![Tañada v. Angara
Focus: the nature of concurrence of the Senate to the membership of the
Philippines in the World Trade Organization
Facts: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the DTI,
representing the PH, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
On August 12, 1994, members of the PH Senate received a letter from the
President of the PH, stating among others that “the Uruguay Round Final
Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.” The President of the PH certified
the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled
“Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.” PH Senate adopted Resolution No. 97, exhibiting
concurrence in the ratification by the President of the PH of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization. On December 29, 1994, the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization and (2) for the prohibition of its
implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of
public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as
the use of government properties and resources by respondents-heads of
various executive offices concerned therewith.
Issue: W/N the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its
annexes is sufficient and/or valid, considering that it did not include the
Final Act, Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services
Held: YES. Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO
Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents referred to in
the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and
insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect
a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by
Secretary Navarro. The Court held that the assailed Senate Resolution No.
97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. It
should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring
in as shown by the members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After
reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators
of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
Ruling: petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Doctrine: Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution -> No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Pangilinan v. DFA Secretary Cayetano
! [MA’AM LOANZON]: FINALS QUESTION
Focus: why the petition had become moot and academic; and that the
Senate could have provided for conditions for withdrawal from a treaty or
an international agreement upon granting its concurrence.
Facts: In 2000, President Estrada signed the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court in 2000. In 2017, Senator Trillanes IV filed "a
"supplemental communication" before the International Criminal Court with
regard to President Duterte's drug war." In Feb. 2018, ICC Prosecutor
started the preliminary examination of atrocities. In March 2018, Duterte
announced PH withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. Duterte
claims that the country never became a state party to Rome Statute since
treaty was not published in the Official Gazette. With this, the petitioners
filed for certiorari and mandamus, seeking for the ff: (a) declare the
Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute as invalid or ineffective,
since it was done without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Senate's members; and (b) compel the executive branch to notify the
United Nations Secretary-General that it is canceling, revoking, and
withdrawing the Instrument of Withdrawal.
Issue: W/N the consolidated Petitions present an actual, justiciable
controversy
Held: NO. The Petitions do not present an actual, justiciable controversy.
They are moot and academic. It is moot in that the President has already
withdrawn from the Rome Statute. The PH had already announced its
withdrawal on March 15, 2018 and had submitted its notice of withdrawal
the following day. Similarly, the Pres of Assemply of State Parties
announced the PH departure from Rome Statute. There are no longer any
factual occurrences that may be adjudicated nor is there an unsettled
incident demanding resolution since it is already done. Court's interference
and ruling on what course of action to take would mean an imposition of its](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/extracases-240210121814-8d76854b/85/additional-cases-on-constitutional-law-1-1-320.jpg)
![acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and
political rights — including the right to seek elective office.
Ruling: Petition for certiorari and petition-in-intervention are DISMISSED
Doctrine: The pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in
the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which
to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon. Upon
acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and
political rights – including the right to seek elective office
Tiu v. Hon. Natividad Dizon
Focus: the conditions for a grant of pardon to be valid
Facts: RTC of Makati convicted Ruben Tiu and two others for violating
Section 15 of R.A. 6425, selling, delivering, and giving away shabu without
authority of law. In March 24, 2009, the Board of Pardons and Paroles
issued a resolution recommending the grant of executive clemency
(pardon), among many others. PGMA granted him "conditional pardon
without parole conditions," but was, nonetheless, still "subject to the
conditions indicated in [the individual pardon papers]." He requested for a
certificate of conditional pardon without parole conditions but was denied
three times. In July 7, 2014, petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas
corpus insisting the efficacy and enforceability of his conditional pardon.
He further claims that his sentence is automatically reduced to just 30
years in light of being a colonist, that he is entitled to 19-years and
7-months of sentence reduction due to Good Conduct Time Allowance,
and that this 19 year GCTA sentence reduction and his already served time
of 14 years is already in excess of his supposed 30-year sentence thereby
necessitating his immediate release.
Issue: W/N a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in favor of the
petitioner.
Held: NO. First, his conditional pardon was incomplete and ineffective.
Conditional Pardon extended by PGMA was subject to the terms and
conditions indicated in an individual pardon paper. Conditional pardon,
which is "a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive
and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the
latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of
the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of the sentence or an additional one. He was never issued an
individual pardon paper and therefore never had conditions to comply with
(in order to be pardoned). Being a purely executive act, grant of pardon
and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are not subject to judicial scrutiny. Second, his mere classification as
penal colonist is insufficient in the reduction of his sentence. The law is
clear that act of approval by the Executive (of such classification) is
necessary before the sentence is reduced.
Ruling: petition is DISMISSED
Doctrine: -> Executive approval in the form of Individual pardon Papers and
compliance to the conditions therewith are necessary for a conditional
pardon to be complete and effective
-> Pardoning Power is an executive power and cannot be delegated. It
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. It is purely an executive act not subject to judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency* is not applicable.
*essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments
are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such
heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts
DFA v. COA
Focus: The charge of docket fees of 10k was reasonable for DFA to ask for
reconsideration of its disallowance by COA
Summary: COA Disallowances -> DFA Appeals -> COA Resolution -> DFA
Motion to Suspend -> COA Decision -> Elevated to SC
The Resolution is being assailed as it requires the payment of filing fees for
appeals including those related to disallowances. Petitioners argue that
this infringes on their right to due process.
Facts:
● COA Resident Auditor in the DFA issued notices of disallowances
(NDs) on the payment of terminal leave benefits for retired DFA
employees. The DFA appealed the NDs and the Auditor elevated
the appeals to the Director.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/extracases-240210121814-8d76854b/85/additional-cases-on-constitutional-law-1-5-320.jpg)
![● After more than 3 years of effectiveness, the DAP was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in this same case.
Issue:
(1) W/N the effects of DAP from its enactment until the Court’s
pronouncement that it is unconstitutional must be invalidated as
well.
(2) W/N operative fact can apply to acts by the President
Held:
● ON ISSUE #1: No, the effects/results of the invalid law prior to its
pronouncement as unconstitutional are still recognized as valid.
○ In theory, a legislative or executive act that is declared
void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any
right or obligation. However, practically speaking, it
would not be realistic to say that its results have
produced no binding effect. Hence, it is now accepted
as a doctrine that prior to a law’s nullification, its
existence as a fact must be recognized.
○ We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the
adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application
to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The
consequences resulting from the DAP and its related
issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone.
○ The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or
unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is
broad enough to include any and all acts of the
Executive, including those that are quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial in nature.
● ON ISSUE #2: YES. Based on equity and fairplay. Decision made
by the President or the administrative agencies has to be
complied with because it has the force and effect of law
Ruling: The Court declared the DAP void. However, its effects prior to this
proclamation of unconstitutionality were recognized.
Doctrine:
● DOCTRINE #1: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official.
● DOCTRINE #2: The doctrine of operative fact can apply only to
the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries
relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP.
○ [NOTE: Later in the case of Municipality of Tupi v. Atty.
Faustino, the Court would use this passage in
ascertaining whether or not the Operative Fact Doctrine
is applicable in that case. Hence, I rephrased this into a
simplified doctrine as listed below for easier
memorization (see Simplified Doctrine #2 below)]
SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE DOCTRINE
DOCTRINE #1:
● GR: Article 7 of the NCC: A void legislative or executive act
cannot be the source of legal rights or duties.
○ N.B. Executive acts include all acts of the Executive,
even those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in
nature.
● XPN: A void law or executive act is nullified BUT its effects are
sustained as a matter of equity and fair play. HOWEVER, this
cannot be invoked as a defense in validating an unconstitutional
law or executive act since this doctrine is resorted to only as a
matter of equity and fair play.
DOCTRINE #2: Requisites for the operative fact doctrine to be applied:
(1) The results can no longer be undone, and
(2) The beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the law
rendered unconstitutional.
[NOTE: Another requisite was added in Municipality of Tupi v. Atty.
Faustino. You will read about this later.]
LECTURE NOTES:
● Basis of Gios-Samar v. DOTC Secretary and CAAP.
● If an airport was built due to a law that ordered its construction, and
later on this law was declared unconstitutional, it would be very
IMPRACTICAL to UNDO and demolish the airport. It would be a
great waste of the taxpayers’ money to do so. Hence, the operative
fact doctrine. Under this doctrine, the government wouldn’t have to](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/extracases-240210121814-8d76854b/85/additional-cases-on-constitutional-law-1-8-320.jpg)
![point that neither has argued. Besides, Section 8, Rule
51, in relation to Section 4 of Rule 56, Rules of Court,
precludes the Supreme Court from deciding a case on
the basis of an alleged error that the parties have not
raised before the Court.
○ NOTE: In a way, the Court added
another requisite for the Operative
Fact Doctrine to be applied; Those
laid down in the case of Araullo v.
Aquino (requisites 1 and 2) plus the
requirement under this ruling, i.e., the
Operative Fact Doctrine must be
raised by any party at any time before
the trial court or the Supreme Court.
● SECOND, it cannot be said that the assailed effect of the
Municipal Ordinance — collection of fines — cannot be
undone. The fines can in fact be restored to Atty.
Faustino. No one has come forward to argue that the
fines can no longer be refunded because, for example,
the Municipality has become bankrupt. The fines to be
reimbursed to the respondent are in the form of fungible
goods that can be satisfied by any other collection of
money in the amount collected. There is also no inequity
or injustice that would arise from the refund of the fines.
To be sure, the converse is true. It would be iniquitous
and unjust to deny respondent the refund of the moneys
he had paid under protest pursuant to an illegal exaction
when (i) the Municipality had then and has now neither
the authority nor the right to get the money from him,
and (ii) in similar situations in the past, the Court has
consistently decreed the refund of illegal collections,
and therefore, in the process, treat respondent
differently from similarly situated members of the public.
● THIRD, there was no reliance by the public in good faith
upon the Municipal Ordinance. In fact, the public was
upfront in challenging the validity of the Municipal
Ordinance. There were no public beneficiaries of the
Municipal Ordinance precisely because the doctrine was
not raised and argued by any of the parties.
ON ISSUE #3: NO, only Atty. Faustino is entitled to a refund.
The Rules of Court provides that "where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a
fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case
and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest." Since the other
persons mentioned by Atty. Faustino and the trial court were not properly
joined as parties here, then they could not be entitled to the benefits or
avails of this specific suit.
Ruling: - The ordinance is unconstitutional. Refund must be tendered ONLY
to Atty. Faustino.
Doctrine:
Requisites for the operative fact doctrine to be applied [UPDATED]:
(1) The results can no longer be undone (Araullo v. Aquino)
(2) The beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the law
rendered unconstitutional (Araullo v. Aquino)
(3) The Operative Fact Doctrine must be raised by any party at any
time before the trial court or the Supreme Court (Municipality of
Tupi v. Atty. Faustino)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/extracases-240210121814-8d76854b/85/additional-cases-on-constitutional-law-1-10-320.jpg)
additional cases on constitutional law 1
- 1. Tañada v. Angara Focus: the nature of concurrence of the Senate to the membership of the Philippines in the World Trade Organization Facts: Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of the DTI, representing the PH, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. On August 12, 1994, members of the PH Senate received a letter from the President of the PH, stating among others that “the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.” The President of the PH certified the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled “Concurring in the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.” PH Senate adopted Resolution No. 97, exhibiting concurrence in the ratification by the President of the PH of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. On December 29, 1994, the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondents-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith. Issue: W/N the concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement and its annexes is sufficient and/or valid, considering that it did not include the Final Act, Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services Held: YES. Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro. The Court held that the assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in. Ruling: petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Doctrine: Sec. 21, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution -> No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Pangilinan v. DFA Secretary Cayetano ! [MA’AM LOANZON]: FINALS QUESTION Focus: why the petition had become moot and academic; and that the Senate could have provided for conditions for withdrawal from a treaty or an international agreement upon granting its concurrence. Facts: In 2000, President Estrada signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2000. In 2017, Senator Trillanes IV filed "a "supplemental communication" before the International Criminal Court with regard to President Duterte's drug war." In Feb. 2018, ICC Prosecutor started the preliminary examination of atrocities. In March 2018, Duterte announced PH withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. Duterte claims that the country never became a state party to Rome Statute since treaty was not published in the Official Gazette. With this, the petitioners filed for certiorari and mandamus, seeking for the ff: (a) declare the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute as invalid or ineffective, since it was done without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Senate's members; and (b) compel the executive branch to notify the United Nations Secretary-General that it is canceling, revoking, and withdrawing the Instrument of Withdrawal. Issue: W/N the consolidated Petitions present an actual, justiciable controversy Held: NO. The Petitions do not present an actual, justiciable controversy. They are moot and academic. It is moot in that the President has already withdrawn from the Rome Statute. The PH had already announced its withdrawal on March 15, 2018 and had submitted its notice of withdrawal the following day. Similarly, the Pres of Assemply of State Parties announced the PH departure from Rome Statute. There are no longer any factual occurrences that may be adjudicated nor is there an unsettled incident demanding resolution since it is already done. Court's interference and ruling on what course of action to take would mean an imposition of its
- 2. will not only on the executive, but also on the International Criminal Court itself. Separation of Powers + Checks and Balances -> SEC. 1, ART 8 of CONSTI on when judicial power is exercised ● in settling actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable; and ● in determining whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. - EXPENDED CERTIORARI JURISDICTION /EXPANDED POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW Requisites to determine justiciability ● (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; ● (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance . . . ● c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and ● (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. On Mootness ● MOOT: ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value ● When belated, concerning matters that are moot, the decision will no longer affect the parties. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced. Ruling: Consolidated petitions are DISMISSED for being moot Doctrine: On Foreign Relation Powers -> Treaty-making in the Philippines is an executive act, with Senate’s involvement limited to concurrence. Nevertheless, this means that effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the legislative, implying that the Senate’s power to concur with treaties necessarily include the power to impose conditions for its concurrence. On the decision of the case -> The petitions in this case are moot because the withdrawal from the ICC has already been completed and thus does not present an actual, justiciable controversy. *The Court outlines three guidelines for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from international agreements ● First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be contrary to the Constitution or statutes. ● Second, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to congressional imprimatur. ● Third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence ->Since effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the legislative branches, the Senate's power to concur with treaties necessarily includes the power to impose conditions for its concurrence. CAN BE EXPRESSED THRU: ● the same resolution in which it expressed its concurrence. ● in a subsequent resolution. ● Encompassing legislative action where it is made a general requirement -> Senate imposed no such condition when it concurred in the Philippines accession to the Rome Statute -> It is also because of this reason that the Court concluded that the senator-petitioners had no legal standing in the case at hand, since their inaction in adopting a resolution that expressly necessitates concurrence in the withdrawal of the Rome Statute subverts the legal standing they supposedly have. Republic v. Sereno Focus: why the Court concluded that Sereno did not possess integrity Facts: This case involves the quo warranto petition against Maria Lourdes Sereno due to her failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities, and net worth despite being an employee of the government from November 1986 to June 2006. This failure was in view of her being a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court, in violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law, and
- 3. the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Republic seeks the nullification of respondent’s appointment, asserting that her failure to file the required disclosures and her failure to submit the same to the Judicial and Bar Council show that she is not possessed of “proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary.” Issue: W/N Sereno is eligible for the position of Chief Justice. Held: NO. ● Article VIII, Section 7(3): A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. ● Article XI, Section 17: A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. ● Section 8, R.A. 6713, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees: Statements and Disclosure. — Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. ● APPLICATION: The Court held that respondent Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of proven integrity. Hence, the petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Ruling: Maria Lourdes Sereno is unlawfully holding a public office. She is ousted from the same. Accordingly, the position of Chief Justice is ordered vacant. Doctrine: A chronic failure to file SALNs constitutes lack of integrity that violates the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement. Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC. In Re: Letter of Mrs. Corona relative to the Claim of Retirement Benefits of Chief Justice Corona Focus: why impeachment is an involuntary separation from service. Facts: This case involves the supplication for the grant of post-employment and survivorship benefits of Ma. Cristina Roco Corona (Mrs. Corona), as the spouse of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. A year after his appointment as Chief Justice, Articles of Impeachment were filed against Chief Justice Corona and was indicted by HOR under Section 2, Article VI of Constitution for betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, and graft and corruption. However, he died April 29, 2016, so criminal charges for graft and corruption then pending before Sandiganbayan, and the tax evasion and forfeiture cases, were all dismissed. Issue: Whether or not retirement benefits, other gratuities, and survivorship pension should be accorded to Mrs. Corona as the spouse of the late Chief Justice Corona despite the latter's ouster by impeachment. Held: YES, because he is deemed involuntarily retired from service, which implies a lack of proper determination of or even a basis for any recoverable liability, thereby allowing him to be entitled to retirement benefits. Effects of judgment on an impeachment complaint extends no further than removal from office and disqualification from holding any public office. Sec. 3(7) Art. 11 ● A judgment of impeachment connotes mere removal from the post and is SEPARATE and DISTINCT from any other actionable wrong, even if it may have a colorable connection to the grounds for which the officer has been impeached. FURTHERMORE: An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established may be considered involuntarily retired from service. ● Retirement is deemed involuntary when one's profession is terminated for reasons outside the control and discretion of the
- 4. worker. Impeachment resulting in removal from holding office falls under the column of involuntary retirement. ● ACCORDINGLY: Due to his involuntary retirement, a fair and more equitable treatment of the present claim for post-employment privileges can be afforded. ○ IN THIS CASE: Court used RA 9946 to conclude that he meets all the requirements necessary for him to be entitled to benefits ● Since CJ Corona is entitled to retirement benefits, it follows that his widow is likewise entitled to survivorship benefits reckoned from the time of the demise of the late Chief Justice until the widow's death or remarriage. Ruling: The late CJ Corona is entitled to retirement benefits. Doctrine: A public officer who has been impeached but whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability has not been proven by a court may be considered to have been retired involuntarily and be eligible for retirement benefits. Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC Focus: why the grant of pardon to President Estrada is absolute Facts: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the PH, for the crime of plunder. On October 25, 2007, however, former PGMA extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, which Estrada "received and accepted" by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC, but these were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the former's right to vote and be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied. After losing during the presidential elections, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition or Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was denied in a Resolution dated April 23, 2013. On April 30, 2013, Risos-Vidal invoked the Court's jurisdiction by filing the present petition. While this case was pending before the Court, or on May 13, 2013, the elections were conducted as scheduled and former President Estrada was voted into office with 349,770 votes cast in his favor. Issue: W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by PGMA Held: NO. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency. It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Petitioner argued that the third preambular clause made the pardon conditional, and with the seeking of elective office, Estrada violated the terms of the pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a statement of fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency was granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy or to delimit the scope of the pardon. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President (doctrine of non-dimunition or non-impairment of the President’s power of pardon by acts of Congress). Thus, from both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation other than to mean that, upon
- 5. acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights — including the right to seek elective office. Ruling: Petition for certiorari and petition-in-intervention are DISMISSED Doctrine: The pardon granted to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent to grant a limited pardon. Upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the right to seek elective office Tiu v. Hon. Natividad Dizon Focus: the conditions for a grant of pardon to be valid Facts: RTC of Makati convicted Ruben Tiu and two others for violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425, selling, delivering, and giving away shabu without authority of law. In March 24, 2009, the Board of Pardons and Paroles issued a resolution recommending the grant of executive clemency (pardon), among many others. PGMA granted him "conditional pardon without parole conditions," but was, nonetheless, still "subject to the conditions indicated in [the individual pardon papers]." He requested for a certificate of conditional pardon without parole conditions but was denied three times. In July 7, 2014, petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus insisting the efficacy and enforceability of his conditional pardon. He further claims that his sentence is automatically reduced to just 30 years in light of being a colonist, that he is entitled to 19-years and 7-months of sentence reduction due to Good Conduct Time Allowance, and that this 19 year GCTA sentence reduction and his already served time of 14 years is already in excess of his supposed 30-year sentence thereby necessitating his immediate release. Issue: W/N a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in favor of the petitioner. Held: NO. First, his conditional pardon was incomplete and ineffective. Conditional Pardon extended by PGMA was subject to the terms and conditions indicated in an individual pardon paper. Conditional pardon, which is "a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. He was never issued an individual pardon paper and therefore never had conditions to comply with (in order to be pardoned). Being a purely executive act, grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are not subject to judicial scrutiny. Second, his mere classification as penal colonist is insufficient in the reduction of his sentence. The law is clear that act of approval by the Executive (of such classification) is necessary before the sentence is reduced. Ruling: petition is DISMISSED Doctrine: -> Executive approval in the form of Individual pardon Papers and compliance to the conditions therewith are necessary for a conditional pardon to be complete and effective -> Pardoning Power is an executive power and cannot be delegated. It demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. It is purely an executive act not subject to judicial scrutiny. Moreover, Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency* is not applicable. *essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts DFA v. COA Focus: The charge of docket fees of 10k was reasonable for DFA to ask for reconsideration of its disallowance by COA Summary: COA Disallowances -> DFA Appeals -> COA Resolution -> DFA Motion to Suspend -> COA Decision -> Elevated to SC The Resolution is being assailed as it requires the payment of filing fees for appeals including those related to disallowances. Petitioners argue that this infringes on their right to due process. Facts: ● COA Resident Auditor in the DFA issued notices of disallowances (NDs) on the payment of terminal leave benefits for retired DFA employees. The DFA appealed the NDs and the Auditor elevated the appeals to the Director.
- 6. ● COA issued a Memorandum returning without action the appeals because the DFA did not pay filing fees prescribed by the Resolution. ● Petitioners find it unfair that they are being hailed to defend themselves from the disallowances and yet, their right to an appeal for the first instance before the Director is conditioned on the payment of filing fees. Issue: W/N the Resolution is unconstitutional for violating the guarantee of due process of law, for being excessive and oppressive, and for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion Held: ● A disallowance is defined as the disapproval in audit of a transaction, particularly a disbursement, either in whole or in part. If numerous notices of disallowances were issued against a government official, this only means that there were different transactions involved. ● A government official may be slapped with different notices of disallowance as an accountable officer under the law. The consolidation of his or her appeals for these disallowances in one single appeal remains an available option, provided that the observance of the reglementary periods for each notice of disallowance would allow it, and more so if he or she has a similar argument or defense in all disallowances. ● This is a reasonable and viable practice which is akin to a joinder of causes of action in ordinary civil actions. The filing fee being capped at Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) no matter the amount involved in the disallowed transaction, proves that it is reasonably intended to cover costs of legal work required to resolve the case. Ruling: Petition is DISMISSED. COA Resolution and Decisions are UPHELD and AFFIRMED. Doctrine: The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is essentially procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. PADPAO v. COMELEC Focus: assoc of several security agencies, sought exemption from comelec circular requiring them to seek permission to carry firearms - SC said - part of the rulemaking powers of comelec to issue such circulars Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of Section 2 (e), Rule III of Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 10015 filed by the Philippine Assoc. of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7 Chapter, Inc., an association of licensed security agencies and company security forces under RA 5487. On November 13, 2015, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 10015 which provided for the rules and regulations on the ban on bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms and other deadly weapons and the employment, availment or engagement of the services of security personnel or bodyguards during the election period, more commonly referred to as the "Gun Ban." Despite the nomenclature used, it must be noted that the regulation covers not only the subject of firearms, but also the engagement of security services. In turn, Section 1, Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 lists those who may apply for authority to bear, carry, or transport firearms or deadly weapons. Private security services providers (PSSPs), 7 which include private security agencies (PSAs), are specifically included. On the other hand, Section 2 (e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 provides for the documentary requirements for the application. Thus, under the said provisions, PSAs may obtain authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside their place of work or business and in public places during the election period after compliance with the foregoing documentary requirements and under the conditions set forth therein. Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2 (e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 insofar as its application to PSAs is concerned. Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC does not have any authority to promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or transporting of firearms by PSAs. Petitioner alleges that PSAs should not be required to secure authority from the COMELEC as RA 5487 already grants this. Petitioner maintains that the power to promulgate rules and regulations with regard to said law is granted to the Philippine National Police (PNP), in consultation with the PADPAO, under Section 17 of the said law Issue: W/N Section 2 (e), Rule III of Resolution no. 10015 is valid Held: YES. The COMELEC did not exceed its rule-making authority in issuing the assailed provision of Resolution No. 10015. The power of the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations to enforce and implement elections laws is enshrined in the Constitution, which provides -> Sec. 6, Article IX-A. In Aquino v. COMELEC, the Court recognized the wide latitude given to the COMELEC by the Constitution and by law to enforce and
- 7. implement election laws to fulfill its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, peaceful, and honest elections. In Loking, Jr. v. COMELEC, the Court also ruled that COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers. Ruling: Court upholds Section 2 (e), Rule III of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 as valid and constitutional Doctrine: Sec. 6, Article IX-A -> Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Sec. 2, Article IX-C -> The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions: (1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT v. ADALA Focus: National patrimony; Congressional franchise Facts: Adala filed an application for CPC to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Cebu City. Cebu Water District refused the grant of franchise to the respondent Adala because it did not have the consent of the Board of Directors, which is a requirement in Section 47 of PD 198. Arguments of both parties in this issue are centered on the definition of the word “franchise”. On the one hand, Cebu Water District argues that "franchise" should be broadly interpreted, such that the prohibition against its grant to other entities without the consent of the district's board of directors extends to the issuance of CPCs. On the other hand, Adala contends that the prohibition against the grant to other entities only applies to franchises in the strict sense — those granted by Congress by means of statute — and does not extend to CPCs granted by agencies such as the NWRB. Issue: W/N the consent of Cebu Water District’s Board of Directors is a condition sine qua non for the grant of the CPC applied for by Adala, in pursuant to Section 47 of PD 198? Held: Court first clarified that adopting the strict interpretation proffered by respondent Adala would be incongruous because it excludes from the scope of the term "franchise" the CPCs issued by the National Water Resources Board. In PD 198, once a district is "duly formed and existing" after following the above procedure, it acquires the "exclusive franchise”. Thus, P.D. 198 itself, in harmony with Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 15 gives the name "franchise" to an authorization that does not proceed directly from the legislature. Nevertheless, the same provision must be deemed void ab initio for being irreconcilable with Article XIV Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, which prohibits that a franchise, certificate or authorization given for the authorization of the public utility be exclusive in character. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Water District has been jurisprudentially established to be considered as “public utility”. Since Section 47 of P.D. 198, which vests an "exclusive franchise" upon public utilities, is clearly repugnant to Article XIV, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution, it is unconstitutional and may not, therefore, be relied upon by petitioner in support of its opposition against respondent's application for CPC and the subsequent grant thereof by the NWRB. Ruling: WHEREFORE, Section 47 of P.D. 198 is unconstitutional. The Petition is thus, in light of the foregoing discussions, DISMISSED. Doctrine: Section 11, Article XII states that “...nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.”. Constitutional prohibition governs over Presidential Declaration 198. Araullo v. Aquino Focus: why the application of the operative fact doctrine could cover a presidential act Facts: ● The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) was implemented in 2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements had caused the growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) to slow down.
- 8. ● After more than 3 years of effectiveness, the DAP was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in this same case. Issue: (1) W/N the effects of DAP from its enactment until the Court’s pronouncement that it is unconstitutional must be invalidated as well. (2) W/N operative fact can apply to acts by the President Held: ● ON ISSUE #1: No, the effects/results of the invalid law prior to its pronouncement as unconstitutional are still recognized as valid. ○ In theory, a legislative or executive act that is declared void for being unconstitutional cannot give rise to any right or obligation. However, practically speaking, it would not be realistic to say that its results have produced no binding effect. Hence, it is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to a law’s nullification, its existence as a fact must be recognized. ○ We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone. ○ The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. ● ON ISSUE #2: YES. Based on equity and fairplay. Decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of law Ruling: The Court declared the DAP void. However, its effects prior to this proclamation of unconstitutionality were recognized. Doctrine: ● DOCTRINE #1: The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. ● DOCTRINE #2: The doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP. ○ [NOTE: Later in the case of Municipality of Tupi v. Atty. Faustino, the Court would use this passage in ascertaining whether or not the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in that case. Hence, I rephrased this into a simplified doctrine as listed below for easier memorization (see Simplified Doctrine #2 below)] SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE DOCTRINE DOCTRINE #1: ● GR: Article 7 of the NCC: A void legislative or executive act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties. ○ N.B. Executive acts include all acts of the Executive, even those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. ● XPN: A void law or executive act is nullified BUT its effects are sustained as a matter of equity and fair play. HOWEVER, this cannot be invoked as a defense in validating an unconstitutional law or executive act since this doctrine is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. DOCTRINE #2: Requisites for the operative fact doctrine to be applied: (1) The results can no longer be undone, and (2) The beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the law rendered unconstitutional. [NOTE: Another requisite was added in Municipality of Tupi v. Atty. Faustino. You will read about this later.] LECTURE NOTES: ● Basis of Gios-Samar v. DOTC Secretary and CAAP. ● If an airport was built due to a law that ordered its construction, and later on this law was declared unconstitutional, it would be very IMPRACTICAL to UNDO and demolish the airport. It would be a great waste of the taxpayers’ money to do so. Hence, the operative fact doctrine. Under this doctrine, the government wouldn’t have to
- 9. undo the effects of an unconstitutional law prior to the Court’s pronouncement of the latter’s unconstitutionality. ● Reason presidential acts are covered: The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. Municipality of Tupi v. Atty. Herminio Faustino Focus: why the Court could not apply the operative fact doctrine in the case Facts: On March 3, 2014, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Tupi enacted Ordinance No. 688, Series of 2014, known as the "Speed Limit Ordinance." It prescribed speed limits for all types of vehicles traversing the national highway, and penalties for violations thereof. However, this ordinance was NEVER published. On October 6, 2014, Atty. Herminio B. Faustino was flagged down by local traffic enforcers for speeding. He was running at 70 kph along the expanse of the highway which had a maximum speed set of 40 kph per the Ordinance. He was fined Php1,000.00 which he paid under protest. In contesting the Ordinance, Atty. Faustino argued that: (a) The ordinance was unconstitutional because it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation; and (b) Previous “violators” of this ordinance who paid the prescribed amount for violation thereof must be refunded the amount they paid. Issues: ISSUE #1: W/N the Court should declare the ordinance unconstitutional? ISSUE #2: Assuming that it should be stricken down as such, W/N the government should refund the penalty paid by Atty. Faustino? ISSUE #3: Assuming that Atty. Faustino is to be given a refund, should other past violators of the ordinance who paid a penalty get a refund as well? Held: ON ISSUE #1: YES, the ordinance is unconstitutional. ● The Ordinance bears a singular requirement for its effectivity, i.e., posting in three (3) conspicuous places. ● Here, considering that the Ordinance was not at all published in any newspaper of either general or local circulation, the owners and drivers of all vehicles traversing along the areas covered by the Ordinance were not properly informed of the prescribed speed limits thereunder. Since Ordinance No. 688 did not comply with the publication requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991, it did not become effective, much less, enforceable. ON ISSUE #2: YES, on two grounds: ● GROUND #1 (NOT IMPORTANT): Atty. Faustino’s prayer for the refund of the P1,000.00 fine imposed on him under Ordinance No. 688 is an incidental relief to the principal relief of the nullification of the Ordinance. ○ An incidental relief to the nullification of Ordinance No. 688 is the refund of the fine of P1,000.00 collected from respondent. The latter relief is germane to the principal relief. Where the law under which money was collected is declared unconstitutional or invalid, it follows that the collection itself is erroneous or illegal, thus, the refund of the money so collected is the incidental, accessory or allied consequence of the declaration. ● GROUND #2 (IMPORTANT): because the Operative Fact Doctrine does not apply in this case. ● Requisites for the application of the Operative Fact Doctrine under Araullo v. Aquino: (1) The results can no longer be undone, and (2) The beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the law rendered unconstitutional. (3) +1 requisite (will be discussed in the next bullet) ● FIRST, because this doctrine was not raised by any party at any time before the trial court or the Supreme Court. Hence, as to this doctrine, the parties have not been heard. It would not be fair to prejudice any of them on a
- 10. point that neither has argued. Besides, Section 8, Rule 51, in relation to Section 4 of Rule 56, Rules of Court, precludes the Supreme Court from deciding a case on the basis of an alleged error that the parties have not raised before the Court. ○ NOTE: In a way, the Court added another requisite for the Operative Fact Doctrine to be applied; Those laid down in the case of Araullo v. Aquino (requisites 1 and 2) plus the requirement under this ruling, i.e., the Operative Fact Doctrine must be raised by any party at any time before the trial court or the Supreme Court. ● SECOND, it cannot be said that the assailed effect of the Municipal Ordinance — collection of fines — cannot be undone. The fines can in fact be restored to Atty. Faustino. No one has come forward to argue that the fines can no longer be refunded because, for example, the Municipality has become bankrupt. The fines to be reimbursed to the respondent are in the form of fungible goods that can be satisfied by any other collection of money in the amount collected. There is also no inequity or injustice that would arise from the refund of the fines. To be sure, the converse is true. It would be iniquitous and unjust to deny respondent the refund of the moneys he had paid under protest pursuant to an illegal exaction when (i) the Municipality had then and has now neither the authority nor the right to get the money from him, and (ii) in similar situations in the past, the Court has consistently decreed the refund of illegal collections, and therefore, in the process, treat respondent differently from similarly situated members of the public. ● THIRD, there was no reliance by the public in good faith upon the Municipal Ordinance. In fact, the public was upfront in challenging the validity of the Municipal Ordinance. There were no public beneficiaries of the Municipal Ordinance precisely because the doctrine was not raised and argued by any of the parties. ON ISSUE #3: NO, only Atty. Faustino is entitled to a refund. The Rules of Court provides that "where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest." Since the other persons mentioned by Atty. Faustino and the trial court were not properly joined as parties here, then they could not be entitled to the benefits or avails of this specific suit. Ruling: - The ordinance is unconstitutional. Refund must be tendered ONLY to Atty. Faustino. Doctrine: Requisites for the operative fact doctrine to be applied [UPDATED]: (1) The results can no longer be undone (Araullo v. Aquino) (2) The beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the law rendered unconstitutional (Araullo v. Aquino) (3) The Operative Fact Doctrine must be raised by any party at any time before the trial court or the Supreme Court (Municipality of Tupi v. Atty. Faustino)