Afp weeks 4_-_5
- 1. February 12 & 14| Analyzing US Foreign Policy • Applying general theories • Theories of decision-making* • Organizational politics • Cognitive theories & misperception •Security dilemma •Alliances and polarity •Collective action and hegemony • Thursday: U.S.-specific theories & arguments
- 2. Theories of decision-making: Organization theory (Halperin, Allison, Wildavsky) Characteristics of organizations determine or shape decision-making, policy outputs and outcomes
- 3. Theories of decision-making: Organization theory “Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”(Allison) Model 1: Rational Policy Model FPbehavior results from purposive strategic decisions of unified national governments Model 2: Organizational Process Model FPbehavior reflects coordinated, but independent output of organizations, functioning according to SOP
- 4. Theories of decision-making: Organization theory (Halperin, Allison, Wildavsky) Organizational behavior and decision-making Characteristics of organizations seek size, wealth, autonomy, and preservation of mission follow standard operating procedures. have parochial perceptions and interests Are slow to adapt, but may change and learn over time
- 5. Theories of decision-making: Organization theory (Halperin, Allison, Wildavsky) “Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”(Allison) Model 1: Rational Policy Model FPbehavior results from purposive strategic decisions of unified national governments Model 2: Organizational Process Model FP behavior reflects coordinated, but independent output of organizations, functioning according to SOP Organizations are self-interested, parochial, governed by SOP, and slow to adapt Model 3: Bureaucratic Politics Model FP outcomes result from intra-national negotiations among key leaders and policy-makers no consistent set of strategic objectives – “where you stand depends on where you sit.”
- 6. Theories of decision-making: Organization theory (Halperin, Allison, Wildavsky) Characteristics of organizations determine or shape decision-making, policy outputs and outcomes Application to U.S. FP Foreign policy decisions may reflect interests and neuroses of government’s component organizations or bureaucratic units, rather than rational pursuit of national interest U.S. tends to underestimate these dynamics in other countries
- 7. Theories of decision-making: Cognitive theories (Jervis) examine role of psychological processes – perception, misperception, belief systems – on FP behavior state, organization, or individual level of analysis Jervis: argues misperception can undermine real- world accuracy of game theoretic models. in determining how to behave, an actor must develop an image of others and their intensions. But, the actor may, for a number of reasons, misperceive both others' actions and their intentions.
- 8. Jervis: “Hypotheses on misperception” (1968) 1. Belief-fact gap: A theory will have greater impact on an actor's interpretation with (a) greater ambiguity of the data, and (b) higher degree of confidence the theory is held 2. Belief-new idea gap: Actors are apt to err by being too wedded to established view and too closed to new information, as opposed to being too willing to alter theories 3. Spoon-feeding: : it’s easier to integrate contradicting information into an established image of another actor if information is transmitted bit-by-bit than if it comes all at once 4. Misperception is most difficult in the case of a missing concept or category – and is easiest to correct when concept is known or recognized, but actor is mis-categorized. 5. Goals vs. Data: If the sender has different background of concerns & information than the receiver does, misunderstanding is likely. 6. When people spend a great deal of time drawing up a plan or making a decision, they tend to think that the message about it they wish to convey will be clear to the receiver. 7. An action may convey unintended message if action itself doesn't turn out as planned 8. General tendency for decision--makers to see other states as more hostile than they are. 9. We tend to view others’ behavior as more centralized, disciplined & coordinated than it is 10. Because a state gets most of its information about other states’ policies from foreign offices, it tends to take the foreign offices’ position as representative of the government as a whole. 11. When states do something we like, we give ourselves too much credit for getting them to do so; when states do something we don't like, we attribute it mostly to internal forces. 12. When I don't try to conceal my intentions, I assume you accurately perceive them. 13. It is hard for an actor to believe the other can see him as a menace; it is often even harder to see that issues important to him are not important to others. 1. 14. Actors tend to forget that a piece of evidence may support multiple or even opposing views.
- 9. Theories of decision-making: Cognitive theories (Jervis) elites suffer cognitive syndromes & misperceptions Attribution theory: states attribute own behavior to circumstances; attribute others' behavior to character Behavioral corollary: states tend to ascribe others' good behavior to their own efforts; blame others' bad conduct on the other's innate character. Belief perseverance: states are slow to absorb new facts and realities that clash with existing beliefs States will exaggerate shared character of information, often unaware when others‘ perceptions diverge from their own States tend to exaggerate the centralized, disciplined, and coordinated character of others' behavior. Leads to strategic mistakes and miscalculations
- 10. Theories of decision-making: Cognitive theories (Jervis) Safeguards Recognize inability to make "unbiased" interpretations of incoming information; and influence of preferred theories see if attitudes contain consistent or supporting beliefs that are not logically linked be aware of tendency to overestimate degree of common interest involved in newly-shared concerns make assumptions, beliefs, and predictions that follow from them as explicit as possible Avoid tying main task, political future, or identity become tied to specific theories and images of other actors
- 11. Theories of decision-making: Cognitive theories (Jervis) Application to US foreign policy Reliance on flawed facts & theories drove American misperceptions of environment & interstate relations misperceptions led U.S. to misapply theories to emergent situations strategic miscalculations Domino theory – overstated influence of communism Bargaining and credibility – poor communication Spiraling & deterrence: critics claim the U.S. misapplied prescriptions of each model to situations governed by the other
- 12. Spiraling and Deterrence Deterrence / Credibility theory (Schelling) credibility of commitments is interconnected Abandoning one commitment destroys credibility of others Compellence and deterrence Misperception and war War most likely if you overestimate others’ hostility, but underestimate their capabilities Misperception: inaccurate inferences or estimations of consequences or others’ reactions to one’s actions/policies
- 13. Spiraling and Deterrence (Jervis) Spiral Model conflicts arise when states punish others expecting compliance; but punishment only provokes retaliation, sparking a conflict-spiral. Prescription: appeasement > threat of punishment (“carrots” safer than “sticks”) Deterrence Model conflicts arise when states appease aggressors; leads aggressor to expect further appeasement & to ignore warnings when appeasement ends Prescription: threat of punishment > appeasement (“sticks” work better than “carrots”)
- 14. Causes of Spirals psychological explanation: States exhibit cognitive syndromes suffered by individual policymakers states underestimate own role in causing others' hostility – and aggressiveness of own conduct – and expect other state to back down if bluff is called nationalism explanation: states tend to overlook/be unaware of past actions that injured other societies; may discount potentially legitimate grievances or fears based on past conduct view others complaints against them as unprovoked malice; expect other state to back down if bluff is called
- 15. Spiraling and Deterrence When does each model apply? When do carrots (positive inducements) work better, and when do sticks (threats of punishment) work better? Are carrots and sticks mutually exclusive? Important conditions to consider Is other state an aggressor or a status quo power? Is the other an aggressor or not? Does the other see itself as an aggressor or not? Are the other state's claims legitimate? Are the other's demands legitimate or not? Does the other see its demands as legitimate or not? How strong is the other state? Are the resources demanded cumulative?
- 16. Other general theories applied to AFP Security dilemma: waxing & waning of security threats and military opportunities explain past US conduct. Leaders have tended to exaggerate security dilemma – overstating insecurity and responding to false threats Alliance theories: American alliances have reflected threat- balancing and/or making common cause with similar powers. Doves: US exaggerates bandwagoning tendencies and ideological solidarity; both misperceptions fuel false fears. Hawks: US exaggerates balancing, uses threat of force too seldom Collective action & hegemonic stability Collective goods are under-provided; collective costs are over-provided. Application: the US free-rode in the past when it could, was/is often subject to free-riding. It now supports and provides goods to maintain position and avoid losing “global commons”
- 17. Next time: Theories specific to US foreign policy Cultural and ideological factors Nature and role of elite culture Popular culture and public opinion Liberal tradition and American exceptionalism Institutional arguments Executive-legislative relations Lobbies, interest groups Role of media and technology
- 18. February 12 & 14| Analyzing US Foreign Policy • Applying general theories, cont’d • U.S.-specific theories & arguments Cultural and ideological factors • • Nature and role of elite culture • Popular culture & public opinion • Liberal tradition and American exceptionalism Institutional arguments • • Executive-legislative relations • Role of media and technology
- 19. General theories applied to AFP Security dilemma: waxing & waning of security threats and military opportunities explain past US conduct. Leaders have tended to exaggerate security dilemma – overstating insecurity and responding to false threats Alliance theories: American alliances have reflected threat- balancing and/or making common cause with similar powers. Doves: US exaggerates bandwagoning tendencies and ideological solidarity; both misperceptions fuel false fears. Hawks: US exaggerates balancing, uses threat of force too seldom Collective action & polarity Collective goods are under-provided; collective costs are over-provided. Application: US free-rode in the past when it could, was/is often subject to free-riding. It now supports and provides goods to maintain position and avoid losing “global commons”
- 20. U.S.-specific theories & arguments Cultural and ideological factors Nature and role of elite culture Popular culture and public opinion Liberal tradition and American exceptionalism Institutional arguments Executive-legislative relations Role of media and technology
- 21. Culture & characteristics of policy elites Elite schools and big business Ivy dominance in FP circles → FP favors US business Economic interests > democratic ideology or institutions Chicago & Straussian neocons → spreading democracy Male-dominated “gendered” foreign policy? Military service and worldviews Growth of national security establishment during Cold War Changing role of military officers and experience Is military prone to exaggerate other states’ hostility and effectiveness of using force in presentations to civilians?
- 22. Culture & characteristics of policy elites Generational effects generational trauma: isolationists and interventionists are created by disasters caused by the others’ policies “those who remember the past are condemned to make the opposite mistake” Cognitive effects: groupthink suppression of internal dissent and policy evaluation Small-group dynamics: highly cohesive, isolated policy environment, lack of open leadership Policy Consequences Incomplete survey of objective and alternatives; Failure to fully analyze risks; Poor information search; Selective bias in processing information; Failure to work out contingency plans
- 23. Mass democracy and public opinion What role should public play in determining policy? Public ignorance → policy blunders & contradictions Marketplace of ideas → public enlightenment → wise policy “Rational ignorance” → doesn’t matter! “Manufacture of Consent” v participatory democracy policy overselling → policies develop lives of their own Diversionary wars and demagoguery Civic knowledge and academic irresponsibility Neoconservative attack on cultural relativism cult of irrelevance in academe → public ignorance
- 24. Liberal tradition & American exceptionalism The liberal tradition in America (Hartz) Dominance of classical liberalism in political culture Absence of feudalism + rough political equality → no radicalism No feudalism = no socialism (Foner) All debate within liberal framework Assume objectivity, superiority of policy and ideological views “The greatest part of...America was peopled by men who...brought with them into the New World a form of Christianity...by styling it a democratic and republican religion” —Alexis de Tocqueville
- 25. Liberal tradition & American exceptionalism Policy preferences and implications foreign policy expected to conform with liberal ideals USFP promotes, exports democracy Belief in responsibility to protect and spread vision of individual liberty individual liberty = moral absolute → system of government that enshrines individual liberty is morally & practically superior Two variants: passive and active Problems Foreign policy undermines liberal principles Ambivalence about expanding government power Viewed as crusading: repressive, racist, essentialist
- 26. Executive-Legislative Relations Constitution as “an invitation to struggle” (Corwin) “Two Presidencies” (Wildavsky) one presidency for domestic policy, another for foreign policy
- 27. Constitutional Powers (Article II) + Judicial review & Oversight Head of State Receives ambassadors Power to make treaties: 2/3 Senate to ratify can circumvent with executive orders and agreements Commander-in-Chief Presides Over the Military Veto Power President can reject legislation with general or pocket veto Congress can override veto with 2/3 vote of both houses Executive power clause “the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” basis for implied powers, exceeds enumerated powers
- 28. Informal Powers Power to Persuade (Neustadt) Professional Reputation: standing in Washington D.C. Public Prestige: standing in the public Responsibility/responsiveness and reputation/ prestige “Bully pulpit” Prerogative power (Locke) Presidential action in the absence of a specific authorization, even when it may violate the law in order to achieve a higher goal – the public good.
- 29. Constitutional powers (Article 1, Section 8) Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years; To provide and maintain a navy; To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
- 30. Constitutional sources of power Budget authority: “Power of the Purse” Legislative and investigative authority House and Senate Committees on Foreign Affairs/Foreign Relations, Armed Forces, Appropriations, Intelligence, Homeland Security Confirm senior appointments (Senate) Ratify international treaties (Senate)
- 31. “Two Presidencies” Why does Congress appear to defer on foreign policy? Stakes are higher in foreign policy Other actors (courts, Congress, public, interest groups) more willing to defer to the president in foreign policy Changing political context and responsibilities Emergence of U.S. as world power & increased global complexity Growth of Federal Government and permanent mobilization Growth of “personal” & popular leadership
- 32. War Powers in the Constitution Congress has the power to declare war raise and support armies and navies “make rules concerning captures on land and water,” “regulation of the land and naval forces.” “provide for calling the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel Invasions” Provide for organizing, arming, & disciplining Militia. Define & punish piracies and felonies on high seas Presidential war powers “Commander in chief” Framers changed language from “make war” to “declare war,” Separation of the power of the purse from the power of the sword.
- 33. Is a war different from a use of military force? Is Congress’s continued appropriation of $ an implicit authorization? How can Congress stop a president? Does Congress want to?
- 34. Media and technology Crucial role of press in foreign policy & national security Manipulated or incompetent press Rise and fall of investigative press Official dominion of press coverage → public ignorance Undemocratic regimes intimidation → foreign leaders decide how the press covers them. Social media and cable news shape FP agenda Raise major issues, highlight conditions, real-time coverage “infotainment” → public ignorance media segmentation → partisanship and hostility
- 37. February 19 & 21| U.S. Interests and Grand Strategy • U.S.-specific arguments, cont’d. • Role of media and technology • National interests & policy-making •Overview •U.S. Grand Strategies Cold War Era (1947-1991) • • Post-Cold War (1992-2001) • Post-9/11 (2001-) •Secondary strategies & interests
- 38. Media and technology Crucial role of press in foreign policy & national security Manipulated or incompetent press Rise and fall of investigative press Official dominion of press coverage → public ignorance Undemocratic regimes intimidation → foreign leaders decide how the press covers them. Social media and cable news shape FP agenda Raise major issues, highlight conditions, real-time coverage “infotainment” → public ignorance media segmentation → partisanship and hostility
- 40. National interests and policy-making National interests important for state’s wellbeing, prosperity, continuity Economic interests (Access to markets, comparative advantage) Political interests (Countries with shared interests and values) Political values (Democracy, human rights, liberty) Vital interests Essential for state’s well-being, prosperity, continuity External focus (foreign threats) Internal focus (education, agriculture, economy, environment, etc)
- 41. Classifying interests and threats Generic Countries Events Technology Specific Territorial integrity & sovereignty Safety of Americans at home and abroad Preservation of vital institutions Strong, stable European Union
- 42. Setting priorities WMD nonproliferation vs counterterrorism Iraqi WMD vs Pakistani WMD Climate change vs energy independence Stability of Russian democracy & economy vs Mexican democracy & economy Other examples? HOW do we decide?
- 43. Policy-making Ongoing conversation and debate: What are national and vital interests? Who/what threatens them? What should we do about it? Key factors shaping policy Facts (necessary but insufficient to set priorities) Managing different of values & interests Future visions What ought to be How to get there Policy legitimacy of process
- 44. Basic strategic components and tools National power Capacity to influence others’ decisions and actions Components: Military capacity & force Cultural & ideological influence and affinities Trade & economic policies Political authority Alliances and coalitions Balancing and bandwagoning Trade and security alliances Bilateral and multilateral agreements Collective security & international law
- 45. Grand Strategies theory explaining how to cause or achieve national interests or other objectives Major strategic principles & approaches Unilateral vs. multilateral action Isolationism vs. internationalism Realism vs. idealism Nation-building
- 46. Grand Strategies theory explaining how to cause or achieve national interests or other objectives U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Cold War Era (1947-1991) Post-Cold War (1992-2001) Post-9/11 (2001-)
- 47. Cold War Era (1947-1991) Economic Rebuild Europe, foster economic liberalism and development, Bretton Woods system & institutions, expand U.S. global role National Security Centered on containment Phase 1: Whether to contain? Phase 2: How to contain?
- 48. Whether to contain (1947-64) Consensus: don’t want USSR to become more powerful; need to maintain or increase own relative power Debate: What is best strategy? Isolation vs. Containment vs. Rollback
- 49. Whether to contain (1947-64) Debate: What is best strategy? Isolation vs. Containment vs. Rollback Major questions How "cumulative" are industrial resources? Possible to conquer or convert these resources into military power, then use to take more? How easy is conquest? Can the USA conquer the USSR? Vice versa? How aggressive is the USSR? Is war inevitable/avoidable? Will offensive action provoke or calm the USSR
- 50. How to contain (1965-1991) Debate: What approach should we take? Europe First vs. Global Intervention Questions Level of Soviet threat to developing world How "cumulative" are resources in developing world? Can U.S. interventions succeed? Would independent communist states threaten U.S. security? How? How much?
- 51. Post-Cold War Era (1991-2001) Changing strategic context Collapse of Cold War consensus More (+ more complex) views of major threats & priorities Alternative strategies
- 52. Post-Cold War Era (1991-2001) Alternative strategies Isolation: U.S. role in world complete with Soviet collapse, we won, time to come home & celebrate Neo-containment: Variant 1: contain any new threats that emerge to fill or even challenge US dominance Variant 2: contain world's most crazy or hostile states Neo-rollback: wage preventive war against rogue states that pursue WMD Selective engagement: prevent interstate conflict in industrial regions of interest Global pacification: prevent interstate conflict everywhere. US could do this (unilaterally or multilaterally) U.S. global engineering : hegemonic stability (economic & political)
- 53. February 21| U.S. Interests and Grand Strategy • National interests & policy-making • Overview • U.S. Grand Strategies • Cold War Era (1947-1991) • Post-Cold War (1992-2001) • Post-9/11 (2001-) • Secondary strategies & interests • Contemporary debates
- 54. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies theory about how to achieve national interests What are our primary interests? Who/what promotes or threatens those interests? What is best strategy to advance these interests? (causal arg.) A+B+C→ achieve desired results X + Y + Z → avoid unwanted results Tools and components Examples: Military force or coercion; diplomatic capacity; political leadership; market dominance; strategic minerals & resources; foreign investment & fiscal capacity; boycotts; sanctions; strategic balancing, trade & security alliances; bilateral & multilateral agreements & institutions; ideological & cultural influence; collective security, human rights, and international law. Major strategic principles & approaches Unilateralism; multilateralism; isolationism; internationalism; realism; idealism
- 55. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Cold War Era (1947-1991) Postwar consensus: Expand U.S. global role: rebuild Europe, foster economic & political liberalism, support multilateral institutions. Containment: use diplomatic, economic, and military means to prevent spread of Soviet power or influence Strategic Debates Whether to contain: isolation, containment, or rollback? How to contain: focus on strategic interests or global influence? Secondary strategies and tools Deterrence: prevent conflict with threat of large military force and mutually assured destruction (MAD) Domino theory: creation of Soviet-backed regime would lead to spread of communism in surrounding region
- 56. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-Cold War Era (1991-2001) Changing strategic context Cold War consensus collapses ↑ democracies worldwide; democratic peace theory More (+ more complex) views of major threats & priorities Alternative strategies
- 57. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-Cold War Era (1991-2001) 1) Isolation: U.S. global role complete; triumph of democracy & free markets; turn focus inwards 2) Neo-containment, Variant 1: contain any new threats that emerge to fill or even challenge US dominance 3) Neo-containment, Variant 2: contain most dangerous states. Limit control of WMD and resources, reduce dependence 4) Neo-rollback: wage preventive war against rogue states that pursue WMD
- 60. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-Cold War Era (1991-2001) 1) Isolation: U.S. global role complete; triumph of democracy & free markets; turn focus inwards 2) Neo-containment, Variant 1: contain any new threats that emerge to fill or even challenge US dominance 3) Neo-containment, Variant 2: contain most dangerous states. Limit control of WMD and resources, reduce dependence 4) Neo-rollback: wage preventive war against rogue states that pursue WMD Tactical debates: Unilateralvs. multilateral strategy. Threats vs. inducements to gain allies
- 61. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-Cold War Era (1991-2001) 1) Isolation: U.S. global role complete; triumph of democracy & free markets; turn focus inwards 2) Neo-containment, Variant 1: contain any new threats that emerge to fill or even challenge US dominance 3) Neo-containment, Variant 2: contain most dangerous states. Limit control of WMD and resources, reduce dependence 4) Neo-rollback: wage preventive war against rogue states that pursue WMD 5) Selective engagement: prevent interstate conflict in industrial regions of interest 6) Global intervention: prevent interstate conflict everywhere – unilaterally or multilaterally 7) Global guardian: hegemonic stability & global engagement – economic and political
- 62. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-9/11 (2001- ) Primary political economic interests: Maintain economic primacy: reinforce economic institutions; extend trade agreements; foster tech/scientific innovation Primary national security interests: Thwarting WMD terror against US counter-terror strategy? counter-proliferation strategy?
- 63. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-9/11 (2001- ) How large is the terrorist threat? far larger than most people formerly believed al Qaeda terrorists may have the skill to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction al Qaeda's large-scale destructive ambitions.
- 64. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-9/11 (2001- ) What changes or factors contributed to threat? Access to WMD: falling manufacturing costs, growing expertise to make them, increasing number of states trying to make or secure WMD. Increasing number of failed states that cannot control their territory – gives terrorist groups places to locate. al Qaeda is first terrorist organization 1) to command substantial wealth and 2) with such highly-skilled leadership Rising Arab and Islamic hostility toward the U.S. created conditions favorable to al Qaeda U.S. failure to answer or counter al Qaeda propaganda and
- 65. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-9/11 (2001- ) Why was immediate terror threat unforeseen? Post-Cold War “peace dividend” led to massive cuts in intelligence budgets and personnel There was no single, powerful federal agency to seek budget increases to address terrorist threat U.S. press did not cover rise of anti-Americanism al Qaeda's capability was hard to detect
- 66. U.S. Foreign Policy Grand Strategies Post-9/11 (2001- ) “Bush Doctrine” (2001-2009) Different interpretations: Doctrine of preemption? Use military force to eliminate threat of imminent action or attack against U.S. Doctrine of prevention? Use military force to eliminate potential threats before they can initiate action against U.S. Emphasis on “hard” vs. “soft” power Minimal commitment to multilateralism
- 67. Secondary interests and strategies Environment and climate change Concerns about catastrophic damage and resource scarcity, leading to political and economic instability Human rights What actions, if any, should U.S. take to protect human rights / address human rights violations? Public health and disease Need to prevent epidemics, address new diseases Retaining economic primacy? Maximize prosperity, balance against other interests, maintain liberal economic institutions & regime
- 68. What are America’s prime interests today?