A Critical Theory Of Technology

1
[“A Critical Theory of Technology,” Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. Ulrike Felt,
Rayvon Fouché, Clark A. Miller, Laurel Smith-Doerr, eds., MIT Press, 2017, pp. 635-663.]
A Critical Theory of Technology
Andrew Feenberg
Introduction
This chapter summarizes the main ideas of critical theory of technology and shows how it relates
to its two sources, Frankfurt School Critical Theory and early work in Science and Technology
Studies (STS).1
Critical theory of technology is concerned with the threat to human agency
posed by the technocratic system that dominates modern societies. Two early trends in STS,
various versions of social constructivism and Actor-Network Theory (ANT), addressed this
threat implicitly, through challenging positivist and determinist ideologies that left little place for
democratic control of technology. Critical theory of technology agrees with STS that technology
is neither value neutral nor universal while proposing an explicit theory of democratic interven-
tions into technology.
As STS has responded in recent years to the emergence of public participation in determin-
ing technology policy, it has moved closer to the concerns of critical theory of technology
(Chilvers and Kearnes 2016). Critical theory of technology is still distinguished from most con-
tributions to STS by its emphasis on certain themes derived from the Frankfurt School, espe-
cially the critique of rationality in modern culture. It thus puts STS in communication with tra-
ditions of social critique often overlooked. In this respect it is not so much an alternative to STS
as an invitation to open STS to a wider range of philosophical and social theories of modernity.
The first sections of this chapter will map the relation between critical theory of technology
and some of the major scholars and methodological innovations of STS. Next, the essay explains
relevant reservations concerning the concept of symmetry which historically is a central concern
of STS scholarship. The succeeding sections explain the principal concepts and methods of criti-
cal theory of technology and discuss its political implications. The concluding sections will show
how the theory interprets an interesting STS case study.
Mapping Critical Theory of Technology
Before the formalization of STS into a scholarly field of inquiry, the social study of technol-
ogy was associated with Marxism, pragmatism, Heideggerian phenomenology and various theo-
1
In the mid 1980s, when I first worked on the theme of this chapter, the phrase “Critical Theory” was associated with
the critique of positivist and technocratic ideology in Marcuse, Habermas and other members of the Frankfurt School.
Today the phrase has no very specific referent, unless capitalized, in which case it still refers to the Frankfurt School. In
miniscule it is loosely associated with the critique of these same ideologies and might refer to work derived from the writ-
ings of Deleuze and Foucault among others.

2
ries of modernity. These broad and often speculative theories explored the relation of technology
to society. They attempted to understand the specificity of modernity in terms of the scientific
and technological revolutions and on that basis to account for the many ills of modernity, espe-
cially the decline of human agency in a technologized society. Their themes are now familiar:
technocracy, the tyranny of expertise, the substitution of knowledge for wisdom and information
for knowledge, a vision of the human being and of society as a complex of functional systems,
the meaningless of modern life, the obsolescence of man, and so on. Lost amidst these vast con-
cerns is technology itself.
STS has been largely successful in supplanting these competing approaches with empirical
case studies of actual technologies. Today few look to Mumford or Dewey, Heidegger or Mar-
cuse for insight into technology. However, when STS turned to case studies, with methods
rooted in other intellectual traditions, it focused less frequently and ambitiously on wider social
and political concerns. Of particular relevance to the argument of this chapter was the decreased
emphasis on the modernity theorists’ concern with the contradiction between political agency
and technocratic rationality.
This abstention from politics was due to what Wiebe Bijker called the “detour into the
academy,” deemed necessary to establish STS as a social science (Bijker 1995, 5). Of course not
everyone made the famous detour but the field was sufficiently marked by abstention from po-
litical controversy to trouble some who belonged to the earlier critical tradition. Langdon Win-
ner spoke for them in an article significantly entitled "Upon opening the black box and finding
it empty: Social constructivism and the philosophy of technology" (Winner 1993). I responded
differently by revising Critical Theory to accommodate the methodological innovations of STS
(Feenberg 1991). Rather than calling for STS to adopt the critical spirit, I adopted the anti-
determinism and anti-positivism of STS to support a critical theory of technology.
The concerns of STS broadened as the widespread controversies over medical care, the
Internet and the environment directly implicated technology in so many different aspects of con-
temporary political life. In response STS has become political, although sometimes with an un-
convincing concept of politics (Brown 2015; Soneryd 2016). Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and
the work of Sheila Jasanoff, Brian Wynne and many others have had a broad influence on at-
tempts in STS to understand the politics of technology (Latour and Weibel 2005; Jasanoff 2004;
Wynne 2011). Studies of hybrid forums and co-production challenge narrow understandings of
democracy prevalent in philosophy and political theory (Chilvers and Kearnes 2016; Callon et
al. 2011; Jasanoff 2004). Some STS researchers have now also become aware of the highly politi-
cized approaches favored in the developing world, especially Latin America (Dagnino 2008;
Kreimer and Thomas 2004; Rajão, et al. 2014). But how can the prior achievements of STS,
exemplified in so many brilliant case studies, be preserved in the context of politically charged
investigations of controversial issues? For reasons rooted in the origins of STS this poses prob-
lems. This chapter proposes one way of addressing those problems.
The critical theory of technology draws on STS while placing the issues in the context of the

3
Frankfurt School’s critique of modernity. Critical Theory was developed by German Marxists in
the 1920s and 1930s. Its most famous members were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Her-
bert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin. They were influenced by George Lukács, whose concept of
“reification” described the reduction of complex and dynamic social relations to apparently law
governed interactions of (social) things (Lukács 1971, 83-110). Lukács argued that reification
constitutes the members of society as isolated individuals. In that condition they cannot change
the laws of social life, only use them as the basis of technical manipulations. The Frankfurt
School continued this line of criticism, demystifying reified institutions and opening up possi-
bilities of critique foreclosed by the tendentious appeal to social and economic laws. Increasingly,
from the 1940s on, the members of the Frankfurt School focused on the collapse of both bour-
geois culture and the proletarian movement in the face of mass culture and fascism.
The dominant liberal ideology of the post-World War II era brought technocratic claims
into the center of public discourse. Social arrangements were justified by reference to their ra-
tional character and opposition dismissed as sentimental nonsense. In the 1960s Marcuse distin-
guished himself by the popular success of his attack on liberalism.2
His 1964 book One-
Dimensional Man had a significant influence on the New Left. His critique of American society
as a highly integrated system governed by “technological rationality” resonated with the concerns
of youth in the advanced capitalist world. The technical details of Marcuse’s theory of technol-
ogy were not widely studied or understood at the time, but today it has surprising relevance. He
not only claimed that technology has been shaped by the capitalist social forces that presided
over its creation, but he argued for the possibility of progressive technological change under the
influence of more humane social forces.
Marcuse’s concept of “technological rationality” as a legitimating ideology updated earlier
Marxist notions of market rationality. Social life in our time appears increasingly not only to de-
pend on science and technology but also to mirror scientific and technical procedures. Efficiency
is said to be rational and commands respect in every area of social life. Rationality thus serves as
the justification and alibi for many kinds of social change. The “mantra of efficiency” draws
strength from this connection even as it has disastrous consequences for some of those affected
(Alexander 2008). Critique is disarmed before it can get off the ground by a blanket accusation
of irrationality. Who dares question the universality, the neutrality, the progressive contribution
of science? Luddites and other “romantic irrationalists” are easily dismissed with a reference to
the overwhelming success of modern science and technology.
Marcuse’s version of Critical Theory recapitulates the essential content of Lukács’s concept
of reification, the notion that capitalism imposes a rational culture that privileges technical ma-
nipulation over all other relations to reality. That culture narrows human understanding and
lives to conform with the requirements of the economic system. Capitalism thus determines the
form of social interaction and experience. Marcuse contends, “When technics becomes the uni-
2
The first edition of One-Dimensional Man sold 300,000 copies (Aronson 2014).

4
versal form of material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical to-
tality - a 'world'” (Marcuse 1964, 154).
Following this approach, critical theory of technology identifies the intrinsic bias of “effi-
cient” solutions to social and technical problems. But it differs substantially from the earlier
works of Lukács and Marcuse. The major shift for critical theory of technology is to draw upon
fundamental assumptions of STS in elaborating the themes treated by earlier traditions.
Like the modernity theorists, STS reacted against technocratic ideology but did not embrace
sweeping philosophical critique. The case study method employed empirical evidence to subvert
the positivistic and determinist assumptions underlying the liberal celebration of the rational so-
ciety. The key alternative assumptions proposed in the social constructivist tradition are the no-
tions of actors, underdetermination, interpretive flexibility, and closure. Although introduced to
account for particular cases, these assumptions can lend support to the critique of the ideological
deployment of the concept of rationality. Critical theory of technology incorporates these as-
sumptions along with the concepts of program, delegation and co-production drawn from Ac-
tor-Network Theory (ANT). However, critical theory of technology questions the most radical
conclusions of STS theorists, such as the symmetrical treatment of disputants in technological
controversies and the symmetry of humans and non-humans. The following sections will elabo-
rate where and how critical theory of technology draws on and diverges from certain STS theo-
ries and methods.
Contributions of Social Constructivism and ANT
The application of social constructivist methods to particular technologies is fruitful. It
blocks the ideological recourse to pseudo-rational justification by showing that social factors in-
tervene in the decisions that lead to “closure,” or the success of a particular design. This version
of social constructivism argues that the perception of technical problems depends on the inter-
pretations of social groups or “actors.” The early stages of the development of an artifact often
involve a multiplicity of actors with conflicting interpretations of the nature of the problem to be
solved. Different social groups may assign different purposes to devices that are basically similar
from a technical standpoint. Design decisions flow from these assignments.
In one of the most cited instances of this approach, Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker offer the
example of the early history of the bicycle (Pinch and Bijker, 1987). They present two compet-
ing types of bicycles in the early days of bicycle design: a fast bicycle with a large front wheel and
a small rear wheel and a safer but slower bicycle with two wheels the same size. Today the large
front wheelers appear to be primitive predecessors of the bicycles we ride, but in its own day the
design suited a specific group of users. Pinch and Bijker propose a “symmetrical” treatment of
the two main designs that takes account of their contemporary social meaning, rather than view-
ing them in terms of an imaginary chronology.
This constructivist “principle of symmetry” was initially introduced to guide the study of
scientific controversy toward an even-handed treatment of both winners and losers. The com-

5
monplace attribution of superior rationality to the winner was to be resisted in favor of an appre-
ciation of the mixed motives and questionable assumptions on all sides of the controversy. In its
application to technology the constructivist principle of symmetry required a balanced view of
the various designs competing at the outset, no one of which was obviously superior in the eyes
of contemporaries.
Each of the bicycle designs Pinch and Bijker studied appealed to different actors: the high
front-wheelers to young man who liked to race and the more stable design to ordinary people
using a bicycle for transportation. Most of the parts were similar and both versions looked like a
bicycle, but they were actually two different technologies understood in different ways by differ-
ent social groups. Eventually, through innovation, the safer model prevailed. Its triumph was not
due to absolute technical superiority but to contingent historical developments.
The outcome was underdetermined by purely technical considerations and can only be un-
derstood by taking into account the actors’ struggles for control of the design process. The tech-
nical underdetermination of artifacts leaves room for social choice between different designs that
have overlapping functions but better serve one or another social interest. This “interpretive
flexibility” of artifacts concerns a hermeneutic dimension overlooked in standard instrumentalist
accounts. Thus the “rational society” is not the “one best way” but contingent on values and in-
terests.
As Pinch and Bijker write, "The different interpretations by social groups of the content of
artifacts lead by means of different chains of problems and solutions to different further devel-
opments…" (Pinch and Bijker 1987, 42). Their key point is the influence of the social on "the
content of the artifact” itself and not merely on such external factors as the pace of development,
packaging or usages. This means that context is not merely external to technology, but actually
penetrates its rationality, carrying social requirements into the very workings of the device.
This argument could lend support to the Marxist account of the development of a specifi-
cally capitalist technology in opposition to the deterministic arguments of the post-War technoc-
racy. In fact, analogs to Pinch and Bijker’s approach can be seen in the work of Marxist histori-
ans of technology, Harry Braverman (1974) and David Noble (1977). The Frankfurt School af-
firmed the capitalist nature of technology on the basis of the same sources in Marx’s work that
influenced these scholars. Adorno writes, for example,
It is not technology which is calamitous, but its entanglement with societal conditions in
which it is fettered… Considerations of the interests of profit and dominance have chan-
neled technical development: by now it coincides fatally with the needs of control. Not
by accident has the invention of means of destruction become the prototype of the new
quality of technology. By contrast, those of its potentials which diverge from dominance,
centralism and violence against nature, and which might well allow much of the damage
done literally and figuratively by technology to be healed, have withered (Adorno 2000,
161–2, n.15).

6
These arguments offer a possible bridge between Marxism and constructivism. Adorno, like
the constructivists, attributes the design of technology to the actors who dominate the design
process. However, other scholars, like those represented by the work of Bruno Latour, object to
this approach because it absolutizes society at the same time as it relativizes technology. Latour’s
formulation of Actor-Network Theory attempts to disengage constructivism from what he con-
siders an over-emphasis on human intention. In order to bring the material layers of the network
into focus, ANT therefore extends the constructivist argument to the things incorporated into
technical networks. It argues for a conceptual and functional “symmetry of humans and non-
humans” different from the social constructivist version of symmetry.3
Symmetry in ANT is
achieved by blurring the distinction between interpretive and intentional acts of humans and the
causal powers of things, signifying both with the neutral term “agency.” People and things link
together in networks and have effects on the networks to which they belong. The concept of
“program” in ANT does the work of the constructivist notion of interpretation with the proviso
that things too may have programs in the sense that their actions play a role in the life of the net-
work.
This approach avoids the subjectivism and relativism sometimes attributed to social con-
structivism, but it does so in a strange way, not by reintroducing the objective properties of
things identified by scientific research, but rather by describing their roles in the networks to
which they belong. A similar reduction strips human beings of inwardness and initiative. People
and things are to be understood as essentially actors in networks, not as subjects and objects. The
division between subject and object, meaning and causality is then explained as an illegitimate
epistemological operation specific to modernity which Latour calls “purification” (Latour 1993).
This after-the-fact operation obscures the foundational significance of the hybrid sociotechnical
realities of the networks.
ANT thus posits the hybrids prior to their components. Its concept of “co-construction” or
“co-production” calls attention to the interdependence of the human actors and the technical
world in which they find themselves. Actors are not constituted by purely social bonds but form
around the technologies that support the interactions of their members. Human agency must
not be privileged over the agency of things. This argument, like that of social constructivism, is
subversive of a naïve confidence in the purely “rational” character of the technical world, which
is now shown to be a scene on which many types of agents are active in terms of a variety of dif-
ferent “programs.”
Critical theory of technology draws on social constructivism for an alternative to technologi-
cal determinism and on ANT for an understanding of networks of persons and things. The con-
structivist approach emphasizes the role of interpretation in the development of technologies.
Actor Network Theory explores the implications of technical networks for identities and worlds.
3
For the early debate see Pickering (1992, chapters 10-12).

7
These notions are congruent with the critique of context-free rationality in the early Frankfurt
School which provides a background to the concept of the bias of technology in critical theory of
technology (Horkheimer 1995; Feenberg 2014). Critical theory of technology thus concretizes
the Frankfurt School approach through the application of STS methods.
The Limits of Symmetry
Constructivist STS research methods have been fruitful. They have introduced new ideas
about technological design and the relation of publics to the technical mediations that bind their
members together. This is an important advance over standard social and political theories that
abstract from the technological altogether or fetishize it deterministically. However, less persua-
sive are the moves beyond critique and methodology to found a relativistic epistemology and a
new network ontology. The problems show up in attempts to generalize STS as a full fledged
political theory. As we have seen, the two principles of symmetry require that the same methods
and terms be used in the treatment of participants in controversies and of humans and non-
humans. These two principles have contradictory political implications. On the one hand, they
weaken the hegemony of the technocracy and carve out a place for democratic initiatives in the
technical sphere. But on the other hand, they make it difficult to understand the nature of social
conflict in a heterogeneous environment such as a modern capitalist society. In the remainder of
this section I will explain these limitations.
The constructivist principle of symmetry proves particularly effective in valorizing the con-
tributions of ordinary people to the redesign of flawed or unnecessarily limited technologies. Ex-
perts bound by interests and traditions sometimes overlook problems and potentials revealed
only once their products circulate widely (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003). Environmentalism is
based in large part on the intolerance of users and victims for levels of pollution deemed accept-
able at first by business and its expert cadres. With the Internet, users have made an undeniable
contribution to the evolution of a major technological system.
Some of these lay interventions involve significant conflict with established institutions.
Conflict in society was of course a central concern of Marxists such as Lukács and Marcuse.
Early social constructivism modeled its discussion of technology on a different type of conflict,
scientific controversy. This poses a problem for the generalization of STS methods to society at
large. Many later attempts in STS to understand social conflict have broken with this early
model, but constructivist symmetry remains an important concept to which reference is often
made. This appears to me to be an inconsistency.
Scientists typically act in good faith and on the basis of evidence, even when they disagree
over its interpretation. The constructivist principle of symmetry was introduced in acknowl-
edgement of this fact. Its application in social studies of science was intended to insure that the
same methods would be applied to all parties to the dispute, avoiding a one-sided treatment of
scientific controversies. As noted above, the methodological relativism imposed by symmetrical
treatment counter-acts the tendency to idealize the winner and undervalue the intelligence and

8
rationality of the loser (or, vice-versa, to demonize the winner and overvalue the rights and jus-
tice of the loser).
For example, Priestley's rejection of Lavoisier’s discovery of the mechanism of combustion
cannot be laid to mere dogmatism, self-interest or stubbornness; his point of view too must be
considered as a rational, if unsuccessful, attempt at understanding.4
Unfortunately, many techni-
cal controversies are quite different from this model. One or both sides are often biased by eco-
nomic interests, dishonest claims, irrational panic, racial or gender prejudice and the corruption
of scientific and public actors. The principle of symmetry can mislead in this context, if applied
injudiciously. Its application to particular cases risks providing alibis for the machinations of un-
scrupulous actors or systematic discrimination. A relativistic method is of no use where dishon-
esty or prejudice prevails.5
Not only is symmetry ill suited to the rough and tumble of techno-
logical controversy, but it risks canceling the normal attributions of responsibility on which we
rely in public life. An even-handed treatment of bad decisions can slip over into a justification of
those responsible.
Consider the case of the Challenger accident as explained by Trevor Pinch and Harry
Collins (Collins and Pinch, 1998). The common view of the accident attributes blame to NASA
managers’ impatience. This asymmetrical explanation conforms with our usual notions of re-
sponsibility, but is it right? The danger of a cold weather launch had not yet been proven ex-
perimentally on the fatal day. But there was cause for concern: the informed observations of the
engineer assigned to investigate the problem. His observations were ignored, Pinch and Collins
write, not because management rejected reasonable caution, but because they did not meet “pre-
vailing technical standards” (Collins and Pinch, 1998: 55). Symmetry prevails, but responsibility
is defeated. The question remains of why “technical standards” were preferred in this instance,
why expert observations were ignored in favor of more rigorous proof that was unavailable.
Could it be that symmetry is broken at the level of epistemology? All too often, scientism trumps
all other evidence when it serves the interests of the dominant social actors, but only then. This
is a good illustration of Marcuse’s notion of “one-dimensional thought” which privileges quanti-
tative precision over experiential knowledge.6
ANT has other problems with politics. The network approach led to the widely adopted
concept of co-production of society and technology. This concept is well suited to understand-
ing political controversies over technology. It has the potential to revolutionize political theory
by focusing attention on the technical mediation of social organization. But Latour’s ambitious
theoretical program is not as successful as the case histories in which the concept of co-
production is applied. The principle of symmetry of humans and non-humans was intended to
orient research toward the structure of the networks uniting them. These networks were said to
4
For a brief, clear illustration of the significance of the symmetry principle in this case, see Mauskopf (2006, 76).
5
Feminists within STS were among the first to see the problem with symmetry. See Wajcman (2004), p. 126. See also
Michaels (2008) and Oreskes and Conway (2010).
6
I engaged in a debate over this claim with Kochan (2006), Feenberg (2006), and Collins and Pinch (2007).

9
explain all macro entities such as “state,” “ideology,” “class,” “culture,” “nature, “economic in-
terest.” But critics accused Latour of bias in favor of the victors in the struggle to define nature
since he argues, in accordance with good STS practice, that nature in the only meaningful sense
is established by the network. But what if the nature so defined is discriminatory? To what can
the losers in struggles over race or gender discrimination appeal if not to a “natural” equality
grounded on a different definition of nature (Radder 1996, 111-112)? Latour eventually came to
agree that he had gone too far toward a Machiavellian affirmation of success (Latour 2013, 64).
He responded to his critics in his writings on ecology, arguing that actors can introduce new
objects into the taken-into-account world, for example, such objects as toxic wastes and smog.
Freedom of discussion in the constitution of the “collective” would insure against economic or
technocratic domination. This is not a bad start toward understanding environmental issues,
such as climate change, but it is not very useful as an account of the actual struggle between af-
firmers and deniers and the gaps in national uptake of the policy recommendations of the UN
panel on climate change. Latour’s rejection of “critique” and of macro concepts in social theory
deprives him of the means to address the role of interests and ideologies in determining positions
on the issues. But without access to these categories, research cannot address the principle insight
of the Frankfurt School, namely, the role of capitalism in the cultural generalization of rational-
ity. Indeed, good old fashioned Marxist notions of interest and ideology are obviously in play
when energy bosses like the Koch brothers mobilize a billion dollars or more to sponsor climate
denial and support political candidates whose policies protect their purse (Rich 2010).7
In an early work, Latour introduced the term “anti-program” to signify the conflictual as-
pect of his networks (Latour 1992, 251-252). Critical theory of technology introduces a new
principle of symmetry based on this notion. I have proposed what I call the “symmetry of pro-
gram and anti-program” in order to avoid any bias in favor of the dominant network actor
(Feenberg 1999, 116-119). Programs corresponding to actors’ intentions carve out sub-sets of
the interconnected elements brought together in the network. Where actors are in conflict, dif-
ferent programs may highlight different elements. For example, the same factory that appears to
its managers as an economic entity may appear to its neighbors as a source of pollution. Both
managers and neighbors belong to the factory network, but their different relations to it are
manifested in different programs, for example, a business plan and a lawsuit.
Critical theory of technology argues for a discriminating application of the two symmetry
principles of social constructivism and ANT and rejects empiricism and methodological indi-
vidualism. This does not imply a return to pre-constructivist realism and humanism, but it does
open a bridge to the recovery of key insights of the tradition of social thought, insights that help
7
Is social constructivism better equipped than ANT to deal with such cases? Indeed, it would seem so since it emphasizes
the role of interests and resources in decision-making. But in this case symmetry in the strong sense in which it was ini-
tially proposed might play an ambiguous role, equating such “resources” as real scientific knowledge with the well re-
warded pseudo-science of climate change denial. Or, more sensibly, symmetry would play no role at all since there are no
serious rational resources on one side of the argument, just propaganda. In that case it is difficult to see how the con-
structivist analysis would differ from a conventional political analysis.

10
to understand the tensions between individuals and a rationalized society.
As STS has evolved over the years it has engaged increasingly with politically sensitive issues.
The problems with symmetry are rarely addressed directly. But the austere exigencies of the early
methodological struggles are left behind and the useful methods and insights applied in combi-
nation with ideas drawn from many fields. The result is promising. STS has a great deal to con-
tribute to an understanding of contemporary politics. Critical theory of technology is an attempt
to provide one possible theoretical framework for such methodological bricolage.
Technical citizenship
Critical theory agrees with ANT that individuality cannot be conceived in independence of
other people and things. It is nonsense to speak of pure consciousness in abstraction from all ma-
terial support. The individual emerges from the “network” constituted by the family and its ma-
terial and cultural environment, and is always thereafter conditioned by its roles in the networks
to which it belongs. But once constituted the individual retains its identity as it switches from
network to network. It cannot be dissolved into its roles. The relative stability of individuality is
the basis of the reflective capacities that enable it to distance itself from and criticize the net-
works in which it participates.
Critical theory of technology is concerned with the threat to such critical potential posed by
the pretensions of the technocracy. Reflective rationality is disarmed by the claims of technical
rationality. In the tradition of the Frankfurt School individuality is regarded as a historical
achievement. Bourgeois culture generalized the capacity for independent thought to an unprece-
dented degree. This is the basis of personal and political agency, the power to define one’s iden-
tity and to further one’s interests. In principle, the socialist revolution would extend this capacity
to every human being, but in the 20th
century it appeared that individuality belonged to an all
too brief interregnum between societies in which independent thought is overwhelmed, either by
custom and religious conformity or by the technocratic legitimation of a mass society.
The Frankfurt School’s notion of individuality grounded a critique of the reified rationality
regulating more and more of social life in advanced societies. The destruction of the capacity for
individuality testified to the rise of technological domination. The mass of the population was
condemned to passive conformity while a minority preserved its mental independence through
theoretical and artistic critique (Marcuse 2001, 69-74). Critical theory of technology takes up
this critical perspective in a different historical period in which resistance to technological domi-
nation has appeared in new forms.
In recent years we have seen the sphere of public debate and activity expand to take in tech-
nological issues that were formerly considered beyond the bounds of discussion. With the expan-
sion of the public sphere new forms of technical agency have emerged. This has given rise to
what David Hess calls "object conflicts,” conflicts over how to configure technologies so as to
serve various interests and conceptions of the good life (Hess, 2007, p. 80-84). The nature of
these conflicts lies at the heart of this chapter. Their proliferation raises new questions about

11
technology and democracy. Have we become technological citizens? More precisely, is there
something we could call political agency in the technical sphere? And if there is, what is its rela-
tion to technical expertise and traditional political agency?8
Agency in the sense in which I use the term is not a free floating matter of arbitrary prefer-
ences but is rooted in the experience made possible by specific social situations. Technical sys-
tems evoke what I call participant interests. The systems enroll individuals in networks which
associate them in various roles, for example as users of the technology or workers building it, or
even as victims of its unanticipated side-effects. Interests flow from these roles where the indi-
viduals have the capacity to recognize them.
The drivers of automobiles discover an interest in better roads they would have had no rea-
son to feel before joining the automotive network. Similarly, the victims of pollution discover an
interest in clean air that would never have occurred to them had they or their children not suf-
fered from respiratory problems caused by those drivers. Drivers, sufferers and cars co-produce a
network to which all belong and it is this which makes certain interests salient that might other-
wise have remained dormant or had no occasion to exist at all.
Once enrolled in a network, individuals not only acquire new interests, in some cases they
also acquire a situated knowledge of the network and potential power over its development. This
knowledge from below and insider power is different from that of individuals who have no con-
nection to the network. Even without expert knowledge, insiders can identify problems and vul-
nerabilities. They have a platform for changing the design codes that shape the artifacts incorpo-
rated into the network. This is conscious co-production: the reciprocal interactions of members
of the network and the codes that define roles and designs.
In critical theory of technology, the actions of citizens involved in conflicts over technology
are called “democratic interventions.” Most of these are “a posteriori,” occurring downstream
after the release of technologies into the public domain. There are many contemporary examples
such as controversies over pollution or medical treatments, leading to hearings, lawsuits, and
boycotts. Such controversies often result in changed regulations and practices. A second mode of
intervention, the creative appropriation of technology, involves hacking or the reinvention of
devices by their users to meet unanticipated demands. This mode has played an important role
in the evolution of the Internet (Abbate 1999). A third mode of intervention can be called “a
priori” because it involves action prior to the release of technologies. This mode takes two main
forms, public participation in “citizen juries” or “hybrid forums” to evaluate proposed innova-
tions, and collaboration in the design process. In these cases, the individuals are solicited to par-
ticipate by the authorities rather than entering into an aposteriori conflictual dialogue (Callon,
Lascoumes, Barthes 2011; Chilvers and Kearnes 2016; Feenberg 1999, chap. 5).
8
Because the concept of agency has been applied to things under the influence of ANT, a preliminary clarification of my
use of the term is necessary. I do not intend by “agency” any and every activity, whether of persons or things, that has an
impact on a network. I will stick to the usual meaning of political agency as the ability to perform intentional acts of
public consequence.

12
Differentiation and Translation
The notion of technical citizenship raises questions concerning the role of expertise. Ordi-
nary people intervene in technical decisions on the basis of everyday experience rather than
through mastery of a technical discipline. Experts possess such mastery and are qualified to im-
plement technical decisions as most lay people are not. Somehow the claims of experience and
those of technical disciplines must be reconciled in the design process. The conundrum only
seems insoluble from a narrow and dogmatic perspective. In the real world of technology, a
largely unacknowledged dialogue between lay and expert is a normal feature of technical deci-
sion-making and should be further developed (Collins and Evans 2002). For examples of the
challenges of design at the interface between engineers and users, see the chapters in this volume
by Kelly Joyce et al. and by van den Scot et al.
If we have a different impression, and fear both arrogant expertise and irrational experience,
that is a function of a unique historical situation that arose in the 19th
century. Before that time
negotiation between craftsmen and communities under the control of judicial authorities regu-
lated the harmful externalities of production. The case law embodied the accumulated wisdom
of experience as it applied to technical activity (Fressoz 2012). In the 19th
century the path was
cleared for rapid technical advance at the expense of workers, communities and users of technol-
ogy. Central administrative controls buttressed by expert authority replaced the traditional judi-
cial restraints on technology. This change accompanied a much enhanced differentiation of soci-
ety under the impact of industrial capitalism.
The separation of technical work from everyday life is an important aspect of the differenti-
ating process of modernization. Medieval craft guilds were social as well as professional organiza-
tions. In addition to regulating prices, training and quality they had many other functions. The
crafts were not based on specialized technical disciplines in the modern sense but on traditional
knowledge of materials and practices, rules of thumb and what the French call “tours de main.”
Their “secrets” needed to be kept secret precisely because they were communicable to experi-
enced consumers. In fact the final stages of production often required consumers to finish the
artifact in a process called “breaking in.”
Modern technical work depends on specialized scientific knowledge. The language of the
technical disciplines can only be understood by initiates, those trained in the profession. The so-
cial and religious concerns of the guilds are stripped away along with the independence of the
technical worker. Today, most technical work goes on in business enterprises, which significantly
changes its character and goals.
The property system on which business is based is also affected by the process of differentia-
tion. Ownership in precapitalist societies involved broad responsibilities. Land owners had po-
litical, judicial and religious functions. Capitalism strips away all these obligations and powers
and focuses the owner on making a profit. Other goals such as providing employment and pro-
tecting the community are gradually abandoned (Simmel 1978, 331-354). This new form of

13
property explains the destructive logic of the industrial revolution. Indifference to nature and
human beings contributed to the shaping of modern technology. Throughout the development
process scientific and technical knowledge was applied in the pursuit of profit without regard for
the social and natural context of enterprise. Narrow specializations and narrow economic goals
complemented each other. The resulting simplifications accelerated technical progress but also
led to problems we are only beginning to address today.
For generations the victims of progress were too weak, ignorant, or marginalized to protest
effectively. But conditions gradually changed, especially after World War II. The side-effects of
more powerful technologies became visible and provoked a public response. Unions and social
movements gained influence and demanded the regulation of industry. As a result, a new stage
of “reflexive modernization” engaged a slow corrective process that still continues (Beck 1992).
In this context everyday experience takes on renewed importance. Where formerly cognitive
success required breaking all dependence of technical knowledge on everyday experience, Ba-
con’s famous “idols,” experience now measures the consequences of technical knowledge and
designs (Wynne 2011). Those consequences should no longer be ignored and are traced back to
their origin in the blind spots of technical disciplines and the limitations of the business perspec-
tive. Users and victims now defend themselves against narrowly conceived technology on the ba-
sis of their understanding of their experience.9
These democratic interventions constitute the so-
cial background to the broad success of new interdisciplinary initiatives such as STS that attempt
to understand the emerging forms of technical citizenship.
These post-war trends constitute original forms of de-differentiation that are progressive
rather than regressive in nature. On the one hand, the technosciences bring science and technol-
ogy together in powerful combinations, crossing well established boundaries between the true
and the useful. On the other hand, corresponding to the emergence of technoscience and its in-
creasingly dangerous side-effects, government regulation crosses the lines between state and
economy, forcing capitalist enterprise to work under a widening range of constraints. The new
relationship must develop its own institutions for translating social knowledge about technol-
ogy’s harmful effects or overlooked potentialities into technical specifications for better designs.
Such translation processes will become routine in the long run as public involvement increases.
The circle in which technology modifies society while itself being modified will be closed.
Revising Rationality
The early Frankfurt School addressed a cultural environment characterized by an unprece-
dented faith in technical rationality. It attributed the decline of agency to the rational culture of
modernity. This is not merely a subjective disposition but is reflected in the multiplication of
9
This new public involvement is not an unmixed blessing. The public makes mistakes too, as for example in the case of
the rejection of vaccinations for childhood diseases. But every advance of democracy grants new powers to the "unquali-
fied." Only after the individuals have acquired citizenship are they in a position to engage the learning process that quali-
fies them to exercise it.

14
bureaucracies and technologies that effectively organize and control most of social life on the ba-
sis of technical disciplines. The knowledge of ordinary people is increasingly devalued and hu-
man agency is reduced to technical manipulations of the rational systems.
This is still the situation in which democratic interventions challenge the technocracy today.
But the original all-encompassing formulations of the Frankfurt School left no room for the re-
turn of agency. To account for struggles over technology, critical theory of technology recon-
structs the critique of rationality in a more empirically oriented form.
Where the Frankfurt School proposed a very general critique of “reified” or “instrumental
rationality,” critical theory of technology looks to a more concrete critique of the bias of social
institutions and technologies. Rational culture is shown to depend on the imitation of methods
and concepts modeled on mathematics and natural science, generalized as a framework for
thought and action in every sphere. For example, market relations rely on quantification in the
form of prices. Similarly, bureaucracy subsumes specific cases under precisely formulated rules
that resemble laws of nature in their formalism and pretention to universality. Technology is
implicated in scientific development. The identification of biases in these domains employs
methods explored in STS and yields a cultural and political critique of modern institutions.
The elaboration of this critique poses a challenge because we normally identify bias where
prejudices, emotions and pseudo-facts influence judgments that ought to be based on objective
standards. I call this “substantive bias” because it rests on a content of belief such as, for example,
the idea that some races possess inferior intelligence. The Enlightenment showed us how to criti-
cize this type of bias. The philosophers of that era appealed to rational foundations, facts and
theories unbiased by prejudice and on that basis refuted the narrative legitimations of feudal and
religious institutions. There is no doubt that Enlightenment critique played and still plays an
important role in emancipatory politics. However, it has a significant limitation since it implies
the neutrality and universality of institutions that claim a rational foundation. This is the case,
for example, with the market, which is justified not by myths, stories or emotional appeals but
by the dry logic of the equivalence of money for goods.
Rationality in this social form did not go unchallenged. Romantic critique implausibly at-
tributed substantive bias to rational systems and thereby denied the rationality of rationality as
such. The choice of reason over passion is supposedly biased by a preference for a bourgeois life
style or, in some recent formulations, by patriarchal ideology. This stance is associated with artis-
tic and political sub-cultures but has little impact on the organization of modern societies (Löwy
and Sayers 2001, 35 ff). The effective critique of a rational system such as markets, technology
or administrative procedure requires a different approach. A subtler analysis must find the bias in
the concrete realization of a rational form. Marx initiated this new type of critique with his
analysis of the bias of the market. Today STS shows that technically rational design is underde-
termined by purely technical considerations and thus is biased under the influence of social crite-

15
ria (Pinch and Bijker 1987).10
The materialization of interests and ideologies in technical disci-
plines and designs I call “formal bias.”
Formal bias has political implications. Some benefit more than others from the technologies
that surround us. The sidewalk ramp is a case in point (Winner 1989). The ordinary high curb
is fine for pedestrians but blocks the free circulation of wheel chairs. Sidewalk ramps were intro-
duced in response to the demands of the disabled. A suppressed interest was incorporated into
the system. The outcome is not an unbiased technology, but more precisely, a technology that
translates a wider range of interests.
The familiar opposition of irrational society and rational technology invoked by techno-
cratic ideology has no place in this context. The biased design that eventually prevails in the de-
velopment of each technology is the framework within which that technology is rational and ef-
ficient. Efficiency is not an absolute standard since it cannot be calculated in the abstract but
only relative to specific contingent demands which bias design. Technology is value-laden like
other social realities that frame our everyday existence. But after technologies are well established
their particular bias seems obvious and inevitable. We cease to conceive it as a bias at all and as-
sume that the technology had to be as we find it. Uncovering the implicit bias constitutes the
“rational critique of reason” promised by the Frankfurt School (Adorno 1973, 85).
Layers and Codes
The emergence of technical citizenship highlights the inherent contingency and complexity
of technical artifacts masked by the coherence of technical explanations. In this context, I suggest
that the concept of a palimpsest can serve as a useful analogy. A palimpsest has diverse layers or
aspects apparent beneath the surface. Technological design is similar: multiple layers of influence
coming from very different regions of society and responding to different, even opposed logics
converge on a shared object. Critical theory of technology is a “palimpsestology.”
Social history has long treated artifacts as palimpsests. In the course of his comments on the
history of money, Marx sketched the rationale for such an approach. He writes that "[t]he con-
crete is concrete, because it is a combination of many objects with different destinations, i.e. a
unity of diverse elements. In our thought, it therefore appears as a process of synthesis, as a re-
sult, and not as a starting point, although it is the real starting point and, therefore, also the
starting point of observation and conception" (Marx 1857/1904, 293). Marx rejects an Aristote-
lian notion of thinghood in which an essence endures through accidental changes. Analysis must
identify the ontological differences in the construction and meaning of objects at each stage in
their development. This is a de-reifying approach that treats social "things," such as artifacts, in-
stitutions and laws, as assemblages of functional components held together by their social roles.
The components disaggregate and recombine as society changes.
In the case of technology and technical systems, these constructions reflect the relative
10
This is a point also made in the field of design. See Friedman, et al. (2008) and Friedman (1996).

16
power of the actors engaged with design. The outcome of their struggles and collaborations is a
“technical code.” The code identifies the larger social meaning of technical choices embodied in
the stabilized intersection of social choice with technical specification. Technical codes translate
the one into the other through what ANT calls “delegation.” So, the social demand for more
navigable sidewalks became a specification for construction projects. The rights of the disabled
were translated into a specific slope. Taken in isolation the slope appears merely technical, but in
its context it has a political significance captured in the code.11
Such codes are incorporated not
only into designs but also penetrate technical disciplines.
Critical theory of technology distinguishes two types of technical codes, the codes of par-
ticular artifacts, and the codes of whole technical domains. The sidewalk example illustrates the
artifact code. Codes relevant to whole technical domains are involved in the definition of pro-
gress. The domain code under which industrial progress was pursued in the 19th century re-
quired the replacement of skilled labor by machines. This code is still influential to this day.
Where it is contested we see the continuing role of public action in determining the technical
future.12
Domain codes in modern capitalist societies are translated into higher-level meanings,
such as ideologies and worldviews. For example, the technocratic concept of efficiency translates
particular interests into technical arrangements conducive to the exercise of managerial authority
(Alexander 2008, 166-170). Reification may be considered as the ultimate domain code of capi-
talism, describing the core principles to which all the lesser domains conform.
Critical theory of technology expresses these complexities through the analysis of design in
terms of functional layers.13
Design is a terrain on which social groups advance their interests. It
proceeds through bringing together layers of function corresponding to the various meanings
actors attribute to the artifact. The study of technology must identify the layers and explain their
relations. This yields a “concrete” account in Marx’s sense. It reveals the co-production of the
social groups formed around the technology and the design of the technology that forms them.
Adding layers corresponds to accepting more social inputs. This takes several different
forms. Often apparently conflicting interests are reconciled to some extent in the final design.
The metaphor of the palimpsest is illuminating in such cases since each relevant social group
contributes a layer to the final design. Artifacts are not coherent individuals so much as they are
concatenations, assemblages of more or less integrated parts. Like a palimpsest, their parts em-
body levels of meaning that reflect a variety of social and technical influences.
The result may involve trade-offs, compromises resulting in a less than perfect design for all
parties. More interesting are those cases in which elegant innovations make it possible to satisfy
all the different demands without loss in efficiency. Such innovations are called “concretizations”
by Gilbert Simondon (Simondon 1958, chap. 1). This term is deceptive since Simondon does
11
I have developed what I call the “instrumentalization theory” to explain these “double aspects” of technology. See
Grimes and Feenberg (2013) for a brief account and examples.
12
For a contemporary example drawn from the field of education, see Hamilton and Feenberg (2012).
13
Two studies exemplifying this method are Feenberg (2010, chap. 6) and Cressman (forthcoming 2016.)

17
not mean to contrast the concrete with the conceptually abstract. His terminology, like Marx’s,
is loosely Hegelian. He defines concretization as the merging of several functions in a single
structure. This can be seen in the Pinch and Bijker bicycle case where inflatable tires satisfied
both the racers' desire for speed and the ordinary users' transportation needs.
This concretizing innovation reconciled all the relevant actors in a single perfected design.
Concretizations construct alliances between the actors whose various demands are materialized in
a single object. That object operates across the boundary between different social groups, each
interpreting it in accordance with its own conception of its needs, each incorporating it into its
own world. Such materialized “boundary objects” are increasingly sought in the struggle between
environmentalists and the representatives of industry (Star and Griesemer 1989; Dusyk 2013,
section 2.2.2.) Concretizations make it possible for industry to find a new trajectory of develop-
ment satisfying a range of demands that were formerly ignored. Concretizing advances refute by
example the supposed opposition of facts and values, rational achievements and ideological op-
position that justifies the technocracy in its resistance to change. Identifying such advances vali-
dates a democratic politics of technology.
An Exemplary Case
In this section I propose to apply the concepts of bias, technical codes, layers and rationality to
an exemplary case. These key elements of critical theory of technology bridge the gap between
particular cases and the wider cultural world of modernity. The case I have chosen illustrates a
common type of technoscientific controversy in which the same artifact plays very different roles
in the different worlds of the actors. In such cases, conflicting interpretations of the artifact re-
sulting from different goals and epistemic tests may eventually lead to design changes or the dis-
placement of one design by another more powerfully supported design. From the standpoint of
critical theory of technology, this case illustrates the legitimating role of rational criteria intro-
duced to suppress subordinate actors, and countered by those actors on the basis of their own
epistemic resources.
Medicine is an especially rich field for the application of STS. For example, Tiago Moreira
poses the problem of the relation between supposedly universal “rational” standards and personal
experience through the example of the denial of a medication for treatment of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease by the British National Health Service (NHS) (Moreira 2012).
The NHS evaluates medications and decides on their cost/benefit ratio in terms of quasi-
scientific measures. In the case of Alzheimer’s, the evaluation did not include issues of quality of
life but was based on measures of cognition and hospitalization. When an existing treatment was
found not to be cost-effective on this basis, it was withdrawn. From the critical theory perspec-
tive, this represents a reified basis for decision-making, aligning scientific and economic regimes
but ignoring other aspects of the network in which the treatment is embedded. The occlusion of
those aspects is the formal bias of the reified NHS approach.
The program under which the NHS interprets treatments has curing as its goal. It did

18
not measure or concern itself with the network of palliative care constructed around the Alz-
heimer’s medication but isolated it as a more or less effective technical device. But patients and
caregivers were upset by the agency’s decision. Even though the medication in question did not
do much to slow cognitive decline or prevent many hospitalizations, it did have a significant im-
pact on quality of life. Here we have an alternative program focused on caring, an aspect of the
network the scientistic bias of the NHS ignored. A typical clash of interpretations ensued, calling
into question the definition of the artifact.
Moreira’s article concerns how the victims of the decision made their point through an
epistemological shift: telling stories about how the medicine had changed and improved the pa-
tients’ quality of life and their own experience of caring. These stories evoked emotional re-
sponses in the form of anger, disappointment, and depression. They operated as allegories, much
like human interest stories in newspapers. Everyone can identify with the subject of a human
interest story through sharing imaginatively the affect it evokes. Similarly, the stories told by the
patients’ caregivers solicited identification and formed community on a different basis from the
quasi-scientific “rational” standards applied by the NHS, with different results for the definition
of the medication and indeed of the medical system itself. Eventually the NHS agreed to supply
the medication to some patients at a certain stage in the progress of the disease.
In this example, the actors’ programs highlight two layers of the medical network con-
structed around the medication, a curing and a caring layer. The chemistry of the medication
was not changed by the caregivers’ intervention, but its meaning and usage qua medication was
decided by the controversy. Meaning and usage, too, are aspects of the reality of technical arti-
facts. Only a partial alignment between the layers was achieved by the clumsy compromise that
settled the controversy.
This example shows the role of democratic interventions in resisting the imposition of a
biased rationality representing the interests of dominant actors. Naturally, the effectiveness of the
caregivers’ campaign was due in part to the existence of widespread concern about both the
NHS and Alzheimer’s disease. This is all about politics, but politics in one of several unfamiliar
domains in which we must get accustomed to seeing ever more frequent public challenges to the
dominant methods and decisions.
Technocratic technical codes are called into question in struggles such as this. As “ra-
tional,” technology takes on an apparent inevitability. It is assumed that devices and systems do
what they do because of what they “are.” This is the dangerous tautology of the illusion of tech-
nology. To create a place for agency technical citizens must struggle to overcome this illusion
and restore consciousness of the contingency of the technical domain. The very definition of
progress is at stake in this struggle.
Democratic interventions are translated into new regulations, new designs, even in some
cases the abandonment of technologies. They give rise to new technical codes both for particular
types of artifacts and for whole technological domains, as in the case of energy production and
computing. This is a special and irreplaceable form of activism in a technological society. It lim-

19
its the autonomy of experts and forces them to redesign the worlds they create to represent a
wider range of interests. Insofar as STS contributes to the understanding of these movements, it
plays a progressive political role.
Methodological Suggestions
I call this concluding section “suggestions” because that is what a formal methodology can
provide. In the end there is no substitute for insight, which cannot be formalized. But methods
do suggest perspectives on cases and that can be helpful in pursuing and organizing research.
Here then are a few methodological suggestions that follow from the approach of critical theory
of technology.
A Dialectical Approach. Political and economic power are legitimated in modern societies
by reference to rational criteria such as efficiency, and powerful institutions rely on technical dis-
ciplines to satisfy those criteria in practice. This sets the stage for the confrontation of expert and
lay actors in many domains, as in the medical example described above. These confrontations are
not challenges to rationality as such, but to the particular form it takes in specific cases. Critical
theory of technology focuses on such conflicts and argues that they be understood as a unifying
theme in the study of the role of technology in modern society.
The different concerns of expert and lay actors engaged with a technical artifact or system
often place conflicting demands on design. This is illustrated in the example, where an object
conflict arose over the value of a medication. Such conflicts reflect conflicting programs which
carve out different sub-systems from the total network. In the example, that network extended to
pharmaceutical companies, the NHS, hospitals, doctors, patients, caregivers and all the artifacts
they employ, including the medication in question. The curing and caring programs fore-
grounded different aspects of the network, the one emphasizing economic costs of treatment, the
other the quality of life of patients and their caregivers. Similar conflicts are found throughout
modern life, in relation to environmental issues, transportation, urban design, worker health and
safety, food safety, and many other issues. Research can be structured around the unfolding of
such conflicts.
Symmetry and Asymmetry. Any method which fails to recognize the widespread existence of
deception and corruption is fatally naïve. (Volkswagen has a car for those who dismiss the cri-
tique of hidden motives as outdated.) STS must be able to distinguish these cases from authentic
disagreements and employ appropriate methods to study each. Asymmetrical methods such as
old fashioned muckraking and ideology critique are useful in cases such as the financing of cli-
mate change denial by the energy industry and research on the harms of tobacco by cigarette
companies. There is no symmetry between the painstaking work of real science and the manu-
facture of propaganda.
Symmetrical methods are appropriate for other cases where the actors are engaged in a real
controversy. In such cases actual knowledge is invoked with reason and conviction on all sides,

20
other motives not withstanding. Claims are not offered simply to create artificial controversy or
to hide costly failures from public view. The question is how to understand these conflicts of ra-
tionality. Maintaining symmetry is problematic where one side in the argument can stand on
material achievements while the other is able to mobilize only words. This is typically the case
where dominant actors meet public protests. This is where the symmetry of program and anti-
program plays an essential methodological role. It overcomes the apparent asymmetry between
dominant actors with their already established technologies and subordinate challengers with
only a discursively formulated anti-program.
Double Aspects of Rationality. Critical theory of technology argues that modernity is char-
acterized by a dominant rational culture. Rationality in this sense is not universal but is context-
bound like other aspects of culture. Critical theory of technology claims further that the rational-
ity of actors’ positions has both strictly technical and intrinsic normative aspects. It is not neces-
sary to invoke extrinsic values to get at the normative aspect because it is implied in the nature of
the technology as understood by the actors. Both sides of the argument between the actors rest
on rational principles of technical construction which are also the basis of normative claims. The
double aspects of technical rationality thus transcend the supposed gap between “ought” and
“is.” The methodological suggestion that follows from this approach is “Follow the actors’ rea-
sons.” I will again use the medical example to illustrate this approach.
Technologies depend most fundamentally on an act of abstraction in which the useful as-
pects of a natural entity are isolated and privileged for incorporation into a device. Abstraction is
a rational procedure. It supplies technical elements that combined constitute a thing with a pur-
pose. In so doing it places the technical subject under the obligations implied by the social
meaning of the product.
The chemists who devised the Alzheimer’s medication were not simply abstracting useful
aspects from nature; they were also creating a meaningful object with a purpose from which ob-
ligations would flow. Those obligations were interpreted differently by the actors because they
understood the product differently. For the NHS, the medication had to “work” by curing or at
least slowing the progress of the disease. For the caregivers, “working” had a different meaning:
the medication had to relieve the burden of care. These normative aspects of the relation to the
medication flow directly from its nature as interpreted by the actors.
A second example can further clarify the double aspects of rationality. Consistency is an-
other basic rational principle invoked and employed in the production and evaluation of tech-
nologies. A technical device must be consistent with its material environment to function. This
is a matter of adaptation: voltage requirements of a hair dryer must be compatible with the volt-
age delivered by the electric outlet, and so on. But the device must also be consistent with a so-
cial environment of meanings and values. The demand for consistency at this level is just as es-
sential as material adaptation. In the medical example, a medication consistent with a neo-liberal
economic environment is mal-adapted to the ethical environment of family caregivers and their
sympathizers and vice versa.

21
Note that these examples show the role of rationality not only in the dominant program but
also in the anti-program of the lay advocates of an alternative understanding of the technology.
Of course there is an important difference between program and anti-program: experts must
translate the lay position into technically rational specifications for it to achieve success on a par
with the already realized program of the dominant actors. In the case in point, physicians would
understand the function of the medication differently in the two opposing cases. While this does
not change its chemical composition, it does define it differently within the medical system. In
other cases the actual design of the technology might have to be changed to adapt it to lay de-
mands. Interpretative flexibility understood as a conflict of rationalities reflects the claims of dif-
ferently situated actors.
Layers. The multiple demands on design are reflected in discursive forms, practices, and
specifications. Technologies can thus be analyzed as layered phenomena, reaching from the
heights of full blown ideology down to the details of technical design. At each level further layers
appear reflecting different degrees of abstraction. For example, the neo-liberal ideology of the
British state inspired the quantitative evaluation methods of the NHS, which in turn reflected
the institutional preference for curing typical of modern medical practice. The program of the
NHS achieved congruence at all levels except the crucial one, the level of the medication itself,
which did not perform effectively on the terms of the NHS. The caregivers’ anti-program intro-
duced a different epistemology, one appropriate to an ethic of compassion and oriented toward
the practices of caring for the chronically ill. An appeal to empathy through personal case narra-
tives corresponded in their program to the quantitative methods of the NHS. On these terms the
medication performed effectively.
The Internet illustrates layering at the technical level. Technical features of the Internet
serve a wide variety of functions reflecting the demands of different actors. For example, a fea-
ture such as anonymous online presence is rooted in the technical protocols of the Internet. The
Internet has no gatekeeper, such as a telephone company, that can demand real name identities.
Anonymity, while imperfect, serves political dissenters, individuals pursuing online partners,
criminals engaged in buying and selling drugs, and those engaged in illegal downloading of mu-
sic and films, among many others.
The different functions that cluster around this feature create tensions over the most appro-
priate design of the Internet. Music and film companies find it difficult to defend their intellec-
tual property on the Internet. They would like to make it easier to identify users who appropri-
ate their contents without payment. This would require changes in the Internet protocol and the
regulation of Internet service providers, and would have an impact on all other uses of anonym-
ity. At the ideological level, freedom of speech opposes the free market in the contest for control
of design. Case studies of issues such as this can be organized from top to bottom, from ideologi-
cal formulations of the desiderata to their realization in usages, technical features and functions.14
14
For an example from my work, see Feenberg 2010, chapter 5.

22
Many more methodological suggestions flow from the focus on the role of biased realiza-
tions of rationality in modern culture. Critical theory of technology examines these realizations
in particular cases in the context of a theory of modernity. In so doing it aims to create a bridge
between the two “layers” I have been discussing throughout this chapter, empirical research and
general social theory.
References
Abbate, Janet. 1999. Inventing the Internet. Cambridge, MIT Press.
Adorno, Theodor. 1973. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E.B. Ashton. New York: Seabury.
Adorno, Theodor. 2000. Introduction to Sociology. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Cam-
bridge: Polity Press.
Alexander, Jennifer. 2008. The Mantra of Efficiency: From Waterwheel to Social Control. Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins.
Aronson, Ronald. 2014. “Marcuse Today.” http://www.bostonreview.net/books-ideas/ronald-
aronson-herbert-marcuse-one-dimensional-man-today. Consulted 27/01/2016.
Beck, Ulrich. 1992. Risk Society. Translated by Mark Ritter. London: Sage.
Bijker, Wiebe. 1995. Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical
Change. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review.
Brown, Mark. 2015. “Politicizing Science: Conceptions of Politics in Science and Technology
Studies.” Social Studies of Science 45 (1): 3-30.
Callon, Michel, Pierre Lascoumes, and Yannick Barthe. 2011. Acting in an Uncertain World.
Translated by Graham Burchell. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Chilvers, Jason and Matthew Kearnes (eds). 2016. Remaking Participation: Science, Environ-
ment and Emergent Publics. London and New York: Routledge.
Collins, Harry M. and Robert Evans. 2002. "The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Ex-
pertise and Experience." Social Studies of Science 32 (2): 235-296.
Collins, Harry and Pinch, Trevor. 2007. “Who is to Blame for the Challenger Explosion.” Stud-
ies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):254-255.
Cressman, Daryl. 2016. Building Musical Culture in Nineteenth-Century Amsterdam: The
Concertgebouw. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Dagnino, Renato. 2008. Neutralidade da Ciência e Determinismo Tecnológico. Campinas: Edi-
tora Unicamp.
Dusyk, Nicole. 2013. The Transformative Potential of Participatory Politics: Energy Planning
and Emergent Sustainability in British Columbia, Canada. University of British Colum-
bia, Doctoral Dissertation.
Feenberg, Andrew. 1991. Critical Theory of Technology. Oxford: University Press.
Feenberg, Andrew. 1995. Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social

23
Theory. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Feenberg, Andrew. 1999. Questioning Technology. New York: Routledge.
Feenberg, Andrew. 2006. "Symmetry, Asymmetry and the Real Possibility of Radical Change:
Reply to Kochan." Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 37: 721-727.
Feenberg, Andrew. 2010. Between Reason and Experience: Essays in Technology and Moder-
nity. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Feenberg, Andrew. 2014. The Philosophy of Praxis. London: Verso.
Fressoz, Jean-Baptiste. 2012. L’Apocalypse Joyeuse: Une Histoire du Risque Technologique.
Paris : Le Seuil.
Friedman, Batya. 1996. "Value-Sensitive Design." Interactions, November-December.
https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~goguen/courses/271/friedman96.pdf
Friedman, Batya, P. H. Kahn Jr., and A. Borning. 2008. "Value Sensitive Design and Informa-
tion Systems." In The Handbook of Informati on and Computer Ethics, edited by Ken-
neth Einar Himma and Herman T. Tavani, 69-101. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Grimes, Sara and Andrew Feenberg. 2013. “Critical Theory of Technology.” In The Sage Hand-
book of Digital Technology Research, 121-129. London: Sage.
Hamilton, Edward and Andrew Feenberg. 2012. "Alternative Rationalisations and Ambivalent
Futures: A Critical History of Online Education." In (Re)Inventing the Internet, edited
by Andrew Feenberg, and Norm Friesen, 43-70. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.
Hess, David. 2007. Alternative Pathways in Science and Industry: Activism, Innovation and the
Environment in an Era of Globalization. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Horkheimer, Max. 1995. "On the Problem of Truth," in Between Philosophy and Social Sci-
ence: Selected Early Writings. Translated by G. F. Hunter, M. S. Kramer, and J. Torpey,
177-215. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2004. "The Idiom of Co-Production." In States of Knowledge: The Co-
Production of Science and Social Order, edited by S. Jasanoff, 1-12. London: Routledge.
Kreimer, Pablo, Hernán Thomas, Patricia Rossini, and Alberto Lalouf, eds. 2004. Producción y
uso social e conocimientos. Estudios Sociales de la ciencia y la tecnología en América La-
tina. Quilmès: UNQ, Bernal.
Kochan, Jeff . 2006. “Feenberg and STS: Counter-reflections on Bridging the Gap.” Studies in
the History and Philosophy of Science 37: 702-720.
Latour, Bruno. 1992. "Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Arti-
facts." In Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed-
ited by Wiebe Bijker, and John Law, 225-258. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Trans. C. Porter. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Latour, Bruno. 2013. An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence. Trans. C. Porter. Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press.
Latour, Bruno and Peter Weibel (eds). 2005. Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democ-

24
racy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Löwy, Michael and Robert Sayre. 2001. Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity. Durham:
Duke University Press.
Lukács, Georg. 1971. History and Class Consciousness. Translated by Rodney Livingstone.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press.
Marcuse, Herbert. 2001. “The Individual in the Great Society.” In Towards a Critical Theory of
Society, edited by Douglas Kellner. New York: Routledge.
Marx, Karl. (1857) 1904. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Translated by
N. I. Stone. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
Mauskopf, Seymour. 2006. “A Tale of Two Chemists.” American Scientist 94(1) (Jan/Feb).
URL: https://www.americanscientist.org/bookshelf/bookshelf.aspx?name=a-tale-of-two-
chemists&content=true.
Michaels, David. 2008. Doubt Is Their Product: How Industry’s Assault on Science Threatens
Your Health. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moreira, Tiago. 2012. “Health Care Standards and the Politics of Singularities: Shifting in and
out of Context.” Science, Technology and Human Values, 37(4): 307-331.
Noble, David. 1977. America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capi-
talism, New York: Knopf.
Oreskes, Naomi and Erik M Conway. 2010. Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists
Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. New York:
Bloomsbury Press.
Oudshoorn, Nelly and Trevor Pinch (eds.) 2003. How users matter: The co-construction of us-
ers and technology. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Pickering, Andrew (ed). 1992. Science as Practice and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Pinch, Trevor, and Wiebe Bijker. 1987. "The Social Construction of Facts and Artefacts." In
The Social Construction of Technological Systems, edited by Wiebe Bijker, Thomas
Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, 17-50. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Radder, Hans. 1996. In and About the World: Philosophical Studies of Science and Technol-
ogy. Albany: SUNY Press.
Rajão, Raoni, Ricardo B. Duque and Rahul De’ (eds). 2014. “Voices from within and Outside
the South—Defying STS Epistemologies. Boundaries, and Theories" Special issue of Sci-
ence, Technology, & Human Values, 39(6).
Rich, Frank. “The Billionaires Bankrolling the Tea Party.” The New York Times 28 Aug. 2010.
Web.
Simmel, Georg. 1978. The Philosophy of Money. Trans. T. Bottomore and D. Frisby. Boston
and London: Routledge & Kegan, Paul.
Simondon, Gilbert. 1958. Du Mode d'Existence des Objets Techniques. Paris: Aubier.

25
Soneryd, Linda. 2016. "Technologies of Participation and the Making of Technologized Fu-
tures." In Remaking Participation: Science, Environment and Emergent Publics, edited
by Jaso Chilvers and Matthew Kearnes, 144-161. London and New York: Routledge.
Star, Susan and James Griesemer. 1989. "Institutional Ecology, 'Translations' and Boundary
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-
39". Social Studies of Science 19 (3): 387–420.
Wajcman, Judy. 2004. Technofeminism. Cambridge: Polity.
Winner, Langdon.1989. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High
Technology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Winner, Langdon.1993. "Upon opening the black box and finding it empty: Social constructiv-
ism and the philosophy of technology". Science, Technology, & Human Values 18 (3):
365–368.
Wynne, Brian. 2011. Rationality and Ritual: Participation and Exclusion in Nuclear Decision-
Making. London and Washington D.C.: Earthscan.

A Critical Theory Of Technology

More Related Content

Similar to A Critical Theory Of Technology (20)

More from Joe Andelija (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

A Critical Theory Of Technology