner and
Rosenfeld, is a product of the dominance of free-
market economics, its elevation of material suc-
cess above all other goals and its cultural tendency
toward anomie. Social controls are weakened and
the use of illegitimate means to attain culturally
desired goals increases as such means themselves
become progressively legitimised. They argue that
societies which protect their members from the
worst excesses of free-market economics therefore
tend to have lower crime rates than others where
there is less restriction on the market. Recent
research (Downes and Hansen, 2006; Cavadino and
Dignan, 2006; Lacey, 2008) tends to provide sup-
port for just such a proposition. Thus, Downes and
Hansen (2006) in a study of crime rates and welfare
spending across 18 societies concluded that:

countries that spend a greater proportion of GDP
on welfare have lower imprisonment rates and
that this relationship has become stronger over
the last 15 years. The consistency in these fi nd-
ings across the United States and the other
17 countries studied makes it diffi cult to believe
that this relationship is simply accidental or
coincidental.
Review questions
1 What are strains? Give some examples.
2 What are the central components of general
strain theory?
3 Why do strains increase the likelihood of crime?
4 What are the main characteristics of institutional
anomie theory?
Assessing strain theory
As we noted at the outset, in many respects strain
theory has fallen out of fashion. It had major infl u-
ence in the 1960s but has waned since, though
Agnew’s general strain theory has revitalised discus-
sion of such ideas in some quarters. Nevertheless,
strain theories contain a number of important fea-
tures and it is important to recognise them.
They draw our attention to the social, cultural

and economic circumstances that lead to
crime.
They point to the necessary relationship between
particular forms of social organisation and
particular levels of crime.
Merton’s formulation drew attention to the
unintended consequences of the social goal of
individual economic achievement. Critics of the
market society and of consumer capitalism are
in many respects working in a similar
tradition.
Anomie and strain theory’s predominant
concern with the vulnerability of working-class
or poorer communities sits comfortably with
the liberal sensibilities of much sociological
criminology and, undoubtedly, accounts for
some of its intuitive appeal.
There are, however, numerous criticisms of strain
theory:
The tendency to rely on offi cial statistics as
an indicator of the nature and distribution of
crime and, connected with this, the tendency
generally to focus on lower-class crime are argued
to be misleading. Strain theory tends to ignore
the crimes of the powerful, for example, or
simply the crimes of the middle classes.
It is argued that anomie theory exaggerates
the consensus that surrounds fi nancial success
as a socially and culturally defi ned objective;
there are other, competing means by which

success can be measured. Indeed, Merton clearly
recognised the existence in American society of
a range of ‘counter-cultures’ (lower-middle-class
preference for security over competition; the
craftsman’s emphasis on skill and ‘expressivity’
over fi nancial reward) but nevertheless assumed
a generalised acceptance of the American dream.
For the radical theorist, anomie theory fails
to look closely enough at the socio-political
circumstances of crime. Thus, according
to Taylor, Walton and Young, the major
shortcoming of Merton’s analysis was its failure
to go beyond the identifi cation of the central
contradiction of American capitalism to ask
why the situation existed and continued. They
quote Laurie Taylor (1971: 148):
It is as though individuals in society are
playing a gigantic fruit machine, but the
machine is rigged and only some players are
consistently rewarded. The deprived ones
then either resort to using foreign coins or
magnets to increase their chances of win-
ning (innovation) or play on mindlessly
(ritualism), give up the game (retreatism)
or propose a new game altogether (rebel-
lion). But in the analysis nobody appeared
to ask who put the machine there in the fi rst
place and who takes the profi ts. Criticism of
the game is confi ned to changing the pay-
out sequences so that the deprived can get
a better deal . . . What at fi rst sight looks
like a major critique of society ends up by
taking the existing society for granted. The
necessity of standing outside the present

structural/cultural confi gurations is not just
the job of those categorised in the rebellion
mode of adaptation – it is also the task of the
sociologist.
In a similar vein, it is argued, again notably by
Taylor et al. , that anomie theory over-predicts
lower-class crime (and, arguably, lower-class
strain ) but it is less clear whether anomie theory
is able to account for crimes of the middle class
and wealthy.
It is similarly unclear that the theory can deal
with the very wide variety of forms of offending
(the wide variety of adaptations ) that exist – are
sexual violence and theft the product of the
same strain to anomie that leads to vandalism,
for example?
Early strain theory tends to focus on structural
conditions and, consequently, pays relatively
little attention to human agency – Agnew’s
general strain theory endeavours to deal with
this criticism.
Assessing strain theory 197
The theory underplays the importance of social
control (and self-control) in the production and
moulding of deviance, i.e. it pays insuffi cient
attention to the particular social circumstances
and opportunities which affect crime.
Merton ignored the possibility of achievements

exceeding expectations, rather than simply
failing to reach them – what Downes and Rock
call the ‘anomie of success’ (2003: 137).
Some deviance, rather than being the product
of strain, appears rather to be part and
parcel of the routine operation of work or
organisations, or even the state. How, for
example, might anomie theory deal with state
human rights abuses?
1 In what ways might crime be considered normal
in society?
2 What are the main differences between
Durkheim’s and Merton’s use of the term
anomie?
3 In what ways is Merton’s argument structural
and in what ways is it cultural?
4 Is it right to say that strain theory over-predicts
working-class deviance?
5 In what ways might a society be considered to
be criminogenic?
6 Does general strain theory solve the problems
identifi ed in earlier strain theories?
Further reading
Agnew, R. (2006) ‘Why do individuals engage in crime?’
in Newburn, T. (ed.) (2009) Key Readings in Criminol-

ogy, Cullompton: Willan.
Agnew, R. and Brezina, T. (2010) ‘Strain theories’, in
McLaughlin, E. and Newburn, T. (eds) The Sage Hand-
book of Criminological Theory, London: Sage.
Cloward, R.A. and Ohlin, L.E. (2006) ‘Delinquency and
opportunity’, in Cullen, F.T. and Agnew, R. (eds)
Criminological Theory Past to Present: Essential readings,
3rd edn, Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury.
Downes, D. and Rock, P. (2011) Understanding Deviance,
6th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press (ch. 5).
Durkheim, E. (1964) ‘The normal and the pathological’,
in Newburn, T. (ed.) (2009) Key Readings in Criminol-
ogy, Cullompton: Willan.
Garland, D. (1990) Punishment and Modern Society,
Oxford: Oxford University Press (ch. 2).
Merton, R.K. (1938) ‘Social structure and anomie’, in
Newburn, T. (ed.) (2009) Key Readings in Criminology,
Cullompton: Willan.
Rosenfeld, R. and Messner, S.F. (1995) ‘Crime and the
American Dream: An institutional analysis’, in New-
burn, T. (ed.) (2009) Key Readings in Criminology,
Cullompton: Willan.
Rosenfeld, R. and Messner, S.F. (2013) Crime and Econ-
omy, London: Sage.
Young, J. (2007) ‘The vertigo of late modernity’, in
Newburn, T. (ed.) (2009) Key Readings in Criminology,
Cullompton: Willan.

Websites
There are a number of websites worth visiting. On Dur-
kheim’s life and work, it is worth looking at: http: //
emiledurkheim.com.
There are some interesting materials on Merton and
anomie on the Crime Theory website: www.crime
theory.com/Merton/index.html
A short fi lm on Durkheim’s notion of mechanical and
organic solidarity can be found here: https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=XGargZd9KkQ&feature=youtu.be
http://emiledurkheim.com
http://emiledurkheim.com
http://www.crimetheory.com/Merton/index.html
http://www.crimetheory.com/Merton/index.html
www.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGargZd9KkQ&featur
e=youtu.be
www.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGargZd9KkQ&featur
e=youtu.be
Chapter outline
Introduction
The Chicago School
Social ecology
Chicago School and crime
The zonal hypothesis

Shaw and McKay: cultural transmission
Chicago Area Project
Differential association
Differential reinforcement
Assessing the Chicago School
Cultures and subcultures
Albert Cohen
Cloward and Ohlin
David Matza
Subcultural theory
American subcultural theory
British subcultural theory
Assessing subcultural theory
Cultural criminology
Crime as culture
Culture as crime
Media dynamics of crime and control
A critique of cultural criminology

Further reading
Websites
10
The Chicago
School, subcultures
and cultural
criminology
10 · The Chicago School and cultural criminology200
Introduction
In the previous four chapters we looked at some of
the roots of what we now understand as criminol-
ogy. By the 1930s – the period we begin from in
this chapter – criminology was still not a term that
was widely used. However, this was soon to change,
and what has subsequently become known as the
Chicago School is central to that process. Indeed,
according to Leon Radzinowicz (1962: 117–118):
In the years between the two world wars, the sig-
nifi cance of criminological studies in the United
States of America increased out of all recognition.
The European infl uence was transcended . . .
American criminology entered upon its germinal
phase . . . It became an independent discipline,
unmistakably original in its approach and con-
clusions, full of explanatory vigour, attracting
minds of outstanding ability.

Indeed, Lewis Coser (1979: 311–312) says ‘It seems
no exaggeration to say that for roughly 20 years,
from the fi rst world war to the mid-1930s, the his-
tory of sociology in America can largely be written
as the history of the Department of Sociology of the
University of Chicago.’
The Chicago School
Chicago University has a special place in the history
of criminology. The reason for this dates back to
1892, when it took the decision to establish the fi rst
major sociology department in the United States. By
the 1930s the department was a large and vibrant
home for a particular brand of sociology – one
based on direct experience and observation (gener-
ally referred to as ‘ethnography’) – and a massive
amount of work which focused on the city in which
the university was located.
Some of the most important names in American
sociology – Walter Reckless, Frederick Thrasher,
Everett Hughes, Robert Park, Edwin Sutherland
and later Clifford Shaw, Henry McKay, Louis Wirth
and Gerald Suttles – studied Chicago’s immigrant and
minority communities, its vice and organised crime,
its homeless and, crucially, the make-up of the city
itself.
Though generally referred to as the Chicago
School, the work of the Chicago sociologists isn’t
uniform or particularly systematised (Heidensohn,
1989). If the establishment of the fi rst sociol-
ogy department was an important factor in this
history, the siting of it in Chicago was vital. At
the time, Chicago was America’s second-largest

city and it was undergoing rapid and signifi cant
change. The rapid industrialisation of the United
States saw the growth of steel mills, railroads and
other major manufacturing concerns in Chicago
and, alongside this, swift demographic changes
as African Americans from the South and white
immigrants from Europe arrived in large numbers.
Half of the population of Chicago in 1900 had
been born outside the USA.
CHAPTER
SUMMARY
For half a century, from the First World War onwards,
criminology was
increasingly dominated by sociologists and sociological
thought. Initially, via a
group of scholars working in, or trained at, the Department of
Sociology at the
University of Chicago, the focus of much criminology was upon
the nature of
the city, its structures and processes, and how these related to
patterns of crime
and delinquency. This chapter considers how such sociology
was based on rich
ethnographic studies of the everyday lives of Chicagoans and
formed the basis
for a tradition which bred a further set of detailed empirical
studies focusing
on the cultural context and social meaning of deviant activity.
Initially,
American sociology dominated the fi eld, but from the 1960s
onward, British
scholars began to turn their attention to the notion of
subcultures . Having
outlined and assessed ‘subcultural theory’, the chapter

concludes by looking at
one of the more recent developments in the fi eld – the
emergence of ‘cultural
criminology’.
The Chicago School 201
Albion Small
Founder of the Sociology
Department in Chicago and also of
the American Journal of Sociology.
W.I. Thomas
Ethnographer and author of The
Polish Peasant .
Louis Wirth
Enormously infl uential urban
sociologist.
Edwin Sutherland
Arguably the most famous
criminologist of the twentieth
century.
Walter Reckless
Deviser of ‘containment theory’.
Erving Goffman

Hugely infl uential sociologist;
author of Stigma , Asylums and The
Presentation of Self in Everyday
Life.
Everett Hughes
Studied occupations; author of
Men and their Work .
Howard Becker
A graduate of the Chicago School
and author of Outsiders: Studies in
the sociology of deviance .
Herbert Blumer
Coined the term ‘symbolic
interaction’.
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay
Authors of some of the Chicago School’s best-known work.
The infl uence of the Chicago School
Social ecology
It was such changes, Lilly et al. (2002: 32) argue,
that ‘made the city – and not the “little house on
the prairie” – the nation’s focal point’. Just as soci-

ology itself was the product of the rapid social, eco-
nomic and cultural changes of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, so sociologically informed
criminology was itself profoundly infl uenced by
the signifi cant social changes of the early twentieth
century – not least urbanisation and mass migra-
tion. Increasingly, crime came to be seen, at least in
part, as a social problem.
The studies of the city itself are often referred to
using the term ‘ecology’ – a biological metaphor
pointing to the importance of natural patterning
produced by differing species within some form of
overall ordered universe. In this case, the universe
was the city and the ecological focus was upon how
the city grew and developed. Much of the Chicago
School work was heavily infl uenced by Durkheim
and, in particular, the view of crime levels as being
linked to social organisation, and also by Georg
Simmel’s (1903) picture of the city as a source of
liberation and alienation.
According to Savage and Warde (1993: 13, quoted
in Valier, 2002):
The work of the Chicago School is best seen as
an extended empirical inquiry into the nature of
social bonding in the modern, fragmented, city.
The city interested them for empirical, rather
than conceptual reasons. It was where the divi-
sion of labour was most elaborate and devel-
oped, and hence where the fragmentary nature
of modern life could most profi tably be studied.
Chicago School and crime

Though elements of the Chicago School research
were statistically based, this group of sociologists is
best known for their detailed ethnographic work,
using participant observation in order to pro-
duce what Matza (1964) later called ‘appreciative’
Robert Ezra Park (1864–1944)
Born in Pennsylvania, Park grew up in Minnesota on the
banks of the Mississippi. Graduating from the University
of Michigan in 1887, Park became a newspaperman and
worked on daily papers for the next decade in Minne-
sota, Detroit, Denver, New York and Chicago.
According to Burgess and Bogue (1964: 3), Park ‘was
interested in the newspaper, its power of exposing con-
ditions and arousing public sentiment, and in taking the
lead against slums, exploitation of immigrants, or cor-
ruption in municipal affairs’.
In the mid-1890s he began to study philosophy at
Harvard University and subsequently became a post-
graduate student in Germany, where, though he was not
formally studying sociology, he was infl uenced by Georg
Simmel.
‘Dr Park found that, while newspaper publicity
aroused a great deal of interest and stirred the emotions
of the public, it did not lead to constructive action. He
decided that something more than news was needed,
that you had to get beneath the surface of things’ (Bur-
gess and Bogue, 1964: 3). His academic career then
started in 1914 at the age of 50.
I expect I have actually covered more ground tramp-
ing about in cities in different parts of the world than

any other living man.
(cited in Lilly et al ., 2002: 33)
It is probably the breaking down of local attachments
and the weakening of the restraints and inhibitions of
the primary group, under the infl uence of the urban
environment, which are largely responsible for the
increase of vice and crime in great cities.
(Park, 1915)
Robert Park, originally a newspaperman, turned urban
ethnographer.
accounts of people’s everyday lives. Shaw and
McKay’s (1942) work in Chicago uncovered two
important patterns concerning the social and geo-
graphical distribution of crime and delinquency.
The fi rst was that neighbourhoods tended to be rel-
atively stable in their statuses as high-, medium- or
low-crime areas. That is, over a 20–30-year period,
neighbourhoods would remain as high-crime, say,
or low-crime areas despite changes in their racial
and ethnic compositions.
Second, they found that crime and delinquency
rates tended consistently to be lower in areas of
high socio-economic status and higher in areas of
relative socio-economic deprivation. This led them
to conclude that the factors that helped explain
socio-economic differences were also important

in explaining social and geographical variation in
crime and delinquency. This is not the same as say-
ing, however, that poverty causes crime.
The zonal hypothesis
At the heart of the Chicago School’s explanation
of urban development was their zonal hypothesis ,
the idea that the city evolved through a series of
concentric circles, each being a zone of social and
cultural life. The natural element to all this is the
fact that it is not, or at least not entirely, planned.
Moreover, the nature of each of the areas comes
increasingly to resemble the character and qualities
of the inhabitants: ‘The effect of this is to convert
what was at fi rst a mere geographical expression
into a neighbourhood, that is to say, a locality with
sentiments, traditions, and a history of its own’
(Park, quoted in Downes and Rock, 2003: 64).
Early work in Chicago by Ernest Burgess had
sought to produce a social map of the city, and this
work in the mid-1920s included the fi rst exposi-
tion of the idea of concentric circles as the basis for
understanding the social organisation of the city.
For Burgess the growth of cities is far from haphaz-
ard, but actually is heavily patterned in ways that
can be understood sociologically. He argued that
cities tended to grow outwards in a series of con-
centric circles or rings.
As Burgess suggests, and as shown in Figure 10.1,
at the heart of the concentric circles is the business
district (Zone I) – a zone that has high property val-
ues and a small residential population. Outside this

FA
CTOR
Y ZONE
I
LOOP
II
ZONE OF TRANSITION
III
ZONE OF WORKING MEN’S
HOMES
IV
RESIDENTIAL ZONE
V
SUBURBAN ZONE
Figure 10.1 Ernest Burgess: the growth of cities
Source : Burgess (1925).
is, for criminological purposes at least, arguably
the most important zone (Zone II), known as the
zone of transition . This is an area which has a more
transient population, one which is poor, living in
inadequate and deteriorating housing. Beyond this
zone lay three residential zones each of which was
broken down into a number of subsections, Burgess’s

argument being that newcomers gradually moved
outward into more prosperous zones as they became
integrated into American cultural life. Zone III is a
zone of relatively modest residential homes occu-
pied by people who have escaped Zone II. Zone IV,
another residential district, is more affl uent and
occupies the space up to the city limits. Beyond this
are suburban areas which make up Zone V.
According to Burgess (1925: 51):
This chart brings out clearly the main fact of
expansion, namely, the tendency of each inner
zone to extend its area by the invasion of the
next outer zone. This aspect of expansion may
be called succession , a process which has been
studied in detail in plant ecology. If this chart is
applied to Chicago, all four of these zones were
in its early history included in the circumference
of the inner zone, the present business district.
The present boundaries of the area of deteriora-
tion were not many years ago those of the zone
now inhabited by independent wage-earners,
and within the memories of thousands of Chi-
cagoans contained the residences of the ‘best
families’.
In the zone of transition there were copious exam-
ples of deviant behaviour and social problems:
crime, prostitution, high infant mortality and poor
health and, of course, poverty. Such problems were
by no means confi ned to the zone of transition, but
they were disproportionately concentrated there.
Such deviance is, in effect, largely an effort to create
order in an area of disorganisation. This zone was
portrayed by the Chicago sociologists as disorgan-

ised and unruly, though others such as Matza and
Whyte were critical of what they saw as the failure
to see the nature of social order and organisation in
the diversity and hubbub of this transitional zone.
Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) had earlier argued
that ‘The stability of group institutions is . . . sim-
ply a dynamic equilibrium of processes of disorga-
nization and reorganization. This equilibrium is
disturbed when processes of disorganization can no
longer be checked by any attempts to reinforce the
existing rules.’ Building on this, Shaw and McKay
argued that rapid population changes resulted in
a degree of social disorganisation in which estab-
lished values lost their hold with predictable conse-
quences for crime and delinquency.
Shaw and McKay: cultural transmission
Burgess’s work was tested by Shaw and McKay in
the early 1940s. Their work (Shaw and McKay,
1942), using Chicago’s juvenile court records over
several decades, explored the ecological patterning
of such offending. They found that the parts of the
city with high delinquency rates were also charac-
terised by:
a high percentage of ‘foreign born’ and African-
American heads of households;
a high percentage of families on welfare;
a low rate of home ownership, and greatest
number of condemned buildings;
decreasing population;

high rates of infant mortality, tuberculosis,
insanity, adult criminality and truancy.
These parts of the city are characterised by different
value systems from those held by other parts, they
argued, and this can have important consequences
for the ways in which people behave:
In the areas of high economic status where the
rates of delinquency are low there is, in general,
a similarity in the attitudes of the residents with
reference to conventional values . . . In contrast,
the areas of low economic status where the rates
of delinquency are high, are characterized by
wide diversity in norms and standards of behav-
iour . . . Children living in such communities
are exposed to a variety of contradictory stan-
dards and forms of behaviour rather than to a
relatively consistent and conventional pattern.
(Shaw and McKay, 1942: 170–172)
Their research supported Burgess’s ecological thesis
and they argued that the high levels of juvenile
delinquency found in the zone of transition were
a product of social disorganisation in that part of the
city. This social disorganisation was characterised
by poverty, residential mobility and racial hetero-
geneity. In addition, Shaw and McKay introduced
the idea of cultural transmission. Their argument
was that values, including delinquent values, are
transmitted from generation to generation, and
it is through such processes that particular areas
become established as delinquent areas despite the
turnover of people in the area. In such commu-

nities there develops a tradition in which various
criminal activities are learned by young boys from
the older ones in the area, with particular offences
such as shoplifting, car theft and jackrolling (steal-
ing) being passed from generation to generation.
This tradition is manifested in many differ-
ent ways. It becomes meaningful to the child
through the conduct, speech, gestures, and atti-
tudes of persons with whom he has contact. Of
particular importance is the child’s intimate
association with predatory gangs or other forms
of criminal or delinquent organization. Through
his contacts with these groups and by virtue
of his participation in their activities he learns
the techniques of stealing, becomes involved in
binding relationships with his companions in
delinquency, and acquires the attitudes appro-
priate to his position as a member of such groups.
(Shaw and McKay, 1942: 436)
Anticipating control theory-related ideas that were
to follow in succeeding decades, Shaw and McKay
argued that in the wealthier parts of the city chil-
dren were more closely and carefully supervised
and that such supervision was more diffi cult to
achieve in those areas where traditional institutions
such as schools, churches and the family itself were
under greater pressure from rapid urban change. In

this manner, social disorganisation is a signifi cant
breeding ground for delinquency and criminality.
Chicago Area Project
Clifford Shaw’s academic studies had a practical
component and consequence also. In the early
1930s he established the Chicago Area Project, a
series of neighbourhood centres situated around
the city. Their function was to coordinate commu-
nity resources (churches, schools, local associations
and clubs) in tackling local problems. In addition,
they acted as a forum for generating funds to spon-
sor programmes for adults and young people, again
with a view to responding to local problems and,
crucially, involving local people in this process. The
projects ran for over 20 years and spawned a num-
ber of imitators and, whilst there is little evidence
that they had any profound effect on local levels
of juvenile delinquency, such models continue to
exert some infl uence on much local community
crime prevention activity.
Differential association
Shaw and McKay’s ideas were taken up and modi-
fi ed by Edwin Sutherland, another criminologist
who studied and, briefl y, worked at Chicago Uni-
versity. His focus was less upon the fairly negative
idea of social disorganisation. Rather, he explored
how differential forms of organisation led to dif-
ferent cultural infl uences and mechanisms, and
he sought to understand criminal behaviour as
learned behaviour. His theory argued that, as with
all behaviour, criminal conduct is learned in inter-
action with others, being communicated between
groups and, indeed, generations. In this, he was
much infl uenced by work by the French sociolo-

gist Gabriel Tarde and his ‘laws of imitation’, and
also by George Herbert Mead’s infl uential work on
symbolic interactionism. In a manner similar to
Sutherland’s later work, Frederick Thrasher (1927)
had argued in The Gang that ideas about behaviour
were passed from generation to generation of males
on the streets. At the core of the idea of differen-
tial association is the notion that if an individual
is exposed to more ideas that promote lawbreaking
than they are ideas that act as barriers to such con-
duct, then criminal conduct becomes highly likely.
In Sutherland’s words differential association is
based on the hypothesis that ‘a person becomes
delinquent because of an excess of defi nitions
Much of the work of the Chicago sociologists focused on
fi rst-hand accounts of life in some of the most run-down
parts of the city.
favourable to violation of law over defi nitions unfa-
vourable to violation of law’ (Sutherland, 1947: 6) .
Shaw’s work in books such as The Jackroller (1930)
had shown the important infl uence of friends and
peers on juvenile delinquency. For Sutherland, such
learning covers the techniques of committing crime
(which may be more or less complex) and what he
refers to as ‘the specifi c direction of motives, drives,
rationalizations, and attitudes’. Differential asso-
ciations vary in intensity, frequency and duration,
and it is those, he argued, that last longer, are more
intense and occur earlier in life that are likely to be

more infl uential.
Sutherland’s ideas have been criticised for
failing to explain why people develop the asso-
ciations they do. Insofar as friendship groups are
concerned, it might be argued that the explana-
tion is actually more to be found in peer selection
than peer infl uence, i.e. people who are disposed
toward delinquency search out delinquent peers
precisely so as to provide a sympathetic context
for their behaviour. Indeed, a number of criminol-
ogists, particularly those working in the control
theory tradition (Hirschi, 1969), have proposed
precisely this. However, in terms of the impor-
tance of association, the ‘selection’ criticism is
obviously more diffi cult to sustain if the relation-
ships concerned are, say, family relationships. The
theory of differential association went through a
number of forms, eventually being summarised in
a set of nine propositions in 1947 (Sutherland and
Cressey, 1947/1970: 75–76):
1 Criminal behaviour is learned.
2 Criminal behaviour is learned in interaction
with other persons in a process of
communication.
3 The principal part of the learning of criminal
behaviour occurs within intimate personal
groups.
4 When criminal behaviour is learned, the
learning includes (a) techniques of committing
the crime, which sometimes are very
complicated, sometimes very simple; [and]

(b) the specifi c direction of motives, drives,
rationalisations, and attitudes.
5 The specifi c direction of motives and drives
is learned from defi nitions of legal codes as
favourable and unfavourable.
6 A person becomes delinquent because of an
excess of defi nitions favourable to violation of
law over defi nitions unfavourable to violation
of law. This is the principle of differential
association.
7 Differential associations may vary in frequency,
duration, priority, and intensity.
8 The process of learning criminal behaviour by
association with criminal and anti-criminal
patterns involves all the mechanisms that are
involved in any other learning.
9 While criminal behaviour is an expression of
general needs and values, it is not explained
by those general needs and values since non-
criminal behaviour is an expression of the
same needs and values. Thieves generally steal
in order to secure money, but likewise honest
labourers work in order to secure money. The
attempts by many scholars to explain criminal
behaviour by general drives and values, such
as the happiness principle, striving for social
status, the money motive, or frustration, have
been, and must continue to be, futile, since
they explain lawful behaviour as completely
as they explain criminal behaviour. They are

similar to respiration, which is necessary for
any behaviour, but which does not differentiate
criminal from non-criminal behaviour.
Differential reinforcement
Criminologists such as Akers (see Chapter 8) and
others have sought to extend Sutherland’s ideas in
a fairly direct form, using social learning theory
to explore how criminal learning is undertaken.
Akers’ theory of ‘differential reinforcement’ takes
Sutherland’s ideas of ‘defi nitions’, and distin-
guishes between the ‘general’ (overall beliefs about
what is good and bad) and the specifi c (particu-
lar conditions under which things are considered
to be good or bad or right or wrong). This intro-
duces the possibility that certain forms of crimi-
nal behaviour might generally be considered to
be wrong, but may be permitted under certain
circumstances.
Differential reinforcement relates to the antici-
pated consequences of particular actions, i.e.
whether they are likely, for example, to result in
punishment. We tend to do things that will not
result in punishment, but in choosing courses
of action we are infl uenced by what others do
through a process that Akers refers to as imita-
tion. Akers’ expansion of Sutherland’s ideas leads
to the proposition that initial delinquent activity
results from a combination of differential asso-
ciation and imitation. This initial participation
CH8

will be differentially reinforced – meaning that
it may be continued if the reinforcement is posi-
tive, or it will cease if the reaction is experienced
as negative. These reinforcements may be directly
experienced – say in the form of punishment – or
observed in others.
Edwin Sutherland’s ideas have had a lasting
impact on various aspects of criminology. His the-
ory of differential association was arguably crucial
in moving criminology away from theories domi-
nated by those who sought their answers in human
biology, physiology or through psychiatry, and his
‘legacy to criminology is not his specifi c learning
theory but his argument that criminal behaviour is
normal learned behaviour’ (Vold et al. , 2002: 175).
On a more general level, however, as Downes and
Rock (2007) note, differential association theory’s
infl uence was in acting as a bridge between the
early work of the Chicago School and what later
became known as subcultural theory. This was true
not just of American subcultural theory but also of
British work in this area in the 1960s and 1970s.
Before we turn our attention to subcultural theory,
we must look at some of the criticisms levelled at
Chicago School sociology.
Assessing the Chicago School
One of the most oft-proffered negative views of
the Chicago School is that the work is somewhat
atheoretical. Some critics view the work of the
Chicago sociologists as being rather overly descrip-
tive and lacking in clear, theoretically based, test-
able hypotheses. Downes and Rock quote Joseph

Gusfi eld’s reminiscence that he and his colleagues
harboured an ‘indifference, even disdain, for the
endless efforts of sociologists to develop refi ned
theory or methodological rigour’ (2003: 76). It is
important not to overstate such criticism, however.
By contrast, Lewis Coser (1979: 313), discussing the
work of the Chicago School, has argued that:
it must be stressed that their reputation as atheo-
retical fact-fi nders and empty-headed empiricists
is by no means deserved. The members of the
early generation possessed well-furnished theo-
retical minds and were very much conversant
with social theory, whether European or home-
grown. Simmel, Durkheim, the Austrian confl ict
theorists, but also Marx (though not Weber)
were part of the theoretical toolkits of most Chi-
cago sociologists of the fi rst generation, and also,
though less uniformly so, of the second.
Second, some commentators have been critical of
the idea of the ecological model itself, in particular
for its downplaying of those structurally determin-
ing factors within cities that were planned and far
from ‘natural’.
Third, the idea of social disorganisation itself is
by no means always clearly distinguished from the
phenomena it is used to explain, such as crime and
disorder. That is, there appears sometimes to be an
element of teleology in aspects of Shaw and McKay’s
explanation.
A fourth criticism concerns the idea of cultural
transmission, which, though persuasive and impor-
tant, is argued to be unclear in some respects.

Thus, it is not always clear how particular cul-
tural formations, e.g. criminal (sub)cultures, come
into being.
Fifth, much of the Chicago work is regularly
criticised for having used offi cial measures of crime
as the basis for understanding different parts of the
city and for doing so rather uncritically (for a cri-
tique of such offi cial statistics, see Chapter 3).
Sixth, elements of the Chicago sociology came
close to structural determinism, placing too little
emphasis on individual decision-making, and over-
emphasising the infl uence of place.
Seventh, some of the work is said to have assumed
too close a ‘fi t’ between delinquent values and
lower-class status or, the reverse, non-delinquent
values and middle-class norms and lifestyles.
Finally, critics question whether ideas such as
differential association and cultural transmission
can explain all forms of crime. Can they, for exam-
ple, explain impulsive or emotive offences where
offenders may have had little contact with deviant
values or ideas?
Whatever its shortcomings may have been, the
detailed ethnographic work of the Chicago School
‘prepared the basis for some of the principal socio-
logical stances that were to come’ (Downes and
Rock, 2003: 80). Crucial amongst these were more
recent studies of neighbourhoods and networks
that have explored issues of ‘social capital’ and
‘collective effi cacy’. According to Bursik (2000: 94)
these systemic theories of neighbourhood crime

rates build on insights originating with Chicago
School studies and suggest that:
The levels of residential instability and
population heterogeneity will be highest in
economically deprived neighbourhoods.
Private and parochial networks will be
smaller, be less dense and have less breadth in
CH3
neighbourhoods with high levels of residential
instability and population heterogeneity.
Public networks will be smaller, be less dense
and have less breadth in economically deprived
neighbourhoods.
Crime rates are a function of the ability of
private, parochial and public networks to
transfer the types of social capital that are
necessary for the effective control of crime.
The total effects of economic deprivation,
residential instability, and population
heterogeneity on crime are mediated by these
intervening systemic factors.
One body of work that owes a substantial debt to
the Chicago School and has sought to build on
many of its insights is Robert Sampson’s work on

local neighbourhoods and crime and, more particu-
larly, on the idea of ‘collective effi cacy’. Sampson
and colleagues’ research in Chicago neighbour-
hoods found that a combination of poverty, family
instability and high residential mobility tended to
be associated with relatively high levels of violent
crime (Sampson et al. , 1997). This they related to
‘social disorganisation’, defi ned as the community’s
inability to realise its objectives. The notion of ‘col-
lective effi cacy’ is almost the reverse of this, being
the community’s ability to maintain order through
overt action. This can only successfully occur when
there is ‘mutual trust’ and suffi cient shared expecta-
tions about intervening to maintain order. Essen-
tially, it refers to social cohesion – a form of social
capital – based on shared values.
Although there are a number of important and
very substantial differences between the social eco-
logical approach of the Chicago School and later
cultural and subcultural theorists, it is also the case
that it is in some of this later work that the infl u-
ence of the Chicago School can most obviously be
seen. The developing interest in modern urban life
and its opportunities can be seen early on in the
work of Robert Park, who set the tone of much that
followed:
The processes of segregation established moral
distances which make the city a mosaic of lit-
tle worlds which touch but do not interpen-
etrate. This makes it possible for individuals to
pass quickly and easily from one moral milieu
to another, and encourages the fascinating but
dangerous experiment of living at the same time
in several different contiguous, but otherwise

widely separated worlds. All this tends to give to
city life a superfi cial and adventitious character;
it tends to complicate social relationships and
to produce new and divergent individual types.
It introduces, at the same time, an element of
chance and adventure which adds to the stimu-
lus of city life and gives it, for young and fresh
nerves, a peculiar attractiveness.
(Park, 1925: 40–41)
Review questions
1 What is meant by an ecological approach?
2 Explain what is meant by the zone of transition
and what its importance was held to be.
3 What is differential association?
4 Why might critics have suggested that Chicago
sociology was atheoretical?
Cultures and subcultures
Core features of Chicago School sociology – the
focus on the city, the ethnographic and appreciative
approach to research, and concern with the cultural
basis of crime – all fi nd their way into the subcul-
tural approaches that emerged initially in America
and later Britain after the Second World War.
As was suggested in the previous chapter, it was
actually Albert Cohen’s work that initially built on
Merton’s theory and which, as importantly, intro-
duced the notions of culture and subculture to the

study of delinquency. Culture, for Cohen (1955), is
systematised ‘traditional ways of solving problems’
transmitted across time. Cohen, who had been a
student of Merton’s at Harvard and Edwin Suther-
land’s at Indiana, drew on strain theory and the
idea of cultural transmission as a means of explain-
ing the development of delinquent subcultures.
‘Subcultures’ emerge as means of solving prob-
lems created by the incompatible demands of struc-
ture and culture. Though conducted much earlier,
an early and path-breaking study of Chicago gangs
by Frederic Thrasher saw such groupings as being
characterised by a quest for excitement among
other features. Thrasher’s immense empirical study
of 1,313 gangs in the city led him (1927: 57) to
defi ne the gang as:
an interstitial group originally formed sponta-
neously, and then integrated through confl ict.
It is characterised by the following types of
Cultures and subcultures 209
behaviour: meeting face-to-face, milling, move-
ment through space as a unit, confl ict and plan-
ning. The result of this collective behaviour is the
development of tradition, unrefl ective internal
structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group
awareness, and attachments to a local territory.
Thrasher’s view of gangs as the product of socially
disorganised environments has been particularly
infl uential, not only on subsequent studies of gangs,

but also in the area of delinquency more generally.
Albert Cohen
Albert Cohen was also drawn to the concentration
of delinquency within gangs, and in his model
viewed gang delinquency as a form of solution to
the contradictions, or strains, faced by many young
men, in particular as a result of their failure within
the educational system. According to Downes and
Rock (2007), the way of life outlined in Cohen’s
theory of delinquency had six major features:
1 Economic rationality is largely absent.
2 Much delinquent activity is characterised by
‘malice’.
3 The behaviour involves a rejection of dominant
values.
4 Gang activity is hedonistic and emphasises
instant gratifi cation.
5 Delinquents are not specialists – their
delinquent behaviour is varied.
6 Primary allegiance is to the gang rather than
other groups.
Young people who have no immediate access to
respectable status by virtue of their families, and
who fare poorly in the competition for achieved sta-
tus, can either continue to conform to middle-class
values despite their low-status position, or they can
fi nd an alternative source of status: the gang. The
gang inverts traditional values – hard work, respect-

ability – as a means of creating an alternative world
within which status can be achieved. In this sense
it is perhaps closest to elements of Merton’s ‘rebel-
lion’ adaptation to strain. In a passage resonant of
Merton, Cohen (1955: 137) observed that:
Those values which are at the core of the
‘American way of life’, which help to motivate
behaviour which we most esteem as ‘typically
Street-corner boys in New York in the 1950s. Gangs, their
organisation and operation have been a long-running theme
in American criminology.
American’, are among the major determinants
of that which we stigmatize as ‘pathological’ . . .
the problems of adjustment to which the delin-
quent subculture is a response are determined,
in part, by those very values which respectable
society holds most sacred.
What Cohen called the ‘corner boys’ were
poorly prepared and equipped to compete with
their higher-class peers. The limited access they
have to the status that is valued in American
society means they are confronted with a ‘prob-
lem of adjustment’. In effect, lower-class boys are
handicapped, in part by the limitations of their
own socialisation and also by the middle-class atti-
tudes and values which are socially esteemed and
by which they will inevitably be judged. They are
‘denied status in the respectable society because

they cannot meet the criteria of the respectable
status system’ (1955: 121).
According to Cohen, to the extent that they care
about this they will feel some ‘shame’ and will expe-
rience ‘status frustration’. Faced with such problems
of adjustment, there is a search for a ‘solution’. The
response of the ‘delinquent boy’ is to join together
with others in a similar position, forming the basis
for the development of a delinquent subculture.
Such reaction formation leads to a response that is
hostile to middle-class values and rejects middle-
class status and middle-class values. This process,
argues Cohen, provides a more realistic basis than
strain theory (see Chapter 9) for understanding the
generally negative and non-pecuniary nature of
much lower-class delinquency.
A number of criticisms have been levelled at
Cohen’s theory. First, some have been critical
of the argument that middle-class values are as
widely accepted by lower-class boys as Cohen sug-
gests. Other critics, such as Downes (1966), have
questioned the extent to which lower-class delin-
quent boys are hostile to middle-class norms and
values.
Cloward and Ohlin
An attempt to build on and test Cohen’s theory was
the work undertaken by Cloward and Ohlin (1960)
in a book entitled Delinquency and Opportunity.
Again, much infl uenced by elements of strain the-
ory, Cloward and Ohlin sought to build not only
on Merton’s work but also on Edwin Sutherland’s
notion of differential association (Cloward had been
a student of Merton’s at Columbia, Ohlin a student

of Sutherland’s, as well as studying at Chicago).
CH9
Cloward and Ohlin asked ‘under which condi-
tions will persons experience strains and tensions
that lead to delinquent solutions?’ (1960: 32). In
part, the answer was that ‘the disparity between
what lower-class youths are led to want and what is
actually available to them is the source of a major
problem of adjustment’ (1960: 86). Where Cohen
had emphasised the importance of schooling and
education failure, Cloward and Ohlin’s analysis was
in some ways closer to Robert Merton’s original
picture of anomie, emphasising economic failure
within a culture that idealised fi nancial success.
However, into this mix they add elements of cul-
tural transmission theory in order to illustrate how
different forms of deviance develop. In essence, they
argue that there exists an illegitimate opportunity
structure (in parallel to the legitimate one), with
some having greater access to this than others. Dif-
ferent groups and different neighbourhoods vary in
their access to resources and to opportunities – both
legitimate and illegitimate. Adaptation to strain is
mediated by the availability of particular means.
Therefore:
The concept of differential opportunity struc-
tures permits us to unite the theory of anomie,
which recognizes the concept of differentials in
access to legitimate means, and the ‘Chicago’
tradition, in which the concept of differentials
in access to illegimate means is implicit. We can
now look at the individual, not simply in rela-

tion to one or the other system of means, but
in relation to both legitimate and illegitimate
systems.
(Cloward and Ohlin, 1960: 151)
They argued for the existence of greater speciali-
sation in delinquency than Cohen had allowed for
and, utilising Sutherland’s ideas, identifi ed three
types of delinquent subculture:
Criminal – In which gangs worked largely for
fi nancial gain through robbery, theft and
burglary; such subcultures he argued were more
likely to emerge in organised slum areas where
established offenders could act as role models to
the younger generation.
Conflict – Where the primary form of
delinquency was violence; such subcultures
were more likely to arise in disorganised areas
where access to criminal role models was more
restricted and where offending was therefore
more to do, at least initially, with establishing
social status.
Retreatist – Where much delinquent activity
involved drug use, arising out of the ‘double-
failure’ to achieve success through legitimate or
illegitimate avenues. Drug use is a ‘solution’ to
the status dilemma posed by such failure.

Each of these represents a specifi c form of adapta-
tion to anomie/strain:
and conformity of many young delinquents. More
particularly, Matza and Sykes departed from the
assumptions of much strain and subcultural theory
in rejecting the idea that delinquent values should
necessarily be understood as oppositional to main-
stream values.
Rather, the constraints of the dominant value
system are merely loosened; delinquent values
enable some distance to be created from domi-
nant values through the adoption of what they
term ‘subterranean values’. Such values include
excitement, machismo, toughness and a rejection
of the world of work, and they are to be found
in all parts of society. Delinquent activity itself is
justifi ed through what he terms techniques of neu-
tralisation. These are effectively rationalisations or
justifi cations. In order to continue with a decision
to break the law, individuals need to able to con-
vince themselves that what they are doing is not
really deviant, is not really wrong. The application
of such techniques, and the necessity of doing so,
is an illustration of the power of non-delinquent
values. They include:
Denial of responsibility (‘It wasn’t my fault’,
‘I wasn’t to blame’).
Denial of injury (‘They were insured anyway’,
‘No one will ever miss it’).
Denial of the victim (‘They were asking for it’,
‘It didn’t affect them’, ‘No-one got hurt’).

Condemnation of the condemners (‘They were
just picking on me’, ‘I didn’t do anything that
others don’t do’).
Appeal to higher loyalties (‘I was only
protecting my family’, ‘I was only obeying
orders’).
Critics have taken Matza to task for underplaying
offending behaviour: ‘Unfortunately in setting out
to remedy theories which he saw as “over-predicting”
delinquency, Matza over-corrects to the point at
which his own theory under-predicts both its scale
and, in particular, its more violent forms’ (Downes
and Rock, 2003: 149).
Subcultural theory
Cultural or subcultural theories proceed from the
basis that behaviour can be understood as a largely
rational means of solving problems thrown up by
existing social circumstances – and, in this, they
share something with strain theory. At the heart of
such approaches there lies the comparison of the
Types of
adaptation
Conventional
goals
Legitimate
means
Illegitimate
means

Criminal + – +
Retreatist – – –
Confl ict +/– +/– +/–
Source : Cloward and Ohlin (1960).
The criminal subculture is likely to arise, they
argued, when individuals facing blocked opportu-
nity structures seek – and fi nd – illegitimate means
for achieving conventional goals. As Cloward and
Ohlin describe it (1960: 171), it arises in circum-
stances where there is:
a neighbourhood milieu characterized by close
bonds between different age-levels of offend-
ers, and between criminal and conventional
elements. As a consequence of these integra-
tive relationships, a new opportunity structure
emerges which provides alternative avenues to
success-goals. Hence the pressures generated by
restrictions on legitimate access to success-goals
are drained off. Social controls over the conduct
of the young are effectively exercised, limiting
expressive behaviour and constraining the dis-
contented to adopt instrumental, if criminalis-
tic, styles of life.
David Matza
A critique and reworking of strain theory can be
found in the work of David Matza. In his own work,
and in his joint work with Gresham Sykes (Matza,
1969; Sykes and Matza, 1957; Matza and Sykes,
1961), Matza was critical of strain theory for its

over-prediction of delinquency – a straightforward
reading of the theory implying that in fact there is
far more delinquency than is actually the case. As
such, Matza and Sykes shared something of the per-
spective of control theorists (see Chapter 12) in that
their focus was upon the apparent conventionality
CH12
‘dominant’ cultures and deviant subcultures – these
subcultures being conceived as a solution (a delin-
quent solution ) to the dilemmas posed by the domi-
nant culture. In early Chicago School work the
cultures of the criminal area were distinct from main-
stream values, and the process by which such values
were learned was one of ‘cultural transmission’.
Later writers such Cloward and Ohlin focused
more on the internalisation of middle-class val-
ues and the reaction formation that occurred as a
result of rejection by middle-class society. In later
subcultural theory, the rather consensual model of
social organisation implied by the idea of a domi-
nant culture was replaced with a greater focus on
dissensus and confl ict and, particularly in British
subcultural theory, in an emphasis on social class.
There have been, therefore, effectively two waves
of subcultural theory (Young, 1986): the fi rst, an
American structural–functionalist wave appearing
in the 1950s and 1960s, later followed by a largely
British Marxist wave in the late 1970s. As Stan
Cohen (1980: iv) noted, despite any differences,

the two waves shared a great deal:
Both work with the same ‘problematic’ (to use
the fashionable term): growing up in a class soci-
ety; both identify the same vulnerable group:
the urban male working-class late adolescent;
both see delinquency as a collective solution to a
structurally imposed problem.
American subcultural theory
An early attempt ‘to give a new slant’ to the fi eld
(Laub, 1983: 174) was Thorsten Sellin’s (1938) idea
of culture confl ict. Sellin, building on Chicago
School work, focused on the way in which the
nature of local neighbourhoods or communities
could lead to the development of social attitudes
that confl icted with legal rules and norms. In par-
ticular he was interested in what localised norma-
tive systems could come into confl ict with more
general social normative systems – as expressed in
law. Crudely, therefore, it is possible that adherence
to local, community norms may have the effect of
leading individuals into confl ict with wider social
expectations and rules: a form of conformity that
leads to crime.
An extension of these ideas was proposed by
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) in The Subculture of
Violence. Their focus, in particular, was on the most
expressive or emotional forms of violence, those
conducted in the heat of the moment rather than
activities that were planned and calculated. Earlier,
Marvin Wolfgang (1958: 188–189) had argued:
A male is usually expected to defend the name

or honour of his mother, the virtue of woman-
hood . . . and to accept no derogation about his
race (even from a member of his own race), his
age, or his masculinity. Quick resort to physical
combat as a measure of daring, courage or defence
of status appears to be a cultural expression,
especially for lower socio-economic class males
of both races. When such a culture norm response
is elicited from an individual engaged in social
interplay with others who harbour the same
response mechanism, physical assaults, alterca-
tions, and violent domestic quarrels that result
in homicide are likely to be common.
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) argued that the dif-
ferences between the parent culture and a subculture
of violence were only partial, not total. The crucial
difference was the reliance, in some circumstances,
on violence as a response to these circumstances.
This might involve challenges to honour, respect or
some other form of challenge, but was expected to
be met with physical force rather than some other
form of reaction. Thus, one can easily imagine in
some communities, slights or perceived threats to
a man’s honour or social standing would be likely
to prompt a violent response. These circumstances
are indicative of a subculture of violence and are often
class-related . Violence tends to be viewed as normal
and expected, and thus is not perceived as wrong
or something which should result in a feeling of
shame or guilt.
Needless to say, subcultures of violence are often
associated with lower-class/working-class environ-
ments. Elijah Anderson in his Code of the Street
(1999) argued that competition among the poor

for very limited job opportunities, and with plen-
tiful illegitimate opportunities, led to the develop-
ment of a sense of alienation and despair. This in
turn generated a code of the street, which was a set
of rules governing public behaviour, at the heart of
which is ‘respect’. It is the failure to show respect
which lies at the heart of much violence he argues:
Manhood in the inner city means taking the
prerogatives of men with respect to strangers,
other men and women – being distinguished as
a man. It implies physicality and a certain ruth-
lessness. Regard and respect are associated with
this concept in large part because of its practical
application: if others have little or no regard for
a person’s manhood, his very life and those of
his loved ones could be in jeopardy . . . For many
inner-city youths, manhood and respect are fl ip-
sides of the same coin; physical and psychological
well-being are inseparable, and both require a
sense of control, of being in charge.
(reproduced in Cullen and Agnew, 2006: 158)
Walter B. Miller’s (1958) ethnographic research
concentrated on the behaviour and attitudes of
male gang members from a relatively poor area
near Boston and explored the extent to which such
groups displayed and adhered to norms and values
that were distinguishable from those of mainstream
cultural values. For Miller (1958), there were six dis-

tinguishing concerns in such cultures:
1 Trouble – There is a particular preoccupation
with ‘getting into trouble’ and the potential
consequences of doing so.
2 Toughness – The dominance of female role
models within the family in such cultures leads
to the valorisation of certain aspects of other
aspects of masculinity in other environments,
none more so than toughness.
3 Smartness – In the sense of being ‘street smart’
is highly prized, in contrast to being ‘book
smart’.
4 Excitement – Daily routines of work can be
exceedingly monotonous and are compensated
for by the active search for excitement in other
arenas.
5 Fate – The future tends to be viewed in fatalistic
terms rather than as something that can be
manipulated or in any way controlled.
6 Autonomy – Strong resentment of outside
interference and intervention is a sign
according to Miller of a sense of autonomy in
life – albeit one that is undermined by the other
focal concerns of such subcultures.
In this view, working-class culture is a ‘generating
milieu’ for delinquency. The absence of male role
models can lead to the development of exagger-
ated masculine styles, and overcrowded conditions
push males out on to the street, where gang activity

becomes more likely. It will be immediately obvious
that one of the important contrasts between sub-
cultural theory – at least in this particular form –
and strain theory is that, unlike strain theory, it sees
lower-class cultural values as being quite distinct
from those of the mainstream. In this case crime
is not a product of a failure to meet middle-class
expectations, but more a product of conformity to
working-class norms.
There are problems, of course, with both posi-
tions. Critics have argued that strain theories over-
emphasise the importance of middle-class values
and, in doing so, adopt a somewhat patronising
attitude toward ‘lower’ social classes. On the other
hand, whilst subcultural theory largely avoids such
faults, some have argued that by contrast one of its
shortcomings is that it is based on a stereotyped
view of working-class cultures.
Much American subcultural theory has been pre-
occupied with gangs or similar organised groupings
within which delinquent activity takes place. By
contrast, as we will see, British subcultural theory
has questioned the extent to which delinquency
really takes place within such settings or, at least,
has questioned the applicability of such ideas to the
British context.
British subcultural theory
David Downes (1966) in his landmark study, The
Delinquent

Solution
, noted that British criminology,
with its preoccupations with penology, the psy-
chology of crime and legal and statistical studies
of delinquency, had ‘involved the almost complete
neglect of the very questions with which American
sociologists preoccupy themselves.’ As David Matza
observed in the introduction to the book, ‘Downes
was a most un-English criminologist.’ In the late
1950s/early 1960s, infl uenced by American socio-
logical criminology, studies such as John Barron
Mays’ Growing Up in the City and Terry Morris’s The
Criminal Area began to emerge, and they formed
the basis of a distinctly British form of sociological
criminology which really took off from the late
1960s after the publication of Downes’s work.
Heavily infl uenced by the Chicago School, Mays’
work was based in a poor neighbourhood in Liv-
erpool and examined the subculture of the area
and its relationship with the culture of the city
more generally. Delinquent values were learned,

he argued, and much of the behaviour he recorded
he interpreted as that of relatively deprived young
people seeking to cope with their restricted cir-
cumstances. Morris’s study of a Croydon suburb
saw this ‘delinquent area’ as the product of hous-
ing policies and the social concentration of ‘prob-
lem families’ in particular areas. The consequence,
borrowing elements of differential association and
cultural transmission theory, is the emergence of a
delinquent subculture in which many will adopt
delinquent values but some will remain relatively
resistant – largely because of their socio-economic
and family circumstances.
Willmott’s (1966) study of adolescent boys in
Bethnal Green in east London also explored youth-
ful delinquency. Willmott rejected the idea of
‘status frustration’ as being at the heart of much
delinquent activity and argued instead that the
more serious offending behaviours were partly at

least a product of a search for excitement and an
expression of group values and solidarity. Simulta-
neously, David Downes was also doing his doctoral
research in the East End (in Stepney and Poplar).
In Downes’s view, delinquency is not at heart
rebellious, but conformist. The conformity is to
working-class values. Consequently, he effectively
rejected the idea – so far as the area he was study-
ing was concerned – of delinquent subcultures and,
rather, saw delinquency as a ‘solution’ to some of
the structural problems faced by young men. In
this, in part, he was aligning himself with American
sociologists such as Matza and Sykes. For Downes,
many of the young people he studied dissociated
themselves from school and work and emphasised
leisure goals:
In the absence of work-orientation and job-
satisfaction, and lacking the compensations
accruing from alternative areas of non-work,
such as home-centredness, political activity and
community service, the ‘corner boy’ attaches
unusual importance to leisure. There is no rea-

son to suppose that the delinquent ‘corner boy’
does not share the more general, technically
classless ‘teenage culture’, a culture whose active
pursuit depends on freedom from the restraints
of adult responsibility, but which refl ects the
‘subterranean values’ of the conventional adult
Two prominent fi gures from British sociological
criminology: David Downes ( left ) and Terence Morris ( right )
both of the LSE.
East London, 1960. The site of a number of important
studies – notably David Downes’s The Delinquent

10 ers. Although one can learn definitions favor- able to .docx

More Related Content

Similar to 10 ers. Although one can learn definitions favor- able to .docx (7)

More from christiandean12115 (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

10 ers. Although one can learn definitions favor- able to .docx