A hybrid cloud approach for secure authorized deduplication

A Hybrid Cloud Approach for Secure
Authorized Deduplication
Jin Li, Yan Kit Li, Xiaofeng Chen, Patrick P.C. Lee, and Wenjing Lou
Abstract—Data deduplication is one of important data compression techniques for eliminating duplicate copies of repeating data, and
has been widely used in cloud storage to reduce the amount of storage space and save bandwidth. To protect the confidentiality of sen-
sitive data while supporting deduplication, the convergent encryption technique has been proposed to encrypt the data before out-
sourcing. To better protect data security, this paper makes the first attempt to formally address the problem of authorized data
deduplication. Different from traditional deduplication systems, the differential privileges of users are further considered in duplicate
check besides the data itself. We also present several new deduplication constructions supporting authorized duplicate check in a
hybrid cloud architecture. Security analysis demonstrates that our scheme is secure in terms of the definitions specified in the proposed
security model. As a proof of concept, we implement a prototype of our proposed authorized duplicate check scheme and conduct
testbed experiments using our prototype. We show that our proposed authorized duplicate check scheme incurs minimal overhead
compared to normal operations.
Index Terms—Deduplication, authorized duplicate check, confidentiality, hybrid cloud
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
CLOUD computing provides seemingly unlimited
“virtualized” resources to users as services across the
whole Internet, while hiding platform and implementation
details. Today’s cloud service providers offer both highly
available storage and massively parallel computing resour-
ces at relatively low costs. As cloud computing becomes
prevalent, an increasing amount of data is being stored in
the cloud and shared by users with specified privileges,
which define the access rights of the stored data. One critical
challenge of cloud storage services is the management of the
ever-increasing volume of data.
To make data management scalable in cloud comput-
ing, deduplication [17] has been a well-known technique
and has attracted more and more attention recently. Data
deduplication is a specialized data compression technique
for eliminating duplicate copies of repeating data in stor-
age. The technique is used to improve storage utilization
and can also be applied to network data transfers to
reduce the number of bytes that must be sent. Instead of
keeping multiple data copies with the same content,
deduplication eliminates redundant data by keeping only
one physical copy and referring other redundant data to
that copy. Deduplication can take place at either the file
level or the block level. For file-level deduplication, it
eliminates duplicate copies of the same file. Deduplica-
tion can also take place at the block level, which elimi-
nates duplicate blocks of data that occur in non-identical
files.
Although data deduplication brings a lot of benefits,
security and privacy concerns arise as users’ sensitive
data are susceptible to both insider and outsider attacks.
Traditional encryption, while providing data confidential-
ity, is incompatible with data deduplication. Specifically,
traditional encryption requires different users to encrypt
their data with their own keys. Thus, identical data copies
of different users will lead to different ciphertexts, mak-
ing deduplication impossible. Convergent encryption [8]
has been proposed to enforce data confidentiality while
making deduplication feasible. It encrypts/decrypts a
data copy with a convergent key, which is obtained by
computing the cryptographic hash value of the content of
the data copy. After key generation and data encryption,
users retain the keys and send the ciphertext to the cloud.
Since the encryption operation is deterministic and is
derived from the data content, identical data copies will
generate the same convergent key and hence the same
ciphertext. To prevent unauthorized access, a secure
proof of ownership (POW) protocol [11] is also needed to
provide the proof that the user indeed owns the same file
when a duplicate is found. After the proof, subsequent
users with the same file will be provided a pointer from
the server without needing to upload the same file. A
user can download the encrypted file with the pointer
from the server, which can only be decrypted by the cor-
responding data owners with their convergent keys.
Thus, convergent encryption allows the cloud to perform
deduplication on the ciphertexts and the proof of owner-
ship prevents the unauthorized user to access the file.
J. Li is with the School of Computer Science, Guangzhou University, P.R.
China and the Department of Computer Science, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University. E-mail: lijin@gzhu.edu.cn.
Y.K. Li and P.P.C. Lee are with the Department of Computer Science
and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T.,
Hong Kong. E-mail: {liyk, pclee}@cse.cuhk.edu.hk.
X. Chen is with the State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks,
Xidian University, Xi’an, P.R. China and the Department of Computer
Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
E-mail: xfchen@xidian.edu.cn.
W. Lou is with the Department of Computer Science, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University. E-mail: wjlou@vt.edu.
Manuscript received 17 Dec. 2013; revised 13 Apr. 2014; accepted 14 Apr.
2014. Date of publication 17 Apr. 2014; date of current version 8 Apr. 2015.
Recommended for acceptance by M.C. Chuah.
For information on obtaining reprints of this article, please send e-mail to:
reprints@ieee.org, and reference the Digital Object Identifier below.
Digital Object Identifier no. 10.1109/TPDS.2014.2318320
1206 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS, VOL. 26, NO. 5, MAY 2015
1045-9219 ß 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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However, previous deduplication systems cannot
support differential authorization duplicate check, which is
important in many applications. In such an authorized
deduplication system, each user is issued a set of privileges
during system initialization (in Section 3, we elaborate the
definition of a privilege with examples). Each file uploaded
to the cloud is also bounded by a set of privileges to specify
which kind of users is allowed to perform the duplicate
check and access the files. Before submitting his duplicate
check request for a file, the user needs to take this file and
his own privileges as inputs. The user is able to find a dupli-
cate for this file if and only if there is a copy of this file and a
matched privilege stored in cloud. For example, in a com-
pany, many different privileges will be assigned to employ-
ees. In order to save cost and efficiently management, the
data will be moved to the storage server provider (S-CSP) in
the public cloud with specified privileges and the dedupli-
cation technique will be applied to store only one copy of
the same file. Because of privacy consideration, some files
will be encrypted and allowed the duplicate check by
employees with specified privileges to realize the access
control. Traditional deduplication systems based on conver-
gent encryption, although providing confidentiality to some
extent, do not support the duplicate check with differential
privileges. In other words, no differential privileges have
been considered in the deduplication based on convergent
encryption technique. It seems to be contradicted if we
want to realize both deduplication and differential authori-
zation duplicate check at the same time.
1.1 Contributions
In this paper, aiming at efficiently solving the problem of
deduplication with differential privileges in cloud comput-
ing, we consider a hybrid cloud architecture consisting of a
public cloud and a private cloud. Unlike existing data dedu-
plication systems, the private cloud is involved as a proxy to
allow data owner/users to securely perform duplicate
check with differential privileges. Such an architecture is
practical and has attracted much attention from researchers.
The data owners only outsource their data storage by utiliz-
ing public cloud while the data operation is managed in
private cloud. A new deduplication system supporting dif-
ferential duplicate check is proposed under this hybrid
cloud architecture where the S-CSP resides in the public
cloud. The user is only allowed to perform the duplicate
check for files marked with the corresponding privileges.
Furthermore, we enhance our system in security. Specifi-
cally, we present an advanced scheme to support stronger
security by encrypting the file with differential privilege
keys. In this way, the users without corresponding privi-
leges cannot perform the duplicate check. Furthermore,
such unauthorized users cannot decrypt the ciphertext even
collude with the S-CSP. Security analysis demonstrates that
our system is secure in terms of the definitions specified in
the proposed security model.
Finally, we implement a prototype of the proposed
authorized duplicate check and conduct testbed experi-
ments to evaluate the overhead of the prototype. We show
that the overhead is minimal compared to the normal con-
vergent encryption and file upload operations.
1.2 Organization
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we
briefly revisit some preliminaries of this paper. In Section 3,
we propose the system model for our deduplication system.
In Section 4, we propose a practical deduplication system
with differential privileges in cloud computing. The secu-
rity and efficiency analysis for the proposed system are
respectively presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we present
the implementation of our prototype, and in Section 7, we
present testbed evaluation results. Finally we draw conclu-
sion in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first define the notations used in this
paper, review some secure primitives used in our secure
deduplication. The notations used in this paper are listed in
Table 1.
Symmetric encryption. Symmetric encryption uses a com-
mon secret key k to encrypt and decrypt information. A
symmetric encryption scheme consists of three primitive
functions:
KeyGenSEð1
Þ ! k is the key generation algorithm
that generates k using security parameter 1
;
EncSEðk; MÞ ! C is the symmetric encryption
algorithm that takes the secret k and message M and
then outputs the ciphertext C; and
DecSEðk; CÞ ! M is the symmetric decryption algo-
rithm that takes the secret k and ciphertext C and
then outputs the original message M.
Convergent encryption. Convergent encryption [4], [8] pro-
vides data confidentiality in deduplication. A user (or data
owner) derives a convergent key from each original data
copy and encrypts the data copy with the convergent key.
In addition, the user also derives a tag for the data copy,
such that the tag will be used to detect duplicates. Here, we
assume that the tag correctness property [4] holds, i.e., if
two data copies are the same, then their tags are the same.
To detect duplicates, the user first sends the tag to the server
side to check if the identical copy has been already stored.
Note that both the convergent key and the tag are indepen-
dently derived, and the tag cannot be used to deduce the
convergent key and compromise data confidentiality. Both
the encrypted data copy and its corresponding tag will be
stored on the server side. Formally, a convergent encryption
scheme can be defined with four primitive functions:
KeyGenCEðMÞ ! K is the key generation algorithm
that maps a data copy M to a convergent key K;
TABLE 1
Notations Used in This Paper
LI ET AL.: A HYBRID CLOUD APPROACH FOR SECURE AUTHORIZED DEDUPLICATION 1207
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EncCEðK; MÞ ! C is the symmetric encryption algo-
rithm that takes both the convergent key K and the
data copy M as inputs and then outputs a ciphertext
C;
DecCEðK; CÞ ! M is the decryption algorithm that
takes both the ciphertext C and the convergent key
K as inputs and then outputs the original data copy
M; and
TagGenðMÞ ! TðMÞ is the tag generation algorithm
that maps the original data copy M and outputs a
tag TðMÞ.
Proof of ownership. The notion of proof of ownership [11]
enables users to prove their ownership of data copies to the
storage server. Specifically, PoW is implemented as an inter-
active algorithm (denoted by PoW) run by a prover (i.e.,
user) and a verifier (i.e., storage server). The verifier derives
a short value fðMÞ from a data copy M. To prove the own-
ership of the data copy M, the prover needs to send f0
to the
verifier such that f0
¼ fðMÞ. The formal security definition
for PoW roughly follows the threat model in a content dis-
tribution network, where an attacker does not know the
entire file, but has accomplices who have the file. The
accomplices follow the “bounded retrieval model”, such
that they can help the attacker obtain the file, subject to the
constraint that they must send fewer bits than the initial
min-entropy of the file to the attacker [11].
Identification protocol. An identification protocol P can
be described with two phases: Proof and Verify. In the
stage of Proof, a prover/user U can demonstrate his iden-
tity to a verifier by performing some identification proof
related to his identity. The input of the prover/user is his
private key skU that is sensitive information such as pri-
vate key of a public key in his certificate or credit card
number, etc. that he would not like to share with the other
users. The verifier performs the verification with input of
public information pkU related to skU . At the conclusion of
the protocol, the verifier outputs either accept or reject to
denote whether the proof is passed or not. There are
many efficient identification protocols in literature,
including certificate-based, identity-based identification
etc. [5], [6].
3 SYSTEM MODEL
3.1 Hybrid Architecture for Secure Deduplication
At a high level, our setting of interest is an enterprise net-
work, consisting of a group of affiliated clients (for example,
employees of a company) who will use the S-CSP and store
data with deduplication technique. In this setting, dedupli-
cation can be frequently used in these settings for data
backup and disaster recovery applications while greatly
reducing storage space. Such systems are widespread and
are often more suitable to user file backup and synchroniza-
tion applications than richer storage abstractions. There are
three entities defined in our system, that is, users, private
cloud and S-CSP in public cloud as shown in Fig. 1. The S-CSP
performs deduplication by checking if the contents of two
files are the same and stores only one of them.
The access right to a file is defined based on a set of
privileges. The exact definition of a privilege varies across
applications. For example, we may define a role-based
privilege [9], [19] according to job positions (e.g., Director,
Project Lead, and Engineer), or we may define a time-based
privilege that specifies a valid time period (e.g., 2014-01-
01 to 2014-01-31) within which a file can be accessed. A
user, say Alice, may be assigned two privileges “Director”
and “access right valid on 2014-01-01”, so that she can
access any file whose access role is “Director” and accessi-
ble time period starts from 2014-01-01. Each privilege is
represented in the form of a short message called token.
Each file is associated with some file tokens, which denote
the tag with specified privileges (see the definition of a
tag in Section 2). A user computes and sends duplicate-
check tokens to the public cloud for authorized duplicate
check.
Users have access to the private cloud server, a semi-
trusted third party which will aid in performing dedupli-
cable encryption by generating file tokens for the request-
ing users. We will explain further the role of the private
cloud server below. Users are also provisioned with per-
user encryption keys and credentials (e.g., user certifi-
cates). In this paper, we will only consider the file-level
deduplication for simplicity. In another word, we refer a
data copy to be a whole file and file-level deduplication
which eliminates the storage of any redundant files.
Actually, block-level deduplication can be easily deduced
from file-level deduplication, which is similar to [12].
Specifically, to upload a file, a user first performs the
file-level duplicate check. If the file is a duplicate, then
all its blocks must be duplicates as well; otherwise, the
user further performs the block-level duplicate check and
identifies the unique blocks to be uploaded. Each data
copy (i.e., a file or a block) is associated with a token for
the duplicate check.
S-CSP. This is an entity that provides a data storage
service in public cloud. The S-CSP provides the data
outsourcing service and stores data on behalf of the
users. To reduce the storage cost, the S-CSP elimi-
nates the storage of redundant data via deduplica-
tion and keeps only unique data. In this paper, we
assume that S-CSP is always online and has abun-
dant storage capacity and computation power.
Fig. 1. Architecture for authorized deduplication.
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Data users. A user is an entity that wants to outsource
data storage to the S-CSP and access the data later. In
a storage system supporting deduplication, the user
only uploads unique data but does not upload any
duplicate data to save the upload bandwidth, which
may be owned by the same user or different users. In
the authorized deduplication system, each user is
issued a set of privileges in the setup of the system.
Each file is protected with the convergent encryption
key and privilege keys to realize the authorized
deduplication with differential privileges.
Private cloud. Compared with the traditional dedu-
plication architecture in cloud computing, this is a
new entity introduced for facilitating user’s secure
usage of cloud service. Specifically, since the com-
puting resources at data user/owner side are
restricted and the public cloud is not fully trusted in
practice, private cloud is able to provide data user/
owner with an execution environment and infra-
structure working as an interface between user and
the public cloud. The private keys for the privileges
are managed by the private cloud, who answers the
file token requests from the users. The interface
offered by the private cloud allows user to submit
files and queries to be securely stored and computed
respectively.
Notice that this is a novel architecture for data dedupli-
cation in cloud computing, which consists of a twin clouds
(i.e., the public cloud and the private cloud). Actually, this
hybrid cloud setting has attracted more and more attention
recently. For example, an enterprise might use a public
cloud service, such as Amazon S3, for archived data, but
continue to maintain in-house storage for operational cus-
tomer data. Alternatively, the trusted private cloud could
be a cluster of virtualized cryptographic co-processors,
which are offered as a service by a third party and provide
the necessary hardware-based security features to imple-
ment a remote execution environment trusted by the users.
3.2 Adversary Model
Typically, we assume that the public cloud and private
cloud are both “honest-but-curious”. Specifically they will
follow our proposed protocol, but try to find out as much
secret information as possible based on their possessions.
Users would try to access data either within or out of the
scopes of their privileges.
In this paper, we suppose that all the files are sensitive
and needed to be fully protected against both public cloud
and private cloud. Under the assumption, two kinds of
adversaries are considered, that is, 1) external adversaries
which aim to extract secret information as much as possible
from both public cloud and private cloud; 2) internal adver-
saries who aim to obtain more information on the file from
the public cloud and duplicate-check token information
from the private cloud outside of their scopes. Such adver-
saries may include S-CSP, private cloud server and autho-
rized users. The detailed security definitions against these
adversaries are discussed below and in Section 5, where
attacks launched by external adversaries are viewed as spe-
cial attacks from internal adversaries.
3.3 Design Goals
In this paper, we address the problem of privacy-preserving
deduplication in cloud computing and propose a new dedu-
plication system supporting for
Differential authorization. Each authorized user is able
to get his/her individual token of his file to perform
duplicate check based on his privileges. Under this
assumption, any user cannot generate a token for
duplicate check out of his privileges or without the
aid from the private cloud server.
Authorized duplicate check. Authorized user is able to
use his/her individual private keys to generate
query for certain file and the privileges he/she
owned with the help of private cloud, while the pub-
lic cloud performs duplicate check directly and tells
the user if there is any duplicate.
The security requirements considered in this paper lie in
two folds, including the security of file token and security
of data files. For the security of file token, two aspects are
defined as unforgeability and indistinguishability of file
token. The details are given below.
Unforgeability of file token/duplicate-check token. Unau-
thorized users without appropriate privileges or file
should be prevented from getting or generating the
file tokens for duplicate check of any file stored at
the S-CSP. The users are not allowed to collude
with the public cloud server to break the unforge-
ability of file tokens. In our system, the S-CSP is
honest but curious and will honestly perform the
duplicate check upon receiving the duplicate
request from users. The duplicate check token of
users should be issued from the private cloud
server in our scheme.
Indistinguishability of file token/duplicate-check token. It
requires that any user without querying the private
cloud server for some file token, he cannot get any
useful information from the token, which includes
the file information or the privilege information.
Data confidentiality. Unauthorized users without
appropriate privileges or files, including the S-CSP
and the private cloud server, should be prevented
from access to the underlying plaintext stored at
S-CSP. In another word, the goal of the adversary
is to retrieve and recover the files that do not
belong to them. In our system, compared to the
previous definition of data confidentiality based
on convergent encryption, a higher level confi-
dentiality is defined and achieved.
4 SECURE DEDUPLICATION SYSTEMS
Main idea. To support authorized deduplication, the tag of a
file F will be determined by the file F and the privilege. To
show the difference with traditional notation of tag, we call
it file token instead. To support authorized access, a secret
key kp will be bounded with a privilege p to generate a file
token. Let f0
F;p ¼ TagGenðF; kpÞ denote the token of F that
is only allowed to access by user with privilege p. In another
word, the token f0
F;p could only be computed by the users
with privilege p. As a result, if a file has been uploaded by a
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user with a duplicate token f0
F;p, then a duplicate check sent
from another user will be successful if and only if he also
has the file F and privilege p. Such a token generation func-
tion could be easily implemented as HðF; kpÞ, where HðÁÞ
denotes a cryptographic hash function.
4.1 A First Attempt
Before introducing our construction of differential dedupli-
cation, we present a straightforward attempt with the tech-
nique of token generation TagGenðF; kpÞ above to design
such a deduplication system. The main idea of this basic
construction is to issue corresponding privilege keys to each
user, who will compute the file tokens and perform the
duplicate check based on the privilege keys and files. In
more details, suppose that there are N users in the system
and the privileges in the universe is defined as P ¼
fp1; . . . ; psg. For each privilege p in P, a private key kp will
be selected. For a user U with a set of privileges PU , he will
be assigned the set of keys fkpi gpi2PU
.
File uploading. Suppose that a data owner U with privi-
lege set PU wants to upload and share a file F with users
who have the privilege set PF ¼ fpjg. The user computes
and sends S-CSP the file token f0
F;p ¼ TagGenðF; kpÞ for all
p 2 PF .
If a duplicate is found by the S-CSP, the user pro-
ceeds proof of ownership of this file with the S-CSP.
If the proof is passed, the user will be assigned a
pointer, which allows him to access the file.
Otherwise, if no duplicate is found, the user com-
putes the encrypted file CF ¼ EncCEðkF ; FÞ with the
convergent key kF ¼ KeyGenCEðFÞ and uploads
ðCF , ff0
F;pgÞ to the cloud server. The convergent key
kF is stored by the user locally.
File retrieving. Suppose a user wants to download a file F. It
first sends a request and the file name to the S-CSP. Upon
receiving the request and file name, the S-CSP will check
whether the user is eligible to download F. If failed, the S-CSP
sends back an signal to the user to indicate the download fail-
ure. Otherwise, the S-CSP returns the corresponding cipher-
text CF . Upon receiving the encrypted data from the S-CSP,
the user uses the key kF stored locally to recover the original
file F.
Problems. Such a construction of authorized deduplica-
tion has several serious security problems, which are listed
below.
First, each user will be issued private keys fkpi gpi2PU
for their corresponding privileges, denoted by PU in
our above construction. These private keys fkpi
gpi2PU
can be applied by the user to generate file token for
duplicate check. However, during file uploading, the
user needs to compute file tokens for sharing with
other users with privileges PF . To compute these file
tokens, the user needs to know the private keys for
PF , which means PF could only be chosen from PU .
Such a restriction makes the authorized deduplica-
tion system unable to be widely used and limited.
Second, the above deduplication system cannot pre-
vent the privilege private key sharing among users.
The users will be issued the same private key for the
same privilege in the construction. As a result, the
users may collude and generate privilege private
keys for a new privilege set PÃ
that does not belong
to any of the colluded user. For example, a user with
privilege set PU1 may collude with another user with
privilege set PU2 to get a privilege set PÃ
¼ PU1 [ PU2.
The construction is inherently subject to brute-force
attacks that can recover files falling into a known set.
That is, the deduplication system cannot protect the
security of predictable files. One of critical reasons is
that the traditional convergent encryption system
can only protect the semantic security of unpredict-
able files.
4.2 Our Proposed System Description
To solve the problems of the construction in Section 4.1, we
propose another advanced deduplication system support-
ing authorized duplicate check. In this new deduplication
system, a hybrid cloud architecture is introduced to solve
the problem. The private keys for privileges will not be
issued to users directly, which will be kept and managed by
the private cloud server instead. In this way, the users can-
not share these private keys of privileges in this proposed
construction, which means that it can prevent the privilege
key sharing among users in the above straightforward con-
struction. To get a file token, the user needs to send a
request to the private cloud server. The intuition of this con-
struction can be described as follows. To perform the dupli-
cate check for some file, the user needs to get the file token
from the private cloud server. The private cloud server will
also check the user’s identity before issuing the correspond-
ing file token to the user. The authorized duplicate check for
this file can be performed by the user with the public cloud
before uploading this file. Based on the results of duplicate
check, the user either uploads this file or runs PoW.
Before giving our construction of the deduplication sys-
tem, we define a binary relation R ¼ fðp; p0
Þg as follows.
Given two privileges p and p0
, we say that p matches p0
if
and only if Rðp; p0
Þ ¼ 1. This kind of a generic binary relation
definition could be instantiated based on the background of
applications, such as the common hierarchical relation.
More precisely, in a hierarchical relation, p matches p0
if p is
a higher-level privilege. For example, in an enterprise man-
agement system, three hierarchical privilege levels are
defined as Director, Project lead, and Engineer, where Direc-
tor is at the top level and Engineer is at the bottom level.
Obviously, in this simple example, the privilege of Director
matches the privileges of Project lead and Engineer. We pro-
vide the proposed deduplication system as follows.
System setup. The privilege universe P is defined as in
Section 4.1. A symmetric key kpi
for each pi 2 P will be
selected and the set of keys fkpi
gpi2P will be sent to the pri-
vate cloud. An identification protocol P ¼ ðProof; VerifyÞ is
also defined, where Proof and Verify are the proof and veri-
fication algorithm respectively. Furthermore, each user U is
assumed to have a secret key skU to perform the identifica-
tion with servers. Assume that user U has the privilege set
PU . It also initializes a PoW protocol POW for the file own-
ership proof. The private cloud server will maintain a table
which stores each user’s public information pkU and its

corresponding privilege set PU . The file storage system for
the storage server is set to be ?.
File uploading. Suppose that a data owner wants to
upload and share a file F with users whose privilege
belongs to the set PF ¼ fpjg. The data owner needs interact
with the private cloud before performing duplicate check
with the S-CSP. More precisely, the data owner performs an
identification to prove its identity with private key skU . If it
is passed, the private cloud server will find the correspond-
ing privileges PU of the user from its stored table list. The
user computes and sends the file tag fF ¼ TagGenðFÞ to
the private cloud server, who will return ff0
F;pt
¼
TagGenðfF ; kpt Þg back to the user for all pt satisfying
Rðp; ptÞ ¼ 1 and p 2 PU . Then, the user will interact and
send the file token ff0
F;pt
g to the S-CSP.
If a file duplicate is found, the user needs to run
the PoW protocol POW with the S-CSP to prove
the file ownership. If the proof is passed, the user
will be provided a pointer for the file. Further-
more, a proof from the S-CSP will be returned,
which could be a signature s on ff0
F;pt
g and a time
stamp. The user sends the privilege set PF ¼ fpjg
for the file F as well as the proof to the private
cloud server. Upon receiving the request, the pri-
vate cloud server first verifies the proof from the
S-CSP. If it is passed, the private cloud server com-
putes ff0
F;pt
¼ TagGenðfF ; kpt Þg for all pt satisfying
Rðp; ptÞ ¼ 1 for each p 2 PF -PU , which will be
returned to the S-CSP together with the signature
s. Then, the privilege set of the file is set to be the
union of PF and the privilege sets defined by
the other data owners.
Otherwise, if no duplicate is found, a proof from
the S-CSP will be returned, which is also a signa-
ture on ff0
F;pt
g and a time stamp. The user sends
the privilege set PF ¼ fpjg for the file F as well
as the proof to the private cloud server. Upon
receiving the request, the private cloud server first
verifies the proof from the S-CSP. If it is passed,
the private cloud server computes and sends
ff0
F;pt
¼ TagGenðfF ; kpt Þg together with the signa-
ture to the S-CSP for all pt satisfying Rðp; ptÞ ¼ 1
and p 2 PF . Finally, the user computes the
encrypted file CF ¼ EncCEðkF ; FÞ with the conver-
gent key kF ¼ KeyGenCEðFÞ and uploads CF to the
S-CSP.
File retrieving. The user downloads his files in the same way as
the deduplication system in Section 4.1. That is, the user can
recover the original file with the convergent key kF after receiv-
ing the encrypted data from the S-CSP.
4.3 Further Enhancement
Though the above solution supports the differential privi-
lege duplicate, it is inherently subject to brute-force attacks
launched by the public cloud server, which can recover files
falling into a known set. More specifically, knowing that the
target file space underlying a given ciphertext C is drawn
from a message space S ¼ fF1; . . . ; Fng of size n, the public
cloud server can recover F after at most n off-line encryp-
tions. That is, for each i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, it simply encrypts Fi to
get a ciphertext denoted by Ci. If C ¼ Ci, it means that the
underlying file is Fi. Security is thus only possible when
such a message is unpredictable. This traditional conver-
gent encryption will be insecure for predictable file.
We design and implement a new system which could
protect the security for predicatable message. The main idea
of our technique is that the novel encryption key generation
algorithm. For simplicity, we will use the hash functions to
define the tag generation functions and convergent keys in
this section. In traditional convergent encryption, to support
duplicate check, the key is derived from the file F by using
some cryptographic hash function kF ¼ HðFÞ. To avoid the
deterministic key generation, the encryption key kF for file
F in our system will be generated with the aid of the private
key cloud server with privilege key kp. The encryption key
can be viewed as the form of kF;p ¼ H0ðHðFÞ; kpÞÈH2ðFÞ,
where H0; H and H2 are all cryptographic hash functions.
The file F is encrypted with another key k, while k will be
encrypted with kF;p. In this way, both the private cloud
server and S-CSP cannot decrypt the ciphertext. Further-
more, it is semantically secure to the S-CSP based on the
security of symmetric encryption. For S-CSP, if the file is
unpredicatable, then it is semantically secure too. The
details of the scheme, which has been instantiated with
hash functions for simplicity, are described below.
System setup. The privilege universe P and the symmetric
key kpi for each pi 2 P will be selected for the private cloud
as above. An identification protocol P ¼ ðProof; VerifyÞ is
also defined. The proof of ownership POW is instantiated
by hash functions H; H0; H1 and H2, which will be shown as
follows. The private cloud server maintains a table which
stores each user’s identity and its corresponding privilege.
File uploading. Suppose that a data owner with privilege p
wants to upload and share a file F with users whose privi-
lege belongs to the set P ¼ fpjg. The data owner performs
the identification and sends HðFÞ to the private cloud
server. Two file tag sets ffF;pt
¼ H0ðHðFÞ; kpt Þg and
ff0
F;pt
¼ H1ðHðFÞ; kpt Þg for all pt satisfying Rðp; ptÞ ¼ 1 and
p 2 PU will be sent back to the user if the identification
passes. After receiving the tag ffF;pt
g, and ff0
F;pt
g, the user
will send ff0
F;pt
g to the S-CSP. If a file duplicate is found,
the user needs to run the PoW protocol POW with the S-
CSP to prove the file ownership. If the proof is also passed,
the user will be provided a pointer for the file. Otherwise, if
no duplicate is found, a proof from the S-CSP will be
returned. The user sends the privilege set PF ¼ fpjg as well
as the proof to the private cloud server. Upon receiving the
request, the private cloud server verifies the signature. If
it is passed, the private cloud server will compute
fF;pj
¼ H0ðHðFÞ; kpj
Þ and f0
F;pj
¼ H1ðHðFÞ; kpj
Þ for each pj
satisfying Rðp; pjÞ ¼ 1 and p 2 PF , which will be returned to
the user and S-CSP, respectively. Then, the user computes
the encryption CF ¼ EncSEðk; FÞ, where k is random
key. The key k will be encrypted into ciphertext fCk;pj g with
each key in fkF;pj ¼ fF;pj
ÈH2ðFÞg using a symmetric
encryption algorithm. Finally, the user uploads fCF ; Ck;pj g.
File retrieving. The procedure of file retrieving is similar to
the construction in Section 4.2 and only Ck;pj where pj 2 PU
will be returned to the user. The user first uses his key kF;pj
to decrypt Ck;pj and obtain k. Then the user uses k to recover
the original file F.

5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our system is designed to solve the differential privilege
problem in secure deduplication. The security will be ana-
lyzed in terms of two aspects, that is, the authorization of
duplicate check and the confidentiality of data. Some basic
tools have been used to construct the secure deduplication,
which are assumed to be secure. These basic tools include
the convergent encryption scheme, symmetric encryption
scheme, and the PoW scheme. Based on this assumption,
we show that systems are secure with respect to the follow-
ing security analysis.
5.1 Security of Duplicate-Check Token
We consider several types of privacy we need protect, that
is, i) unforgeability of duplicate-check token: There are two
types of adversaries, that is, external adversary and internal
adversary. As shown below, the external adversary can be
viewed as an internal adversary without any privilege. If a
user has privilege p, it requires that the adversary cannot
forge and output a valid duplicate token with any other
privilege p0
on any file F, where p does not match p0
.
Furthermore, it also requires that if the adversary does not
make a request of token with its own privilege from private
cloud server, it cannot forge and output a valid duplicate
token with p on any F that has been queried. The internal
adversaries have more attack power than the external
adversaries and thus we only need to consider the security
against the internal attacker, ii) indistinguishability of
duplicate-check token: this property is also defined in terms of
two aspects as the definition of unforgeability. First, if a
user has privilege p, given a token f0
, it requires that the
adversary cannot distinguish which privilege or file in the
token if p does not match p0
. Furthermore, it also require
that if the adversary does not make a request of token with
its own privilege from private cloud server, it cannot distin-
guish a valid duplicate token with p on any other F that the
adversary has not queried. In the security definition of
indistinguishability, we require that the adversary is not
allowed to collude with the public cloud servers. Actually,
such an assumption could be removed if the private cloud
server maintains the tag list for all the files uploaded. Simi-
lar to the analysis of unforgeability, the security against
external adversaries is implied in the security against the
internal adversaries.
Next, we will give detailed security analysis for scheme
in Section 4.2 based on the above definitions.
5.1.1 Unforgeability of Duplicate-Check Token
Assume a user with privilege p could forge a new
duplicate-check token f0
F;p0 for any p0
that does not
match p. If it is a valid token, then it should be calcu-
lated as f0
F;p0 ¼ H1ðHðFÞ; kp0 Þ. Recall that kp0 is a
secret key kept by the private cloud server and
H1ðHðFÞ; kp0 Þ is a valid message authentication code.
Thus, without kp0 , the adversary cannot forge and
output a new valid one for any file F.
For any user with privilege p, to output a new dupli-
cate-check token f0
F;p, it also requires the knowledge
of kp. Otherwise, the adversary could break the secu-
rity of message authentication code.
5.1.2 Indistinguishability of Duplicate-Check Token
The security of indistinguishability of token can be also
proved based on the assumption of the underlying message
authentication code is secure. The security of message
authentication code requires that the adversary cannot dis-
tinguish if a code is generated from an unknown key. In our
deduplication system, all the privilege keys are kept secret
by the private cloud server. Thus, even if a user has privi-
lege p, given a token f0
, the adversary cannot distinguish
which privilege or file in the token because he does not
have the knowledge of privilege key skp.
5.2 Confidentiality of Data
The data will be encrypted in our deduplication system
before outsourcing to the S-CSP. Furthermore, two kinds of
different encryption methods have been applied in our two
constructions. Thus, we will analyze them respectively. In
the scheme in Section 4.2, the data is encrypted with the tra-
ditional encryption scheme. The data encrypted with such
encryption method cannot achieve semantic security as it is
inherently subject to brute-force attacks that can recover
files falling into a known set. Thus, several new security
notations of privacy against chosen-distribution attacks
have been defined for unpredictable message. In another
word, the adapted security definition guarantees that the
encryptions of two unpredictable messages should be indis-
tinguishable. Thus, the security of data in our first construc-
tion could be guaranteed under this security notion.
We discuss the confidentiality of data in our further
enhanced construction in Section 4.3. The security analysis
for external adversaries and internal adversaries is almost
identical, except the internal adversaries are provided with
some convergent encryption keys additionally. However,
these convergent encryption keys have no security impact
on the data confidentiality because these convergent
encryption keys are computed with different privileges.
Recall that the data are encrypted with the symmetric key
encryption technique, instead of the convergent encryption
method. Though the symmetric key k is randomly chosen,
it is encrypted by another convergent encryption key kF;p.
Thus, we still need analyze the confidentiality of data by
considering the convergent encryption. Different from the
previous one, the convergent key in our construction is not
deterministic in terms of the file, which still depends on
the privilege secret key stored by the private cloud server
and unknown to the adversary. Therefore, if the adversary
does not collude with the private cloud server, the confi-
dentiality of our second construction is semantically secure
for both predictable and unpredictable file. Otherwise, if
they collude, then the confidentiality of file will be reduced
to convergent encryption because the encryption key is
deterministic.
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We implement a prototype of the proposed authorized
deduplication system, in which we model three entities as

separate C++ programs. A Client program is used to model
the data users to carry out the file upload process. A Private
Server program is used to model the private cloud which
manages the private keys and handles the file token compu-
tation. A Storage Server program is used to model the S-CSP
which stores and deduplicates files.
We implement cryptographic operations of hashing and
encryption with the OpenSSL library [1]. We also imple-
ment the communication between the entities based on
HTTP, using GNU Libmicrohttpd [10] and libcurl [13].
Thus, users can issue HTTP Post requests to the servers.
Our implementation of the Client provides the following
function calls to support token generation and deduplica-
tion along the file upload process.
FileTag(File)—It computes SHA-1 hash of the
File as File Tag;
TokenReq(Tag, UserID)—It requests the Private
Server for File Token generation with the File Tag
and User ID;
DupCheckReq(Token)—It requests the Storage
Server for Duplicate Check of the File by sending the
file token received from private server;
ShareTokenReq(Tag, {Priv.})—It requests the
Private Server to generate the Share File Token with
the File Tag and Target Sharing Privilege Set;
FileEncrypt(File)—It encrypts the File with
Convergent Encryption using 256-bit AES algorithm
in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode, where the con-
vergent key is from SHA-256 Hashing of the file; and
FileUploadReq(FileID, File, Token)—It
uploads the File Data to the Storage Server if the file
is Unique and updates the File Token stored.
Our implementation of the Private Server includes corre-
sponding request handlers for the token generation and
maintains a key storage with Hash Map.
TokenGen(Tag, UserID)—It loads the associated
privilege keys of the user and generate the token
with HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm; and
ShareTokenGen(Tag, {Priv.})—It generates
the share token with the corresponding privilege
keys of the sharing privilege set with HMAC-SHA-1
algorithm.
Our implementation of the Storage Server provides dedu-
plication and data storage with following handlers and
maintains a map between existing files and associated token
with Hash Map.
DupCheck(Token)—It searches the File to Token
Map for Duplicate; and
FileStore(FileID, File, Token)—It stores
the File on Disk and updates the Mapping.
7 EVALUATION
We conduct testbed evaluation on our prototype. Our eval-
uation focuses on comparing the overhead induced by
authorization steps, including file token generation and
share token generation, against the convergent encryption
and file upload steps. We evaluate the overhead by varying
different factors, including 1) File Size, 2) Number of Stored
Files, 3) Deduplication Ratio, 4) Privilege Set Size. We also
evaluate the prototype with a real-world workload based
on VM images.
We conduct the experiments with three machines
equipped with an Intel Core-2-Quad 2.66 GHz Quad Core
CPU, 4 GB RAM and installed with Ubuntu 12.04 32-Bit
Operation System. The machines are connected with 1 Gbps
Ethernet network.
We break down the upload process into six steps, 1) Tag-
ging, 2) Token Generation, 3) Duplicate Check, 4) Share
Token Generation, 5) Encryption, 6) Transfer. For each step,
we record the start and end time of it and therefore obtain
the breakdown of the total time spent. We present the aver-
age time taken in each data set in the figures.
7.1 File Size
To evaluate the effect of file size to the time spent on dif-
ferent steps, we upload 100 unique files (i.e., without any
deduplication opportunity) of particular file size and
record the time break down. Using the unique files ena-
bles us to evaluate the worst-case scenario where we
have to upload all file data. The average time of the steps
from test sets of different file size are plotted in Fig. 2.
The time spent on tagging, encryption, upload increases
linearly with the file size, since these operations involve
the actual file data and incur file I/O with the whole file.
In contrast, other steps such as token generation and
duplicate check only use the file metadata for computa-
tion and therefore the time spent remains constant. With
the file size increasing from 10 to 400 MB, the overhead
of the proposed authorization steps decreases from 14.9
to 0.483 percent.
7.2 Number of Stored Files
To evaluate the effect of number of stored files in the sys-
tem, we upload 10,000 10 MB unique files to the system and
record the breakdown for every file upload. From Fig. 3,
every step remains constant along the time. Token checking
is done with a hash table and a linear search would be car-
ried out in case of collision. Despite of the possibility of a
linear search, the time taken in duplicate check remains sta-
ble due to the low collision probability.
Fig. 2. Time breakdown for different file size.

7.3 Deduplication Ratio
To evaluate the effect of the deduplication ratio, we prepare
two unique data sets, each of which consists of 50 100 MB
files. We first upload the first set as an initial upload. For the
second upload, we pick a portion of 50 files, according to
the given deduplication ratio, from the initial set as dupli-
cate files and remaining files from the second set as unique
files. The average time of uploading the second set is pre-
sented in Fig. 4. As uploading and encryption would be
skipped in case of duplicate files, the time spent on both of
them decreases with increasing deduplication ratio. The
time spent on duplicate check also decreases as the search-
ing would be ended when duplicate is found. Total time
spent on uploading the file with deduplication ratio at
100 percent is only 33.5 percent with unique files.
7.4 Privilege Set Size
To evaluate the effect of privilege set size, we upload 100
10 MB unique files with different size of the data owner
and target share privilege set size. In Fig. 5, it shows the
time taken in token generation increases linearly as more
keys are associated with the file and also the duplicate
check time. While the number of keys increases 100 times
from 1,000 to 100,000, the total time spent only increases
to 3.81 times and it is noted that the file size of the
experiment is set at a small level (10 MB), the effect would
become less significant in case of larger files.
7.5 Real-World VM Images
To evaluate the overhead introduced under read-world
workload data set, we consider a data set of weekly VM
image snapshots collected over a 12-week span in a univer-
sity programming course, while the same data set is also
used in the prior work [14]. We perform block-level dedu-
plication with a fixed block size of 4 KB. The initial data size
of an image is 3.2 GB (excluding all zero blocks). After
12 weeks, the average data size of an image increases to
4 GB and the average deduplication ratio is 97.9 percent.
For privacy, we only collected cryptographic hashes on
4 KB fixed-size blocks; in other words, the tagging phase is
done beforehand. Here, we randomly pick 10 VM image
series to form the data set. Fig. 6 shows that the time taken
in token generation and duplicate checking increases line-
arly as the VM image grows in data size. The time taken in
encryption and data transfer is low because of the high
deduplication ratio. Time taken for the first week is the
highest as the initial upload contains more unique data.
Overall, the results are consistent with the prior experi-
ments that use synthetic workloads.
7.6 Summary
To conclude the findings, the token generation introduces
only minimal overhead in the entire upload process and
is negligible for moderate file sizes, for example, less than
2 perecnt with 100 MB files. This suggests that the scheme
is suitable to construct an authorized deduplication sys-
tem for backup storage.
8 RELATED WORK
Secure deduplication. With the advent of cloud computing,
secure data deduplication has attracted much attention
recently from research community. Yuan and Yu [24] pro-
posed a deduplication system in the cloud storage to
reduce the storage size of the tags for integrity check. To
enhance the security of deduplication and protect the data
confidentiality, Bellare et al. [3] showed how to protect
the data confidentiality by transforming the predictableFig. 4. Time breakdown for different deduplication ratio.
Fig. 5. Time breakdown for different privilege set size.Fig. 3. Time breakdown for different number of stored files.

message into unpredictable message. In their system,
another third party called key server is introduced to gen-
erate the file tag for duplicate check. Stanek et al. [20]
presented a novel encryption scheme that provides differ-
ential security for popular data and unpopular data. For
popular data that are not particularly sensitive, the tradi-
tional conventional encryption is performed. Another two-
layered encryption scheme with stronger security while
supporting deduplication is proposed for unpopular data.
In this way, they achieved better tradeoff between the effi-
ciency and security of the outsourced data. Li et al. [12]
addressed the key-management issue in block-level dedu-
plication by distributing these keys across multiple servers
after encrypting the files.
Convergent encryption. Convergent encryption [8] ensures
data privacy in deduplication. Bellare et al. [4] formalized
this primitive as message-locked encryption, and explored
its application in space-efficient secure outsourced storage.
Xu et al. [23] also addressed the problem and showed a
secure convergent encryption for efficient encryption, with-
out considering issues of the key-management and block-
level deduplication. There are also several implementations
of convergent implementations of different convergent
encryption variants for secure deduplication (e.g., [2],
[18], [21], [22]). It is known that some commercial cloud
storage providers, such as Bitcasa, also deploy convergent
encryption.
Proof of ownership. Halevi et al. [11] proposed the notion
of “proofs of ownership” for deduplication systems, such
that a client can efficiently prove to the cloud storage server
that he/she owns a file without uploading the file itself. Sev-
eral PoW constructions based on the Merkle-Hash Tree are
proposed [11] to enable client-side deduplication, which
include the bounded leakage setting. Pietro and Sorniotti
[16] proposed another efficient PoW scheme by choosing
the projection of a file onto some randomly selected bit-
positions as the file proof. Note that all the above schemes
do not consider data privacy. Recently, Ng et al. [15]
extended PoW for encrypted files, but they do not address
how to minimize the key management overhead.
Twin clouds architecture. Recently, Bugiel et al. [7] pro-
vided an architecture consisting of twin clouds for secure
outsourcing of data and arbitrary computations to an
untrusted commodity cloud. Zhang et al. [25] also presented
the hybrid cloud techniques to support privacy-aware data-
intensive computing. In our work, we consider to address
the authorized deduplication problem over data in public
cloud. The security model of our systems is similar to those
related work, where the private cloud is assume to be hon-
est but curious.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, the notion of authorized data deduplication
was proposed to protect the data security by including dif-
ferential privileges of users in the duplicate check. We also
presented several new deduplication constructions support-
ing authorized duplicate check in hybrid cloud architecture,
in which the duplicate-check tokens of files are generated
by the private cloud server with private keys. Security anal-
ysis demonstrates that our schemes are secure in terms of
insider and outsider attacks specified in the proposed secu-
rity model. As a proof of concept, we implemented a proto-
type of our proposed authorized duplicate check scheme
and conduct testbed experiments on our prototype. We
showed that our authorized duplicate check scheme incurs
minimal overhead compared to convergent encryption and
network transfer.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported by National Natural Science
Foundation of China (Nos. 61100224 and 61272455), GRF
CUHK 413813 from the Research Grant Council of
Hong Kong, Distinguished Young Scholars Fund of
Department of Education (No. Yq2013126), Guangdong
Province, Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong
Province (Grant No. S2013010013671), the Guangzhou
Zhujiang Science and Technology Future Fellow Fund
(Grant No. 2012J2200094), China 111 Project (No. B08038),
Doctoral Fund of Ministry of Education of China (No.
20130203110004), Program for New Century Excellent Tal-
ents in University (No. NCET-13-0946), the Fundamental
Research Funds for the Central Universities (BDY15).
Besides, Lou’s work is supported by US National Science
Foundation under Grant (CNS-1217889).
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Jin Li received the BS degree in mathematics from
Southwest University in 2002 and the PhD degree
in information security from Sun Yat-sen University
in 2007. Currently, he works at Guangzhou Univer-
sity as a professor. He has been selected as one
of science and technology new star in Guangdong
province. His research interests include applied
cryptography and security in cloud computing. He
has published more than 70 research papers in ref-
ereed international conferences and journals and
has served as the program chair or program com-
mittee member in many international conferences.
Yan Kit Li received the BEng degree in computer
engineering from the Chinese University of
Hong Kong in 2012. Currently he is working
toward the MPhil degree at the Department of
Computer Science and Engineering at the same
school. His research interests including deduplica-
tion and distributed storage.
Xiaofeng Chen received the BS and MS degrees
in mathematics in Northwest University, China,
and the PhD degree in cryptography from Xidian
University in 2003. Currently, he works at Xidian
University as a professor. He has published more
than 100 research papers in refereed interna-
tional conferences and journals. He has served
as the program/general chair or a program com-
mittee member in more than 20 international con-
ferences. His research interests include applied
cryptography and cloud computing security.
Patrick P.C. Lee received the BEng degree (first-
class honors) in information engineering from the
Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2001, the
MPhil degree in computer science and engineer-
ing from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in
2003, and the PhD degree in computer science
from Columbia University in 2008. He is now an
assistant professor of the Department of Com-
puter Science and Engineering at the Chinese
University of Hong Kong. His research interests
include various applied/systems topics including
cloud computing and storage, distributed systems and networks, operat-
ing systems, and security/resilience.
Wenjing Lou received a BS and an MS degrees
in computer science and engineering at Xi’an
Jiaotong University in China, the MASc degree in
computer communications at the Nanyang Tech-
nological University in Singapore, and the PhD
degree in electrical and computer engineering at
the University of Florida. She is now an associate
professor in the Computer Science Department at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
For more information on this or any other computing topic,
please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
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Bangalore - 560021

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