2010: Mobile Security - WHYMCA Developer Conference

Mobile Security Intense overview of mobile security threat Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

Who am i Passion in hacking, security, intelligence and telecommunciations Playing with security since ’95 as “naif” Playing with mobile since 2005 CTO & Founder at PrivateWAVE http://www.privatewave.com We do mobile voice encryption (Nokia,iPhone,Blackberry,Android) My (outdated) homepage http://fabio.pietrosanti.it My (english) blog http://infosecurity.ch

Key points & Agenda 1 Difference between mobile security & IT security 2 Mobile Device Security 3 Mobile hacking & attack vector 4 The economic risks 5 Conclusion 40 minutes for +60 slides? Let’s go speedy and interactive!

Introduction Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Security

Mobile phones today Mobile phones changed our life in past 15 years (GSM & CDMA) Mobile phones became the most personal and private item we own Mobile smartphones change our digital life in past 5 years Growing computational power of “phones” Diffusion of high speed mobile data networks Real operating systems run on smartphones Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Introduction

Mobile phones today Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Introduction

It’s something personal Mobile phones became the most personal and private item we own Get out from home and you take: House & car key Portfolio Mobile phone Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Introduction

It’s something critical phone call logs addressbook emails sms Mobile browser history documents calendar Voice calls cross trough it (volatile but non that much) Corporate network access GPS tracking data Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Introduction

Difference between mobile security & IT security Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Security

Too much trust Trust between operators Trust between the user and the operators Trust between the user and the phone Still low awareness of users on security risks Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Difference between mobile security & IT Security

Users download everything: new social risks! Users install *much more* applications than on a PC Titolo - Autore 50.000 users 500.000 users

Too difficult to deal with Low level communication protocols/networks are closed (security trough entrance barrier) Too many etherogeneus technologies, no single way to secure it Diffused trusted security but not omogeneous use of trusted capabilities Reduced detection capability of attack & trojan Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Difference between mobile security & IT Security

Too many sw/hw platforms Nokia S60 smartphones Symbian/OS coming from Epoc age (psion) Apple iPhone iPhone OS - Darwin based, as Mac OS X - Unix RIM Blackberry RIMOS – proprietary from RIM Windows Mobile (various manufacturer) Windows Mobile (coming from heritage of PocketPC) Google Android Linux Android (unix with custom java based user operating environment) Brew, NucleOS, WebOS,… Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Difference between mobile security & IT Security

Vulnerability management Patching mobile operating system is difficult Carrier often build custom firmware, it’s at their costs and not vendor costs Only some environments provide easy OTA software upgrades Almost very few control from enterprise provisioning and patch management perspective Drivers often are not in hand of OS Vendor Basend Processor run another OS Assume that some phones will just remain buggy Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Difference between mobile security & IT Security

Vulnerability count Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Difference between mobile security & IT Security Source: iSec

Mobile Device Security Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Security

Reduced security by hw design Poor keyboard -> Poor password Type a passphrase: P4rtyn%!ter.nd@’01 Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Reduced security by hw design Poor screen, poor control User diagnostic capabilities are reduced. No easy checking of what’s going on Critical situation where user analysis is required are difficult to be handled (SSL, Email) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Devices access and authority All those subject share authority on the device OS Vendor/Manufacturer (1) Carrier (2) User Application Developer (1) Blackberry banned from france government for spying risks http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6221146.stm (2) Etisalat operator-wide spyware installation for Blackberry http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/07/14/blackberry_snooping/ Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

About security model Pre-exploitation Technical vectors Type-safe devel languages Non-executable memory... (same as non-mobile) Social vectors Ease of app delivery Application signing policies App store inclusion policies Post-exploitation Technical vectors Privileges/permissions App sandboxing Social vectors Ease of removal Remote kill/revocation Vendor blacklist Titolo - Autore Source: Jon Oberheide (cansecwest09)

About security model Security means control Restricted vs. open platforms Allow self-signed apps? Allow non-official app repositories? Allow free interaction between apps? Allow users to override security settings? Allow users to modify system/firmware? Telephony is a market that come back from monopolies , financial impact of keeping things under control is very relevant for business reasons ¾ of high yield bonds in European debt market comes from TLC Titolo - Autore Source: Jon Oberheide (cansecwest09)

Mobile security model: old school Windows Mobile and Blackberry application Authorization based on digital signing of application Everything or nothing With or without permission requests Limited access to filesystem (BB) No granular permission fine tuning Cracking blackberry security model with 100$ key http://securitywatch.eweek.com/exploits_and_attacks/cracking_the_blackberry_with_a_100_key.html Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Mobile security model old school but Enterprise Windows Mobile 6.1 (SCMDM) and Blackberry (BES) Deep profiling of security features for centrally managed devices Able to download/execute external application Able to use different data networks Force device PIN protection Force device encryption (BB) Profile access to connectivity resources (BB) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Mobile security model iPhone Heritage of OS X Security model Centralized distribution method: appstore Technical application publishing policy Non-technical application publishing policy AppStore “is” a security feature Reduce set of API (upcoming iPhone OS 4) Just some enterprise security provisioning General rooting capabilities 2 Months ago Vincenzo Iozzo & Charlie Miller presented iphone safari exploit that remotely dump the user SMS database just by visiting a website Google for: pwn2own 2010 iphone hacked sms Extremely easy reverse engineering Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Mobile security model Symbian Trusted computing system with capabilities Strict submission process if sensible API are used Sandbox based approach (data caging) Users have tight control on application permissions Symbian so strict on digital signature enforcement but not on data confidentiality Symbian require different level of signature depending on capability usage Some enterprise security provisioning with no real official endorsment by Nokia Private API issues Opensource what? Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Mobile security model – Android No application signing No application filters User approved application permissions (still require deep granularity) Sandboxed environment (process, user, data) NO memory protection NO serious enterprise security provisioning Google want to be free… but operators? Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Brew & NucleOS Application are provided *exclusively* from mnu facturer and from operator Delivery is OTA trough application portal of operator Full trust to carrier Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security

Development language security Development language/sdk security features support are extremely relevant to increase difficulties in exploiting Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Device Security Blackberry RIMOS J2ME MIDP 2.0 No native code Iphone Objective-C NX Stack/heap protection Windows Mobile .NET / C++ GS enhanced security Nokia/Symbian C++ Enhanced memory management / trusted Android/Linux Java & NDK Java security model

Mobile Hacking & Attack vector Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Security

Mobile security research Mobile security research exponentially increased in past 2 years DEFCON (USA), BlackHat (USA, Europe, Japan), CCC(DE), ShmooCon (USA), YSTS (BR), HITB (Malaysia), CansecWest (CAN), EuSecWest)NL, GTS(BR), Ekoparty (AR), DeepSec (AT) *CLCERT data Hacking environment is taking much more interests and attention to mobile hacking Dedicated security community: TSTF.net , Mseclab , Tam hanna Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile security research - 2008 DEFCON 16 - Taking Back your Cellphone Alexander Lash BH DC / BH Europe – Intercepting Mobile Phone/GSM Traffic David Hulton, Steve– BH Europe - Mobile Phone Spying Tools Jarno Niemelä– BH USA - Mobile Phone Messaging Anti-Forensics Zane Lackey, Luis Miras Ekoparty - Smartphones (in)security Nicolas Economou, Alfredo Ortega BH Japan - Exploiting Symbian OS in mobile devices Collin Mulliner– GTS-12 - iPhone and iPod Touch Forensics Ivo Peixinho 25C3– Hacking the iPhone - MuscleNerd, pytey, planetbeing 25C3 Locating Mobile Phones using SS7 – Tobias Engel– Anatomy of smartphone hardware Harald Welte 25C3 Running your own GSM network – H. Welte, Dieter Spaar 25C3 Attacking NFC mobile phones – Collin Mulliner Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile security research 2009 (1) ShmooCon Building an All-Channel Bluetooth Monitor Michael Ossmann and Dominic Spill ShmooCon Pulling a John Connor: Defeating Android Charlie Miller BH USA– Attacking SMS - Zane Lackey, Luis Miras – BH USA Premiere at YSTS 3.0 (BR) BH USA Fuzzing the Phone in your Phone - Charlie Miller, Collin Mulliner BH USA Is Your Phone Pwned? - Kevin Mahaffey, Anthony Lineberry & John Hering– BH USA Post Exploitation Bliss – BH USA Loading Meterpreter on a Factory iPhone - Vincenzo Iozzo & Charlie Miller– BH USA Exploratory Android Surgery - Jesse Burns DEFCON 17– Jailbreaking and the Law of Reversing - Fred Von Lohmann, Jennifer Granick– DEFCON 17 Hacking WITH the iPod Touch - Thomas Wilhelm DEFCON 17 Attacking SMS. It's No Longer Your BFF - Brandon Dixon DEFCON 17 Bluetooth, Smells Like Chicken - Dominic Spill, Michael Ossmann, Mark Steward Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile security research 2009 (2) BH Europe– Fun and Games with Mac OS X and iPhone Payloads - Charlie Miller and Vincenzo Iozzo– BH Europe Hijacking Mobile Data Connections - Roberto Gassirà and Roberto Piccirillo– BH Europe Passports Reloaded Goes Mobile - Jeroen van Beek CanSecWest– The Smart-Phones Nightmare Sergio 'shadown' Alvarez CanSecWest - A Look at a Modern Mobile Security Model: Google's Android Jon Oberheide– CanSecWest - Multiplatform iPhone/Android Shellcode, and other smart phone insecurities Alfredo Ortega and Nico Economou EuSecWest - Pwning your grandmother's iPhone Charlie Miller– HITB Malaysia - Bugs and Kisses: Spying on Blackberry Users for FunSheran Gunasekera– YSTS 3.0 / HITB Malaysia - Hacking from the Restroom Bruno Gonçalves de Oliveira PacSec - The Android Security Story: Challenges and Solutions for Secure Open Systems Rich Cannings & Alex Stamos Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile security research 2009 (3) DeepSec - Security on the GSM Air Interface David Burgess, Harald Welte DeepSec - Cracking GSM Encryption Karsten Nohl– DeepSec - Hijacking Mobile Data Connections 2.0: Automated and Improved Roberto Piccirillo, Roberto Gassirà– DeepSec - A practical DOS attack to the GSM network Dieter Spaar Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

From the Attack layers Mobile attacked at following layers Layer2 attacks (GSM, UMTS, WiFi) Layer4 attacks (SMS/MMS interpreter) Layer7 attacks (Client side hacking) Layer3 (TCP/IP) is generally protected by mobile operators by filtering inbound connections Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Link layer security - GSM GSM has been cracked with 2k USD hw equipment http://reflextor.com/trac/a51 - A51 rainbowtable cracking software http://www.airprobe.org - GSM interception software http://www.gnuradio.org - Software defined radio http://www.ettus.com/products - USRP2 – Cheap software radio Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Link layer security - UMTS 1° UMTS (Kasumi) cracking paper by Israel’s Weizmann Institute of Science http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/01/13/gsm_crypto_crack/ No public practical implementation UMTS-only mode phones are not reliable Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Link layer security – WiFi All known attacks about WiFi Rogue AP, DNS poisoning, arp spoofing, man in the middle, WEP cracking, WPA-PSK cracking, etc Extremely facilitate Mobile Web attacks and injection (Facebook) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Link layer security Rogue operators roaming Telecommunication operators are trusted among each other (roaming agreements & brokers) Operators can hijack almost everything of a mobile connections: mobile connect whatever network is available Today, becoming a mobile operators it’s quite easy in certain countries: trust it’s a matter of money Today the equipment to run an operator is cheap (OpenBTS & OpenBSC) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

MMS security Good delivery system for malware (binary mime encoded attachments, like email) Use just PUSH-SMS for notifications and HTTP & SMIL for MMS retrieval “Abused” to send out confidential information (intelligence tool for dummies & for activist) “Abused” to hack windows powered mobile devices MMS remote Exploit (CCC Congress 2006) http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001064.html MMS spoofing & avoid billing attack http://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/MMS_Spoofing.ppt MMSC filters on certain attachments Application filters on some mobile phones for DRM purposes Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

SMS security (1) Only 160byte per SMS (concatenation support) CLI spoofing is extremely easy SMS interpreter exploit iPhone SMS remote exploit http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-10299378-245.html SMS used to deliver web attacks Service Loading (SL) primer SMS mobile data hijacking trough SMS provisioning Send Wap PUSH OTA configuration message to configure DNS (little of social engineerings) Redirection, phishing, mitm, SSL attack, protocol downgrade, etc, etc SMSC filters sometimes applied, often bypassed Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

SMS security (2) Easy social engineering for provisioning SMS Thanks to Mobile Security Lab http://www.mseclab.com Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Bluetooth (1) Bluetooth spamming (they call it, “mobile advertising”) Bluetooth attacks let you: initiating phone calls sending SMS to any number reading SMS from the phone Reading/writing phonebook setting call forwards connecting to the internet Bluesnarfing, bluebug, bluebugging http://trifinite.org/ Bluetooth OBEX to send spyware Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Bluetooth (2) Bluetooth encryption has been cracked http://news.techworld.com/security/3797/bluetooth-crack-gets-serious/ But bluetooth sniffers were expensive So an hacked firmware of a bluetooth dongle made it accessible: 18$ bluetooth sniffer http://pcworld.about.com/od/wireless/Researcher-creates-Bluetooth-c.htm Bluetooth interception became feasible Bluetooth SCO (audio flow to bluetooth headset) could let phone call interception Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

NFC – what’s that? Near Field Communications Diffused in far east (japan & china) Estimated diffusion in Europe/North America: 2013 Estimated financial transaction market: 75bn NFC Tech: 13.56mhz, data rates 106kbit/s, multiple rfid tags NFC Tag transmit URI by proximily to the phone that prompt user for action given the protocol: URI SMS TEL SMART Poster (ringone, application, network configuration) NFC Tag data format is ndef J2ME midlet installation is automatic, user is just asked after download already happened Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

NFC – example use NFC Ticketing (Vienna’s public services) Vending machine NFC payment Totem public tourist information Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

NFC - security EUSecWest 2008: Hacking NFC mobile phones, the NFCWorm http://events.ccc.de/congress/2008/Fahrplan/events/2639.en.html URI Spoofing: Hide URI pointed on user NDEF Worm Infect tags, not phones Spread by writing writable tags Use URI spoofing to point to midlet application that are automatically downloaded SMS/TEL scam trough Tag hijacking Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile Web Security - WAP HTTPS is considered a secure protocol Robust and reliable based on digital certificate WAP if often used by mobile phones because it has special rates and mobile operator wap portal are feature rich and provide value added contents WAP security use WTLS that act as a proxy between a WAP client and a HTTPS server WTLS in WAP browser break the end-to-end security nature of SSL in HTTPS WAP 2 fix it, only modern devices and modern WAP gateway Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile Web Security – WEB Most issues in end-to-end security Attackers are facilitated Phones send user-agent identifying precise model Some operator HTTP transparent proxy reveal to web server MSISDN and IMSI of the phone Mobile browser has to be small and fast but… Mobile browser has to be compatible with existing web security technologies Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile Web Security WEB/SSL SSL is the basic security system used in web for HTTPS It get sever limitation for wide acceptance in mobile environment (where smartphone are just part of) End-to-end break of security in WTLS Not all available phones support it Out of date Symmetric ciphers Certificates problems (root CA) Slow to start Certificates verification problems Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile Web Security – SSL UI Mobile UI are not coherent when handling SSL certificates and it may be impossible to extremely tricky for the user to verify the HTTPS information of the website Details not always clear From 4 to 6 click required to check SSL information Information are not always consistent Transcoder make the operator embed their custom trusted CA-root to be able to do Main In the Middle while optimizing web for mobile Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile Web Security – SSL UI Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector Tnx to Rsnake & Masabi

Mobile VPN Mobile devices often need to access corporate networks VPN security has slightly different concepts User managed VPN (Mobile IPSec clients) Operator Managed VPN (MPLS-like model with dedicated APN on 3G data networks) Authentication based on SIM card and/or with login/password Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Voice interception Voice interception is the most known and considered risks because of media coverage on legal & illegal wiretapping Interception trough Spyware injection (250E) Interception trough GSM cracking (2000-150.000E) Interception trough Telco Hijacking (30.000E) Approach depends on the technological skills of the attacker Protection is not technologically easy Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Location Based Services or Location Based Intelligence? (1) New risks given by official and unofficial LBS technologies GPS: Cheap cross-platform powerfull spyware software with geo tracking ( http://www.flexispy.com ) Gps data in photo’s metadata (iphone) Community based tracking (lifelook) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Location Based Services or Location Based Intelligence? (2) HLR (Home Location Register) MSC lookup: GSM network ask the network’s HLR’s: where is the phone’s MSC? Network answer: {"status":"OK","number":"123456789","imsi":"220021234567890","mcc":"220",”mnc":"02","msc":"13245100001",””msc_location”:”London,UK”,”operator_name”:” Orange (UK)”,”operator_country”:”UK”} HLR Lookup services (50-100 EUR): http://www.smssubmit.se/en/hlr-lookup.html http://www.routomessages.com Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile malware - spyware Commercial spyware focus on information spying Flexispy (cross-platform commercial spyware) Listen in to an active phone call (CallInterception) Secretly read SMS, Call Logs, Email, Cell ID and make Spy Call Listen in to the phone surrounding Secret GPS tracking Highly stealth (user Undetectable in operation) A lot small software made for lawful and unlawful use by many small companies Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile malware – virus/worm (1) Worm Still no cross-platform system Mainly involved in phone fraud (SMS & Premium numbers) Sometimes making damage Often masked as useful application or sexy stuff In July 2009 first mobile botnet for SMS spamming http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security-threats/2009/07/16/phone-trojan-has-botnet-features-39684313/ Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile malware – virus/worm (2) Malware full feature list Spreading via Bluetooth, MMS, Sending SMS messages, Infecting files,Enabling remote control of the smartphone,Modifying or replacing icons or system applications, Installing "fake" or non-working fonts and applications, Combating antivirus programs, Installing other malicious programs, Locking memory cards, Stealing data, Spreading via removable media (memory sticks) , Damaging user data, Disabling operating system security mechanisms , Downloading other files from the Internet, Calling paid services ,Polymorphism Source: Karspersky Mobile Malware evolution http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?pubid=204792080 Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Mobile Forensics It's not just taking down SMS, photos and addressbook but all the information ecosystem of the new phone Like a new kind of computer to be analyzed, just more difficult Require custom equipment Local data easy to be retrieved Network data are not affordable, spoofing is concrete More dedicated training course about mobile forensics Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Extension of organization: The operator Mobile operator customer service identify users by CLI & some personal data Mix of social engineering & CLI spoofing let to compromise of Phone call logs (Without last 3 digits in Italy) Denial of service (sim card blocking) Voice mailbox access (not always) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

Some near future scenarios Real diffusion of cross-platform trojan targeting fraud (espionage already in place) Back to the era of mobile phone dialers Welcome to the new era of mobile phishing QR code phishing: “ Free mobile chat, meet girls” -> http://tinyurl.com/aaa -> web mobile-dependent malware. SMS spamming becomes aggressive Mobile client-side web hacking spread Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Hacking & Attack Vector

The economic risks TLC & Financial frauds Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Security

Basic of phone fraud Basic of fraud Make the user trigger billable events Basics of cash-out Subscriber billable communications SMS to premium number CALL premium number CALL international premium number DOWNLOAD content from wap sites (wap billing) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti The economic risks

Fraud against user/corporate Induct users to access content trough: SMS spamming (finnish & italian case) MMS spamming Web delivery of telephony related URL (sms:// tel://) Bluetooth spamming/worm Phone dialers back from the ‘90 modem age Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti The economic risks

Security of mobile banking Very etherogeneus approach to access & security: STK/SIM toolkit application mobile banking Mobile web mobile banking - powerful phishing Application based mobile banking (preferred because of usability) SMS banking (feedbacks / confirmation code) Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti The economic risks

Conclusion Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Mobile Security

Just some points Too many technologies Security model are too differents among platforms Operators and manufacturer does not like user freedom on-device and on-network The security and hacking environment is working a lot on it We must take in serious consideration the mobile security issues Mobile Security – Fabio Pietrosanti Conclusion

Thanks for you attention! Questions? Slides will be available online For any contact: Mail: [email_address] Job: http://www.privatewave.com Blog: http://infosecurity.ch Me: http://fabio.pietrosanti.it

2010: Mobile Security - WHYMCA Developer Conference

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