A Roadmap for Advocacy, Policy Development, and Programming

A Roadmap for Advocacy, Policy Development,
and Programming:
Protection in Mixed Movements along the Central
and Western Mediterranean Routes 2021

Cover photo credit:
© MMC / Kawakb Almaloumat Company / 2020
A Roadmap for Advocacy, Policy Development, and Programming
2

Foreword
Bram Frouws
Head of the Mixed Migration Centre
Over the course of three days in
February 2021, the Mixed Migration
Centre (MMC) partnered with the
United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) to bring
together 41 speakers at a joint
virtual Policy Workshop on Protection Challenges on the
Central and Western Mediterranean Migration Routes.
A diverse group of speakers, moderators and
participants – from different countries, organisations
and backgrounds – actively engaged in three days of
sharing experiences, lessons learned, ideas and intense
discussions on how the protection of people on the move
may be ultimately improved.
The diversity of experiences and backgrounds the
participants brought with them to the workshop ensured
a wide and rich array of perspectives, reflected in the
various papers contributed by the participants, which
we are pleased to present in this volume. On behalf of
the MMC and, in particular, MMC’s team in North Africa,
I would like to thank all the participants for sharing their
time and ideas so generously with us. I am also grateful to
UNHCRfortheirsupportinmakingthisworkshoppossible.
MMC and the Danish Refugee Council are committed to
continuing our close cooperation with UNHCR and all
other partners that share the same overarching objective
of ending all forms of violence against refugees and
migrants. It is now up to policy makers and practitioners
to translate the findings and recommendations from
the workshop, as well as the papers in this volume, into
action on the ground, into policy and advocacy. We hope
that by convening the workshop and publishing these
papers, we are collectively able to push the discussion
forward towards evidence-based, nuanced, rational and,
crucially, humane migration policies.
This discussion is as timely as ever. In fact, it remains
desperately needed. In July 2020, UNHCR and MMC
launched a joint report, offering compelling evidence on
the scale of violations faced by refugees and migrants
engaged in mixed migration, where these violations are
happening and who the perpetrators are. Such reliable
data are needed as a first step towards effective action.
We still witness grave abuses along the various migration
routes towards the Mediterranean coast. We still witness,
on a daily basis, people intercepted at sea and brought
back to Libya, with many ending up in detention and in
horrific conditions.
Instead of real solutions, a sense of political panic and
ad-hoc actions to contain movements pervade. What
we need are more humane and smarter approaches to
mixed migration in line with our principles and moral
values, leading to far less human suffering. It is possible.
It requires courage, accountability, leadership and
innovation, but it is possible.
This volume is the culmination of three days of
discussions, years of participants’ experience and
high-quality research. It is yet another call to action and
a call for change. It offers concrete recommendations
on, for example, the important role of local authorities;
community-based approaches; the need for a stronger
focusonchildrenandyouthonthemove;moresustainable
approaches to combatting trafficking in persons; and
more nuanced approaches to stem the phenomenon of
migrant smuggling.
We hope that this report will stimulate concrete action
for improving protection for all people on the move. As
MMC, we will continue to contribute to evidence-based
migration policies, responses and public debate, always
placing the human rights and protection of all people on
the move at the centre.
A Roadmap for Advocacy, Policy Development, and Programming 3

Foreword
Vincent Cochetel
UNHCR Special Envoy for the
Central Mediterranean Situation
Over the last five years, mixed
movements of refugees and
migrants across the Mediterranean
Sea have attracted more
international and national public
attention than similarly dangerous, more massive
movements by land. This disproportionate focus on
sea crossings has been politically instrumentalised on
both sides of the Mediterranean, feeding apocalyptic
and xenophobic rhetoric disconnected from the complex
realities of displacement along long and dangerous
routes. Despite significant efforts to reconcile interests
north and south under a mosaic of cross-regional and
bilateral fora, such as the balanced Joint Valletta Action
Plan of 2015, the focus and scope of “managing mixed
movements” are still often reduced by States to a
simplistic “containment agenda.”
The Policy Workshop co-hosted by UNHCR and the
Mixed Migration Centre provided valuable up-to-date
perspectives towards sustainable, protection-centred
approaches to asylum and migration management by
States. The papers and discussions usefully reminded
us that combatting irregular migration (often wrongly
labelled as illegal migration) has been forcefully presented
to public opinions in Europe as the priority. Reductions in
the number of successful irregular sea crossings seems
to serve as the key performance indicator of whether
migration policies work. However, participants in the
workshop underlined that such a narrow approach,
ignoring the underlying causes of mixed movements,
their depth and different forms, is bound to fail. They
emphasised that, long-term, broad-based partnerships
are needed with all countries concerned along the routes
in a combined and coherent approach.
Participants emphasised that, even if better border
management systems which recognise the diverse
reasons why people cross borders and move onwards are
needed, effective solutions are more complex and must
be multi-faceted. They must address the root causes
of primary and secondary movements. They should
also recognize that credible alternatives to dangerous
journeys are still lacking for both refugees in some
countries of first asylum, and for potential migrants.
The discussions helped uncover the fact that the
challenges experienced by different States along the
routes are similar. Gaps in protection and service delivery
for refugees and migrants in States along the routes place
smugglers and traffickers at a unique advantage to ply
their criminal business models. With no visible, and thus
no credible alternatives to dangerous journeys in many
places, smugglers and traffickers can sell, unchallenged
by any meaningful counter measures, their false promises
of a “better life somewhere else.” And, in this context
where legal pathways to mobility are greatly lacking, the
distorted narrative of diaspora serves only to encourage
irregular movements from countries of origin and transit,
and to amplify the very false perception of an inclusive and
welcoming dreamland across the desert or the sea.
The workshop also highlighted the evolving contexts in
North African countries, which today are also countries
of final destination and not just countries of departure
or transit, but where legal frameworks for refugees and
to some extent, for migrants, are still lacking, unlike
in sub-Saharan Africa. The effects of the COVID-19
pandemic on mixed movements across Africa and beyond
demonstrated the limits of the so-called “tolerance status”
for refugees and migrants. This was notable in North Africa
where their limited socio-economic inclusion highlighted
the need to renew efforts to define legal frameworks
which recognise that some foreigners in these countries
need protection and a future where they are.
In this context, Europe has a key responsibility to ensure
it shows leadership and solidarity, and helps countries
along the routes to more effectively manage their
migration and asylum systems. North African countries
must be supported and assisted to cope with increasing
pressures related to these mixed movements. However,
support must be provided in a win-win manner which
reinforces social cohesion for refugees and migrants, and
brings tangible self-interested benefits to host States and
local host communities. There cannot be an impression
that building migration and asylum systems in North
Africa and elsewhere is a way for European countries to
offload their responsibilities.
Another important subject discussed – perhaps too
briefly – was the responsibility of countries of origin.
Often a taboo in inter-governmental fora, the issue of the
responsibility of countries of origin vis-à-vis their citizens
who are forced to flee human rights violations, wars
and violence, or who leave home due to the absence of
socioeconomic prospects, remains central to discussions
on reducing or preventing dangerous journeys. The
responsibility and initiative to address root causes must
be taken up by home/origin countries and cannot just rest
with other States.
4

With many thanks to the Mixed Migration Centre
and to all the participants for their engagement over
three very productive days of collective work, we hope
the rich debate that we had will support renewed
advocacy efforts for achieving much-needed policy and
normative changes, which offer increased protection for
vulnerable refugees and migrants in mixed movements
on the Central and Western Mediterranean routes. The
conclusions and key recommendations of the workshop,
collected in this volume, provide a path forward.

Acknowledgements
Suggestedcitation:MMCandUNHCR(Eds.).(2021).ARoadmapforAdvocacy,PolicyDevelopment,andProgramming:
Protection in Mixed Movements along the Central and Western Mediterranean Routes 2021. Mixed Migration Centre
and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Available at:
http://www.mixedmigration.org/resource/road-map-2021/
Lead Editors: Dr. Ayla Bonfiglio (MMC), Edward O’Dwyer (UNHCR), Jim van Moorsel (MMC), Fergus Peace (UNHCR)
Peer Review Committee: Dr. Ayla Bonfiglio (MMC), Dr. Georgia Cole (University of Edinburgh), Rachel Criswell
(UNHCR), Prof. Geoff Gilbert (University of Essex), Jim van Moorsel (MMC), Ana-Maria Murphy-Teixidor (MMC), Edward
O’Dwyer (UNHCR), Fergus Peace (UNHCR), Claire Simmons (University of Essex)
Authors, contributors and expert respondents:
Vincent Cochetel
Special Envoy for the Central
Mediterranean Situation,
UNHCR
Johanna Bögel
Advisor to GIZ East
Africa, Better Migration
Management (BMM)
Programme
José Dogma Tebou
4Mi Monitor in Tunis, MMC
North Africa
Bram Frouws
Head of the Mixed Migration
Centre
Dalmar Hamid
Refugee Researcher,
International Institute for
Social Studies, Erasmus
University (Rotterdam)
Prof. Odessa
Gonzalez Benson
University of Michigan
Joost Klarenbeek,
Special Envoy for
Migration, The Netherlands
Prof. Ryszard Piotrowicz
Professor of Law, Aberystwyth
University; Council of
Europe’s Group of Experts on
Action against Trafficking in
Human Beings, member from
2013-2020
Bader Albader
Doctoral Student, University
of Michigan College of Urban
Planning
Sarah Elliott,
Legal Officer, UNHCR
Marzia Rango
Data Innovation & Capacity-
Building Coordinator, Global
Migration Data & Analysis
Centre (GMDAC), IOM
Imed Soltani
President, Association La
Terre pour Tous
Megan Denise
Smith, Gender-Based
Violence Officer, IOM
Ana-Maria
Murphy-Teixidor
Research Specialist, MMC
North Africa
Marwen Saidi
Volunteer, Association La
Terre Pour Tous
6

Gemma Baccini,
Volunteer, Association La
Terre Pour Tous
Yadh Bousselmi
Tunisia Country
Representative and Regional
Program Advisor, DRC
Hanane Mansour
Research Center in Applied
Economics for Development
(CREAD)
Julia Uyttewaal
Lead Researcher and
Manager, Center for Human
Rights, Gender and Migration,
Washington University in
St. Louis
Verena Sattler
Programme Support Officer
(Migrant
Protection and
Assistance), IOM
Dr. Ayla Bonfiglio,
MMC Regional Coordinator
North Africa
Prof. Hassen Boubakri
University of Sousse,
President of the Tunis Center
for Migration and Asylum
(CeTuMa)
Abderazaq Ouiam
Moroccan Organisation for
Human Rights (OMDH)
Ana Belén
Anguita Arjoana
Senior Community Protection
and Mixed Movements Officer
Teona Aslanishvili
Child Protection Specialist &
Children on the Move Focal
Point, UNICEF MENA
H.E. Amira El Fadil,
Commissioner of Social
Affairs, African Union
Commission
Prof. Amira Ahmed
American University of Cairo
Hamissou
Alasane Ibrahim
Migration Manager, NGO
Jeunesse-Enfance-Migration-
Développement (Niger)
Dr. Leander Kandilige
Senior Lecturer, Centre for
Migration Studies, University
of Ghana
Iolanda Genovese
Migration Research Officer,
UNICEF Office of Research –
Innocenti
Cissé Mariama
Mohamed,
Director for Social Affairs,
African Union
Khaled Menna
Economist Senior Research,
(CREAD, Algiers)
Dr. Catherine Duric
Migration Programme Team
Leader, Conflict, Security
& Migration Department
Foreign, Commonweath &
Development Office (FCDO)
Pauline Vidal
Research Manager – IMREF,
SEEFAR
Laetitia Bader
Horn of Africa Director,
Human Rights Watch
Jim van Moorsel,
Research & Reporting Officer,
MMC North Africa
Soumia Bouchouk
Research Support Engineer,
(CREAD)
Prof. Kim Thuy
Seelinger
Director, Center for Human
Rights, Gender and Migration,
Washington University in
St. Louis
Benedetta
Francesca Cordaro
Information Management
(Counter-Trafficking in
Emergencies), IOM
Danielle Botti
MMC Manager – East Africa
and Yemen

Additional authors:
Vasileia Digidiki, François Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard University
Jacqueline Bhabha, François Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard University
Abhishek Bhatia, François Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard University
Samuel Peisch, François Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights at Harvard University
Dr. Lucy Hovil, Research Consultant, UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti
Mark Gill, Research Consultant, UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti
Prof. Jo Vearey, Director, African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), University of the Witwatersrand
Annalisa Camilli, Journalist, Internazionale
Idel Hanley, Research Fellow, BIICL
Coordination and management: Rim Hajri (MMC) and Jim van Moorsel (MMC)
Copy-editing and proof reading: Johanna Morden
Layout and design: Rim Hajri (MMC), Jaycom Creative Agency, and Simon Pegler
Janina Stürner
Research Fellow, University
of Nuremberg
Faras Ghani
Digital Editor, Al Jazeera
Lionel Nzamba
Migration Officer, United
Cities and Local Governments
(UCLG) of Africa
Dr. Jean-Pierre Gauci
Arthur Watts Senior
Research Fellow, British
Institute of International and
Comparative Law (BIICL),
Director of the People for
Change Foundation (Malta)
Nahom Gebremeskel
4Mi Monitor in Médenine,
MMC North Africa
Lucie Eches
Protection Activity Manager
Misrata, MSF France
Sylvain Astier
Delegate for Migration Libya
and North Africa, Embassy of
Switzerland in Tunisia
Manon Radosta
Advocacy Coordinator, Libya
INGO Forum
Edward O’Dwyer
Senior Policy Advisor, OSE,
UNHCR
Dr. Kuda Vanyoro
Post-Doc Researcher,
ACMS, University of the
Witwatersrand
Nicholas Maple,
Post-Doc Researcher,
ACMS, University of the
Witwatersrand
Amera Markous,
Libya Team Leader, MMC
North Africa
Dr. Georgia Cole
Chancellor’s Fellow, School of
Social and Political Sciences,
University of Edinburgh
Miriam Brewka
European External Action
Service Global 4 (Migration
Division)
8

The editors would like to thank all of the workshop
participants who contributed their time and expertise
in the compilation of this roadmap. We are grateful to
Roberto Forin (MMC) and Bram Frouws (MMC) for their
feedback to sections of this volume, as well as Eline
van Oosterhout (Radboud University, The Netherlands).
Rachel Criswell (UNHCR) provided invaluable support
at every stage of the design and implementation of the
workshop and this volume. We are also grateful to the
UNHCR colleagues in Regional Bureaux and in Geneva
who supported the planning of the workshop which led to
this volume, including Ana Belén Anguita Arjona, Patrice
Dossou, Markus Topp, Allehone Abebe, Jeanette Zuefle,
Nina Schrepfer, Michele Cavinato and Madeline Garlick.
We are of course especially grateful to all the people on
the move who have taken the time to share their stories,
which allow us to better understand their movements,
advocate for their rights and contribute to better policies
and responses.
Disclaimer: The information, views and opinions
expressed in this publication are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or
position of the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), the Danish
Refugee Council (DRC) nor the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The policy notes,
essays and first-hand accounts included in this volume
were first presented at a UNHCR-MMC Policy Workshop
in February 2021 and selected through a peer review
process that included reviews from MMC, UNHCR and
external higher education institutions.
The selection of the notes and essays, and the
designations and evidence therein, do not imply
endorsement on the part of MMC, DRC or UNHCR.
Note on terminology: Mixed movement is a term used by UNHCR. MMC normally applies the term “mixed
migration” to refer to cross-border movements of people including refugees fleeing persecution and conflict,
victims of trafficking and people seeking better lives and opportunities. See MMC’s full definition of mixed
migration and associated terminology here. UNHCR applies the term “mixed movement,” defined as: The
cross-border movement of people, generally in an irregular manner, involving individuals and groups who travel
alongside each other, using similar routes and means of transport or facilitators, but for different reasons.
People travelling as part of mixed movements have different needs and profiles, and may include asylum-
seekers, refugees, victims of trafficking, unaccompanied or separated children, stateless persons and migrants
(including migrants in irregular situations or migrants in vulnerable situations). See more on UNHCR’s approach
to mixed movements here. In light of the partnership between UNHCR and MMC in publishing the volume
based on the policy workshop, the term “mixed movement” is used.
Having specified the preferred terminology of MMC and UNHCR, it is important to note that MMC and UNHCR
have not changed the terminology employed by the authors and participants included in this volume. In this
way, the terms and concepts used by the authors and participants do not reflect the positions of MMC and/
or UNHCR.
The movement of refugees and migrants along the Central and Western Mediterranean routes, from
sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and onwards to Europe, often encompassing a multitude of step-wise,
circular and return movements, is a longstanding, historic phenomenon. Driven by persecution, insecurity
and conflict, and socioeconomic instability and stagnation in their home countries, and seeking better lives
and opportunities elsewhere, thousands of people continue annually to risk their lives on dangerous, irregular
journeys by land and sea on the routes, or use the limited legal pathways that are available, such as visa-free
entry to countries like Morocco and Tunisia.

Contents
03 Foreword - Bram Frouws
04 Foreword - Vincent Cochetel
06 Acknowledgements
12 Introduction
13 The Policy Workshop at a Glance
15 A Roadmap for Advocacy, Policy Development and Programming on
Protection in Mixed Movements

16 Emphasising systemic factors

17 Implementing flexible and adaptive protection programming

18 Mobilising local support for national and regional protection frameworks

19 Collaborating with cities and municipalities on urban mixed movement initiatives

20 Creating more comprehensive approaches to combatting trafficking in persons

21 Unpacking the complex roles and dynamics with in smuggling
networks for more targeted policies

22 Advancing child- and youth-centered mixed movement programming and policies

23 Advocating for solutions to enhance the protection of people on the move

24 Placing evidence and research at the centre of programming and policy
25 Policy Notes - Theme 1: Critical approaches to human trafficking and policy

26 Embracing Complexity: Calling for Critical Approaches in Counter-Trafficking
Policy and Practice

32 Anti-Trafficking’s Blind Spot: Long-term Solutions for Victims of Trafficking

36 Fit no More: Victims of Trafficking of Human Beings Negotiating Vulnerabilities
and Protection gaps

41 Identifying and Protecting Trafficked People, and People at Risk of Being Trafficked,
in Mixed Migration Flows
45 Policy Notes - Theme 2: Key links in the chain of smuggling policies: Intermediaries,
people on the move and local communities

46 Understanding Intra-Network Dynamics for non-Libyan Smuggling Intermediaries
in Libya’s Western Migration Corridor

52 Voices from the Ground: Perceptions on Smuggling and Protection Risks

54 A Telling and an Illustration of Loss, Hope and Action: Families of the
Mediterranean’s Missing Migrants
10

60 Policy Note - Theme 3: Gaps and good practices in national protection frameworks

61 From national to local: the protection landscape for people on the move across
North Africa and the Sahel
64 Policy Notes - Theme 4: Protection in contexts of mixed movement

65 Identifying International Protection Needs: Considerations for North Africa’s Mixed
Movement Context

70 Gaps in Protection for West African Refugees in Times of Crises: The role of a
Multi-stakeholder Platform within a Partnership in Preparedness Model

74 Protection Programming in Transit Settings: Challenges and Recommendations on
Targeting and Accessing Transit Migrants in Agadez, Gao and Ouagadougou

77 “See Migration Like Water”: An Analysis of Flow Monitoring Survey Data on
Migration Flows in and through West and Central Africa

81 Rethinking Responses to Migration: Evidence from Children and Young people in
Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia
90 Policy Notes - Theme 5: Regional policy responses to mixed movement

91 Migration Management in the Time of COVID-19: EU Policies and Libya

98 Policy Regions and Migration Routes: Where is the (Mis)alignment?

102 Local Authorities as Allies in Promoting Protection Frameworks for Mobile
Urban Populations
107 Policy Notes - Theme 6: Advocating for improved protection responses

108 Protecting Young Migrants and Refugees in Libya: An Operational
Perspective by MSF

113 Key Gaps in Protection Frameworks for Refugees and Migrants in Libya

118 When Private Vessels Rescue Migrants and Refugees

123 Voices from the Ground: Protection Risks and Smuggling from the Horn of
Africa to Tunisia
125 Annex - Live notes from daily wrap-ups during the three days of the workshop
126 Endnotes

Introduction
Research allows us to move beyond repetitive
humanitarian assessments, planning, monitoring and
evaluation, to develop a broader understanding of the
experiences, concerns and needs of people on the move.
Through research we can identify and map complex
displacement patterns and trends and the longer-term
and macro-level forces that impact the drivers of
displacement and durable solutions. The Mixed Migration
Centre’s (MMC) North Africa Hub and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Office
of the Special Envoy for the Central Mediterranean
Situation organised a virtual policy workshop from
15 to 17 February 2021, with the aim of highlighting
protection challenges along the Central (CMR) and
Western Mediterranean Routes (WMR), and identifying
opportunities for advocacy, policy development and
reform of asylum and protection in the context of broader
migration management.
The workshop brought together more than 40
academics, researchers, humanitarian and development
programming partners, policy actors and people with a
displacement experience from North, West, East and the
Horn of Africa as well as Europe and North America. Over
three days, the event gathered the latest knowledge on:
• Protection frameworks in contexts of mixed
movements, including good practices and
gaps;
• The effectiveness and challenges of strategic,
cross-regional cooperation on asylum and its
relation to migration management; and
• Trafficking in persons and human smuggling.
This volume comprises 25 research papers and firsthand
experiences aimed at informing policy, programming
and advocacy, presented by workshop participants
as well as a synthesis of the key recommendations
debated and validated by participants (see the Annex for
the live notes drawn during each of the daily wrap-up
sessions). This synthesis aims to serve as a roadmap for
strategic engagement with States and different asylum
and migration stakeholders at the local, national and
international levels.
As a part of the process of convening diverse expertise
and fostering information-sharing and debate, it was
crucial that we included the research and perspectives
of people who themselves had experienced some form
of forced or migratory displacement. Their intimate
knowledge of the impact of displacement and of the
needs and aspirations of persons of concern made their
contributions of great value in thinking through improved
policies and programming.
More broadly, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)
and Global Compact for Migration (GCM) emphasise
the importance of a whole-of-society response to forced
displacement and migration, respectively. Research in
support of the objectives of both compacts, including
expanding access to third-country solutions; supporting
conditions in countries of origin for return in safety
and dignity; and reducing the risks and vulnerabilities
that people on the move face at different stages of
their journey by respecting, protecting and fulfilling
their human rights and providing them with care and
assistance; is one of the contributions academics make.
This volume is a contribution to such research. The
GCR and GCM also recognize the role that refugees
and migrants themselves play in whole-of society
response. People on the move must stand at the front
lines of this research, as both subjects and investigators.
It is our hope that the policy workshop and this volume
contributes to this necessary re-framing.
12

Nahom Bruk Gebremeskel,
4Mi Monitor in Tunis,
MMC North Africa
To enter Libya with the help of smugglers, departing
either from Egypt or Sudan, one has to travel through the
Sahara Desert. For a fortunate few, the journey will take a few
days or weeks, but for the majority, it lasts a couple of months.
They travel in crowded vehicles, with limited water and food
supplies, amid temperatures that rise above 40 °C, not to
mention violent treatment from the smugglers. For those, the
possibility of making it alive to Libya is greatly reduced.
H.E. Amira El Fadil,
Commissioner of Social Affairs,
African Union Commission
We believe that migration and mobility,
when well-managed, can have substantial
positive impact for the development of countries
of origin, and yield significant benefits as well
for countries of transit and destination.
Laetitia Bader,
Horn of Africa Director,
Human Rights Watch
Advocacy around protection and
refugee rights needs to be ongoing
and linked to advocacy and engagement
in the general rights situation. The
compartmentalisation of international
actions and policies are thereby not helpful.
Ongoing efforts to raise awareness about
the risks of abuse and violence along
the migration routes are important, […].
However, without a significant improvement
in the Horn’s human rights situation, people
from the region will continue to flee despite
the risks. A lack of human rights protection
is closely linked to the lack of a future for
young people’s aspirations and freedoms.
José Dogma Tebou,
4Mi Monitor in Tunis,
MMC North Africa.
Risks [of travelling with a smuggler]
include forgery, questionable
grounds for entry into another
country, scams, aggression and theft.
Migrants are exposed to exhausting
walks under dangerous temperatures
(the weakest who cannot follow the
troop are to be abandoned or killed),
[and] overloaded and unsecured cars
(according to testimonies, many people
fall overboard and die). Some drown
in the Mediterranean Sea. Many of the
migrants’ passports are taken away.
They are often taken hostage, with
ransom demanded from their families,
under torture or are involuntarily
subjected to unpaid, forced labour.
Vincent Cochetel,
UNHCR Special Envoy for
the Central Mediterranean
Situation
Too often in industrialised countries,
particularly in Europe, we look at countries
as countries of transit. But we should keep in
mind, in my opinion, that those countries of
transit are hosting sizeable refugee populations
on their territories. Only between 10 to 15%
percent of the refugees in those countries may be
tempted by those dangerous journeys leading to
North Africa.
The Policy Workshop at a Glance
6 Thematics | Over 40 Speakers | 150 Attendees
25 Research, Policy & Advocacy Notes | Voices from the Ground | Key Takeaways

Photo credit: © MMC /
Kawakb Almaloumat
14

A Roadmap for Advocacy, Policy
Development and Programming on
Protection in Mixed Movements
This section presents the policy and programming
recommendations arising from 25 research, policy and
advocacy papers as well as firsthand experiences,
presented by 41 speakers at the UNHCR-MMC Policy
Workshop on Protection Challenges on the Central
(CMR) and Western Mediterranean Routes (WMR). It
also integrates the recommendations and key issues
raised by speakers and wider participants during the
workshop’s roundtable and discussion sessions, and do
not necessarily reflect the positions of UNHCR or MMC.
Speakers and participants represented a range of mixed
movement stakeholders and experts, including persons
of concern; humanitarian and development practitioners;
local, national and regional policy actors; and researchers
and academics.
Workshop insights and recommendations are structured
by theme and stakeholder group, and some context is
provided to situate the recommendations. This roadmap
serves as a synthesis and does not aim to be fully
exhaustive of all points raised and recommendations
made during the workshop. The recommendations set
out here shall be used as a basis for a next phase of
targeted policy and programming engagement.

Systemicorcontextualfactorsarethebroadergeopolitical,
economic, ideological and social forces – among others –
that impact and determine the experiences and decision-
making of people on the move, as well as the ability of
protection actors to design and implement effective
interventions. Without an understanding of what these
forces are and how they impact persons of concern,
policies and programming will fail to be sustainable and
may result in unintended consequences for people on the
move along the CMR and WMR.
• Stakeholders working on counter-trafficking
programme design or with survivors of trafficking
should work together with researchers and
academics to identify structural factors that lead to
trafficking in persons. Understanding from a holistic
perspective how socio-cultural norms, gender norms,
poverty and household livelihood strategies, on the
one hand, and labour markets, rights regimes and
limited legal pathways for movement, on the other,
affect the cycle of trafficking is key for designing
durable counter-trafficking interventions.
• Policy makers should ensure that “policy regions,”
such as those established by the Khartoum and
Rabat Processes, capture and respond to actual
movement patterns and dynamics, which often cross
regions in non-linear ways. Within this sphere, these
actors should be prompted to consider how particular
labels have conditioned their understandings of
and responses in these regions (e.g. focusing on
“mixed movement” in the Horn of Africa and “labour
migration” in the Arabian Gulf despite high degrees
of interconnectedness). In other words, all intra- and
inter-regional patterns of movement, even beyond
the defined geographies of specific regions, should
be considered in policy processes, to ensure that
the drivers of movement are fully understood and
reflected in informing policy decisions.
• Without increased legal pathways for regular and
safe movements and the adoption or implementation
of national protection frameworks in all countries on
these routes, smuggling will inevitably continue to
exist and flourish with impunity. Policy actors should
consider multi-faceted approaches to disincentivise
smuggling activities, which include working together
with researchers and academics to understand how
community and society-level factors impact human
smuggling. In Agadez, Niger, programmes around
demobilisation and amnesty have aimed at fostering
opportunities in the formal economy and at disrupting
smuggling and trafficking activities. So far, this has
been met with mixed results, and such approaches
should form an area of future research to better
understand potential good practices.
1. Emphasising systemic factors
Pro-actively consider what macro-level
factors impact protection challenges
for people on the move along the CMR
and WMR including, but not limited to,
trafficking in persons, human smuggling
and gaps in protection frameworks.
Photo credit: © UNHCR /
John Wendle
Sudanese asylum-seeker Fatima*
is living at UNHCR’s humanitarian
centre near Agadez, Niger. *Name
changed for protection reasons.
16

2. Implementing flexible
and adaptive protection
programming
Implement protection programmes
that are designed to respond to
the changing needs and protection
concerns of people on the move
along the CMR and WMR.
Hassan Gamary
Nineteen-year-old Rumaysa from
the host community holds up a sign
saying “I want to live in safety” during
the UNHCR campaign against human
trafficking in east Sudan.
It is not always evident who the most vulnerable are
among people on the move along the CMR and WMR.
The vulnerability of persons of concern heightens
the longer they spend in transit: they are exposed to
different forms of extortion and abuse, severe resource
constraints and physical and mental stress, to name just
a few. In addition, shifts in irregular routes, fluctuating
conflict dynamics, economic volatility and, not least, the
continuing effects of the COVID-19 health crisis, can
suddenly change the needs, decisions and locations of
persons of concern.
• Encourage donor agencies to design calls for
proposals and fund projects that provide for
flexible programming and adaptations to emerging
crisis contexts. In turn, it is key that donors and
programming actors work with researchers in the
field to understand shifts in context. Particularly a
shift in terms of needs, intentions and aspirations
spurred by the outbreak and continuing impact of
COVID-19 is a key contextual change in all mixed
movement contexts across the regions.
• Improve the capacities of national and local
authorities, including border guards, to identify
vulnerable people on the move at borders and other
points of entry, and to provide documentation and
registration facilities for vulnerable individuals unable
to call on their country of nationality or habitual
residence. Increase the presence and coordination
of protection personnel in dangerous border areas,
specifically on child protection and trafficking in
persons.
• Protection actors should improve cross-sectoral
coordination and information-sharing, specifically
in key mixed movement hubs and gathering points,
whilst always respecting the human rights of the
data subject and the humanitarian principle of ‘do no
digital harm’. As part of these coordination efforts,
actors as well as beneficiaries should have a clear
understanding of who does what, how and where.
Greater and more systematic usage of tools such
as the “4Ws” and forums, including mixed migration
working groups (MMWG) or migrant and refugee
platforms (MRP), would assist in these efforts.
• Within the context of flexible and effective
programming, national authorities should enable
programming actors to directly fund, support,
partner and coordinate with local authorities and
community-based organisations.
• Protection actors, policy makers as well as local
authorities or community liaisons should widen
their scope, taking into consideration abuses and
violations that occur along mixed movement routes
and through people on the move’s interactions with
smugglers, particularly in key countries along mixed
movement routes such as Libya, Niger and Sudan;
and not solely focus on abuses in countries of origin.
Protection is a continuous framework.

3. Mobilising local
support for national
and regional protection
frameworks
Adopt community-based and
“whole-of-society” approaches
to support local civil society
and their advocacy and
solidarity efforts in calling
for enhanced protection
frameworks.
Community-based approaches can serve as catalysts
for national and regional legal developments, including
asylum and migration legislation. While achieving broad
policy change can take time, success often depends on
the political will fostered by civil society. When inclusive
practices are in place at the local level to enhance
protection for people in mixed movements, bridging
such legal gaps on a national level might become more
tangible and politically acceptable.
• Inter- and intra-regional and university-to-university
initiatives have sought to strengthen the dialogue on
providing protection to people in mixed movements,
often in the form of alternative or complementary
protection pathways, including for higher education
migration. Local authorities are key actors in this
effort, brokering relationships with higher education
institutions and showing how their communities can
be enriched through such partnerships.
• International actors as well as national and local
authorities should invest in the creation of local
public or semi-public agencies that can function
as one-stop shops, training staff in human rights
principles. States should protect the right to asylum,
and disseminate information on rights and access to
services in languages spoken by people on the move.
• National authorities should involve their local
counterparts and civil society initiatives in the
planning and implementation of policies responding
to mixed movements. International organisations
and UN agencies, including development actors
through their engagement in local service
planning, should be further encouraged to engage
with local authorities to advocate for their inclusion
in the planning and implementation in these policy
processes.
Photo credit: © Taha Loukil
The Medina, Tunisia, 2020.
18

4. Collaborating with cities and
municipalities on urban mixed
movement initiatives
Increase local capacity-building and
delegate more responsibilities and
adequate resources to local governing
bodies to improve the protection of
persons of concern in communities.
In North Africa, where countries are places of origin,
transit and destination, local authorities often do not
have the legal authority to respond, regulate and manage
the presence and stay of people on the move transiting
or settling in their communities. Against this backdrop, a
number of municipalities across the region, such as in Sfax
in Tunisia and Oujda in Morocco, have taken a pro-active
stance towards socio-economic inclusion, going beyond
their legal responsibilities, recognising that policies
which exclude provisions for refugees and migrants
lead to segregation and impede durable solutions. Good
practices exist of cities exchanging information and
lessons-learned on socio-economic inclusion like the
International Centre for Migration Policy Development
(ICMPD)’s Mediterranean City-to-City Migration Project
(MC2CM), the Mayors Migration Council and UNHCR’s
Cities Network.
• An extension of some actionable responsibilities from
national to local authorities, and better cooperation
between the two, could help overcome current asylum
and migration governance stalemates, translating
national policies into workable local outcomes.
• Foster a community-based approach aimed at
building trust between persons of concern and their
local authorities and service providers. This includes
making information and asylum documentation
available in languages other than Arabic, English
and French, and offering interpretation services
where needed.
• Develop multi-level partnerships that engage a
range of stakeholders, from local authorities to the
private sector, to increase the resilience and agility
of communities to respond to crises. Partner with
development actors who hold experience in operating
and investing in local communities.
• Active engagement among local authorities
to strengthen their information-sharing (whilst
upholding data protection principles), especially on
the adaptation of innovative approaches to hosting
people on the move. Information-sharing could
promote coordination around more equitable burden
and responsibility-sharing.
• Foster solidarity between host communities and
people on the move to promote social inclusion and
combat discrimination and xenophobia, which
appeared to experience a resurgence during the
COVID-19 pandemic in some countries along the
CMR and WMR.
• Increase opportunities on education and training
for local stakeholders working on issues of sexual
violence and discrimination, gender-based violence,
trafficking, torture and forced labour, to name a few.
Clément Arbib
View of the Medina of Tunis, 2020.

Counter-trafficking programming often targets the
prosecution of perpetrators and protection of victims
through a retro-active approach, leaving aside
more difficult-to-design, pro-active prevention and
identification activities. When counter-trafficking
interventions occur, they tend to be short-term, do
not address the societal issues that contributed to
the process of trafficking, and lack cross-country and
cross-regional coordination mechanisms. As a result,
victims remain vulnerable to re-trafficking, and exposure
to new instances of trafficking and other protection
violations continues.
• Bolster support for programming to identify victims
and potential victims of trafficking, as well as their
communities at risk, to better understand what factors
at the individual and community levels make people
vulnerable to being trafficked. As part of such efforts,
design activities aimed at building trust between
local authorities and victims and potential victims
of trafficking.
• Enhance coordination among programmes and
programming stakeholders at local, national and
intra-regional levels, and in key cities along the CMR
and WMR, in particular in the identification of victims
and potential victims of trafficking.
• Civil society, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and local authorities should coordinate
on enacting long-term monitoring and follow-ups
with survivors returning and reintegrating into home
communities to assess the risk of re-trafficking,
stigmatisation and alienation, and should ensure
survivors’ continued access to basic services.
• UN agencies and governments should support
the resettlement of victims of trafficking when
repatriation might not provide adequate protection,
especially if trafficking is persistent within the
community in question.
5. Creating more
comprehensive
approaches
to combatting
trafficking in
persons
Work towards more
comprehensive
solutions to combat
trafficking in persons,
and implement
long-term measures
to protect victims and
potential victims in their
communities of origin,
transit and destination
or resettlement.
Photo credit: © MMC
20

National, regional and international policies and
frameworks do little to distinguish between the varied
roles of different actors within human smuggling
networks and the implications for criminal law and
prosecutions. Human smuggling is often subject to
blanketcriminalisation;andthereislimitedresearchonthe
diversity in profiles of smugglers, and the demographic,
economic and social factors that lead to the formation of
smuggling networks and on the individuals seeking out
smugglers. Conceptual lines are blurred when smugglers
share the same identities and experiences as those who
are being smuggled, or when the wide range of activities
that support the organised, irregular movement of people
make it difficult to distinguish where smuggling activities
start and where they end.
• State authorities, international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs) and UN agencies should
work together with researchers and academics
to understand how ‘‘recruiting smugglers’’ target
refugees and migrants, to inform people on the move
on awareness-raising initiatives on smuggling, for
instance in camps in Eastern Sudan and in contexts
of urban displacement in countries of first asylum and
migration where recruiters operate.
• Authorities and local security forces should
prioritise finding alternatives to policies and practices
focused on containment or extra-territorialisation,
such as in the case of Libya through the detention
and interception at sea of people on the move. These
measures can unintentionally fuel the demand for
smuggling or incentivise smugglers to use more
precarious routes, increasing the exposure of people
on the move to protection incidents.
6. Unpacking the
complex roles
and dynamics
within smuggling
networks for more
targeted policies
Develop a more
nuanced policy
approach on smuggling,
taking into account
smuggling dynamics
and moving beyond
the criminalisation of
smugglers.
Photo credit: © UNHCR / Sylvain Cherkaoui
“We saw people fleeing and then watched the army retreat.
We weren’t going to sit and wait for the threat to arrive. I fled
and left everything behind. We left our fathers, our brothers,
our children … Sometimes we hear news. The news we get
is okay but there are no guarantees. As women, we couldn’t
sleep in Mangaize because of the insecurity there. Here we
can all sleep at night.”

Forced displacement and mobility may be due to
protection risks in the country of origin or asylum, or be
a part of the coping strategies of children and youth,
and their attempts to seek out educational and other
opportunities not available in their home countries
affected by conflict and crisis. At the same time, children
and youth may experience protection violations while
travelling along precarious, irregular routes and age
categories used by protection actors may be misaligned
with their needs. In extreme cases, as exemplified in the
detention of children and youth on the move in Libya,
children may transition to the age of adulthood while
experiencing grave protection violations, and because of
a lack of services for young people, may lose access to
services they are heavily reliant on.
• NGOs and UN agencies should increase their
vulnerability screening and monitoring of children on
the move, who should not be discriminated against
on the basis of their nationality and migration status,
and ensure that those who are underserved benefit
from specific outreach and inclusion efforts.
• NGOs, UN agencies and civil society organisations
should develop more programming for youth up to
the age of 25 to ensure that when children reach the
age of 18, they do not face new risks from no longer
being able to access certain forms of assistance while
still being in need.
• Work towards alternative pathways for those who
are unable or do not want to return home, especially
for those who have no prospect of being able to settle
in their current locations. This includes putting in
place the Best Interest Procedure (BIP) for children
and protection case management to meet the needs
of children and others on the move.
• Humanitarian actors should explore alternative care
and accommodation options for children and youth
on the move in crisis or in conflict situations where
there is no access to return or resettlement – including
providing greater opportunities for foster care or, in
the case of Libya, opening shelters for those with
specific protection needs, and supporting individuals
or groups living outside shelters.
7. Advancing child-
and youth-centered
mixed movement
programming and
policies
More research is needed on
the experiences, aspirations,
capabilities as well as
vulnerabilities of children
and youth on the move, to
make screening and service
provision more appropriate
to their needs. At the same
time, age categories should
not limit service provision
for children and youth.
Kawakb Almaloumat
22

People on the move often face widespread abuses and
are disproportionately affected by protection incidents,
as perpetrators are well aware of their vulnerability,
lack of support networks and inability to seek justice
and redress. Until states adopt legal frameworks that
offer protection to refugees and migrants, and move
away from criminalising irregular migrants, people on
the move will continue to be exposed to heightened
protection risks.
• The international community should continue to
advocate for the improvement of the protection space
in national jurisdictions along the routes. This requires
strong, coordinated and high-level engagement with
the authorities and stakeholders (including those with
de facto effective control of territory), at both national
and local levels.
• International and national humanitarian actors
should improve their coordination around a joint
advocacy response, such as on interceptions at sea
off the Libyan coast and arbitrary deportations taking
place from countries along the routes (for example
from Libya and Algeria).
• When there is a lack of legal safeguards for people
on the move, international organisations should
advocate with authorities to establish safe spaces for
refugees and migrants, and develop alternatives to
arbitrary detention.
• Engage in a policy dialogue with authorities on
a human rights-centered approach to migration
management. This includes taking an integrated
approach to search-and-rescue, which involves
adherence to human rights as well as to maritime
law by States, private actors (such as NGOs
and shipping companies) and international
organisations.
• The international community should clarify and
formalise rules for disembarkation, and avoid using
delayed disembarkation as a lobbying tactic for
responsibility-sharing.
• The private sector, including shipping companies,
should use their individual and collective bargaining
power to pressure States to improve the regulation
of search-and-rescue, and to ensure the swift and
safe disembarkation of all rescued persons in a place
of safety. At the same time, their practices need to
be monitored to ensure their compliance with legal
obligations, forming part of an integrated approach
followed by all stakeholders involving adherence to
human rights principles, due diligence obligations, as
well as law of the sea requirements.
8. Advocating for
solutions to enhance
the protection of
people on the move
In the absence of basic
legal safeguards for
refugees in some North
African countries, and the
criminalisation of irregular
migration, advocating for
creative solutions to improve
the protection of those on
the move requires collective
action and collaboration
Photo credit: © UNHCR / Scott Nelson
An Egyptian fishing boat heads to sea from the
port of Alexandria in 2016. Such boats were
often used to smuggle asylum seekers from
Africa and the Middle East to Europe, sometimes
with catastrophic results when they capsized,
drowning many of their passengers.

• Policy and programme actors should work together
with researchers and academics to ensure the timely
integration of evidence and research throughout all
stages of policy and programming cycles, particularly
on the political, economic, social and environmental
macro-level factors impacting the protection of
people on the move.
• Support evidence and research on the different roles
played by individuals involved in human smuggling
networks (e.g. as recruiters, intermediaries or
transporters) and their interactions with people on
the move to contribute to policies that move beyond
simplistic labels for smugglers that do not take into
account a diversity in profiles. While some smugglers
are committing sanctionable abuses and grave
protection violations, not all smugglers or smuggling
intermediaries are committing such abuses.
• Researchers and academics should increase the
evidence base on the characteristics of children
in mixed movements and their strategic decision-
making and aspirations and engage protection
organisations working with children and youth to
inform their programming.
9. Placing evidence and research
at the centre of programming
and policy
While evidence and research on people on
the move are growing, particularly along
the Central and Western Mediterranean
routes, it often risks not reaching the
right audience or intended targets.
This stems from a lack of coordination
between research “producers” and
potential “users” and, at times, a lack of
incentives to use evidence and research
for programme design, implementation
and adaptation.
Photo credit: © Tienko Dima
Cairo, Egypt.
24

Policy Notes
Theme 1: Critical
approaches to human
trafficking and policy
Photo credit: © UNHCR
Fifteen-year-old Eritrean refugee
Mohamed holds up a sign saying
“No to trafficking of children” at Wad
Sharife refugee camp in Sudan.
“I think we need to reframe our approach to Victims of Trafficking. […] We need to combat
the stigmatization of the Victim of Trafficking in the sense that we see him almost as
guilty as the trafficker: he puts himself into that sort of danger. […] We need to look for
alternative solutions for return to the home country. We often don’t realize that a person
is trapped. The trafficking may not stop with the return to the home country, it may even
increase. […] We could look at Victims of Trafficking as people with important information
who could help combating trafficking as key witnesses.”
Vincent Cochetel, UNHCR Special Envoy for the Central Mediterranean Situation.

Embracing Complexity: Calling for Critical
Approaches in Counter-Trafficking Policy
and Practice
Authors: Sarah Elliott,1
Legal Officer, UNHCR London; Megan
Denise Smith, Gender-Based Violence (GBV) Officer, IOM
Bangladesh
Introduction
Counter-trafficking practitioners working along the
Central and Western Mediterranean routes may be
unaware that the programmes they design, implement or
report on to donors – and the definition of harm that they
adopt in the process2
– serve particular institutional, state
or individual interests, and may not be the best models
for change. This is reinforced by a lack of monitoring and
evaluation of counter-trafficking programmes, along
with the embedding of accumulated knowledge in new
policies and programming,3
and limited time, resources
or willingness to shift the status quo.
Counter-trafficking is typically a state-centric affair,
with non-state actors playing a supportive role to
governments to achieve commitments enshrined in the
Palermo Protocol on Trafficking.4
The “3P” paradigm
of prosecution, protection and prevention is the
fundamental framework for addressing trafficking at
the international, regional and national levels.5
Counter-
trafficking interventions, particularly in the context
of mixed flows, can include rescue and repatriation
programmes for victims; education programmes about
the dangerous methods of smugglers and traffickers;
development programmes for improving economic
livelihoods in trafficking “hotspots”; and international and
bilateral policing efforts aimed at securing borders and
arresting people smugglers and traffickers.
Such interventions rarely tackle long-term development
issues, leaving prevention, the third ‘P’ of the classic 3P
approach to counter-trafficking, as either the elephant
in the room or a mere standalone recommendation for
more research into ´root causes’. According to Dr. Sverre
Molland, “(t)he initiators of anti-trafficking activities who
carried out microcredit programmes in the early 2000s
would have been puzzled if they had known that, less
than 20 years later, former army and police officers
would replace them.”6
The counter-trafficking sector has
shifted towards a logic of emergency in order to ‘save
lives’ and rescue its victims,7
because developmental
change is difficult to measure and less legible than the
number of identified victims, operational safe shelters or
secured convictions. Moreover, political questions around
poverty, commercialisation of industries, migration, race
and gender can be loaded, unfavourable and unwieldy.
The counter-trafficking landscape has since ballooned in
the last decade to feature a multitude of UN agencies,
nongovernmental organisations, philanthropists, state
governments and celebrities who have jumped on the
bandwagon of its moral imperative – us included. While
we must acknowledge the important work being done
along the Central, Eastern and Western Mediterranean
migration routes to mitigate risks and improve the lives
of many, given the well-known perennial challenges to
addressing human trafficking effectively and the lack of
progress made to date,8
critical thinking is required to
reinvigorate counter-trafficking policy and programming
in what has become one of the most violent and
despairing regions of the world.
Central
Mediterranean
Route, Western
Mediterranean
Route
Europe
26

We ultimately conclude that “Complex Systems Thinking”
is a crucial conceptual paradigm needed to overcome
existing siloes and limitations in counter-trafficking policy
and practice.
It provides a more holistic framework than the 3 (or
4) Ps, accounting for the complex interplay between
the structural and proximate factors causing and
contributing to human trafficking discussed below. The
ten questions and sub-questions posed to policy and
programme designers at the end of this brief, deliberately
embrace plurality, and can be useful in scenario building/
risk assessments or programme evaluation and design.
It also helps identify opportunities for collaboration
between humanitarian, development and peace actors,
which is desperately needed to make a real inroad into
the low-risk, high-profit crime of human trafficking.
Structural challenges in
counter-trafficking
Admit it or not, human trafficking and the programmes
to counter it are shaped by hegemonic norms and
institutions, colonial legacies, asymmetric power relations
and ideologies, which are often neo-liberal, racist and
patriarchal.9
The abolition of human trafficking creates a
simple moral imperative with enormous popular appeal;
even as it depoliticises and absolves the state – often
behind a humanitarian agenda – for its role in creating
the structures that permit, if not encourage, vulnerability
to trafficking.10
Abolitionism enables states, and their corporate partners,
to champion the anti-trafficking cause through concerted
efforts to root out the bad apples and rescue the victims,
while also deeming unnecessary any commitment to
addressing the underlying causes of exploitation they
benefit from. These “bad apples” – traffickers, criminals,
clients, pimps, corrupt immigration or police officers,
specific corporations that violate labour laws or isolated
national governments that oppose Western hegemony
– are casted as the only perpetrators.11
This framing
identifies human trafficking as a crime committed by
individual actors, instead of the result of systemic global
disparities in wealth, social exclusion and discrimination
within labour and migration frameworks. Social harm
is positioned outside of the institutions of corporate
capitalism and the state apparatus; big business,
the state, its institutions and the police are therefore
reconfigured as allies and saviours (who can pat
themselves on their backs for a job well done) against
these deviants, while continuing to benefit from cheap,
de-regulated foreign labour.12
Much has been written on the US dominance over and
policing of the global counter-trafficking regime, aided by
its annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report that ranks
countries according to four US “minimum standards,”
which can result in economic sanctions against those
who fail to perform. These minimum standards can be
found in the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act 2000
as amended, focusing on in-country efforts to punish and
eliminate trafficking, rather than wider structural factors
as discussed in this policy brief. In fact, the TIP report
explicitly acknowledges that its rankings are not affected
by development initiatives.
Such rankings have historically served as a tool to
influence long-standing US foreign policy interests in
Africa,13
the Caribbean and South Africa. Based on these
standards, it comes as no surprise that “developing”
countries are positioned poorly with new goals annually
established based on an “old playing field.”14
McGrath
and Watson15
conclude that representations of victims
within the US TIP report remain racialised; questions
of development are reduced to “cultural relativism”;
and problematic connections between supply chains
and migration, which could put the responsibility on
developed countries, are managed.16
The unintended consequences, or “collateral damage,”17
of anapproach to human trafficking steeped in an
imperative of criminal justice, national security and moral
rescue have included policies harmful to labour migrants,
refugees, sex workers and other individuals at risk of
exploitation. These at-risk populations find themselves
again and again at the bottom of the food chain of
global capitalism.18
Some of this fall out encompasses
the criminalisation of undocumented workers; increased
securitisation and stricter border controls; rising
detentions and deportations of “illegal migrants” back to
the circumstances which led them to being trafficked in
the first place;19
re-traumatisation; the infantalisation of
survivors; a disproportionate focus on sexual exploitation
and less attention paid to labour trafficking, and so on.20
Counter-trafficking programming should consider the
historical and current economic and political relationship
between the source, destination and donor countries
involved; what cultural, social, religious and spiritual
norms might motivate risky irregular outward movement
or in-country exploitation; and how racism features
– not just in the attitude of destination countries or
humanitarian agencies, but in the desire of migrants to
improve their wealth and prospects by greater proximity
to “whiteness”.21
The trafficking of women and girls from Edo State in
Nigeria to Europe is a phenomenon that exists due to all of
these factors22
– factors that are equally vital to consider
in the design of return and re-integration programmes for
survivors to avoid re-trafficking.23
While it is important to
“appreciate where human trafficking is happening, who
its victims are and who is perpetrating this crime,” as
Yury Fedotov, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) Executive Director, has stated, it is equally
important to appreciate the normalised societal cultures
that may perpetuate the problem, and just what and who

would be required to dismantle it. Current approaches
in counter-trafficking often fail to understand, for
example, the complex realities of gendered social norms
in source countries24
and the dynamics of smuggling
and trafficking networks. Such networks are usually
comprised of other displaced community members,
often with family, kinship, community or social ties to
the victims,25
and whose purpose or profits may serve
wider family, kinship and community interests that are
extremely difficult to replace.
A better understanding is required of the demand for
Nigerian prostitutes in the far reaches of Europe and other
markets in the developed world – in particular, for the
sexual and labour exploitation of persons originating from
former colonies and the wider so-called “Global South.”
Before investing in training police on anti-trafficking
investigations, or considering expanding their powers to
raid and rescue, know that their rent-seeking behaviour
may be a colonial legacy. Changing this behaviour will
require significant investment, mentorship, resources
and political will, which could far surpass your budget
and timeline. Colonial policing, centred upon extracting
revenue and suppressing insurrection, is a culture that
largely persists today among chronically underfunded
and corrupt police forces in Africa.26
This is also why
marginalised sections of some societies avoid going to
the police for protection and justice, and why that lack
of trust follows their migration journeys – prohibiting
self-identification as victims of crime along the way.27
The
increasingly non-linear, cross-border, professionalised,
digital and humanitarian nature of successful
anti-trafficking investigations28
makes the objective of
building police capacity to fight trafficking in countries
along the Central Mediterranean even more challenging
than anticipated.
Before we design development models addressing
the root causes of trafficking, there is also a need to
acknowledge the differences in how institutions like
the state, the market, civil society or the legal system
are shaped in different parts of the world, often in very
different development stages.29
In Kotiswaran’s 2019
casestudyonIndia,TangoattheMargins,whichexamines
the relationship between Sustainable. Development Goal
8 and target 8.7,30
activists and academics working on
various forms of extreme exploitation – including, bonded
labour, contract labour, domestic work, inter-state and
international migrant work and sex work in the country
– rejected the proposed 2016 Trafficking Bill. The bill
entrenched a criminal law approach to trafficking
through raids, rescue and rehabilitation and the typical
sensationalist, neoliberal discourse of “modern slavery.”31
They argued that, overall, the bill did not reflect Indian
working-class realities of extreme exploitation and
precarious employment, and elaborated on the systemic
causes of exploitation in India. They added:32
``We believe there is a direct relationship between
distress migration and vulnerability to trafficking,
forced labour and slavery.
We oppose policies that aggravate this
vulnerability caused by the agrarian and
environmental crises, the displacement of
tribal communities, the commercialisation and
mechanization of agriculture, the militarization
of entire regions in the country, pauperization
and immiseration of the rural population, the
informalisation of the employment relationship,
and the effects of globalisation, privatisation, and
contractualisation on the urban workforce.”
This case called for further exploration of alternate
paradigms for addressing the structural factors that
create an environment ripe for trafficking. Counter-
trafficking practitioners must recognise that there is no
simple correlation between the prevalence of trafficking
and the score of the human development index, the rate
of poverty, or the measure of income inequality.33
Kotiswaran emphasises the need to go beyond
mainstream and dominant paradigms of development
and economic thinking, and to better consider how
to produce contextualised and plural development
approaches in counter-trafficking.34
Such approaches
would take into account a country´s specific development
trajectory, with historical perspective as the starting
point for any counter-trafficking programme or policy.
These approaches engage with, rather than supplant,
deep histories of local struggles as in the case of extreme
labour exploitation in India.
Contrary to what Walk Free’s Global Slavery Index35
and others call for, economic development will neither
automatically reduce the prevalence and risk of slavery
nor of human trafficking.36
A simplistic view of poverty
based on low-income levels does not alone explain why
some people are vulnerable to human trafficking. An
understanding of the non-economic elements of poverty
– such as gender discrimination and the lack of human
capital – also helps locate those who are most vulnerable
to marginalisation within the development process, as well
as governance issues that reinforce their vulnerability to
trafficking related to access and allocations of resources
and services in a community.37
Moreover, it is not always
the poorest who migrate in search of better opportunities;
outward movement can demand considerable resources
and information, which may increase with rising gross
domestic product (GDP).38
A critical examination of
the systems and institutions that contribute to human
trafficking is therefore not just necessary, it also requires a
far broader commitment to, and a nuanced understanding
of, social and economic justice, including the stage of
“development,” the level of welfare available in a source
country, who is benefitting and with what outcomes.
28

Human trafficking is a multidimensional and constantly
evolving phenomenon that cannot be addressed by
traditional approaches and oversimplified 3P models
given its complexity. Lack of development is not simply
a root cause of trafficking, and development is not the
silver bullet of a solution. In attempting to wrap our
heads around the structural causes and consequences
of the industry of human trafficking and its abolition, the
authors believe that rather than continuing with business
as usual, we should embrace complexity and deliberately
bring it back into programme design and policy.
Conclusion: Embracing
complexity
Despite the continued and widespread public interest
in abolishing one of the most lucrative and destructive
international crimes to exist – and to do so along the
Central Mediterranean specifically – various structural
phenomena and historical underpinnings too often limit
counter-trafficking efforts within a prism of piecemeal,
short-sighted and cookie-cutter approaches. These can
be ineffective, not properly localised, sustainable nor
considerate of the wider social, cultural or economic
changes necessary to get to the root of the problem.
Complex Systems Theory can help guide us through our
most multifarious and ambiguous objectives without
being overwhelmed in the process. It is a framework
that is proving essential to chip away at some of today’s
most pressing global problems, such as climate change
and public health crises like the COVID-19 pandemic.
Complex Systems Theorist Alex Ryan explains that if we
are to make any headway on such systemic challenges
which often traverse national, organisational and
disciplinary boundaries at will, a fundamentally different
approach must be taken. He states:39
“To keep our heads above water in a sea of
disruption and disorder, we cling to whatever
is within reach: the organizations, processes,
toolsets, mindsets, and habits we have lived with
longest and are most familiar with. But if we are to
make any headway on our systemic challenges—
the kind that cross national, organizational, and
disciplinary boundaries at will—we need to take
a fundamentally different approach. The familiar
approaches have been designed for sailing fast on
a smooth lake. They quickly become liabilities in a
white-water world.”
Complex Systems Theory suggests that a complex and
ever-evolving social problem such as human trafficking,
cannot be achieved by using a linear or simplified lens
(i.e. the 3P approach), and requires a holistic perspective
of the interactions between actors, structural and
proximate factors, as well as emergent behaviour in both
the criminal justice system and the human trafficking
system in order to combat it effectively.40
We would tend
to agree. In fact, Complex Systems Thinking has already
been applied to better comprehend the multi-stakeholder
response to criminal investigations of human trafficking
for sexual exploitation in South Africa.41
Structural factors
• Economic: Globalisation, poverty, deprivation
and economic downturns and trends, free
market economics, de-regulation, migratory
movements
• Social: Social inequality, gender discrimination,
discrimination and marginalisation based
on age (children and minors), gender status,
disadvantaged cultural, regional and linguistic
status, prostitution
• Ideological: Racism, xenophobia, gender and
cultural stereotyping
• Geopolitical: War, civil strife, violent conflict,
military bases and operations
Proximate Factors
•
Legal and Policy: Inadequate national
and international legal regimes, poor law
enforcement, immigration/migration laws and
policies, inadequate and poorly enforced labour
laws and standards
• Rule of Law: Corruption, complicity of state in
criminal activities or support of underground
criminal networks, organised criminal/parallel
entrepreneurship including underground sex
trade, smuggling, trade in arms and drugs
• Inadequate partnership between civil society
and state: Weak education campaigns, low
awareness among vulnerable communities,
apathetic civil society, poor accountability of
state organisations
Figure 1: Examples of structural and proximate factors involved in trafficking. Note some
structural and proximate factors apply to both source and destination countries, some
apply solely to the one or the other42

Recommendations for policy
It is apparent that no number of checklists, toolkits, indicators, models, referral pathways, safe houses or police training
can counter the appetite of violent economies without an honest examination and reflection of what truly drives state
involvement into human trafficking, as well as what drives the practitioners, states and donors tasked to respond. It is
therefore crucial that counter-trafficking practitioners and policy makers take a step back and think about what they
do, why they do it and what their potential blind spots are. We believe that without this deep dive, any attempt to
improve regional, state and local coordination efforts to tackle human trafficking in the focal region will remain limited
in their scope and impact.
By posing the following 10 interconnected questions, the authors hope to foster more critical and self-reflexive thinking
among counter-trafficking practitioners, policy makers and donors working along the Central, Eastern and Western
Mediterranean routes; and spur areas for further inquiry using a Complex Systems Theory approach.
1. What definition of human trafficking do you (or your programme) adopt and why?
Consider the debate around definitions and what interests may be served by the definition adopted versus their
practical utility (i.e. what is the role of the UN, corporations or states?).
2. What are the historical underpinnings of trafficking along the Central Mediterranean route that you are
seeking to target, and what structural factors are driving it?
Consider here the relationship between source and destination country, with a particular focus on how legacies of
and institutions of racism may inform regular and irregular migration routes between them.
3. Who is leaving and who is staying behind (and what role do they play in risky irregular migration?)
This incorporates the reality that those who embark on risky migration may in fact have more resources than those
who remain, and may have been shut out of employment opportunities brought on by a rise in GDP.
4. What vulnerabilities do perpetrators and victims in fact share?
Reconsider who is “vulnerable” in the categorical dichotomy of “bad apple” and victim, and what interventions may
be needed to prevent persons from trafficking as a necessary means of self-preservation, protection or livelihood.
5. Who actually relies on the profits of trafficking and why/for what?
a. Is it supporting communities other than just the traffickers themselves?
b. Exactly what would be required to dismantle this?
6. Who benefits from the harm caused or from exploitation (the demand)?
a. Is it supporting powerful corporate, foreign policy or hegemonic interests? And how will an understanding of
this be factored into your objectives?
b. Are we looking hard enough at what drives the demand side of the equation in what we propose (rather than
just reducing the supply)?
7. Who is working on human trafficking and who is not that should be? (i.e. considering the interlinkages
between the relief, rehabilitation and development fields)
a. Are you considering the agency of those at risk and those already working on addressing human trafficking in
their own communities? How are you meaningfully engaging with the lived experiences of those trafficked?
b. Who are the organisations and local partners available to work with? (i.e. women´s organisations, local
community networks, national NGOs and grassroots networks often comprised of survivors of trafficking
themselves).
8. In what ways do counter-trafficking practitioners (indirectly) perpetuate trafficking?
Could the programme you implement somehow exacerbate the vulnerability of victims, either in the country of
assistance (i.e. such as vis-a-vis the host community by not providing an appropriate form of residence to identified
victims) or upon return to their country of origin (i.e. through the method of administering repatriation payments, or
the lack of understanding of what reintegration would require)? Consider here social, cultural, gendered and other
community norms, and your role in the local context, too.
30

9. How can we create real, long-term and sustainable integrated migration and counter-trafficking policies
that are not aimed at ‘migration management’ but, rather, at better global governance?
How does your programme promote a more just and equal society overall, and give respect to subaltern experience
and knowledge?
10.
What does an alternative framework that is lodged in a commitment to social and economic justice,
decolonisation and respect for local experience and knowledge look like?

Anti-Trafficking’s Blind Spot: Long-term
Solutions for Victims of Trafficking
Author: Johanna Bögel, Advisor, Better Migration Management
Programme, GIZ
Introduction
Long-term solutions for trafficking survivors are a blind
spot in anti-trafficking. In the “4Ps” of anti-trafficking,
long-term solutions are notably absent and they remain
both under-theorised and underfunded. This is a
humanitarian disaster and a public policy problem.
It is a humanitarian disaster because survivors, often
traumatised by arduous trafficking journeys, do not
receive what it says on the label: A long-term solution.
When unpacking long-term solutions, the vast majority
are a variation of reintegration programmes. While
research on the reintegration of migrants gained traction,
reintegration of trafficking survivors is more complicated
due to their specific trafficking context. It also is a public
policy problem. From a donor’s point of view, it does
not make sense to identify trafficking survivors, provide
them with emergency care, medium-term support and a
reintegration package only to see them re-enter a cycle
of human trafficking.
Therefore, this paper sets out to answer the following
question: How effective are long-term solutions for
trafficking survivors in the long-term? It argues that
long-term solutions for survivors are a blind spot in
anti-trafficking. Not only are they often not working, but
there is little awareness of the scale to which they are
failing. This paper aims to show policy makers that this
is a problem to focus funds on: Without making sure that
trafficking is not circular, resources spent on protection
and reintegration have little impact.
This paper compares various national referral
mechanisms (NRMs) for trafficking survivors. While
it builds upon primary data collected in East Africa,
specifically in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, its findings
are applicable to the wider region. Findings are based on
interviews with local non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and recent academic literature. They provide
insights and recommendations for policy makers and for
donors to fund more research into long-term solutions for
survivors; to better target reintegration programmes to
the specific needs of survivors; and to provide alternatives
to reintegration.
Unpacking Long-term Solutions
Comparing NRMs for victims of trafficking from Ethiopia,
Kenya and Somaliland (Somalia does not have a national-
level referral mechanism), it is apparent that long-term
solutions are under-theorised and reintegration is the
only option discussed. In the Ethiopia NRM, return and
reintegration is the only long-term solution mentioned,
though a vague reference is made to “reintegration
options or services that may or may not be available.”43
The Kenyan NRM discusses the return and reintegration
process but is vague on alternatives. While it admits that
“in some cases, reunification may be neither feasible
nor desired,”44
alternatives are only mentioned in the
flowchart on return, reintegration and repatriation. They
are listed as “extended stay in the country/shelter,
integration, resettlement, referral to appropriate service
providers” but not discussed further.45
The Somaliland
referral flowchart mentions return, integration or
resettlement, but gives no guidance on any of them. Local
service providers in Somaliland mentioned that return
and reintegration are usually the default option.46 47
Having established that reintegration is the NRMs’ default
option and the only option considered in any detail, we
Ethiopia,
Kenya,
Somalia
East Africa
32

next turn to the extent to which there is follow-up and
monitoring of reintegration to ensure that reintegration
works in the long-term. Among the interviewed NGOs,
three NGOs stated that the period for monitoring and
follow-up varied with the reintegration of the survivor,
whereas two NGOs shared that they had fixed periods of
monitoring for three and six months respectively. Among
those with varying length of monitoring, NGOs stated
that the average time of follow-ups was equally between
3-6 months, and rarely exceeded a period of one year.
NGOs also noted that it was difficult to obtain funding for
reintegration follow-ups and monitoring. From a funding
perspective, following up with reintegrated survivors
does not seem to be as “sexy” as rescuing them.
Considering monitoring in NRMs, the Ethiopian NRM
explicitly discourages NGOs from following up with
reintegrated adult survivors for a period exceeding one
year “as this could add to the stigmatisation and be
counter-productive to the normalisation.”48
The Kenyan
NRM requires follow-ups and monitoring without
specifying a timeframe. The Somaliland flowchart does
not mention follow-ups.
There also is a gap in the research on long-term solutions.
As illustrated above, most programmes follow up with
survivors for up to six months before the case is closed.
The long-term success of reintegration programmes is
rarely assessed beyond this timeframe. This research
gap is striking, especially if we compare it with the
growing body of research on survivors at pre-departure
stage or en route.
The few exceptions where longitudinal research with
survivors has been done indicate the scale and complexity
of the problem. The 10-year longitudinal research project
conducted by the Chab Dai Coalition in Cambodia and the
Butterfly Longitudinal Re/Integration Research Project
(BLR) gives strong indications of the long-term challenges
reintegrated survivors face. While there is no comparable
longitudinal data available for Africa, anecdotal evidence
from East Africa collected in this paper strongly suggests
similar challenges. It indicates a considerable risk of
re-trafficking for reintegrated survivors.
Unaddressed long-term challenges
For analytical purposes, the challenges reintegrated
survivors face can be divided into three factors:
1. Structural factors in the home community, usually
pre-existing factors that directly contributed to the
individual’s vulnerability to being trafficked in the first
place;
2. Personal factors related to the trafficking experience
such as health challenges due to the trafficking
incident; and
3. Community or household factors related to how
the home community responds to the trafficking
survivor’s return and reintegration.
First, reintegrated survivors usually face the same
challenges in their home communities that contributed
to them being trafficked in the first place. This entails
a strong socio-economic dimension: When survivors
leave the shelter, stop receiving associated services
and reintegrate into their home community, they often
experience a “real sense of ‘shock’” followed by a feeling
of social isolation.49
Once services are phased out, many
survivors face poverty. In East Africa, cash support for
basic services such as housing is paid for by reintegration
programmes for a fixed period varying between three
to six months.50
In most cases, this leaves reintegrated
trafficking survivors unable to earn their own livelihoods
after support ends, and they sometimes prefer to stay
dependent on NGO services.51
While many reintegration programmes include economic
empowerment components such as education or
vocational trainings,52
this rarely ensures a secure
livelihood after reintegration. Vocational skills taught
in reintegration programmes often do not correspond
to market needs.53
All interviewed NGOs that provide
economic empowerment programmes focused on
self-employment and small-scale businesses rather than
salaried employment.54
“In the areas where the survivors
come from,” one interviewee explained “there already
were few options for employment to begin with”; and
with survivors being traumatised and stigmatised in their
home communities, salaried employment in the home
community is not an option.55
The threat of poverty after reintegration and cessation
of services increases the risk of re-trafficking. In the BLR
study, 68 percent of the reintegrated male survivors
eventually left their home community after reintegration,
32 percent did so in search of work. The often precarious
forms of remigration increase the risks of re-trafficking
or of experiencing other forms of exploitation en route.56
57
Interviewees from all three countries reported that
reintegrated survivors in many instances eventually
leave their home communities and remigrate, usually
irregularly and in precarious ways, in search of better
economic opportunities.58
Yet, reintegration is the default long-term option for
survivors. Throughout the interviews, there has been
one example of a trafficking survivor who resettled to a
different country with the help of a service provider. This
option was only considered after several failed attempts
to reintegrate, and the survivor repeatedly re-entering
the trafficking cycle. In this case, the survivor specifically
asked for resettling abroad, arguing that “people don’t
know me here and I can start afresh.”59
For the same
reason, some survivors specifically ask for resettlement
within their home country rather than reintegration into
their home community.60
However, this option is rarely
funded under long-term solution programmes. Often,
survivors are assisted to reintegrate but eventually
decide to resettle unassisted.

Next to the socio-economic dimension, there is a law
enforcement dimension to this factor. In surprisingly many
cases, survivors are reintegrated into home communities
even though their trafficker still lives freely in the
community. Systematic research in the West African61
and Cambodian62
context, as well as evidence from East
Africa, indicate that survivors reintegrating into home
communities were then re-exposed to their traffickers.
There have been reported instances where known
traffickers from the family of underaged survivors were
released on bail and known to be looking for them. Yet,
reintegration went ahead regardless because there was
no alternative available and the NRM did not specifically
request the case worker to reconsider reintegration.63
Second, the trafficking experience is per definition
associated with exploitation and human rights abuses,
leaving many trafficking survivors heavily traumatised.
While service providers aspire to provide trauma-
informed care, the fact that addressing trauma is a
long-term process runs contrary to the short-term
timeframe of reintegration programmes. Research shows
that survivors have worse health outcomes in the decade
after reintegration due to their challenges to overcome
trauma.64
However, current reintegration programmes
are not designed to address these long-term medical and
psychological needs.65
This can lead to emotional health
challenges, including post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse and a higher likelihood of coming into
conflict with the law.66 67 68
Heavily traumatised trafficking
survivors are less likely to reintegrate successfully and
are thus more likely to be re-trafficked.
Third, reintegrated survivors can face stigma and
pressure from their home community precisely because
of their trafficking experience. When survivors prefer
to keep their stories to themselves, the mental strain of
keeping a secret has been shown to lead to worse health
outcomes.69
In cases where their stories are known,
reintegrated survivors often face discrimination and
social exclusion.70
Many organisations attempt to address this challenge
through home community sensitisation, but research
shows that this carries its own risks. Well-intentioned
campaigns in Ghana, which communicated health
challenges of returnees to home communities, reinforced
an image of reintegrating survivors having been infected
with HIV due to sex work. This increased rather than
decreased the stigma that returning survivors faced.71
In some cases, survivors’ participation in an official
reintegration programme seems to add another level
of complexity: Survivors who participated in NGOs’
reintegration programmes, stayed in shelters and
received services are sometimes seen as compromised
and “promiscuous.”72
They experience stigmatisation
precisely because they are associated with NGO
reintegration programmes. In East Africa, there have
been cases of survivors preferring “self-reintegration”
without direct NGO contact or support once they arrived
in their home community because they were cautious of
the community’s reaction to the NGO’s presence.73
In addition to external stigmatisation, many survivors
suffer from a feeling of failure after having migrated to
find better opportunities and returned to their expectant
families empty-handed.74
Survivors who left to migrate for
better opportunities and were trafficked along the way
also often went into debt and had families and friends
lend them money which they are expected to pay back
upon return.75
There also exists an expectation that family
members going abroad for better opportunities will send
remittances..76 77 78
Failure to provide the expected financial
support or pay back debts often leads to financial anxieties
and worse health outcomes for reintegrated survivors.
These pressures can contribute to a survivor’s decision to
migrate again, often in precarious ways, and to willingly
accept exploitation to address mounting debts.79 80
As illustrated, survivors face specific challenges when
reintegrating into their home communities that are
not sufficiently addressed by current programmes.
Sometimes, reintegration might just not be the best
solution, specifically in cases where the trafficker is
still living freely in the home community or even in the
same household. In many cases, returned trafficking
survivors struggle both socially and economically to
reintegrate into their home communities. They eventually
opt for remigrating – domestically or internationally –
and settling elsewhere to escape stigmatisation and the
circumstances that led to them being trafficked in the
first place.
A circular problem: Re-trafficking
Considering the above, what do NRMs say about the
risks of re-trafficking? The Ethiopian NRM explicitly
mentions the need to assess the risk of re-trafficking in
the reintegration plan. However, as reintegration is the
only long-term solution foreseen in the NRM, the NRM
gives no guidance on how to then address this risk. The
Kenyan NRM requires service providers to assess the
role that family members played in the initial trafficking
for minors, but does not have a similar requirement
for adults. The Somaliland referral flowchart does not
mention any considerations on this. Addressing the risk
of re-trafficking seems to be, if at all, a marginal concern.
It is difficult to obtain reliable statistics about human
trafficking due to its clandestine nature. Re-trafficking
suffers from the same problem. Even in cases where
trafficking cases are counted or estimated, re-trafficking
is not a separate category. Consequently, reliable
statistics on re-trafficking are scarce. Research from
the early 2000s places the re-trafficking prevalence
rate vaguely between 3 to 43 percent in South-Eastern
Europe,81
at about 21 percent in Great Britain82
and closer
to 25 percent in India.83
Interviewees who felt confident
in estimating the percentage of reintegrated survivors
who were re-trafficked placed the number at about 30
percent.84
This does not offer a clear percentage for the
34

prevalence of re-trafficking in Africa, but it does suggest
that it is not a negligible trend.
The existing research on causes of re-trafficking
worldwide85 86
is coherent with anecdotal evidence
gathered from interviews in East Africa. Having
experienced trafficking and exploitation, especially at a
young age, leaves young survivors more vulnerable to
experiencing trafficking again later in life.87 88
Anecdotal
evidence also suggests that the vulnerability to trafficking
can be ‘inherited’ – in surprisingly many cases, trafficking
survivors one of the interviewees worked with were
children of reintegrated trafficking survivors.89
Research
should be done on whether children of trafficking
survivors are more likely to be trafficked themselves.
The presence of the initial trafficker in the home
community and, sometimes, in the household that the
survivor reintegrates into is another factor that drives
re-trafficking. In a recent study conducted in Ghana, the
initial trafficker often was a parent or legal guardian.
While sometimes the survivors themselves expressed
their wish to remigrate after reintegration due to hardship,
the presence of the initial trafficker in the household
was a dominant factor in determining whether a child
trafficking survivor would experience re-trafficking.90
Similarly, in the BLR study, avoiding a trafficker who still
lived in the home community was one frequent reason
why reintegrated survivors decided to leave their home
community after reintegration.91
The interviewees agreed
that reintegration into home communities exposing the
survivor to the initial trafficker was a factor strongly
contributing to re-trafficking.92
“There simply are no
systematic safeguards against re-trafficking once the
trafficking survivor is reintegrated,” said one case worker.93
There has also been anecdotal evidence of reintegrated
trafficking survivors themselves joining the trafficking
network and recruiting new victims of trafficking from
their home community.94
Often, the structural factors in the home community,
which contributed to the initial instance of trafficking,
have not changed upon a survivor’s return. In addition, the
abuse that survivors experience during their trafficking
journey can render them less able to cope with these
challenges. Feelings of disappointment, the failure to live
up to the family’s financial expectations, indebtedness
and stigmatisation by the community make the trafficking
survivor’s situation upon return yet more difficult. These
factors contribute to the trafficking survivor’s vulnerability
to re-trafficking, “pushing people back into the same
vicious cycle of trafficking and re-trafficking.”95
Policy implications
The discussion above illustrates first and foremost
that long-term solutions for victims of trafficking are a
blind spot in the anti-trafficking sector. Not only are the
available long-term solutions – mostly reintegration – not
working for many survivors, there also is little awareness
of the scale and complexity of this problem.
From a donor’s perspective, addressing this blind spot
makes financial sense: If trafficking is indeed in many
cases a circular problem, resources spent on reintegration
programmes that lead to re-trafficking are wasted. In a
re-trafficking context, a well-targeted long-term solution
and thorough follow-ups with reintegrated survivors are
likely more effective in preventing human trafficking than
money spent on blunt awareness-raising campaigns.
As one interviewee explained, “organisations working
in this sector need to realise that sustainable, long-term
reintegration is costly and complex, and to only do half
the job might in fact make the situation worse”.96
A necessary first step could be to conduct more research
into long-term solutions for survivors. Here, it is important
to not automatically equate long-term solutions with
reintegration but to broaden the debate to the full
spectrum of rehabilitation.97
Where reintegration is the
preferred choice, reintegration programmes should be
better targeted to address the specific long-term needs
of survivors. What makes a reintegration programme
successfulnotover6monthsbutoverageneration?Which
survivors might benefit from a well-targeted reintegration
programme? And which realistic alternatives might
there be for survivors who are unwilling to participate in
and unlikely to benefit from reintegration programmes?
Providing alternatives to return and reintegration will
also require destination countries to open more legal and
safe pathways to migration.

The
Netherlands,
Italy
Europe
Fit no More: Victims of Trafficking of
Human Beings Negotiating Vulnerabilities
and Protection gaps
Author and Affiliation: Dalmar Hamid,98
Refugee Researcher,
International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, The
Netherlands
Introduction
The Central Mediterranean route is important for “people
on the move”99
– broadly defined as irregular migrants
using identical routes and modes of transport, who
pay the same human smugglers exorbitant sums.100
In
particular, this is due to a lack of protection frameworks
that take into consideration all groups of irregular
migrants, as well as the failure of destination countries,
such as those within the European Union (EU), to ratify
human rights policy, resulting in increased vulnerability
to trafficking in human beings (THB).101
For many migration scholars, it is vital to go beyond
simple binaries between refugees and migrants, and
to differentiate the experience of those on the move.102
As member states reinterpret (or misinterpret) the 1951
Refugee Convention, “irregular” migrants have fallen
outside “the scope of international refugee protection
frameworks, but… nevertheless need humanitarian
assistance.”103
Legislation governing mixed movement,
based on “distinctions between migrants and
refugees,” has clearly “…led to a protection gap.”104
For
many years, the Dutch government sought to improve
the situation of victims of THB. From 2018 to August
2019, robust protective policies were in place, leading
the Netherlands to become a favoured country of
destination for victims of trafficking (European Council,
2018).105
However, with increasing arrivals of THB
victims (Dublin claimants)106
from Italy, Dutch policy
changed from late 2019, reinforcing a protection gap for
this group of vulnerable migrants.107
Limited data
At present, available statistics do not convey the nature
nor the magnitude of the problem because, most
often, multiple situations occur simultaneously: Death,
extortion, torture, prostitution, sexual violence, slavery,
smuggling and trafficking.108
In terms of those who
fall victim to THB while en route, Filippo Grandi, High
Commissioner of UNHCR, paints a grim picture:
“The Central Mediterranean routes have blighted
tens of thousands of lives over the last decade.
For many, their experiences in Libya are part of a
continuum that extends far beyond that country’s
borders…and characterised by unspeakable
brutality and inhumanity.”
(UNHCR-MMC, 2020)109
While quantitative data is patchy, stories told by migrants
convey persistent protection challenges. Such stories
from life should inform policy debates alongside hard
data. This policy note therefore considers the narratives
and lived experiences of those utilising Central and West
Mediterranean routes, and their implications for Dutch
policy. Travelling from Libya to Italy, what begins as
smuggling can end in trafficking, when people cannot
afford to pay smugglers’ fees. Some are sold for labour
or sexual exploitation until they can pay to leave Libya.110
36

Protection gaps for victims of THB
Prior to August 2019, non-EU trafficking victims exploited
both in Libya and Italy by human traffickers received
a short-term residency permit (B-8/3 permit) in the
Netherlands upon their identification.111
However, after
this date, victims were required to state the full names,
addresses and car number plates of traffickers. Very few
victims could or would provide such information. Some
could not read or write; others feared reprisals. Hence,
some of those previously granted B-8/3 permits were
denied them; and some were returned to Italy where
it seems unlikely that they would receive protection.
As Palumbo (2015) mentions, “Article 18” protection
in Italy should not depend on victims’ ability to supply
detailed evidence about their traffickers.112
In practice,
victims of THB rarely obtain a residence permit in Italy
without lengthy, expensive legal procedures. NGOs
and migrant associations underscore that the Italian
police routinely refuse permits to those who claim to be
trafficked, unless these individuals are also willing to
testify against their traffickers.113
The aforementioned situation results in a protection
gap arising from the return of victims of THB from the
Netherlands to Italy. One stakeholder called GRETA, an
Independent Committee monitoring the implementation
of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings, has requested that the
Netherlands come up with alternative procedures for
identifying THB victims that do not involve the police at
all. So far, no such alternative mechanism has been put
in place.
Closing the door
Following a dramatic increase in recorded victims of THB
in 2019, the State Secretary for Security and Justice of
the Netherlands tightened rules governing B-8 and B-9
permits. This especially reduced how many Nigerians
could claim protection as victims of THB.114
The unproven assumption was that the rise in recorded
claimants meant that some migrants were abusing the
THB-protection system. However, the reverse is true.
Reforms in 2018 meant victims of THB could report to
the police without fear of arrest. Increased reporting
marked the success of a more protective policy at the
time. Yet, policy makers problematised this rise, arguing
that a tougher approach was needed. By pinpointing a
supposed “loophole” in migration controls, Dutch policy
makers again allowed the police to suspect most victims
of THB of not being in genuine need of protection.
It was estimated that, in 2018, most THB victims in the
Netherlands were hiding from the authorities. From 2018
to mid-2019, more victims reported their situations to
the police when it became easier to request for a B-8
or B-9 permit. Prior to that, most feared contacting the
police, in case they were returned to Italy. Although
“the Netherlands vigorously attempt [to] combat
human trafficking in persons...it is estimated that the
Netherlands currently only detects a ninth of the victims…
four years ago, estimates showed that one fourth or fifth
of the victims were detected. This steep drop is worrying”
(Van Voorhoute, 2020, p. 95).115
In 2020, according to one
stakeholder interviewed, as few as one in 20 THB victims
may have come to the attention of the authorities.
Stories from the THB Frontlines: Victims
narrate
Stories of migrants arriving in Europe show the yawning
chasm between state-level definitions of forced and
voluntary migration, and the perceptions of the migrants
themselves.116
The rigidity of policy and practices displays
a narrowed-down view of THB victims within irregular
migratory movements. The following two migrant stories
shed light on how smuggling and trafficking intertwine
in the lived experiences of those who find themselves in
the EU, but still caught between a rock and hard place: In
a protection gap. The first story was told by a Nigerian
victim of THB concerning his journey.
“I came from Nigeria. A man came to our village
and took [me] to a place where a Voodoo ritual
was performed on me. He then promised me a job
in Europe and paid for my passage to Libya. It was
a very difficult journey. They asked us to remove
our shoes and I refused. They then asked me to
get out of the truck, to stand up and put both my
hands behind my back then punched me in the
eye. I instantly felt excruciating pain and dizziness,
and fell over…We [migrants] held onto each other
because the truck was full and the path they
took was dangerous. People fell out of the truck
and the truck never stopped. I never thought we
would reach Libya. Any person who helped you
became your family. It was a matter of life and
death. So many people also died on the way. Upon
reaching Libya, they took us to what looked like an
underground warehouse. They locked us there for
three months in the dark…We were often beaten.
During the day, we would be asked to line up,
and some people would come and take us. I was
sexually abused repeatedly. At times, I wished
I was dead…Six months later, the smuggler told
me that I will be leaving for Italy. Once I arrived,
the man who paid for my travel to Libya asked
me to work for him or else pay the debt he had

incurred to bring me there [Italy], which he said
was €20,000…or else Voodoo will kill me. Here,
again, I was forced into prostitution and physically
harmed. I escaped to the Netherlands…I have
been very sick lately and have lost significant
weight. I was 90 kilograms before, but am now 40
kilograms, and have recently been diagnosed with
HIV/AIDS. I can’t return home, and I don’t have
papers. Life is so unfair.”
(Migrant, Male, Nigerian, Amsterdam,
January 2020)
Dilemmas for Dublin claimants
The complexities of the Dublin system for claimants mean
that many are forced to go when their asylum claims fail.
They then wait for the chance to regularise their status.
The purpose of the Dublin II Regulation, adopted in
2003, was to determine which EU Member State would
be responsible for examining an asylum application.
Normally, this is the State where the asylum seeker first
sought asylum or entered the EU. The Dublin Regulation
aims to ensure that each claim gets a fair examination
in one Member State. In reality, asylum legislation and
practice vary widely from country to country, and this
causes asylum seekers to receive very different treatment
across Europe.117
Host states’ narrow interpretation of
Dublin rules, and stricter policy definitions of irregular
migration, determine how migrants are treated when
they enter the host country. The law sets boundaries for
the burden of proof from an asylum claimant about the
validity of their claim; yet, these boundaries are subject
to bureaucratic agreements and varying interpretations
of immigration officials. The asylum process can be
marred by bureaucratic and institutional hurdles given
strict asylum application procedures.118
For instance,
one Eritrean asylum seeker found himself in an irregular
position. His account of his journey shows how multiple
displacements can shift someone from refugee to victim
of THB.
“I came to Netherlands to seek freedom and
humanity…I had to find a place where I could find
peace and safety. For other people, they come for
economic purposes. But I didn’t want to come to
the Netherlands. I left my country, Eritrea, and
went to Ethiopia for safety reasons. I stayed in
Ethiopia for seven years and after that I went to
Sudan. In Sudan, I used to be a businessman…I
lived there for eight years…in 2016 conflict
started…my shop and other houses were burned
down by rebels. I couldn’t go back to my country,
and therefore had to escape and go to Libya. On
the way to Libya, it was normal to see so many
dead people on the way…In Libya, I suffered so
much for one year and six months in the hands of
“Samsarit” – smugglers. [They] sell people to other
smugglers, then to another group of smugglers…
you have to pay so much money. In one camp,
they sold me twice. I paid USD3,500…they asked
for another USD5,000…later forced me to pay
another USD8,000. In total, I paid USD16,500
or else they said they will kill me. Smugglers sell
people like animals. In Libya in December, it was
very cold, we were forced to work outside and we
were not paid…and it’s raining. When I remember
these things, I feel a lot of pain…I don’t want to
remember these things. I experienced a lot of
difficulties and a lot of bad experiences. I then left
Libya by boat to Italy. It was not a normal boat…
[it] is meant for fishing, not for carrying human
beings. I stayed in Italy for three months. I left
Italy because a lot of refugees in Italy do not get
shelter nor medical help…I had to hide myself in
a train…from Italy to the Netherlands. When I
arrived here in Amsterdam, I didn’t know what to
do…Wereldhuis helped me with transport to the
Ter Apel Asylum Reception Centre…but after six
months I got a negative decision, because I am a
Dublin [claimant]. Now I am [an] undocumented
migrant. I left Ter Apel because if the police caught
me, they will deport me back to Italy. Now I live
in a BBB [“Bed, Bath, Bread”] shelter waiting for
the Dublin Claim to cease in 18 months. Then I
will start a new procedure again, and apply for
asylum again.”
(Migrant, Male, Eritrean, Amsterdam,
September 2019)
Returning THB victims from the
Netherlands to Italy
From a practical point of view, the new procedures lead
to the exclusion of victims of THB. To circumvent the
difficulties of regularisation procedures, which only allow
THB victims to begin a procedure 18 months after their
Dublin claim ceases, THB victims stay for prolonged
periods in the Netherlands, awaiting a chance to seek
permission to remain legally. The Dutch immigration
and Naturalisation Service (IND) tends to encourage
THB victims to report to the police rather than to the
department. Yet, if THB victims do report to the police,
their Dublin Claim will be delayed, with cases pending in
court. This does not protect them from being expelled or
returned to Italy. For this reason, most THB victims who
are Dublin claimants tend to avoid all contact with the
authorities that could result in their return to Italy. This is
because existing conditions in Italy are not conducive for
THB victims to be returned to.
38

Three gaps
A protection gap
With a harsher immigration regime in Italy, THB victims
increasingly fear that the police and local authorities will
expel them back to Libya. This intensifies their feelings of
insecurity and vulnerability, sending them underground.
There are insufficient shelters in Italy, so they are often
homeless and again vulnerable to THB, as they end
up on the streets. They see no future in Italy. Caught
somewhere between the Dutch policies, which promise
protection but often fail to deliver on these promises, and
the ever-harsher climate in Italy, lies the protection gap
for victims of trafficking.
An information gap
Confidentiality is often the pretext for a lack of data
about trafficking among and across boundaries in the
EU. Information about key players is often restricted to
the police, who are supposed to investigate complaints.
The lack of transparency of police operations makes it
difficult for victims of THB and for local organisations
that support them to have confidence in criminal justice
and legal procedures in relation to victims of THB.
An identification procedure gap
For those who remain in the Netherlands, the lack of a
clear victim identification procedure may lead to a lack
of protection, according to a stakeholder organisation
that asked to remain anonymous. At the moment,
THB victims are vulnerable, often homeless and suffer
from severe psychological problems. Their health
problems are multilayered and may include HIV/AIDS
or even tuberculosis. Clearly, they are also at high risk of
contracting COVID-19. These stories offer a glimpse into
their multi-layered vulnerabilities and how these shape
irregular migrants’ life trajectories.
In interviews, stakeholder organisations and key players
in the counter-trafficking sector have echoed emerging
concerns about THB victims – Dublin claimants from Italy
in particular – who find that they cannot obtain proper
protection, or be identified as victims in the Netherlands.
“…instead of [the Dutch authorities]…providing
protection, this victim is at high risk of human
trafficking again. I think the Dutch government
doesn’t take responsibility in this sense. Of course,
the protection of victims should have the highest
priority.”
(Regional Care Coordinator of THB victims in
the Netherlands, 2020)
The criticisms levelled at policies and practices view
them as too rigid as regards the lived experiences of THB
victims. A decline once again in registered and reported
cases since the end of 2019 highlights the dilemmas
that emerge from seeking to fill gaps in protection.
Control over numbers of recorded cases is trumped by
border-control priorities, depriving THB victims of both
acknowledgement and protection. This contradicts
relevant EU laws and Council of Europe protocols, which
stress the prioritisation of protection of trafficked persons,
irrespective of their origin or nationality, once identified
as victims. Regarding the 2019 stricter measures,
CoMensha notes:
“We believe the Secretary of State’s decision to
strengthen the regulation is not in line with the EU
Directive on Human Trafficking.”
(CoMensha, 2020, expert interview).
Conclusion
This study has highlighted several gaps in the protection
of victims of THB in the Netherlands. The challenge of
identifying victims of THB among the masses of migrants
andrefugeeswhoheadforandarriveinEUMemberStates
poses a dilemma to migration governance. So far, since
late 2019, no impact assessment has been conducted
to monitor the effects and humanitarian implications of
Dutch policies on THB victims. Since THB victims are not
reliably recorded in Dutch statistics as trafficked persons,
their forcible return to Italy remain largely invisible. They
are frequently returned to situations where they are
vulnerable to further abuse and exploitation.
Most migrants are healthy young people who become
increasingly vulnerable to ill health due to the conditions
surrounding the migration process119
and their
experiences of being trafficked, resulting in physical
and mental health-related vulnerabilities, which tend to
shape their conditions “of being unfit anymore”. Current
policies and procedures fail to address protection
for THB victims. There is a need to simultaneously
address different levels of vulnerability and the various
protection gaps. Ultimately, “the importance of adopting
a multi-tiered approach to respond to such challenge”
must be acknowledged for alternative mechanisms
that do not involve enforcement.120
Such approach is
urgently needed if the Netherlands is to live up to its
pledge of combatting human trafficking under the third
Sustainable Development Goal, and leave no one behind
in the global economy (Van Voorhoute, 2020, p. 87).121
To
document this process is vital, since data are essential to
inform more humane and inclusive protection policies in
the future.

Based on the conclusion drawn, this Policy Note proposes the following recommendations targeted at national and
local authorities:
• Align practices with the EU Victims’ Rights Directive by shifting priorities from a perpetrator-focused approach,
which is grounded on victims cooperating with local authorities and providing personal details (i.e. name, address
and number plates), towards a more victim-centered approach that addresses the vulnerability contexts and
protection gaps of THB victims to safeguard lives.
• Encourageinformation-sharingandinformationaccessibilityamongkeyactors.Thisenablesspaceforgovernments
and civil society actors to work together, thereby exchanging information and knowledge to inform better practices
and help achieve robust protection for THBs at the local level.
• Establish a victim identification procedure with a multidisciplinary expertise or approach to THB victims. This
identification procedure should extend beyond criminal investigations, which is most often the practice, and should
take into account both the personal and situational (survival) conditions of THB victims, such as economic and
social background. Foster a conducive environment, so that THB victims can feel secure enough to file a complaint
or report to the police without fear of deportation.
• Achieve robust THB victim protection by incorporating broader aspects of THB victims’ background, such as
gender, culture, religion and spiritual beliefs (e.g. Voodoo). To this end, a more nuanced and holistic understanding
is required, in order to offer protection mechanisms aligned with human rights considerations and social justice
based on the needs and personal stories of migrants.
• Monitor and assess the humanitarian impact of policy response in light of existing data gaps since 2019 – caused
by the invisibility of THB victims who remain in hiding. Under this condition, with no right to shelter and means
of survival they are confronted with a problem of victimisation, they tend to fall off the cracks off the protection
system and are in a highly vulnerable situation.
40

Identifying and Protecting Trafficked
People, and People at Risk of Being
Trafficked, in Mixed Migration Flows
Author: Ryszard Piotrowicz, FLSW, Professor of Law,
Aberystwyth University; Adjunct Professor, University of South
Australia; Senior Research Associate, Refugee Law Initiative,
University of London; Member of GRETA, 2013-2021122
Introduction
I was a member of the Council of Europe’s Group of
Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings
(GRETA) from 2013 to 2020. GRETA’s core function is
to monitor States’ compliance with their obligations
under the Council of Europe Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings (“the Convention”).
These obligations essentially deal with the protection
and support of trafficked people, and enforcement of
the law against traffickers. Compliance is assessed by
various means, but the most important part are country
visits, where GRETA meets relevant ministries, civil
society organisations and international organisations,
as well as visiting shelters for trafficked persons and
centres accommodating asylum seekers and other
foreign nationals.
The Convention contains extensive measures on
protection and support for trafficked people, as well as
persons at risk of being trafficked. These range from
providing shelter and medical and psychological support
through to international protection, where a person has
been trafficked to another country and cannot safely
return to their home State.
The duty to identify
In order for States to meet their protection and support
obligations, trafficked people, as well as those at risk,
must first be identified. Such persons will not always
self-identify. They may not even fully understand their
own situation or vulnerability. Moreover, they may be
afraid of, or lack trust in, state authorities. States therefore
need to be pro-active in identifying those at risk.
Identification is an obligation under the Convention.
Article 10123
provides in part:
1. Each Party shall provide its competent
authorities with persons who are trained and
qualified in preventing and combating trafficking
in human beings, in identifying and helping victims,
including children, and shall ensure that the
different authorities collaborate with each other
as well as with relevant support organisations, so
that victims can be identified in a procedure duly
taking into account the special situation of women
and child victims…
2. Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other
measures as may be necessary to identify victims
as appropriate in collaboration with other Parties
and relevant support organisations…
Malta,
Italy
Central
Mediterranean
Route
Europe

Identification has also been declared to be part of States’
obligations under Article 4 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, the prohibition of slavery, forced labour
and servitude. This requires States to have in place an
appropriate administrative and legal framework.124
Successful identification is a significant challenge. Some
countries, even if they have the will to do so, do not
always have sufficient resources or expertise despite the
duty to identify.
The risks associated with being trafficked are many,
and serious. Victims may be subjected to sexual and/
or labour exploitation. As part of this exploitation, they
are physically, sexually and psychologically abused. The
victims may not be readily visible, or they may be highly
visible, for example because they are begging or working
in car washes or fruit farms. They may be subjected to
threats and intimidation against themselves or their
families. They may face blackmail and threats of being
reported to the authorities. They may be compelled to
commit criminal offences. They may even be killed.
Trafficked people need to be rescued from these
situations. Those at risk of being trafficked need to be
spotted before they actually fall into exploitation. Some
people may believe that they are being smuggled when
in fact they are being trafficked. Others, owing to their
very vulnerability when being smuggled, may end up
being trafficked. This is a real risk for migrants and others
seeking to cross the Mediterranean Sea through the
Central and Western routes to Italy, Malta or Spain.
Of course, the countries from which the boats embark
for Europe should also be taking steps to identify
trafficked persons. They should probably be preventing
these journeys in the first place. But once they are en
route to Europe, the passengers will eventually fall
under the jurisdiction of Spain, Italy or Malta, and the
Convention is clear that the parties must seek to identify
all victims or possible victims, irrespective of where they
have been exploited.
State practice
GRETA has paid close attention to effective
identification during its monitoring activities. In 2017,
GRETA published an urgent report on Italy, outside its
routine monitoring activity, focusing on the identification
of victims of trafficking among migrants and asylum
seekers.125
This was the first time such action had been
taken by GRETA, and it reflected its concern for the
particular vulnerability to trafficking of those crossing
the Mediterranean to Italy. GRETA noted:
Victims of trafficking granted refugee status or
subsidiary protection in Italy continue to face
risks of re-trafficking in Italy and elsewhere in the
EU. The fact that victims of trafficking arriving
in Europe are increasingly young is particularly
disturbing and calls for urgent action at domestic
and European level to ensure effective protection
of the rights of migrant and asylum seeking
children and young people…126
GRETA then specified the measures that the Italian
authorities should adopt, as follows:
72. GRETA once again urges the Italian authorities
to improve the identification of victims of
trafficking among migrants and asylum seekers,
including by: setting up clear, binding procedures
to be followed and providing systematic training
of immigration police officers and staff working
in first aid and reception centres (CPSA or
“hotspots”), accommodation centres (CDA),
identification and expulsion centres (CIE) and
centres for accommodation of asylum seekers
(CARA); providing operational indicators to
all frontline staff to enable them to effectively
and pro-actively identify victims of trafficking;
strengthening multi-agency involvement in victim
identification by introducing a National Referral
Mechanism and further involving NGOs and
international organisations in the identification
of victims of trafficking, including by giving them
expanded access to hotpots, reception centres
and CIE. In this context, GRETA welcomes the fact
that the Territorial Commission for Recognition
of International Protection in Rome has involved
the NGO BeFree in asylum interviews of Nigerian
women and considers that the Italian authorities
should extend the practice of involving specialised
NGOs;ensuringthatthereareappropriatefacilities
for holding confidential interviews with a view to
identifying victims of trafficking in hotspots and
other places where asylum seekers and migrants
are held.
42

73. GRETA also urges the Italian authorities
to mainstream prevention of trafficking in the
training of all staff working with unaccompanied
children and separated children and to provide
them with training on indicators of trafficking. The
authorities must increase efforts to identify child
victims of trafficking and to set up child-specific
identification procedures which involve child
specialists and take into account the special
circumstances and needs of child victims of
trafficking.
These comments clearly indicate the seriousness of
GRETA’s concerns about the dangers of trafficking to
which people were being exposed on their journeys. In
its second monitoring report, GRETA concluded that,
despite some progress, there was still much to be done.
In particular, GRETA called on Italy to:
- strengthen the multi-agency involvement in
victim identification by introducing into practice
a National Referral Mechanism which defines the
procedures and roles of all frontline actors who
may come into contact with victims of trafficking,
and providing guidance and training on its
application to all relevant professionals …
- provide NGOs involved in the identification of
victims of trafficking amongst asylum seekers
with sufficient resources to enable them to fulfil
the task and enable effective co-operation with
NGOs, including those engaged in rescue at sea
operations;
- ensure identification of possible victims of
THB at all border crossings in accordance with
the OHCHR’s Recommended Principles and
Guidelines on Human Rights at International
Borders.127
Despite the Covid-19 pandemic, GRETA managed to
conduct a monitoring visit to Malta in 2020. However, the
report on that visit is unlikely to be published before late
2021, at the earliest. The previous visit took place in 2016
and I was part of the delegation. In its report on that visit,
GRETA observed that the number of migrants landing in
Malta had decreased considerably, with only one boat
containing around 100 asylum seekers having arrived in
2015.128
GRETA nevertheless stated that “the Maltese
authorities should ensure the regular training of relevant
officials in the use of trafficking indicators, including
asylum officials and staff working in reception centres for
asylum seekers and administrative detention centres.”129
The position has changed significantly: According to
UNHCR, in 2020, 2,281 people were rescued at sea and
had disembarked in Malta.130
There is a clear danger that
people at risk or those already being trafficked may be
included in these numbers.
In its most recent report on Spain, GRETA took the
view that Spain could do more. It urged the Spanish
authorities to:
…pay increased attention to the pro-active
detection of victims of trafficking among asylum
seekers and persons placed in immigration
detention, as well as migrants arriving in the
autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, allowing
sufficient time to gather necessary information
and taking into account their traumatic experience
In this context, training on the identification of
victims of THB and their rights should be provided
to asylum officers and staff working in centres
where such persons are placed.131
What is clear from these reports is that States have not
been doing enough to ensure that they do actually identify
trafficked persons in mixed movements, nor those at risk.
This raises the following issues: How far must a State go
to implement its obligation of identification? How many
resources must be devoted to it? All states have finite
resources, and difficult choices have to be made.
Guidance Note
In 2020, GRETA adopted a Guidance Note on the
Entitlement of Victims of Trafficking, and Persons at
Risk of Being Trafficked, to International Protection.132
This instrument provides guidance to decision-makers
on how and why trafficking victims in another country
may be entitled to international protection, because of
the dangers they face if compelled to return to their home
countries. Some countries do not necessarily consider
that victims of trafficking might have such an entitlement.
For example, in its response to GRETA’s questionnaire for
the third evaluation round, Malta stated bluntly:
The Office of the Refugee Commissioner does
not collect data relating to Trafficking in Human
Beings as this does not feature among the reasons
why an international protection application may
be filed or among the reasons why an application
may be positively considered.133
This attitude is very concerning and is at odds
with international law, which clearly allows
that some victims of trafficking may qualify as
refugees, while others may qualify for other forms
of international protection.

The Guidance Note calls for asylum applications to be
allowed while presumed victims of trafficking are in
an identification procedure.134
It further states that the
human-rights based approach of the Convention even
requires States to take into account the risk of persecution
of victims of trafficking. On the issue of identification, the
Note asserts:
39. States have a positive obligation under Article
4 of the European Convention on Human Rights
to identify presumed victims of trafficking. The
positive obligation on States to identify presumed
victims of trafficking arises in the context of
receiving persons seeking asylum, in determining
applications for asylum and in resettlement
procedures. Unreasonable delays in identification
and referral for assistance may heighten the risks
of re-trafficking, and lead to violations of a victim’s
rights to specialised assistance and protection.
40. States are required to ensure that all persons
responsible for determining asylum claims are
trained in the identification and referral of victims
of trafficking to specialised assistance. All persons
involved in asylum determination, reception
systems for asylum seekers, and relevant support
organisations, including lawyers and civil society,
should cooperate effectively to ensure timely
identification of victims and referral for assistance.
Identification of victims of trafficking amongst
irregular migrants and asylum seekers requires
also clear, binding procedures to be followed.135
This Guidance Note is not the first instrument to address
the entitlement of trafficked persons, and those at
risk thereof, to international protection. UNHCR did so
in 2006,136
and there is substantial state practice
recognising such.
Conclusion
As things stand, not enough is being done to ensure
effective identification of trafficked persons, and persons
at risk of being trafficked, in mixed movements. It is
particularly concerning that some States do not even
countenance the possibility that trafficked people might
need, and be entitled to, international protection.
• Ensure effective identification: The legal duty to identify victims of trafficking, as well as person at risk of being
trafficked, must be fully respected by States when processing asylum seekers; financial and personnel resources
adequate to achieve this must be allocated.
• Respect and protect: States should recognise that the risk of being trafficked may be a legitimate basis for a duty
to provide international protection: They should accept, respect and follow the reasoning of the UNHCR Trafficking
Guidelines, as well as the GRETA Guidance Note, and make international protection available in appropriate cases.
44

“The main countries of origin of smugglers in Tunisia are Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Mali, Guinea,
and Cameroon. Other origin countries are DRC, Senegal, Comoros, Niger, Somalia, and
Chad. Smugglers who are migrants themselves have, due to lack of money to finance
their own trip, decided to work for a network of negotiators.”
José Dogma Tebou, 4Mi Monitor in Tunis, Mixed Migration Centre North Africa.
Policy Notes
Theme 2: Key links in the
chain of smuggling policies:
Intermediaries, people on the
move and local communities
Photo credit: © UNHCR / Alfredo D’Amato
Italy / boat people / With little space in the ship’s garage, young
men sleep in cramped conditions. / UNHCR / A. D’Amato / June
2014 With Summer at its peak and the waves at their calmest,
Italy’s Mare Nostrum Rescue at Sea operation has been
inundated with arrivals of asylum seekers, mostly journeying
from the coast of Libya. At least 5000 were rescued at sea over
the course of just 48 hours between June 28 - 29, 2014.

Understanding Intra-Network Dynamics
for non-Libyan Smuggling Intermediaries
in Libya’s Western Migration Corridor
Author and Affiliation: Ana-Maria Murphy-Teixidor,137
Research Specialist, Mixed Migration Centre North Africa
Introduction
For decades, Libya has been a destination for refugees
and migrants as well as a key node for migrant smuggling
from Africa to Europe. Given the fractured control over
Libya’s territory by various armed groups, and the
geographical challenges of entering and journeying
through the country, migrant smuggling has been a
cornerstone of the illicit economy in Libya.138
Migrant
smuggling networks rely on an intricate system of routes
and connections that adapt within the ever-evolving
operating environment.139
To date, most analyses of the smuggling sector in Libya
have focused principally on Libyan actors – examining
smuggling and trafficking operations vis-à-vis local
governance and the conflict economy. Yet, qualitative
inquiry suggests that non-Libyan smugglers are a key
actor for refugees and migrants on their journey.140
Although sub-Saharan intermediaries are known to take
part in refugee and migrant recruitment and movement
facilitation, comparatively little attention has been
paid to intra-network dynamics and the varied roles
of sub-Saharan African smugglers and intermediaries
operating in Libya.141
Moreover, existing research into
Libya’s smuggling economy does little to examine
the relationships between sub-Saharan smuggling
intermediaries and Libyan smugglers, and how social
and demographic factors affect the structure and nature
of intra-network interactions.
In terms of policy, frameworks at the national, regional
and global level similarly do little to distinguish between
the varied roles in migrant smuggling. The broad
definition put forward by the United Nations (UN)
Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and
Air – which is “Procurement, in order to obtain, directly
or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the
illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the
person is not a national or a permanent resident” (Article
3) – means that anyone receiving monetary benefits, be
that from hosting, transporting or organising irregular
transnational movements, can be charged.142
This report draws upon 24 in-depth semi-structured
interviewscommissioned by the Mixed Migration Centre
(MMC) withnon-Libyan smugglers, of whom 23 are
active smugglers and one a former smuggler, between
November 2018 and April 2019. It seeks to better
understand this cross-section of migrant smugglers
byexploring the sector through the eyes of non-Libyan
smuggling intermediaries along Libya’s western
migration corridor, from Agadez to Italy along the Central
Mediterranean Route (CMR).
Structure of smuggling networks in Libya
and intra-network dynamics
Several studies have explored the nature and structure
of smuggling networks within Libya. The New-Med
Research Network argues that smuggling networks
across the region can be categorised in two ways – from
Libya
Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa
46

• Finance
operations
• Ensure access
to departure sites
• Bribe authorities
on grand scale
• Manage military
and political connections
• No contact with migrants
• Oversee safe house and boat supply
• Oversee the labour force
carrying out day-to-day operations
• House migrants / arrange transport from safe houses
• Provide security
• Prepare launch sites
• Collect money from recruiters / brokers
• Instruct migrants on boat operations / interactions with authorities
• Recruiters / brokers (“Samsar”)
• Bring together groups of migrants
• Collect money
• Negotiate terms of journey
H
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highly organised criminal groups to individual occasional
smugglers.143
These two categories, however, are not
mutually exclusive and when in their best economic
interest, can and do frequently cooperate.144
Undertaking
a quantitative network analysis of a smuggling operation,
Campana noted that a larger network operating out of
Libya across the Mediterranean had a clear tendency of
clustering around certain smugglers within the network,
noting that individual smugglers had various degrees of
importance within the network.145
Campana’s quantitative analysis also noted a difference
between “organisers” and “aides,” arguing that much of
this stratification is “task-based.”146
The way in which
nationality contributed to such stratification was not
explored within the papers. Tinti and Reitano suggest
that, generally, migrant smuggling in Libya, particularly
within highly organised groups, is set up in a “layered
pyramid structure” with high-level coordinators sitting at
the top of the pyramid, far removed from the “recruiters”
at the bottom.147
Tinto and Reitano’s work highlights that the roles of the
non-Libyan intermediaries are often the most visible, and
the most interchangeable. They argue that intermediaries
are the key players whom those on the move will refer
to when discussing “their smuggler.” Faced with fewer
opportunities for employment in Libya, non-Libyans
have utilised their contacts in their countries of origin,
their language skills and their acquired knowledge of
contemporary Libya to organise many of the elements
of the process of transporting refugees and migrants to
Libya. These intermediaries are almost always the same
nationality and/or ethnicity as the refugees and migrants
they are supporting, and have often also undertaken the
migration journey towards Libya. Despite their key role,
few if any accounts are available from sub-Saharan
smugglers’ own perspectives.
Understanding intra-network dynamics
along the route
To further understand the interactions between
sub-Saharan smugglers and Libyan actors, this paper
takes a routes-based approach and examines the Western
migration corridor through Libya. Journeys through
Libya were divided into three key steps also reflected
in the payment structures of refugees and migrants to
their smugglers. The first part of the route is generally
categorised from the border crossing into the south of
Libya, and primarily included the journey from Agadez,
Niger to Sebha, Libya. The second part of the route
includes movements from Sebha to cities in north-western
coastal Libya such as Azzawya, Alkhums, Misrata, Tripoli
and Zwara. For those travelling towards Europe, the
final part of the journey is from coastal cities across the
Mediterranean to Southern Europe (Italy or Malta).
Figure 1: Framework
for understanding
the stratification of
migrant smuggling
operations in Libya148

Moving to Libya from the West (Route to
Sebha)
In Libya’s borderlands moving towards Sebha,
sub-Saharan smuggling intermediaries have increasingly
limited movement restrictions, which they have had to
adapt to over time. A Nigerian smuggler based in Sebha
highlighted: “In 2015 and 2016, the flow was much more
free and easy through the Niger desert…Ever since late
2016, that the Niger government has been after those
drivers, [the freedom of movement for non-Libyan
intermediaries] has been reducing.” The same Nigerian
smuggler emphasised that while sub-Saharan co-lingual
smugglers could arrange the travel and drive refugees
and migrants through to Agadez, driving between
Agadez and Sebha was largely conducted through
Libyan or Chadian drivers:
“[S]o those drivers will deliver to Agadez the
same connection, then those Libyan and Chadian
drivers will bring them to Libya.”
This is likely due to the criminalisation of irregular
migration within Libya, although it does not explain why
those of a Chadian nationality would be acceptable, for
as soon as a non-Libyan smuggler enters Libya, they
may be subject to fines and detention.149
Given the geopolitical control of various ethnic groups
across the region between Agadez and Sebha, the
ability of sub-Saharan smuggling intermediaries to
broker the movement of refugees and migrants across
territories is dependent on their relationship to the
groups that control the area. Ethnic and tribal disputes
often impact the access that non-Libyan smugglers have
across southwest Libya, and, even among Libyan drivers,
there are exchanges as refugees and migrants traverse
regions controlled by different ethnic groups:
“…[F]rom Agadez until the border we send the
Tuaregs. Then from the border to Sebha, it’s the
Arabs driving the cars,”
Nigerian smuggler based in Sebha.
Beyond ethnic groups brokering movement, local
authorities and militias are critical in facilitating or
impeding the movement of sub-Saharan smuggling
intermediaries in southern Libya. Prior to 2016, soldiers
from Agadez accompanied refugees and migrants to the
border in what were described as “combined” caravans:
“The soldiers would take the lead in the front, the
middle, at the back because of the desert rebels.”
Figure 2: Smuggling route serving as geographic framework for analysis
LIBYA
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
ITALY
(Sicily)
GREECE
Tripoli
Zwara
Azzawya
Ejdabia
Benghazi
Sebha
Murzuq
Al Jabal Al Gharbi
Alkufra
Ubari
Misrata
100 km
M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a
48

By contrast, when detailing his last trip through the desert,
a Sebha-based smuggler noted an entirely different
relationship with soldiers, stemming from increased
border management of Niger’s border since 2017:
“There is no way that you will follow [soldiers
through] the desert...and [the] Niger government
the way they are operating in the desert since
2017 was too tough and you know, people [were]
losing [their] life. The soldiers are opening fire
on the driver and the passengers, so it was too
deadly.”
The smuggler explicitly highlighted the change in border
policing by armed forces along this route, and how that
impacted the safety and security of those on the move:
“So the soldiers who were securing the movement
before are now the enemy of the movement.”
The portion of the journey across the desert from Agadez
to Sebha is perilous for refugees and migrants as well as
their smuggler intermediaries operating across this part
of the route. This is due to the geographic dangers of the
desert, the use of force by soldiers tasked with securing
the border, and the targeting of refugees and migrants
for ransom by rebel groups operating in the desert. When
discussing the dangers for smuggler intermediaries,
particularly those new to the business, one smuggler
explained:
“Some drivers are very new into the business and
[if they lose track of the soldier they are following]
they will die together with the passengers…but
people who know the route they can get lost and
still survive and appear in Algatroun.”
Moving through Libya (Sebha to the coast)
Once smugglers transport refugees and migrants to
Sebha, they begin the second stage of their journey
through Libya, as one smuggler noted:
“First you need to arrive to Sebha. When you
arrive here, you can rest for one or two days and
then [smugglers] can arrange the journey to [a
coastal city].”
Refugees and migrants may wait for a few days or weeks
in Sebha depending on their smuggling arrangements,
and may stop in various cities along the route depending
on the current movement restrictions and Libyan Arab
tribe brokering movement for the smuggling network,
including Bani Walid, Brak, and Mizdah among others.
While critical to the smuggling operation, sub-Saharan
smuggling intermediaries operating between Sebha and
coastal Libyan cities work in limited ways. A large part
of the smuggling work for non-Libyan smugglers centres
around coordination:
“In Sebha, my brother there will go looking for the
passengers, will give them food and then will send
them here to Azzawya. He will give my number
to the Arabs and alert them that there are some
passengers arriving.”
While the non-Libyan smugglers can recruit people who
are looking to make the journey further north in Libya and
provide them with interim support, they do not act as
major transporters along this route, but rather as brokers
and as “connection men and women,” as suggested by
Tinti and Reitano’s research. A limited ability to operate
cars between Sebha and Libyan coastal cities was
highlighted by many non-Libyan smugglers:
“In Libya, even from the time of [Ghaddafi’s]
government we don’t have such freedom to drive
and, let me just tell you the facts, we are living not
even as second-class citizens, as just workers,
so we are not recognised as such....So if we are
talking of driving, no, we do not drive, only our
business is on a network, on calls.”
The result is that Libyan drivers transport passengers
while the intermediaries find passengers to undertake
the route. “Even if you are British or American, you
cannot drive from Sebha,” said a Ghanaian smuggler.
This is for “pure Libyans.” Interviewees noted that the
price from Sebha to Tripoli in a taxi would be LYD100 for
a Libyan or a foreigner with a residency permit, yet for
an undocumented migrant, the price would be LYD700.
Libyan smugglers broker control with the various Libyan
tribes which control movement across their territory
and, subsequently, control over many of the logistics of
smuggling activities.
Additionally, the roads between Sebha and coastal cities
have become increasingly patrolled, creating riskier
journeys for those on the move. Fees are levied by armed
groups at checkpoints on major transit routes. “There are
10 to 15 checkpoints from Sebha to Tripoli,” a smuggler
based in Tripoli reported. “Some you pay, some take your
money or take you to prison.” Travellers complain that a
trip from Sebha to Tripoli by road now takes at least twice
as long as before. While previously the journey could take
seven or eight hours, now it takes more than fourteen as
a result of the proliferation of checkpoints. The search for
profits by armed groups, and the legal status of refugees
and migrants, including the smuggling intermediaries

within Libya, pose a specific risk to refugees and migrants
on the move through Libya.
Moving out of Libya (Azzawya and Other
Coastal Towns to Italy)
OnceinAzzawya,sub-Saharansmugglingintermediaries
largely work as brokers between refugees and migrants
and more senior Libyan smugglers. Like the non-Libyans
smugglers in Sebha, those in coastal Libya engage with
the smuggling sector through the provision of shelter,
water and communication technology. One smuggler
highlighted,
“I give [refugees and migrants] a SIM card so that
they can make calls, and I allow him to rest,”
while others noted:
“I arrange for them [to have] something to eat and
[a] place to sleep before they go on the boat.”
The non-Libyan intermediary coordinates the day-to-day
aspects of the journey leading up to the sea crossing,
further corroborating the smuggling framework proposed
by Tinti and Reitano. The same smuggler details:
“I make money through the Arabs each time that
I send them a client/passenger to go to Italy. So,
after a few days, I will hand over the passenger to
the Arabs (who will arrange the journey to Italy)
and I receive my money from the Arabs.”
Under the migrant smuggling protocol, such financial
gain constitutes the crime of smuggling. This means
that the recruitment of refugees and migrants, the
coordination of their transportation and housing, and the
provision of food and telephone access are all aspects
of smuggling, in addition to the actual transportation of
people on the move.
In northern Libya, non-Libyan smugglers also noted
working with detention centre officials to release refugees
and migrants from arbitrary detention. Two interviewed
intermediaries noted making agreements with Libyan
police and/or detention centre guards to release the
refugees and migrants he was seeking to transport. A
Nigerian smuggler operating in Azzawya stated:
“[Yes, from] Osama prison in Azzawya. Other
smugglers, they accept money to free people
from the prisons. I don’t do that. I take them out
of prison.”
A smuggler from the same network went further noting
his ties with detention centre officials:
“I also have two people that work for me in the
prison of Azzawya who look for passengers and
take them out. There were also two children in the
prison that we got out of the prison.”
This demonstrates the ties that exist between migrant
smuggling in Libya and arbitrary detention. Whether
or not detainees must pay to be released to smugglers,
detained refugees and migrants must ultimately pay
smugglers for transporting them after their release.
Hence, during this section of the journey, we see how
detention centres feature and can be a staging ground
for identification and recruitment or the extortion of
further payment from refugees and migrants.
Moreover, interviews with non-Libyan smugglers
operating along the Western route to Northern Libya
indicate that it is the Libyan smugglers who entirely
control the Mediterranean crossing. Libyan smugglers
own the boats and run the operations. These smugglers
pay non-Libyan smugglers a percentage of the crossing
fee in return for providing clients wishing to reach Europe.
One non-Libyan smuggler maintained that he receives
LYD200 (USD45) per person he transports, and that he
usually transports people in groups of five. This smuggler
said he also acts as a liaison for payment of the Libyan
smuggler. If the “client” has paid all fees in advance of
travel, then the smuggling network will settle the sea
crossing fee. For example, a Nigerian smuggler working
in Azzawya noted:
“I am responsible for collecting the clients that
arrive here in Azzawya, and my colleague in
Sebha processes the payments and organises the
taxis that drive the clients here. So, this is how we
work. My colleague calls me to tell me how many
people he has sent to Azzawya and once they
arrive, I pay the taxi.”
This handover from non-Libyan to Libyan actors in
Azzawya was highlighted in various interviews where
smugglers detailed the nature of their smuggling network:
“For Italy, it’s my boss that sets the prices... He is Libyan
my boss.” Another non-Libyan smuggler highlighted, “My
boss here (Arab), is in charge of organising the boats that
go to Italy. And he sends the boats with his friend, but
some boats have departed, and his friend is not back
yet.” While yet another highlighted the same trend of
handing over the refugee or migrant to a Libyan smuggler
to finalise the trip to Europe, stating, “We give the money
to the Arabs and then they make the arrangements for
the trips to Europe.”
50

Conclusion
Most analyses of the smuggling sector in Libya have
focussed principally on Libyan actors. Comparatively
little attention has been paid to non-Libyan smugglers
operating in Libya. This paper set out to preliminarily
explore the sector through the eyes of a cross-section of
non-Libyan smugglers, in order to understand their roles
andtoprovideamorenuancedunderstandingofthesector.
It found that intra-network dynamics change both along
the route from Agadez to Italy and through time. Moreover,
Libyan smugglers tended to wield control over routes and
access, while non-Libyan smuggler intermediaries were
more engaged in the day-to-day operational dynamics of
the movement of refugees and migrants to and through
Libya. Thus, while Libyan actors in smuggling networks
have more stability and control within operations, there
are significant limits on the activities of non-Libyan
intermediaries acting along migration routes, particularly
due to the criminalisation of migrants within the country
and the intra-network power dynamics.
• Acknowledge shifting identities: Smugglers have different profiles, which warrants a more nuanced policy
approach that moves beyond criminalisation (while some smugglers are committing sanctionable abuses, not all
smugglers are reported to be committing abuses). The distinction between people on the move and their smugglers
is less clear cut than the way it is often portrayed in public discourse and anti-smuggling policies.
• Increase data availability across a more nuanced understanding of smuggling: Policy responses to mixed
migration need to account for the complex and nuanced nature of movement processes, and the equally complex
and nuanced smuggler structures that facilitate this movement. Furthermore, more qualitative instruments should
be deployed to further understand the complexity of the many facets of migration journeys. Specific thematic
data gaps requiring additional qualitative and quantitative data collection include the following: Motivations for
non-Libyan smuggling intermediaries to engage with the sector; non-Libyan smuggler intermediaries’ perceptions
of their Libyan counterparts; and the impact of labour market opportunities on the engagement of non-Libyans
within the smuggling economy in Libya (“alternatives to smuggling”).
• Move away from security and containment-focussed policies: Stricter border measures are a factor in the rising
demand for smuggling. Such policies increase the number of refugees and migrants using smugglers, the price
of the journey and the use of riskier routes, thus amplifying the exposure of refugee, migrant and intermediary
smugglers to protection incidents.
• Advocate for legal change: The criminalisation of migration in Libya will heighten refugees’ and migrants’ demand
for smugglers when travelling to and through Libya. Liaise with Libyan authorities to first remove the provisions
surrounding fines and detention of irregular migrants, and of the criminalisation of migration. Specifically, work
with the Ministry of Interior and the Department for Combatting Illegal Migration to find alternatives to detention.
Furthermore, encourage the Ministry of Labour and Capacity Building to continue to build legal channels and work
to promote a legal framework that seeks to offer protection to refugees and migrants moving through Libya.
• Move towards opening up legal pathways for movement: Criminalising smuggling without increasing legal
pathways for mobility overlooks the fact that the demand for mobility will continue to exist. Such legal channels for
movement can be as follows: Expanding options for circular labour mobility at all skill levels; granting humanitarian
visas; creating humanitarian corridors between transit countries and Europe; expanding family reunification
programmes; and developing complementary protection pathways through higher education.

Voices from the Ground: Perceptions on
Smuggling and Protection Risks
Author and Affiliation: José Dogma Tebou, 4Mi Monitor,
Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) North Africa
Introduction
José Dogma Tebou is from Cameroon and has been
residing in Tunis, Tunisia for many years. After studying in
Tunis, she became an entrepreneur and set up a fashion
brand. Moreover, she has been working with MMC North
Africa since December 2019, conducting a high number
of surveys with refugees and migrants located invarious
cities in Tunisia.
Smugglers are usually people who provide people on the
move with mobility in exchange for money or services
that generate money, often illegally. Smugglers can
be part of host communities, or can be on the move
themselves. They generally work in national networks
(dealing with movements within a country); regional
networks (dealing with movements in specific regions of
a continent); or international networks. Smugglers likely
infiltrate or collaborate with persons who work in certain
administrations, such as the police or national guards.
Profile of the smugglers
The main countries of origin of smugglers in Tunisia
are broadly Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali and
Nigeria. Other countries of origin of smugglers can include
Chad, Comoros, Niger, Senegal and Somalia. Smugglers
who are people on the move themselves have, due to a
lack of money to finance their own trip, decided to work
for a network of negotiators. This can involve any of the
following two roles:
Role of the negotiator
The negotiator looks for customers; convinces them;
comes to a price; and informs the other partners. Here,
we often notice that prices are not the same for everyone,
especially for the first stage of the trip. A negotiator’s
main goal is to take the largest profit possible, so they
will set the highest price according to the customer.
Role of the smuggler
Some people make a real job out of it, becoming
smugglers, or passeurs in French, themselves. The
smuggler has a couple of different tasks, such as getting
in touch and negotiating with their partners in the area
(e.g. police and coastguards), and with the suppliers
of the necessary materials (e.g. boat manufacturers
and suppliers of compasses, engines, oars, gasoline
and life jackets). Furthermore, a smuggler orders the
necessary materials based on the number of customers,
coordinates the different actors in their network
(according to the different stages of the journey) and
collects money from the negotiator, after which they
distribute the money in accordance with the different
services provided by the network.
How smugglers organise their trips
There are very few smugglers who work alone, as they are
usually embedded in networks and each of them covers a
specific area or route of the trip. They can simultaneously
take the role of supplier of clients and of negotiator.
Negotiators target countries, thereby looking for future
customers. Most of the time, their ‘marketing’ is based on
lies. As soon as they come to an agreement with their
clients, negotiators either refer the client to the smuggler,
who organises the trip, or arrange the trip themselves
Tunisia
Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa
52

depending on the area they cover. Associates within in
the administrative system, such as police officers and
coast guards, are major elements contributing to the
general success of the trip.
Marketing strategy of smugglers
In order to explain how smugglers gain customers on a
daily basis, let us analyse the profiles of these potential
customers. Interestingly, smugglers’ businesses do
not cease to flourish, even as everyone seems wary of
them. We can potentially deduce that the negotiators
mainly target people who are lower-skilled and/or
lower-educated; are from countries that are relatively
unstable and whose population no longer feels safe; are
relatively young (between 15 and 50 years old); are able
to work (preferably young males and females in good
physical condition); or are sufficiently broken and/or
disappointed by society, the system and their problems,
but who are ready to rebuild themselves.
Modes of transportation
Most of the trips from West and Central Africa that
are organised by smugglers go to Italy, and involve an
airplane for the first part and a boat for the second. Other
trips involve travelling by road in cars, pickups, buses,
trucks, trains, motorcycles and even on foot. Some just
travel by air directly from the country of departure to the
final destination.
Risks during travel
There are several risks involved during travel with a
smuggler. These risks include forgery, questionable
grounds for entry into another country, scams, aggression
and theft. Furthermore, people on the move are exposed
to exhausting walks under dangerous temperatures
(with the weakest who cannot follow the group risking
to be abandoned or killed), as well as to overloaded and
unsecured cars (according to testimonies, many people
fall overboard from pickups and die). Some drown in the
Mediterranean Sea. Many of them have their passports
taken away. They are often taken hostage with a ransom
demanded to their families, while under torture or
subjected to unpaid forced labour.
Testimonies of people who have
experienced the work of smugglers
’’I paid the travel expenses to Tunisia, and half of
my crossing by sea, before leaving my country. But
when I arrived, my smuggler informed me that his
services included accommodation and food, and
these will be offered for as the journey continues.
However, it was not true. I was detained against
my will with a family, my passport was seized and I
had to work without being paid for nine months, so
I had to flee. We were put in a room by a smuggler
in Sfax and [were] told that the boat would leave
after two days. The next day, the police came and
took all of our money, beat us and chased after
us. Later, we put pressure on the smuggler whom
we suspected of getting us trapped. He said that
we cannot do anything against him, since even
the police were on his side and [that] he was well
protected by his network.”
‘‘I remember my second attempt to cross. The officer
of the guard [accomplice] of the boat that left before
us was in charge of diverting the security cameras,
[which were] investigating smuggling at sea, but he
had not done his job properly. At the border of the
international waters, a navy boat came towards
the boat that left before us and then turned around.
Being at shore, we could clearly hear the smuggler
negotiating to let them go. It resulted in no boats
leaving anymore that evening.’’

A Telling and an Illustration of Loss,
Hope and Action: Families of the
Mediterranean’s Missing Migrants
Author and Affiliation: Imed Soltani,150
Odessa Gonzalez
Benson,151
Vadim Besprozvany,152
Bader Albader,153
Elena Godin,154
Antonio Siciliano,155
Marwen Saidi156
and
Gemma Baccini157
Introduction
As part of migrant advocacy efforts, our action research
documents and visualises the narratives of families of
missing Mediterranean migrants. Action research is a
collaborative, reflexive form of applied research that
analyses real-world problems and contexts through
the experiences of subjects, in order to ultimately
better their lives. Broadly speaking, action research is
the pursuit of academic knowledge and social change
together.158 159
Our action research project has transpired
in a transnational context, putting La Terre Pour
Tous, a Tunisia-based migrant advocacy civil society
organisation,160
in conversation with a research team
from the University of Michigan in the US. La Terre Pour
Tous works with families of missing migrants to generate
awareness, action and legal remedies to the plight of
migrants and their families. Oral histories and student-
created data visualisations, which we publicly exhibited
at the University of Michigan in February 2020, now
reside on a dedicated online platform.161
Narratives and visuals
Action research does not limit itself to a logocentric
realm, but engages with the continuum of social ideation
and production. Critically, it can be a domain where
“research, politics and aesthetics are interwoven.”162
Here, art is understood as a social practice engaged in
the world within which subjects find themselves, and
in which they seek to intervene.163 164
In our case, family
narratives and visual modalities cohere into applied
research – concerned not only with absence and loss, but
also with advocacy and voice.
Stories and illustrations can convey something profound
and seek to humanise, while delivering messages for
policy change.165 166
Below, we share the words of seven
families who engage in activism in partnership with La
Terre Pour Tous. Family narratives often share intimate
moments about their children’s journey: The night before
they leave; how departure was planned for some, and
experienced as eloping by others; how communication
channels open to facilitate smuggling; and how
communication channels break down into a deafening
silence once Italy is reached, or not.
On smugglers
Different actors come into view from the families’ narration,
and among them is the “smuggler.” “If the migrant arrives
safely at the destination,” explained one family member,
“the smuggler is viewed as a hero. If the migrant dies or
something bad happens to him or her, the smuggler is
considered solely responsible for the tragedy and he has
to be punished.” Families relate to the smuggler in ways
that seem to be at once personal and transactional. The
relationship is personal, because the smuggler often
lives among the families and is often known to them,
“considered a good person who helps to achieve their
Tunisia
Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa
54

beloved’s dreams,” as one family member put it. However,
the families’ relationship with the smuggler is also
transactional; if their son safely completes the journey,
they are grateful for a successful business deal, but if he
does not, they seek answers and punishment.
Yet, the families are also acutely aware that the smuggler
is but a middle person, and that there are more powerful
actors. When local policing in Tunisia recently tightened
around smugglers, the families explained that boats did
not cease to depart, but instead changed. The departing
boats are no longer the large ones owned by smugglers,
but are now small boats co-owned by those making
the journey. This briefly illustrates that the plights of
migration are tied up not only with the policing of Tunisian
shores, but with systemic issues that thrust the subaltern
into a geopolitical realm. Indeed, the families’ visions and
demands for policy change are not directed at the people
who own the boats and who give their children means for
the hopeful yet dangerous journey: Their calls for policy
change are more far-reaching.
Recommendations: On rights-claiming
The families resolutely and urgently call for the following
change: That their right to identify and inter their lost
deceased be respected and sustained by expanding
forensic capabilities and DNA data-sharing networks
in Tunisia and across the Mediterranean; that their right
to know the whereabouts of their loved ones not be
jeopardised by forced expulsions from Italy; and that
their right to the pursuit of happiness be understood as
predicated upon their freedom of movement. The latter
includes increased access to information about travel
and immigration policies, easing visa restrictions and
increasing the transparency of visa decision-making to
reduce its capriciousness, especially given how arduous
that process is for many applicants.
Since the Jasmine Revolution, Tunisians have sought not
only employment but the good life, envisioning a future
not unlike their counterparts across the sea. A different
sort of relation is imagined for the lands middled by the
Mediterranean Sea – one linked to common heritages
and cultures167
– as well as shared labor, production
and consumption economies.168 169 170
Different models
of free movement across borders – like those in the
Maghreb, European Union and post-Brexit Ireland –
constitute precedents for a viable long-term goal in the
Mediterranean space. It is crucial that the families’ call for
freedom of movement be understood in tandem with the
smaller, immediate actions that can be implemented along
the coasts and at the cities of Tunis, Rome and Geneva. The
families bring together the vision of a broader ideological,
structural change with the practical, localised aims of
small reform. One place to start is by forming local-regional
collaborations, through participatory approaches that
meaningfully include institutional and community actors
across places of origin and arrival, to generate common
understandings and potential solutions to the roots of the
“migration crisis,” and not merely its symptoms.
Conclusion: Our witness
While loss and yearning are palpable in the families’
stories, what emerges is a message that is much more
complex: These sentiments coalesce with perseverance,
hope, anger, indignance, invocation, voice, solidarity and
action. By bringing the migrant and family plights into
closer view, we hope to humanise the abstract vastness
of the Mediterranean. In colours and in quotations, we
bear witness not only to tragedy, but also to an ethics of
responsibility and care.

Figure 1. “We won’t lose hope.”
The visuals utilise the power of the portrait, here of a
father: His aching face, his hands holding shoes of his
son and his message of resolve in the face of personal
tragedy. In a stark confrontation, the viewer-witness
comes face-to-face with the stranger across the globe,
no longer estranged.
– O. Nayak
Figure 2. “Hope is always here.”
The visuals appeal to a wider symbolic context: An open
palm signifies a request for help, hope, and dialogue; the
sun symbolises light, warmth, hope and dream.
– Y. Wang
Figure 3. “Lives lost.”
The layout recycles traditional Tunisian ceramic motifs.
The chosen colour palette and graphic pattern suggest
a part-to-whole relationship between the lost and
the world.
– A. Engel
Figure 4. “Student, obsessed by…”
The words here convey profundity. “Friends” and
“neighbourhood” depict the mundane and the everyday.
“Revolution” and “better life” depict the aspirational.
– K. O’Sullivan
56

Figures 5 and 6. “Migrant Human” poster
series.
The dynamic composition and a high-contrast, minimalist
style combine to emphasise a verbal message, forging of
fundamental intersubjective connections.
– M. Maturen

Excerpts from narratives shared by
seven families
We are burning for our
children. Please set
them free, it is time.
Everything’s changed.
There’s not an event
or holiday where we
don’t think of him.
Even when walking
the streets outside, I
seem to always see his
shadow.
“I will
search for him
for as long as I
have two legs to
do so.
There were
no faces. There was no
flesh. The fish had eaten
them away. Families would
identify the boys by
their clothes and
accessories.
It still feels new to me.
It seems that it was just
yesterday when he left. I
won’t stop feeling this way
until I see him, whether
breathing or in his grave.
Hello, have you heard
anything? Our phone calls
would go. My phone doesn’t
leave my hand nowadays.
58

If he had
died, and I had the
opportunity to see him in
front of my eyes and bury him,
I would be at peace. Death
comes to every person, but
we are constantly chasing
– chasing him and his
whereabouts.
To the
international community:
“Your word takes precedence
internationally and is heard and
respected by all. Whether through
power or diplomacy, other countries
will listen to you. We ask for your
intervention in our circumstance.
We ask you to empathise with
our mothers. Feel for our
children just as you would
with yours.”
The government is
neglecting our youth. They
are trying to deter these
young men by showing
them the cases of dead
migrants from the past. But
how will that stop them
when they already feel dead
living in this country.
Democracy
and freedom are more
than just ideologies. They
are tangible. You see
these ideologies spread on
television and in the media,
but when you go to touch it
you’ll find nothing.
We are willing and
ready to accept our
children’s fate. Dead, in jail
or alive. Give us the truth.
Put our unease to rest. Our
cases should have been
closed within six months. It
has been nine years.”
When I went to the
morgue, I didn’t expect it to be
so intense. As I walked through
the mortuary door, I stepped
over one of the 13 bodies that
lay there. I rummaged through
them, frantically looking for
clothes I recognised that
would belong to my son. I was
throwing up everywhere. I was
delirious. I didn’t find my son.

Policy Notes
Theme 3: Gaps and good practices in
national protection frameworks
“Cities should be a lot more included when it comes to
developing local, national and international protection
frameworks. […] It would strengthen outcome-orientation to
start with city networks that unite cities that are interested in
engaging on questions of migration and displacement.”
Janina Stürner, Research Fellow, University of Nuremberg
Scott Nelson
Egyptian fishing boats at
anchor in 2016 in the port of
Alexandria. Such boats were
regularly used--and monitored
by UNHCR--to try to smuggle
asylum seekers across the
Mediterranean sea to Europe.
60

From national to local: the protection
landscape for people on the move across
North Africa and the Sahel
Author and Affiliation: Jim van Moorsel,171
Research and
Reporting Officer, Mixed Migration Centre North Africa
Introduction
TheroundtablediscussiononDay2ofthepolicyworkshop
highlighted key gaps in national protection frameworks
along the Central and Western Mediterranean Routes,
good practices among local protection actors and civil
society organizations, and the impact of COVID-19
on existing vulnerabilities among refugee and migrant
communities across the North Africa region and the
Sahel. Seven participants participated in the roundtable,
bringing in expertise from their respective countries in
Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Niger:
• Prof. Amira Ahmed, American University of Cairo;
• Prof. Hassen Boubakri, University of Sousse,
President of the Tunis Centre for Migration and
Asylum (CeTuMa);
• Khaled Menna, Soumia Bouchouk and Hanane
Mansour, Centre de Recherche en Economie
Appliquée pour le Développement (CREAD);
• Abderazaq Ouiam, Organisation Marocaine des
Droits Humains (OMDH);
• Hamissou Alasane Ibrahim, NGO Jeunesse-
Enfance-Migration-Développement.
Yadh Bousselmi, Tunisia Country Representative and
Regional North Africa Programme Advisor with the
Danish Refugee Council, moderated the discussions. This
note aims to synthesize the rich exchanges, highlighting
the current state of protection and asylum legislation,
and proposed recommendations.
Highlighting key gaps in national
protection frameworks
All roundtable participants agreed that gaps in national
protection frameworks stemmed from a lack of harmony
between national and international legislation, and
among national asylum and migration actors, resulting in
inadequate protection for people on the move.
In the case of Morocco, a national migration strategy
and asylum law exist, but no national procedure to
receive asylum applications through State facilities or
public institutions is in place. As a result, the country
delegates the process of refugee status determination
(RSD) to UNHCR. In Niger, a similar process is taking
place, as UNHCR supports the national asylum system
particularly focusing on the timeliness of registration
and RSD. UNHCR also carries out RSD in the region
in Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. These countries
are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but
– contrary to Morocco and Niger – have not introduced
their own domestic asylum legislation and asylum
processing structures, which has consequences for the
quality of protection. For instance, a refugee or asylum-
seeker identification card issued by UNHCR might not be
recognised as a piece of identification by state authorities,
and particularly by administrative services and police. A
lack of government-issued documentation hinders those
with refugee status from having access to basic services
Egypt, Tunisia,
Algeria, Morocco,
Niger
West Africa,
North Africa

from official channels, sometimes with the exception of
education and health care services. This in turn increases
reliance on assistance from UNHCR, NGOs or civil society
initiatives, and income from remittances and precarious
and often irregular jobs.
Those with refugee and asylum-seeker identification
cards often continue to experience limited access
to the labour market. In fact, a lack of government-
issued documentation will also hinder access to regular
work opportunities. While assistance in many cases,
especially in relatively costly cities with high rents such
as Cairo, Tunis and Algiers, may often not be sufficient
to cover basic living expenses, registered refugees and
asylum-seekers are be obliged to accept irregular job
opportunities due to a lack of access to regular work. In
Tunisia, a collaboration can be found between UNHCR
and the Tunisian Association for Management and
Stability (TAMMS), who ensure legal work opportunities
and social insurance for an increasing number of refugees
and asylum seekers. In such examples of good practice,
refugees and asylum-seekers are able to deliver a visible
contribution to the economy of the host community.
In Morocco, a current lack of political engagement to
tackle incoherent and incomplete asylum procedure
is likely linked to its diverging foreign policies, with on
the one hand an increasing openness towards African
countries, and on the other negotiating with the European
Union the securitisation of borders in light of people on
the move towards Europe. Tunisia is navigating a similar
split, where the civil society advocating for a national
asylum framework is faced with a lack of political will and
support, with the current status quo with no effective
asylum framework in place being further fostered
by domestic political instability and ever-changing
ministerial posts.
In Algeria and Niger, the narrative on a lacking protection
framework for people on the move is tied to broader
security concerns. Porous borders in the desert and
recent terrorism activities are further feeding into policies
focusing on exclusion and deportation.
Discrimination and xenophobia lead to
irregular parallel services filling the gap
Participants argued that limited access to basic services
in a host community generates far-reaching systemic
consequences impeding the integration of refugees and
migrants within societies, and might lead to unintended
consequences like discrimination and xenophobia.
While Tunisia and Egypt, for example, might a priori
grant access to education and health care for people
on the move, this does not guarantee that in practice
refugees and migrants can viably access those services
without experiencing instances of discrimination. The
consequence is that people on the move who have settled
in communities might create parallel irregular support
systems such as community services and schools, a
common practice in Egyptian cities. In Algeria, where
access to educational and health services for people in
mixed movements is generally restrained, both reliance
on assistance and self-organisation co-exist as coping
mechanisms among refugee and migrant communities.
The sphere of informality in which refugees and migrants
find themselves due to limited access to regularisation,
can paradoxically give them the necessary space to
set up such initiatives. The question remains if such
communal initiatives should be seen as mere coping
mechanisms to increase the viability of livelihoods on
individual and communal levels, or if they could also
capacitate a bottom-up approach to integration within
local communities with the potential to later on lead to
a policy and societal change towards more inclusive
and participatory societies. Participants underlined
that public opinion eventually has the power to push
authorities to change and put in place new legislation.
COVID-19 and exacerbated vulnerabilities
The impact of COVID-19 around North Africa
exacerbated existing vulnerabilities for people on the
move. Their precarious living conditions and limited
access to healthcare made them more vulnerable to
contract the virus, compounded by the fact that most
lost their income-generating activities and therefore
had limited access to viable livelihoods. At the same
time, COVID-19 spurred an increase in perceived
discrimination and xenophobia towards people on the
move across the region, particularly noted in Egypt, Libya,
Algeria and Tunisia. Refugees and migrants reported
that they refrained from accessing health services for
experiencing COVID-19 symptoms or even for other
health concerns, afraid of being stigmatised or exposed
in public, potentially leading to arrests and deportations
for those in irregular situations.
The Tunisian authorities, and particularly municipalities,
became interested in gathering more knowledge on
mixed movements in the contexts of their cities. They
often came to a conclusion there were no adequate
statistics to support mapping refugees and migrants in
need due to the impact of COVID-19. In municipalities
such as Sfax, Sousse and La Marsa, local authorities and
particularly civil society organisations, not distinguishing
host community from refugee and migrant communities
but assisting based on needs, played a major role in
handing out first needs packages. However, due to
inadequate or lacking statistics, monitoring where aid
went and if the most vulnerable refugees and migrants
were reached was a challenge.
62

Recommendations
• Greater and improved coordination between all stakeholders and transferring responsibilities to local
institutions: Coordination between national and local authorities on migration issues should improve. Transferring
actionable responsibilities on migration from national to local authorities could pave the way towards more
inclusive and whole-of-society initiatives, with municipalities taking the lead on managing the integration of mixed
movement communities within societies through mapping these populations, their needs, and enhancing their
access to basic services. This could pave the way for increased public support to change the legal framework,
where the national authorities would come and ensure taking responsibility in addressing key gaps, including
setting up a working national asylum procedure and providing regularised access to the labour market for refugees
and migrants.
• Recognition of key role of CSOs and streamlining coordination process: Civil society organisations and
initiatives should be given a key practical role within this coordination process. Such initiatives thus far have
provided support to refugee and migrant communities in areas where authorities have not provided actions fully
covering the protection of these communities. Yet, a State-led initiative could streamline these activities providing
greater coordination among all involved actors.
• Regional and transnational cooperation on providing safe pathways: Border areas between North Africa
and the Sahel through the Sahara remain porous and people on the move are extremely vulnerable to protection
incidents along the way. COVID-19 has further exacerbated this through closed borders, leaving refugees and
migrants with no other option than to resort to more dangerous routes and the services of smugglers. While across
the region there is an acknowledged need for transnational migration initiatives, through engagement within the
African Union, and the launch of the African Migration Observatory in Morocco, further coordination should focus
on providing safe journeys for people on the move, limiting exposure to risks along the way.
• Vastly improve access to statistics on the presence of refugees and migrants and their needs: Numbers on
people on the move, regardless of status, throughout North Africa and the Sahel remain poor. It is fundamental
that national authorities cooperate with municipalities to get a better sense of the presence of mixed movements
on their territory, the needs of those people on the move, and particularly the risks they encounter. Beyond this
national-local link, involvement of academia and international organisations can foster evidence-based initiatives
that increase the integration of refugees and migrants in local societies.

“Transnational organized criminal networks, have hijacked the otherwise historically
harmless migration routes into a multi-billion criminal industry with far devastating
consequences for migrants and implications for source, transit and destination countries
alike. Trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling has become the second largest
criminal enterprise in the world with an estimated total revenue of US$32 billion annually.
A total of about 27 million migrants are trafficked globally, each year. 1.2 million of these
are children, half of whom are Africans, ranging from ages 5 to 15 years.”
H.E. Amira El Fadil, Commissioner of Social Affairs, African Union Commission
Policy Notes
Theme 4: Protection in contexts
of mixed movement
Photo credit: © UNHCR / John Wessels
“In Libya there is too much war. When I arrived in Tunisia, I was a bit
terrified. I told my story to the police and they transferred me here. I
will try to cross the sea again because there is no other solution.”
Thirty-three-year-old Sudanese asylum-seeker Mahamoud is
photographed near the Zeitoun shelter in the coastal town of Zarsis,
south-east Tunisia. Mahamoud left his family when he was just eight
years old to escape domestic violence. For years, he moved around
Sudan in search of work until he was forced to flee persecution. He
used smugglers to enter Libya, where he was captured by militias and
sold several times. He tried to cross the Mediterranean, but his boat
sank and he was brought back to Libya and detained.
64

Identifying International Protection
Needs: Considerations for North Africa’s
Mixed Movement Context
Author and Affiliation: Kim Thuy Seelinger,172
Julia Uyttewaal,173
and Ana Belén Anguita Arjona174
Introduction
The mixed movement context in North Africa presents
urgent protection concerns. Increasing numbers of
refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants are traveling
to and through countries like Morocco and Tunisia, due
in part to deteriorating conditions in Libya that restrict
passage through the Central Mediterranean route to
Europe. Former “transit” countries are now becoming
destinations for people from different countries,
backgrounds, and languages who are all in movement
for different reasons. Their statuses and needs may
change over time. Some may have a valid visa one day
and overstay it the next. Some may start out fleeing
persecution at home and end up abused en route as well.
Some are simply looking for work or adventure and find
it; others end up trafficked into abusive or unpaid labor.
A primary challenge in this complex mixed movement
population is identifying international protection
needs and reaching out to potential refugees and
asylum seekers in order to ensure they have access to
international protection. This requires not only effective
identification of potential asylum seekers, but awareness
of diverse factors that may enable or impede different
individuals’ disclosure of their needs for international
protection. During the COVID-19 pandemic, it has also
meant conducting these efforts in the context of closed
borders, restricted internal mobility, and interruption or
suspension of services.
In July 2020, UNHCR’s Regional Office for the Middle East
and North Africa commissioned the Center for Human
Rights, Gender and Migration (CHRGM) at the Institute
for Public Health at Washington University to conduct
exploratory research on barriers identifying international
protection needs in North Africa’s mixed movement
context. From October through early November 2020,
the CHRGM team conducted remote, semi-structured
interviews with 60 individuals representing 47 different
state entities and service providers serving refugees,
asylum seekers, and migrants as part of their work. Most
study participants were based in Morocco and Tunisia;
additional experts provided supplemental insights on
the region and neighboring countries such as Algeria.
The inquiry focused on barriers to detecting international
protection needs in North Africa’s mixed movement
context, as well as promising strategies service providers
have adopted to address these barriers.
Central to the study is the concept of “disclosure.” In the
context of this research, “disclosure” refers to an individual
revealing their need for international protection. This can
range from the general expression of a need for help to
speaking in more specific detail about one’s past or fear
of harm back home. Disclosure may or may not occur in
response to direct questioning or screening by a service
provider (including as part of identification efforts); it may
also occur for many reasons specific to that individual.
Most importantly, disclosure focuses on the experience,
perspective, and needs of a refugee or potential asylum
seeker, who may be influenced by myriad personal,
social, and structural or contextual forces. The concept of
“disclosure” is closely related to, though distinct from, that
Morocco,
Tunisia
North Africa

of “identification”. The latter refers to affirmative efforts
made by governments, UNHCR, service providers, or other
actors – whether by screening tool, direct questioning,
or other systematic methods – to engage populations of
concernanddetectindividualsamongthemwhomayneed
international protection. In a way, “identification” is the
seeking of this information. “Disclosure,” on the other hand,
is the offering of this information. While “identification”
has long been an objective and practice of humanitarian
actors, this research invites consideration of “disclosure,”
as well. Shifting perspectives can help humanitarian
actors and other service providers understand both the
facilitators and inhibitors of help-seeking among persons
of concern – including in mixed movement contexts.
Summary of findings
After describing recent trends observed in North Africa’s
mixed movement, study participants indicated diverse
barriers to the identification of international protection
needs in this context. These can be roughly grouped into
individual-level and structural-level barriers.
Individual-level barriers to identification
Study participants noted that, at the personal level,
many potential asylum seekers struggle with challenges
including language barriers and the impacts of trauma.
This can include a person’s lack of subjective identification
as a victim of persecution, which may occur if the forms
of harm experienced were common in the person’s home
country. This psychological state may make it unlikely
that someone would come forward to seek asylum, even if
they could be eligible. Study participants also cited social
forces including fear of stigmatization and basic lack of
knowledge about asylum as individual-level inhibitors
to disclosing protection needs. For instance, even where
someone may have a vague concept of refugee status,
lack of knowledge about asylum eligibility may lead them
to omit key details about why they left home.
Study participants also discussed fear and mistrust of
strangers, be they state actors, service providers, or even
members of their own communities, as impediments
to help-seeking. For instance, one study participant
explained that individuals from Cameroon may be
reluctant to be identified as asylum seekers by their
own communities. This can complicate identification of
possible asylum seekers among a certain community
group and their specific needs.
Study results also highlighted individual-level barriers
arising for people with certain vulnerabilities or security
risks, such as victims of trafficking, unaccompanied
children, and individuals with diverse sexual orientations
and gender identities. For victims of trafficking, the inability
to leave a trafficking ring can complicate disclosure in and
of itself. The community-based nature of such trafficking
can also prevent victims from coming forward, particularly
if they fear retaliation against their families.
For others with particular vulnerabilities, such as lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and/or intersex (LGBTI)
individuals, disclosing details about past or feared harm
through an interpreter could be particularly daunting,
as many may fear being “outed” or misrepresented
due to an interpreter’s implicit bias or limited familiarity
with LGBTI -specific issues. LGBTI individuals may be
particularly disinclined to disclose the specifics of their
protection needs if an interpreter is a member of their
own community.
Structural barriers to identification
Findings also raised numerous structural or process-
related impediments to identification of international
protection needs. As a preliminary challenge, Moroccan
and Tunisian legislatures have both drafted but not yet
adopted national asylum legislation. Study participants
noted that the absence of a clear legal framework has
kept state actors in each country from fulfilling their
potential in terms of identifying and responding to
refugees and asylum seekers. This was particularly
apparent at entry points. In Morocco, for instance, study
participants stated that border authorities may be
unaware of procedures for identifying, admitting, and
referring possible asylum seekers, since border agents
“need to have a law to enforce it at the borders.”175
In
Tunisia, authorities and international agencies including
UNHCR and IOM had existing training programs and
robust Standard Operating Procedures for receiving
and referring refugees and migrants rescued at sea and
entering by land from Libya. There, challenges arose in
terms of capacity and standardizing the application of
identification and referral procedures across the country.
Other barriers were found inland, in the context of contact
with international, national, and community-based
organizations providing services to migrants, refugees,
and asylum seekers. While many study participants
felt that local service providers were doing the best job
possible in detecting vulnerabilities and protection needs,
some did note inconsistent levels of training and capacity
in profiling and intake procedures. They also pointed to
varying levels of coordination and referral among service
providers offering a range of services to mixed movement
populations, who might be in a position to refer them
to UNHCR. In Morocco, geographic constraints were
a challenge, as well, with UNHCR only authorized to
operate one office, in Rabat. This posed difficulty to some
asylum seekers outside the capital.
Strategies to address identification
challenges
Study participants presented an array of strategies
to improve their own abilities to identify potential
international protection needs and to enable would-be
asylum seekers to disclose these needs. These included
training efforts to improve staff knowledge and intake
/ interview skills, as well as using community liaisons
and social media to spread accurate information about
asylum. They also described initiatives to ease the
66

asylum process itself, such as providing psychosocial
support, accompaniment by a community member, and
application assistance from legal clinics staffed by local
law students. This year, the COVID-19 pandemic spurred
additional innovations. Study participants reported
mobile service delivery and creative use of Facebook
and WhatsApp groups to disseminate information
and maintain community ties at a distance. In addition,
UNHCR’s country team in Morocco launched a “remote
registration” system with a local partner outside the
capital, to enable asylum seekers beyond Rabat to
enter the process amid travel restrictions. This may be a
promising practice even post-pandemic.
Discussion
Reflection on the interview data surfaced several key
takeaways about “disclosure” and identification of
internationalprotectionneeds.Theserelatetotheconcept
of “disclosure” in the context of the asylum process, the
critical importance of community-based approaches to
aid in identification, the need to strengthen referral and
coordination to improve response, the need for more
training about refugee protection and the asylum process
among service providers most likely to encounter persons
with international protection needs, and the critical role
of the state.
First, barriers to identification of international protection
needs are closely related. However, disclosure itself is
a highly complex and subjective process, warranting
additional consideration on the part of those serving
refugees and asylum seekers. Disclosure of one’s need for
international protection can happen to different degrees; it
maybethoughtofasanongoingandpotentiallydeepening
process. First, at the most superficial level of disclosure,
one might generally express a need for international
protection or desire to access the asylum process - the
rough equivalent of saying, “I need help,” or “I am afraid
to return to my country” and not much more. This degree
of disclosure might be sufficient to trigger a more in-depth
intake or, possibly, referral to UNHCR for pre-registration
or registration as an asylum seeker. Second, an individual
might reveal the basic contours of a claim for asylum -
for example, roughly describing past harm in an intake
interview, in conversation with a community-based
outreach worker, or on any migration related application.
At this level, the individual may or may not even know
about the option to apply for asylum or the meaning of
refugee protection. Third, one might offer greater detail
about the nature, severity, motives, and impacts of past
persecution or fear of return to one’s homeland. This is likely
to demonstrate eligibility for refugee protection for those
who are indeed qualified under the 1951 Convention. It is
needed at the point of eligibility interview, if not before.
Borrowing from one framework of behavioral analysis,
one might ask why a would-be asylum seeker may decline
or fail to disclose their international protection needs,
and does this absence of disclosure result from lack of
motivation? Lack of capability? Or lack of opportunity?
The answer will be different for every asylum seeker,
but there may also be patterns among specific groups.
For example, data related to victims of trafficking
suggest unique constraints on motivation, capability,
and opportunity to access either the asylum process
or anti-trafficking support systems. Understanding
barriers to identify of international protection needs in
terms of motivation, capability, and opportunity can help
key actors and policymakers prioritize and adjust their
interventions at individual and population levels.
A second key takeaway from this study was that, in
the mixed movement contexts of Morocco and Tunisia,
UNHCR and its partners cannot identify all persons with
international protection needs on their own. UNHCR
works with a number of partners and communities to
increase outreach to potential asylum seekers who will
be referred for care and protection as needed. Most are
simply more likely to move, work, and live with others
from their homelands or communities of origin. For this
reason, community-based approaches are critical to
promote both individual-side disclosure and service
provider-based identification efforts. The organizations
that engaged community liaisons, especially for different
linguistic or national origin groups, reported great
success in learning of new arrivals as well as tracking
evolving needs of longer-standing community members.
These liaisons act as vessels back and forth between the
organization and the community, bringing information
and potential persons with international protection
needs from one to the other, while three UNHCR field
units are established in Tunisia. They serve outreach and
trust-building functions in their communities of focus,
which are both integral to identification efforts.
COVID-19 has highlighted the critical importance of
community-based approaches in the delivery of services
as well as the dissemination of information. As UNHCR
and its partners have experienced limited mobility due
to the pandemic, community liaisons have continued
to connect individuals to service teams by phone and
other digital methods. Similarly, the use of social media
platforms to gather and connect with community
members in digital spaces has taken on more utility
during the pandemic. In a mixed movement context,
information about the asylum process, eligibility criteria,
and where to access help can be disseminated broadly
and cheaply through Facebook and WhatsApp groups.
This information can even spread by word of mouth to
community members who do not actively use social
media. In this way, it can reach potential asylum seekers,
while also building social cohesion and trust in service
providers. This may, in turn, also promote identification of
protection needs and facilitate identification and referral
to UNHCR. As promising as they are, social media-based
outreach and connection strategies must be taken
up with clear ground rules about confidentiality, data
security, and group membership.

A third key takeaway was the importance of
strengthening referral and coordination systems to
strengthen response to the disclosure of international
protection needs and strengthen access to asylum
processes in both Morocco and Tunisia. Findings revealed
positive examples where international agencies, national
NGOs, and state authorities developed strong Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) for receiving and assisting
people rescued at sea. These joint profiling and intake
exercises, followed by open referrals and collaboration,
seemed to increase the likelihood that vulnerable
individuals will be able to access processes for refugee
protection. Findings suggested that similar SOPs and
referral mechanisms implemented at a national scale for
both state authorities and service providers would help
harmonize and strengthen coordination across countries.
In general, findings indicated that coordination networks
in each country were strong among certain pairs or
clusters of providers but had inconsistently broad reach
and inclusion. Clear communication channels between
organizationsandproceduresforreferralandcollaboration
would help ensure that access to protection is not simply
dependent on the goodwill or personal connections of a
few individuals within a few organizations. Broadening
systems of coordination and collaboration seems crucial
for expanding access to refugee protection beyond
capital or main cities, to rural and border zones. Fourth,
findings also indicated that service providers and other
organizations, including community-led associations
and community leaders, sought training and awareness-
raising on international protection generally and asylum
specifically. Without a clear understanding of protection
benefits, processes, and eligibility criteria, these first
responders and interveners could miss important
opportunities to identify people in need of protection,
including particularly vulnerable groups who may be
particularly hesitant to disclose experiences of harm.
This, in turn, could limit an organization’s ability to make
necessary referrals for support and protection. A final
takeaway from study findings relates to state role in
protecting asylum seekers and refugees. In both Morocco
and Tunisia, the lack of a comprehensive legal framework
for asylum or active institutional role in the process
limited the state’s ability to actively participate in the
identification of possible refugees and asylum seekers,
or respond to their disclosure of international protection
needs. Moreover, without the prospect of a recognition of
asylum claim, individuals in need of protection may not
be motivated to disclose those needs to state authorities.
Until the adoption of comprehensive asylum legislation,
several study participants suggested that regular and
comprehensive trainings for state authorities may be
helpful to strengthen familiarity with the 1951 Convention
and principles of non-refoulement. Commendable efforts
in both countries include national training programs
for border authorities and police agents on refugee
protection and human rights of migrants, detecting
vulnerabilities and protection needs, and referring to
competent agencies and service providers.
Conclusion
Mixed movement contexts are uniquely challenging
for enabling access to international protection due to
rapid and shifting movement, diverse needs and legal
statuses among fellow travelers, and the invisibility of
highly vulnerable, insecure individuals such as victims
of trafficking in persons. Key actors in North Africa
already make concerted, affirmative efforts to identify
individuals in mixed movements who may be eligible for
international protection, be it through screening tools,
direct questioning, or other systematic methods. This
research presents the importance of also considering the
potential “disclosure” of international protection needs
from the perspective of persons of concern themselves.
Their disclosure may be determined by the degree
to which they have sufficient motivation, capability,
or opportunity to express their needs for protection.
By better understanding these various barriers and
developing appropriate strategies to approach diverse
forms of disclosure, key actors and policymakers
can strengthen access to asylum and other forms of
international protection.

68

Existing good practices and recommendations
• Continue engaging state authorities and expanding capacity building. Expand existing training on identification
of international protection needs, asylum eligibility and processes, and counter-trafficking procedures, and work to
strengthen referrals to support services and access to application processes. Continue promoting a cross-sectoral
approach to deepen understanding of the diverse needs and profiles of people in mixed movements and improve
the quality of asylum-related information disseminated to them, taking into consideration the increasing use of
digital communication channels and community outreach initiatives in the North Africa. This would enhance state
authorities’ and service providers’ interactions with persons of concern at borders, at other ports of entry, and
inland, and increase capacity to identify and refer asylum seekers upon first contact.
• Continue reinforcing trauma-informed approaches in and training related to international protection.
Ensure sensitization of state and non-state actors on trauma-informed care and interview techniques, including
psychological first aid. Integrate issues of gender-based violence, LGBTI-related violence and discrimination,
working with victims of torture, working with victims of trafficking, and working with interpreters in policy and
training materials related to international protection guided by existing and upcoming guidelines from UNHCR.
• Continue to promote community-based protection approaches while linking community-based groups and
service providers through local and regional coordination mechanisms. This would help ensure the referral of
potential asylum seekers and victims of trafficking to diverse support and protection resources via networks of
“safe spaces” along the displacement cycle toward and through North Africa. This also requires the development
and implementation of clear guidance regarding the confidentiality of referral-related communications, including
use of social media.
• Continue progress towards the adoption and implementation of comprehensive asylum legislation in the
North African region. Specifically, current efforts to develop comprehensive asylum laws in Morocco and Tunisia
should be supported through advocacy and capacity building, in order to strengthen state authorities’ ability to
identify, refer, and assist persons in need of international protection.
• Support the implementation of the coordination mechanisms established between refugee protection
and anti-trafficking systems. This could be through a combined working group, establishment of a liaison
between systems, or the expansion of recently launched “cross-training” programs (ie, UNHCR Blended Learning
Programme on Trafficking and Smuggling MENA region, Trafficking Referral Guide and Manual in Tunisia) to foster
mutual learning about asylum and anti-trafficking protections and processes for all relevant actors
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of
the United Nations or UNHCR. This paper may be freely quoted, cited and copied for academic, educational or
other non-commercial purposes without prior permission from UNHCR, provided that the source and authors are
acknowledged.

Gaps in Protection for West African
Refugees in Times of Crises: The role of
a Multi-stakeholder Platform within a
Partnership in Preparedness Model
Author: Leander Kandilige, Senior Lecturer, University of Ghana
Introduction
As victims of persecution owing to their race, religion,
nationality, social group or political opinions, refugees’
rights have been protected through international
conventions, protocols and compacts since the 1950s.
Embedded in these international legal provisions are
rights and obligations on all stakeholders throughout the
forced migration trajectory – asylum seekers, countries
of origin, countries of transit, migration intermediaries,
host states and immigration control officials at the host
society. An example includes the prohibition of wilful
forced return of asylum seekers to places where they are
likely to be subjected to torture, or their lives are likely
to be imperilled through persecution (the principle of
nonrefoulement). Another example is the obligation on
an asylum seeker, who has been granted refugee status
by a host state, not to use that social sphere as a launch
pad to organise destabilising activities against their
country of origin.
The 2020 Africa Migration Report176
acknowledges that
Africa hosted 7.3 million refugees (including asylum
seekers) or 25 percent of the global refugee population at
28.7millionin2019.Overall,oneineveryfourinternational
migrants in Africa was a refugee, compared to one in
every 10 international migrants globally. This represents
a significant number of vulnerable populations that are
exposed to obvious challenges in host countries in times
of national crisis. The report points to the bulk of refugees
on the continent being hosted by countries in Eastern
Africa, with relatively smaller numbers in the rest of
the regions. Though comparatively smaller, Western
Africa’s stock of about 383,000 refugees in 2019 has
protection needs just as regions with larger populations.
This policy note argues that while protection regimes
broadly exist for involuntary migrants within the ambit
of intergovernmental/international organisations such
as UNHCR, the International Red Cross Society or even
IOM during peace times, there is a yawning gap in
national protection mechanisms for involuntary migrants
in host countries during episodes of crisis situations. The
two central questions that guide this policy note are:
Are national statutory agencies, which are responsible
for coordinating disaster management, adequate
in protecting the rights of refugees during national
crisis? How can a multi-stakeholder approach, in the
form of a national platform dedicated to coordinating
support specifically for migrants, better protect the
rights of refugees during national crisis situations? To
aid the analysis, I have adopted the conceptualisation
of “crisis situations” by the Migrants in Countries in
Crisis (MICIC) Initiative.177
Within this context, “crises
may arise when social, political, economic, natural or
environmental factors or events combine with structural
vulnerabilities and/or when the magnitude of those
events or factors overwhelm the resilience and response
capacities of individuals, communities, or countries. This
interpretation sees crises as events with such a severe
intensity and magnitude that they can overwhelm the
capacity of the government and population to cope
with them. These are crises triggered by (1) natural
disasters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, and
sudden and slow-onset floods); and by (2) conflict (e.g.
Ghana West Africa
70

civil unrest, generalised violence and/or international or
non-international armed conflict).”
Though international cooperation and actions have
positive broad strategic impacts on the nature,
severity and scope of crises, especially in economically
underdeveloped countries, the need for localised state
and multi-stakeholder action before, during and after a
crisis situation is critical. There is mostly a trust deficit
between state agencies/state officials and refugees due
to the power asymmetries that exist between the two
parties. The role of non-state actors such as civil society
organisations (CSOs), nongovernmental organisations
(NGOs), faith-based organisations and private sector
actors therefore becomes important in coordinating
services for involuntary migrants, especially during a
crisis situation. Targeted state-funded initiatives could
be channelled through impartial non-state private actors
who tend to have a physical operational presence in local
communities prior to the onset of crises. This approach
was also emphatically endorsed by the “Migrants in
Countries in Crisis (MICIC): Supporting an Evidence-
based Approach for Effective and Cooperative State
Action” project, funded by the European Union (EU) and
implemented by the International Centre for Migration
Policy Development (ICMPD). Despite the fact that the
central focus was on voluntary migrants, the guidelines
and subsequent Partners in Preparedness (PiP) initiative
that emerged from this broad project are equally
instructive for state action in the context of refugees and
other involuntary migrants.
The seventh guideline specifically recommends the need
to build partnerships and establish routine coordination
before a crisis breaks out, and the maintenance of such
coordination at all times throughout the cycle of a crisis.
This is equally consistent with the Inter-Agency Standing
Committee’s (IASC) Early Warning, Early Action and
Readiness Report,178
which proposes pre-disaster/
emergency planning requirements in order to mitigate the
severity of such phenomena. Existing approaches to the
protection of refugees during disasters and humanitarian
emergencies, such as the IASC Emergency Response
Preparedness (ERP), therefore allow the international
community to complement the efforts of individual
states while recognising that national governments
are ultimately responsible for providing such reliefs to
refugees. This statutory role is aptly captured in the UN
General Assembly resolution 46/182, to the effect that
each “State has the responsibility first and foremost to
take care of the victims of natural disasters and other
emergencies occurring on its territory. Hence, the affected
State has the primary role in the initiation, organisation,
coordination and implementation of humanitarian
assistance within its territory.” Other initiatives, such
as the Preparedness Package for Refugee Emergencies
(PPRE) and the Refugee Coordination Model (RCM),
also stipulate approaches to preparing for refugee
emergencies.
Using Ghana as a case study, the PiP sought to address
the lack of dedicated, inclusive and open structures to
support dialogue, information-sharing and cooperation
at the national level, in order to implement migrant-
sensitive responses in times of crisis for migrants in
Ghana. After three National Workshops held on 21 to 22
June 2018, 24 to 25 October 2018 and 13 to 14 December
2018 among representatives of relevant government
ministries, departments and agencies, intergovernmental
organisations, CSOs and academic/training institutions,
a National Platform for the Protection of Migrants in
Crisis (NPPMC) was launched. This platform approach,
however, has broader applications across other regions
in Africa and beyond, because it complements existing
international attempts through a public-private
partnership approach.
National platform model for
protecting migrants during
crisis
GhanahasaNationalDisasterManagementOrganisation
(NADMO), established in 1996, by an act of parliament
(Act 517) in response to the Yokohama Strategy and Plan
of Action for a Safer World. It is the statutory agency
mandated to coordinate all disasters in the country. The
organisation coordinates all relevant civil authorities
at the national, regional and district levels to respond
to disaster situations. Since its founding, NADMO has
depended on state subventions for funding, and it has
not been permitted to attract funding from other sources.
Theoretically, the situation changed with the passage
of the NADMO Act of 2016 (Act 927), which now allows
NADMO to source funding from bilateral and multilateral
partners in addition to government subventions. In
practice, however, funding shortages have constrained
the ability of the organisation to take pre-emptive steps
prior to the occurrence of crises, in order to either avert
them, minimise their impact or to hasten the restoration
of normalcy after a crisis.
While the mandate of NADMO encompasses the
protection of all persons present in Ghana at any given
time, peculiar challenges pertain to voluntary and
involuntary migrants. Challenges could include the lack
of local language proficiency; poor appreciation for local
support systems; unsettled social networks; suspicion
and discrimination; poor access to accommodation
facilities and welfare services; and invisibility due to
a deficiency in consistent formal records on migrants.
As such, a national platform with specific focus on the
rights of migrants during crisis situations is critical.
The limitations of the NADMO highlight the enduring
benefit of a public-private partnership in the area of
preparedness prior to, during and after crisis situations.
The terms of reference of NPPMC primarily focus on
the coordination of services specifically for migrants

during crisis, including: Access to consular services,
information (e.g. disseminating crisis information, alerts),
documentation (e.g. interpretation and translation
services), relief and humanitarian assistance (e.g.
healthcare, shelter, food, clothing, dignity kits for
women); counselling or psycho-social support; referrals
to relevant service providers; and support in the
provision of temporary identity and travel documents
(e.g. emergency travel certificates). The platform aims
at raising awareness among different stakeholders of
its existence and the specific needs of migrants in crisis
situations. The platform also seeks to provide a space
and means for relevant actors to enhance their capacity
to identify, implement and review migrant-sensitive
responses in crisis situations – for instance, through
simulations, drills and research. In addition, it intends to
strengthen collaboration among government ministries,
departments or agencies, and between governmental
and nongovernmental partners at different spatial levels
(district, regional and national) through the identification
of focal points. Furthermore, the platform seeks to
foster the sharing of information, knowledge, skills and
resources among relevant stakeholders.
To succeed, the platform is grounded in and guided by
some enduring principles. The three core principles
adopted include ensuring inclusive and meaningful
participation, as well as engagement with all relevant
and interested stakeholders at appropriate levels (local,
regionalandnational)intheprotectionofmigrantsincrisis
situations; facilitating multi-stakeholder partnerships,
which are stimulated and kept engaged through ongoing
interactions (i.e. through formal meetings and other
means of communication, but also informal interactions
and spontaneous exchanges); and maintaining
transparency and openness of its operations to ensure
mutual accountability among all stakeholders, within
and outside the platform. The membership of NPPMC
comprises of both primary and secondary stakeholders.
Primary stakeholders are composed of all relevant
government ministries and departments responsible
for the management of disasters and crises, while
secondary stakeholders count relevant institutions and
agencies that do not necessarily play a continuous role
in the functioning of the platform, but which are critical
collaborators in times of crisis. Secondary stakeholders
are vital to the provision of logistics, information, rescue,
relief and recovery support for migrants, in collaboration
withtheprimarystakeholders.Membershipoftheprimary
stakeholders category is based on the following criteria:
Capacity or technical know-how in migration issues;
access to relevant information, possession of logistics
and/or equipment, which are relevant for the protection
of migrants in crisis situations; synergies between
the institution’s core mandate and that of the NPPMC
Platform; availability of appropriate human resources or
staffing; and possession of expertise in dealing with the
particular type of crisis or disaster in question.
Applicability of the platform
model to refugee protection
during crisis
Both camp-based and urban refugees are predisposed
to vulnerabilities due to resource constraints in host
countries. These could manifest in the form of poor
sanitation, inadequate shelter, limited access to
healthcare and educational facilities as well as poor
nutrition. These vulnerabilities are amplified during crisis
situations in host communities. Specific steps should
therefore be taken to ameliorate the impact of national
crisis situations on refugees.
Protection of refugees should be considered a process
rather than an event. In this regard, the phases in
a full cycle of disaster management – pre-disaster
phase (prevention and mitigation), the disaster phase
(response) and the post-disaster phase (recovery) –
should be accorded equal attention. This suggests that
prior to the actual occurrence of a disaster, the national
platform must undertake prevention and mitigation
activities that either prevent the disaster, minimise its
effects or enhance the preparedness of agencies that
need to be coordinated to respond to a disaster when it
occurs. Practical activities within the pre-disaster phase
should involve regular meetings by primary stakeholders
to carry out emergency response planning. This should
include an evaluation of existing plans, standard
operating procedures (SOPs) and incident reports from
previous disaster situations, with the focus on how they
protect the rights of refugees. In addition, the platform’s
primary stakeholders should monitor the political climate
and natural disaster risks, as well as review information
and data on the stock of refugees in the country. There is
also a need to device the platform’s emergency response
plan, targeting refugee-populated communities such as
camps and clusters in urban centres where refugees
reside. Awareness of the existence of the platform will
have to be raised to allow refugees, and entities that
support refugees, to signpost asylum seekers, refugees
and stateless persons to the range of services that are
coordinated by the platform. In a pre-disaster phase,
there is also a critical need for training and simulation
exercises to enhance operational preparedness and
capacity to respond to actual crises should they happen.
The platform must, therefore, coordinate simulation
exercises involving refugees, the leadership of camps,
state agencies responsible for emergency response
actions, non-state actors and development partners.
During the actual crisis phase, stakeholders of the
platform should coordinate services in support of
refugees. These services should involve field visits;
collection of information and data on where refugees liv;
identification and assessment of the immediate needs
of refugees; activation of the platform’s crisis mode;
and convening the platform’s emergency meetings
72

with partners, who might be able to offer support, not
only in the form of rescue but also in the provision of
immediate relief services such as temporary shelter, food
and healthcare. Again, this should adopt a public-private
partnership approach. The response plan for crises, which
ideally must have been drafted at the pre-crisis phase,
should be activated by the platform to guidcoordinated
response processes.
Post-crisis, the platform should evaluate the level of
collaboration among the various stakeholders – primary,
secondary and other actors supplying services to
refugees. There is also a need to evaluate and document
the response operations to serve as a guide for future
responses. Finally, it is essential to review the platform’s
objectives periodically, in order to amend them in light of
response gaps, opportunities for better coordination and
the dynamics of the vulnerabilities facing refugees. This
approach recognises that the experiences of refugees
are not static givens; also, that impacts on refugees are
context-specific and that the composition of coordinating
partners should be subject to change.
Conclusion
The reflections expressed in this Policy Note
complement the fundamental object of the Global
Compact on Refugees, which conveys that the
“thorough management of a refugee situation is often
predicated on the resilience of the host community.”
Resilience during national crisis situations is better
attained through the adoption of a “whole-of-society”
approach to the management of disaster situations. The
agility, human resource capacity, outreach and scope,
access to flexible funding, access to equipment and
communication channels of multi-stakeholders proposed
in the platform model increase the potential to guarantee
the protection of the rights of refugees in crisis situations.
The understanding, in this policy note, of crisis and
disaster management as a cyclical process allows for
continuous engagement of stakeholders, including those
from the private sector, civil society, NGOs, international/
intergovernmental organisations, diplomatic missions,
community groups as well as mainstream government
ministries, departments and agencies. The early warning,
preparedness and contingency planning propositions
in the Global Compact on Refugees, aimed at shaping
refugee reception by nation states, are consistent with
the proposed national platform model in planning for,
dealing with and evaluating crises and disasters at the
national spatial level.
• Dedicated migration platforms avoid neglect of refugees during national crisis: Resource constraints prevent
national agencies that are responsible for managing disasters from deliberately focusing limited resources on
marginalised communities. Advocacy by a migrant platform highlights migrant-specific vulnerabilities that exist
throughout the three main stages of the disaster management cycle into the limelight. Policies that target victims
of a disaster as a homogenous group miss an important point and they need to be realigned to appreciate the
diversity of needs that are embedded in the heterogenous backgrounds, experiences and life courses of migrants
(voluntary and involuntary).
• Move towards hybrid protection models: There is a critical need for a hybrid of public-private efforts, geared
towards the forecasting of the likelihood and severity of crises, together with a coherent response to both natural
and man-made crises should they occur. Non-state actors have the potential to release complementary skills,
technical expertise, equipment and enduring community relationships for collaborative activities as well as funding
sources. Policy formulation and implementation should therefore privilege hybridity over unilateral and unifocal
state actions.

Protection Programming in
Transit Settings: Challenges and
Recommendations on Targeting and
Accessing Transit Migrants in Agadez,
Gao and Ouagadougou
Author and Affiliation: Pauline Vidal,179
Research Manager
of the Independent Monitoring, Research and Evidence
Facility (IMREF)
Introduction
People in mixed migration flows on the Central
Mediterranean Route (CMR) are vulnerable to violence,
physical abuse, and exploitation in their north-bound
overland journeys towards North Africa and Europe. To
help these transit migrants avoid, cope with, and recover
from exposure or experiences of harm,180
international
humanitarian and development organisations have
significantly increased the scope and scale of protection
programming in the Sahel since 2016.
Providing direct protection assistance to transit
migrants181
comes with specific challenges that differ
from other humanitarian displacement contexts. In
other humanitarian contexts, organisations will typically
profile a population and consult its leaders to identify
the most vulnerable members that require humanitarian
assistance.182
However, in the context of the CMR,
profiling mobile populations is significantly more
challenging and beneficiary identification efforts are less
effective, despite widespread physical, social and mental
health-related vulnerabilities.
This paper looks at protection programming in transit
settings, and the challenges to providing protection to
transit migrants. In particular, it examines challenges in
targeting migrants, and challenges in building trust with
potential migrant beneficiaries.
The paper draws on insights from transit migrants and
stakeholders interviewed by Independent Monitoring,
Research and Evidence Facility (IMREF) in Agadez,
Gao, and Ouagadougou, between September 2019 and
November 2020.183
Challenges in targeting
migrants
Many stakeholders IMREF interviewed say that it is not
always clear who the most vulnerable people are among
transit migrants on the CMR. IMREF research suggests
that migrants’ vulnerability increases the longer they
journey along the CMR: they are exposed to different
forms of extortion and abuse, their financial resources
diminish, and their physical and mental stresses
Burkina Faso,
Niger, Mali
West Africa
74

increase. This reflects the fact that vulnerability is not a
simple, easily measurable characteristic of an individual,
but rather the result of situational factors and personal
characteristics.
While some organisations are moving away from
checklist-type vulnerability assessments towards more
non-static definitions to integrate the personal and
situational conditions of individual migrants,184
significant
challenges remain in applying these in transit migration
contexts. Transit migrants are highly mobile and often
stay in transit hubs for a limited amount of time, aiming
to move forward to the next leg of their journey as soon
as they are able to. While organisations have increased
their presence in migration intersections, such as bus
stations and ghettos, community mobilisers, field staffs
and volunteers report that they struggle to clearly spot all
vulnerabilities as some are actively hidden by migrants
or not visible at a first look. This includes survivors
of SGBV, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT)-identifying individuals, and underaged youth.
Most stakeholders agree that improved referrals between
humanitarian organisations have helped to better target
vulnerable migrants. In Agadez, Gao and Ouagadougou,
organisations have developed referral pathways that
outline the target groups of each organisation and the
services they provide, along with contact numbers that
field workers can use. However, practical gaps remain in
implementing effective referral mechanisms: field workers
often said they are not fully familiar with the mandates and
services provided by all organisations which are part of
the referral mechanism; that phone numbers indicated for
referral do not always work; and that some organisations
may not accept referrals due to lack of funds.
Successful referrals and targeting are closely tied to
access strategies and the ability to identify migrants in
places they transit and live, either to access them directly
or to ensure migrants receive information on the services
available to them. However, unlike many displacement
settings, access to migrants is not guaranteed in transit
migration settings.
Challenges in accessing transit
migrants: spotlight on the
issue of trust in humanitarian
organisations
Several migrants interviewed by IMREF in Agadez,
Ouagadougou and Gao said they were unwilling to access
assistance available to them. Migrants’ priority is often to
continue the journey, even if that leads to dependencies
on smuggling actors and reduced resources, and puts
them in harm’s way. As a result, onward migrants do not
access assistance if they feel that available services will
impede or delay their north-bound journey.
Moreover, several migrants interviewed by IMREF in
Agadez,OuagadougouandGaosaidafearofdeportation
made them unwilling to access services and encouraged
them to hide from both authorities and humanitarian
organisations. These migrants expressed concerns that
if they accessed humanitarian services, they would be
forced to return to their country of origin either by the
police or the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM) through their return assistance programme, which
some migrants did not view as voluntary. Perceived
collaboration between organisations and the police or
government amplified these concerns. Most migrants
said that they did not trust the police or local authorities.
Several migrants in both Gao and Agadez said that
organisations gave information about them to the police
leading to detention or deportation. A 31-year-old Ivorian
migrant in Gao expressed concerns that NGOs would
denounce him to the police:
“What makes me suspicious of organisations
is that every year we see many migrants who
are turned away by the authorities in the places
where they are. And finally, one wonders if
humanitarian organisations are not at the
root of these expulsions; maybe humanitarian
organisations that share our information with the
local authorities.”
In some cases, fears led some migrants to actively
prevent humanitarian staff from entering ghettos and
engaging with them. Some smuggling actors also used
these concerns to encourage migrants to remain inside
the network, including in ghettos and safe houses, and
to not approach humanitarian organisations that could
assist them.
While other migrants did not believe organisations would
forcibly deport them, they were afraid organisations
would manage to manipulate them out of migrating,
losing the significant investments they had already
made in their journeys. A 27-year-old Ivorian migrant
interviewed in Agadez articulated these concerns by
saying: “It seems that there are organisations that will do
everything they can to discourage you and make you give
up your trip. That’s why I don›t even try to go because
I have travelled thousands and thousands of kilometres
before arriving in Niger.” In both Agadez and Gao, several
respondents believed that the European Union (EU)
funded humanitarian organisations to stop them from
migrating. These migrants talked about a fundamental
gap between the support they wanted and the support
that organisations offered, arguing that support to travel
to Europe would be more appropriate than any other
type of support. Support activities that migrants thought
would be most relevant included: transportation to cross
the desert safely; creation of safe and legal pathways to
Europe, including support to get visas; direct protection
from security forces at border stops; and advocacy

against expulsions. While migrants were often aware
that these expectations were unrealistic, this illustrates
a key tension between protection needs identified by
migrants themselves and constraints organisations face
in providing protection.
As a result, several migrants described accessing
organisations as a trade-off between their level of need
and perceived risks to their journeys, which often meant
that they waited until they were extremely vulnerable
before seeking assistance. As a result of this dynamic,
organisations often cannot provide migrants with
informationonhowtoavoidharmastheytravelnorthward,
or with items to prepare their journeys more safely (e.g.
condoms, adequate clothes, hygiene kits). The inability to
access migrants and help them avoid harm is thus a key
gap in protection programming in transit settings.
Conclusion
The challenges of targeting migrants in transit settings
create a risk that humanitarian and development
programmes will not reach the most vulnerable
migrants. Furthermore, the lack of trust in humanitarian
organisations clearly limits transit migrants’ uptake of
available assistance in Agadez, Gao and Ouagadougou.
Recommendations for policymakers
Based on insights from migrants, field staffs, and on lessons learned from the literature, IMREF’s research suggest
preliminary steps to overcome targeting and access challenges that severely impede protection programming on
the CMR. In particular, recommendations focus on trust-building and communications which are critical to effective
protection programming in transit settings. Implementers should improve communications on organisations’
mandates, their activities and neutrality that take into account existing concerns among migrants. Uncoordinated
communications could, in contrast, lead to further suspicions among migrants and smuggling actors.
• Implementers should develop a shared, area-based strategy and coordination plan through existing
Migration Protection Working Groups. This strategy should include, at a minimum: i) building trust with key actors
in the targeted communities and beneficiary groups; ii) a mapping of the presence of community mobilisers in key
migration intersections, including ghettos and bus stations; iii) clear referral pathways to cover gaps in assistance;
and iv) common procedures for sharing research and analysis, approaches to detection of vulnerabilities as well as
to working with smuggling actors, local government and local organisations (including migrant associations).
• Implementers should use existing coordination platforms to organise day-to-day coverage at bus stations,
ghettos,andkeyneighbourhoodstoclearlycommunicateavailablesupportassistancebydifferentaidorganisations
and to prevent misconceptions and misinformation that may create suspicions among migrants.
• Implementers should train field workers on identifying a wider range of vulnerabilities, regardless of their
organisation’s specific mandate, and specifically with a view to identifying vulnerabilities less visible at a first look.
This would allow for not leaving vulnerable migrants behind and improving referrals to relevant actors following
detection and first contact with migrants. Alternatively, organisations could nominate a single actor that could be
in charge of screening migrants in main transit intersections; leading referral processes; and staying updated on
new actors, target groups and changes in focal points within organisations.
76

“See Migration Like Water”: An Analysis
of Flow Monitoring Survey Data on
Migration Flows in and through West and
Central Africa
Authors: Digidiki, V., J. Bhabha, A. Bhatia, S. Peisch, V. Sattler,
B. Cordaro and H. Cook. (2021) “See Migration Like Water”:
An Analysis of IOM Flow Monitoring Survey Data on Migration
Flows in West and Central Africa. FXB Center for Health and
Human Rights at Harvard University, Boston, and International
Organization for Migration, Geneva
Understanding migration in West and Central Africa
Human mobility is an inherent element of human
development. In recent decades, this human imperative
has frequently abutted against migration policy
responses that limit access to safe and regular migration,
even for sizeable constituencies for whom mobility
represents an essential lifeline. Indeed, human mobility
has been at the epicenter of an intensifying discussion
on national security, which portrays much of mobility as
a problematic threat to sovereign borders requiring firm
management and restrictive regulation. As the COVID-19
pandemic leads to shutdowns of global migration
pathways, the already limited safe and regular movement
options have been further constrained, forcing people
in need of migrating to either follow shadowy, irregular
pathways or remain in overcrowded camps or transit
points under precarious health and safety conditions.
With the pandemic becoming an economic wrecking
ball, poverty levels have increased and deep-seated
inequalities within and between societies have been
accelerating, generating both a public health crisis and
a human rights crisis that will only increase the need for
mobility, even as regular mobility options dwindle.
International law recognises that all persons have hu-
man rights, which must be respected and protected. This
normative framework extends to all people on the move,
irrespective of their migration status.
International law also provides international protection
frameworks for well-established categories of people
such as refugees and trafficked persons. Under the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Member States
committed to facilitating orderly, safe and responsible
migration and mobility while also eradicating forced
labour, modern slavery and human trafficking (SDG 8.7,
SDG 10.7). The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration, although a non-binding agreement,
represents a significant commitment to address and
reduce vulnerabilities in migration, and to enhance
international cooperation for the improvement of
migration governance holistically and comprehensively.
Nevertheless, despite this normative framework and
significant advances in recent years by states to plan
concrete responses to ensure safe, orderly and regular
West Africa,
Central Africa

migration, protection measures often prove inadequate
duetosignificantmigrationmanagementcapacitydeficits
at both national and international levels. Migrants are
often subject to harm, discrimination, abuse, exploitation
and other forms of human rights violations.
Strengthening and ensuring proper implementation
of international protection frameworks must be a
cornerstone of any response to ensure that the human
rights of people on the move are upheld. However, this
is not sufficient to respond to all the protection needs
migrants may have, including those that may arise
during extremely challenging journeys. Many migration
routes within West and Central Africa – shared by the
majority who are travelling within the region as well as
those destined for North Africa or Europe – are complex
and multi-dimensional; often characterised as “mixed
migration.” Under a mixed-migration lens, migrants can
belong to more than one established protection category
simultaneously or shift between categories while on
the move, depending on the challenges they face and
their capacity to overcome them. In addition to ensuring
rights to international protection are recognised and
upheld, this complex reality needs to be addressed by
operationalising a contextualised analysis of individual
vulnerability to identify migrants who have other
protection needs at early stages of their journey.
Protection measure have long been designed, with
different levels of effectiveness, by governments to
address the urgent needs that migrants face. However,
the complexity and rapidly evolving characteristics of
modern mobility, combined with the emergence of new
threats and risks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have
limited the efficacy of these frameworks, leaving many
migrants unprotected. Evidence-based information
about the risks and protective factors impacting migrants
is critical to comprehend such a multifaceted and rapidly
evolving reality and to the design and implementation
of targeted, comprehensive and sustainable small- and
large-scale responses tailored to the needs of different
groups of migrants.
TheWestandCentralAfricanregionsproviderichevidence
of dynamic migratory patterns, including long histories
of diverse intraregional and interregional migration
flows (IOM, 2020b),185
as well as severe protection
gaps and challenges along popular migration routes
(Adepoju, 2016).186
The region has the highest rate of
both intraregional and extra regional migration (Lombard,
2012), with 19.4 million intra-African migrants in 2018
alone (McAuliffe and Kitimbo, 2018).187
During the past
two years, and in the face of these substantial movements,
the African Union supported the efforts of the Regional
Economic Communities, such as the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African
Community (EAC), to enhance regional integration by
adopting a continent-wide protocol on free movement
(African Union, 2017).188
However, migrants continue to
face severe protection gaps, highlighting enduring and
significant migration management capacity deficits at the
national and regional levels (Adepoju, 2016).189
This report calls for a comprehensive and contextualised
understanding of migrant vulnerability across the most
popular West and Central African migration routes –
examining risk and protective factors at the individual,
household, community and structural levels – to stimulate
the development of prevention-based protection
frameworks to assist migrants in need.
The report is based on an analysis of DTM flow monitoring
survey (FMS) data gathered from 110,402 migrants of
73 different nationalities at 39 flow monitoring points
(FMP) (exit, entry and transit) in seven countries in West
and Central Africa in 2018 and 2019 (namely, Burkina
Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal),
as well as from qualitative data gathered from 11 expert
interviews in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic. It
documents the varied and complex migration patterns
occurring within West and Central Africa; the profiles of
migrants; their ongoing experiences at numerous points
along the migration routes; and the different protection
issues and obstacles they face throughout the course of
their journeys.
Driven by these data, this report aims to:
Generate an evidence-based analysis of the tightly
interwoven geographic, cultural and economic patchwork
thatconstitutesWestandCentralAfricanmigrationforthe
benefit of IOM and other migration-related international
organisations, the broader humanitarian community,
policy makers and other relevant stakeholders;
Provide evidence-based programming recommendations
on protection and assistance tailored to the specific
needs, trajectories and vulnerabilities of migrants moving
within and out of the region;
Advance viable harm prevention-based frameworks for
assisting migrants in situations of increased vulnerability
to harm, with a view to stimulating the development
of policies that afford safe and regular migration
opportunities for this constituency.
This report is part of the wider effort of IOM to collect and
disseminate sound empirical data on migration dynamics
and vulnerabilities in order to support progress towards
enhancement of safe migration, including to support the
implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly
and Regular Migration, and realise the migration-related
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and targets.
The findings of this report emphasise the immediate
and pressing need for a sustainable, multilayered, harm
prevention-based strategy to protect migrants at a time
when the mismatch between the existence of regular
migrationpathwaysandtheneedformobilityhasbecome
far too wide. As the world grapples with an emerging
third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the highest
78

levels of global inequality in human history, migration will
continue to be a life-saving strategy for people. Human
mobility, therefore, must be safe, accessible and inclusive.
Key findings
The vast majority of migrants opt to
remain within the region.
A large majority, or 80.09 percent, of the study’s
respondents reported a country of the West and
Central Africa region as their final destination,
with only 19.37 percent reporting Europe and less
than 0.5 percent reporting the Americas, Asia or
Oceania.
Almost half of the migrant women
interviewed are travelling without a
relative or family member.
Women travelled alone not only as a part of a
family reunification strategy, but to seek better
livelihood opportunities as they are often the sole
provider in their household. Many of these women
will be alone at their destination and often have to
leave their children behind.
The vast majority of migrants who were
forcibly displaced in their home country
tend to remain on the continent.
Almost nine out of 10 (87.75 percent) of
respondents who were forcibly displaced from
their homes intend to remain on the continent,
while only 11.73 percent identified Europe
as their intended destination and less than 1
percent planned to migrate to other continents.
These migrants are less likely to embark upon
long-distance journeys and more likely to remain
close to their respective home countries than their
non-forcibly displaced counterparts.
The majority of the migrants reported
using their savings to finance their
journeys.
A third (66.76 percent) of the respondents
mentioned that they financed their journey using
their own savings. Prospective migrants often
liquidate personal assets to secure funds – a
strategy that can severely complicate return or
future migration planning.
Children travelling without parents or an
adult caregiver are more likely to travel
alone, rather than in groups, compared
to migrants over the age of 18.
Leaving a familiar and often protective
environment – to embark on travel alone –
places children in highly risky situations where
their physical and psychological security and
well-being can be threatened.
Financial issues and food insecurity are
the most common challenges reported
by unaccompanied migrant children
across the migration routes under study,
followed by accommodation insecurity
and documentation issues.
Financial issues are one of the most common
challenges, reported by 46.43 percent of child
migrants travelling alone, along with food and
accommodation insecurity, reported by 46.43
percent and 42.86 percent, respectively. The
need for financial resources to cover daily needs,
including access to food and shelter while en
route, or to finance the continuation of the journey
forces children into illicit (and therefore dangerous)
money-making activities, exposing them to
deception, coercion, exploitation and abuse.
Documentation issues were mentioned by
28.57 percent of child respondents. Lack of
documentation leads to a series of interconnected
protection gaps for children, ranging from stressful
(and often problematic) age assessments and
prolonged detention to limited access to available
services – challenges that increase children’s
vulnerability to abuse and exploitation (Terrio,
2015; UNICEF, 2002).190

Drawing on data from multiple migration points and
mixed migration flows, this large-scale study aimed to
provide a dynamic and comprehensive understanding of
West and Central African migration trends and migrant
vulnerability, in order to inform the design of targeted,
inclusive and rights-centred responses and a more
effective harm-prevention framework.
Targeted migration responses should focus on mitigating
widespread risks and dangers, and on addressing the
multifaceted needs that migrants face across migration
routes. These responses will not be effective if they do
not consider the heterogeneity of migrants and the
complexity of their mobility – both of which are factors
that generate different risks, needs and vulnerabilities –
even when migration routes and journey modalities are
the same.
The recommendations on the next page, anchored on the
objectives of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration, set out key actions for consideration
by IOM and other international agencies engaged in
responding to the protection challenges facing migrants,
as well as national governments, in the context of West
and Central African migration.
Recommendations
• Enhance access to support services along migratory routes. Improve access to essential services, such as
health and legal assistance, establish open and accessible information points for migrants at transit points and
strengthen the provision of psycho-social services along migration routes.
• Ensure and enhance the availability of pathways for regular migration. Strengthen international cooperation
and promote bilateral and multilateral agreements that will ensure safe, orderly and regular migration, expand
access to work permits, options for labour and academic mobility and exchanges, ensure the availability of visas
on humanitarian grounds and ensure access to rapid family reunification procedures.
• Awareness-raising and access to information. Finance and support national awareness-raising campaigns in
origin countries to ensure prospective migrants have access to accurate information, engage return migrants,
publicise available opportunities and encourage the practice of seeking information from official sources.
• Invest in enhancing the capacity of agencies and governmental actors. Provide all agencies, governmental
actors and stakeholders with rigorous training in human rights principles; share good practices.
• Create livelihood opportunities in origin and neighbouring countries. Create sustainable livelihood opportunities
at the local and regional levels, ensure equal access to economic opportunities, provide skill development
programmes, address unnecessary bureaucracy and red tape that prevent people from accessing job opportunities.
• “Facilitate safe and dignified return and readmission, and sustainable reintegration” (Objective 21 of the
Global Compact for Migration). Ensure that return and readmission of migrants to their own country is safe,
dignified and in full compliance with international human rights law; ensure that migrants have accurate and timely
information about the return process; make available return and reintegration programmes; provide returnees with
access to short-term support programmes; and ensure individual reintegration activities.
• Collect accurate, disaggregated and in-depth data. Conduct regular systematic studies on protection challenges
that migrants face along the different migration routes.
• Enhance efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate human trafficking in the region. Ensure that counter-
trafficking responses are incorporated in all humanitarian relief operations across the different routes, collaborate
with governments at policy and assistance levels and increase prevention efforts.
• Collaboration and coordination among stakeholders and governments. Foster coordination and collaboration
between national governments, UN agencies and local NGOs by defining roles and responsibilities, minimising
redundancies and maximising constructive collaboration in delivering services.
80

Rethinking Responses to Migration:
Evidence from Children and Young people
in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia
Authors: Lucy Hovil,191
Research Consultant, UNICEF Office of
Research – Innocenti; Mark Gill, Research Consultant, UNICEF
Office of Research – Innocenti; Iolanda Genovese, Migration
Research Officer, UNICEF Office of Research – Innocenti; Teona
Aslanishvili, Child Protection Specialist – Migration focal point,
UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
Introduction
In the Horn and North of Africa, we are observing a
rapidly evolving phase of human mobility built upon
a long established and deeply embedded history of
movement in the region.192
Children and families often
use migration as a key coping strategy when their
environment compels them to seek safety, protection and
better sources of livelihood elsewhere.
Children’s right to protection and safety does not change
when they move, and is irrespective of the circumstances
or nature of their migration. This is underscored by the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which affords
rights to children in – and not of – a country. However, in
practice, the protective and enabling environment often
remains out of reach for children who move, particularly
where the global policy setting, with imposed restrictions
on mobility, leads to exclusion and greater levels of risk.
Considering these challenges, migration – especially
migration of children and young people – is often framed
primarily in terms of risk and the need for protection. This
framing is rarely balanced by a discussion of the potential
benefits that mobility and relocation might bring. It also
overlooks the agency of children and young people, which
leads to a lack of support for those who are moving and
the countries that are hosting them.
This paper uses data from four countries to help build a
grounded picture of migration in the Horn and North of
Africa that is informed by those who live and experience
it. Findings of the research challenge migration policies
and responses that are based on rigid dichotomies of
“regular” versus “irregular” migration; “choice” versus
“coercion”; and “voluntary” versus “forced” migration.
The approach of this study highlights the complexity of
children and young people’s movement: Their reasons for
moving, their experiences while travelling, their views of
their current location, and their future plans. It assesses
vulnerabilities and opportunities, providing indicators of
some of the wider factors that constitute child well-being,
including access to services and unmet demand for
needed support.
Egypt, Ethiopia,
Somalia, Sudan
North Africa,
East Africa

Findings
Reasons for moving
Drivers of migration in the Horn of Africa are complex,
interlinked and fluid. Two-thirds (67 percent) of children
and young people interviewed identified economic drivers
(including poverty and loss of jobs) and almost half (48
percent) security issues (including forced recruitment) as
the two most important reasons for initially leaving their
home area. In fact, these two concerns are drivers for nine
in 10 children and young people who move. Furthermore,
for a significant proportion – one in four – both reasons
were given for moving.
Figure 1: Reasons for moving (n=1,634)
Economics was significantly more of a factor than
security for young people (72 percent versus 44 percent),
whereas these factors were more evenly balanced for
children (59 percent versus 53 percent). Economic factors
were particularly reported by those living alone and by
those who themselves had chosen to move. Among
those who left home for security reasons, one major fear
was of forced recruitment.
Key protection issues children face while
moving
83 percent of children and young people travelled with
someone, and only 16 percent travelled alone. However,
only half of those who travelled with other people were
accompanied by their families, 36 percent travelled with
friends and 26 percent with community members. The
remainder made their journey without familiar support
mechanisms: One in three travelled with people they did
not know, and 8 percent travelled with smugglers.193
Methodology and
Respondent Profiles
Data used in this paper are based on face-to-
face surveys with 1,634 children and young
people (aged 14 to 24 years) on the move and 248
qualitative interviews with children, young people,
families, community members and key informants
(government officials, civil society organizations,
UN agencies). The research was conducted by
UNICEF-trained interviewers between April 2019
and January 2020 in sample points across Egypt,
Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The respondents
reflected the mixed nature of migration in this part
of Africa.
Respondents:
• 57% were male and 43% female;
• 40% were nationals of the country they were
interviewed in and 60% were non-nationals;
• The majority (59%) were aged between 18
and 24 years old (“young people”) and the
remainder (41%) were between 14 and 17
years (“children”);
• Of the latter, 22% said they were not with an
adult responsible for their care, and have been
classified as “unaccompanied children” – 71%
of them were boys;
• 17% of the overall sample said they were living
alone at the time of the interview: These were
more likely to be male (70%) and 18 to 24 years
(81%);
• 82% of respondents said that they were still
moving;
• 17% described themselves as returnees.
Either
reason:
89%
Reasons for leaving
82

Figure 2: Children travelling alone or with someone (n=1,634)
Although only a small proportion of children and young
people travelled with a smuggler as part of their journey,
a greater number (19 percent) said that a smuggler
helped them plan their journey. The research explored
the services and opportunities that smugglers offered
and provided, and the fact that almost equal numbers
of respondents felt that the smuggler they used was a
good person (43 percent) and a bad person (40 percent).
This perception demonstrates that from the perspectives
of those who move, smugglers present opportunities and
help, as well as dangers and risk.
Migration is often associated with danger and harm.
However, the findings show that this is only a partial
view; in this study, most children and young people said
they had not experienced harm. Nevertheless, two in five
(39 percent) were hurt by someone they knew or by a
stranger, and one in five (21 percent) was forced to do
work either with or without pay. A more likely experience
for children and young people was feeling scared of
other people or of wild animals: Just over half of those
interviewed claimed they had experienced feeling scared
since leaving their home area.
Figure 3: Harms suffered by children since leaving home (n=1,634)
26%
Community
Members
50%
Families
36%
Friends
32%
Strangers
8%
Smugglers
16%
Travelled alone
83%
Travelled with others
“I will never forget what I
experienced on my journey.
Worst of all, they forced us
to work in private farms
without any payment just
like slaves. There was no
one to protect you there.”
17-year-old returnee,
Ethiopia
Felt scared
Physically hurt
Detained
Forced to work

Therefore, while many children and young people do
encounter harm when they move, it is important to note
that not all migration is dangerous, and migration is often
viewed as a safer option to remaining at home. In fact,
while half said they felt safe in their home area before the
moved this increased to 75 percent who felt safe in their
current location after leaving their home area.
Deprivation of liberty. Detention is also a risk faced
by those who move: Three in 10 said that they had
experienced this, and they were twice as likely to
be detained by authorities than other people. While
immigration detention is never in the best interests of
the child, children are still subject to deprivation of liberty
by governments and by persons or actors other than
governments, indicating serious protection gaps. While
both girls and boys can be subject to deprivation of
liberty, more boys reported having been detained.
Children crossing borders. The majority (70 percent) of
those interviewed had crossed an international border as
part of their journey. Crossing borders can be associated
with heightened risks, and children typically reported
borders as points on the migration journey that are lonely
and lacking in support from authorities.194
Figure 4: Experiences of children and young people at border crossings (n=1097)
Many children and young people felt unsafe crossing
borders, especially unofficial border crossings: 77 percent
of those who crossed an unofficial border described it
as unsafe – far higher than the 28 percent who said the
official border crossing was not safe. In our sample, more
boys than girls had negative experiences at borders, and
were more likely to describe them as lonely and unsafe.
Access to basic services and
support
While limited availability of services or associated costs
are problems that confront migrant and host communities
alike in many countries on migration routes, children and
young people who move often face additional challenges.
The research explored specific constellation of barriers
among the respondents.
84

Figure 5: Percentage of children and young
people who have been to school in the last
month, by category
Findings on access to education clearly demonstrate that
children often face multiple barriers in accessing services.
Almost two in five respondents said they had wanted to
go to school but had been unable to – the highest level
of exclusion of all of the 10 services or types of support
covered in the research. The main barrier to school access
was cost: Twice as many gave this reason as compared
to those who reported lack of availability of schools as the
main barrier. Cost as a barrier was not only associated
with school fees, but also other costs including the money
required to pay for school items, uniform and/or travel.
Findings also indicate that children often have to choose
between earning and learning. Others felt too scared to
go to school as a result of xenophobia or discrimination.
Only39percentofchildreninterviewedhadbeentoschool
in the last month and, in the case of unaccompanied
children, only 8 percent had been to school in the last
month.
“I wanted to learn, but there was no school there.
Plus, it is a camp and it is so far from everything
else.”
18-year-old Eritrean man, Sudan
The second highest unmet demand was for support from
a social worker. Half of respondents identified lack of
availability as a barrier to using a social worker, and a
third said they did not know how to access social workers.
It is revealing that those living in camps – often seen
as settings with a higher density of services designed
specifically for those “on the move” – typically had higher
levels of unmet demand for a range of services than
those living elsewhere, with the exception of shelter or
temporary accommodation. For instance, 20 percent of
those in a non-camp setting felt excluded from using
health services, but this was 30 percent for those in a
camp. The gap was even more significant in relation to
using schools (33 percent felt excluded in non-camps
versus 45 percent of those in a camp) and accessing
social workers (29 percent and 41 percent, respectively).
It is wrong, therefore, to assume that those in camps are
more likely to receive support and protective services
that those out of camps.
Figure 6: Percentage of children and young people who had wanted to but have been
unable to use each service (n=1,634)
% of each group who have been to
school in the last month
24% All interviewed
21% Boys
27% Girls
39% Children
13% Young people
8% Unaccompanied
children
Barriers in accessing services:
• lack of availability
• costs implication
• lack of information
• mistrust
• stigma
School
Legal assistance
Social worker
Counsellor
Adult in community
Health centre/ hospital
Shelter
Family
Money transfer
Interpreter
37%
32%
32%
29%
29%
23%
23%
19%
19%
12%

The research illustrates that many children who are
classified as being “on the move” are not actually moving,
either because they do not have the resources to either
move on or return to their country of origin, or because
they have chosen to remain in their current location. As
a result, many are effectively stuck. Indeed, 45 percent
of the children and young people interviewed said
they had been living in their current location for more
than 12 months, and 29 percent between six and 12
months. Alongside multiple reported barriers of moving
elsewhere and lack of options or desire to return home,
there were also barriers to local integration, which were
compounded by high levels of distrust in authorities and
many local service providers.
Legal identity and its impact on accessing services. Most
children and young people who were moving had some
form of identification with them, but almost three in 10
did not. There was little difference between boys and
girls, but somewhat more children than young people did
not have documentation, particularly unaccompanied
children, and more nationals than non-nationals did not
have any documentation.
Figure 7: Documentation (n=1,634)
Typically, those without documentation were more likely
to say they were unable to access services, as outlined
below:
Table 1: Documentation and access to services (n=1,634)
% of each group with
no documents:
29% boys
25% girls
33% children
23% young people
55% unaccompanied children
33% nationals
23% non-nationals
National
documents
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
35%
Travel
documents
31%
Proof of refugee /
asylum status
30%
Other ID card 29%
Any of these 72%
None of these 27%
% of those who had any
documentation who were
unable to acess the service
% of those who had no
documentation who were
unabvle to acess the service
A health centre or hospital 17 37
A social worker 28 43
A school 31 50
Legal assistance 29 42
A shelter/ temporary accommodation 18 45
86

Children’s trust in services and institutions
The research indicates that many children and young
peoplewhomovearedistrustfulofservicesandinstitutions
that are designed to provide care, protection and basic
services. While a majority believed international charities,
teachers, religious leaders and social workers would help
them, not all were convinced. More strikingly, only around
a third felt government officials or the police would help
them. Government officials and police were also among
entities associated with a comparatively higher level of
expectation of harm, when compared to others.
Figure 8: Whom do children and young people trust? (n=1,634)
Future plans and aspirations
Push and pull factors for staying or moving on. Just over
half of respondents195
(54 percent) said they planned to
move somewhere else in the next six months. However,
given that the majority had been in their current location
for more than six months, responses may indicate more of
a desire to move than firm plans for a substantial number.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that expectations
related to finding or continuing employment play a
predominant role in shaping intentions to move and to
stay. In addition, for those who want to move, half (51
percent) do so for better school or education opportunities;
and for those who plan to stay, safety was the second
most important reason for doing so.
Figure 9: Children and young people’s plans in the next six months
Top 2 Reasons:
• 48% jobs
• 44% safety
Top 2 Reasons:
• 69% jobs
• 51% schools
42% Stay
54% Move
Harm
Help
International charities
Teachers
Religious leaders
Social workers
Community leaders
Government ofiicials
Police
6%
66%
6%
61%
5%
60%
4%
54%
7%
43%
15%
36%
15%
35%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Barriers to returning home. When asked about barriers
to returning home,196
economic and security concerns
in their home area were most frequently given as the
reasons. Furthermore, fear of their home government and
political situation, along with a feeling that nothing had
changed at home, were also in the top five reasons for
not returning. This suggests that the factors that pushed
most migrants to leave their home area persist as barriers
to returning. As such, only one in four (26 percent) said
that lack of money to travel was a barrier and even fewer
(9 percent) identified lack of documentation.
Figure 10: Barriers to returning home (n=1,333)
Economic situation
at home
No money to travel
Insecurity at home
Fear of home government /
political situation
No change / no
hope at home
Family
Lack of educational
opportunities
Lack of basic services
Community at home
Don’t have
documents to travel
Nothing
Military conscription
37%
26%
34%
22%
18%
11%
12%
17%
8%
9%
5%
3%
0% 20% 40% 60%
88

Conclusion and recommendations
Migration stakeholders should embrace a child-centred understanding of the drivers
and characteristics of migration.
Children and young people do not define themselves by formal categories of migration. While categories of
migration contained in international frameworks retain validity as a key source of protection – including forced, unforced;
regular, irregular; and internal, external – the perspectives of children and young people on the move demonstrate that
many of these categories have limited validity in practice. For instance, the vast majority moved for multiple reasons,
and there was significant overlap between moving for economic purposes and for security reasons.
Older children and young people show a high degree of agency in making the initial decision to move, as well
as during subsequent milestones along their journeys. The vast majority (76 percent) said it was their choice to
leave their home area, and nearly all (93 percent) said it would be their choice whether to stay in their current location
or move elsewhere in the next few months. This demonstrates that children and young people are not just passive
participants in their movement, and their agency is a key factor in understanding their motivations, decisions and
attitudes to risk.
Reform and strengthen systems in a way that ensures effective protection according
to needs.
Migration can present both risks and opportunities; and both need to be taken into account when assessing
the best interests of a child. The majority remain within the region and, as the findings show, more feel safer in their
current situation than they did before they left their home area. Therefore, focusing only on the vulnerabilities and
harm associated with movement leads to a narrow perspective on those who move.

“There is no question that any improvement in protection along the routes needs to be
linked to actions and policies within the countries of origin in the Horn of Africa, and
that all international and regional actors need to make sure that they have a coherent
approach in this regard.”
Laetitia Bader, Horn of Africa Director, Human Rights Watch.
Policy Notes
Theme 5: Regional policy
responses to mixed movement
Sylvain Cherkaoui
An aerial view of the site in Ouallam, Tillaberi,
south-west Niger where houses are being built
to accommodate Malian refugees, internally
displaced Nigeriens and the host community.
90

Migration Management in the Time of
COVID-19: EU Policies and Libya
Authors: Amera Markous,197
4Mi Team Leader for Libya, Mixed
Migration Centre North Africa; Dr. Ayla Bonfiglio, Regional
Manager, Mixed Migration Centre North Africa; Ana-Maria
Murphy-Teixidor, Research Specialist, Mixed Migration Centre
North Africa
Introduction and rationale
Given the political instability, insecurity and weak
health systems in Libya, the country is at a higher risk
of the spread of COVID-19.198
Refugees and migrants
find themselves in a particularly precarious situation
given their reliance on casual, daily work as well as their
vulnerability to arrest and detention.199
For some, the
perceived need to continue their journey onward from
Libya, improve their livelihood and seek out protection
outweigh the risks involved in undertaking the dangerous
sea-crossing to Europe.200
Human rights groups are
concerned that the European Union (EU) and its Member
States (MS) are using the pandemic as grounds to limit
arrivals of refugees and migrants.201
This paper examines the impact of EU migration
policies and procedures on the conditions of refugees
and migrants in Libya since the outbreak of COVID-19.
The findings seek to provide European policy actors
with evidence to inform such policies and procedures
in the Mediterranean, while taking into consideration
the impact that they have on the lives and mobility of
refugees and migrants. The following section sets out the
three objectives of this study:
Objective 1: To understand how COVID-19 has impacted
the migration policies and procedures of the EU and EU
MS with operations around the Mediterranean.
Objective 3: To examine how migration actors in Libya
are managing mixed migration and implementing EU
policies and procedures, particularly those enacted in the
wake of COVID-19.
Objective 3: To understand how refugees and migrants
in Libya are being impacted by migration policies and
procedures implemented in the aftermath of COVID-19.
This paper uses a combination of qualitative and
quantitative research methods to reach its objectives. It
examines existing academic, policy and programmatic
literature, and draws upon qualitative data from 15
key informant interviews with Libyan and European
officials, humanitarian workers and migrant and refugee
community leaders in Libya. This study also draws
upon quantitative data collected from 200 surveys with
individual refugees and migrants in Libya between
October and November 2020.
Libya
Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa

Continuation of migration
policies and procedures aimed
at reducing Mediterranean
crossings
In March 2020, Operation Sophia – formerly known
as the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean
(EUNAVFOR Med) – expired and was replaced by IRINI.
EUNAVFOR Med was founded in 2015 as a naval mission
to disrupt the business model of migrant smuggling in the
area, and reduce irregular migration. However, as the
mission evolved, it was also taking part in search and
rescue operations that saved the lives of thousands of
refugees and migrants stranded at sea.202
Nevertheless,
this was criticised as a “pull factor” for migration by some
member states,203
although no evidence exists to support
such claim.204
IRINI, its successor, is a military mission
primarily monitoring the United Nations arms embargo
in Libya, but also to train Libyan Coast Guards (LCG) to
disrupt human smuggling networks.205
While its vessels
are still obliged by international law to rescue migrants
and refugees stranded at sea, IRINI does not mention sea
rescues as part of its mandate, and is positioned away
from Western Libya, where most coastal departures take
place and people would need rescuing. Furthermore,
some European states have once more stressed the “pull
factor” generated by such missions at sea, stating that
if IRINI appeared to have any impact on migration, then
ships would be withdrawn from the Mediterranean.206
Following the COVID-19 outbreak, April 2020 saw the
continuation of approaches aimed at reducing irregular
migration across the Mediterranean and combatting
migrant smuggling operations in Libya, with IOM and
the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)
Libya signing a new memorandum of understanding
to support the Libyan government with security reform
and border management.207
Furthermore, in September
2020, the European Commission launched the New Pact
on Migration and Asylum, which further strengthens
collaboration with countries like Libya: “The EU will
strengthen cooperation with countries of origin and
transit to prevent dangerous journeys and irregular
crossings, including through tailor-made Counter Migrant
Smuggling Partnerships with third countries.”208
The
impact of this pact, however, is not yet evident. In a key
informant interview, EU Member of Parliament Clare Daly
maintained that:
“The unspoken but foundational policy of
‘keeping migrants out of Europe at any cost,’
without question has the greatest impact on the
migration dynamics in the Mediterranean and in
Libya today. This policy will be codified and given
further energy by the new Migration Pact, with
its heavy emphasis on border externalisation
.Border externalisation is the reason migrants are
trapped in Libya, it’s the reason for pushbacks…
in the Mediterranean, and the reason for the
abandonment of state-led search and rescue
(SAR).”
These brief examples show that since the outbreak
of COVID-19 in early 2020, migration policies and
procedures aimed at reducing Mediterranean crossings
have continued unabated.
European port closures and
returns to halt the spread of
COVID-19
To halt the spread of COVID-19, Italy and Malta
declared their ports unsafe for disembarkation, followed
by Germany calling on humanitarian rescue vessels to
halt their operations at sea.209
A limited number of NGO
rescue ships continued to operate at sea during the
pandemic, some of which were refused disembarkation
in Europe. Italian authorities detained some ships five
times between May and September 2020.210
Rescue
operations were conducted by private commercial
vessels to help fill the gap and in the absence of SAR
capacity. Yet, even private vessels were refused
disembarkation when they rescued migrants.
An Amnesty International (AI) report details an incident in
which Malta did not rescue refugees and migrants at sea,
but instead used “illegal tactics” to return them to Libyan
shores. AI adds that Maltese authorities used COVID-19 as
a“pretext”todeclaretheirportsunsafefordisembarkation,
going so far as to contract a commercial boat to return a
group of 51 people stuck at sea to Libya. AI argues that
“the abusive practices by Malta are part and parcel of
wider efforts by EU Member States and institutions to
outsource the control of the central Mediterranean to
Libya.”211
A humanitarian worker interviewed for this
study also highlighted a case in May in which a group of
135 Sudanese migrants were returned by the LCG from
Maltese waters to Libyan shores, where they would enter
Libya’s detention system. This key informant maintained
that “this is one of the hypocrisies in their policies – maybe
their excuse is that they don’t want to let them in because
of COVID-19, but this was a dirty political deal.”212
IOM estimates that 11,891 refugees and migrants were
returned to Libya in 2020 and, as of 13 March 2021,
this number has already reached 4,129.213
This marks a
considerable increase compared to the 9,225 returns in
2019,214
and reflects the continued cooperation between
the EU and Libyan authorities to prevent refugee and
migrant crossings to Europe. Moreover, this rise may also
suggest the pandemic has provided EU MS with greater
means of refusing entry.
92

Perception of policy shifts in
Libya and Europe
While the pandemic does not appear to have had an
impact on the content of policies, which are a result of
longer-term political processes, there is evidence to
suggest that it has affected the implementation of such
policies. Yet, it is being used to strengthen positions
in preventing arrivals. Based on the data collected,
eight interviewed key informants, including Libyan
and European officials, humanitarian workers and one
researcher, noted that COVID-19 had not prompted
policy change around Libyan maritime and land borders.
Instead, a researcher at Statewatch explained that
Europe continues to prevent crossings from Libya, and
are using COVID-19 as a justification for their actions.
While migration policies in Libya and at sea may not have
changed, in some European states, migration procedures
were modified to respond to the pandemic, such as
Italy’s regularisation programme for migrant workers.215
Moreover, an interviewed EU official also noted that EU
MS changed procedures to comply with their health rules
during the pandemic, which failed “to guarantee both
health security and respect of the rights of migrants.”
Migration management by
Libyan authorities since the
outbreak: Interceptions and
detention
Since April 2020, Libyan authorities enacted movement
restrictions and other measures to halt the spread of
COVID-19, at the same time making changes to migration
governance. These changes included the appointment of
a new Minister of Interior and new Head of Directorate
for Combatting Illegal Migration (DCIM), and committing
to operate SAR strictly within Libyan waters and not in
European waters.
Similarly, a humanitarian worker highlighted in an
interview the improved coordination between the LCG
and the General Administration for Coastal Security
(GACS), which increased efforts to dismantle smuggling
networks. While there is no evidence that Libya’s actions
are anything but its own, they do represent a continuation
and strengthening of objectives it shares with the EU to
reduce irregular sea crossings.
In terms of Libya’s detention policies, interviewed
humanitarian workers noted that following the COVID-19
outbreak, some detention centres were closed, and
refugees and migrants were released. However, they
underscored that these are largely measures by individual
managers of detention centers, utilising their level of
authority. On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest
that discussions are taking place with high-level officials
in Libya, which shows engagement between ministries
despite instability within the Libyan government. A
Libyan official from the Ministry of Justice explained in
an interview for this paper that that the ministry had
taken certain coordinated measures in response to the
pandemic. Such measures included a decree by the
Supreme Judicial Council of Libya to release vulnerable
migrants from detention centres during the outbreak,
alongside intensified conflict in Tripoli, resulting in the
release of 245 refugees and migrants. Demonstrating
divergence between Libyan and EU perspectives, the
interviewed Libyan official claimed that these were
state-led initiatives; on the other hand, an EU official
reported this as an achievement led by EU engagement
efforts.
In sum, there appears to be engagement by some
Libyan and European actors in reducing the detention
of refugees and migrants in light of the pandemic, and
potentially reducing the number of detention centres in
visible coastal areas, moving them further inland. Yet, it
is not clear the extent to which agreements by higher-
level decision-makers at ministries trickle down to actors
involved in the implementation of Libya’s migration
policies. For instance, due to the general state of insecurity
in Libya, it is unclear how effective agreements are in
influencing the existence of unofficial detention centres,
and in monitoring the conditions inside detention centres.
Impacts on the lives of
refugees and migrants in Libya
According to IOM, there are currently 574,146 refugees
and migrants in Libya,216
including 44,725 refugees and
asylum seekers registered with UNHCR.217
In 2020, the
conflict in Libya escalated, and the humanitarian situation
became more complex due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Refugees and migrants have been particularly vulnerable
because they are largely reliant on daily or casual work,
which has been impeded by COVID-19 restrictions on
movement, as well as due to the deteriorating economic
situation with less opportunities in the construction and
reconstructionsectors,andbecauseoftheriskstheyfacein
terms of detention and protection violations. Nevertheless,
refugees and migrants still embark on the journey to
Europe by crossing the Mediterranean. As of November,
the Ministry of the Interior of Italy reported a total of
15,136 refugees and migrants reaching Italy and Malta
from Libya in 2020.218
On the other hand, there have been
substantial return movements overland from Libya too,
both through forced deportations219
and voluntary returns.

Impact on protection:
detention
IOM called 2020 “the worst year” for refugees and
migrants in Libya, due to disappearances caused by the
continued conflict” and the absence of European SAR
operations at sea.220
An interviewed migrant community
leader noted that the COVID-19 situation for refugees
and migrants is particularly risky in Libya, given that if
they test positive for COVID-19, they will be taken to a
detention centre. Although there have been closures of
some centres as a response to the pandemic, some are
still running.
When surveyed refugees and migrants were asked if
they thought there had been an increase in arbitrary
arrest and detention since the outbreak of COVID-19
pandemic, 57.5 percent of respondents (n=115) agreed
or strongly agreed with an increased risk (Figure 1).221
Figure 1. There is an increased risk of arbitrary arrest and detention since the outbreak
of the COVID-19 pandemic (n=200)
Along with the amplified risk of detention for refugees
and migrants, reports suggest no improvement to
conditions inside detention centres to protect against
COVID-19 exposure.222
In a key informant interview, a
humanitarian worker noted that “overcrowding is still
there…also, there’s no respect for the privacy, humanity
and dignity of the person.”
Impact on migration journeys
and planning
Internal and external border closures in Libya have
impacted upon migration journeys and planning, as they
have constrained the ability of refugees and migrants to
return or move onward (Figure 2). Interviewed refugees
and migrants underlined that only those who have legal
documentations have the ability to move freely: “It makes
life very difficult for undocumented migrants because we
don›t always have rest [peace] of mind, most especially
when we want to go to a very far place, [and] we are
always afraid,” reported a man from Nigeria in Tripoli.
Regarding migration routes within Libya, some surveyed
refugees and migrants stated that the tightened security
situation inside the country is affecting the number of
days spent to reach the Libyan coast, where they plan
on departing for Europe. Others spoke of the fact that
UNHCR suspended their resettlement and evacuation
programmes, and IOM suspended their Voluntary
Humanitarian Return (VHR) programme at the start of
the pandemic;223
both programmes have since resumed
operations by August 2020.224
8,5
40 17,5 19,5
14,5
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree
94

Figure 2. Have recent migration policy changes affected your migration plans? (n=199)
Out of 200 surveys, 40 percent (n=80) noted that they
planned to attempt the sea crossing in the next six
months, while an additional 9.5 percent (n=19) remained
undecided (Figure 3). A Nigerian man in Tripoli stated
that “most of my friends over there [Europe] were also
complaining of [a] lack of jobs…I was even told that there
are many migrants who are beggars on the streets of
Italy.” As a result, he decided not to cross to Europe.
Figure 3. Do you plan to attempt the sea crossing in the next six months? (n=200)
Yes No Don’t know Haven’t decided Refused
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Overall (n=200) Women (n=100) Men (n=100)
2%
7%
43%
48%
60%
Yes No Don’t know Refused
Percentage
of
respondents
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

There was gender parity over those who had decided to
make the sea crossing. For those who were undecided
on undertaking the sea crossing, however, there was a
larger portion of men who were undecided (20 percent;
n=20) as compared to women (11 percent; n=11).
Key informant interviews with humanitarian workers
suggest such decisions related to migration planning
vary from one community to another. For example, they
find that East Africans, and Eritreans in particular, are
more determined to make the sea crossing to Europe.
This finding was corroborated in the quantitative data.
While these data should be taken with caution, given
the small sample size, Eritreans (11/20) were among the
nationalities that most often responded with a “Yes” to
the question, “Do you plan to attempt the sea crossing
in the next 6 months?” Other top nationalities included
Nigerians (10/37) and Cameroonians (7/14).
Moreover, key informants suggest that COVID-19 may
haveimpactedthecostoftheseacrossingfromtheLibyan
coast to Europe, rising from an equivalent of USD1,095
per person to between USD2,190 to USD3,649. Some
have reported that the increase is linked to tightened
security along the Mediterranean with active sea patrols,
likely on the part of the LCG. It should be noted that most
surveyed refugees and migrants cannot differentiate
between the various actors at sea, their affiliation and if
they were operating in Libyan or European waters.
Understanding of the role of
policy in migration journeys
and planning
Many of the surveyed refugees and migrants are
generally aware of migration policies and practices in
Libya, citing interceptions and returns at sea, detention
and deportation. A limited number of respondents
(44 percent; n=87) noted changes to policies and
procedures linked to COVID-19. Furthermore, when
looking at access to information on policies, surveyed
refugees and migrants emphasised that they most often
received information on migration policies and changes
in procedures from peers who had successfully arrived
in Europe via a Mediterranean crossing (32 percent).
Yet, 10 percent of surveyed refugees and migrants
noted not having access to information on migration
policies or changes in procedures. Moreover, in relation
to information about detention centres, interviewed
community leaders reported receiving information from
their embassies or from detainees who have phones; and,
in turn, they share such information with their community
through designated Whatsapp groups, face-to-face
meetings and phone calls. Few others have reported
accessing information through smugglers.
Conclusion
This paper examined how the migration policies and
procedures of the EU and EU MS with operations around
the Mediterranean have been impacted by COVID-19,
including their implementation on the ground. It also
assessed their impact on the conditions and experiences
of refugees and migrants in Libya, with a special focus on
their migration planning and journeys.
Findings suggest that COVID-19 did not impact the
development of migration policies in the Mediterranean,
but instead affected their implementation and the
overall management of migration. Evidence shows that
COVID-19 is being used to strengthen positions against
a greater acceptance of refugees and migrants, and to
prevent irregular arrivals to Europe regardless of their
adherence to legal obligations and international law.
In this way, it can be concluded that migration restrictions,
particularly those related to COVID-19 health procedures,
have had an effect on the lives and human rights
conditions of refugees and migrants in Libya, particularly
those undertaking the journey across the Mediterranean.
However, the need of some to seek protection and better
opportunities appears to outweigh the risks of the sea
crossing and potential exposure to the virus.
96

Recommendations
Based on these findings, this study puts forward the following recommendations for authorities, policy actors and
programming.
To EU and Libyan authorities
• Implement coherent policies and procedures that align with human rights standards and international law,including
the compliance of each State to their own SAR zone at sea.
• Provide alternatives to detention, and ultimately reformulate the Libyan law225
that uses detention as a policy to
fight irregular migration and decrease crossings to Europe.
• Engage wider groups of stakeholders on discussions around the management of migration, including civil society,
migrants and refugees, to keep them informed and get their feedback and recommendations.
To EU and EU MS
• Support the Libyan government in improving its response to COVID-19, with particular focus on migrants and
refugees, as this paper finds them to be among the most vulnerable groups in Libya.
• Support humanitarian programmes that respond to the needs of the people on the ground, rather than direct the
funds towards backing certain migration policies by donors.
• Cease providing any assistance or support that contributes to refugees and migrants being intercepted,
disembarked and often detained in Libya, which is not a place of safety, and require provided assistance to meet
human rights standards ando bligations.
For INGOs and UN agencies

• Provide humanitarian assistance to migrants and refugees regardless of their intentions to move onward with their
migration journey.
• Improve advocacy efforts to ensure minimum human rights standards are met for migrants and refugees in Libya.

Policy Regions and Migration Routes:
Where is the (Mis)alignment?
Author: Dr Georgia Cole,226
Chancellor’s Fellow, University of
Edinburgh
Introduction
This short paper responds to the question, “To what
extent do ‘policy regions’ correspond with and capture
intra- and inter-regional movement patterns and
dynamics?” by highlighting the importance of connecting
migratory movements across the Red Sea with those
towards and across the Mediterranean.
In this context, it argues that we need better answers
to the following questions: How do the migratory
dynamics of displaced populations within and to the
Gulf impact regional and global patterns of forced
migration? And how can and might a greater awareness
of these interconnected migration systems shape
more localised and regional policies towards displaced
populations? Drawing upon original empirical research
with Eritreans in Uganda and the United Kingdom, it
provides some preliminary answers to these questions,
as well as raising some of the challenges that emerge in
integrating different policy regions that are approached
through different migration governance mechanisms
and labels. In this context, it discusses the potential value
of strengthening an African version of the Abu Dhabi
Dialogue in order to protect migrant workers’ rights and
opportunities in the Gulf States, given the connections
between labour migration in this region and forced
migration movements within and from the Horn of Africa.
Empirical context
In 2014, as the number of Eritreans attempting to reach
Europe through the ports of North Africa markedly
increased, European policy makers and international
organisations fixed their gaze on what was happening
in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, assuming that the cause
of this rise would be found in these individual’s country
of origin or in countries of first asylum. What much of
the analysis on this dynamic missed, however, was that
Eritreans were at this time ever more effectively barred
from entering Israel, a country to which approximately
37,000 Eritreans had travelled between 2006 and 2012
to access employment and remit money to their families
in Eritrea.227
In December 2013, the civil war in South
Sudan had also broken out, worsening the country’s
security situation and causing a decline in national
and foreign investment. A large population of Eritreans
who had been establishing a foothold in the country’s
hospitality and transport sectors – which had been
growing since the country’s independence from Sudan –
found their markets drying up and their physical security
threatened, causing many to have to at least temporarily
relocate. With these two options closed, more Eritreans
were thus compelled to travel towards Europe or
elsewhere in the Middle East to find opportunities for
refuge and/or remittances. A more linear understanding
of source and transit countries nonetheless meant that
the EU’s response to increased Eritrean arrivals in Europe
took the form of policies directed at points on a series of
arrows, which sketched almost direct lines from Eritrea
through to Libya. The potential impacts of bolstering
Eritreans’ asylum and labour rights in Israel, for example,
were overlooked.
Eritrea,
Ethiopia,
Sudan, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia
East Africa,
North Africa
98

Similarly, and more recently, the intensification of punitive
immigration policies in Saudi Arabia has forced large
numbers of long-staying migrants, including Eritreans
who had previously fled Eritrea, to leave the country.
Since the early 2010s, rising discontent and conflict in
the Arab Middle East had fuelled the Saudi government’s
existing policy agenda of diversifying its economy away
from oil dependency, and reducing the unemployment
rate among young Saudi nationals. A growing list of
occupations are now reserved exclusively for Saudi
nationals, lessening employment opportunities for
foreign nationals. Other recent measures have included
the introduction of several new taxes, such as a tax
announced in January 2018 that required companies
to pay SAR400 per month per foreign employee, and
various fines that encourage businesses to preferentially
employ Saudis. With these additional costs for the most
part passed on to employees through reductions in their
take-home wages, life in Saudi Arabia has thus become
prohibitively expensive for large swathes of the country’s
foreign-born workforce.
From the perspective of the Saudi government, these
policies have seemed to be “working” in terms of pushing
expatriate workers out of the country. In the first quarter
of 2018 alone, one investment firm reported that almost
a quarter of a million foreign nationals had lost their jobs
due to the introduction of the expat tax, with the impacts
felt particularly acutely in the construction sector.228
Between the first quarter of 2017 and the third quarter of
2018, official reports show that 1.1 million foreigners left
Saudi Arabia.229
By midway through 2019, the number
of foreign workers in Saudi had continued to fall, with a
net decrease over the preceding two and a half years of
22 percent.230
Caught up in this mass displacement event are,
nonetheless, large numbers of forced migrants who
had escaped conflict and repression in their countries
of origin by travelling to the Gulf States. Historically,
considerable numbers of Eritreans, Palestinians and
Yemenis employed this strategy of seeking respite in
the labour markets of the Gulf States. More recently,
Syrians, Rohingya and Ethiopians have followed in their
wake. In recognition of their forced departures from
their homelands, the Saudi government has at various
points institutionalised minimal concessions in terms
of immigration regulations and access to services and
employment,albeitonlyforparticularnationalitygroups.231
During the 1980s, Eritreans who were members of the
Eritrean Liberation Front were one of the populations to
which Saudi immigration authorities applied a de facto
policy of less policing and scrutiny.
Some of those foreign nationals who were forced from
theircountriesoforigintotheGulfupwardsof50yearsago
have nonetheless remained there, raising their families
into second and third generations despite the absence
of opportunities to naturalise or establish long-term legal
security within any of these states. The sizeable Eritrean
population who first travelled to Saudi Arabia in the
1970s and 1980s fits this profile, having moved there
and stayed there in response to foreign occupation, civil
war, repression and economic decline in Eritrea. Unable
to now return “home” in the face of these intensifying
Saudisation policies, because of the political situation
and economic stagnation in Eritrea, these individuals
and families are on the move across Africa, seeking
opportunities to work or regularise their status through
asylum in countries such as Egypt, Sudan and Uganda.232
Among the Eritreans we interviewed in Kampala in
January 2020, all of whom had recently travelled there
from the Gulf, almost all were subsisting on money sent
from relatives elsewhere while contemplating next steps.
These relatives were mainly based in North America
and Europe or were, on occasion, individuals who had
achieved financial security in places like Addis Ababa,
Dubai or Juba. Shifts in the fortunes of migrant workers
in the Gulf thus ripple through the transnational networks
of care that fill the void created by overstretched and/or
repressive governments, with varied implications for the
migratory dynamics of family members and friends.
While this study focussed on Eritreans, these taxes
and changes have been experienced by all expatriate
populations across the Gulf. The same story can be told
for Ethiopians, Somalis and Sudanese who have sought
work in the Gulf States in the hundreds of thousands,
but who, particularly in the last five years, have been
exposed to more discriminatory immigration policies
and mass deportations. Workers may have initially
sought to send their families out of Saudi Arabia in order
to minimise the dependents’ tax, but increases in the
expatriate tax have meant that many workers have now
been forced to join them.233
Some of these populations
will have originally entered the Gulf States having fled
conflict, violence and persecution in their countries of
origin. Their experiences of “return” following forced
departures from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member
states may entail rounds of further displacement similar
to the Eritreans discussed above.
Policy implications
How shifts in the economic fortunes and policies of
migrant-receiving states relate to past and ongoing
incidences of displacement in connected migratory
systems thus warrants greater attention, not least to help
predict and mitigate against future patterns of forced
migration. Regional increases in asylum applicants
and migrants from the Horn of Africa across Africa and
Europe, for example, may indeed relate as much to policy
developments in the Gulf as to political developments
in their countries of origin.234
Further restrictions on
employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia following the
economic recession caused by COVID-19 may be one of
these developments.
Similarly, fluctuations in demand for smugglers in the

Horn of Africa or a rise in the numbers of individuals
being trafficked across the continent will be tied to
the availability of other opportunities for intra- and
inter-regionalmigration.Shrinkingopportunitiesforcertain
populations to find employment in the Gulf clearly ties into
this. Estimates suggest that 300,000 Ethiopians alone
were returned to Ethiopia from Saudi Arabia in the two
years following March 2017.235
Assuming that the need
or desire to migrate among many of them does not abate
upon returning to Ethiopia, this represents a significant
population that might seek or be coerced to migrate
through the pathways that remain open to them. With the
official number of Africans in the Gulf standing at 3 million
– but undoubtedly being far more – and with deportation
constituting a relatively quick and efficient mechanism for
Gulf governments to reduce their numbers, the possible
scale of this dynamic should not be underestimated.236
Platforms such as the Khartoum Process, nonetheless,
pay limited attention to this “root cause.” Despite its
primary focus on the trafficking and smuggling of
migrants on the route between the Horn of Africa and
Europe, this significant interplay between the inter and
intra-regional migratory dynamics between the Gulf and
the Horn is rarely discussed. This leaves the initiative
potentially less ready and able to respond to one of the
major determinants of increased demand or susceptibility
to these pathways.
The situation thus provides a tentative answer to the
following question: To what extent do “policy regions”
(such as Europe, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa)
correspond with and capture intra- and inter-regional
movement patterns and dynamics? It provides
one example of how a policy region with a limited
geographical focus on North Africa might be failing
to capture a critical determinant of forced migration
within the region. It instead highlights the importance
of connecting migratory movements within the Red
Sea region with both fluctuations in migrant numbers
and asylum applications within Sub-Saharan Africa,
and with migration dynamics towards and across the
Mediterranean. Beyond the physical movement of
people, these dense connections also have broader
impacts on migrant decision-making: Money remitted
from senders in the Gulf, for instance, enables individuals
to pay to leave Eritrea or to pay to stay in other locations,
and news of opportunities in the Gulf diverts individuals
from refugee camps in the Horn of Africa towards those
jobs in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
It is also worth mentioning, however, that the limitations
of these policy fields are reinforced through labels
as well as geographies. There is a general paucity of
material discussing the role of the Gulf States in relation
to forced migration. Part of this stems from the fact that
none of these states are signatories to certain major
human rights treaties, including the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. Due to their ongoing
resistance and/or indifference towards adopting the
1951 Convention and the legal-normative vocabulary of
“refugeehood” that accompanies it, they have thus, until
recently,237
rarely been acknowledged as hosting forced
migrants within their populations of labour migrants. The
two labels are indeed almost seen as mutually exclusive
in the Gulf context; if individuals have been labelled as
labour migrants, they are rarely recognised or analysed
as potentially also being forced migrants. As almost all
individuals enter the Gulf through the kafala system of
employment visas, there is little in official statistics to
refutethisview.Oneresultofthishasbeenthatacademics
and Western policy makers have largely analysed labour
migration to the Gulf in separate policy forums and
institutional spaces to those in which mixed and forced
migration within Africa are under discussion.238
Responses by African
governments
Governments in the Horn of Africa have of course long
recognised the importance of labour markets in the Gulf
for the security of their citizens and nations, as well as
for regional migration dynamics. More recently, however,
they have sought to more explicitly engage with migration
initiatives that seek to strengthen and regularise these
pathways, such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. This initiative
dates back to 2003 when a number of labour-sending
countries in Asia formed a Regional Consultative Process
– the Colombo Process – in order to collectively maximise
the benefits of labour migration from the region to the
Gulf, while ensuring that their citizens’ rights were upheld
in the process. Five years later, the Abu Dhabi Dialogue
was established between the 12 labour-sending states
in Asia that formed the Colombo Process as well as six
Gulf countries of destination, in order to facilitate safe,
orderly and regular temporary labour migration between
these regions. It aimed to maximise the benefits of
migration for the source and destination countries, and
for the migrants themselves.
In recent years, observers from within Africa – including
from the Egyptian government, African Union, Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Economic
CommunityofCentralAfricanStates,EconomicCommunity
of West African States and Intergovernmental Authority
on Development – have attended related meetings in
the hope of establishing a blueprint for a similar platform
for Gulf-Africa dialogue on labour migration. One goal of
boosted dialogue on migration between these two regions
is the improvement of conditions for African migrants in
the Gulf. Beyond the importance of this for the migrants
themselves, African governments have also been keen
to avoid situations in which they are forced to respond to
serioushumanrightsinfractionsagainsttheircitizensinthe
Gulf by banning individuals from travelling there. With few
other channels through which to protest this mistreatment
or lobby for more protections for their citizens, migrant-
sending states have indeed resorted to wholesale bans on
100

labour migration to the Gulf. These have generally inflicted
more economic and political damage upon themselves
and their citizens than the states that caused the harm,
while driving demand for irregular migration given the
suspension of legal options.
Ethiopia offers one example where the government
has supposedly used quiet diplomacy to engage and
leverage Gulf states on these issues. From the Ethiopian
government’s perspective, they are aware that any
blanket migration ban will only push people towards other
forms of irregular migration, which have been seen to
have devastating consequences for those attempting to
enter the Gulf states illegally.239
States, such as the UAE,
have more recently seemed to recognise that they should
provide better protection to African labour migrants
for reasons including their international reputation and
the maintenance of amicable relationships with key
geopolitical allies in the Horn of Africa like Ethiopia. In
September 2018, the UAE therefore signed a bilateral
agreement with Ethiopia mandating that if someone
is going to the UAE as a domestic worker, they will get
pre-departure training, official registration through
the TADBEER visa system (not the kafala system) and
training in situ.240
Bahrain and Qatar have similarly
devised alternative bilateral arrangements to the kafala
system, though they remain reluctant to make this public.
Ethiopia and Kenya in particular are thus pushing ahead
with bilateral agreements, while trying to lobby for a
forum for a more coordinated regional response within
Africa similar to the Abu Dhabi Dialogue.241
For these governments, the possible links between
labour migration opportunities to the Gulf and forced
migration within and from the Horn of Africa have not
been lost. The strengthening of these regional multilateral
initiatives continues to be seen as a key way to support
and safeguard migratory strategies employed by their
citizens for decades.
Recommendations
For European governments and international donors
• Recognise and respond to the limitations of formulating policies that do not reflect the interconnectedness
of migratory systems across different regions. Incidences of trafficking and smuggling will undoubtedly be
exacerbated by the closure of intra-and inter-regional migration opportunities; populations of labour migrants in
major migrant-receiving states should be connected to historical patterns and future incidences of forced migration
in and from their countries of origin. While this policy note highlighted the connections between forced migration
in Africa and policies in the Gulf States, similar relationships should be explored in the context of patterns of
movement between Central and South East Asia and the Gulf States, and between Central and North American
countries.
• Observe and assist initiatives that are being driven by African governments to safeguard their citizens’
rights in the GCC region. This involves respecting the policy priorities of migrant-sending states in the North,
East and Horn of Africa,and supporting these governments in the realisation of national and regional priorities for
safe and dignified migration.
• Engage with the GCC region in its capacity as the host of significant populations of forced migrants, and
work with GCC states to strengthen respect for the rights of refugees, migrants and other people of concern.
This includes monitoring migrant populations and labour market policies in major migrant-receiving states, such
as the GCC states, to ensure that forced migrants and refugees who reside there are not at risk of being returned
or deported to countries (including their countries of origin) where they may face persecution or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment.

Local Authorities as Allies in Promoting
Protection Frameworks for Mobile Urban
Populations
Authors: Janina Stürner, Research Fellow, University of
Erlangen-Nuremberg; Lionel Nzamba, Project Officer, United
Cities and Local Governments of Africa (UCLG Africa)
Introduction
In 2018, city representatives participating in the Africities
Summit discussed municipal strategies to realise the
Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and the Global
CompactonRefugees(GCR),adoptingtheCharterofLocal
and Subnational Governments of Africa on Migration.242
Reflecting on policy frameworks surrounding questions
of migration and displacement on the African continent,
the question remains why African cities would engage
in such municipal debates and commitments given
their lack of legal mandates for migration and refugee
protection.243
In fact, legal protection frameworks for
migrants and refugees have traditionally been conceived
by states lending predominance to competences and
solutions at the national level. However, as more and
more migrants and refugees move to urban areas,
many African cities are becoming de facto frontline
actors addressing interdependencies between mixed
movements, urbanisation, housing, health care, social
cohesion and local development.244
This policy brief argues that African local authorities,
driven by a pragmatic interest in ensuring social cohesion
and urban development, could become central allies of
humanitarian and development actors, researchers and
civil society in advocating for and advancing protection
frameworks that favor inclusive solutions for refugees,
migrants and host communities. In the first part, we
review central challenges for African host and transit
cities related to the absence of national protection
frameworks, incomplete decentralisation reforms, limited
access to funding and capacity building as well as a lack
of local data availability. Confronted with these barriers
to engagement, many local authorities do not consider
questions of migration and displacement as municipal
responsibilities or priorities. In recent years, however, a
small but growing number of African local authorities
have been aiming to build partnerships with local,
national and international actors to overcome central
gaps between restricted capacities and resources, on the
one side, and the fact that cities are becoming de facto
actors in contexts of mixed movements on the other.245
In the second part, we zoom in on action taken by some
pro-active cities, showing how their engagement may
drivechangeinlocal,nationalandtransnationalprotection
frameworks. Building on this analysis of challenges and
good practices, we present recommendations to inform
the development of advocacy work and the expansion of
partnerships between international organisations (IOs),
civil society, academia, national and local authorities
to improve and reform local, national and transnational
protection frameworks for mobile populations along the
Central and Western Mediterranean routes.
This policy brief draws on the first-hand experience
of the United Cities and Local Governments of Africa
(UCLG Africa), a network of African cities, as well as on
interview-based research of municipal authorities’ local
and transnational strategies in addressing migration and
displacement conducted by the University of Erlangen-
Nuremberg between 2019 and 2020. The interviews
Morocco,
Tunisia, Uganda,
Sierra Leone
North Africa,
East Africa,
West Africa
102

included in this policy brief have been conducted with
representatives of Freetown in Sierra Leone, Kampala
in Uganda, Oujda and Rabat in Morocco as well as
Sfax and Sousse in Tunisia. Cities have been selected
based on their interest and engagement on questions of
migration and displacement at the local, national and/or
transnational levels.
Challenges: Lacking mandates,
resources, capacities and data
While it is important to acknowledge that many local
authorities in Africa and worldwide do not concern
themselves with topics of migration and displacement,
this section focuses on challenges faced by African local
authorities that do recognise the need for municipal
action on questions of human mobility.246
An analysis
of contexts where political will for engagement can, in
principle, be found allows us to zoom in on factors that
would enable interested coalitions to move from local
commitments to multi-stakeholder action.
At the 2018 UNHCR High Commissioner’s Dialogue on
Protection Challenges, as well as during the 2019 Global
Refugee Forum, African cities drew attention to their
lack of political mandates, capacities and resources to
engage on questions of migration and displacement.247
Even in countries like Morocco and Tunisia, where official
decentralisation strategies have been adopted, actual
transposition remains limited, may not include adequate
transfers of human and financial resources or may
simply avoid the topics of migration and displacement
altogether. In this context, a number of local authorities
are cooperating with civil society to offer a minimum
of support and protection to migrants and refugees on
their territory, thereby cruising on the edge of their legal
competences. In a research interview, a representative of
the Tunisian city of Sfax emphasised that despite the need
for local action to respond to rising conflict, climate and
poverty-related human mobility, municipal authorities held
only two official competences when it comes to migrants
and refugees: Issuing birth and death certificates.248
The
absence of legal competences has a direct impact on
municipal capacities, resources and access to national
and international funding and partnerships.
As long as local authorities hold no official power to
address urban displacement they are rarely considered
(priority) partners or relevant recipients of funding by
national and international actors that engage in urban
refugee responses.249
This has direct consequences
on municipalities’ capacities to respond to mixed
movements. One interesting example is provided by
the city of Kampala. Even though the Kampala Capital
City Authority (KCCA) has started cooperating with a
wide range of international actors to systemise urban
refugee responses, the administration remains unable to
secure national or international funding for establishing
a municipal integration office.250
Such municipal efforts
to institutionalise local action and build an interface for
migrants and refugees, as well as for (potential) national
and international partners, are often impeded by a strict
concentration of competences at the national level.
Moreover, a prevalent practice exists among donors
and humanitarian actors to reserve funding for direct
assistance to migrants and refugees through national or
international actors, rather than indirect support through
municipal capacity building.
Another obstacle to municipal action is a widespread
lack of local data on urban migration and displacement.
In order to develop evidence-based strategies, and
advocate at the national or international levels
for adequate funding and capacity-building, local
authorities would need to collect or access up-to-date
information on (mobile) urban populations. However,
official census data is often outdated, at times by several
decades, and rarely allows reliable estimations on the
number of residents living and working in informal urban
areas.251
In particular, during the global COVID-19
pandemic, the absence of local data hinders local and
national actors in developing migrant and refugee-
sensitive crisis responses. During aresearch interview,
a representative from the city of Rabat highlighted a
municipal challenge in planning for and meeting the
needs of migrant populations who were not officially
registered and are,overall, difficult to reach.252
During the 2020 GFMD-African Union Regional
Consultation, local authorities highlighted that the
combination of poor national policy guidance, limited
municipalcapacitiesandlackofreliabledataandresource
allocation contributed to the exclusion of migration and
displacement issues from public planning processes,
and increased the marginalisation and vulnerability
of urban migrants and refugees.253
Therefore, city
representatives urged national governments to
expand municipal competences by including respective
provisions into decentralisation laws, and called upon
national and international actors to partner with cities in
multi-stakeholder and multi-level cooperation.254
Potentials: Local authorities
as drivers of change in local,
national and transnational
protection frameworks
Quite evidently, local authorities are not necessarily more
open to hosting migrant and refugee populations than
national governments,as positions at both the local and
national levels vary from one government to another.
Openness may also depend on the form that hosting
mobile populations would take. Municipal opposition
to African migration “hotspots” envisaged in European
migration policies illustrates the controversy of these

issues. However, local authorities are overall closer to the
realities on the ground than their national counterparts.
In some African cities, this proximity led municipal
authorities to recognise that exclusionary policies and
short-term decisions to halt mixed movements do not
result in sustainable solutions, and may even spark social
unrest and urban conflicts. Rather than conditioning
access to social and economic life on a person’s legal
status, cities like Kampala, Sfax and Freetown have
therefore chosen a more pragmatic strategy: Highlighting
benefits of inclusive urban approaches for migrants,
refugees and host communities, they call upon national
and international actors to invest in cities as cooperation
partners and to join forces in addressing urban migration
and displacement.255
Such inclusive approaches have
even gained in importance in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic, during which the GCR and Sustainable
Development Goals principles of responsibility-sharing
and “leaving no one behind” have become more vital than
ever for urban centres in Africa and around the world.256
Local authorities along the Central and Western
Mediterranean routes could thus become central allies
of civil society and IOs, such as UNHCR and IOM, in
developing innovative and sustainable solutions on
the ground and advocating for reforms of national and
transnational policy protection frameworks – a potential
that has been largely overlooked so far. The following
analysis spotlights municipal strategies from the regions
aiming to drive change in local, national and transnational
protection frameworks.
Driving change in local protection
frameworks
In 2018, the city network UCLG Africa launched the
Charter of Local and Subnational Governments of Africa
on Migration. In the charter, signatory cities committed
to protecting the rights of migrants and refugees;
supporting migrants and refugees in situations of
vulnerability; promoting social cohesion and cultural
diversity at the local level; and advocating for national
policies that ensure safe and regular forms of human
mobility. Moreover, these cities pledged to take action
against xenophobia and security-biased narratives,
and condemned the criminalisation of migrants and the
establishment of detention camps for African migrants.
To achieve the charter’s objectives, local authorities aim
to cooperate with IOs, national governments, civil society
and migrant/refugee communities.257
Such multi-stakeholder cooperation for inclusive
approaches to mixed movements is also the basis
of various projects launched by local authorities and
civil society actors in North African cities participating
in the Mediterranean City-to-City Migration Project
(MC2CM). Co-organised by UN-HABITAT, UCLG and the
International Centre for Migration Policy Development,
the MC2CM network empowers local authorities to create
urban migration profiles, and to develop and realise
evidence-based local strategies in cooperation withlocal,
national and international partners.258
Cities make use
of such partnerships to address city specific risks for
migrants and refugees by strengthening local ecosystems
for the protection of mobile populations.259
For instance,
the cities of Madrid, Oujda and Rabat have started a
cooperation piloting local coordination mechanisms to
ensure a permanent two-way communication between
the municipality and all stakeholders working on urban
migration and displacement responses. This pilot is
conducted in collaboration with IOM Spain, UCLG Africa
and the Moroccan government.260
Such mechanisms
could enable local authorities to establish municipal
cartographies of relevant stakeholders, activities and
target groups.
Driving change in national protection
frameworks
While North African municipalities, such as Sfax and
Sousse, could have simply argued that Tunisian local
authorities do not have legal responsibility for migrants
and refugees, they decided to take a more pro-active
stance in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Not
only did they strive for local whole-of-society solutions,
they also stepped up municipal advocacy vis-à-vis the
national government.
In this sense, both municipalities have called upon regional
and national authorities to include migrants and refugees
in COVID-19 responses. They have furthermore joined
forces with national non-governmental organisations
advocating for the adoption and implementation of
national asylum and migration policies, and working on a
concrete legislative draft proposal to regularise persons in
situationsofirregularity.261
InstateslikeMaliandNiger,civil
society actors are playing an important role in promoting
migrant and refugee rights to the city, including access to
decent housing, healthcare and education, and opposing
closed detention in migration “hotspots” in African cities.
Taking a broader perspective on protection frameworks,
local authorities could prove to be invaluable allies of IOs
and civil society in advocating for ambitious national GCM,
GCR and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
(CRRF) implementation strategies.262
Driving change in transnational protection
frameworks
As a growing number of African cities start engaging
in city-to-city exchanges on the continental and
international levels, they become aware of a striking
paradox: Even though cities around the globe have
become de facto actors in urban migration and
displacement, their expertise remains mostly excluded
from intergovernmental policymaking processes.
However, as (inter)national policies impact urban
realities, these cooperation gaps risk leading to vertical
policy incoherence in the governance of migration and
displacement.263
When it comes to African and European-
African dialogues on migration and displacement, UCLG
Africa is therefore spearheading efforts to bring municipal
perspectives into intergovernmental policy deliberations.
104

Recent examples include the AU-EU Summit 2017, the
EU Cities and Regions for Development Cooperation
Forum 2019 and the Global Forum on Migration and
Development 2020. Representatives of African cities
seized the opportunity offered by these international
events to criticise one-sided European strategies focusing
on “hotspots” and readmission agreements; the cities
called for a re-orientation of the inter-regional governance
of human mobility based on respect of human rights,
partnerships and decentralised cooperation.264
In parallel,
a growing number of European cities linked calls upon
their national governments to ensure the safety of persons
travelling on the Central and Western Mediterranean
routes with concrete offers for local integration.265
We
thus perceive a particular potential for alliances between
civil society, IOs and local authorities in joint advocacy for
improving search-and-rescue (SAR) operations, as well as
opening complementary pathways.
Conclusion
For a long time, national governments and international
organisations have been the main protagonists shaping
and implementing protection frameworks for mobile
populations.Butrapidurbanisationandtheunderstanding
that mixed movements can only be addressed through
multi-stakeholder and multi-level approaches (as per the
New York Declaration, GCR and GCM) push traditional
as well as emerging actors to forge new alliances. As
a growing number of cities, located along the Western
and Central Mediterranean routes, show ambition to
co-shape inclusive approaches to urban migration and
displacement, their potentials and challenges should be
taken seriously, and their ideas and local solutions taken
into account. In this sense, the importance attributed to
cooperation with local authorities in the GCR and the
GCM is a first step in the right direction.

Recommendations for policy: Building new alliances
Building on this analysis of challenges and good practices, we present recommendations to inform the development
of advocacy work, and the expansion of partnerships between IOs, civil society, academia, national and local
authorities, towards improving and reforming local, national and transnational protection frameworks.
Local protection frameworks
• African local authorities are invited to sign the “Charter of Local and Subnational Governments of Africa on
Migration” and use it as a tool to promote inclusive approaches for the benefit of refugees, migrants and local
communities, in cooperation and with financial and technical support from national authorities, development
banks and IOs. Humanitarian and development actors, civil society and academia, in turn, could leverage the
charter as an instrument to engage municipal authorities and other local actors in developing and promoting local
protection frameworks for migrants and refugees.
• National authorities should not only adopt effective national protection frameworks, but should also ensure that
such national frameworks include an actionable devolution of competences, resources and capacities to local
authorities in order to translate national policies into local realities.
• UNHCR, IOM and other international organisations should step up direct cooperation with cities, moving
beyond a perspective of local authorities as pure implementers of national or international policies. In this sense,
the organisations should explore how international agreements and programmes such as the GCM, the GCR and
the CRRF could strengthen municipal capacities and the local-level creation of context-specific strategies for
sustainable solutions to urban migration and displacement.
National protection frameworks
• African local authorities should cooperate with civil society, academia, the UN Network on Migration and
UNHCR to advocate for ambitious national GCM, GCR and CRRF implementation strategies that benefit urban
migrants, refugees and host communities.
• UNHCR and the UN Network on Migration should encourage national governments to include local authorities
in the planning, imple mentation and review of national GCM, GCR and CRRF strategies.
Transnational protection frameworks
• The European Union and the African Union should ensure that cities are included in inter-regional deliberations
on mixed movements both in the framework of city-to-city fora and through an institutionalization of municipal
participation in EU-AU summits and other intergovernmental debates such as the Rabat and the Khartoum
Processes.
• African and European local authorities should partner with IOs, academia and civil society to call upon states
to respect the right to life of every human being by relaunching SAR operations in the Mediterranean, prosecuting
and holding accountable actors responsible for and participating in push-back operations, and fighting human
trafficking.
• UNHCR, research institutions and civil society should launch partnerships with African and European local
authorities to advocate and pilot complementary pathways such as private sponsorship or university corridor
schemes.
106

“Traumatized migrants naturally have less capability to deal with certain circumstances
than those who have not experienced trauma. After an often perilous journey it is hard
for them to catch up with “normal” life, unless psychosocial assistance is provided.
Many migrants are not able to have such services in Tunisia, since they lack proper
documentation. Moreover, some cannot afford psychological assistance and others do
not really understand the essence of it.”
Nahom Bruk Gebremeskel, 4Mi Monitor, Mixed Migration Centre North Africa.
Policy Notes
Theme 6: Advocating
for improved protection
responses
Photo credit: © UNHCR / Hereward Holland
A woman weeps, minutes after being saved by the Sea
Watch search and rescue ship.

Protecting Young Migrants and Refugees
in Libya: An Operational Perspective by
MSF
Authors: Suha Diab, Lucie Eches and Elsa Laino, Protection
Team Libya, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) France
Introduction
Over 584,000 migrants are currently in Libya,266
with over
44,000 persons registered with UNHCR. 8 percent of
the migrant population and 33 percent of the registered
refugee population are children, with nearly 25 percent
unaccompanied or separated267
(including 4.6 percent
among registered asylum seekers).268
There are severe limitations in Libya for providing a
meaningful protection response to migrants due to the
lack of sustainable shelters and solutions for community
integration.269
This was exacerbated in 2020 with
the advent of COVID-19-related restrictions, which
limited access to and movement within the country for
humanitarian actors. It also increased risks for migrants
and refugees living in urban settings, exposing them
to COVID-19-related threats, on top of the cycle of
kidnapping, abuse and exploitation to which they were
already normally exposed. Moreover, resettlement slots
and other legal pathways out of Libya for persons in need
of protection are lacking, leaving many with no other
option than to cross the sea to seek protection and safety.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), of which
Libya has been a signatory since 1993, establishes that
a “child” is every human being below the age of 18 years
(Article 1). Children are entitled to certain standards of
guarantees and protection, which are not respected
in Libya, where it is common practice to hold migrant
children in arbitrary detention alongside adults – with no
separation or distinct treatment, subjected to torture or
other ill and inhumane treatment, intercepted at sea and
forcibly returned to a country that is not safe.
In addition to what they were exposed to as children
and upon reaching the age of majority in Libya, young
migrants and refugees lose access to the already lacking
set of services they would have been entitled to as
children. Worse, these young persons are cases likely
to be excluded from accessing the already very limited
resettlement and evacuation opportunities, because
hosting countries tend to prioritise women, families and
young children considered to be more easily supported
for integration.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) France started its
operations in Libya in 2011, and reoriented its activities
in 2016 to support migrants in detention. Despite the
constraints linked to the restrictions and limited access
imposed by the COVID-19 response in the last year, MSF
remains committed to supporting populations most in
need in Libya. MSF provides primary healthcare, psycho-
social support and protection services to migrant and
refugee communities living in urban communities or
arbitrarily detained in official detention centres, as well
as those who have escaped clandestine prisons run
by traffickers, including the infamous hangars of Bani
Walid. Our teams also offer care to people intercepted
at sea by the EU-supported Libyan Coast Guard (LCG)
and forced back to Libya. In the Libyan city of Misrata,
MSF runs an in-patient clinic for persons affected by
Libya
Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa
108

tuberculosis (TB), with services open to both migrants
and Libyans.
In this article, we will illustrate cases of unfair exclusion
from protection and long-term solutions for young
migrants who have turned 18 in detention (Case I), and
gaps in the protection response for unaccompanied
children affected by multiple vulnerabilities (Case II).
Case I: Access to protection
provisions for young adults
There is a consensus among humanitarian actors, and
even among some Libyan officials, that the detention
of children is wrong on both moral and legal grounds.
The detention of children goes against international
conventions and treaties. Article 37(b) of the CRC
states that “No child shall be deprived of his or her
liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or
imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the
law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort
and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”
In 2012, the CRC committee clarified the meaning of
“measure of last resort.” It maintained that the detention
of children, whether separated or with families, based on
immigration status constitutes a violation and is never
appropriate: “The detention of a child because of their or
their parents’ status constitutes a child rights violation
and always contravenes the principle of the best interests
of the child. In this light, States should expeditiously and
completely cease the detention of children on the basis of
their immigration status.”270
Thus, even if a child entered the country illegally, the
denial of liberty is never appropriate.271
Despite the clear
guidelines of the convention, states continue to detain
children based on their immigration status. Libyan law
criminalises “illegal” entry regardless of age or protection
needs. Refugee claimants, UNHCR’s persons of concern
(POC) and migrants are arrested and held under the
authority of the Libyan Ministry of the Interior and the
Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration.
Operating in detention centres (DC), MSF has witnessed
the detention of separated and unaccompanied children
as young as 10 years old. At the same time, there has
been some flexibility among DC managers who, at times,
have agreed to release children under the age of 15,
especially if they “looked younger.” Nevertheless, this
practice is arbitrary and subject to the compassion of
individual DC managers. There is no formal recognition
within these institutions that it is illegal and wrong to
detain child migrants. Given the slow response to child
detention in Libya, a large segment of this population is
increasingly forgotten and ignored by UN agencies and
other humanitarian actors. Children languish in detention
for years, resulting in many growing up into adulthood
whileindetention.DaherAlJabalDetentionCentre(DJDC)
is a case in point. The DJDC is located roughly 140 km
southwest of Tripoli. It opened in 2017 to accommodate
migrants and refugees caught in the crossfire in the
Sabratha and Gharyan detention centres, along with
others who were intercepted by the LCG and brought in
from Tripoli. For many detainees, the choice to tuck this
detention centre away in the mountains was a deliberate
effort to conceal the problem of finding sustainable and
long-term solutions for these refugees and migrants. By
keeping them out of sight and out of mind, there would be
less pressure to find a solution. The UNHCR conducted a
handful of visits to DJDC since it opened in 2017 despite
the constant appeal of detainees for more visits.
MSFbeganitsoperationsinJune2019toservethemedical
needs of 700 migrants and refugees, mainly Eritreans
and Somalis. Since then, over half of the detainees were
either transferred to the Gathering and Departure Facility
(GDF) in Tripoli, “voluntarily” repatriated to their country
of origin through the work of IOM, or escaped to coastal
cities. In October 2020, MSF was informed that the DJDC
would be closed, and UNHCR-registered refugees will be
transferred to Tripoli to live in urban communities in the
Gargarish neighbourhood. Upon starting its verification
process for the transfer, UNHCR asked each person to
sign a release form, written in English, stating that the
UNHCR will not provide shelter or cash assistance, but
only food and non-food items (NFIs).
Responding to this development, MSF referred 81
persons, who self-identified as being under 18 and
unaccompanied, to UNHCR. Information was collected
during brief interviews with detainees to understand
their protection needs. Nearly 40 percent of this group
indicated that they have family links in Europe, North
America and Australia.
Out of this group of 81, UNHCR only considered 10
as children, as they were still under 18 at the time of
release. The remaining youths were treated by the
UNHCR as adults, despite recognising that they were
minors when originally detained; and, thus, they were
immediately excluded from any special protection
measures available for minors under the CRC. Upon
their release in mid-January 2021, MSF received several
calls from these individuals, who were disoriented and
confused after spending years in detention only to be
dropped off in front of the UNHCR office in Saraj with
a renewed Asylum Certificate, LYD20 for transportation
and a promise of a food parcel and NFIs, which only a few
reported to have obtained.
At present, regardless of condition or need, upon turning
18, individuals lose access to services, protection and
care to which they were entitled as minors. Worse
still, as “young men,” these vulnerable teenagers are
very likely to be excluded from resettlement and family
reunification programmes272
due largely to their age, as
they no longer meet the definition of “childhood.” As a

result, this population of young, distressed males are
effectively abandoned with little hope of rehabilitation or
reintegration. The only option left is to cross the sea. The
lucky few, who succeed in reaching Europe – most often via
perilous boat journeys – are subject to adult immigration
control standards with little regard given to the extreme
deprivation they experienced during childhood.
There is a need to rethink how protection agencies treat
these young adults. Given the long state of detention
and violence endured, these young adults should be, in
fact, prioritised for immediate and long-term protection
solutions. When assessing protection needs, age should
be considered along with other systematic failures that
prevent children from reaching their full potential, rather
than trapping them in a space where violence and
detention is normalised.
Case II: Access to protection
for unaccompanied minors
who are survivors of torture
and/or recovered from TB
This case study illustrates the challenges in accessing
protection and alternative care for unaccompanied
migrant minors who have survived torture and recovered
from TB. The information shared in this case study is
based on the experience of MSF staff in the MSF TB
centre in Misrata. In 2020, 49 patients were admitted,
with an average of 23.27 percent under 18 years
old. The main nationalities of the patients in the clinic
are Eritreans, Ethiopians and Somalis.
In 2020, 11 persons (22 percent) have been referred to
the TB unit immediately after escaping or being released
from the hangars run by criminals in Bani Walid. A further
22 patients mentioned that they passed through such
torture hangars at some point in their journey. These
persons reported being kidnapped and held against their
will by criminals for up to one and a half years, averaging
six months – in horrendous conditions, deprived of their
freedom of movement, with no access to basic needs
and exposed to physical and sexual violence. They are
systematically tortured,273
with their families asked to
pay ransoms for their freedom. While all nationalities face
similar extortion, some nationalities face longer detention
in such conditions as their families are demanded to pay
higher ransom amounts (up to USD15,000 according to
patients). The nationalities exposed to longer periods
of detention match the nationalities seen in our TB unit:
Ethiopians, Eritreans and Somalis.
The medical condition of patients referred from Beni
Walid in 2020 is extremely severe, some critical.274
In
addition to tuberculosis symptoms, more than half of the
patients are severely malnourished,275
and all, except one,
of the remaining patients are moderately malnourished,
showing signs of a systematic deprivation of food. All
patients have scabies and other skin infections, resulting
from the deplorable hygiene conditions in which they
were detained. All patients show signs of violence in the
form of alterations to their skin due to blunt and sharp
trauma, thermal injuries and electrical injuries. Some
also have impaired walking and persistent pain due to
the use of certain torture technics such as falanga.276
They also show signs of psychological responses to the ill
treatment they faced with signs of depression, symptoms
of post-traumatic stress disorder and somatic symptoms.
In 2020, all patients under 18 in the TB unit reported
being kidnapped and held in Bani Walid.
“He tortured me day and night. When he
understood that no one could pay for me, I hoped
he was going to kill me. Instead he used me as
‘example’ to scare the others and threaten them to
pay. He was putting me in the middle of the room,
beating me with iron sticks and pulling my nails,
and telling the others that this is what happens to
them if they do not pay. This is what they do with
people who cannot pay.”
A., 16 years old, Eritrean
Once admitted in the TB unit, the patients receive (as
much as possible) the following holistic care addressing
their conditions: Treatment for TB, nutritional follow up,
treatment for scabies, the services of a psychologist (and
apsychiatristforthemostseverecases),physiotherapy,277
regular psycho-social support session and recreational
activities. In addition, a protection case worker follows
up their situation to identify protection concerns and to
develop a case plan for after discharge.
All patients under 18 years of age in the TB unit were
unaccompanied,278
All patients have reported physical
abuses and arbitrary detention, while 36 percent (8)
have reported being trafficked to Libya. 18 percent (2)
reported witnessing the death of a family member while
in Libya. Only five say they have a support network at
home, and only one mentioned relatives in Libya; the rest
do not have any support network in the country.
As long as these children, who are survivors of torture,
are in need of care due to their TB, MSF can guarantee
safety and mental health support. However, once they
are medically recovered from TB we encounter severe
challenges in discharging them from our medical clinic
due to the lack of reliable solutions, forcing MSF to extend
their stay in a medical facility – which is not suitable for
non-positive TB cases nor for children.
As per the International Minimum Child Protection
Standards, unaccompanied children should be provided
with alternative care options to meet their basic needs
and safety. However, the options for alternative care
in Libya are extremely limited despite their heightened
110

risk and vulnerabilities. There is only one organisation in
Libya providing such services, and they face considerable
constraints. In addition, child victims of torture should
have access to specialised services for their rehabilitation.
However, proper rehabilitation and specialised care
cannot be guaranteed in Libya.
The main nationalities of our TB patients, as mentioned
above, are not present in the community of Misrata,
resulting in difficulties in placing children from Ethiopia or
Somalia. The lack of presence of UNHCR in Misrata – no
registration or interview services are available in Misrata
– is a push factor for POCs to go to Tripoli, where they
face amplified risks of violence and abuses. This explains
the large community of Ethiopians and Eritreans, among
other nationalities, in Tripoli and their absence from
Misrata. MSF received reports of individuals, including
Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children (UASC), asked
by UNHCR to come by themselves to Tripoli from Misrata
to participate in interviews. Some cases, supported
through community-based care in Misrata, decided to
leave Misrata for Tripoli thinking they would have faster
access to the UNHCR evacuation programme there.
Following advocacy by NGOs – including MSF – UNHCR
has conducted registration visits in Misrata, with three
visits recorded in 2020.
In Tripoli, the number of UASC is higher.279
While
options for community-based care are broader due
to the presence of communities from the nationalities
concerned, the risk of violence towards these
communities is also higher,280
and the ability to monitor
their placement by the social workers is lower due
to security considerations (few NGO staff visit these
communities) as well COVID-19 restrictions (with
organisations suspending home visits for more than
seven months). This results in children being placed
in community-based care, but without proper follow
up and assurance that their basic needs are met and
that they are not exposed to abuse. This is against
alternative care standards.281
One example is the case of S., a 15-year-old boy from
Ethiopia, who after two months in the TB unit was
referred to child protection services with various concerns
identified: Asylum seeker, unaccompanied minor, survivor
of torture , survivor of traumatic experience (witnessing
the death of his relative) and signs of psychological
distress. A request was made to find alternative care for
him in Tripoli as no option in Misrata could be identified.
MSF supported his transfer to Tripoli and to the UNHCR
Community Day Centre, where he was taken in charge
of by a social worker. The social worker then put him
in contact with a community leader who helped find a
host family. However, no proper follow up was done to
assess the condition of the child in the hosting family,
resulting in his decision to abscond and to stay with other
adult migrants with all his basic needs unaccounted for.
A month after his discharge to Tripoli, S. contacted the
MSF protection case worker very distressed and worried,
saying: “I am scared, I don’t have money to pay the rent,
until now people let me stay but now, I need pay. I have
no money for food.” At the time of writing, S. is still in
Tripoli and is staying in an urban setting without any
support. He is considering crossing the sea as some of
his friends did.
Due to the difficulty of identifying a protection solution
for unaccompanied minors once they are medically
recovered, MSF has no other option than to extend their
stay in the clinic, sometimes up to more than a month
until a temporary solution could be found. Out of the 13
patients under 18 years old in 2020, seven were referred
to UNHCR child protection services and only three
were placed in a host family; the rest were referred to a
community building with cash or no support. Out of these
seven, five are currently in extremely vulnerable conditions
following a brief assessment visit of MSF in Tripoli.282
Most
report not receiving information on their status, difficulty
to access medical services and a lack of resources to meet
their basic needs. These findings are corroborated by
other organisations conducting protection monitoring.283
In addition, children recovered from TB face difficulty in
pursuing their treatment after discharge, in attending
follow-up appointments and in obtaining drug refills in
Tripoli, mainly due to security concerns on moving within
Tripoli and the lack of adult supervision.
The impact of inappropriate care for survivors of torture,
including unaccompanied minors, has irreversible
implications on their physical recovery – some relapse into
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis – as well as their mental
health. This is exacerbated by the lack of information
regarding their procedure for evacuation, the inability
to access existing medical or mental health services,
the lack of adult supervision, the continued exposure to
violence and the inability to meet their basic needs.
MSF believes that long-term solutions out of Libya should
be the priority for these vulnerable cases; however,
considering that most cases will not be evacuated before
a minimum of six months after being registered,284
(if
evacuated at all, or up to two years for UASC as shown
in the first case study), it is imperative that appropriate
solutions during this waiting period are supported for
this population.

Conclusions and recommendations
Based on the experience of MSF in Libya, this policy note sheds light on the gaps in protection frameworks at the
local, national, regional and international levels, which have a negative impact on children and young adults in Libya.
Without underestimating the operational constraints and risks associated – such as security, COVID-19 and access
to liquidity – of implementing safe alternative care for children and young adults in Libya, MSF makes the following
recommendations to UN protection agencies and partner NGOs:
• In the Libyan context where the normalcy for migrants is abuse, protection actors must accept taking
considered risks that reduce the overall harm faced by minors in abusive situations or are otherwise at high risk.
• Improve the possibility for persons of concern to access the services offered by UNHCR (including registration,
urban solutions and assessment for long-term solutions) all over the Libyan territory and not only in the city of
Tripoli.
• Ensure that survivors of torture are prioritised for evacuation and for other legal pathways out of Libya,
considering that there are no appropriate services in Libya for their rehabilitation.
• Explore alternative care options for youth, such as opening shelters for protection cases, including survivors of
torture, or support individual/group independent living.
• Ensure that young persons who arrived in Libya as children are not excluded from support solely on the
basis that they have reached the age of majority, and that the trauma and human rights violations that they
experienced as children are taken into account in assessing their needs and identifying possible solutions.
112

Key Gaps in Protection Frameworks for
Refugees and Migrants in Libya
Author: Manon Radosta,285
Advocacy Adviser, Libya INGO
Forum (LIF)
Introduction
Reports from the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix
(DTM) suggest that there are currently 571,464 migrants
from over 43 nationalities in Libya,286
including 43,624
asylum seekers and refugees registered by UNHCR.287
Many of them are routinely subjected to torture,
sexualviolence, abduction for ransom, trafficking in
persons, forced labour and unlawful killings throughout
Libya, in a climate of near-total impunity.288
Migrants,
asylum seekers and refugees are continuously observed
by humanitarian organisations as being the most
exposed to protection risks, including their exposure to
abuse and exploitation. This is confirmed by data from
the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), which reveals that
37 percent of all surveyed individuals experienced one
or more protection incidents within Libya, a remarkably
high proportion that underlines how critical the situation
for refugees and migrants is within the country.289
In 2010, the government of Libya introduced its Law No.
19 on Combatting Illegal Migration to penalise irregular
entry,290
coinciding with the adoption of a cooperation
agenda with the European Union (EU) to combat
clandestine immigration.291
It de facto criminalises all
migrants by defining the act of “illegal” migration as
covering “anyone who enters or stays in the Libyan
territories without authorisation or permit from competent
authorities with the intention of settling there or crossing
to another country.”292
Under this law, all foreigners who
violate its migration provisions are criminalised and
sanctioned with fines and imprisonment, regardless
of their nationality or country of origin. This lack of
distinction applicable to asylum seekers and refugees
violates their right to international protection.
Thispaperdrawsonevidence,observationsandfirst-hand
data collected by 25 international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs), which are members of the Libya
INGO Forum (LIF) – an independent network of INGOs
implementing humanitarian programmes or are in the
process of setting up operations in Libya. Relying on their
combined experience and expertise, this paper focuses
on the lack of basic safeguards for migrants and refugees
in Libya, and the culture of systematic abuses in the
country, with a view towards making recommendations
for policy reform and advocacy.
Lack of basic legal safeguards
for migrants and refugees
While Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the country has
ratified the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, both of
which recognise the right to seek and receive asylum and
prohibit expulsions. Libya’s 2011 interim Constitutional
Declaration also embedded this right to asylum in its
Article 10. Yet, these Conventions have never been
translated into national laws and, as such, have never
been enforced. Irregular entry, stay and exit constitute
criminal offenses and are punishable by a prison
sentence, a fine and, ultimately, deportation.293
The impact and responsibility of EU migration policies
in hardening Libya’s national framework is undeniable:
The EU practice of externalisation of its border control
Libya
Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa

and overall external migration policies have had a huge
impact on all neighbouring countries – and Libya is no
exception. Historically, Libya was a major destination for
labour migrants seeking employment in the country’s oil
and construction sectors, with 1.2 to 1.5 million foreign
workerspriorto2011.Themajorityofthesemigrantswere
from African countries and did not require a visa, enjoying
free access to health care, education and other public
services.294
In the span of a decade, from 2000 to 2010,
the government considerably hardened its migration
policies to align with the EU agenda, consecrated in 2007
by the reinstatement of visa requirements for all African
nationals – effectively casting thousands of migrants into
irregularity, and, in 2010, by the adoption of Law No. 19
on Combatting Illegal Migration.
Neither these repressive measures, nor the political and
security instability the country has been facing since
2011, are deterring migrants from coming to Libya as a
destination or a transit country. Refugees and migrants
still perceive Libya as a viable destination, offering better
opportunities for livelihoods than their origin countries.295
In 2019, an IOM study reveals that, of the migrants
interviewed, 81 percent identified Libya as their intended
country of destination at the time of departure from their
country of origin.296
Most of those who intend to stay are
drawn to the country’s job opportunities, and wish to
remain either permanently or temporarily.
Once in the country, migrants and refugees are confronted
with widespread abuses and disproportionately affected
by several types of protection incidents, as perpetrators
are well aware of their vulnerability, lack of support
networks and inability to seek justice and redress.297
In a
recent assessment, IOM found that a quarter of migrants
reported they would not turn to anyone for justice.298
Refugees and migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are
reportedly particularly vulnerable to racial discrimination
and xenophobia, and detention.299
As a result of their
irregular status and lack of legal documents,300
as well
as widespread discriminatory practices, most do not
benefit from social protection mechanisms available to
vulnerable Libyans.301
They face challenges to access
basic servicesand employment, resulting in poor living
conditions and heightened vulnerability.302
As Libya does not have a functioning national asylum
system, UNHCR has stepped in to conduct refugee status
determination (RSD). However, their capacity to operate
in the country is heavily constrained, and the protection
UNHCR’s certificates provide to refugees and asylum-
seekers is very limited as there is no official memorandum
of understanding between UNHCR and Libya. This
means that no specific access to education or health
services is granted on the basis of possession of a UNHCR
certificate, and that UNHCR letters of attestation are
not always recognised by Libyan authorities. UNHCR’s
ability to fill gaps in the national asylum framework is
further limited by Libyan authorities’ recognition that only
individuals of nine designated nationalities may have a
claim for international protection.303
Culture of systematic abuses
in the country: Arbitrary
detention and unlawful
deportations
As a direct consequence of these gaps in protection
frameworks, migrants and refugees in Libya are highly
exposed to arbitrary detention, abuse and exploitation.
Elevated numbers of migrants and refugees continue to
bearbitrarilydetainedafterarrestforimmigration-related
reasons in urban and coastal areas, and thousands of
migrants and refugees are believed to be held in other
sites, such as those run by smugglers or non-state armed
groups. Not only do humanitarian partners not have
access to those sites to provide critical assistance,304
there is also no exhaustive knowledge on their locations,
the number of people detained as well as their situation
and needs. A study on determinants of detention by the
MMC finds that “ten percent of people surveyed between
May 2017 and June 2019 reported being detained in
Libya, and the proportion of respondents experiencing
detention increased over time.”305
The research centre
stresses that “refugees and migrants of East African
origin were four times more likely to be detained than
those from West, Central and North Africa.”
These data are confirmed by protection organisations
that monitor the situation in their areas of intervention:
when surveying vulnerable migrants and refugees
they are assisting in urban areas, these organisations
found that the proportion of people having experienced
detention in Libya is very high, depending on their location
of residence and their nationalities. In Tripoli, of the total
individuals surveyed between September and November
2020, 44 percent reported having been detained at least
once, and up to three times or more.306
The progressively restrictive immigration practices of the
EUMemberStatesfocusedoncontainmentanddeterrence,
which include interceptions at sea and in the desert of the
Sahel, have played a role in effectively trapping migrants
and refugees in Libya.307
Sincethe signing of the Libya-Italy
Memorandum of Understanding on Migration in 2017,308
which was renewed in February 2020, Italy and the EU
have provided financial and technical support to the
Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) to increase its capacity to carry
out search-and-rescue operations, while criminalising
INGOs conducting much-neededrescue operations as per
the international and maritime obligation to assist those in
distress at sea. This support amounted to approximately
EUR90 million in 2018 and 2019,309
despite reports
accusing the LCG of collusion with smuggling networks310
and involvement in human rights violations against
asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants311
As a result of
114

increased LCG operations, with the active support of EU
Member States, the proportion of persons intercepted at
sea and being returned to Libya has risen,312
reaching a
cumulative number of 50,417 migrants313
by the end of
2020. As denounced by many humanitarian organisations,
the return of these individuals to an unsafe country has
resulted in the denial of their right to access asylum
and therefore constitutes a violation of the principle
of non-refoulement.314
The majority of disembarked migrants and refugees
are then placed into some form of detention, in either
state-run or unofficial centres, without due process.315
Since the beginning of 2021, there has been a sharp
increase in both the number of departures from Libya, and
those systematically and arbitrarily detained after being
intercepted at sea and brought back for disembarkation.
This year, the number of individuals detained in official
detention centres (DCs) rose from just over 1,000 in
January to almost 4,000 at the end of February.316
The
humanitarian aid provided to migrants and refugees in
urban settings or those recently released from detention
is often insufficient; it also suffers from poor coordination
among operational partners and a lack of referral
pathways. Thousands of migrants and refugees remain
unaccounted for, following their disembarkation or recent
release from DCs, having been brought to either unofficial
centres or having managed to escape from the authorities.
Very few organisations have access to disembarkation
points or official DCs whether in the West or in the East
of the country, and there is little to no capacity and ability
to locate migrants and refugees.317
Official declarations
of the government in the West stating that they are in the
process of closing all DCs are contradicted by the recent
influx of arrest and detention of migrants in Tripoli in new
centres, while larger structures in the centre of the country
are reportedly being re-opened and rehabilitated, and
could be presented as “isolation facilities” for migrants
and refugees.
Finally, protection organisations have also observed an
increase in mass arrests and deportations of migrants
and refugees, predominately in the East318
– where 29
percent of migrants are recorded – but also increasingly in
the West. Between January and April 2020, the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
expressed concern about the deportation of at least
1,400 migrants and refugees by land from eastern and
southern Libya to Chad, Niger, Somalia and Sudan.319
Moreover, since the adoption by the Eastern Ministry of
Interior of Resolution No. 241,320
in July 2020, 36 mass
arrest operations have been reported between May and
December 2020, leading to a total of 2,298 migrants
being arrested through mass operations in urban areas.
Protectionorganisationshavealsonotedanintensification
of deportation from Benghazi, with 23 mass deportation
operations recorded, resulting in a total of 1,595 migrants
being deported to their countries of origin (mainly Chad,
Egypt and Sudan). The COVID-19 pandemic increased
discriminatory practices and stigma towards migrants
and refugees, with migrants often being presented as
carriers of the virus, making it even more difficult for them
to access the services they need, and further constraining
aid organisations’ access to them.

Until the legal framework related to migrants and refugees is broadened and revised, and incorporates ratified
and existing international legal frameworks into domestic laws and their applications, the majority of refugees and
migrants in Libya will continue to be subjected to human rights violations. Libya is an unsafe country, and none of
the migrants and refugees who embark on the journey to Europe should be returned to its shores. The international
community must advocate for the improvement of the protection space in Libya, which will require robust, coordinated
and high-level engagement with the Libyan authorities and all groups with de facto control of territory, at both
national and local levels.321
Since the launch of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) in November 2020, progress has been made
towards Libya’s political reunification. The oath of the Government of National Unity, sworn in before the House of
Representatives in March 2021, is a positive step forward, and INGOs are calling on Libyan authorities to rapidly
address the key gaps in the protection frameworks for migrants and refugees in the country. So far, viable ways
out of Libya, other than risking the dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean, are dramatically insufficient; migrants
and refugees are in need of assistance and protection, including alternatives to detention for those detained, and
prevention of re-detention for those in urban settings. Since 2017, only 6,186 refugees have benefitted from existing
resettlement and evacuation programmes. In 2020, this figure was only 811 refugees,322
of which 490 were transferred
to Emergency Transit Mechanisms (ETM) in Niger and Rwanda and will now have to wait for durable solutions to be
processed – in some cases, taking years323
– and 321 transferred to host countries in Europe and Canada.
The Libya INGO Forum consequently makes the following recommendations:
To Libyan authorities and groups with de facto control of territory
• In line with Article 10 of the Constitutional Declaration, commit to develop a national asylum system that will
fairly and efficiently assess asylum claims, and will include adequate reception facilities.
• Commit to end arbitrary detention and gradually close all detention centres for migrants and refugees. All releases
should be coordinated with relevant national and international actors to ensure the most vulnerable can access
assistance. Pending their release, safe and unimpeded access of humanitarian actors providing life-saving
assistance to detained populations must be guaranteed by the competent authorities.
• Ensure that all arrests and detentions are carried out with due process and legislative safeguards, including the
right to challenge the detention and expulsion order in front of judicial authorities, and in respect with the human
rights and wellbeing of all migrants and refugees.
• Ensure the formal recognition of UNHCR, in the form of a memorandum of understanding that will guarantee the
organisation’s full access to migrants and refugees across the country, with no restriction on nationality or any
other parameters.
• Following the recommendations of the IHL/HR Working Group part of the Berlin Process:
• Fully cooperate with international accountability mechanisms including the ICC and the Fact-finding
mission on Libya mandated by the Human Rights Council;
• Establish independent, impartial, and transparent monitoring and accountability mechanisms, with the
aim of bringing the perpetrators of serious international crimes to justice.
• Ensure non-discrimination in the provision of public health services (beyond emergency assistance), and publicly
communicate to all public health care facilities that migrants cannot be denied access because of their nationality
or migration status.
• Take measures to enable migrants to report crimes committed against them without fear of being arrested,
detained or deported because of their migration status.
• Establish safe and regular channels for migrants to facilitate their entry and work opportunities, in accordance
with the right to decent work, including providing work permits to migrants already employed in Libya in order to
legalise their status.
116

To the international community
• Support the Libyan authorities in implementing policies providing legal pathways for migrants, including brokering
coordination with other states, and setting up durable alternatives to detention.
• Expand safe and regular entry channels for migrants and refugees, including but not limited to: increased
settlement programmes, humanitarian admission programmes, private sponsorships, educational visas, family
reunifications, or labour migration at all skill levels. The absence of legal pathways for migrants and the lack
of adequate resettlement opportunities for refugees only works to further fuel the trafficking and smuggling
industry, exposing already vulnerable people to often horrendous abuse and exploitation. Evidence shows that
many refugees, asylum seekers and migrants only turn to smugglers having exhausted all possible legal options
available. Currently, UNHCR’s Emergency Transfer Mechanism (ETM) is virtually the only legal option for refugees
and asylum seekers to leave Libya, so it is vital that there are more pledges from governments, and that the ETM
process is streamlined by rapidly increasing the rate at which people are resettled. Last year, only 501 vulnerable
refugees were evacuated out of Libya, including just 221 who were resettled to Europe. This barely scratches the
surface of those in need;
• Ensure humanitarian interventions and bilateral country agreements are conditional upon adherence to human
rights standards and international laws.
To the European Union and Its Member States in particular, including Delegations and Representatives in Libya
• Fully commit to implement the outcomes of the Berlin Conference, explicitly calling for the European Union support
for initiatives to:
• Amend the Libyan legislative frameworks on migration and asylum to align them with international law
and internationally recognized standards and principles;
• End arbitrary detention, gradually close the detention centres for migrants and asylum seekers and
establish alternative procedures to detention.
• As Libya is not a safe port for disembarkation of people intercepted or rescued at sea, urgently re-establish
search and rescue capacity in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent loss of life and comply with the principle of
non-refoulement.
To the humanitarian community
• Engage in comprehensive and high-level joint advocacy vis-à-vis the Libyan authorities to improve the protection
space throughout the country. Consider engaging jointly in a policy dialogue with the Libyan authorities at
different levels on a human rights-centred approach to migration management.
• Continue to advocate with the Libyan authorities to establish safe spaces for migrants and refugees and develop
alternatives to detention for migrants and refugees in Detention Centres and those intercepted at sea at risk of
being brought to detention.
• Renew efforts in effective operational coordination, especially through the development and strengthening of
referral pathways and systems between international and national humanitarian actors, and in cooperation with
available public services.
• Further develop cross-sectoral initiatives, linking in particular protection, shelter, and multi-purpose cash
assistance to allow decent living conditions for migrants and refugees in urban settings.
• Strengthen the accountability frameworks in place in the humanitarian response, including full compliance to the
Principled Framework of intervention in Detention Centres, and the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence
Policy (HRDDP). Under these two frameworks, humanitarian actors cannot provide authorities with support in
constructing, renovating, or any other work that would facilitate the opening of new detention facilities.

When Private Vessels Rescue Migrants
and Refugees
Author: Dr. Jean-Pierre Gauci*
Introduction: The Issue
Private vessels are often called to assist vessels in
distress – and sometimes the assisted vessels include
persons fleeing persecution, war and other human
rights violations. Of the 152,343 people rescued at
sea in 2015, over 16,000 were rescued by merchant
ships and over 20,000 were assisted by rescue boats
belonging to non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
In 2016, 381 merchant ships were diverted from their
routes and 121 ships were involved in the rescue of
13,888 people. In recognition, the International Maritime
Organisation commended “all merchant vessels and
their crew participating in the rescue of mixed migrants
at sea for their bravery, professionalism and compassion
embodying the highest traditions of the sea.”324
The engagement of private vessels carries a number
of legal (human rights and commercial) implications.
Concerns over the role of private (merchant) vessels
when rescuing migrants at sea have been raised by
researchers and activists over recent years. Despite
their particularities, individual cases often raise similar
questions concerning the obligations and responsibilities
of commercial vessels, as well as the responsibilities of
States involved in such rescues. The key issues include
the following: The failure of some vessels to rescue people
at sea, delays in the disembarkation of rescued persons
and instructions to vessels to return rescued persons to
unsafe ports (e.g. Libya).
This policy brief will examine three responsibilities that
vessels have in turn – namely, the obligation to rescue,
responsibilities under human rights law (in particular the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights)
and commercial responsibilities towards clients. It will
then raise the question of state responsibility before
presenting eight key recommendations.
Obligation to rescue
The obligation of commercial vessels to rescue people in
distress at sea is established in domestic law, customary
international law, industry practice and treaty law,
with the latter including the 1982 UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 1974 Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) as well as the 1989
International Convention on Salvage (the “Salvage
Convention”. These obligations are directed towards the
State through whose legislation it becomes binding on
the shipmasters of vessels flagged in that jurisdiction,
although the wording of both SOLAS and the Salvage
Convention refers directly to the shipmaster. There is a
widespread acceptance of the obligation to rescue, at
least at the general level, including through the obligation
of States to require vessels flying their flag to rescue
people in distress under customary international law,
and therefore binding on all States.325
The general duty
*This policy brief is extracted and adapted from a report published by The British Institute of International and Comparative Law in November
2020. The full report is available at: https://www.biicl.org/publications/when-private-vessels-rescue-migrants-and-refugees-a-mapping-of-legal-
considerations. Special thanks to Francesca Romana Partipillo for her research assistance on the original project and to Idel Hanley for her assistance
in the finalisation of the report and this policy brief.
Malta, Italy,
Libya, Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa,
East Africa,
West Africa
118

to rescue may, theoretically, give rise to criminal and civil
liability in the case of failure to abide by the obligation.
The obligation to rescue is often incorporated into the
criminal law provision of flag States, and it often includes
criminal penalties in the form of a fine or imprisonment for
shipmasters who ignore their duty to rescue.326
The obligation to rescue, while broad, is not absolute.
Indeed, limitations on the obligation have existed since
the early days of its development. Under UNCLOS, the
provision is limited by “as far as it is reasonable” to do
so.327
Under SOLAS, a shipmaster is given the discretion
to decline to provide assistance if “unable or, in the special
circumstances of the case, considers it unreasonable
or unnecessary to proceed to their assistance.”328
The
stricter limitation on the shipmaster’s discretion is found
in the Salvage Convention, which provides that the
obligation to rescue stands as long as the shipmaster
can rescue “without serious danger to his vessel and
persons thereon.”329
Business responsibility: The UN
Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights
In the context of the rescue of migrants at sea, the
responsibility of private vessels to avoid infringing upon
the human rights of others as set out in the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs),
includes, at a minimum, two manifestations.
The first relates to those obligations emanating from the
right to life, and this includes an obligation to do one’s
duty to prevent loss of life at sea. This, in turn, includes
responding to situations of distress and to ensuring that
the vessel, including its crew, is prepared to undertake
the rescue so as to avoid death or injury during the course
of a rescue operation. While the extension of positive
obligations in human rights law to corporate actors
through the UNGPs is a matter of debate, undertaking
rescue operations is both a requirement of the law of the
sea and a human rights obligation extending from the
responsibility of business to respect the right to life. In
addition, the duty to rescue applies both to States and to
masters of ships.330
Indeed, under international law, the
duty to rescue is personally attributed to the master of
the vessel. It may be argued that the shipmaster is the
subject of the duty, for instance under SOLAS,331
and that
the shipowner is not to be held liable for a breach of the
duty to rescue, as under the Salvage Convention.332
This obligation is further imbued with other human rights
requirements, such as the principle of non-discrimination.
This duty applies to all persons in distress without
distinction. The nationality of the vessels or of the
persons, their legal status and the activity in which they
are engaged are irrelevant. Even the fact that the persons
are engaged in an unlawful activity should not make any
difference to the duty to rescue. The fact that the persons
to be saved are migrants or are in the process of being
smuggled should not in any way interfere with the right
to be saved.333
This is clarified by both the SOLAS and
the Search and Rescue Convention.334
The obligation to rescue also involves being prepared to
rescue. Under SOLAS for instance,
“All ships shall have ship-specific plans and
procedures for recovery of persons from the water,
taking into account the guidelines developed by
the Organisation.”335
This is particularly relevant given that many commercial
vessels will have high sides that make recovering persons
from the water dangerous.
The second manifestation is that the shipmaster should
ensure that they are not party to violations of the principle
of non-refoulement. The prohibition of refoulement
emanates from multiple sources in both refugee law
(notably, Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Refugee
Convention) and human rights law (including the right
to life and the prohibition of torture as well as cruel and
inhumane treatment or punishment). Addressing the
obligation of non-refoulement as applicable to States,
UNHCR notes that they
“are bound not to transfer any individual to
another country if this would result in exposing
him or her to serious human rights violations,
notably arbitrary deprivation of life, or torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”336
Non-refoulement, as established in the refugee
convention and complemented through human rights
standards, is a principle of customary international
law binding on all States.337
It includes both direct
and indirect refoulement. The prohibition of torture
is recognised as jus cogens.338
The application of the
principle of non-refoulement339
in maritime operations,
including relating to immigration control, is reiterated
in other relevant instruments such as Article 19 of the
Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants.
The application of the principle has been elaborated by
courts, including the European Court of Human Rights in
the case of Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy.340
The 2004 International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) Guidelines on the Treatment
of Persons Rescued at Sea call on shipmasters to ensure
that “survivors are not disembarked in a place where
their safety would be further jeopardised.”341
While the
IMO Guidelines are not directly binding, they are adopted
with a view to supporting governments in adhering to

their binding legal obligations. Domestic courts have also
determined that actions by rescued persons, in pressuring
shipmasters not to return them to countries like Libya,
were justified under the principles of self-defence.
Other human rights might also be impacted in the context
of rescue operations. Depending on the conditions
onboard the vessel, the treatment of rescued persons
might be in violation of the prohibition of degrading
treatment, for instance. Here, one should note that the
obligation of the shipmaster to treat rescued persons
with respect is circumscribed by the limitations of the
vessel, and must be read in line with the rescue vessel
not being a place of safety and the need to facilitate
prompt disembarkation. Moreover, the right to physical
and mental health of rescued persons may also be
impacted, as frequent stories of individuals taking ill and
attempting suicide have clearly highlighted.
In this regard, it is also worth noting that adequate
planning, preparation, training and support are
needed to ensure that the rights of crew members
are also safeguarded. This includes, but is not limited
to, the right to health. As the International Chamber
of Shipping recognises, “seafarers may experience
stress or psychological after effects following a rescue
operation,”342
and preventive measures must be taken as
regards communicable diseases.
According to UNGP 23, “all business enterprises have the
same responsibility to respect human rights wherever they
operate. Where the domestic context renders it impossible
to meet this responsibility fully, business enterprises
are expected to respect the principles of internationally
recognised human rights to the greatest extent possible
in the circumstances, and to be able to demonstrate their
efforts in this regard.” This issue becomes particularly
fraught when a vessel is faced with instructions by rescue
coordinationcentrestoundertakeanactionthatmayresult
in human rights violations. Such instructions may involve
disembarking individuals in a country where they face
harm or instructions to hand over control of the rescued
persons to authorities from those countries, placing a
shipmaster in a particularly difficult position. While rescue
instructions by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre
(MRCC) are not enforceable against a vessel on the high
seas,343
especially when the instruction relates to the
disembarkation of rescued persons, the coastal State may
well be the next port of call for the vessel and will make it
impossible for that vessel to sail into its ports. Indeed, there
have been situations were ports were closed for vessels
who were not allowed to disembark rescued persons.
Put differently, while the instruction as to where to return
people is not binding (or enforceable), a vessel will often
come within the enforcement jurisdiction of a State if it
sails into that State’s contiguous zone waters or territorial
sea. Entry into port for the purpose of disembarkation
falls squarely within the remit of the coastal State’s
decision. Indeed,
“under the Law of the Sea regime, a coastal State
is therefore principally entitled to take measures
against a vessel that is not authorised to enter its
territorial sea. It is submitted that such measures
may include an exchange of communications,
requiring the vessel to leave, blocking passage
by positioning ships in the vessel’s way, and
ultimately, the use of forceful means.”344
In practice, therefore, there is significant pressure on the
shipmaster to follow the instructions given. Moreover,
when a vessel sails into the port of that coastal State,
or even as soon as a vessel enters the contiguous zone
of a State, “the coastal State may exercise the control
necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its
immigration laws within its territory or territorial sea” (in
line with UNCLOS).345
In practice, the response to such instructions varies and
willdependbothonthedecisionoftheshipmaster,andthe
broader organisational culture as reflected in its human
rights statements, if available. Two examples stand in
stark contrast. Facing relatively similar instructions, the
MV Salamis in 2013 and the MV Nivin in 2019 adopted
different approaches. The MV Salamis challenged the
instruction and continued to sail towards Malta. It was
blockaded outside Maltese waters and threatened with
legal action. Eventually, after a standoff of four days,
the migrants on board were allowed disembarkation in
Italy. The MV Nivin, on the other hand, sailed to Libya to
disembark the migrants it had rescued.
These situations raise important questions; companies
must equip the masters of vessels to make decisions that
comply with human rights obligations. Importantly,
“The owner, the charterer or the company
operating the ship … or any other person … shall
not prevent or restrict the master of the ship from
taking or executing any decision which, in the
master’s professional judgment, is necessary for
safety of life at sea.”346
Vessels, and their representatives, should use their
leverage with the relevant search-and-rescue and
coastal States, and with and through their flag State, to
identify solutions that do not render the vessel de facto
part of situations of refoulement.
120

Commercial implications
Deviation and delay linked to rescue will entail significant
financial ramifications for the vessel involved and the
parties with a financial interest in that journey. Migrant
rescue operations tend to be complex, with the allocation
of costs involving the shipowner, the charterers, the
cargo owners and insurers, at a minimum. Determination
of exact costs is subject to the details of any particular
situation. The costs can broadly be categorised as direct
and indirect.
Direct costs include humanitarian provisions, additional
wages and stores, extra fuel consumed during and after
the rescue, port charges assessed during disembarkation
of rescued persons, repairing, restocking and cleaning
the vessel itself.347
Indirect costs comprise issues
arising from deviation and delay; implications on the
commercial agreements underlying any given voyage;
and losses to the money-making potential of the vessel.
As Attard notes, “providing assistance may entail loss of
profit or damage due to, inter alia, deviation or delayed
disembarkation.”348
These are likely to be even more substantial than the
direct costs. As the MV Tampa,349
MT Salamis350
and
Maersk Etienne incidents illustrate, these delays are
likely to be worsened by States’ unwillingness to allow
disembarkation. While details of such losses have tended
not to be published, stakeholders have reported losses of
up to USD500,000 arising out of a single migrant vessel
rescue causing the vessel to bedelayed for one week.351
While insurance may cover some of theseexpenses (as
we will see below) significant costs will be borne by those
having a direct financial interest in the voyage.
The determination of costs and, critically, who bears
those costs, will depend on the underlying agreements.
Identifying the parties responsible for specific costs will
allow them to better prepare and seek relevant insurance
and related coverage. An important distinction must be
drawn here between contracts for the carriage of goods
under a bill of lading (used primarily in the liner trade) on
one hand, and contracts for the carriage of goods under
a charterparty (in the tramp trade) on the other.
On state responsibility
While the focus of this policy brief has been on the
role played by private vessels, States retain significant
obligations. These obligations include flag State
responsibility to ensure that any vessel flying its flag
rescues persons in distress; coastal States’ obligations to
minimisedelayindisembarkations;andtheaccountability,
under international law, for instructions given to private
vessels that violate human rights obligations.

This briefing has demonstrated that privately-owned vessels have a clear obligation to rescue persons in distress.
Yet, it has also shed light on the limitations to, and incomplete nature of, this framework. Based on the research, it is
urgently recommended that the following changes be made to ensure rescue by private vessels.
1. There is a clear need for an integrated approach to boat migration and rescue at sea. Such an approach
requires genuine good faith efforts by States in line with their international obligations; all commercial players
involved in shipping; and other actors including NGOs and international organisations. An integrated approach
involves adherence to human rights principles as well as law of the sea requirements. Greater accountability
under international law – such as the recent decision on jurisdiction by the Human Rights Committee – can go
some way towards ensuring good faith implementation of obligations by States. Consumers, shareholders and
others can help hold business to account internally, while developments in the business and human rights legal
frameworks can further develop accountability mechanisms for shipping companies.
2. The international community should clarify and formalise rules for disembarkation, and avoid using delayed
disembarkation as a lobbying tactic for responsibility sharing. The rescue of people at sea, across all its
stages, should not be used as a bargaining chip.
3. States must take responsibility for assisting shipmasters having rescued persons in distress at sea. This
can only be achieved if realistic, effective and efficient mechanisms for solidarity are developed between States,
including the relocation or resettlement of asylum seekers and other rescued persons, according to a fair and
equitable system of responsibility allocation.
4. Shipping companies should use their individual and collective bargaining power to put pressure on States
to better regulate rescue at sea and to ensure the swift and safe disembarkation of all rescued persons in a
place of safety. For example, the current negotiations around the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum can be
used as an opportunity for shipping companies to advocate for clearer guidance in this regard.
5. Industry organisations should develop model clauses addressing the sharing of risk between different actors
involved, for easy adoption by shipowners and charterers into their agreements.
6. States and industry bodies should consider developing international public or private mechanisms that
allow shipping companies, and any other corporation engaged in maritime activities, to share the financial
costs of the rescue of migrants at sea. The model of the International Convention on the Establishment of
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage could provide a basis for these discussions,
allowing shipping companies to share the financial risks associated with rescue operations.
7. In order to promote greater engagement with the commercial implications in this area, relevant parties should
facilitate access to information on arbitration decisions – even if anonymised and summarised – relating to
questions addressing the allocation of costs linked to rescues at sea.
8. Researchers and activists should ensure that the role of private vessels, especially in this field, is
mainstreamed in literature addressing business and human rights, and that business and human rights are
mainstreamed in the analysis of merchant vessels involved in maritime rescues.
122

Voices from the Ground: Protection Risks
and Smuggling from the Horn of Africa to
Tunisia
Author and affiliation: Nahom Bruk Gebremeskel, 4Mi Monitor,
Mixed Migration Centre North Africa
Introduction
My name is Nahom Bruk Gebremeskel, a refugee from
Eritrea who is currently residing in Tunis, Tunisia. Since
December 2019, I have been a volunteer with Mixed
Migration Centre (MMC) North Africa (first while based
in Médenine, now in Tunis), conducting a high number of
surveys with refugees and migrants located in various
cities in Tunisia, as well as in Sudan, through remote
surveying. While conducting the surveys, I came across
many migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, the
majority of whom travelled from or are travelling through
the Central Mediterranean Route. This helped me
develop a fundamental understanding of the prevailing
challenges they encounter, in addition to my learnings
from my treacherous personal experiences traversing
this route. Given that this contribution covers a broad
topic, it is not possible to fully express all of the details of
vulnerabilities on the ground. Hence, I will focus mainly
on protection risks within the smuggling context in three
countries along the route that I am most familiar with –
Sudan, Libya and Tunisia.
Sudan
Many West Africans on the move are crossing the border
to Sudan from Chad, during which they can become
victims of physical violence and robbery at gun point
by armed groups and criminal gangs. Furthermore,
many reported that, during their stay in Sudan, they
experienced an immense struggle to get access to work
opportunities and other social services because of the
following obstacles: The lack of proper documentation;
a language barrier particularly perceived by this group;
a fear of detention and deportation by authorities; and
perceived discrimination. Due to these factors, this group
is often left without any other choice than engage in
underpaid, informal labour jobs.
People on the move from the Horn of Africa – including
Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia – might enter Sudan
with or without the help of smugglers. When dealing
with smugglers, however, most of the time, they find
themselves locked up and tortured for ransom in areas
like El Hajer (in Al Jazirah state, south of Khartoum) or in
a warehouse in the middle of a desert. For East African
migrants, living in Sudan becomes challenging after
facing such extortions, in addition to arbitrary round
ups in cities and detention by the authorities. To avoid
such round ups or to get released from detention, East
Africans might bribe the ones in charge. Nevertheless,
briberies are just momentary quick fix, which makes
the search for long-lasting solutions inevitable. Hence,
smugglers often become the only option for them to
escape their precarious situations, since the majority
of people on the move from the Horn of Africa do not
possess legal documents.
Libya
For the past three or four years, the majority of African
people on the move have attempted to cross the
Mediterranean Sea embarking from Libya. Almost all
respondents I surveyed mentioned having become
Sudan
Libya
Tunisia
Central
Mediterranean
Route
North Africa

victims of violence and abuses in Libya. In particular, I will
narrow down the focus on refugees and migrants from
the Horn of Africa.
To enter Libya with the help of smugglers, departing
either from Egypt or Sudan, one has to travel through the
Sahara desert. For a few fortunate ones, the journey will
take a few days or weeks, but for the majority it lasts a
couple of months. They travel in crowded vehicles, with
limited water and food supplies, amid temperatures that
rise above 40 °C; not to mention the violent treatment from
smugglers they are exposed to. It reduces the possibility
of making it alive to Libya. A high number of people on
the move lose their lives on this desert journey every year
due to factors like hunger, dehydration, car accidents and
violent incidents, often involving the burning of vehicles,
which happen between smugglers.
Many – if not all – of those who arrived in Libya reported
that they were told to pay a higher ransom than the deal
they had in the first place. Some also reported that they
were brought to Libya after having been kidnapped, and
were asked to pay a ransom. Whether someone enters
Libya voluntarily or not, once trapped in the hands of
smugglers, chances are high that torture might follow,
including beatings, rape, starvation, water splashing
during cold nights and electric shocks. A lack of medical
supplies results in another considerable number not
making it out alive from the warehouses before or even
after paying the ransom. This is often considered the
first link in the succeeding chain of warehouse tortures.
Smugglers often extract money multiple times through a
cycle of selling migrants more than once.
Afterpassingthroughthiscycleoftorture,victimsofsevere
protection incidents, such as those who suffered sexual
and gender-based violence,352
and other traumatised
refugees and migrants try to cross the Mediterranean
Sea. Often, they then end up being intercepted and
detained in detention centres run by Libyan authorities
from which evacuation to transit countries is carried out
by UNHCR. These detention centres are known for their
poor management in terms of medical and food supplies
as well as safety. Many reported to have been sold to
smugglers while being detained there. Some manage
to escape and continue their lives in Tripoli, which is a
relatively safe city for people on the move compared to
any other place in Libya. However, being relatively safe
does not make Tripoli a safe place. It is a city where
they can still be exploited, robbed at gun point and even
murdered in some occasions.
Tunisia
Traumatised refugees and migrants naturally have less
capability of dealing with certain circumstances than
those who have not experienced trauma. After an often
perilous journey, it is hard for them to get back to “normal
life,’’ unless psycho-social assistance is provided. Many
who come to Tunisia from Libya cannot access such
services, since they lack the proper documentation.
Moreover, some cannot afford such assistance and others
do not really understand the essence of it. The absence
of both proper documentation and an asylum law also
hinders refugees and asylum seekers from obtaining
work and study permits, as asylum cards only grant
limited authorisation. Attempting to address this problem,
humanitarian organisations such as UNHCR advocate
for more durable solutions. Thereby, their collaboration
with national and international organisations is seen
to increase activities that aid refugees and migrants in
Tunisia in sustaining their self-esteem.In addition to my
personal experiences, the analytical reasoning of the
surveys I conducted with many migrants, asylum seekers
and refugees for over a year in Médenine, located in the
south of Tunisia, enabled me to understand the extent of
discrimination that people on the move still face. Hence,
it is crucial for the authorities to devise further means for
improving the relationship between local communities
and people on the move.
I hope to convey this message not just on my behalf, but
also for many others like me. In closing, I wish to express
my gratitude to MMC North Africa for entrusting me with
this task and for giving me the opportunity to broadly
spotlight protection risks in the context of smuggling in
Sudan, Libya and Tunisia.
“Despite the existence of international
organisations, they are hardly known to migrants,
asylum seekers and refugees. It is very important
for those NGOs to find ways of introducing
themselves to these vulnerable populations,
because it is usually easier for the NGOs to trace
the migrants than for migrants to chase them.”
Nahom Bruk Gebremeskel, 4Mi Monitor, Mixed
Migration Centre North Africa
124

Annex
Live notes from daily wrap-ups during the three days of the
workshop
Across the three-day virtual workshop, daily wrap-ups on protection in mixed movement were presented, and key
points for advocacy, policy reform and action were co-created by all participants.
Credit: © Ink Factory / UNHCR / MMC
Visualised by Ink Factory – inkfactorystudio.com

Endnotes
1 The views expressed in this section are those of the authors and not of UNHCR or IOM.
2 This includes whether or not they use the term “modern slavery” instead of “trafficking in persons”; treat forced labour or “sex work” as trafficking in persons; or de-emphasise
movement and emphasise exploitation as the core of the harm.
3 Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT) (2016). Pivoting toward the evidence: building effective counter-trafficking responses using accumulated
knowledge and a shared approach to monitoring, evaluation and learning; and Bryant, K. and Landman, T. (2020). Combatting Human Trafficking since Palermo: What Do We Know
about What Works? Journal of Human Trafficking 6 (2), 119-140.
4 Danziger, R., Martens, J. and Guajardo, M. (2009). Human Trafficking & Migration Management. In: Friesendorg, C. (2009) Strategies Against Human Trafficking: The Role of the
Security Sector 78. Vienna and Geneva, National Defence Academy and Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports / Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
5 Sometimes a fourth ‘P’ is added to the 3P paradigm as ‘partnerships’ – to emphasise multi-agency coordination and cooperation, or “the means” to achieving the 3Ps. United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) (2013). Counter-Trafficking in Persons: A Field Guide.
6 Kotiswaran, P. (2019). Trafficking: A Development Approach, Current Legal Problems 72(1), 388.
7 Molland, S. (2017). Humanitarianised Development – Anti-trafficking reconfigured. Development and Change 50 (3), 763-765.
8 Elliott, S. and Smith, M. (2020) Simulating a multi-agency approach for the protection of trafficked persons in migration and displacement settings. Journal of Human Trafficking 6
(2), 168-181.
9 Wylie, G. (2016). The International Politics of Human Trafficking. London, UK, Palgrave Macmillan.
10 These include lax labour laws that permit employers to exploit their workers with impunity under the guise of a state-sponsored, or government contracted scheme, or securitised
borders that fail to address demand for cheap foreign labour, opening up clandestine and dangerous migration pathways. See Chuang (2014), p. 639 and Kotiswaran (2019), p. 378.
11 Kempadoo, K. (2015). The Modern-Day White (Wo)Man’s Burden: Trends in Anti-Trafficking and Anti-Slavery Campaigns. Journal of Human Trafficking 1, 8–20.
12 Bernstein, E. and Jakobsen, J.R. (2010). Sex, Secularism and Religious Influence in US Politics. Third World Quarterly 31 (6), 1023–1039.
13 Kempadoo, K. (2016). The War on Humans: Anti-trafficking in the Caribbean. Social and Economic Studies, 65(4), 5-32.
14 Kotiswaran, P. (2019). Trafficking: A Development Approach, Current Legal Problems, 72(1), 375 -416.
15 McGrath, S. and Watson, S. (2018). Anti-slavery as Development: A Global Politics of Rescue; Geoforum, 93, 22-31.
16 Kotiswaran, P. (2019). Trafficking: A Development Approach, Current Legal Problems, 72(1), 375 -416.
17 Kempadoo, K. (2016). Countering Human Trafficking: Introduction. Social and Economic Studies, 65(4), 1-4. See also: Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women (GAATW) (2007).
Collateral Damage: The Impact of Anti-Trafficking Measures on Human Rights around the World. Bangkok, Thailand.
18 Vanwesenbeeck, I. (2019). The Making of “The Trafficking Problem”. Archives of Sexual Behavior. 48, 1961–1967.
19 Yea, S. (2020). Towards critical geographies of anti-human trafficking: Producing and precluding victimhood through discourses, practices and institutions. Progress in Human
Geography. See also Ford, M., Lyons, L., van Schendel, W. (2012). Labour Migration and Human Trafficking: An Introduction. In Willem van Schendel, Lenore Lyons, Michele Ford
(Eds.), Labour Migration and Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives. 1-22. London and New York: Routledge.
20 Kempadoo, K. (2015). The Modern-Day White (Wo)Man’s Burden: Trends in Anti-Trafficking and Anti-Slavery Campaigns. Journal of Human Trafficking 1, 8–20.
21 “Internalised racism refers to the acceptance, by marginalised racial populations, of the negative societal beliefs and stereotypes about themselves – beliefs which reinforce the
superiority of Whites and devalue people of color, and which can lead to the perception of oneself as worthless and powerless … and a belief that value can only be attained with
greater proximity to whiteness - be it ideologically, physically or even geographically.” See page 31 of the published thesis submitted by Oyinkansola Adepitan for her Masters of
Arts in Political Science Department, School of Interdisciplinary Studies, University of South Florida and entitled Decolonising human trafficking: A case study of human trafficking in
Edo State Nigeria, March 2020, retrieved from https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9346&context=etd.
22 For a discussion on the origins of, and societal norms which perpetuate the trafficking of women and girls from Edo State, Nigeria, see Ibid. by Oyinkansola Adepitan (2020).
23 Paasche, E. (2016). The role of corruption in reintegration: experiences of Iraqi Kurds upon return from Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(7), 1076-1093.
24 Szablewska, N. (2015). The politics of anti-trafficking efforts. Australian Institute of International Affairs: Australian Outlook.
25 Antonopoulos, G. A., Rusev, A., Di Nicola, A., and Terenghi, F. (2019). Human trafficking finances: Evidence from three European countries. Springer Briefs in Criminology. Cham,
Switzerland: Springer.
26 Eck K. (2018). The origins of policing institutions: Legacies of colonial insurgency. Journal of Peace Research 55(2), 147-160.
27 Kotiswaran, P. (2019). Trafficking: A Development Approach, Current Legal Problems 72(1), 375-416.
28 Van der Watt, M. (2014) Towards a complex systems understanding of human trafficking. Culture, Policy and Law Enforcement 3 (1), 2. For a discussion about the challenges in
fostering police/NGO cooperation in anti-trafficking - see Elliott, S. and Smith, M. (2020). Simulating a multi-agency approach for the protection of trafficked persons in migration
and displacement settings. Journal of Human Trafficking, 6(2). 168-181.
29 Kotiswaran, P. (2019) Trafficking: A Development Approach, Current Legal Problems, 72(1), 375-416.
30 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. SDG Target 8.7:
Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child
labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms.
31 Kotiswaran, P. (2019) Trafficking: A Development Approach, Current Legal Problems, 72(1), 375-416.
32 Ibid.
33 Laczko, F. and Danailova-Trainor. G. (2009). Trafficking in Persons and Human Development: Towards A More Integrated Policy Response. Human Development Research Paper
2009/51. International Organization for Migration, United States Government Accountability Office, (GAO).
34 Kotiswaran, P. (2019). Ibid.
35 Chuang, J.A. (2014). Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law. The American Journal of International Law, 108(4), 609-649.
36 Ibid.
37 Laczko, F. and Danailova-Trainor. G. (2009). Trafficking in Persons and Human Development: Towards A More Integrated Policy Response.’ Human Development Research Paper
2009/51. International Organization for Migration, United States Government Accountability Office, (GAO).
38 Ibid.
39 Ryan, A. (2016). What is Systemic Design?. Medium.’ Feb. 03. 2016. Retrieved from: https://medium.com/the-overlap/what-is-systemic-design-f1cb07d3d837 (last accessed:
18/01/2021)
40 Van der Watt, M. and van der Westhuizen, A. (2017). (Re)configuring the criminal justice response to human trafficking: a complex-systems perspective. Police Practice and
Research. 18(3), 218-229.
41 Van der Watt, M. and van der Westhuizen, A. (2017) (Re)configuring the criminal justice response to human trafficking: a complex-systems perspective. Police Practice and
Research. 18(3), 218-229. https://doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2017.1291560
42 Cameron, S. and Newman E. (2008) Introduction: Understanding human trafficking. In: Trafficking in humans: Social, cultural and political dimensions. 1-19. United Nations
University Press. New York.
43 National Referral Mechanism for Ethiopia (2019). Joining Efforts to Protect the Rights of Victims of Trafficking in Ethiopia, page 23.
44 Guidelines: National Referral Mechanism for assisting victims of human trafficking in Kenya. (2016), page 49.
45 Ibid, page 52.
46 Interview 1, interview conducted via phone between the author and a staff member of a local NGO based in Hargeisa, 29 December 2020.
47 Interview 2, interview conducted via phone between the author and a staff member of a local NGO operating in Hargeisa and Nairobi, 5 January 2021.
48 National Referral Mechanism for Ethiopia (2019), ibid, page 25.
49 Havey, J. (2018) Top 10 Findings…So far… . Butterfly Longitudinal Research.
50 Interview 1, ibid. Interview 2, ibid. Interview 3, interview conducted via phone between the author and a staff member of a local NGO based in Nairobi, 06.01.2021. Interview 4,
interview conducted in written form via email between the author and a staff member of a local NGO based in Addis Ababa, 08.01.2021. Interview 5, interview conducted via phone
between the author and a staff member of a local NGO based in the coastal region of Kenya, 09.01.2021.
51 Interview 2, 3, ibid.
52 Interview 1, 3, 4, ibid.
55 Interview 3, ibid.
56 Golo, H. & Eshun, I. (2019) ‘Re-Trafficking’ in the Coastal Communities and the Volta Lake of Ghana: Children’s Rights, Agency and Intra-household Bargaining Position. American
Journal of Business and Society, Vol.4(4).
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57 Jobe, A. (2010) The Causes and Consequences of Re-trafficking: Evidence from the IOM Human Trafficking Database. IOM Human Trafficking Database Thematic
Research Series.
58 Interview 2, 3, 4, 5, ibid.
61 Golo, H. & Eshun, I. (2019) Ibid.
62 Havey, J. (2018) Ibid.
67 Busch-Armendariz, N.B., Nsonwu, M.B. & Cook Heffron, L. (2011) Human Trafficking Victims and Their Children: Assessing Needs, Vulnerabilities Strengths, and
Survivorship. Journal of Applied Research on Children: Informing Policy for Children at Risk, Vol.2(1).
68 Okech, D. et.al. (2018) Social Support, Dysfunctional Coping and Community Reintegration as Predictors of PTSD Among Human Trafficking Survivors. Behavioural
Medicine, Vol.44(3).
69 Morrison, T. et.al. (2015) Survivor Experiences and Perceptions of Stigma: Reintegration into the Community. Thematic Paper, The Butterfly Longitudinal Research
Project.
71 Kandilige, L. & Geraldine, A. (2019) The Quagmire of Return and Reintegration: Challenges to Multi-Stakeholder Coordination of Involuntary Returns. International
Migration, 2019.
74 Ibid.
77 For a discussion of this in the West African context, see Merry, L.; Mogere, D; Odindo, D. & Edwards, N. (2019) Transnational family support and perspectives from
family members back home: a pilot study in Kisumu, Kenya. Journal of Global Health Reports, 2019.
78 Hammond, L. (2011) Obliged to Give: Remittances and the Maintenance of Transnational Networks Between Somalis at Home and Abroad. Bildhaan: An
International Journal of Somali Studies: Vol. 10, Article 11. Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/bildhaan/vol10/iss1/11.
80 Smith-Brake, J. et.al. (2015) Economic Reintegration of Survivors of Sex Trafficking: Experiences and Expressions of Filial Piety and Financial Anxiety. Thematic Paper,
The Butterfly Longitudinal Research Project.
81 Surtee, R. (2005). Second Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South-Eastern Europe. Regional Clearing Point, IOM, Geneva.
82 Stephen-Smith, S. (2008). Routes In, Routes Out. Quantifying the Gendered Experience of Trafficking to the UK. Poppy Project, London.
83 Sen, S. & Nair, P.M. (2004). A Report on Trafficking in Women and Children in India 2002-2003. NHCR-UNIFEM-ISS, National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi,
India.
84 For the Kenyan coastal community, interview 5, ibid.
85 Golo, H. & Eshun, I. (2019). Ibid.
86 Jobe, A. (2010). Ibid.
87 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Golo, H. & Eshun, I. (2019). Ibid.
91 Havey, J. (2018). Ibid.
97 For a discussion of this topic, see Begum, I. (2020). Getting Back to Society: Rehabilitation of Trafficking in Assam, India. Journal of Human Trafficking, Vol.6 (2).
98 With special thanks to Brian, the spokesperson for CoMensha for giving his time to discuss protection concerns for THBs.
99 IOM (2017) Human Trafficking Through the Central Mediterranean Route: Data, Stories and Information Collected By The International Organization For Migration.
Pg.8. IOM International Publications. https://italy.iom.int/sites/default/files/documents/IOM_report_trafficking_2017.pdf.
100 Crisp, J. (2008) Beyond the nexus: UNHCR’s evolving perspective on refugee Protection and international migration. New Issues in Refugee Research. Research
Paper No. 155. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/research/wor king/4818749a2/beyond-nexus-unhcrs-evolving-perspective-refugee-protection international.html.
101 The Convention [Migrant Workers and their families] and Libya, Egypt and Algeria are State Parties - even if Libya national law criminalizes irregular migrants. The
Convention seeks to establish minimum standards that States parties should apply to migrant workers and members of their families, irrespective of their migratory
status. The rationale behind the recognition of rights of undocumented migrant workers is also reaffirmed in the preamble, in which the States parties consider, inter
alia, that irregular migrants are frequently exploited and face serious human rights violations and that appropriate action should be encouraged to prevent and
eliminate clandestine movements and trafficking in migrant workers while at the same time ensuring the protection of their rights. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/
publications/factsheet24rev.1en.pdf.
102 Skleparis D. and Crawley, H. (2016) “Refugees and Migrants neither both: Categorical Fetishism and Politics of Bounding in Europe’s Migration crisis. Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies, Volume 44, Issue 1. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1348224.
103 Crisp, J. (2008). Ibid.
104 Steffen, A. and Koch, A. (2017) Global Migration Governance and Mixed flow implications for development-centered policies (SWP Research Paper, 8/2017). Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-53361-3.
105 European Council (2018). Together Against Trafficking in Human Beings. The Netherlands. Government of the Netherlands Website. https://www.government.nl/
documents/reports/2019/04/09/together-against-human-trafficking. Accessed 10.01.2020
106 Dublin Claim (See paragraph 6, for further clarifications).
107 European Council. (2018). Ibid.
108 Hamid, D. (2020) Master Thesis: Losing hope? The role of faith -based organization in the local negotiation of immigrant il(legality). The International Institute of Social
Studies of Erasmus University, The Netherlands.
109 UNHCR-MMC (2020) “On this journey, no one cares if you live or die”: Abuse, protection, and justice along routes between East and West Africa and Africa’s
Mediterranean Coast”.
110 Ibid.
111 United States Department. (2020) Trafficking in Person: Netherlands. https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/netherlands.
112 Palumbo, L. (2015) Protection of Trafficked people in Italy: Policies, Limits and Challenges. Journal of Money Laundering Control. Vol.18. No. 1. Pp. 52-65. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1108/JMLC-01-2014-0001.
113 Ibid.
114 CoMensha. (2019) Personal Interview with CoMensha Spokesperson. The Hague, The Netherlands. 17 November 2020.
115 Van Voorhoute, C. J.E.B. (2020) Combatting Human Trafficking Holistically Through Proactive Financial Investigation. University of Amsterdam. UVA-DARE. https://
dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=b9843351-360b-4440-af74-b63778a01206.
116 Snel, E. Bilgil, O. and Staring, R. (2020) Migration trajectories and transnational support within and Beyond Europe. Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies. DOI:
10.1080/1369183X.2020.1804189.
117 UNHCR-ECRE The Dublin Regulation. Asylum in Europe. Now, it is up to you. https://www.unhcr.org/protection/operations/4a9d13d59/dublin-regulation.html.
118 Hamid, D. (2020) Master Thesis: Losing hope? The role of faith -based organization in the local negotiation of immigrant il(legality). The International Institute of Social
Studies of Erasmus University, The Netherlands
119 Thompson, L. (2013) IOM Commentary on Protection of Migrants (see UN Chronicle, Vol, 1: No.3, September 2013)
120 Martin, I. and Bonfanti, S. Migration and Asylum challenges in Eastern Africa: Mixed Migration Flows Require Dual Policy Approaches. Policy Brief, Migration
Policy Centre. EUI. https://migrationpolicycentre.eu/publication/migration-and-asylum-challenges-in-eastern-africa-mixed-migration-flows-require-dual-policy-
approaches/;p.1
121 Van Voorhoute, C. J.E.B (2020) UVA-DARE. Academic Repository. University of Amsterdam. https://dare.uva.nl/search?identifier=b9843351-360b-4440-af74-
b63778a01206.
122 The views expressed here are those of the writer, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any organisation with which he is, or has been, associated.
123 CETS No. 197.
124 J. and Others v. Austria, App no 58216/12 (ECtHR, 17 January 2017), paras. 109–111.

125 GRETA (2016). 29.
126 Para. 71.
127 GRETA (2018). 28, para. 158.
128 GRETA (2017). 3, para. 82.
129 GRETA (2018). 26, para 84. According to more recent figures, the number of persons trafficked in Malta remains low. The authorities claimed to have provided
assistance to 120 victims of trafficking in the period 2017-19: Reply from Malta to the Questionnaire for the evaluation of the implementation of the Council of Europe
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings by the Parties, submitted 3 February 2020.
130 https://www.unhcr.org/mt/figures-at-a-glance?
131 GRETA (2018). 7, para. 151.
132 GRETA (2020). 6 - https://rm.coe.int/guidance-note-on-the-entitlement-of-victims-of-trafficking-and-persons/16809ebf44
133 GRETA (2018). 26_MLT_rep, p. 36
134 Para. 37.
135 Footnotes omitted.
136 GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: The application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees to
victims of trafficking and persons at risk of being trafficked, HCR/GIP/06/07, 7 April 2006.
137 Special thanks to Ayla Bonfiglio, Bram Frouws, and Roberto Forin for their review of this paper; and to Tim Eaton for previous qualitative research for MMC North
Africa on migrants smuggling in Libya, which informed this paper.
138 The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2018). Responding to the Human Trafficking-Migrant Smuggling Nexus. Geneva, Switzerland.
139 New-Med Research Network (2015). The Changing Dynamics of Cross-border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Mediterranean. Rome, Italy.
140 Tinti, P. & Reitano, T. (2018). Migrant, refugee, smuggler, saviour. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
141 Ibid.
142 This is the same definition presented by the European Union in documents pertaining to Operation Sophia and IRINI.
143 New-Med Research Network (2015). Ibid.
144 Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy (IRCP). (2010) Organized crime involvement in trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants. Ghent,
Belgium.
145 Based on the evidence available, it was not possible to code the nationality systematically for all the actors; Campana, P. (2018). Out of Africa: The organization of
migrant smuggling across the Mediterranean. European Journal of Criminology, 15(4), 481-502.
146 Ibid.
147 Tinti, P. & Reitano, T. (2018). Migrant, refugee, smuggler, saviour. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
148 Ibid.
149 Libyan Law No. 19 (2010): “The illegal migrant will be put in jail and condemned to forced labor in jail or a fine of 1,000 Libyan dollars. … The person must be expelled
from Libyan territory once he finishes his time (in prison).” This law allows for indefinite detention, followed by deportation for irregular migrants.
150 Association La Terre Pour Tous
151 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Association La Terre Pour Tous
157 Ibid.
158 Bradbury, H. (Ed.) (2015) The Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice. 3rd Edition. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
159 Baird, M., Domian, E., Mulcahy, E., Mabior, R., Jemutai-Tanui, G. and Filippi M. (2015) Creating a Bridge of Understanding between Two Worlds: Community-Based
Collaborative-Action Research with Sudanese Refugee Women. Public Health Nursing, 32(5): 388-396.
160 Association La Terre Pour Tous (2020). Retrieved from www.facebook.com/laterrepourtous
161 Missing Migrants of the Mediterranean (2021). Retrieved from missingmigrants.org
162 Beyes, T. and Steyaert, C. (2011). The Ontological Politics of Artistic Interventions: Implications for Performing Action Research. Action Research, 9(1), 100–115.
163 Norton, L. and Sliep, Y. (2018). #WE SPEAK: Exploring the Experience of Refugee Youth Through Participatory Research and Poetry. Journal of Youth Studies 22(7),
1-18.
164 Fox, M. (2015). Embodied Methodologies, Participation, and the Art of Research. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 9(7), 321-332.
165 Marino, S. (2015). Making Space, Making Place: Digital Togetherness and the Redefinition of Migrant Identities Online. Social Media + Society.
166 Murphy, K. (2019). Against Precarious Abstraction: Bearing Witness to Migration through Moysés Zúñiga Santiago’s La Bestia Photographs. Latin American and
Latinx Visual Culture 1(1), 7–22.
167 Keshavarz, M. and Khosravi, S. (2020) The Magic of Borders. E-flux. Retrieved from https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/at-the-border/325755/the-magic-of-
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168 Gaibazzi, P., Bellagamba, A. and Dunnwald, S. (2017) Introduction: An Afro-Europeanist Perspective on EurAfrican Borders. In Giabazzi, P., Bellagamba, A. and
Dünnwald, S. (Eds.), Eurafrican Borders and Migration Management : Political Cultures, Contested Spaces, and Ordinary Lives (pp.3-28). Palgrave Macmillan.
169 Glick Schiller, N. and Çaglar, A. (2011) Locality and Globality: Building a Comparative Analytical Framework in Migration and Urban Studies. In Schiller N. and Çağlar
A. (Eds.), Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants (pp. 60-82). Cornell University Press.
170 Lemberg-Pederson, M. (2017) Effective Protection or Effective Combat? EU Border Control and North Africa. In Giabazzi, P., Bellagamba, A. and Dünnwald, S. (Eds.),
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171 Special thanks to Ahmed Aziz Dabboussi for his support on this note, and to Ayla Bonfiglio and Flannery Marcelle Dyon for their review. Moreover, thanks to the
roundtable participants and the moderator for the lively discussion on which this note is based.
172 Director, Center for Human Rights, Gender and Migration (Institute for Public Health); Research Associate Professor, Brown School of Social Work, Public Health and
Social Policy; Visiting Professor, School of Law, Washington University.
173 Manager and Researcher, Center for Human Rights, Gender and Migration (Institute for Public Health), Washington University.
174 Senior Community Based Protection Officer and Mixed Movements Focal Point, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Regional Bureau in the
Middle East and North Africa.
175 Interview (MOR-8), October 2020. Notes in possession of authors.
176 IOM (2020). Africa migration report: challenging the narrative. IOM: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
177 MICIC Initiative (2016). Guidelines to protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster. Retrieved from http://micicinitiative.iom.int/
178 Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) (2016). Early Warning, Early Action and Readiness Report.
179 This paper was submitted on behalf of IMREF. IMREF is part of the Department for International Development’s Safety, Support, and Solutions Phase II (SSS II)
programme. It is delivered by a consortium, which is led by Integrity and includes Seefar, IMPACT Initiatives, and Danube University Krems.
180 IOM (2019a). IOM Handbook on Protection and Assistance for Migrants Vulnerable to Violence, Exploitation and Abuse.
181 In the context of this paper, IMREF defines “transit migrants” as individuals who have the intention of continuing their journeys towards North Africa and/or Europe as
soon as they are able to do so. It includes, but is not limited to, migrants who have recently arrived and are staying in ghettos, stranded migrants, and migrants who
have been expelled from Algeria and Libya but are planning to travel to North Africa or Europe as soon as they have the means to do so. Transit migrants fall under
different protection regimes. This definition does not include regional migrants.
182 Mixed Migration Centre (2020). Evidence-based operational responses to mixed migration: challenges and best practice.
183 IMREF conducted over 270 qualitative interviews (including Focus Group Discussions and in-depth interviews) with migrants. See: IMREF (2020). Accessing the Most
Vulnerable Migrants in Agadez and Ouagadougou, March 2020; IMREF (2020). Exploring the impact of COVID-19 on the vulnerabilities of migrants in Agadez, Gao
and Ouagadougou; IMREF (2020). Exploring the relations between transit migrants and local communities in Gao and Agadez, unpublished; IMREF (2020). Exploring
migrants’ trust in humanitarian organisations in Gao and Agadez.
184 For example, the “IOM Handbook on Protection and Assistance for Migrants Vulnerable to Violence, Exploitation and Abuse”, published in 2019, uses the
Determinants of Migrant Vulnerability (DoMV) model.
185 IOM Handbook on Protection and Assistance for Migrants Vulnerable to Violence, Exploitation and Abuse. Geneva. Available at www.iom.int/iom-handbook-migrant-
protection-and-assistance.
186 Adepoju, A. (2016). Migration dynamics, refugees and internally displaced persons in Africa. United Nations Academic Impact article, 20 September.
187 McAuliffe, M. and A. Kitimbo (2018). African migration: what the numbers really tell us. Web Economic Forum website article, 7 June.
188 African Union (2017). Draft Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right
of Establishment of July 2017.
189 Adepoju, A. (2016). Ibid.
190 Terrio, S.J. (2015). Whose Child Am I? Unaccompanied, Undocumented Children in U.S. Immigration Custody. University of California Press, Oakland, California.
UNICEF (2002). A child rights approach on international migration and child trafficking: a UNICEF perspective. Paper presented at the coordination meeting on
international migration, New York, 11–12 July. Available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/coordination/3/docs/P06_UNICEF.pdf.
128

191 This paper is part of a broader research programme. Full acknowledgement available in Hovil, Lucy, Mark Gill, Iolanda Genovese, Olivia Bueno, Josiah Kaplan and
Ramya Subrahmanian, Reimagining Migration Responses: Migrant Children and Young People’s experiences in the Horn of Africa, UNICEF Office of Research –
Innocenti, Florence, 2021. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
UNICEF. See, for example, Girmachew Adugna. (2019)“Migration patterns and emigrants’ transnational activities: comparative findings from two migrant origin
areas in Ethiopia.” CMS 7, 5.; and IM Lewis. (1960) “The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa,” The Journal of African History Vol. 1, No. 2, 213-230. United Nations
Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 6 (2005) on the Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin,
CRC/GC/2005/6.
192 See, for example, Girmachew Adugna, “Migration patterns and emigrants’ transnational activities: comparative findings from two migrant origin areas in Ethiopia.”
CMS 7, 5 (2019); and IM Lewis, “The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa,” The Journal of African History Vol. 1, No. 2 (1960), pp.213-230.
193 As identified by respondents.
194 Where percentages do not add up to 100% this may be due to rounding, multiple responses or exclusion of «don’t know» responses
195 Data based on (a) those “still on the move” and planned to move elsewhere in next six months (n=764) and (b) “still on the move” and planned to stay in current
location in next six months (n=506)
196 This question was asked to those who said they were “still on the move” (n=1,334) rather than returnees.
197 Amera Markous was the principal investigator for this study. Special thanks to Jim van Moorsel, Bram Frouws and Roberto Forin for their review of this paper; to
Flannery Dyon, Maxime Giraudet, Imen Aouani, and Mohamed Najib Ben Saad for the implementation of 4Mi in Libya; and to Jim van Moorsel for inputs to qualitative
data analysis and Ana-Maria Murphy-Teixidor for analysis of the 4Mi data. This paper received support from the Fredrich Ebert Stiftung (FES).
198 Health Sector Libya, (March 2020). Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) preparedness and response plan for Libya; UN OCHA, (June 2020). Libya: COVID-19 -
Situation Report.
199 MMC, (February 2021). The impact of COVID-19 on refugees and migrants on the move in North and West Africa.
200 UNHCR, (May 2020). Conflict and pandemic drive more people to risk deadly sea route from Libya.
201 Human Rights Watch, (April 2020). EU/Italy: Port Closures Cut Migrant and Refugee Lifeline.
202 ECRE. (2020) Last Breath of Operation Sophia Should Push Coalition of the Willing
203 Modern Diplomacy. (2020) The ending of Operation Sophia: The EU sway from its Human Security approach
204 Cusumano, E. & Villa, M. (2020) From “Angels” to “Vice Smugglers”: The Criminalization of Sea Rescue NGOs in Italy
205 European Council. (2020) EU launches Operation IRINI to enforce Libya arms embargo
206 Human Rights Watch. (2020) EU Turns Its Back on Migrants in Distress
207 European Council. (2020) Libya: European Union Border Assistance Mission and International Organization for Migration deepen cooperation
208 European Commission. (2020) EU New Pact on Migration and Asylum
209 The New Humanitarian. (2020) How COVID-19 halted NGO migrant rescues in the Mediterranean
210 MSF. (2020) Detainment of fifth search and rescue ship in five months condemns people to die at sea
211 Amnesty International. (2020) Malta: Illegal tactics mar another year of suffering in central Mediterranean
212 Ibid.
213 IOM. (March 2021) IOM Libya Maritime Update
214 IOM. (December 2020) IOM Libya Monthly Update
215 European Commission. (2020) Italian Government Adopts Targeted Regularisation for Migrant Workers
216 IOM DTM. (December 2020) Libya Migrant Report
217 UNHCR. (December 2020) Libya Fact Sheet
218 MMC. (2020) Impact of COVID-19 on protection risks for refugees
219 See, for example: Amnesty International (2020). Libya: New evidence shows refugees and migrants trapped in horrific cycle of abuses.
220 Independent. (2020) ‘Left to rot’: Inside Libya’s squalid detention centres where migrants and refugees suffer a ‘slow death’
221 200 surveys were collected with migrants and refugees across more than 20 cities in Libya, as part of MMC’s Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4Mi),
with a particular module for this paper that looks at how refugees and migrants experience and perceive migration policies in general, and on those enacted since the
COVID-19 outbreak and their impact on their livelihoods and mobility. 4Mi is the Mixed Migration Centre’s global data collection programme. More information about
4Mi’s methodology here: https://mixedmigration.org/4mi/.
222 Independent. (2020) ‘Left to rot’: Inside Libya’s squalid detention centres where migrants and refugees suffer a ‘slow death’
223 IOM. (March 2020) IOM, UNHCR announce temporary suspension of resettlement travel for refugees
224 IOM. (August 2020) IOM Libya Monthly Update
225 Namely, law No. (6) of 1987 on organising the entry, residence, and exit of foreigners in Libya ,law No. (20) of 1991 on the promotion of freedom, law No. (19) of 2010
on combatting illegal immigration and law No. (10) of 2013 on the criminalisation of torture, forced disappearance and discrimination
226 I wish to thank my two Eritrean research collaborators in Uganda for assisting with conducting the interviews for the broader project on which this piece is based
and for sharing their enormous knowledge on the history and situation of Eritrean forced migrants in the Gulf, and David Kigozi from the International Refugee Rights
Initiative for his assistance in the initial framing of these thoughts. My thanks also go the Margaret Anstee Centre for Global Studies at Newnham College, Cambridge
for funding this exploratory stage of the research project.
227 BBC (2014). Israel ‘coercing Eritreans and Sudanese to leave’. 9 September. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-29122352
228 Gonçalves, P. (2018). Saudi Arabia denies ‘rumours’ about freezing expat fees. International Investment, 17 August.
229 Fahim, K. (2019). Saudi Arabia encouraged foreign workers to leave — and is struggling after so many did. The Washington Post, 2 February.
230 Free Malaysia Today (2019). 1.9 million expats leave Saudi over high fees, slow growth. 19 September.
231 Lysa, C. (2020). A Recent History of Refugees in Saudi Arabia. 22 October. Retrieved from: https://www.janmyr.org/blog/a-recent-history-of-refugees-in-saudi-
arabia
232 Preliminary evidence suggests that Christian Eritreans have sought to move to countries where they might freely practice their religion after decades of concealment
in the Gulf States, while Arabic-speaking, Muslim Eritreans have preferred to move to Egypt and Sudan where the religious climate has more similarities with the
states they have left (Cole, G. (2020). Choiceless departures and involuntary immobility: Forced migration from the Gulf States to Africa. International Refugee Rights
Initiative Rights in Exile Policy Paper Series. Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/IRRI-Policy-Paper-Series-Forced-Migration-Gulf-
to-Africa-Sept-2020.pdf).
233 Al Maeena, T. A. (2018). Saudi Arabia’s expat tax conundrum. Gulf News, Op-Eds, 24 March. Retrieved from: https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/saudi-arabias-
expat-tax-conundrum-1.2193754
234 States and cities in the Gulf have also been shown to have played an important, if imperfect, role in modulating the MENA region’s economic and political tensions
through accommodating crisis-hit populations. Using historical and contemporary evidence, Bel-Air (2018) charts the interconnected geopolitics of migration from
Arab countries to the Gulf States (De Bel-Air, F. (2018). ‘Blocked’ youth: The politics of migration from South and East Mediterranean countries before and after the
Arab uprisings. The International Spectator, 53(2), 52–73). He points to the impacts of the Gulf States’ decisions in the late 1980s to replace Arab migrant workers
from the Gulf States with non-Gulf Arabs, who were seen as less likely to spread political sedition in their host countries. Disgruntled and underemployed citizens
of those former source countries then no longer had such reliable access to labour markets beyond their borders, reducing their ability to assist family members in
weathering economic storms in their home states through the remittance of wages. In his work on Saudi Arabia’s contemporary response to migrants from the MENA
region, Bel-Air notes similar dynamics, beginning with the increase in the number of Egyptians and Tunisians in Saudi Arabia after 2013 as individuals fled from the
violence and economic downturn of popular uprisings in those countries. Once the uprisings intensified, however, hiring bans on Syrians, Tunisians and Egyptians
were imposed by several Gulf countries due to concerns about migrants spreading insurrection and to accelerate nationalisation policies, such as Saudisation. While
Bel-Air stops short of attributing Egypt’s political and economic decline in the 1980s and 1990s solely to this factor, and lacks data on the political implications of
the Gulf states’ more recent bans, he nonetheless draws attention to how political and personal security in certain parts of the world have long been premised upon
labour migration constituting a safety valve for the economically and politically disenfranchised. There is now a discussion about to what extent Saudi Arabia’s mass
deportations of young Ethiopian migrant workers back to Ethiopia since 2013 intensified discontent in the regions to which they were returned, including Tigray, and
thus subsequently fuelled rioting, displacement and emigration within and from the country over the past few years. This again points to the need to understand
patterns of migration to and from North Africa as connected to policy and political developments in the Gulf States (partially taken from Cole, G. (2021). Pluralising
Geographies of Refuge. Progress in Human Geography, 45(1), 88-110).
235 Pilling, D. and England, A. (2020). Saudi Arabia repatriating thousands of migrants back to Ethiopia. The Financial Times, 12 April. Retrieved from: https://www.
ft.com/content/b4f3c258-7ec9-477c-92f7-5607203f77fc
236 Interviews with four members of the Citizens and Diaspora Unit of the African Union on 8 September 2020 (Civil Society Division) and 17 September 2020 (Diaspora
Unit). Two members of each unit were interviewed, with interviewees based in Khartoum and Addis Ababa.
237 Valenta, M. and Jakobsen, J. (2017). Mixed migrations to the Gulf: An empirical analysis of migrations from unstable and refugee-producing countries to the GCC,
1960–2015. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 36(2), 33–56; Valenta, M. and Jakobsen, J. (2018). Nexus of armed conflicts and migrations to the Gulf: Migrations to the GCC
from war-torn source countries in Asia, Africa and the Arab neighbourhood. Middle Eastern Studies, 54(1), 22–47; De Bel-Air, F. (2016). A Note on Syrian Refugees in
the Gulf: Attempting to Assess Data and Policies. Report, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (Explanatory Note No. 11/2015).
238 Cole, G. (2021). Pluralising Geographies of Refuge. Progress in Human Geography, 45(1), 88-110; Cole, G. (2021) Sampling on the Dependent Variable: An Achilles’
heel of Research on Displacement?. Journal of Refugee Studies, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feaa123.
239 Amnesty International. (2020). Ethiopian migrants describe “hell” of detention. News, 2 October. Retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/
ethiopian-migrants-hellish-detention-in-saudi-arabia/

240 Webster, N. and Zacharias, A. (2018). UAE agreement with Ethiopia will further protect rights of domestic workers. The National, 14 August. Retrieved from: https://
www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-agreement-with-ethiopia-will-furtherprotect-rights-of-domestic-workers-1.759812.
241 The representatives at CIDO also flagged the AU-ILO-IOM-ECA Joint Programme on Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration in Africa (JLMP
Priority) as a new initiative (launched in 2018) designed to enhance the benefits and security of migration. This distinguishes it from many EU mechanisms that
are designed almost exclusively to reduce migration and reports like the ILO’s response to Saudi deportations of Ethiopians, which focus on the extreme violence
and abuse associated with migration to and from the Gulf. Much of the literature on migration from Ethiopia to the Gulf States, particularly of domestic workers,
has tended to be overwhelmingly negative, focusing on these individuals as victims, mislead by traffickers, blinded by hope, and abused on arrival, which leads to
responses that primarily seek to restrict mobility. As Schewel and the representatives at the AU argue, however, this can downplay individual’s knowledge of the risks
that migration entails, and the rational and aspirational reasons for why they still migrate, and sideline or delegitimise efforts that are concentrated on improving,
rather than constraining, those migratory pathways (Schewel, K. (2018). Why Ethiopian women go to the Middle East: An aspiration-capability analysis of migration
decision-making. Migration Institute Working Papers Paper 148. Retrieved from: https://www.migrationinstitute.org/publications/why-some-young-women-migrate-
to-the-middle-east-an-aspiration-capability-analysis-of-migration-decision-making-in-ethiopia).
242 UCLG and UCLG Africa (2018). The transition towards sustainable cities and territories: the role of local and regional governments in Africa. Africities Migration Day.
Rabat, Morocco. UCLG Africa (2018). Charter of local and subnational governments of Africa on Migration. Rabat, Morocco.
243 Thaller, L., and Silver, I. (2019). A virtuous circle of collaboration for an efficient urban humanitarian response: Kampala. Alternatives Humanitaires, 10, 59-69.
244 In accordance with the background paper provided for this workshop, we follow the UNHCR definition of mixed movements, understanding these as “flows of people
travelling together, generally in an irregular manner, over the same routes and using the same means of transport, but for different reasons. The men, women and
children travelling in this manner often have either been forced from their homes by armed conflict or persecution, or are on the move in search of a better life. People
travelling as part of mixed movements have varying needs and may include asylum-seekers, refugees, stateless people, victims of trafficking, unaccompanied
or separated children, and migrants in an irregular situation”. In accordance with MMC’s definition of “mixed migration” we focus particularly on cross-border
movements. UNHCR (n.d.). Asylum and Migration. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/en/asylum-and-migration.html
245 UCLG Africa (2020). La gestion de la migration en Afrique : Quelles responsabilités pour les collectivités territoriales. Rabat, Morocco.
246 Haysom, S. (2013) Sanctuary in the city? Urban displacement and vulnerability. Final report. Humanitarian Policy Group. London, United Kingdom. Wanjiku-Kihato, C.,
and Landau, L. (2016) Stealth Humanitarianism: Negotiating Politics, Precarity and Performance Management in Protecting the Urban Displaced. Journal of Refugee
Studies 30 (3), 407-425. Bauder, H., & Landau, L. (2018). Why cities hold the key to safe, orderly migration. World Economic Forum. Cologny, Switzerland.
247 UNHCR. (2018) Summary of the roundtable on Africa – High Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges, 2018. Geneva, Switzerland. UNHCR. (2019): UNHCR
Realizing Refugee Inclusion with City and Refugee Leaders. Recording of the Global Refugee Forum Spotlight Session. Geneva, Switzerland.
248 Interview Sfax, City Council, August 2020.
249 Saliba, S., & Silver, I. (2020). Cities as partners: the case of Kampala. Forced Migration Review 63, 41-43.
250 Interview Kampala, Kampala Capital City Authority, February 2020.
251 Blaser Mapitsa, C., & Landau, L. (2019). Measuring Municipal Capacity to Respond to Mobility. SAGE Open, 9 (1), 1-11. Aouani, I., Giraudet, M., & Van Moorsel, J.
(2020). Urban Mixed Migration. Tunis Case Study. MMC Briefing Paper. Geneva, Switzerland.
252 Interview Rabat, City Administration, August 2020.
253 Mayors Mechanism (2020a). GFMD African Union Consultation. Mayors Mechanism – overview and key messages. Brussels, Belgium.
254 Mayors Mechanism. (2020b). GFMD African Union Consultation. Statement by Ms. Thembisile Nkadimeng, Mayor of Polokwame, and President of the South African
Local Government Association (SALGA). Brussels, Belgium. Mayors Mechanism (2020c). GFMD African Union Consultation. Statement by Mr. Jean Pierre Elong
Mbassi, Secretary General of UCLG Africa. Brussels, Belgium. Mayors Mechanism (2020d). GFMD African Union Consultation. Statement by Mr. Armand Beouinde,
Mayor of Ouagadougou, Mali. Brussels, Belgium.
255 Cities Alliance. (2020). Updates from the Cities and Migration Joint Work Programme. Brussels, Belgium. UCLG Africa (2020). Ibid.
256 Aki-Sawyer, I., & Sala, G. (2021). Cities in Africa and Europe must lead in the recovery. Here’s why. Cologny, Switzerland.
257 UCLG Africa (2018). Ibid.
258 imap (2020): About the Migration Urban Hub. Retrieved from https://www.imap-migration.org/urban.
259 For further innovative examples of multi-stakeholder cooperation between local authorities and a wide range of other actors addressing urban migration and
displacement see also the Joint Work Program on Cities and Migration of the Cities Alliance in North and East Africa. Cities Alliance (2020): How Secondary Cities Can
Manage Migration to Promote Growth: A Discussion. Lessons from Ethiopia, Kenya, Tunisia and Uganda. Brussels, Belgium.
260 UCLG Africa. (2021) Migration. Retrieved from https://knowledge-uclga.org/-migration-.html?lang=fr.
261 Stürner, J., & Bekyol, Y. (2021) Going the (social) distance. How migrant and refugee-sensitive urban COVID-19 responses contribute to the realization of the Global
Compacts for Migration and Refugees. A study of the MC2CM project. Barcelona, Spain.
262 Brandt, J., & Henderson, J. (2018) The Global Compact on Refugees: The Role of Cities. How the Compact fares on urban issues, and how it can work at the local level.
UNHCR paper. Geneva, Switzerland.
263 Stürner, J. (2020) A New Role for Cities in Global and Regional Migration Governance? Bosch Stiftung Policy Paper. Stuttgart, Germany. Aki-Sawyerr, Y. (2018).
Opinion: Tackling migration — An African perspective. DW. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/opinion-tackling-migration-an-african-perspective/a-46637793.
264 UCLG Africa, PLATFORMA and CEMR. (2017) Declaration of the Africa-Europe Forum of Local and Regional Governments. Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. UCLG Africa. (2019)
The Side Event organized by UCLG Africa on: “Cooperate around Migration”. Rabat, Morocco. UCLG Africa (2020). Participation de CGLU Afrique au Forum Mondial de
la Migration et du Développement (GFMD). Rabat, Morocco. Mixed Migration Review 2020. Mixed Migration and cities. Urban frontlines for displacement and mobility.
Geneva, Switzerland.
265 Sabchev, T., & Baumgärtel, M. (2020) The path of least resistance? EU cities and locally organised resettlement. Forced Migration Review 63, 38-40.
266 IOM Update, November 2020 https://libya.iom.int/sitreps
267 IOM Update, November 2020 https://libya.iom.int/sitreps
268 https://data2.unhcr.org/en/dataviz/105?sv=0&geo=666
269 Libya Protection Sector strategy 2020-2021 https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/libya-protection-sector-strategy-2020-2021
270 Paragraph 78 and 79 of CRC committee standards
271 End Child Detention, 2016
272 Based on the cases referred for family reunification, MSF
273 Definition of Torture under the Istanbul protocol
274 MSF has witnessed the death of two patients after their referral from Bani Walid in 2020
275 Severely malnourished considered from BMI under 16 – with cases as low as a BMI of 12
276 IRCT (2004). Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
277 Service provided by Handicap International
278 As per the definition of UASC toolkit of UNHCR
279 Approximately 2560, based on Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021 data
280 Event of a killing of a 15-year-old reported in December 2020
281 Interagency Working Group on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (2013). Alternative Care in Emergencies Toolkit
282 Additional two are currently pending a placement with a family identified
283 DRC Protection Monitoring reports
284 Based on observations of cases referred by MSF
285 This advocacy note is a product of the Libya INGO Forum and has been endorsed by its members.
286 IOM DTM (2021). Libya Migrant Report - Round 34 (November - December 2020).
287 See UNHCR portal, as of March 2021.
288 See, for example, Amnesty (2020). ‘BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH’ Refugees and migrants trapped in Libya’s cycle of abuse. London.
289 See MMC (2020). Sharper Lens on Vulnerability (North Africa). A Statistical analysis of the determinants of vulnerability to protection incidents among refugees and
migrants in Libya, p. 19.
290 Provisions for migration-related violations are contained in two specific laws: Law No. 6 (1987) Regulating Entry, Residence and Exit of Foreign Nationals to/from
Libya as amended by Law No. 2 (2004) and Law No. 19 of 2010 on Combating Irregular Migration. See MICIC (2017), An Unending Crisis – Responses of Migrants,
States and Organisations to the 2011 Libya Crisis, p. 20.
291 Ibid., p. 18.
292 Article 1 of Law No. 19 of 2010 on Combatting Illegal migration. See ICMPD (2020), The Foreigners’ Legal Guide to the Libyan Legislation, p. 66.
293 Article 6 of Law No. 19 of 2010 on Combatting Illegal migration. See ICMPD (2020), Ibid.
294 See MICIC. (2017) An Unending Crisis, op. cit.
295 See for example, Westcott, T. (2019). “In Libya, hard economic times force migrant workers to look elsewhere”, The New Humanitarian, 18 February 2019.
296 See IOM (2019). Libya - migrant vulnerability and humanitarian needs assessment. 19.
297 See OHCHR & UNSMIL (2018). Desperate and dangerous: Report on the human rights situation of migrants and refugees in Libya.
298 IOM (2021). Closely knit. An assessment of migrants’ social networks in Libya. 34.
299 MMC (2020). A Sharper Lens on Vulnerability (North Africa), op. cit.
300 OCHA (2020). Libya HNO 2021. 37-71.
130

301 According to some researches, some do, at local level, depending on local migration governance. See for example the case studies of Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya in
Clingendael & Global Initiative. (2019) From abuse to cohabitation: A way forward for positive migration governance in Libya p. 58.
302 A recent study from IOM stresses that 20% of migrants live in a building deemed inhabitable. See IOM-DTM. (2020) A Long Way From Home. Migrant’s Housing
Conditions in Libya, p. 27.
303 Accordingly, UNHCR has registered as persons of concern primarily individuals from these nine countries, namely Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan,
South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Outside of the nine nationalities, UNHCR exceptionally registers small numbers of persons from other refugee-producing situations,
including for instance Mali, Burkina Faso and NW/NE Nigeria, and, irrespective of nationality, persons with particular claim profiles such as persons of diverse sexual
orientations and/or gender identities, survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and survivors and victims of trafficking. UNHCR continues to advocate
for the registration of all persons seeking international refugee protection, regardless of nationality, and seeks cooperation from all partners to ensure quality referrals
to UNHCR. See UNHCR (Sept 2020), UNHCR position on the designations of Libya as a safe third country and as a place of safety for the purpose of disembarkation
following rescue at sea, footnote 25, pp. 3-4, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5f1edee24.pdf
304 OCHA (2020). Libya HNO 2021, p. 18.
305 MMC (2019). What makes refugees and migrants vulnerable to detention in Libya? A microlevel study of the determinants of detention, p. 5.
306 Protection organisations monitoring report, September - November 2020.
307 See Sabrina Tucci, “Libya and International Refugee and Asylum Law: Addressing the Protection of Refugees and Migrants Displaced by the 2011 Conflict», Oxford
Monitor of Forced Migration, Volume 2, Number 2, pp. 48-54.
308 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields of Development, the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking and Fuel Smuggling and on
Reinforcing the Security of Borders Between the State of Libya and the Italian Republic, 2 February 2017.
309 Legal opinion on the legality of EU funding for the Libyan coastguard, in GLAN, ASGI & ARCI, Complaint to the European Court of Auditors Concerning the
Mismanagement of EU Funds by the EU Trust Fund for Africa’s ‘Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya’ (IBM) Programme, p.2
310 See Euronews, EU Funds Libyan Coast Guard but Has Limited Monitoring Capacity, Leaked Report Suggest, 3 November 2019; or AP News, Making Misery Pay: Libya
Militias Take EU Funds for Migrants, 31 December 2019.
311 UNSC (2019). United Nations Support Mission in Libya: Report of the Secretary-General, 26 August 2019, S/2019/682.
312 See updated arrival figures on the UNHCR portal.
313 See UNHCR Update Libya from 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020: their December reports indicate that the numbers of migrants and refugees intercepted at sea by the LCG
and brought back to Libya are respectively: 15,238 - 14,949 - 8,965 and 11,265.
314 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy [GC] No. 27765/09 (European Court of Human Rights 23 February 2012). See also, in Sea Watch case before the Tribunal of Agrigento,
Uff. GIP, judgment of 2 July 2019, Judge Vella; and Criminal proceedings against Gip Catania, Nunzio Sarpietro in Open Arms’s case, Decision of 15 May 2019;
Mediterranea’s case, Tribunal of Agrigento, 29 January 2020; and Vos Thalassa’s case, Tribunal of Trapani, 23 May – 3 June 2019. In GLAN, ASGI & ARCI, Complaint
to the European Court of Auditors Concerning the Mismanagement of EU Funds by the EU Trust Fund for Africa’s ‘Support to Integrated Border and Migration
Management in Libya’ (IBM) Programme, p. 4.
315 See reports from human rights organisations and regular protection agencies. See for example: “UNHCR and its partner, IRC, continued to be present at the
disembarkation points to provide urgent medical assistance and core relief items (CRIs) before individuals were transferred to detention centres by the Libyan
authorities.” in UNHCR Update Libya, 31 December 2020
316 UNHCR (2021). Libya Update, 26 February 2021
317 In addition to that, a number of DCs are quite porous, and many migrants and refugees get in and out of detention for various reasons, which makes is even more
difficult to track them and provide assistance.
318 Numbers are communicated on the social media accounts of some DCs. See for example the following Facebook pages: https://www.facebook.com/-‫غري‬-‫الهجرة‬-‫مكافحة‬-‫جهاز‬
-2259394174314795‫الكربى‬-‫بنغازي‬-‫الرشعية‬/; https://www.facebook.com/-619432161465512‫شحات‬-‫فرع‬-‫الرشعية‬-‫غري‬-‫الهجرة‬-‫مكافحة‬-‫جهاز‬/; https://www.facebook.com/-‫اجدابيا‬-‫الرشعية‬-‫الغري‬-‫الهجرة‬-‫مكافحة‬-‫جهاز‬
111727730595975/?ref=page_internal
319 See OHCHR, Oral update of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 40/27, 18 June 2020.
320 This Resolution led to the creation of a specific committee and operations aiming at the listing of all foreigners living in Eastern Libya through an electronic system
and deporting all those who do not have legal documentation or/and any persons having communicable disease to their Country of Origin, in violation of international
protection legal frameworks.
321 Some researches provide interesting perspectives such as looking into the private sector, to become a driving force for positive migration governance. In the Libyan
context, “one clear opportunity lies in the possibility for local government actors to capitalize on the need for, and the acceptance of, migrant labour – linked to an
overall need to strengthen (inclusive) economic growth”. See Clingendael & Global Initiative (2019), From abuse to cohabitation: A way forward for positive migration
governance in Libya, p. 70.
322 UNHCR Update on Libya, dated 31 December 2020
323 See ECRE (2020), Refugees in Niger Protest Against Delay of Resettlement and Dire Conditions, 20 December 2020.
324 IMO, ‘Special Recognition for Merchant Vessels and Their Crew Involved in the Rescue of Mixed Migrants at Sea (Resolution A.1093(29).’ (International Maritime
Organisation 2015).
325 See: Papanicolopulu, I. (2016). ‘The Duty to Rescue at Sea, in Peacetime and in War International Review of the Red Cross’ (98 International Review of the Red Cross
491.; Felicity Attard, The Duty of the Shipmaster to Render Assistance at Sea under International Law (BRILL 2020).92–108.
326 Attard (n 2).
327 Article 98
328 Cap V Reg 33.1
329 Article 10(1)
330 See generally: Bernaz, N. and Pietropaoli, I. (2020). ‘Developing a Business and Human Rights Treaty: Lessons from the Deep Seabed Mining Regime Under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ Business and Human Rights Journal 1.
331 Cap v. Reg 33.1
332 Salvage Convention Article 10(3)
333 Papanicolopulu (n 2) 11.
334 SOLAS Cap V Reg 33.1;
335 SOLAS Cap III Reg 17-1
336 UNHCR, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulment Obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its
1967 Protocol’ 17.
337 See ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal); International Court of Justice 20 July 2012
338 Ibid.
339 Lauterpacht, E. and Bethlehem, D. (2003). ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’ Refugee protection in international law: UNHCR’s
global consultations on international protection 87.
340 Hirsi Jamaa v Italy (European Court of Human Rights). See in this regard: Mallia and Gauci (n 12).
341 IMO, ‘Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea MSC.167(78)’ (2004).
342 International Chamber of Shipping, ‘Large Scale Rescue Operations at Sea: Guidance on Ensuring the Safety and Security of Seafarers and Rescued Persons’
(International Chamber of Shipping 2015) 10.
343 Erk Rosaeg, ‘The Duty to Rescue Refugees and Migrants at Sea’ (Border Criminologies, 25 March 2020) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-
criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2020/03/duty-rescue>.
344 Lisa-Marie Komp, L. (2017) ‘The Duty to Assist Persons in Distress: An Alternative Source of Protection against the Return of Migrants and Asylum Seekers to the
High Seas?’, ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at Sea: A Comprehensive Approach. Brill Nijhoff
345 Article 33
346 SOLAS Cap V Reg 34.1.
347 This list is provided in P&I Coverage documentation.
348 Attard (n 2) 14.
349 Rothwell, D. (2002). ‘The Law of the Sea and the MV Tampa Incident’ 13 Public Law Review. Attard (n 2). 87.
350 Mallia, P. and Gauci, J. (2014) ‘Irregular Migration and the International Obligation of Non-Refoulement: The Case of the MV Salamis from a Maltese Perspective’
(2014) 2014 Journal of International Maritime Law.
351 Kilpatrick, R. ‘The “Refugee Clause” for commercial shipping contracts: why allocation of rescue costs is critical during periods of mass migration at sea’, https://
digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2409&context=gjicl
352 Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

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