A survey in privacy and security in Internet of Things IOT

A SURVEY IN
PRIVACY & SECURITY IN INTERNET OF THINGS
1

AGENDA
 What is Internet of Things ( IOT).
 Such IOT Technologies.
 IOT Architecture
 IOT Architecture Security Issues and requirements ( different viewpoints).
 RFID and WSN Security Issues and requirements
 IOT protocols
 Security in IOT communications protocols
 Lightweight security protocol
 6LOWPAN and RPL ( Routing protocol for Low power and Lossy links ) issues and
requirements
2

WHAT IS IOT ?
• Collection of physical objects that are designed with built in wireless or
wired connectivity, so they can be monitored, controlled and linked over the
Internet via a mobile app or software that uses with another platform.
• An general example:
• An specific example :
3

THE INTERNET OF THINGS CONSISTS OF THREE
MAIN COMPONENTS:
• The things (or assets) themselves.
• The communication networks connecting them.
• The computing systems that make use of the data flowing to and from our
things.
4

CHARACTERISTICS
- Pervasive (Ubiquitous)
Embedded everywhere
- Heterogeneous
Many technologies interact each other
- Scalability
Order of magnitude higher than current internet
5

HETEROGENEOUS NETWORK
• A network connecting computers and other devices with different
operating systems and/or protocols
• For instance, A wireless network which provides a service through
a wireless LAN and is able to maintain the service when switching to
a cellular network is called a wireless heterogeneous network.
6

ADVANTAGES
• Useful in many different categories including asset tracking and inventory
control, shipping and location, security, individual tracking, and energy
conservation.
• Lower operating costs
• Efficiency and lower operating expenses
• Remotely control your world !
• Providing accurate data
• Decision making
8

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN IOT AND
TRADITIONAL INTERNET
• Many IoT networks are deployed on low-power lossy networks
(LLN).
• LLNs are networks constrained by energy, memory, and processing
power.
• These aspects have not been considered for the standard Internet.
9

SUCH COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES CAN
IMPLEMENT THE CONCEPT OF INTERNET OF
THINGS.
• Radio Frequency Identification (RFID).
• Near Field Communication (NFC).
• ZigBee.
• Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication (V2V).
• WIFI.
10

MACHINE-TO-MACHINE COMMUNICATION
(M2M)
• Central theme of IOT
• Used for automated data transmission and measurement between
mechanical or electronic devices.
• Allow both wireless and wired systems to communicate with other
devices.
• Refers to the communications between computers, embedded
processors, smart sensors, actuators and mobile devices
11

WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORK (WSN)
• Compositions of independent nodes whose wireless communication takes place
over limited frequency and bandwidth.
• Wireless sensor networks consist of large number of low power and low cost sensor
nodes.
• Each node collects information within its sensing range and then transmits data to
its neighboring nodes
• The information gathered by all nodes then forwarded to the base station ( sink
node )
12

IOT SECURITY ISSUES AND REQUIREMENTS
1- According to “Hui Suoa”
Security features : Perceptual nodes (sensors) are short
of computer power and limited storage capacity so unable
to apply frequency hopping communication and public key
encryption algorithm to security protection
Security requirements
• Use lightweight encryption technology becomes
important, which includes Lightweight cryptographic
algorithm. 14
Network Layer
Perception
Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

2- Issues according to “Kai Zhao” :
- Sensor nodes have many varieties and high heterogeneity.
• Several common kinds of attack are:
o Node Capture
o Fake Node and Malicious Data
o Denial of Service Attack
o Timing Attack
o Routing Threats
o Replay Attack
o SCA (Side Channel Attack) 15
Network Layer
Perception
Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

3- Issues according to “Weizhe Zhang”
1). Physical capture:
Many nodes are statically deployed in the area and can easily be
captured by attackers and thus, are physically risky.
2). Brute force attack:
limited ability of resource storage in sensor node is the big issue
to hacked by brute force attack. the attacker utilize his encryption
algorithm experience in decode the encoded files and messages.
3). Clone node: Attacker can easily copy the node because
hardware structure of several perceptual nodes is simple.
16
Network Layer
Perception
Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

4). Impersonation:
Authentication in the distributed environment is very difficult for
the perceptual node, allowing for malicious nodes to use a fake
identity for malicious or collusion attacks
5). Routing attack:
Intermediate nodes may be attacked during data forwarding
and relay through nodes.
6). Denial of service (DoS) attack:
Nodes can easily be trapped under DoS attack
7). Node privacy leak:
The attacker can passively or actively steal sensitive
information in the node.
17
Network Layer
Perception
Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

• Solutions according to Weizhe Zhang , proposed a type
of security architecture against security threats in IOT
architectures.
Security module in the perceptual layer:
1- Allow terminal identity authentication mechanism by the
hash algorithm and asymmetric encryption algorithm.
2- Hide terminal identity such as the group signature by
certain anonymous algorithm.
3-Preserve data secrecy by asymmetric encryption
algorithm.
18
Network Layer
Perception
Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

Security features
• Man-in-the-Middle Attack and counterfeit attack still exist, a
large number of data sending cause congestion.
• Identity authentication is a kind of mechanism to prevent the
illegal Nodes
• Need to establish data confidentiality and integrality
mechanism.
19
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer
IOT Security Issues and requirements

2- Issues according to “Kai Zhao”
A. Traditional Security Problems.
including illegal access networks, eavesdropping information,
confidentiality damage, integrity damage, DoS attack, Man-in-the middle
attack, virus invasion, exploit attacks.
B. Compatibility problems.
The existing Internet network security architecture is designed based on
the perspective of person, and does not necessarily apply to
communication between the machine.
20
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

C. The Cluster Security Problems. Including network
congestion, DoS attack, authentication problem, etc. IoT has
a huge number of devices. If it uses the existing mode of
authentication authenticate device, a large amount of data
traffic will likely to block network.
D. Privacy Disclosure. With the development of the
information retrieval technology and social engineering,
hackers can easily collect a large number of the particular
user’s privacy information.
21
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

2- Solutions according to “Kai Zhao”
• Because of IoT node arrangement random, autonomic, unreliability of energy limitation and
communication, it leads to that IoT have no infrastructure and dynamic topology so
The attacker can easily cause attacks.
• Security measures for that problem, Kai Zhao needs to set up the specific authentication
cohesive mechanism, the end-to-end authentication and key agreement mechanism,
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), WPKI for wireless, Security routing, Intrusion
detection, etc.
22
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

3- Issues according to Weizhe Zhang
• Malicious behaviours against right path topology and
forwarding data and DoS attack.
23
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

3- Solutions according to Weizhe Zhang
• The security in this layer fixes routing security Problems in
heterogeneous and integrating networks.
• Intrusion detection and security monitoring
management platform are employed to detect and avoid
any malicious incident.
24
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

Security features
- Intelligent processing is limited for malicious information,
so it is a challenge to improve the ability to recognize the
malicious information.
- Needs a lot of the application security architecture such
as cloud computing and secure multiparty computation
25
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

2- Issues according to Weizhe Zhang
1). DoS attack: DOS or DDOS can destroy the service.
2). Non-permission to access:
Attackers can easily threaten security by denying permission to access the
related service, if unreasonable access configuration, malicious intrusion, or
trapping users with higher permissions into improper operation are present.
3). Data attacks:
Focused on attacks for data service such as attackers redo service requests,
change data on request headers, and execute parts of data dictionary attacks.
4). Session attacks:
the attacker could hijack the session state or redo sessions to catch illegal
access when the service access can be showed as a request/respond (
conversation ).
26
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

2- Solutions according to Weizhe Zhang
• Security module in the application and middleware layers :
The identity security of these layers focuses on identity
identifiability and the cooperation authentication
between multiple services.
27
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

Security features
• Data sharing is that one of the characteristics of application
layer, which creating problems of data privacy, access control
and disclosure of information.
security requirements
• Authentication and key agreement across the
heterogeneous networks
• User’s privacy protection.
28
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

2- Issues according to “Kai Zhao”
- Data Access Permissions, Identity Authentication
- Data Protection and Recovery
- The Ability of Dealing with Mass-data
- The Application Layer Software Vulnerabilities
• Xueguang Yang puts forward a design scheme of intelligent
household security system.
• Antonio J. Jara gives some solutions that based on 6LoWPAN (IPv6
over Low power WPAN) architecture 29
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

2- Solutions according to “Kai Zhao”
• Across Heterogeneous Network Authentication and Key Agreement:
- Based on symmetric key cryptosystem, public key crypto-system
(certificate or PKI), and certification transfer technology.
• The Protection of the Private Information
- It includes fingerprint technology, digital watermarking,
anonymous authentication, threshold cryptography.
30
Network Layer
Perception Layer
Application
Layer
Middleware
Layer

IN A SUMMARY, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
31

ATTACKS AND SECURITY ISSUES IN RFID
TAGS
i. Unauthorized tag disabling (Attack on authenticity): According to Tuhin Borgohain
• This attack leads to incapacitation of the RFID tag temporarily or permanently then misinformation is
coming by its EPC (Electronic Product Code) against unique numerical. this attack can be done remotely that
attacker can tamper the tag behavior from away.
ii. Unauthorized tag cloning (Attack on integrity):
• The capturing of the identification information (like its EPC) through the manipulation of the tags by rogue
readers falls under this category
iii. Unauthorized tag tracking (Attack on confidentiality):
• Hustler readers can trace a tag that might reason in quitting of sensitive data such customer's address. For
instance, buying a product that has RFID tag that result that tag let attack chase you and in fact
endangers their privacy.
32

iv. Replay attacks (Attack on availability):
• An attacker copies a forwarded packet and later sends out the copies repeatedly
and continuously to the victim in order to exhaust the victim’s buffers or power
supplies, or to base stations and access points in order to degrade network
performance.
• Some prominent security vulnerabilities of RFID technologies in this category
are:
i. Reverse Engineering
ii. Power Analysis
iii. Eavesdropping
iv. Man-in-the-middle attack
v. Denial of Service (DoS)
vi. Spoofing
vii. Viruses
viii. Tracking
33

• Because RFID and WSN are an important part of IoT perception
layer, their security measures will be introduced respectively.
• RFID Security Measures:
A. Data Encryption:
• it’s very necessary to encrypt the RFID signal using the
appropriate algorithm Xiaoni Wang, puts forward a kind of
nonlinear key algorithm
B. The Based on IPSec Security Channel:
• Two types of security mechanisms: authentication and
encryption so, Data encryption mechanisms prevent attacker
from eavesdropping and tampering data during transmission, and
encode data for ensuring data confidentiality.
34
SECURITY SOLUTIONS IN RFID TAGS

RFID Security Measures:
C. Cryptography Technology Scheme:
• Cryptography technology not only can realize the user privacy
protection, but also can protect the confidentiality, authenticity and
integrity of the RFID system
• Hash function, the random numbers mechanism, server data search,
the logic algorithm, and re encryption mechanism.
35
SECURITY SOLUTIONS IN RFID TAGS

Attacks on network availability (DOS) in WSN:
• DoS attack on the physical layer IN WSN: According to Tuhin
Borgohain
1- Jamming: In this type of DoS attack occupies the communication
channel between the nodes thus preventing them from
communicating with each other.
2- Node tampering: Physical tampering of the node to extract
sensitive information is known as node tampering.
36
ATTACKS AND SECURITY ISSUES IN WSN

• DoS attack on the link layer IN WSN:
1- Collision:
This type of DoS attack can be initiated when two nodes simultaneously
transmit packets of data on the same frequency channel. The collision of
data packets results in small changes in the packet results in identification
of the packet as a mismatch at the receiving end. This leads to discard of the
affected data packet for re-transmission.
2- Unfairness :
is a repeated collision based attack. It can also be referred to as exhaustion
based attacks.
3- Battery Exhaustion:
This type of DoS attack causes unusually high traffic in a channel making
its accessibility very limited to the nodes.
37

• DoS attack on the Network layer IN WSN:
1- Spoofing: replaying and misdirection of traffic.
2- Hello flood attack: This attack causes high traffic in channels by congesting
the channel with an unusually high number of useless messages. Here a single
malicious node sends a useless message which is then replayed by the attacker to
create a high traffic.
3- Homing: In case of homing attack, a search is made in the traffic for cluster
heads and key managers which have the capability to shut down the entire
network.
4- Selective forwarding: A compromised node only sends a selected few nodes
instead of all the nodes. This selection of the nodes is done on the basis of the
requirement of the attacker to achieve his malicious objective and thus such nodes
does not forward packets of data.
38

5- Sybil: In a Sybil attack, the attacker replicates a single node and
presents it with multiple identities to the other nodes.
6- Wormhole: This DoS attack causes relocation of bits of data from its
original position in the network. This relocation of data packet is carried out
through tunneling of bits of data over a link of low latency.
7- Acknowledgement flooding: Acknowledgements are required at times in
sensor networks when routing algorithms are used. In this DoS attack, a
malicious node spoofs the Acknowledgements providing false
information to the destined neighboring nodes
39

• DoS attack on the Transport layer IN WSN:
1- Flooding: It refers to deliberate congestion of communication
channels through relay of unnecessary messages and high traffic.
2- De-synchronization: In de-synchronization attack, fake messages
are created at one or both endpoints requesting retransmissions for
correction of non-existent error. This results in loss of energy in one
or both the end-points in carrying out the spoofed instructions.
40

1- Key Management:
- There are four main key distribution protocols: simple key distribution
protocol, key pre distribution agreement, dynamic key management protocol,
and hierarchical key management protocol.
2- Secret Key Algorithms:
- Geng Yang, puts forward the improved scheme of ECC (Elliptic Curves
Cryptography) key management based on the lightweight. It has a wide
attention of the key management research in WSN
Wireless Sensor Network Security SOLUTION
41

3- Security Routing Protocol
- Perrig A, and Liu D. including SNEP (Secure Network Encryption
Protocol) protocol and μTESL (Micro Timed Efficient Streaming Loss-
tolerant Authentication Protocol) protocol. SNEP protocol is used to
implement the confidentiality, integrity, freshness and pointto- point
authentication. μTESLA protocol is an efficient flow authentication
protocal that based on time. It realizes point to multipoint broadcast
authentication.
4- Intrusion Detection Technology:
- IDS (Intrusion Detection System) can monitor the behavior of network
nodes timely, and find the suspicious behavior of nodes.
42

5- Authentication and Access Control:
* Authentication
- The lightweight public key authentication technology
- PSK (Pre Shared Key)
- Random key pre-distribution authentication technology
- UIsing auxiliary information authentication technology, based on one-
way hash functions authentication technology.
* Access Control:
- Access control mainly include based on asymmetric cryptosystem and
based on symmetric cryptosystem.
43

IMPORTANT IOT PROTOCOLS
According to Shahid Raza, communication in the IoT can be classified into
different layers:
• 1- Application layer
• 2- Transport layer
• 3- Network layer
• 4- Data link layer
• 5- Physical layer
44

• Application layer
** Constrained Application Protocol ( CoAP):
- Subset of HTTP is being standardized as a web protocol for the IOT.
- Web transferred protocol used with constrained nodes networks in the IOT.
- Why HTTP ? * heavyweight
** Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) :
- Another Web transferred protocol used with M2M networks in the IOT
45

• Transport layer :
- TCP, HTTP
- UDP , CoAP * lightweight
46

• Network layer:
- Use Internet protocol (IP)
- IPv4 ??
- There is a report that estimates 50 billion devices and objects will be
connected to the Internet by 2020, So as IPv6 networks is the IP protocol for
IOT communications.
• So, Because IOT is ubiquities environment, it utilizes IPv6 that increases the
address size from 32 bits to 128 bits.
• As IPv6 is also heavyweight, IETF has defined 6LOWPAN ( IP6 over Low
Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) to possibly used in resource
constrained networks such as WSN.
47

• Data link and Physical layers:
- Use IEEE 802.15.4 standard protocol for low-rate wireless personal
area networks such as source constrained networks.
- 6LoWPAN Networks use the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol as link layer to
enable transmission.
48

SECURITY IN IOT COMMUNICATIONS
PROTOCOLS
• Communication Security
• Yu et al propose E2E secure communication between WSNs and Internet.
They use asymmetric cryptography for key management and
authentication and delegate resource hungry operations to a gateway
• Wander et al. compare two most well-know asymmetric algorithms, RSA
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) , on sensor nodes and conclude
that ECC is more efficient than RSA, and asymmetric cryptography is viable
for constrained hardware.
• Liu et al.and Chung et al. describe key distribution mechanisms that save
scarce bandwidth in resource constrained networks. These improvements
make cryptographic mechanisms in the context of WSNs more viable
49

• IEEE 802.15.4 Security
• the ArchRock PhyNET that applies IPsec in tunnel mode between the border router
and Internet hosts
• HIP DEX is another solution that can be used directly as a keying mechanism for a
MAC layer security protocol.
• Wood et al. also propose a solution to secure link-layer communication in TinyOS for
IEEE 802.15.4-based WSN.
• Roman et al. proposed key management systems for sensor network in the context of
the IOT that are applicable to link-layer security
• Shahid Raza also implements standardized 802.15.4 security for 6LoWPAN networks
with hardware-aided crypto operations and show that it is viable to use 802.15.4 security
in constrained environments, however, 802.15.4 security only protects
communication between two neighboring devices. 50

• Transport Layer
• Hong et al. proposed End-to-end security that can be provided by using Transport
Layer Security (TLS) , or by its old version SSL. TLS/SSL has been proposed as a
security mechanism for the IoT. But Their evaluation shows that this security mechanism
is indeed quite costly in terms of time and energy during full SSL handshake and a data
packet transfer
• Foulagar et al. propose a TLS implementation for smart objects . However, this solution
involves the border router to reduce cryptographic computational effort on smart objects
and cannot be considered a full E2E solution.
• Brachmann et al propose TLS-DTLS mapping to protect the IoT. However, their
solution requires the presence of a trusted 6BR that break E2E security at the 6BR
• Kothmayr et al. investigate the use of DTLS in 6LoWPANs with a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) to get hardware support for the RSA algorithm. However, in addition to
specialized hardware requirement, they have used DTLS as it is without using any
compression method which would shorten the lifetime of the entire network due to the
redundancy in transmitted data.
51

• Granjal et al. evaluate the use of DTLS as it is with CoAP for secure communication. They note
that payload space scarcity would be problematic with applications that require larger payloads.
• Brachmann et al. provide an overview of state-of-the-art security solutions for a CoAP-based
applications, and discuss the feasibility of DTSL, TLS, IPsec, or combination of these for E2E
security and secure multicast communication. They assume pre-shared keys in their proposals due
to resource-constrained
• Recently, Koeh et al. in an IETF draft discuss the implications of securing the IP-connected IoT
with DTLS and propose an architecture for secure network access and management of unicast and
multicast keys with extended DTLS
• Garcia et al. also propose and compare pre-shared based Host Identity Protocol (HIP) and
DTLS as key management, secure network access, and secure communication protocols. They
onclude that though HIP is efficient, it is not widely available in the current Internet;
• Because The above solutions either review the use of (D)TLS in the IoT or propose
architectures that break E2E security, Shahid Raza reduces the overhead of DTLS in CoAP-
based IoT by employing 6LoWPAN header compression mechanisms, and implement and evaluate
it in an IoT setup on real hardware .The solution is DTLS standard complaint and ensures E2E
security between CoAP
• Researchers are also investigating vulnerabilities in the DTLS protocol.
• Nadhem et al. recently demonstrated successful attacks against the DTLS protocol . 52

• IPsec
• Granjal et al. investigate the use of IPsec for 6LoWPAN . However,
they do not provide exact specifications of the required 6LoWPAN
headers.
• Shid Razas design, implement, and evaluate 6LoWPAN compressed
IPsec for the IoT, and quantitatively compare it with the 802.15.4
security .We propose to use IPsec in transport mode that enables
E2E security between the communicating endpoints. We implement
our compressed IPsec in the Contiki OS .
• Jorge et al. has extended 6LoWPAN compressed IPsec and included
support for IPsec in tunnel mode. They have implemented and
evaluated their proposal in TinyOS.
53

LIGHTWEIGHT PROTOCOLS
##Lightweight IPsec
• With 6LoWPAN header compression
* the IPsec AH (Authenticated Header) header size is reduced from 24 bytes to
16 bytes.
*the ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) header size is reduced from 18 bytes
to 14 bytes.
• This results in a lower number of bits being transmitted, more space for
application data, and may avoid 6LoWPAN fragmentation.
• Contrary to the common belief that IPsec is too heavy for constrained devices, IPsec
is faster than the IEEE 802.15.4 security as the number of hops grows or the data
size increases
• Because the compression mechanisms substantially reduce the data overhead on
fragmented traffic.
• cryptographic operations are only performed at the end hosts, that is in Ipsec, not at
54

##Lightweight DTLS
• CoAP is being standardized as a web protocol for the IoT
• to make web protocol secure as CoAPs, secure transport layer represent in
Lightweight DTLS must be done.
• Like IPsec, DTLS is designed for the conventional Internet and not for the
resource-constrained IoT.
• The DTLS header compression is based on 6LoWPAN NHC ( Next Header
Compression ). Employing these compression mechanisms significantly
reduces the DTLS header sizes and ultimately results in fast and energy
efficient communication com- pared with plain DTLS.
• The use of compressed DTLS makes CoAPs considerably lightweight and a
feasible security protocol for the IoT.
55

6LOWPAN
• 6LoWPAN is novel IPv6 header compression protocol and allows constrained devices to connect to IPv6
networks.
• Because limitation in constrained devices like battery powered, memory and processing capability etc.
for this a new network layer routing protocol is designed called RPL (Routing Protocol for low power
Lossy network).
• RPL is light weight protocol and doesn't have the functionality like of traditional routing protocols so
routing protocol may goes under attack.
• A. 6LoWPAN integrates IP-based infrastructures and WSNs by specifying how IPv6 packets are to be
routed in constrained networks such as IEEE 802.15.4 networks
• the 6LoWPAN standard also defines fragmentation and reassembly of datagram ،Due to the limited
payload size of the link layer in 6LoWPAN networks.
• The IEEE 802.15.4 frame size may exceed the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size of 127 bytes for
big application data, in that case additional fragment(s) are needed
• 6LoWPAN networks are connects to the Internet through the 6BR (6LoWPAN Border Router) that
is analogous to a sink in a WSN. The 6BR preforms compression/decompression and
fragmentation/assembly of IPv6 datagrams.
• RPL is also prone to a number of routing attacks aimed to disrupt the topology, so In the IoT, a
57

RPL TOPOLOGY
• RPL topology forms the DODAG (Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph) tree, which contain only 1 root. The root
node is also called as the sink node.
 Nodes inform parents of their presence and reachability to descendants by sending a DAO (DODAG Information Object)
message
 Root node starts the formation of the topology by broadcasting the DIO (DODAG Information Object) messages.
 Nodes receiving the DIO message selects the parent to sender, with rank value calculated with respect to the parents
rank value and other parameters.
 The rank value may be depend on the distance from the root node, energy of link etc.
 The network owner can decide the rank value calculation parameters.
 The nodes continue to broadcast the DIO message and form the tree topology.
59

ATTACKS ON RPL TOPOLOGY
Selective Forwarding Attack:
The purpose of attack is to disrupt routing paths and filter any protocol. In RPL
attacker could forward all RPL control messages and drop the rest of the traffic
1- Solution on this attack can be creating the disjoint path or dynamic path between
parent and children.
2- Other solution is by using encryption technique in which attacker will not able to
identify the traffic flow
3-According to Wallgren, Heartbeat protocol basically used for detection of the
disruption in network topology but also can be used as defend against selective
forwarding attack.
4- According to Raza Shahid, IDS solution given the End to End packet loss
adaptation algorithm for detection of selective forwarding attack.
• RPL self-healing does not correct the topology " According to Wallgren"
62

 Sinkhole Attack.
Attacker node advertises beneficial path to attract many nearby nodes to
route traffic through it. This attack does not disrupt the network operation
but it can become very powerful when combined with another attacks.
• Solutions:
• 1- The IDS system give the solution to detect this attack According to
Raza Shahid
• 2- According to "Weekly Kevin," defend against sinkhole attack
evaluated parent fail-over and a rank authentication technique.
 The rank authentication technique relies on one way hash technique
Parent fail-over technique: uses UNS (unheard nodes set) field in DIO
message indicating that the nodes are in sinkhole compromised path.
• RPL does not have the self- healing capacity against the sinkhole. 63

64
 Sybil Attack
malicious node uses several identities on the
same physical node.
Sybil attack on RPL is not evaluated yet in IOT.
 Hello Flooding Attack
network node broadcast initial message as HELLO message.
Attacker can introduce himself as neighbour node to many node
by broadcasting Hello message with strong routing metrics and
enter in network
- In RPL, DIO messages refereed as Hello message, which is
used to advertise information about DODAG
*solution: 1- This attack can be mitigated by using the link-layer
metric as a parameter in the selection of the default route. If it
fail to receive link-layer acknowledgements then different route
is chosen.
2- using the geographical distance, node should
not select the nodes which are beyond their transmission range.

65
 Wormhole Attack:
The main purpose of this attack is Disrupt the
network topology and traffic flow.
Solution: According to "Khan Faraz",
Wormhole attack can be prevented using the
construction of Markle tree authentication .
-In RPL the tree construction starts from root
to leaf nodes and Markle tree construction
starts from leaf node to root.
 Clone ID Attack Attacker
Attacker node clones the identity of other node
to gain access to traffic destined to victim node
or through victim node.
* Solution: 1- This attack can be minimized by
using tracking number of instances of each
identity and this could able to detect cloned
identities. If geographical location of the nodes
with their identity stored at 6BR, using this we
can identify the original node and
cloned/malicious node.
2- Other distributed technique is by using
distributed hash table (DHT).

66
 Denial of Service Attack:
• Denial of service or Distributed denial of
service attack is attempt to make resources
unavailable to its intended user.
• In RPL this attack can be bring using the
IPv6 UDP packet flooding.
Solution: According to Kasinathan, IDS
system in proposed the framework for
detection of DOS attack in 6LoWPAN.
 Alteration and Spoofing Attack:
Rank attack:
By changing Rank value, an attacker can
attract child node for selecting as parents or
improve some other metric, and can attract
large traffic going toward the root.
Solution: According to Dvir Amit, To defend
Rank attack VeRA (Version number and Rank
Authentication) a new security service for
preventing the misbehaving node from
decreasing Rank values for attack purpose.

DIS (DODAG Information Solicitation) Attack
In this attack malicious nodes periodically sends the DIS messages to
its neighbours. When the DIS messages broadcast by attacker, the
receiver nodes upon receiving DIS message reset the DIO timer
assuming something went wrong with the topology around it.
67

ATTACKS ON RPL 6LOWPAN
• In resource constrained devices, the maximum MTU size is 127 bytes only, however IPv6
minimum MTU size is 1280 bytes due to this the fragmentation is done.
• 6LoWPAN does not support any kind of authentication mechanism this lead to fragmentation
attack.
 A. Fragmentation Attack:
Attacker may put his own fragments in fragmentation chain as there is no authentication mechanism
at receiver side for checking that received fragment is not a spoofed or duplicated fragment.
*Solution: According to Hummen, René, et al. propose two mechanisms, split buffer approach and
content chaining scheme.
1- The content chaining scheme uses cryptography to verify that received fragments belong to the
same packet or not, on a per-fragment basis
2- Attacker can attack on the receiver buffer allocation as the receiver waits for all fragments to
receive for reassembly, so According to Hummen, René, et al Split buffer schema promote direct
competition between original senders and an attacker for reassembly buffer resources. 68

 B. Authentication Attack:
• 6LoWPAN does not authenticate the node before joining the network. Due to this any attacker
node can easily joins the network.
• Solution:
• According to Oliveira, Luis ML, et al, To authenticate the nodes author presents a mechanism
that can be used to control the nodes that have access 6LoWPAN network.
• This method is based on administrative approval, which controls the third party nodes from
using the network to communicate with regular nodes.
• The border router contains the list of nodes in the network with their layer 2 address. Using
this address the presence of node is determined. And authorized to only those nodes which
are in the list.
69

 C. Confidentiality Attack:
Various attacks including eavesdropping, man in
middle, spoofing kinds of attacks etc.
Solution:
• Providing confidentiality or encryption mechanism
in 6LoWPAN, According to Raza, Shahid, et al,
provide the End-to-End (E2E) secure
communication between IP enabled sensor
networks and the traditional Internet.
• According to Sherburne, Matthew, examined
implementation of Moving Target IPv6 Defense
(MT6D) in 6LoWPAN. The MT6D is basically
designed to defend against network attacks.
70
 D. Security threats from internet side:
As 6LoWPAN is directly connected to the unsecured
internet can undergo attacks from internet.
Solution:
• According to Raza, Shahid, For avoiding such
attack, the firewall could be installed on 6BR to
control the malicious packets from internet.

RPL, NETWORK LAYER ATTACKS HAVE
BEEN NOT EVALUATED YET
71
1) Internet Smurf attack:
Internet Smurf attack takes place by
spoofing the victim node address and
echo message to other node. This could
lead the flooding to victim node.
 If attack exists the defense for this
attack, detection of attack using IDS
solution can be a research challenge.
2) Homing attack:
- By traffic analysis, attacker can identify
the important node for attack being
performed.
- Attack can be interested in knowing root
node or nodes which are direct child of
root node. By exploiting these nodes
attacker can bring attack on RPL with
more concentration.
 The defense mechanism and detection
of this attack using IDS or
cryptographic solution could be a
research challenge.

72
3) Wormhole attack detection:
- The IDS detection technique for
wormhole attack and other
prevention/detection technique could
be a research area.
4) Blackhole attack detection:
- However the detection and prevention
mechanism is not evaluated for RPL
environment. IDS solution for detecting
the Blackhole attack could be a research
area.
5) Sybil and Clone ID attack detection:
- Both Sybil and Clone ID attack has not been evaluated
against the network parameter in RPL.
 This there is a requirement for the light weight detection
and prevention mechanism for these attacks. Existing IDS
solutions can be extended for detection of this attack.

73
6) Sinkhole attack detection:
- The traditional sinkhole attack detection
mechanism can be optimized for RPL
network.
 IDS solution for detecting this attack on
6LoWPAN network could be a research
area.
8) RPL based attack:
- The IDS based solution for detecting
local repair attack, neighbour attack,
DIS and version attack could be a
research challenge.
7) Resource exhausting attack:
- Resource constrained nodes in RPL can exhaust the
resource if they have too many missions to do. The attacker
can perform this attack using reprogramming node, to start
activities such as broadcasting, sending control messages
without reason.
 There is need of mechanism which controls this types of
attack and prevent the nodes from getting out of resources
by load balancing.

IPV6 AND IPV4 CAN "WORK SIMULTANEOUSLY"
THROUGH THE USE OF TUNNELLING.
74

A survey in privacy and security in Internet of Things IOT

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