2018 01-18 jg

1
Viewpoints January 3, 2018
Bracing Yourself for a Possible Near-Term Melt-Up
(A Very Personal View)1
Jeremy Grantham
Ifind myself in an interesting position for an investor from the value school. I recognize on one
hand that this is one of the highest-priced markets in US history. On the other hand, as a historian
of the great equity bubbles, I also recognize that we are currently showing signs of entering the
blow-off or melt-up phase of this very long bull market. The data on the high price of the market
is clean and factual. We can be as certain as we ever get in stock market analysis that the current
price is exceptionally high. In contrast, my judgment on the melt-up is based on a mish-mash of
statistical and psychological factors based on previous eras, each one very different, so that much of
the information available is not easily comparable. It also leans very heavily on a few US examples.
Yet, strangely, I find the less statistical data more compelling in this bubble context than the simple
fact of overpricing. Whether you will also, dear reader, remains to be seen. In any case, my task in
this note is to present the evidence, both statistical and touchy-feely, as clearly as I can.
So let’s start by looking very hard at all the great bubbles of the past, searching for useful guides to
the future. The classic examples are not just characterized by higher-than-average prices. Price alone
seems to me now to be by no means a sufficient sign of an impending bubble break. Among other
factors, indicators of extremes of euphoria seem much more important than price. Ben Graham, as
quoted two quarterly letters ago, said that as far as he could see no bubble had ever broken (by 1963)
without being accompanied by signs of real excess such as those found in 1929. Two months ago,
Robert Shiller also made the point (in the Sunday New York Times) – as I will do – that not nearly
enough signs of euphoria were yet present to make this look like a late-stage bubble. (Although in
my opinion they have finally begun to pick up in the last two or three months.) And Robert Shiller
was one of a very small group predicting a future market collapse in 1999, and one of a few handfuls
with us in 2006 focusing on the future risks from an unprecedented US housing bubble breaking
due to vulnerable mortgages. So when he held his fire this time on the issues of a market crash, as I
have done, waiting for more evidence, I took considerable comfort. After all, for a major investment
bubble to burst it must first form, and this one has been very slow to do that, at least until recently.
1
My job at GMO is an enviable one: to comment on any broad issue that might affect the market. My views are not
always closely aligned with those of our various investment teams at GMO, including Asset Allocation, the group to
which I belong.

2 Bracing Yourself for a Possible Near-Term Melt-Up
January 3, 2018
While I am attacking the concept of leaning on price alone I should add that I carry a lot of blame
for exaggerating the significance of price alone as a bubble measure. After all, I helped pioneer the
data-mined result that previous bubbles have been separated from ordinary bull markets by passing
through 2 standard deviations on their price series, a level that statistically should occur every 44 years
in a random series. It has been a very useful assumption for a broad-based study of global bubbles in
a variety of asset classes and it had, of course, a good historical record, because that’s how we picked
it. But this time, this statistical measure has been misleading because as the US market hit a 2-sigma
level, it had almost none of the other more important bubble indicators of investor euphoria and even
craziness. Similarly, early 1998 had none when we reduced our risk levels to a minimum based on
price alone. In complete contrast, late 1999 and early 2000 had very many signs of bubbly, completely
irrational behavior, just as mid, or even early 1929 had.
Is a late bubble surge beginning?
So let’s look at what is missing in the way of psychological and technical signs of a late-stage bubble
and what is beginning to fall into place. On the topic of classic bubbles, I have long shown Exhibits
1 and 2. They recognize the importance of a true psychological event of momentum increasing to
a frenzy. That is to say, acceleration of price. The average time of the final bubble phase of the great
equity bubbles shown in Exhibit 1 is just under 3.5 years, with the average upcycle of real acceleration
just 21 months. And the two smaller equity bubbles had gains of 65% and 58%. They also show an
interesting symmetry, don’t you think? Rising and falling at about the same rate, as did the real McCoy
– the South Sea Bubble shown in Exhibit 2 – before them. Yes, there is a real danger of being late. And
in general, average market declines are considerably faster than average advances. But historically,
when dealing with real bubbles, being late has not been materially different in time and pain than
being too early, as you can see. Value managers are historically painfully too early over and over again,
as I know better than most.
Exhibit 1: Modern Classics of the Bubble World
Source: Robert Shiller, Compustat, Worldscope, S&P, National Association of Realtors, GMO
See ”Bubbles for Fama,” Greenwood, Shleifer, and Yu, to understand why acceleration is important. The equity bubbles
depicted are only looking at price action over the period of interest; the housing bubble is looking at price-to-income ratios.
1
mplate
rietary information – not for distribution. Copyright © 2017 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
Exhibit 1: Modern Classics of the Bubble World
of 9/30/16
rce: Robert Shiller, Compustat, Worldscope, S&P, National Association of Realtors, GMO
”Bubbles for Fama,” Greenwood, Shleifer, and Yu, to understand why acceleration is important.
equity bubbles depicted are only looking at price action over the period of interest; the housing bubble is looking at price‐to‐income ratios.
1929 S&P 500 Bubble 1989 Japanese Equity Bubble
0.90
1.10
1.30
1.50
1.70
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
2000 S&P 500 Tech Bubble 2007 Housing Bubble
0.90
1.20
1.50
1.80
2.10
2.40
1995 1997 1999 2001
0.90
1.40
1.90
2.40
1985 1987 1989 1991
0.30
0.80
1.30
1.80
2.30
1925 1927 1929 1931
3½ years 3 years
3½ years
3½ years
Price Rise in
Final Phase:
+104%
Price Rise in
Final Phase:
+65%
Price Rise in
Final Phase:
+58%

January 3, 2018
Exhibit 2: Now That’s Acceleration!
Source: Marc Faber, Editor and Publisher of “The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report.”
(December 1718 – December 1721)
Recently an academic paper titled “Bubbles for Fama”2
concluded that in the US and almost all global
markets, the strongest indicator – stronger than pure pricing or value – was indeed price acceleration.
(This is perhaps the third time I have agreed with mainstream economists in the last 50 years. I have a
firm principle of generously quoting them when they agree with me.) Exhibit 3 shows what the market
looks like today. Until very recently it could justifiably be described as clawing its way steadily higher.
But just recently, say the last six months, we have been showing a modest acceleration, the base camp,
perhaps, for a final possible assault on the peak. Exhibit 4 represents our quick effort at showing what
level of acceleration it might take to make 2018 (and possibly 2019) look like a classic bubble. A range
of 9 to 18 months from today and a price rise to around 3,400 to 3,700 on the S&P 500 would show the
same 60% gain over 21 months as the least of the other classic bubble events.
Exhibit 3: What Things Look Like Today
As of 11/21/17
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, Bloomberg
2
Robin Greenwood, Andrei Shleifer, and Yang Yu, Harvard University, Revised, February 2017.
2
O_Template
oprietary information – not for distribution. Copyright © 2017 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
urce: Marc Faber, Editor and Publisher of “The Gloom, Boom & Doom Report.”
ecember 1718 – December 1721)
South Sea Stock Bubble
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1718 1719 1720 1721
3
O_Template
Exhibit 3: What Things Look Like Today
of 11/21/17
urce: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, Bloomberg
1,000
1,400
1,800
2,200
2,600
3,000
31‐Dec‐09
31‐May‐10
31‐Oct‐10
31‐Mar‐11
31‐Aug‐11
31‐Jan‐12
30‐Jun‐12
30‐Nov‐12
30‐Apr‐13
30‐Sep‐13
28‐Feb‐14
31‐Jul‐14
31‐Dec‐14
31‐May‐15
31‐Oct‐15
31‐Mar‐16
31‐Aug‐16
31‐Jan‐17
30‐Jun‐17
30‐Nov‐17
2½ Years of
Upward Struggle
S&P

January 3, 2018
Exhibit 4: What it Would Take to Make the S&P 500 a Classic Bubble
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, GMO
What of other indicators? I have previously defined a great bubble as being “Excellent Fundamentals
Euphorically Extrapolated.” And I have previously concluded that, in general, the fundamentals of
recent years were disappointing and that investors, far from being euphoric, had instead been “climbing
the wall of worry” as they used to say. But fundamentals are improving. The global economy is in sync
for the first time in a dozen years and global profit margins are at a high; in the US, a corporate tax
cut is on the way, which in today’s sticky, more monopolistic world, is unlikely to be quickly competed
away as theory suggests, but very likely to further fatten the corporate share of the GDP pie and
perhaps provide the oomph to keep stock prices rising.
In looking for signs of late bubble behavior, we have to reconcile to the fact that no two bubbles, even
the classics, are the same. They share the fact that there are many signs of investor euphoria, sometimes
indeed approaching the madness of crowds, but the package of psychological and technical indicators
has been different each time. The historian has to emphasize the big picture: In general are investors
getting clearly carried away? Are prices accelerating? Is the market narrowing? And, are at least some
of the other early warnings from the previous great bubbles falling into place?
Increasing concentration and unusual outperformance of quality and low beta
These are really two separate points and they can occur separately, but sometimes the data overlaps so
it’s convenient to examine them together. Between them I believe they are right behind acceleration
in their effectiveness in warning of a late-stage bubble. First, the principles: Concentration is the
essence of an escalating euphoria. By late-stage cycles, many buyers are fixating on “winners” with
the purchase motive being further stock gains, rather than any logic of long-term value. Thus, as the
market soars, attention is increasingly focused on those with the largest earnings and stock price gains,
and interest in the B players falls away. (This concentration effect naturally favors larger companies,
perhaps because they can better absorb a rising demand.)
The second principle is the outperformance of quality and low beta stocks in a rapidly-rising market.
This is clearly odd behavior and is very rare, restricted as far as I can tell to some, but not all, late-stage
bull markets. I attribute the logic for this – and this effect is something I noticed almost 40 years ago
when studying the Crash of 1929 – to Chuck Prince; a series of Chuck Princes over the years might
have said, “The market keeps going up faster and faster and there is no way commercially that I can
play against it. So I have to keep dancing. But at least I don’t have to risk dancing off the cliff with a
4
O_Template
of 11/30/17
ource: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC, GMO
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Up 60% in the
final 21 months!
3700
3400

January 3, 2018
Pumatech.” (My favorite example of an extreme speculation – the most advanced stock in 1999, a very
high hurdle.) “Rather, I will keep dancing with RCA or GE in 1929, Coca Cola and Avon in 1972,
and Cisco and Microsoft in 1999.” It makes at least some sense (and in 1929 caused you to lose a mere
80% rather than 95% – a quadrupling difference in recovery). Now, to take the markets in sequence…
The 1929 Crash. A reasonable indicator of increasing concentration is the advance-decline line,3
and
Exhibit 5 makes it clear what was happening. But my favorite all-time data is shown in Exhibit 6. This
looks at the S&P’s “Low Price Index,” comprising very fallen industrial angels. This indicator, sadly
abandoned in the late 90s, had a very high and very variable beta (about 1.4) and the index had just
had a magnificent 1928, more than doubling the S&P 500 (+72% to +33). Then, in 1929, it produces
what I call the great primal scream of all-time from the market: By the time the S&P 500 peaks in
October, up 35% for the year, accompanied by all the touchy-feely signs of crazy speculation, the Low
Price Index is down 37%, having fallen steadily all year!
Exhibit 5: 1929 Advance-Decline
Data provided is between January 1, 1929 and October 31, 1929.
Source: S&P, Bloomberg, NYSE, Global Financial Data
Exhibit 6: Strange Last Minute Warnings – 1929 Crash
Source: S&P, FTSE, GMO
3
The number of advancing stocks less the number of declining stocks.
5
_Template
‐15000
‐10000
‐5000
0
5000
10000
10
15
20
25
30
35
Dec‐28 Feb‐29 Apr‐29 Jun‐29 Aug‐29 Oct‐29
S&P 500 (left axis) NYSE Cumulative Advance‐Decline (right axis)
Exhibit 5: 1929 Advance‐Decline
ta provided is between January 1, 1929 and October 31, 1929.
urce: S&P, Bloomberg, NYSE
S&P 500 (left axis) NYSE Cumulative Advance‐Decline (right axis)
Exhibit 6: Strange Last Minute Warnings – 1929 Crash
of 9/30/17
1929: S&P vs. Low Price Index
+114%
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
Dec‐28 Jan‐29 Feb‐29 Mar‐29 Apr‐29 May‐29 Jun‐29 Jul‐29 Aug‐29 Sep‐29
Low Price IndexS&P 500

January 3, 2018
1972 – The Nifty Fifty. All measures of concentration increased in 1972, and in that “Nifty Fifty” era
from the early 60s – in which 50 IBMs, Coca-Colas, and Avons were increasingly favored, culminating
in the only large premium ever for quality stocks (50%) – the advance-decline ratio, not surprisingly,
trended steadily downward, as it continued to do in 1972 in a non-remarkable way. So, no exhibit.
More interesting, I think, is the outperformance over our friend, the high-beta Low Price Index, by the
S&P 500 (see Exhibit 7). And most compelling for me is that this was the very first time since 1929 that
high-beta stocks were soundly beaten as the S&P 500 rose significantly. And the 1972 high ushered in
by far the biggest stock market decline since The Great Depression. The 1973-74 decline in the S&P
was 63% in real terms, still the second worst decline to date in the post 1925 era. You have to admit
this odd signal did a great job in these first two bubbles of the twentieth century.
Exhibit 7: Strange Last Minute Warnings – 1972 Nifty Fifty
Source: S&P, FTSE, GMO
The Tech Bubble of 2000. In contrast to the previous two, this bubble was preceded by a very clear
signal indeed from the advance-decline line, as shown in Exhibit 8, which, after rising strongly, turned
down equally emphatically 2 full years before the market’s first peak in March 2000.
Exhibit 8: S&P Peaks 2 Years after Advance-Decline Line (1997-2001)
Source: S&P, Bloomberg, NYSE
7
O_Template
Exhibit 7: Strange Last Minute Warnings – 1972 Nifty Fifty
s of 9/30/17
ource: S&P, FTSE, GMO
1972: S&P vs. Low Price Index
0.7
0.9
1.1
Mar‐72 Apr‐72 May‐72 Jun‐72 Jul‐72 Aug‐72 Sep‐72 Oct‐72 Nov‐72 Dec‐72
+35%
Low Price IndexS&P 500
Exhibit 8: S&P Peaks 2 Years after Advance‐Decline Line (1997‐2001)
500
700
900
1100
1300
1500
1700
Jan‐97 Aug‐97 Mar‐98 Oct‐98 May‐99 Dec‐99 Jul‐00 Feb‐01 Sep‐01
Market Peaks
ource: S&P, Bloomberg, NYSE
S&P 500 NYSE Advance‐Decline
Advance‐Decline Peak

January 3, 2018
A second very clear but unusual signal was given between the two peaks of the S&P 500 in March and
September 2000. (They were both within 1% of each other.) In this short period, the tech stocks broke
and declined rapidly, but in a possibly unique pattern, the rest of the S&P continued up to a substantial
new high as shown in Exhibit 9. From March through December 2000, the deviation was so great that
technology stocks would have had to rally 106% to close the gap. What a great escape opportunity,
offered before the balance of the S&P rolled over and declined about 40%.
Exhibit 9: Strange Last-Minute Warnings in 2000: Tech Stocks Break and Balance of
Market Continues Up
Source: S&P, FTSE, NYSE
The possible/probable bubble of 2018-19
The advance-decline line is clearly not delivering a threatening message yet. It has risen, apparently
inexorably, along with the S&P 500, perhaps helped along by the rising percentage of index purchases (a
separate,interestingtopic).So,forthetimebeing,nobubble-burstingearlywarningthere.Thehigh-beta-
loses paradox, on the other hand, appears to be giving a very early warning as quality stocks extend an
unusual upside lead. Exhibit 10 shows the year-to-date gains of our Quality universe against the S&P 500
(+9%), just as our junk universe, with its higher beta, shows an equal and offsetting underperformance
(-7%). This is by no means up there with some earlier “last minute” warnings, but it is interesting. (And
even if you remove the FAANGs from the universe, this interesting result still holds.)
Exhibit 10: YTD Gains of US Quality Universe vs. S&P 500
As of 11/30/17
Source: S&P, Bloomberg, GMO
The quality universe is the top quartile of companies in the US sorted by GMO’s proprietary quality score. The
junk universe is the bottom quartile of companies in the US sorted by GMO’s proprietary quality score.
9
O_Template
Exhibit 9: Strange Last‐Minute Warnings in 2000: Tech Stocks Break and
Balance of Market Continues Up
ource: S&P, FTSE, GMO
2000: S&P ex‐Tech vs. S&P Tech
+106%
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
Mar‐00 Apr‐00 May‐00 Jun‐00 Jul‐00 Aug‐00 Sep‐00 Oct‐00 Nov‐00 Dec‐00
S&P 500 Tech S&P 500 ex‐Tech
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
Dec‐16 Feb‐17 Apr‐17 Jun‐17 Aug‐17 Oct‐17
Return Index
US Quality Universe
+29%
S&P 500
+20%
US Junk
+13%
Exhibit 10: YTD Gains of US Quality Universe vs. S&P 500
s of 11/30/17

January 3, 2018
Other asset classes making impressive bubbly moves
The US housing market lacks the touchy-feely signs of euphoria that described it in 2004, 2005, and
2006 – the classic sign being the level of cocktail party bragging about condos in Florida that had
just gone up 100% in price in a hurry. (The exception to this observation might be in a few hot cities,
this time San Francisco, Boston, and New York.) But the basic data in Exhibit 11 shows that the
average US house price, as a multiple of family income, is way higher than at any time before the great
3-sigma housing bubble of 2006. Those extraordinary and nationwide prices then perhaps serve to
camouflage the current 2-sigma rise, as the outrageous prices of 2006 make today’s high prices seem
less unreasonable. The existence of today’s 2-sigma house market may serve once again to point out
that price alone is not as reliable a guide as we would like.
Exhibit 11: US Housing Is Now at About the 2-Sigma Level
As of 8/31/17
Source: National Association of Realtors, GMO
Perhaps housing supply and zoning considerations introduce elements happily lacking in the equities
markets. They also suggest that in the next down leg, some global housing markets (mainly English-
speaking) are important legs of the stool that can break badly, although, in this respect, the US, for
once, looks like a financial powerhouse with its higher deposits and fixed-rate mortgages. In a circular
but probably accurate argument, just as rising house prices facilitate the development of an optimistic
attitude for other assets, a US equity market melt-up, were it indeed to occur, would create exactly the
right investment mood for another advance in house prices, with predictable consequences for the
severity of the ensuing, more or less inevitable, crash.
Right party in power (just sayin’)
ThispointisanexcuseforusingExhibit12,whichwaspreparedforourrecentannualclientconference.
The data speaks for itself. Its statistical significance is another matter entirely.
11
O_Template
2.50
2.70
2.90
3.10
3.30
3.50
3.70
3.90
4.10
4.30
1976 1980 1983 1986 1990 1993 1996 2000 2003 2006 2010 2013 2016
Exhibit 11: US Housing Is Now at About the 2‐Sigma Level
s of 8/31/17
ource: National Association of Realtors, GMO
House Price‐to‐Income Ratio
+1 Standard Deviation +2 Standard Deviations

January 3, 2018
Exhibit 12: And that Absolute Requirement for a Bursting Bubble: A Republican Presidency!
Source: Library of Congress, US National Archives and Records Administration, US Department of Defense
Extreme expensiveness
At last, we come to value. Extreme overvaluation plays a huge role in bubbles breaking: It is a
necessary precondition. The more overvalued, the merrier. But, for judging the extent that bubbles
will overrun fair value and for timing the break, value, sadly, is largely irrelevant. Thus, it is a necessary
but absolutely not sufficient condition. Exhibit 13 shows how handsomely the current cycle already
passes the necessary condition.
Exhibit 13: Markets Truly Are Expensive
As of 9/30/17
Source: Robert Shiller
12ary information – not for distribution.  Copyright © 2017 by GMO LLC.  All rights reserved.
Library of Congress, US National Archives and Records Administration, US Department of Defense
Hoover (R) – Nice to Bankers Nixon (R) – Nice to the Chinese
G.W. Bush (R) – Nice to Cheney Trump (R) – Nice to Russians
1929 1973
2001
2008
2019?
Exhibit 13: Markets Truly Are Expensive
s of 9/30/17
ource:  Robert Shiller
Shiller P/E
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
31‐Jan‐1881
31‐Jan‐1896
31‐Jan‐1911
29‐Jan‐1926
31‐Jan‐1941
31‐Jan‐1956
29‐Jan‐1971
31‐Jan‐1986
31‐Jan‐2001
29‐Jan‐2016

January 3, 2018
The Fed’s role in recent bubbles
Taking a different tack, we should look at the policy of what I call the Greenspan-Bernanke-Yellen
Fed. This policy of pushing down generally on rates – lower highs and lower lows – over 25 years,
accompanied by a lot of moral hazard, has very probably helped push asset prices higher. All three
Chairmen at some time have specifically taken credit for helping the economy by generating a wealth
effect from a higher market. Over the years we have come to believe that moral hazard is more
important in raising asset price levels than the interest rate level and availability of credit, although
they may also help. The moral hazard – the asymmetric promise to help if times get tough but to leave
you alone when times are rolling – had become increasingly well-understood, particularly during
Greenspan’s first 15 years. It seems likely that such a policy as the Greenspan Put might culminate
periodically in investment bubbles of the type it did indeed generate in the 2000 TMT bubble and the
2006 housing bubble. And the likelihood of bubbles forming no doubt increased because all three Fed
bosses outspokenly denied that such bubbles were occurring even as they passed through 2-sigma
levels. Greenspan poetically argued in 1999 that the internet was driving away the dark clouds of
ignorance and was issuing in a new era of permanently higher productivity. Think how encouraging
this was to the bulls as the market in 1998 went past the 21x peak of 1929 and climbed remorselessly
(and at an accelerating rate!) to 35x. Even more statistically remarkable was Bernanke’s dismissal of a
clear 3-sigma US housing market – a one in a thousand event normally – as “merely a reflection of a
strong US economy,” and that “US house prices had never declined!” That was accurate enough, but
what it really meant – and was interpreted as meaning – was that US housing prices would not decline
in the future. But, of course, the US housing market had never been tested by a 3-sigma bubble before!
And the rest is history.
The point here is that Yellen, too, sees no signs of dangerous stock prices and in general continues
with the program of moral hazard. Yes, rates will rise, just as they rose from 2003 to 2006, but it is
considered, quite rightly, to be cyclically normal in a tightening economy and so does not constitute
a breach of contract. (The recent rate rises, just like the 400-basis-point rise from 2003 to 2006, did
not at all get in the way of rising stock prices any more consequently than the two recent rises of
this cycle have.) So why would the Fed stop its general asymmetric support before we reach a third
bubble? Nothing is certain in life, but I would bet that a Yellen-like successor of the lower-rates-are-
helpful variety will get the job done (Mr. Powell should fit the bill) and deliver a third in their series of
Great Bubbles. A major shift in style of the Fed, on the other hand, based on an accumulation of new
appointees who would turn away from the accommodating style of the last 30 years, would reduce the
chances of a well-behaved classic bubble forming in the next year or two. But if we have a strong head
of steam up by next February, it might well happen anyway. We’ll deal with that when we get there.
The bottom-line question is probably this: Will this administration, when faced with either a market
break or unexpected economic weakness, not push the completely independent Fed committee for
lenient, lower-rate policies? Surely it will. (The Presidential Cycle of a very strong pre-election effect
and a compensating weak “recycling” in post-election years one and two that existed in earlier Fed
regimes did not come out of thin air, but presumably from deliberate influence. Since Greenspan was
appointed, though, we seem to have lived, at least most of the time, stuck in a year-three phase of
stimulus.)

January 3, 2018
The most difficult call: Are the more touchy-feely measures of market excess falling
into place?
Anyone around in 1999 and early 2000 has had a classic primer in these signs. We know we’re not
there yet, but we can perhaps see some early movement: increasing vindictiveness to the bears for
costing investors money; the crazy Bitcoins of the world (this is a true, crazy mini-bubble of its own I
expect – it has certainly passed my “nephew test” of his obsessing about buying or not); and Amazon
and the other handful of current heroes – here and globally – taking over more of the press coverage
and a growing percentage of total market gains (Amazon +13%, the day before I started to write this,
and Tencent doubling this year to a $500 billion market cap). The increasingly optimistic tone of press
and TV coverage is also important. A mere six months ago, new market highs were hardly mentioned
and learned bears were featured everywhere. Now, the newspaper and TV coverage is considerably
more interested in market events. (This last comment reminds me of some advice for contrarians:
There is usually a phase or two in each cycle where most investors expect a market gain or loss and
it actually happens. The mass of investors usually ends up wrong in the end, but not all the time, for
Heaven’s sake!)
Other items worth mentioning are IPO windows and new record highs for corporate deals. We can
have a satisfactory melt-up without them, but still one or the other is likely and both together are quite
possible. I believe their presence would make a spectacular bust that much more likely.
Finally, my favorite advice once again: Keep an eye on what the TVs at lunchtime eateries are showing.
When most have talking heads yammering about Amazon, Tencent, and Bitcoin and not Patriot
replays – just as late 1999 featured the latest in Pets.com – we are probably down to the last few
months. Good luck. We’ll all need some.
Bitcoin: The Essence of a Bubble
As you can see, Bitcoin dwarfs even the legendary South Sea Bubble! Having no clear fundamental
value and largely unregulated markets, coupled with a storyline conducive to delusions of grandeur,
makes this more than anything we can find in the history books the very essence of a bubble.
Historical analogy suggests this junior bubble, by size, may well crash and burn even before the broad
market peaks.
Work and data from my colleague Philip Pilkington.
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
-11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Index(t-11=100)
Dutch Tulip Mania
1636 – 1637
S&P 500
1928 – 1929
South Sea Company
1719 – 1720
Bitcoin
2016 – 2017

January 3, 2018
Summary of my guesses (absolutely my personal views)
■■ A melt-up or end-phase of a bubble within the next 6 months to 2 years is likely, i.e.,
over 50%.
■■ If there is a melt-up, then the odds of a subsequent bubble break or melt-down are
very, very high, i.e., over 90%.
■■ If there is a market decline following a melt-up, it is quite likely to be a decline of some
50% (see Appendix).
■■ If such a decline takes place, I believe the market is very likely (over 2:1) to bounce
back up way over the pre 1998 level of 15x, but likely a bit below the average trend of
the last 20 years, as the trend slowly works its way back toward the old normal on my
“Not with a Bang but a Whimper” flight path.4
A. Suggested action plan for everyone
■■ What I would own is as much Emerging Market Equity as your career or business risk
can tolerate, and some EAFE. I believe each of these, especially Emerging, has more
potential than most think (as noted in my recent piece in GMO’s 3Q 2017 Letter).
B. For those individual investors willing to speculate5
■■ Consider a small hedge of some high-momentum stocks primarily in the US and
possibly including a few of the obvious candidates in China. In previous great bubbles
we have ended with sensational gains, both in speed and extent, from a decreasing
number of favorites. This is the best possible hedge against the underperformance you
will suffer if invested in a sensible relative-value portfolio in the event of a melt-up.
■■ As is also true in Case A, if we have the accelerating rally that has typified previous
blow-off phases, you should be ready to reduce equity exposure, ideally by a lot if
you can stand it, when either the psychological signs become extreme, or when, after
further considerable gain, the market convincingly stumbles. If you can’t cope with
this thought and can’t develop and execute an exit strategy, then sit tight and ignore all
this advice, except for an overweighting of Emerging. I certainly recognize that leaping
out of declining markets is a completely unrealistic idea for large, illiquid institutions
and nerve-wracking enough for even the toughest-minded individuals. In this sense
you can treat this paper as an academic exercise… the musings of an old student of
the market, who thinks he sees the signs of an impending melt-up that will be painful
for value investors. Is it better to be warned and suffer than be surprised and suffer? At
least when warned you can brace yourselves.
Postscript: Possible Political Consequences
Living in a hyper-political era, I should mention that if my best guesses are correct, a near-term melt-
up would obviously help the current administration at mid-term, just as the subsequent and highly
probable melt-down would seriously hurt it.
4
GMO Quarterly Letter, 3Q 2016.
5
That is to say, willing to invest in an asset with an unusually low long-term return, an expectation of a shorter-term price
game.

January 3, 2018
Disclaimer: The views expressed are the views of Jeremy Grantham through the period ending January 2018, and are subject to change
at any time based on market and other conditions. This is not an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security and should
not be construed as such. References to specific securities and issuers are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to be, and
should not be interpreted as, recommendations to purchase or sell such securities.
Copyright © 2018 by GMO LLC. All rights reserved.
Jeremy Grantham. Mr. Grantham co-founded GMO in 1977 and is a member of GMO’s Asset Allocation team, serving as the firm’s chief
investment strategist. He is a member of the GMO Board of Directors and has also served on the investment boards of several non-
profit organizations. Prior to GMO’s founding, Mr. Grantham was co-founder of Batterymarch Financial Management in 1969 where he
recommended commercial indexing in 1971, one of several claims to being first. He began his investment career as an economist with
Royal Dutch Shell. Mr. Grantham earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Sheffield (U.K.) and an M.B.A. from Harvard
Business School.
Appendix: Structural Flaws
Market bears list an impressive number of structural stress points under the surface of the economy and
the financial system. Perhaps they are correct, as were some early warners in 1929 about deteriorating
fundamentals. Certainly some of their points will turn out to be at least partially correct. But for
a bubble to form from here we only need the ship to hold together and look good for another few
quarters. And to be fair, economies are often, even typically, considerably more resilient and capable
of muddling through than bearish arguments would suggest. Both here and elsewhere. (China, for
example, with its empty trains and empty cities and booming house prices has been predictively
doomed for years even as its trains and cities fill up and its remarkable gains in average wages in
the last three years far exceed the house price rises in 80% of its cities.) Having said all this, if the
bubble ends in the way I expect it will, then the structural stress may well help the decline become, in
technical terms, a real humdinger.

2018 01-18 jg

More Related Content

What's hot (20)

Similar to 2018 01-18 jg (20)

More from Mats Larsson (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

2018 01-18 jg