IMT Verification Report Summary
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The IMT report summarizes its findings from investigating the January 25, 2015 Mamasapano incident between Philippine security forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Key findings include: 1) the police operation was valid but did not follow ceasefire protocols, 2) engagement occurred in an MILF area without required coordination, and 3) both sides likely violated the ceasefire agreement through aggressive actions. The report provides recommendations to clarify protocols, strengthen command and control, and hold accountable any violations of laws of war.
IMT Verification Report Summary
- 1. The IMT Verification Report On the January 25, 2015 Mamasapano Incident
- 2. Overview • IMT is a neutral body tasked to assist in the monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire agreements between the GPH and MILF • Authorised to conduct a Verification Mission on the Mamasapano incident; mission conducted with support from GPH and MILF ceasefire committees • Submitted via email to the GPH Panel on 5 April 2015
- 3. Overview (cont) • Objectives: As a neutral body, to – Verify allegations of violations of the ceasefire agreement provisions – Propose recommendations to avoid recurrence of similar incidents and enhance the ceasefire mechanisms • Report submitted by email to GPH Panel on 5 April 2015
- 4. Limitations • Area: not granted access to site where Marwan was killed due to security considerations • Mission limited to “verification only… not to make “thorough investigations.”
- 5. Summary of Findings • Valid law enforcement operation by the PNP • Ceasefire protocols not observed during planning and execution of Oplan Exodus • Site of encounter between the 55th SAF and MILF-BIAF is accepted to be an MILF area/community under the control of BIAF base commanders – Raises questions on clear definition of what constitutes and MILF area/community other than those referred to in signed documents (i.e. Joint Acknowledgement of 10 Feb 1999 and Joint Statement of 17 Feb 1999) • After raid on Marwan’s hut and subsequent clash between 84th Sac and BIFF, the PNP-SAF at some point engaged the MILF-BIAF which went from “the status of deliberately uncoordinated movements to a disastrous firefight between the 55th SAC and elements of the BIAF 105th BC.”
- 6. Findings on Possible Ceasefire Violations 1) On MILF providing sanctuary to criminal or lawless elements: • No evidence to show that the MILF as an organization provided sanctuary or assistance • However, this does not dispel claims that some members of the MILF might have had knowledge of the whereabouts of Marwan and Usman
- 7. Findings on Possible Ceasefire Violations 2) On PNP SAF’s lack of coordination with the MILF prior to Jan 25, 2015: • Para 6, part VI of the Implementing Guidelines of the Joint Communique of 6 May 20012 may be interpreted in two ways with respect to LEOs against HVTs: i) AHJAG can inform CCCH less than 24 hours before or within reasonable time for civilian evacuations and to avoid armed confrontation between GPH and MILF forces; OR ii) exemption
- 8. Findings on Possible Ceasefire Violations 2) On PNP SAF’s lack of coordination with the MILF prior to Jan 25, 2015: - To avoid uncertainties, the IMT recommended this provision be clarified by its crafters. Until clarification is made, any LEO against HVTs AHJAG must still inform CCCH less than 24 hours prior to the operations and within reasonable time to allow evacuation of civilians and to avoid untoward incidents - Failure of PNP SAF to have prior coordination with AFP, other PNP forces, CCCH and AHJAG is a violation by the GPH of Article II of the AGCH of 1997.
- 9. Findings on Possible Ceasefire Violations 3) On alleged aggressive actions such as attacks, raids, ambuscades and offensive military actions: - There is probable cause to assume that the PNP SAF opened fire resulting in the two KIA from the BIAF side when said BIAF fighters tried to cross the bridge in Mamasapano as supported by the bullet marks and blood stains on the bridge. - This indicates a “full firefight rather than a mere uncoordinated movement.” This is a violation by the GPH of Para 3b, Article I of the AGCH of 1997 (aggressive actions such as attacks, ambuscades, etc.
- 10. Findings on Possible Ceasefire Violations 3) On alleged aggressive actions such as attacks, raids, ambuscades and offensive military actions: - BIAF’s actions can be seen as a response to the non- coordinated movements which cannot be categorized as a violation of Article I of the AGCH of 1997 - However, BIAF’s entry into the cornfields which led to an armed clash with the 55th SAC may be considered as a violation of para 3b, Article I of the AGCH ogf 1997
- 11. Findings on Possible Ceasefire Violations 4) On the conduct of terrorist acts such as robberies and summary executions: - No violation on the part of MILF BIAF against Article I of the AGCH, para 3A (Summary executions and IHL) nor violated IHL; But the IMT posited that the MILF BIAF “should have respected their counterparts and the SAF commandos consistent with the Rome Statue and RA 9851 forbidding pillage.” - Items taken by MILF BIAF from fallen PNP SAF are considered military and not personal items (i.e. cellphones though personal items being used as communications tools or as military items in this case) - No sufficient evidence that summary executions against PNP SAF that the IMLF BIAF were the perpetrators (no witnesses). - PNP SAF (member, 55th SAC) who killed 4 sleeping MILF fighters on Jan 26 is a violation og Art I of AGCH para 3A (summary execution and OHL)
- 12. Findings on Possible Ceasefire Violations 5) On the civilian protection aspect: - Two civilians killed on January 25, 2015, one after being apprehended by the PNP SAF 55th SAC. Cause of death was crossfire but verification did not yiled conclusions as to who fired the fatal shots. - Violation of Agreement on CPC of 2009: Indiscriminate use of force: Most MILF fighters carry firearms while interacting with civilians adding confusion to law enforcement agencies and which could result to civilian casualties - If it can be proven that PNP SAF failed to take precautions to protect civilians: violation of IHL and RA 9851 Section 4(c) (7)
- 13. Recommendations To resolve the issue or deter future similar cases from occurring, the IMT recommended that: • The GPH coordinate and initiate the use of the conflict preventive mechanisms available when launching LEO in known MILF areas • There is a need to clarify further what is provided in Part VI (Mechanics of Implementation) Paragraph 6 of the AHJAG Implementing Guidelines on the Joint Communiqué of 6 May 2002. • A higher ranking PNP Office should be assigned to GPH CCCH • The MILF BIAF strengthen its command and control among its ranks as well as intelligence in their organization • The Parties should uphold and observe the laws of war, international humanitarian law, and their respective rules of engagement and codes of conduct • The PNP and BIAF combatants found to have committed crimes should be penalized accordingly under RA 9851