A Discursive Model Of Satire

# 2014 - 001
A Discursive Model of Satire
by
Massih Zekavat
(Nonaffiliated researcher)
JENA ELECTRONIC STUDIES IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE is a publication
of the Institute für Anglistik/Amerikanistik der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Germany. For
editorial correspondence please contact vanderbeke@t-online.de.
© by the author

Jena Electronic Studies in English Language and Literature 2014 - 001
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A Discursive Model of Satire
by
Massih Zekavat
(Nonaffiliated researcher)
Abstract:
Although it has been an almost ubiquitous discourse from ancient times to the present, satirists
and critics do not agree on a single definition of satire. A synthetic definition of satire could be
reached through a critical survey of its various definitions. Accordingly, satire is a discursive
practice in a Foucauldian sense to which four elements, with varying degrees, are essential:
attack or aggression, laughter or humor, play, and judgment. Defining satire as a Foucauldian
discourse allows the critical analysis of its interactions with other discourses within respective
power structures. Therefore, a general discursive model of satire is deduced according to which
the discourse of satire not only shapes, but is also shaped by, five major discourses—namely
discourses of economy, politics, morality, patriarchy, as well as learning and knowledge—
through their negotiations and transactions within specific epistemes.
Keywords: satire; Foucauldian discourse; epistemological model.
Introduction
Satire has been a ubiquitous discourse: it can be traced through different epochs, cultures and
media. Although satire is said to be one of the earliest modes of expression rooted in ancient
rituals1
(Colebrook 178, Quintero 3, Keane 36), at present there is no common understanding of
it. Despite the fact that there is no consensus about a single definition of satire, critics and
satirists maintain that satire performs certain social functions. So far, satire criticism has been
mainly concerned with rhetoric. Some studies, especially those concentrating on a specific
satirist, have also employed historical and biographical approaches. There is a reason behind
this: the bulk of satire criticism belongs to the pre-1970s before the rise of “theory”. But, as the
number of recent publications conveys, there is a renewal of interest in satire.
1
R. C. Elliott first contended that satire can be traced back to ancient rituals in his The Power of Satire:
Magic, Ritual, Art (1960).

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Foucault’s influence proves to be of special significance in proposing a general model of
satire. Recognizing satire as a Foucauldian discourse allows the epistemic investigation of its
emergence. The discourse of satire is likely to emerge through discursive transaction and under
specific circumstances. In order to reach an appropriate explanation of satire, its discordant
definitions have to be examined. On this basis, a general model for the epistemic analysis of the
discourse of satire will be developed. It will be demonstrated that satire is likely to emerge as the
result of discursive negotiations in an episteme. More accurately, discourses of morality,
economy, politics, patriarchy, as well as knowledge and learning not only shape the discourse of
satire but are also shaped by it.
Towards a Definition of Satire
There is no consensus on a definition of satire. Still, an intercultural critical survey of its various
conceptualizations can convey the richness of satire and enable a move towards an appropriate
definition. Such an intercultural and historical survey can lead to a relatively autonomous
definition that holds true in divergent epochs and/or milieus. I will focus mainly on British and
Persian literary and critical traditions which best suit my language skills. I also have to delimit
my study, especially with regard to the examples I cite, both due to time and space restraints and
because of certain limitations in research facilities, including lack of access to necessary indexes
and databases. Moreover, since the objective of this study is to propose a theoretical
epistemological model of satire, I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive historical survey of
all definitions proposed for satire in these two cultures.
As they are the main practitioners of satire and scholarly perspectives are based on their
works, I want to begin with satirists themselves. In a poem (1566), Thomas Drant says that,
“Satyre is a tarte and carpyng kind of verse, / An instrument to pynche the prankes of men.” He
goes on to write that,
those that wyll them write,
With tauting gyrds and glikes and gibes must vexe the lewde,
Strayne curtesy, ne reck of mortall spyte. (qtd. in Sutherland 31)
In his Discourse Concerning Satire, John Dryden draws on Casaubon for a definition of
Greek satire:
The Satyric is a dramatic poem, annexed to a tragedy, having a chorus, which
consists of Satyrs. The persons represented in it are illustrious men; the action of it
is great; the style is partly serious, and partly jocular; and the event of the action
most commonly is happy. (qtd. in Dryden 51)
He adds that for the Romans, satire “was not only used for those discourses which decried vice,
or exposed folly, but for others also, where virtue was recommended” (67). So he deems satire
to be similar to moral philosophy and emphasizes its instructive and corrective functions. He
also objects to Heinsius who believes satire to be,
a kind of poetry, without a serious action, invented for the purging of our minds; in
which human vices, ignorance, and errors, and all things besides, which are
produced from them in every man, are severely reprehended; partly dramatically,

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partly simply, and sometimes in both kinds of speaking; but, for the most part,
figuratively, and occultly; consisting in a low familiar way, chiefly in a sharp
pungent manner of speech; but partly, also, in a facetious and civil way of jesting;
by which either hatred, or laughter, or indignation, is moved. (qtd. in Dryden 100)
Dryden also strives to distinguish satire from other forms of explicit and tendentious vexation:
How easy is it to call rogue and villain, and that wittily! But how hard to make a
man appear a fool, a blockhead, or a knave, without using any of those opprobrious
terms! To spare the grossness of the names, and to do the thing yet more severely,
is to draw a full face, and to make the nose and cheeks stand out, and yet not to
employ any depth of shadowing. (Dryden 92-93)
In his “Preface” to The Battle of the Books, Jonathan Swift avers that, “SATYR is a sort
of Glass, wherein Beholders do generally discover every body’s Face but their Own; which is
the chief Reason for that kind of Reception it meets in the World, and that so very few are
offended with it” (Swift 140, italics in the original). Accordingly, he underlines that satire is
primarily used for censuring vices in order to correct them. In addition, he emphasizes the
significance of the text-audience interactions in the process of its reception. People are prone to
project vices onto others and laugh at them, while they frequently fail to detect them in their
own personality and behavior and are reluctant to confess that they are also subject to similar
shortcomings. He continues his tongue-in-cheek remarks with the eventual inefficiency of
satirist’s attempts to correct vices:
But if it should happen otherwise, the Danger is not great; and, I have learned from long
Experience, never to apprehend Mischief from those Understandings, I have been able to
provoke; For, Anger and Fury, though they add Strength to the Sinews of the Body, yet
are found to relax those of the Mind, and to render all its Efforts feeble and impotent.
(Swift 140, italics in the original)
Boyle believes that Swift is implying that “we need not worry about the mischief done to those
foolish enough to be provoked to anger by being told the truth” (4).
Swift also gets close to defining satire in his “Verses on the Death of Dr. Swift,” when he
imagines himself as the topic of a discussion at Rose Tavern after his death. The speaker
comments on the Swift’s motivations for writing satire:
Perhaps I may allow the Dean
Had too much satire in his vein;
And seemed determined not to starve it,
Because no age could more deserve it. (lines 455-458 )
Here he echoes Juvenal’s remark, “difficile est saturam non scribere,” (Satires 1.30), in claiming
that his milieu makes him write satire. Then he moves on to discuss the object of his satire:
Yet malice never was his aim;
He lashed the vice, but spared the name;
No individual could resent,
Where thousands equally were meant;
His satire points at no defect,

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But what all mortals may correct;
For he abhorred that senseless tribe
Who call it humor when they gibe:
He spared a hump, or crooked nose,
Whose owners set not up for beaux. (lines 459-468)
So satire is not tendentious and should not be motivated by chagrin or derision of physical
defects. He does not censure individuals but human vices that could be corrected. In the end, he
comes to false wits:
True genuine dullness moved his pity,
Unless it offered to be witty.
Those who their ignorance confessed,
He ne’er offended with a jest;
But laughed to hear an idiot quote
A verse from Horace learned by rote. (lines 469-474 )
Swift takes pretenders for his object of satire and implies that the function of satire is to correct
vices. Wit, he maintains, is essential to satire.
For brevity’s sake, this short review of major satirists must suffice. As we have seen, at
least since the sixteenth century, British satirists have systematically employed meta-language to
reflect upon their art. But, although Persian literary tradition is also rich with satiric texts,
systematic studies, including definitions, have not much attracted the attention of satirists until
the last century. Moreover, satire has been intermittently flourishing since the time of
Constitutional Revolution during the first decade of the twentieth century in Iran. For this reason
it makes sense to focus on modern Iranian satirists and their understanding of their art. Mujābī, a
Persian satirist, defines anz, which could roughly be translated as satire, as “the skeptical and
containedly-resistant expression of the present structures” [my translation] (Mujābī 18). In his
“Bahārān Khujastih Bād” [Happy Nowruz], Nabavī, another contemporary satirist in exile,
maintains that,
Satire is a way of reacting to reality. In literature, satire refers to a certain mode of
writing in which the satirist tries to reveal the essence of what we see. It usually
drives us to laughter as well as reflection. Satire could be detected from the
reaction it provokes: first you burst into laughter and then you say “well, he/she
[i.e. the satirist] is right!” [my translation] (Nabavī)
In an interview, Salāhī contends that satire is not a weapon to destroy the enemy (99, 104).
It does not only fight or attack. Satire can indeed be “mystic” or “romantic.” We can have
“political,” “social,” and “philosophical” satire among various other categorizations (104-105).
Besides satirists, many critics have also attempted to define satire. Sutherland explains the
view of Puttenham, a Renaissance critic. According to Puttenham, satirists “taxe the common
abuses and vice of the people in rough and bitter speeches” (qtd. in Sutherland 31). Likewise, in
1591, Sir John Harington declares that satire is “wholly occupied in mannerly and covertly
reproving of all vices” (qtd. in Sutherland 31-32). Colebrook refers to Robert C. Elliott when she
gets closest to defining satire.

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According to Elliot (1960), satires have their origin in ancient fertility rituals and
sacrifice, where those who were ungenerous become the object of invective. Satire
can therefore be traced back to an attack upon those who are life denying or anti-
social. In Roman times, and with the figures of Horace and Juvenal, satire takes on
certain formal qualities. In general satire takes the form of an attack by way of
ridicule, irony or parody. (Colebrook 178)
Accordingly, satire is an attack. If there is an attack through something other than ridicule, irony
or parody, the result is not satire. Nor do we have satire if there is ridicule, irony and parody but
no attack.
In his Anatomy of Satire, Highet recounts the characteristics of satire: “it is topical; it
claims to be realistic (although it is usually exaggerated or distorted); it is shocking; it is
informal; and (although often in a grotesque or painful manner) it is funny” (5). Besides, it
usually has the shape of a monologue, parody or narrative (13-14). He asserts that light-
heartedness is essential to satire (21, 22). It is incongruity that stimulates satiric laughter (21).
Moreover, he believes that satire is actually a “type of literature” and a “genre” (24). Highet
goes on to cite two more critics. Pamela Hansford-Johnson believes that “Satire is cheek” and
her husband, C. P. Snow adds that, “It is the revenge of those who can’t really comprehend the
world or cope with it” (qtd. in Highet 277). In other words, Snow emphasizes the relieving
function of satire.
Another critic, Hooley, believes that “satire can be said to be a kind of social criticism
rendered with a degree of artificially encoded irony ...” (154). He also asserts that “Satire,
crucially, criticizes” (10, italics in the original). For him, satire means “something funnily
critical or critically funny ...” (1). He adds that, “satire is simply one of the fundamental modes
of human expression. It is always with us, and has left its traces in artistic, and artless,
expression throughout human history ... . Humankind will stop satirizing only when it stops
existing—which, a satirist would point out, could be at any moment now” (1-2). Rightly, he
points to the problem already suggested, i.e. where satire belongs: “satire is a generic child of
other genres, precisely a mixture of lineages, with a lifelong identity problem” (2). According to
him, satire is self-conscious about its contingent identity: “An indicator of this radical
uncertainty is the fact that satire, like all identity-challenged children, is almost pathologically
self-conscious” (3). He goes on to explicate two different meanings of satire. First, satire is a
“generic space” in which certain experiences, for instance corporeal or scatological ones, which
are excluded from manifestation in other genres, come to voice. In this sense, the carnivalesque
function of satire, which allows provisional resistance and relief, is implied (Hooley 8). Second,
satire can be thought of as “the (first?) place where the poet’s ‘I’ gets to run with the
possibilities of literary discourse” (Hooley 8-9).
Knight is also ambiguous about the nature of satire. “Because satire both imitates genres
and shares many of their distinctive features,” he maintains,
it may appear either as a metagenre or as what Alastair Fowler describes as mode.
The nature of satire, however, lies not only in its common generic signals but in
its quasi-Platonic program. Satire imitates discourse (either ordinary language or
what Smith calls “fictive discourse”) to stress its inherent contradictions, to reveal
the discrepancies between discourse and the appearances it claims to represent, or

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to unveil the conflicts between those appearances and the deeper reality that they
in turn imitate. (Knight 40)
Elsewhere, he writes, “Satire is thus pre-generic. It is not a genre in itself but an exploiter of
other genres. Nor is it quite a mode in the usual sense. ... As a pre-genre, satire is a mental
position that needs to adopt a genre in order to express its ideas as representation” (4). He also
refers to “Edward Rosenheim’s definition of satire as an indirect attack on historical particulars,
especially if one adds the characteristic feature of humor ...” (13). Still, Knight goes on to call
satire a “pre-generic form,” a “frame of mind,” and a “mode.”
In his “Satire and Definition,” Conal Condren maintains that “Satire ... much like the
humor with which it has for so long been associated, is unsuitable for an essentialist definition”
(396). Accordingly, he argues that “a characterisation in terms of family resemblance is more
helpful for a strictly historical understanding than formal definitions and that it is misleading to
take satire as a genre, let alone a literary one” (375).
Various other definitions of satire can also be mentioned. Morris maintains that, “literary
satire is understood to be work that relies upon humor to expose both human and institutional
failures” (377). According to Chase, satire “designates the content as hostility against a specific
piece of reality, a perspective widespread and current enough that the audience will ‘get’ the
joke ... . Writers of satire devote themselves not to a particular form of self-expression, but to the
creation of entertaining lies that expose the lies of others around them” (332). Draitser also
believes that “Satire is a genre of literature whose goal is not only to point out a social vice but
to make it clear that this vice is intolerable” (qtd. in Simpson 112). And, Bihzādī defines satire
mainly according to its social and political functions. Satire is a way of disclosing and censuring
social and political vices and corruptions that cannot be discussed in a serious manner because
of oppression and censorship. Satire features a mocking laughter that aims to efface these
corruptions and correct the society (Bihzādī 5-6).
Every one of these definitions hints at some partial characteristic(s) of satire and tries to
distinguish it from other ‘phenomena’: they attempt to define satire by saying what it is not,
rather than what it is. Yet, hardly can any one of them be found appropriate because either they
do not specify an apt superordinate or they do not limit their proposed umbrella-term to make it
simultaneously inclusive and exclusive enough. So, I move toward a synthetic definition of
satire based on Simpson and Test. Simpson asserts that “. . . satire is not a genre of discourse but
a discursive practice that does things to and with genres of discourse” (76, italics in the original).
He remarks that,
... satire is a complexly interdiscursive mode of communication. It is also a mode
of communication that, frankly, does not sit easily beside forms of literary
discourse such [as] poems, plays or prose, but which nonetheless seems almost to
have been totally appropriated into literary study. ... [S]atire needs to be wrested
away from “Literature” and to be put instead in the context of popular and populist
discourses. (62)
Therefore, “[a]s satire ... has the capacity to subsume and assimilate other discourse
genres, it can only be appropriately situated in a position beyond that established for genre”
(Simpson 76 and 214). He believes that “... satire has no ontological existence but, rather, the
status of ‘satire’ is something that is conferred upon a text and this conferral is as much a

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consequence of the way the text is processed and interpreted as it is of the way it is produced
and disseminated” (153). Finally, he defines satire as a “... discursive practice in Foucaultian
[sic] sense. This is to categorize satire as a discourse of a ‘higher-order’ than either genre or
register ...” (83, italics in the original). Simpson, therefore, identifies a proper superordinate but
fails to restrict it.
In his Satire: Spirit and Art, Test assumes that “satire is merely the aesthetic manifestation
of a universal urge so varied as to elude definition” (ix). He insists that “Satire for better or
worse is beyond any medium in which it occurs” (9). Also, that “Satire, from the beginning of
recorded literature, existed in its own right as a spirit expressed through other forms (poetry,
drama, fables) as well as a reaction to literary forms (epic, drama)” (10). He goes on to remind
the reader of Samuel M. Tucker (in 1908) and Frances T. Russell (in 1920) who defined satire as
a “spirit” (Test 14). Test never claims to have an actual theory of satire behind his study, but the
framework he proposes is still of interest as a complement to Simpson’s definition. Instead of a
rigid and abstract theoretical model, he just identifies satire’s basic elements. “[F]our elements
basic to satire,” as Test asserts, are, “attack or aggression, laughter or humor, play, and
judgment” (x).
Test has a broad sense of satire in mind. Actually, he derives humor, farce, invective,
fables, apologues, social criticism, parody, travesty, spoof, comedy, and burlesque as well as
various other subheadings from this very quadripartite scheme. He is right in assuming that all
humor-related forms of expression share these four essential elements. What distinguishes them
is the varying degree of the elements they manifest. In comedy, for example, play and laughter
dominate, while there is just some judgment and very little aggression at all. But farce, on the
other hand, lacks judgment while aggression, play and laughter are dominant in it (Test 33-34).
Such flexibility allows a wide array of potential applications through a single formula. Instead of
proposing new definitions for each term, a general definition should be slightly modified to refer
to a different term within a single category.
Test mentions two advantages for his approach to satire. First, there is its distinguishing
capability as already discussed. Second, he claims that his approach renders the spirit of satire as
an autonomous entity by ripping it from the author’s intention, the audience’s reception and its
context of creation. Also, he believes that this approach does not concern the study of the
relationship between different satires. In other words, he eliminates the promises of comparative
studies of satire (hardly is this attitude an advantage). Therefore, “The question of what is good
satire would involve, according to this scheme, evaluating the variety and efficiency in the mix
of [these four] elements” (Test 31).
However, satire extensively depends on its reception. A text, of course, needs to be
recognized as satire by its audience in order to provoke a corresponding reaction. Defined as a
discursive practice, satire is then a discourse that does something. Such a practice is the result of
interaction between the satirist, the satirized, the audience, and the text. Satire can be successful
on the condition that the audience identifies it as satire at the first step. Then, they should have
the background contextual knowledge that is almost always necessary for understanding satire
because it habitually refers to external reality; hence merely the text is not sufficient for its
comprehension. Finally, the audience should sympathize with the satirist’s attitude towards the
satirized in order to support the satirist’s judgment, condemn the vice, and attempt to bring
about correction. Besides, as Test also affirms, “Aggression, play, laughter, and judgment are all

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social forms of behavior” (31). It is odd to remove the interaction of the articulator/author with
their audience in a temporal and spatial context from social behaviors because they simply do
not happen in a void. Satire is actually highly contextual. Neither does Test offer a scale to
evaluate “the variety and efficiency in the mix of elements” (Test 31). In fact, these elements
can be qualitatively compared, but there is no scale to measure them quantitatively in their own
right. Elsewhere, he remarks,
The fact is that ire and righteousness [that is to say, the emotions frequently
provoked by satire] are strong emotions that have produced a rich literary reaction.
Such emotions are universal and cultures have accommodated them in various
ways. These responses with their verbal patterns and forms, their personae and
other caricatures, plot structures, and the special relationship between satirist,
audience, subject matter, and expression make up a recognizable body of material.
(Test 259-260)
So he underscores the expression of emotions in satire. But emotions presuppose human
subjects—whether articulator/writer or audience. Besides, he insists on the universality of these
emotions and their accommodation in various cultures. Similarly, Carroll also insists on “anger,
contempt and disgust” as “the animating sentiments of satire” (113, 127). These are three of the
seven “basic emotions,” common to Homo sapiens, which partly map various plot structures. As
these emotions are not culture-specific, they can provide a common ground as the basis for
undertaking intercultural and comparative studies of satire. Like humanists and literary
Darwinists, some comparatists, for instance David Damrosch, insist on the supposedly essential,
universal and eternal qualities of art and literature. Such commonalities can be traced in satire,
as well.
I want to suggest that Simpson’s and Test’s conceptions of satire can be productively
merged, and that satire can be defined as a discursive practice in a Foucauldian sense to which
Test’s four elements, with varying degrees, are essential: attack or aggression, laughter or
humor, play, and judgment. This definition does not restrict satire just to literature per se.
Defining it as a discourse allows its investigation in different media such as motion pictures, text
messages, cyberspace, architecture, music, fashion, hairstyle, and computer games, to name but
a few. Also, being a Foucauldian discourse, satire can be studied within constructivist
frameworks. Yet, the integrated forms of social behaviors emphasize the role of human
subjects—articulator/writer and/or audience. Accordingly, the readers’ role is also foregrounded.
As a result, this definition also allows for essentialist and comparative studies, too. Human
subject, text, context, essentialism as well as constructivism are all accommodated in this
definition.
A Discursive Paradigm for the Study of Satire
But another question requires an answer. Who/what is behind satire? Or how far can the
author/satirist (intentionally and consciously) decide what circumstances necessitate satire and
what functions should satire serve in these circumstances? With regard to this, there are two
extreme standpoints: first, satire can be viewed as the pure creation of the satirist’s subjectivity;
second, it can be considered as the result of a conglomeration of social, political, and various

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other forces. The former extreme acknowledges the satirist as the agent and towering figure who
disinterestedly observes the society from which she is objectively detached. She supposedly
judges individuals and societal developments, comes up with a verdict, and diagnoses social ills.
Later on, she intently takes upon herself to cure those ills of which a very thin minority, or even
just a single individual, i.e. the satirist, is aware. But because a single individual cannot bring
about change on a large scale, and because the satirist does not occupy an influential position in
power, she finds satire the only way through which she might be able to set things aright. So,
satire is the satirist’s prescription to cure social ills. Similarly, Freudian theory of humor also
identifies the human individual as the author and initiator of satire. However, the satirist does
not consciously undertake to address social problems. Humor, according to Freud, is rather an
unconscious way of releasing suppressed psychological tensions. Jokes are supposed to “make
possible the satisfaction of an instinct (whether lustful or hostile) in the face of an obstacle that
stands in its way. They circumvent this obstacle and in that way draw pleasure from a source
which the obstacle had made inaccessible” (Freud 101). Actually, this is an instance of mental
resistance and subversion, hence psychic purgation, when one cannot do anything else. In other
words, humor cures individual and psychological problems by providing a channel not towards
gaining the object of desire but towards deluding oneself through a supposed fulfillment which
simulates the pleasure that the actual object of desire would have brought. Consequently, humor
originates from a disturbed individual mind and that individual’s mental state accounts for its
creation.
This standpoint at one end of the spectrum inevitably leads to biographical or historical
perspectives in literary studies. The critic should either investigate the biography of the satirist
while trying to match the individuals and events of her life with the characters and episodes
depicted in her works; or study the history of the era in which the work was created while trying
to match historical figures and events with the characters and plot of the work. A work, then, is a
mirror which reflects the social or personal history of its author. According to this perspective, a
satirist is more a historian rather than an artist.
Others, however, believe that satire is not merely a reflection on collective (in case of the
historical approach) or individual (in cases of biographical and Freudian approaches) history,
but it is history in itself. It can affirm or subvert political systems. This can be interpreted “as a
reciprocal concern with the historicity of texts and the textuality of history,” to use Montrose’s
words (588). This brings us to the second possible standpoint. The satirist is not credited as the
cause of satire; in other words, the satirist is no longer a full-fledged agent. She is immersed
within the same system she criticizes; she is subject to what she aims to resist and subvert. The
satirist is molded by the very discourses she satirizes because, in the first place, she is
interpellated, to borrow Althusser’s term, by them. In other words, she owes her subjectivity to
them.
Accordingly, the role of author/satirist and her biography are minimal. Also, a work does
not reflect the historical milieu of its author; rather, as a discourse, satire is shaped by and
shapes other discourses in an episteme. So instead of biographical or traditional approaches, an
approach that emphasizes discursive negotiations and exchanges within a constructivist
framework is more appropriate, a new-historical approach.
There are numerous discourses circulating in a certain episteme. In their interactions and
exchanges they mold each other. One of these discourses is the discourse of satire. Because the

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role of the individual is minimal, what really matters is the panoptic structure of power. So,
personal likes and dislikes do not determine the status of satire; rather, the congeries of other
discourses determines its status. In the light of such insights, we can better understand Juvenal’s
remark, “difficile est saturam non scribere,” (Satires 1.30) which shows he felt he was
compelled to write satire.
A discursive model can be deduced from the definitions of and discussions about satire.
Although in his book Knight refers to satire as a “pre-generic form,” a “frame of mind,” as well
as a “mode,” he later assumes that satire is a genre competing against the novel. Here, he takes
satire as “a weapon of Tory efforts to retain the hierarchies of the past” (Knight 226). During the
eighteenth century, with the establishment of Whig and Tory parties and the rise of middle
classes, satire is employed to modify the contemporary political and economic situation and
restore previous values of monarchy and aristocracy. Of course, this is how Tories employed
satire to their ends. Whigs, on the other hand, used it to promote their own political and
commercial enterprises. This conveys the negotiations between satire, on the one hand, and
political and economic discourses, on the other hand. Later on, Knight proceeds to give three
reasons for the dominance of the novel over satire in mid-eighteenth century. He believes that
the novel subsumed and transformed satire because of “the [novel’s] focus on individual
consciousness, the replacement of a narrowly individual perspective by a cultural openness, and
the novel’s capacity to supply heuristic structures” (Knight 229). By the novel’s capacity to
supply heuristic structures, he means the potentials offered by the novel, such as length and the
possible number of characters. The substitution of a narrowly individual perspective by a
cultural openness implies that satire focuses its attack on a single historical person or institution,
but the novel is broader in its perspective because it is fictive. This reason seems a bit forced,
first because satire is also fictive, and then because satire does not always attack particularities.
The move toward individualism, however, was a significant force behind the rise of the novel.
Among other reasons, behind the emergence and dominance of the novel are the rise of the
bourgeoisie, the burgeoning of commerce, the decline of aristocracy, shifting social hierarchies,
and the renunciation of the notion of the great chain of being. The French Revolution was also
an important factor in the rise of individualism. In other words, changes in power structure led to
the rise of individualism, which, in its turn, caused the rise of the novel and the relative decline
of satire. All these causes can actually be translated into transformations in political and/or
economic discourses which, in their turn, have determined the generic dominance of the novel
over satire in the eighteenth century.
Knight goes on to declare that in the late twentieth century satire gained momentum over
the novel again. He also explains this shift in prominence by
the importance of culture in contrast to the individual consciousness; the general,
political, and theoretical nature of the author’s concerns; the loss of a strong sense
of the integrally developed individual; the paradox posed by the need to reject the
trivializing elements of late capitalist culture but the failure to find universal values
that authorize the rejection. (Knight 231)
All these causes or the stimuli behind them can again be translated into changes in the
power structure, more accurately, changes in economic, political and/or moral discourses: World
War II, the Vietnam war, the 1960s social turmoil and upheavals, expressed doubts about liberal

11
democracy, capitalism and consumerism all of which constitute political, economic and/or moral
discourses.
Thus, we can infer that changes in the power structure can lead to the rise and fall of
satire. Similarly, Test also highlights that epistemic changes determine the emergence of the
discourse of satire:
Whenever and wherever there have been differences among persons and groups
personal, social, religious, philosophical, political, there have been strong emotions
aroused that have expended themselves in verbal aggression. ... [W]henever the
social structure has been threatened or fragmented, various expressions of satire
have erupted. (Test 260)
In other words, satire emerges as the result of disruptions in the socio-political order, or
what one might call a rupture in discursive negotiations. My discussion of Knight has so far
conveyed that the most significant discourses that interact, negotiate and exchange with the
discourse of satire within the power structure are economic, political and moral discourses. The
determining role of these three discourses is similarly implied by the reasons Bihzādī offers for
the rise of satire: first, totalitarianism, oppression hence corruption (xviii), i.e. the political
discourse. Second, religious fundamentalism, and the abuse and manipulation of religion by
politicians (xix), i.e. the moral discourse. And, finally, destitution and social and economic gaps
(xx), i.e. the economic discourse. Such interactions, negotiations and exchanges lead to the
mutual evolution and formation of these discourses.
Besides political, economic and moral discourses, there are at least two more determinants
of satire: discourses of patriarchy and knowledge. Of course, the rise and fall of a phenomenon
cannot usually be explained as the effect of a single discourse’s evolution. Moreover, the
boundary between various discourses is not clear-cut or definitive. For example, economic and
political discourses usually blur into each other. Similarly, political and moral discourses are
also intertwined.
Still, as the bulk of satire concerned with economic issues conveys, economy, whether in
domestic or (inter-)national scale, is a determining factor in the emergence and/or decline of
satire. Jonathan Swift’s The Drapier’s Letters is a clear example of how the contemporary
economic discourse has promoted the discourse of satire. Lanters tries to account for the decline
of Swiftian satire after the eighteenth century by appealing to the changes that the economic
discourse witnessed.
Swiftian satire did not have a strong following in Ireland after the eighteenth
century—perhaps because there was no such established native tradition, but also
because writers in the nineteenth century, who witnessed such catastrophes as the
Famine, found it difficult to put enough ironic distance between themselves and the
often dire circumstances of their fellow countrymen. (481)
Likewise, Bihzādī explains the escapism inherent to hazl (a term used to denote a certain
entertaining literary mode which features humor, wit and (often) bawdiness, like facetiae, in
Persian and Arabic) by drawing upon the economic discourse. He asserts that some critics
believe hazl to be the direct result of escapism and Epicureanism. If there is a social class which
does not need to work in order to earn its living, it is likely to find hazl as a favorable

12
entertainment to fill its spare time with. Similarly, the down and out might resort to hazl to
soothe (but not solve) their economic hardships, at least temporarily (663-664).
Furthermore, political issues have always been a major stimulus for satire. “As
Montesquieu was to suggest in 1748, in his De l’Esprit des lois (12.13), satire can thrive in a
monarchical system, whereas the diffusion of power in an aristocratic system puts too many
individuals in a position to suppress subversive voices” (Goulborne 144). So the political
system—in this case, the Monarchy of eighteenth century France—can cause the emergence of
the discourse of satire. In other words, in its epistemic negotiations, political discourse can give
rise to the discourse of satire. Moreover, Goulborne implies that satire can serve a subversive
function when the political discourse manifests totalitarian properties but the imposed
suppression is not absolute. Bakhtin also discusses the subversive function of satire at length in
his Rabelais and his World. George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm are among the most
distinguished satires motivated mainly by political discourses of their time. This is also evident
in hajv, i.e. lampoon. As Bihzādī observes, the ultimate goal of hajv is revenge and character
killing. Those who are oppressed but are not capable of resistance because they do not have the
necessary power or facilities or because societal regulations suppress their reactions find hajv an
effective tool to soothe themselves and take revenge (860). That could explain why some
scholars believe that hajv and aristocracy are closely associated (870). Bihzādī insists that a loss
of freedom of expression leads to an increased need for satire. This is one reason why court
fools and jesters extensively use satire to criticize the ruling class (793).2
At the first reading, the
suggestion of the release of a suppressed voice might bring Freud’s theory into mind. But this
suppression is not the result of an individual’s psychological structure. Rather, the root cause is
the political discourse that does not allow any resistance and subversion in the panoptic structure
of power. Therefore, the political discourse can stimulate the emergence of the discourse of
satire in certain socio-political contexts.
Moral discourse is another force behind the formation of satire.3
Ethics of the Aristocrats
by ‘Ubayd-i Zākānī, a fourteenth-century Persian satirist, is a lively example of how satire,
while itself shaped by the moral discourse, tries to shape it in return. John Dryden’s The Hind
and the Panther and Jonathan Swift’s A Tale of a Tub are two instances of religious satire. To
cite another example, Lanters, in his attempt to explain the scarcity of Irish satire, underlines the
impact of both moral as well as political discourses in the production of satire.
Why the Anglo-Irish period produced so few examples of formal narrative satire is
a matter for speculation. One reason may be that it requires a worthy opponent ... .
Anglo-Irish literature was written by Protestants of English descent, whose
relatively small numbers and marginal status put them in no position to direct their
2
Also see Farjami, Mahmud. “Political Satire as an Index of Press Freedom: A Review of Political Satire in
the Iranian Press during the 2000s.” Iranian Studies 47.2 (2014): 217-239, where he explores the relationship
of satire, political discourse, and freedom of expression in contemporary Iran.
3
Codes of politeness, ethics and religion are major determinants of morality. Law also plays a pivotal role in
determining the values and (in)appropriate behaviors. But, I think it is more useful to relate law to the
juridical discourse which, due to the arbitrary nature of distinction between various discourses, at some
points, overlaps and coincides with the moral discourse, too. Such coalescence is amplified when juridical
laws are based mainly on religious principles. So in theocracy, moral/religious discourse has the greatest
impact on the formation of the juridical, hence political, discourses.

13
satires at the British government or the Church—the only obvious and legitimate
targets. (480-481)
Fourth, patriarchy can also—but not necessarily—lead to satire. It is one of the most
ancient and most prevalent discourses in various cultures. Juvenal’s sixth satire is one of the
earliest known instances of patriarchy as a force that has gone into the making of satire. As
Highet observes,
Men are never tired of criticizing women, and so (apparently from the seventh
century B.C. [sic]) we have an iambic poem by Semonides of Amorgos surveying
the different types of wives, comparing one to a yapping bitch, one to a hazy sow,
and so forth; only one, the bee, is praised. This stands at the head of a long series
of misogynistic satires, which still show no sign of coming to an end. (39)
Similarly, Knight mentions “gender exclusivity” as a quality of the satiric frame of mind.
Women had a very limited share in the production of satire but they have always been subject to
its ridicule. He goes on to say,
What makes satire more-or-less a masculine genre is not a gender exclusivity
(satire and tragedy for men, comedy and lyric for women) as it is the fact that
women as a gender were treated as an identifiable group, while men (as men all
know) are merely people. Satire of men is thus satire of human nature, but satire of
women is satire of a particular variety of people. (6)
Later, he enumerates two reasons to account for the scarcity of satire produced by women. First,
as Knight believes, “[s]atire is not, on the whole, private and domestic.” Second, “satire is a
transgressive genre, based on the socially objectionable element of attack, often personal attack.
If it often requires male satirists to take a defensive, apologetic position, it places women, who
assume a suspicious position even as writers, in a nearly untenable role” (7). Baines also notes
that eighteenth century women did not engage in “so masculine a genre” as satire (95) and
Kairoff calls satire a “manly” genre (276).
Although some of Knight’s reasons might be valid to a certain extent and for specific
epochs and cultures, they do not seem to explain the “gender exclusivity” of satire. Actually, I
think that satire has never been gender exclusive. If by satire one means a certain literary genre
per se, then one has to concede that canonical literature was gender exclusive, at least up to a
certain point in time in human history. It is not just satire but also the whole body of canonical
literature in whose production men have a greater share than women. However, one advantage
of defining satire as a discourse is that it does not have to be written in a certain form, published,
circulated and (for the written record) preserved to reach us today as “literature”. Satire can be
found in various genres, media and cultural products in which women have had a significant
share. Accordingly, the role of women in the production and circulation of satire is undeniable
in various walks of life.
When the discourse of patriarchy is dominant, we expect to see it shaped by and shaping
other discourses including that of satire. Patriarchy, as the cause of satire, can either be the
object of satire or the ideology of the satirist. Accordingly, satire in its exchanges with
patriarchy might act in two different directions: it can resist or subvert patriarchy or else
reinforce it. Patriarchy provides men with a privileged position, which they do not essentially

14
deserve. This gives them the upper hand in social and cultural arenas. Some prominent attitudes
in satire, for instance harsh attacks, censure, condescension or offense directed at women, partly
demonstrate how patriarchy shapes satire. Alexander Pope’s satiric “Epistle 2. To a Lady: Of the
Characters of Women,” which maintains that “‘Most women have no characters at all’,” (line 2)
is an instance of this attitude. Swift has also many satires which aim at women, one of the most
well-known of which is “The Lady’s Dressing Room.” His excremental poems include further
examples.
In addition, Satire can serve to provide psychological release from and/or resistance to
patriarchy. Arousal-relief is among the psychological explanations of humor. According to
arousal-relief theories, humor acts as a pent-up valve which relieves psychic repression. Humor,
according to this theory, performs a similar function to dreams and slips of tongue in Freudian
Psychoanalysis. In his Jokes and their Relation to the Unconsciousness, Freud deems humor to
be a defense mechanism which releases the repressed energy of the psyche and brings about
contention. That is to say, humor gives voice to what the ego and the superego repress as
unaccepted and taboo. Accordingly, satire can be employed to release the psychological
suppression imposed by patriarchy on women. Moreover, as Bakhtin shows in his Rabelais and
His World, satire can also serve the purpose of (socio-political) resistance and subversion.
Likewise, it can be employed to resist and subvert patriarchy. Astarābādī’s Aqāyid al-Nisā‘
[Women’s Beliefs] pokes fun at men and patriarchy, promotes female solidarity, and defies
preordained gender roles. Christine de Pizan, Sarah Fyge Egerton, Lady Mary Wortley
Montagu, Mary Leapor, and Eve Ensler are among the female satirists who, in one way or the
other, take patriarchy for their object of satire.4
Besides the impact of economic, political, moral and patriarchal discourses, a fifth
discourse is also of importance in the emergence of satire: the discourse of learning and
knowledge. The status of knowledge and science, of scholarship and of those who deservedly or
undeservedly are regarded as learned or wise is influential in the emergence of satire. Satire
presupposes a privileged, omniscient position and claims full awareness and knowledge of what
people are ignorant of. Thus, the deficiencies of the discourse of learning determine satire
which, in its turn, tries to (re-)shape our understanding of education, knowledge, and science.
Literary satire5
—in which pedantry and the conceit of learning, as well as the banality of
composition, among other things, are satirized—can also be classified under this category. In his
Scholar’s Bedlam: Menippean Satire in the Renaissance, W. Scott Blanchard writes that,
“Menippean satire is a genre both for and about scholars; it is an immensely learned form that is
at the same time paradoxically anti-intellectual.” He goes on to say that, “If its master of
ceremonies is the humanist as wise fool, its audience is a learned community whose members
need to be reminded ... of the depravity of their overreaching intellects, of the limits of human
understanding” (qtd. in Womack 328). Rabelais in his Gargantua and Pantagruel; Cervantes in
Don Quixote; Dryden in Mac Flecknoe; Scriblerus Club writers such as Swift in The Battle of
Books and the third book of Gulliver, and Pope in Peri Bathous and The Dunciad; as well as
4
For two surveys of eighteenth-century female satirists and how some of their texts defy patriarchy see Baines
as well as Kairoff. I am grateful to Paul Baines and Zahra (Venus) Khalilian who shared their resources with
me.
5
Javādī categorizes satire into four main kinds: religio-moral, political, literary and personal (13).

15
Persian satirists such as Anvarī, ‘Ubayd, Sa‘dī, and many Iranian Constitutional writers are
among those whose texts illustrate the negotiation of satire and knowledge.
Conclusion
Thus, the discourse of satire not only shapes but is also shaped by, at least, five major
discourses—namely discourses of economy, politics, morality, patriarchy, as well as knowledge
and learning—through their negotiations and transactions within a certain episteme. In other
words, satire’s relationship with these five discourses is dynamic and mutually constitutive.
Such a discursive approach toward satire can account for its emergence or decline in different
epochs, cultures, milieus and literary traditions. Also, it can be used as a paradigm for an
international and intercultural understanding of satire across different linguistic, national and
political boundaries and in diverse media. When there are similar discursive properties and
transactions in different epochs and epistemes, the exchanges might mount up to comparable
discourses of satire. Thus, certain satirical texts which belong to different eras, cultures and
milieus might manifest similarities. Such similarities can be explained by referring to this
general discursive model. This epistemological model, however, should still be applied to
various other texts and contexts, and probably modified, to prove its efficacy.

16
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