![mathematical formula he used base 2 (‘certainty’ vs.
‘uncertainty’) and introduced the concept of‘bit.’ [‘If the
base 2 is used the resulting units may be called binary
digits, or more briefly bits, a word suggested by Tukey.
A device with two stable positions, such as a relay or a
flip-flop circuit, can store one bit of information’
(Shannon, 1948).] The equation he found is the same
equation used for thermodynamic entropy,the measure
of randomness vs. order in a thermodynamic system.
Thermodynamic entropy increases as energy dissipates
and randomness increases. Information entropy, a vari-
able of state for information scientists, also increases as
information is corrupted, as measured from certainty
(order) towards uncertainty (randomness).
Entropy, for thermodynamics and information, is a
state measure on the spectrum between certainty and
uncertainty. In Information Theory, entropy increases
with random sources (uncertainty). For Shannon, the
act of choosing between messages creates information.
Certainty is having only one message possible, no
choice and predictability. Because of this, certainty
carries no information, creating an apparent paradox:
uncertainty is information.We can resolve this paradox
if we follow Shannon’s approach – making a choice from
randomness creates information and communication is
the act of resolving this uncertainty.Because of the large
number of choices,the unexpected event has high infor-
mation entropy.We gain information by making choices
when we engage the unexpected.
Physicists and chemists study the change of entropy
in the system because it is the change in entropy that
drives reactions. While information scientists study
entropy as a single variable,in crisis management we can
study the change in information entropy as people make
choices over time to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity.
Making choices creates information. Just as the change
in thermodynamic entropy drives physical processes,
the change in information entropy, giving meaning to
randomness and uncertainty by choices,increases infor-
mation. Ambiguity, when it drives engagement, can
create reliable crisis management.
In these three forms of uncertainty, the dictionary
form describes states where information can decide the
situation. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle refers to
knowledge of either place or movement but never both
and the inability to know causation and prediction. It
approaches ambiguity when we focus on momentum and
prediction. Shannon’s Information Entropy describes
how choice creates information. For pragmatic
purposes, however, we face situations with multiple
reasons for causation, multiple predictions and multiple
responses following each intervention. Uncertainty, as a
static state,is amenable to the collection of information.
Ambiguity, as the temporal quality of uncertainty, has
multiple possible causes, multiple possible futures and
multiple possible responses to each intervention.
Ambiguity creates the possibility for divergent views
on how best to act. Individuals select different interpre-
tations or some people see ambiguity where others see
single causation or a predictable trajectory. Focus on
the most frightening possibility in these discrepancies
makes possible the use of fear to motivate others;focus
on the most benign possibility or denial of alternative
views, leads to dangerous complacency. Ambiguity, and
the sense of vulnerability it creates,may drive safety and
reliability or create fear and panic. Ambiguity can also
lead to serious, intractable problems.
Operators who accept ambiguity and Wolfberg’s
mystery-solving are more likely to entertain doubt
while expressing less confidence that they are right.
They may actually be more accurate with predictions
than those who deny uncertainty and ambiguity.Ambi-
guity deniers tend to reduce the problem to some core
theoretical theme with which they feel comfortable,
giving them exceptional confidence in the accuracy of
their predictions (Watts & Brennan, 2011).The crowd is
more likely to follow the reductionist, ambiguity denier
who expresses great confidence than the operator who
accepts ambiguity and the doubt that accompanies it.
A group may reduce the ambiguous situation to one
explanation through which all perception is filtered.
When the group’s beliefs co-opt newer members, not
only does groupthink develop but this shared belief
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy through enactment
(Weick, 1979). Enactment prevents individuals from
acting on their sensemaking to engage the situation.The
group will ostracize the individual who acts contrary to
the groupthink, creating stagnation in the presence of
ambiguity.
Rule-based decision-making relies on recognition of
the situation and categorization together with rules for
actions (Rasmussen & Lind, 1982).For such a rule-based
system to work, a certain level of fidelity must exist
between the chosen category and reality. In states of
uncertainty, one can collect more information to
support the chosen category. Ambiguity in causation,
however, clouds where to look to relieve the uncer-
tainty, ambiguity in prediction clouds how to prepare
for the outcome, and ambiguity of response to actions
clouds the ability to learn from the choices made.
When the rule does not perform well,enactment and
cognitive dissonance may drive the individual, support-
ive colleagues and organizations to continue using the
rule despite its failure. Reason (1990) described this as
the ‘strong-but-wrong’ rule.The application of discrete
concepts to ambiguous situations is problematic, much
as the difficulties that exist between discrete concepts
and continuous perceptions (Weick, 2011).
Ambiguity prevents us from making a direct link
between our actions and results.We cannot fully attrib-
ute success to a specific intervention, a problem that
hinders learning. In the same way, we may continue to
Ambiguity 49
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
Volume 23 Number 2 June 2015© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/4e8c5fdc-440a-45a5-97f9-ba5911120842-160919010829/85/Ambiguity-Guest-Editorial-3-320.jpg)
Ambiguity, Guest Editorial
- 1. Ambiguity When you have an event, you can intervene in the wrong moment and cause catastrophic failure.By the time you see the problem,the catastrophic event has occurred. Michael Gallo, Kelly Space &Technology, Inc., on high energy testing Ambiguity may lead us to construct a world that, while supported by evidence,is not true.This is the danger of ambiguity – we select evidence and interpre- tations for their plausibility, but later events show we were wrong.After an unwanted result, ambiguity allows us to select interpretations to blame people, accept the inevitability of failure or announce this result as success. Carroll (1995) describes this as ‘root cause seduction’. These inconsistencies among self-perception, percep- tion and sensemaking are the essence of ambiguity. In Gallo’s scenario, intervening at the right moment may prevent catastrophe, while intervening at the wrong moment causes catastrophic failure. Here, we cannot be uncertain, or even aware, about the right moment,as it has passed before we can take the correct action.We can, rather, search for context and give value to what is known in an effort to identify early heralds of failure. The right moment is ambiguous. The observer can respond to an anomaly by collecting more informa- tion and be wrong before error can be identified. Or the observer can respond to an anomaly by giving meaning to existing information to better interpret observations. Information describes the circumstance, while meaning reflects context and the value of infor- mation. Context and value influence the success or failure of ambiguous situations, a pragmatic, rather than philosophical or theoretical, distinction. We must distinguish between uncertainty and ambi- guity in a radically distinct way. Information, as data or description, lessens uncertainty, a word stemming from cert (sure or decided).Ambiguity, from ambigere (to go around, ambi both + igere drive, lead or act), describes information that contains more than one meaning.The distinction between uncertainty and ambiguity is critical to those who work in hazardous situations.Uncertainty compels the search for information, ambiguity the search for meaning. Uncertainty–certainty is binary, our information is right or not right, there is a correct answer. Information has fidelity to reality. Our goal becomes one of finding this correct answer and achieving fidelity.Ambiguity, on the other hand, is multifaceted and describes multiple, reasonable explanations of events; multiple, likely pre- dictions; or multiple responses to a single intervention. Ambiguity has limited fidelity to the situation, particu- larly when the situation is in flux or a dynamic state. Ambiguity is,to some degree,uncertainty with a time dimension.When taken as a single moment in time, it is possible to reduce a situation towards the spectrum of certainty and uncertainty.Ambiguity develops when we add the element of time – the addition of a past creates multiple ways the situation developed; the addition of a future creates multiple possible developments;the addi- tion of only one intervention, added to the complexity of the situation, creates multiple possible responses. In this definition, adding the element of time makes ambi- guity a special case of uncertainty. More information does not resolve ambiguity, as the relevance of information may change with a different past or future. We want to learn about causation within the event,something we cannot observe without experimentation. Operators experiment through engagement of the situation, observing responsiveness to their actions.Action by short feedback loops gener- ates information while also giving it meaning from context and causation, even as it changes the situation. Compare this to observation, where information col- lected as the situation changes becomes almost imme- diately outdated. Information generated by action, along with knowledge and experience, allows the operator to give meaning to the situation. Operators can better resolve ambiguity through engagement, as discussed in papers of this special issue,or passively,with the passage of time. In preparation for the Eighth International High Reli- ability Organizing Conference, hosted by the University of North Texas, Fort Worth, March 2014, I considered bringing experts together to discuss how organizations respond to uncertainty. Marc Otten (ContainR Media, Amsterdam, the Netherlands) suggested asking the question, ‘How do organizations respond to ambi- guous information?’ He recommended this because Warren E. Watson, PhD, Regents Professor of Management, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, participated in the development of this special issue from the beginning. His unexpected death in July 2014 prevented him from carrying this to completion. His participation and guidance are felt throughout this work. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 23 Number 2 June 2015 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd DOI: 10.1111/1468-5973.12082
- 2. organizations can respond to uncertainty with increased information and evaluation but the same response to ambiguity will not be effective.This special issue of the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Manage- ment arises from that conference session. Ambiguous information occurs within stochastic pro- cesses or dynamic states. Uncertainty is the result of stochastic processes, but during the process, we see ambiguity.The difficulty lies in giving meaning to infor- mation when there is uncertainty of ‘before, now, and future’. Because the interpretation of information during dynamic situations depends on events that have happened or will happen, collecting more information to reduce uncertainty does not relieve ambiguity. Wolfberg (2006) describes this dilemma as puzzle- solving vs. mystery-solving. There is only one right answer in puzzle-solving and the puzzle has its own internal logic. Collecting puzzle pieces leads to a solu- tion. Mystery-solving accepts the multifaceted nature of events and, whileWolfberg refers to this as uncertainty, the concept of ambiguity I use here better fits his description of how mystery-solving opens up a universe of possibilities.This occurs when the operator engages the situation. How the organization responds to ambiguous infor- mation may predict resilience and adaptability to a greater extent than the organization’s response to uncertainty. The organization can reduce uncertainty through systems for collecting and better understand- ing information.Ambiguity, on the other hand, occurs in dynamic, real-time interactions and responds to using tacit knowledge with shared sensemaking, use of local and general context, the flow of information and migra- tion of authority.The detailed intimacy of an organiza- tion’s reliable response to ambiguous information may be inaccessible to observers and, possibly, even to executives within the organization. The silent danger of ambiguity comes from our failure to consider multiple paths and trajectories or the denial of ambiguity itself.With only one path to the event and one trajectory away from it, one can easily search for information that supports decisions made (confirmation bias) and, as events progress, memory triggers will readily occur to bias decision-making towards easily recalled information (availability heuris- tic). In a dynamic state, this rapidly increases the vulner- ability of the operator and the system. This sense of vulnerability drives the search for early heralds of problems and threats while also informing the decision-making that increases information (infor- mation entropy and certainty). The multiple possible meanings in ambiguous events hinder us from easily reducing the situation to a few simple components. By accepting ambiguity, operators also accept the possibil- ity of diverse responses to their interventions and remain watchful for interventions that make the problem worse. Operators must remain engaged with the situation, as multifaceted events will change even as the operators grasp the structure of the problem. By making choices, operators develop local information in context; this local expertise can influence decisions others will make.Response to the inherent vulnerability that comes from ambiguous information drives resil- ience and reliability when the organization is faced with unexpected crisis or catastrophic situations. These responses by individuals and the organization reflect the five principles of High Reliability described by Weick and Sutcliffe (2011): pre-occupation with failure, reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise in respective order of the above paragraph.The organiza- tion’s response to ambiguity may also reflect its level of High Reliability. Three forms of uncertainty are in common use: dic- tionary definitions,Werner Heisenberg’s famous Uncer- tainty Principle and Claude Shannon’s Information Entropy. Dictionary definitions derive from the Latin root cert for sure, settled or decided and relate to confidence vs. doubt, accuracy and precision, and unknown or unpredictable states.These definitions do not incorporate the dynamics inherent in the definition of ambiguity. Heisenberg, using wave mechanics, found an uncer- tainty relation between the position and momentum (mass × velocity) of a subatomic particle. Increasingly precise measurement of one decreases the precision of the other.This uncertainty affects causality and predic- tion of the particle’s behaviour. Uncertainty principles result from wave mechanics and oscillation in linear time-variant systems (as their name implies, they vary or oscillate in a linear manner over time). Collecting information over one dimension relies on the other, affecting precision in that measurement, somewhat analogous to our macro experience in crisis management. In crisis management, the relation between events (position) and time (momentum) interferes with precise evaluation of an event. At a specific time, the precision of information for that moment is low or we can have a greater precision of information about the event but obtained over a longer time interval.There- fore, in crisis management, we can know what is hap- pening but not when it happened, or we can know when it happened but not fully what happened. This is most obvious when the trajectory of events accelerates or changes direction.This change moves the uncertainty of events into ambiguity. Shannon (1948) identified information entropy from the mathematics he used to solve the fundamental problem of communication – transmitting information in a reliable manner between transmitter (encoder) and receiver (decoder). To evaluate information in a 48 Daved van Stralen Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 23 Number 2 June 2015 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- 3. mathematical formula he used base 2 (‘certainty’ vs. ‘uncertainty’) and introduced the concept of‘bit.’ [‘If the base 2 is used the resulting units may be called binary digits, or more briefly bits, a word suggested by Tukey. A device with two stable positions, such as a relay or a flip-flop circuit, can store one bit of information’ (Shannon, 1948).] The equation he found is the same equation used for thermodynamic entropy,the measure of randomness vs. order in a thermodynamic system. Thermodynamic entropy increases as energy dissipates and randomness increases. Information entropy, a vari- able of state for information scientists, also increases as information is corrupted, as measured from certainty (order) towards uncertainty (randomness). Entropy, for thermodynamics and information, is a state measure on the spectrum between certainty and uncertainty. In Information Theory, entropy increases with random sources (uncertainty). For Shannon, the act of choosing between messages creates information. Certainty is having only one message possible, no choice and predictability. Because of this, certainty carries no information, creating an apparent paradox: uncertainty is information.We can resolve this paradox if we follow Shannon’s approach – making a choice from randomness creates information and communication is the act of resolving this uncertainty.Because of the large number of choices,the unexpected event has high infor- mation entropy.We gain information by making choices when we engage the unexpected. Physicists and chemists study the change of entropy in the system because it is the change in entropy that drives reactions. While information scientists study entropy as a single variable,in crisis management we can study the change in information entropy as people make choices over time to resolve uncertainty and ambiguity. Making choices creates information. Just as the change in thermodynamic entropy drives physical processes, the change in information entropy, giving meaning to randomness and uncertainty by choices,increases infor- mation. Ambiguity, when it drives engagement, can create reliable crisis management. In these three forms of uncertainty, the dictionary form describes states where information can decide the situation. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle refers to knowledge of either place or movement but never both and the inability to know causation and prediction. It approaches ambiguity when we focus on momentum and prediction. Shannon’s Information Entropy describes how choice creates information. For pragmatic purposes, however, we face situations with multiple reasons for causation, multiple predictions and multiple responses following each intervention. Uncertainty, as a static state,is amenable to the collection of information. Ambiguity, as the temporal quality of uncertainty, has multiple possible causes, multiple possible futures and multiple possible responses to each intervention. Ambiguity creates the possibility for divergent views on how best to act. Individuals select different interpre- tations or some people see ambiguity where others see single causation or a predictable trajectory. Focus on the most frightening possibility in these discrepancies makes possible the use of fear to motivate others;focus on the most benign possibility or denial of alternative views, leads to dangerous complacency. Ambiguity, and the sense of vulnerability it creates,may drive safety and reliability or create fear and panic. Ambiguity can also lead to serious, intractable problems. Operators who accept ambiguity and Wolfberg’s mystery-solving are more likely to entertain doubt while expressing less confidence that they are right. They may actually be more accurate with predictions than those who deny uncertainty and ambiguity.Ambi- guity deniers tend to reduce the problem to some core theoretical theme with which they feel comfortable, giving them exceptional confidence in the accuracy of their predictions (Watts & Brennan, 2011).The crowd is more likely to follow the reductionist, ambiguity denier who expresses great confidence than the operator who accepts ambiguity and the doubt that accompanies it. A group may reduce the ambiguous situation to one explanation through which all perception is filtered. When the group’s beliefs co-opt newer members, not only does groupthink develop but this shared belief becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy through enactment (Weick, 1979). Enactment prevents individuals from acting on their sensemaking to engage the situation.The group will ostracize the individual who acts contrary to the groupthink, creating stagnation in the presence of ambiguity. Rule-based decision-making relies on recognition of the situation and categorization together with rules for actions (Rasmussen & Lind, 1982).For such a rule-based system to work, a certain level of fidelity must exist between the chosen category and reality. In states of uncertainty, one can collect more information to support the chosen category. Ambiguity in causation, however, clouds where to look to relieve the uncer- tainty, ambiguity in prediction clouds how to prepare for the outcome, and ambiguity of response to actions clouds the ability to learn from the choices made. When the rule does not perform well,enactment and cognitive dissonance may drive the individual, support- ive colleagues and organizations to continue using the rule despite its failure. Reason (1990) described this as the ‘strong-but-wrong’ rule.The application of discrete concepts to ambiguous situations is problematic, much as the difficulties that exist between discrete concepts and continuous perceptions (Weick, 2011). Ambiguity prevents us from making a direct link between our actions and results.We cannot fully attrib- ute success to a specific intervention, a problem that hinders learning. In the same way, we may continue to Ambiguity 49 Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 23 Number 2 June 2015© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- 4. fail without being able to identify the cause of our failure or the flaw in our reasoning. When people identify themselves as highly expert and experienced, they risk the effects of cognitive dis- sonance – the painful inconsistency that forms between reality and the person’s self perception. The logical response, in their mind, is to believe their own percep- tion over reality (Tavris & Aronson, 2008).The nature of ambiguity enables the individual to select information supporting their perception while furthering their iden- tity. Cognitive dissonance, reinforced by ambiguity, makes some people resistant to reality. The dynamic, multifaceted event, rich with paradoxi- cal meanings, contributes to errors and disagreement, confounding efforts to explain the cause of actions. In the causation–action–justification linkage, causation is hidden and justification is suspect.Ambiguity allows the selection of information that,retrospectively,supports a particular view and we can see how easy it is to commit an error, criticize others or blame the individual.This is related to the availability heuristic and confirmation bias, along with individual prejudices and attitudes. Another way to use ambiguity in a positive sense is to assume ‘People in these situations do the right thing; they do what I would do.’ This drives us to look at the circumstances from the individual’s perspective with the goal of understanding what would cause the person to act in the manner they did.This begins a search for signals and meaning from the environment that would drive specific actions, opening up new possibilities of understanding. The papers in this Special Issue can be assembled and considered in multiple ways. At the risk of oversimpli- fying, I have placed them in an order that emphasizes a discussion of ambiguity followed by responses to ambi- guity and finally the role of organizations in handling ambiguity. My co-author (Thomas A. Mercer, RAdm, USN, retired) and I write about ambiguity as experienced while creating new programmes (van Stralen & Mercer, 2015).RAdm Mercer describes his experience assuming command of the US Navy aircraft carrier Carl Vinson with the ambiguity of a novel communication system. Karlene Roberts, from the University of California, Berkeley, studied his command philosophy and the crew’s performance in her work on High Reliability Organizing (Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1987) and my experience in a paediatric intensive care unit (Roberts, Madsen, Desai, & van Stralen, 2005). Our article describes the effect ambiguity has, at the levels of the individual and leader, on creation of our respective programs. John Carroll (2015) focuses on functional types of ambiguity and their effect on safety. Fundamental ambi- guity is experienced as the lack of categories; causal ambiguity is from cause–effect relationships; and role ambiguity of who is accountable.This is what people face when they stand alone at the beginning of a crisis and to what the organization responds.Weak signals of unsafe practices tend to be ambiguous and easy to ignore.As in Wolfberg’s mystery-solving and full spectrum analysis, we do not know what information may be relevant. Carroll describes the effect of information entropy on bad news as it is reframed to become less threatening and also less meaningful and less urgent. More success- ful strategies involve seeking multiple perspective and innovative suggestions, which contributes to learning by doing. Bea (2015) creates a typology of ambiguity and uncertainty for assessment and management. He iden- tifies ambiguity inherent to the system, Intrinsic Uncer- tainty, comprising a natural part of the environment or the result of analytical modelling. Ambiguities from outside the environment, Extrinsic Uncertainty, arise from human and organizational test performance or the development and utilization of information. Engineering approaches do not address extrinsic uncertainties where high reliability leadership and management have greater importance. Proactive management requires anticipation and a robust system that can tolerate the damage and defects of the adverse effects from extrin- sic uncertainties. Reactive assessment management relies on the premise that systems can fill in the goals to minimize consequences of failures. Engagement, a nec- essary component of working with ambiguity, occurs through interactive assessment and management func- tions, a form of real-time crisis management. Because ambiguity cannot be reduced to zero, the management of ambiguity is a continuous process,a constant struggle to make sense of what is happening to a complex system. Barton et al. (2015) studied how wildland firefighters reduce ambiguity with improved sensemaking and lead- ership.This is enabled by a two pronged set of practices enacted by leaders and frontline workers that includes actively searching for discrepancies and actively seeking diverse perspectives.Wildland fire culture accepts real- time experimentation and improvisation. The authors’ use of Bertrand Russell’s concept of ‘Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description’ to explain leadership in dynamic states is of good use and long overdue for complex organizations that rely on highly experienced personnel. The closer one comes to the event, the greater the influence of ambiguity. The authors’ clear explanation of anomalizing and proactive leader sensemaking can easily translate to other industries. Flin and Fruhen (2015) defined ambiguity more broadly to encompass vague probabilities and lack of clarity. They focus on senior managers and ambiguous threat with problem solving as a management behav- iour. Flin and Fruhen’s description of problem solving as 50 Daved van Stralen Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 23 Number 2 June 2015 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- 5. a behavior is similar to the principle of engagement and Wolfberg’s mystery-solving and full spectrum analysis. This correlates closely to emergency responders who routinely encounter novel situations, which may explain the insightful conclusion that, with problem-solving strategies, managers ‘gain a closer estimate of the risks they are dealing with’.This point will benefit any discus- sion of how to create a safety culture.The concept that calm is a source of chronic unease in operators is very real,not because operators want to act,but because the calm may be due to missing an early herald of failure. Chronic unease in managers influences how they react with subordinates, but it also presents the opportunity to model behaviour and thinking for ambiguity. Con- flicted decision-making, from Janis and Mann, is a most useful explanation of the response to uncertainty and ambiguity under stress, including many of my experi- ences that became an integral part of what I taught for emergency management. Meshkati and Khashe (2015) used the US Airways Hudson River landing and the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station earthquake response to show how ambi- guity can act as a source of resilience through improvi- sation. In each of these situations the operators remained engaged to enact a response that lessened the damage that could have occurred.To do this,people had to move from routine operations to non-routine,emer- gency operations quickly and with minimal discussion among themselves. Using Rasmussen’s skill-based, role- based, and knowledge-based framework, they demon- strate that independent,thinking people are the last line of defense in a high risk, ambiguous situation. Woods et al. (2015) discussed how organization managers discount safety metrics and information when faced with uncertainty and ambiguity.With several real- life examples, they show that the deficit in ability for an organization to assess incoming evidence of vulnerabil- ity can be measured.Their Q4-Balance framework pro- vides the analytic individual basis to assess balance and imbalance across the four classes that are formed.Safety energy comes from this framework; it looks at how the organization consumes its ‘energy’, which is expertise, time and networking activities for safety personnel. Safety energy is a dynamic quantity expanding or con- tracting in the face of the organization’s reaction to ever-changing goals and conditions of operation. Vidal (2015) approaches ambiguity from the three stances of Thorngate (1976): simplicity, generality and accuracy.We can have any two but not all three.Vidal explains our choices with metaphors of the engineer, the craftsman and the gardener.The engineer metaphor (simple and accurate, local therefore not general) underscores our discussion of uncertainty with use of delegation of authority,protocol,and collection of facts. The craftsman (simple and general, ambiguous there- fore not accurate) aims for causation and uses creativity to shape the world.The gardener (general and accurate, complex therefore not simple) can only respond to a limited number of things,‘a figure who takes action on the little things under his control, without expecting to control nature, and who contemplates the beauty of a world within his comprehension’. Weick (2015) embraces ambiguity, describing that even to reduce ambiguity you must initially increase it. Ambiguity becomes a moving target and acceptance of avid unity as an expected part of the everyday marks an increase in understanding from the level of the super- ficially simple and uncertain to the complex and ambiguous. But it is through the engagement of the complex and ambiguous that we organize. Information entropy is deeply embedded in his article as the active engagement of ambiguity to create understanding, organization, and communication similar to Shannon’s statement that when we make choices in uncertainty we create information.Weick describes how we manage ambiguity through experience. This is similar to ‘You become part of the problem’, a phrase used to describe our experience as rescue ambulance paramedics in an area of high crime gang activity.We could only solve the problem by entering the crowd, but by entering the crowd we might need rescue ourselves as we change the immediate environment. Mentioned in several of the articles were the early herald and anomaly, the presence of a time course, the need for engagement or interaction, the need for creativity and improvisation, and the importance of leadership. Anomalies, small deviations, early warnings, minor perturbations and weak signals are signs that the system is not working well and bring attention to events that, if not engaged, can enlarge to cause major disruptions.Anomalies as indicators ‘have the potential to trigger re-evaluation and re-conceptualization about changing risks before serious incidents or acci- dents occur’ (Woods et al). ‘Among these emerging disconnects and contradictions lurk the weak signals, the cues indicating a hazardous condition where addi- tional scrutiny is now merited’ (Flin & Fruhen). Ambi- guity and background noise make it easy to ignore these signs (Barton et al., 2015; Carroll, 2015; Flin & Fruhen, 2015; Meshkati & Khashe, 2015; van Stralen & Mercer, 2015; Woods et al., 2015). Shannon’s formulation of information entropy finds information in uncertainty and that we gain information by the choices we make.Ambiguity, discrepancy and the creation of discrepancy force us to make choices, cre- ating information From our authors, discrepancy identifies the small deviation that may enlarge. Every experience creates discrepancies and, when we pay more attention to the seemingly subtle and insignificant, we experience more ambiguity (Weick, 2015). Discrepancy can come from Ambiguity 51 Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 23 Number 2 June 2015© 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- 6. people with different experiences or from people with the same experience but difference sensemaking. Within ‘these emerging disconnects and contradictions lurk the weak signals, the cues indicating hazardous condition where additional scrutiny is now merited’ (Flin & Fruhen, 2015). Barton et al.call the active search for discrepancy and outliers anomalizing.The leader can then reflect on the harsh realities of multiple viewpoints (Carroll, 1995, 2015; Barton et al., 2015; Bea, 2015; Flin & Fruhen, 2015; Weick, 2015). Organizations that operate effectively will simulta- neously engage different parts of the system to main- tain balance (Barton et al., 2015). Carroll (2015) describes this eloquently as ‘acting into an ambiguous situation’, capturing our feeling, as rescue ambulance men, when we approached a hostile crowd. People are involved in dynamic and continuous interaction to prevent failure and hazard; touching the boundary of loss of control is necessary during a crisis (Meshkati & Khashe, 2015). In this manner, several groups of heroic people engaged the crisis of an airplane landing on the river and a nuclear power plant severely damaged by an earthquake and tsunami. Interactive approaches, interactive assessment and management of ambiguity, is performed during the operations conducted (Bea, 2015). Safety energy reflects the resources devoted to safety-oriented indicators for proactive safety manage- ment; the purpose of proactive safety metrics is for engagement (Woods et al., 2015). The Fog of War can only be managed by engagement (van Stralen & Mercer, 2015). Weick describes how high reliability organizations increased ambiguity in the initial phase of engagement. ‘To grasp ambiguity is to comprehend it adequately.’We experience ambiguity and we do this through engage- ment,always substituting,always interrupted,and always relational.To manage ambiguity we experience ambigu- ity and even that experience, because we see it new, allows us to see new things. Innovative suggestions and learning-by-doing are significant contributors to success in ambiguous states (Carroll, 1995, 2015). Ambiguity can enable collective action by numbing potential conflicts of interest; it can trigger explora- tion and learning. In the gardener’s stance,Vidal (2015) evocatively describes engagement with the Gardener’s Stance; ‘take action on the little things under his control, without expecting to control nature, and who contemplates the beauty of a world beyond his com- prehension’ (Carroll, 1995, 2015; Barton et al., 2015; Bea, 2015; Meshkati & Khashe, 2015; van Stralen & Mercer, 2015; Vidal, 2015; Weick, 2015; Woods et al., 2015). Ambiguity, by several authors, unfolds over time and with it the context changes, which changes the meaning of observations and experience. As an unfolding sequence of events, ambiguity threatens safety and reli- ability. Reactive management approaches, the premise that systems can fail, seek to learn from near misses (Bea, 2015), events easily missed or disregarded in real time. Safety energy is a dynamic quantity that contracts or expands in the face of the organization’s reaction to ever-changing goals and conditions of operation (Barton et al., 2015; van Stralen & Mercer, 2015; Weick, 2015; Woods et al., 2015). The principle that organizations use creativity, improvisation and innovation as a response to ambigu- ity, surprised me the most about this project. Vidal (2015) describes the basis of innovation,‘Organizations are better prepared when their reservoir of ideas and actions is large enough,so that people can choose those that help them make sense of the situation at hand and recombine behaviours to improvise ad-hoc solutions’. Meshkati and Khashe (2015) write, ‘Improvisation is considered as an engine of resiliency, improvisation in safety critical situation, which inhabits ambiguous infor- mation, could result in either mitigation or prevention of catastrophic system failures’. In the heroic response to the nuclear power station damaged by an earthquake and tsunami, they add that,‘The improvised acts of the nuclear shutdown are too numerous to mention’. From Weick, ‘Interruptions and improvisations seem to go together . . . one possibility of how organizations react to ambiguity’. Flin and Fruhen (2015) write,‘The ability to imagine negative consequences is requisite imagina- tion.This is captured as flexible thinking’ (Carroll, 1995, 2015; Flin & Fruhen, 2015; Meshkati & Khashe, 2015; van Stralen & Mercer, 2015; Vidal, 2015; Weick, 2015; Woods et al., 2015). The authors who discussed leadership commonly described elements of a bottom-up approach or, at the least, transformative and supportive leaders at the top. Weick (2015) discusses the ‘group writ small’, which I think is critical as it describes the dynamics of a bottom-up approach. It supports the idea that safety and reliability are self-organizing responding to local context. ‘Empowering expert people closest to a problem and shifting leadership to people who have the answer to the problem at hand’ (Meshkati & Khashe, 2015) is central to success. Leadership in ambiguity also has a top-down element. Vidal urges caution with the Engineer’s Stance of lead- ership – ‘when lessons learned by organizations trans- late into the refinement of procedures, protocols, and the proliferation of rules’. ‘Managing uncertainty by an inflation of rules is typical of the engineer’s stance.’ Rather, successful leaders seek out diverse perspectives and discrepancy (Barton et al., 2015), engage diverse participants from inside and outside the organization to provide multiple perspectives and innovative sugges- tions that contribute to learning-by-doing (Carroll, 1995, 2015), and a shuffling of power and influence to 52 Daved van Stralen Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management Volume 23 Number 2 June 2015 © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
- 7. those who can make sense of the ambiguous situation. Only the Captain of the ship could say no, giving a bias for action to make the system work (van Stralen & Mercer, 2015). A deeper understanding of ‘only the Captain can say no’ is the Captain sees a larger picture of the events (Mercer,pers.commun.).Carroll describes the CNO who reversed the firings of two contract workers who voiced safety concerns.The CNO saw the larger picture and, by acting into ambiguity, increased not only safety in the program but transformed leader- ship in the ranks of management. Bea described the importance of corporate leader- ship: when the leaders who developed the programme retired, ‘the pipes started leaking again.’ (Barton et al., 2015; Carroll, 1995, 2015; Meshkati & Khashe, 2015; van Stralen & Mercer, 2015;Vidal, 2015;Weick, 2015). When we assume uncertainty, we assume we have missed information, that there is a correct hypothesis and outcome, and more information will bring us closer to reality. When we accept ambiguity, we accept that there are multiple interpretations, that system trajecto- ries and our conclusions will change, and that percep- tions have limited fidelity to reality. How an organization responds to ambiguity is how the organization maintains productivity, quality, resil- ience and safety in a changing, hostile and ambiguous environment. Daved van Stralen*,** *Department of Pediatrics, Loma Linda University School of Medicine, Loma Linda, CA 92350, USA. **Riverside County EMS Agency, Riverside, CA 92503, USA. E-mail: vanstralen@stratrel.com References Barton, M., Sutcliffe, K.M., Vogus, T. and DeWitt, T. (2015), ‘Performing under Uncertainty: Contextualized Engagement andWildland Firefighting’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,Volume 23, Number 2, pp. 74–83. Bea, B. 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