An efficient distributed group key management using hierarchical approach with ecdh and symmetric algorithm

Computer Engineering and Intelligent Systems www.iiste.org
ISSN 2222-1719 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2863 (Online)
Vol 3, No.7, 2012

An Efficient Distributed Group Key Management Using
Hierarchical Approach with ECDH and Symmetric Algorithm
Uday Pratap Singh*, Rajkumar Singh Rathore
Computer Science & Engineering Department, Galgotias College of Engineering and Technology
Greater Noida (UP), India
* E-mail of the corresponding author: erdev.8@gmail.com
Abstract
Ensuring secure communication in an ad hoc network is extremely challenging because of the dynamic nature of the
network and the lack of centralized management. For this reason, key management is particularly difficult to
implement in such networks. Secure group communication is an increasingly popular research area having received
much attention in recent years. Group key management is a fundamental building block for secure group
communication systems. We will present an efficient many-to-many group key management protocol in distributed
group communication. In this protocol, group members are managed in the hierarchical manner logically. Two kinds
of keys are used, asymmetric and symmetric keys. The leaf nodes in the key tree are the asymmetric keys of the
corresponding group members and all the intermediate node keys are symmetric keys assigned to each intermediate
node. For asymmetric key, a more efficient key agreement will be introduced. To calculate intermediate node keys,
members use codes assigned to each intermediate node key tree. Group members calculate intermediate node keys
rather than distributed by a sponsor member. The features of this approach are that, no keys are exchanged between
existing members at join, and only one key, the group key, is delivered to remaining members at leave.
Keywords: Elliptic Curve, Distributed Group Key Management, Hierarchical Key Management, Mobile Ad-hoc
network (MANET).

1. Introduction
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) can be used in many fields such as battlefields, airplanes, aircraft carriers
monitoring, outdoor rescue and other emergent environments without infrastructures. They are easier to be deployed
and updated than other conventional wired networks. Most of the users change their locations randomly, so the
network topology may change at any time. MANETs can meet this requirement. [1] Mobile ad hoc network
(MANET) is a low-cost solution for wireless communication because it does not require any prior investment in a
fixed infrastructure.
Recent literatures have sought to address the key management issues in MANETs. Most schemes that have been
proposed depend on certificate-based cryptography (CBC) and ID-based cryptography (IBC). In traditional
certificate-based public key cryptosystems, a user’s public key is certified with a certificate, which is issued by a
certification authority (CA). Any participant that wishes to use a public key must first verify its validity using the
corresponding certificate. The main concern with this approach is the need for public key distribution.
The concept of ID-based public key systems was introduced by Shamir in 1984. The main idea of such systems is
that each user uses his identity securing information, such as a telephone number or email address, as a public key. In
other words, the user’s public key can be determined directly from his identifying information, rather than having to
be extracted from a certificate issued by a CA. ID-based systems enable any pair of users to communicate securely
without exchanging public key certificates, without keeping a public key directory and without using the online
services of a third party. This is enabled by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG), which issues a user a private key
corresponding to each user’s identity when he first joins the network. Therefore, ID-based systems are a powerful
alternative to CA-based systems in terms of both efficiency and convenience. However, the PKG represents a single
point of failure. If the private key of the PKG is compromised, the entire system is compromised. To counter this,
Boneh and Franklin have suggested spreading the PKG private key using threshold cryptography.
In contrast to fixed networks, a centralized public key infrastructure (PKI) or a centralized certification authority is

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not feasible in ad hoc networks. Distribution of a signing key and CA functionality over multiple nodes using secret
sharing and threshold cryptography is a possible solution to this problem. However, a number of issues must first be
resolved. First, the security of the entire network is broken when a threshold number of shareholders are
compromised. Second, efficiency is greatly reduced because updating public/private keys requires each node to
individually contact a threshold number of shareholders, which represents a significant communication overhead in
large-scale MANETs. Third, shareholders joining and evicting need an efficient share update protocol to reduce the
communication costs.
Group key agreement (GKA) is another important challenge of key management in MANETs. GKA protocols allow
two or more parties to agree on a common group key and exchange information among them over an insecure
channel. A key agreement that provides mutual key authentication among parties is called an authenticated key
agreement (AKA). Authenticated group key agreement (AGKA) protocol applications proliferate in many modern
collaborative and distributed environments. As a consequence, the design of a secure and efficient protocol for group
key agreement has received much attention as a significant research area.
Group communication protocols are classified into three main categories:
(1) Centralized (one-to-many) protocols: A key server is solely responsible for managing and distributing group
key to group members.
(2) Decentralized protocols: The group is divided into multiple domains. Each domain is managed by a domain
controller which is responsible for generating the keys for that domain.
(3) Distributed (many-to-many) protocols: Instead of key server, group members collaborate with each other to
establish the group key. The responsibility of the members is equal.
This paper presents an efficient many-to-many group key management protocol in distributed group communication.
In this protocol, group members will be managed in the hierarchical manner logically. Two kinds of keys will be used,
asymmetric and symmetric keys. The leaf nodes in the key tree are the asymmetric keys of the corresponding group
members and all the intermediate node keys are symmetric keys assigned to each intermediate node. For asymmetric
key, a more efficient key agreement method will be introduced in place of previously existing Diffie-Hellman
method. To calculate intermediate node keys, members will use codes assigned to each intermediate node key tree.
Group members calculate intermediate node keys rather than distributed by a sponsor member. The features of this
approach should be that, no keys are exchanged between existing members at join, and only one key, the group key,
is delivered to remaining members at leave.

This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related works. Section III and IV present our proposal.
Section V compares our proposal with other protocols. Finally, the conclusion and future work is given in
section VI.

2. Related Work
In hierarchical approaches, the members of group are mapped with the leaves of a logical binary key tree. Each
member maintains all the keys along the path from his/her leaf to the root, hereinafter called the path set. The root
key is the group key. At join/leave, all the keys in the path set need to be changed to new ones. Based on the key
management approach, the number of key generations, key encryptions, and key delivery differs. Typically, each
member maintains O(log n) keys which shows the height of the key tree where n is the number of members.
In order to establish a group key for secure distributed group communication, many approaches have been proposed.
As stated before, most of these approaches are based on different types of n-party Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol. The other approaches are based on other methods. The main purpose of these approaches is to reduce the
overhead of group key management. The fact with all of them is that the evaluation measures of these approaches are
not distinct. For example, they do not consider key generation, key encryption separately in their works. In this
section we discuss two of typical approaches in terms of efficiency in communication and computation, and
scalability.

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EDKAS [3] is very similar to OFT [4] in the sense of key structure. For each node a secret key and its corresponding
blinded key is associated. The blinded keys are computed by applying a given one-way function. Each member
generates a unique secret key for itself by a secure pseudo random number generator (PRNG). The key of an
intermediate node is computed by the blinded keys of two child nodes using Ki,j=f(g(Ki), g(Kj)) where f is a mixing
function and g is a given one-way hash function. Each member maintains his/her own secret key and all the blinded
keys of nodes that are sibling of the nodes from the path set. The drawbacks of this protocol are expensive
maintenance of secure channels between members, and expensive communication cost as well as its message size
cost.
DHSA[5] uses hierarchical key tree to manage the keys logically. In this protocol, the combination of Diffie-
Hellman key agreement and symmetric key is used. Diffie- Hellman key agreement is introduced to the leaf nodes of
the key tree where the members are assigned, and symmetric key is introduced to intermediate nodes. By considering
this approach, the re-keying cost is O(1) at join and O(log n) at leave. However, the cost of modular exponentiation
leads the protocol to delay because the protocol needs initiation after each membership change.
Our proposal, ECDHSA (Distributed Group Key Management using Hierarchical Approach with Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman and Symmetric Algorithm), uses hierarchical key tree to manage the keys logically. In this protocol,
the combination of Elliptic Curve Diffie- Hellman key agreement and symmetric key is used. ECDH[2] Key
agreement is introduced to the leaf nodes of the key tree where the members are assigned, and symmetric key is
introduced to intermediate nodes. By considering this approach, the re-keying cost is O(1) at join and O(log n) at
leave.

3. Design Principles
Now I’m going to present my efficient approach, ECDHSA, for distributed secure group communication. The
inspiration of this approach is to decrease re-keying overhead at join and leave operation of nodes. ECDHSA focuses
on member collaboration for key calculation instead of key delivery by centralized sponsor or co-distributor. For this
reason, I’m introducing three basic characteristics of ECDHSA.
(1) The leaf key in the key tree is the public key of the corresponding group member, and all intermediate node
keys are symmetric keys.
(2) The public key of each member along with binary code the corresponding parent node is stored in a list
shared by group members. This list will be updated on each membership change and from time to time.
(3) All group members have the same capability and are equally trusted and equally responsible for group key
generation.
The public key of each member is generated by Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) Key Establishment Protocol.
The operation of Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is as follows: [6, 7]
• User A and B choose a group of system parameters and make it public: (q, Fq, E, P, n):
q {p, 2m} , p is an odd prime, Fq is a prime finite field, Elliptic curve over Fq , and the points whose degree is a big
primes n: P E (Fq ) .
• User A (B) choose the random number a(b) Zn as its private-key Ka ( Kb ). A (B) calculates Qa = Ka P (Qb = Kb P)
and sends it to each other.
• User A (B) can calculates S = KaKb P with its random number and the value getting from B (A).
S = Ka ( Qb) = Kb ( Qb)
S is the shared key of A and B.
ECDHSA introduces two types of codes in its key tree:
1. Binary Code: This code will be used for member position discovery.
2. Decimal Code: This Code will be used for intermediate node key calculation.
Fig 1 illustrates a key tree with 8 members, {u1, …, u8}, and its corresponding binary code. The binary code of first

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level of each intermediate node from the bottom of the key tree, and the corresponding two member’s public key are
stored in a list. Each member uses this list to find the public key of any member whom he/she wishes to establish a
connection. As stated before, this list is updated whenever there is a membership change and is broadcasted to other
members by multicast. Usually, the sibling member of affected branch is responsible to send the updated information
to other members. Table I shows the management of binary code and its associated members public key in the list. As
shown in this table, the public keys of u1 and u2 are gx1, gx2 respectively, and their associated parent binary code is
000. Since there is no sibling member for u3, the list just shows its public key, g x3, and the associated parent binary
code, 00.
As stated before, the other code type in DHSA is decimal code. This code is used just for intermediate node keys
calculation, and is assigned to each intermediate node in the key tree. Each intermediate node key is updated by
applying one-way hash function to the bitwise XOR of that intermediate node code and the group key by the formula
below.
Keyintermediate_node=f Keygroup Codeintermediate_node
Moreover, each intermediated node code is calculated by the formula below.
Codechild_node = (Codeparent_node || Random digit).
Fig. 2 illustrates the node code management in the key tree with 8 members, {u1,…, u8}. For example, when an
intermediate node code is 04 and the generated random number is 6, the code assigned to that new node will be 046.
Finally, the number of digits in a code shows the number of nodes in the path set. In Table 3.1 the intermediate node
key computation for members {u1,…,u8} is illustrated. For example, K1,4 is calculated as f ( KG 04) .
In ECDHSA, the group key at join is sent to new member being encrypted by the shared key with his/her sibling
member. However, the current members can calculate it by applying one-way hash function to previous one. When f
is a given one way hash function, and KG is the previous group key, the new group key K’G is calculated as follows.
K’G= f (KG)
K1,4 = f (KG 04)
K5,8 = f (KG 08)
K1,2 = f (KG 042)
K5,6 = f (KG 081)
K3,4 = f (KG 046)
K7,8 = f (KG 087)

4. Detailed Design
To explain the detailed approach, consider our simple example with 8 members illustrated in Figs.1 and 2 for join
operation, and Fig. 3 for leave operation. Members decide a large prime number p and its primitive element g for
each group. Initially, this value is selected at initial mode of key tree establishment. These values are publicly known
in the group.
When a new member wants to join a group, he/she sends a hello message to discover the group members. Members,
who receive the signal of this member, look up the list to know which member does not have a sibling member. A
member who does not have a sibling member in his/her branch replies to this signal. But when each member has
his/her corresponding sibling member in his/her branch, the member with lowest parent binary ID replies to that
member. He/she exchanges the public key generated by Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Here, a
member who replies is responsible to authenticate new member. We assume that each group member is equipped
with some authentication capability [8].
Once authentication operation is completed, the public key of new member and his/her corresponding parent binary
code is stored in the list, and the updated information is multicast to existing members. Next, the current members as

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well as the new one can calculate the affected intermediate node keys by applying a given one-way hash function to
bitwise XOR of new group key and the intermediate node code.

4.1. Join Operation Of A Node
Fig. 1 illustrates a multicast group of 7 members, {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7, u8} as current members when a new
member u4 joins the group (Fig.2). Re-keying procedure at join for this example in ECDHSA is as below.
i. u4 broadcasts a hello message for member discovery.
ii. u3 who does not have a sibling node, replies this member.
iii. u3 shares a key with u4 by ECDH key agreement.
This key is gx3gx4 P.
iv. u3 downgrades his/her position from 00 to 001, updates the member discovery key by replacing the new
parent binary code and new member’s public key (Table 2).
v. u3 calculates the new intermediate node code for his parent.
Code_K3,4 = (04 || 6)= 046.
vi. u3 generates new group key as below.
K’G= f (KG) gx3gx4 P
vii. u3 sends K’G, and the new node code to u4 being encrypted by the shared key between them.
unicast
u3 (K’g,046)
viii. Existing members, {u1, u2, u3, u5, u6, u7, u8}, renew the group key as describe in step(vi)
ix. Then, the members in the affected path set calculate the affected intermediate node keys by applying
one-way hash function to bitwise XOR of intermediate node codes and the new group key.
u3, u4: K3,4= f (K’G 046)
u1, …..,u4: K1,4= f (K’G 04)
As you notice just one key is delivered to new member. This is an important feature for distributed group
communication in wireless network. Since members are mobile, in addition to dynamic join/leave, simultaneous join
may occur in such networks. In order to solve such problem, the overload of join operation must be minimized. The
features of DHSA provide this task with just one key delivery.
4.2. Leave Operation of A Node
When a member leaves a multicast group, his/her node is deleted from the key tree. The sibling member on that
branch moves to his/her parent node position. And the sibling node is also responsible to delete the leaving node
public key from the list, and to transmit updated information of the list to other members. After each leave, the group
key and some intermediate node keys need to be updated. At leave operation, the key tree has divided into some parts.
The number of these parts is equal to (log n -1) where n is the number of group members. The sibling of leaving
member generates the new group key and sends it to one of the member in each part. To do this the sibling node
checks his/her list and finds one of the available members in each part, shares a key with that member using his/her
public key and send the group key for his/her via unicast. The member who receives the group key is responsible to
multicast it to his/her branch members being encrypted with upper intermediate node which is not affected. Now the
users are able to renew the affected intermediate node key. We use a simple example to explain leave operation.
Fig.3.3 illustrates a multicast group of 8 members, {u1, u2, u3, u3, u5, u6, u7, u8} when u8 leaves the group.
i. u7 is promoted to his/her parent position.
ii. u7 updates the member discovery list by deleting the leaving node’s public key, and changes his/her parent
binary code. u7 also informs the other nodes about the updated information.
iii. u7 generates new group key K”G , by using symmetric algorithm.

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iv. u7 checks his/her list and use "Elliptic Curve" Diffie-Hellman key agreement to share a key with one of
the member in each branch. Then, it unicast new group key to each of them.
unicast
u7 u1:(K”G) K1K7
unicast
u7 u5:(K”G) K5K7
v. Now u1 and u5 multicast the received new group key K”G ,to members of their branch as follow:
multicast
u1 u2, …, u4:(K’G) K2K4
multicast
u5 u6:(K’G) K5K6
vi. Finally the members in affected path calculate the code of the affected intermediate node by the formula
below.
u5, u6, u7 : K5,7= f (K’G 08)

5. Comparison
In this section we compare and analyze our proposal with two of other distributed key management approaches
EDKAS and DHSA. The comparison metrics which are used include key generation, key encryption and
communication overhead. Key generation overhead is the number of keys generated during the join and leave
operations by the sponsor. Key encryption overhead identifies the number of encryptions on any membership change
by the sponsor and co-distributors. The last metric, key communication overhead is used to estimate the number of
messages required to transmit in group rekeying process from the sponsor and co-distributors Tables 4, 5 and 6
summarize our comparisons, focusing described metrics.
Table 4 shows the key generation overhead at join and leave operations. ECDHSA just like DHSA reduces the
number of key generation at join and leave operations to 1 because on each membership change, only the group key
is generated by the sibling member of new member, and the other necessary keys are computed by the members. This
feature results in efficiency of group key management for a group with dynamic join and leave. The key generation
overhead of EDKAS at join is larger than our approach.
Table 5 shows key encryption overhead at join and leave operations. In ECDHSA when a member joins the group,
one encryption is performed. This encryption is done based on symmetric algorithm. The number of key encryption
in DHSA is same as or protocol. The number of key encryption for EDKAS is larger than of ECDHSA that at join
and leave because in EDKAS the sponsor encrypts the necessary keys by each member’s individual key, and sends
directly to that member.
Table 6 illustrates the communication overhead at join and leave. The communication overhead for ECDHSA at join
operation is 1 because at join the sibling member of new member just communicates with that member, and delivers
the group key to that member, and the other members compute the new group key by applying one-way hash
function to previous group key.
The communication overhead of EDKAS at join/leave is larger than the others because the sponsor node
communicates with every single node to deliver the necessary keys. DHSA and ECDHSA has the same
communication overhead at leave but the key size of ECDHSA is smaller for same level of security as in DHSA with
large size of key.

6. Conclusion and Future Work

6.1 Conclusion
In this work I have proposed a new group key management approach in distributed network. This protocol is based
on logical key hierarchy. I have proposed usage of symmetric cryptosystem along with asymmetric cryptosystem.
For asymmetric key, Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement is introduced.

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At the end, we conclude our proposal with following of its contributions.
• We have used Elliptic Curve Cryptography and it provides much stronger security with smaller key size, as
shown in Table 5.
• ECDH uses scalar multiplication and performing scalar multiplication takes less time in comparison with
the modulus and exponent operation performed in previous existing DHSA method. This is the main
advantage of our approach because mobile devices have limited battery life and using ECDH for key
agreement work faster than using diffie hellman.
• In ECDHSA, intermediate node keys are calculated by group members rather than distributed by a sponsor
member.
• The features of this protocol are that, at join no keys are needed to be exchanged between existing members,
at leave only one key, the group key, is delivered to remaining members.

6.2. Future Work:
Since we have seen using Elliptic Curve Cryptography have enhanced the security level with small size of key
because it provide same level of security that RSA and DH provide with large size of keys. We have also seen that
scalar multiplication of ECDH makes it very suitable to be used for MANET because mobile devices have limited
battery life and scalar multiplication takes less time in computation. In future we can use any other efficient protocol
for Authentication purpose of new nodes.

References
Dahai DuL and Huagang Xiong, "A Dynamic Key Management Scheme for MANETs," Cross Strait Quad-Regional
Radio Science and Wireless Technology Conference 2011.
SECI, "Elliptic curve cryptography," Certicom Corp. Sep. 2000.
J. Zhang, V. Li, C. Chen, P. Tao and S. Yang, “EDKAS: An Efficient Distributed Key Agreement Scheme Using One
Way Function Trees for Dynamic Collaborative Groups,” IMACS Multiconference on CESA, Bejing, China, pp.
1215-1222, Oct. 2006, doi: 10.1109/CESA.2006.313506.
D.A. McGrew and A.T. Sherman, “Key Establishment in Large Dynamic Groups Using One-Way Function Trees,”
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING, VOL. 29/5, pp.444-458, May 2003, doi:
0.1109/TSE.2003.1199073.
S. Anahita Mortazavi, Alireza Nemaney Pour “An Efficient Distributed Group Key Management using Hierarchical
Approach with Diffie-Hellman and Symmetric Algorithm: DHSA” IEEE 2011.
Standard specifications for public key cryptography, IEEE standard,pI363,2000.
Williams Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security, Prentice Hall,4th Edition, 2006.
Y. Kim, A. Perrig and G. Tsudik, “Tree-based Group Key Agreement,”ACM Transactions on Information and System
Security (TISSEC), Vol. 7/1, Feb. 2004, pp. 60-94, doi: 10.1145/984334.984337.

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About Authors:
UDAY PRATAP SINGH
Uday Pratap Singh pursuing his M.Tech in Computer Science and Engineering from Galgotias
College Of Engineering and Technology, MahaMaya Technical University, Noida, India. He had
completed his B.Tech from SIET, Allahabad. He have two year of experience as a lecturer in a
reputed Institution. He has contributed several research papers at National/International Journals.
His area of interest includes Computer Networks, Operating System, Cryptography and Network
Security.

RAJKUMAR SINGH RATHORE
Rajkumar Singh Rathore is working as Assistant Professor in Computer Science and
Engineering Department at Galgotias College of Engg. & Technology, Greater Noida (U.P.). He
has written books on “Database Management System”, “Operating System”, “IT Infrastructure
and Its Management” and “Software Engineering”for undergraduate and postgraduate courses.
He has contributed several research papers at National/International Conferences/Journals. He is
the reviewer of many International Journals. He is the member of ISTE, CSI, IEEE, IAENG,
IACSIT, CSTA etc. His area of interest includes ITIM, Operating System, Database
Management System, Compiler Design and Software Engineering.

Table 1: List of Binary Code and Associated Members Public Key
Parent Binary Code Member Public key
000 gx1, gx2
00 gx3,
010 gx5, gx6
011 gx7, gx8

Table 2: List of Parent Binary Code and Associated Members Public Key
000 gx1, gx2
00 gx3, gx4
010 gx5, gx6
011 gx7, gx8

Table 3: Updating Member Discovery List When a member leaves the group
000 gx1, gx2
00 gx3, gx4
010 gx5, gx6
011 gx7

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Table 4: Comparison of Key Generation Overhead at Join and Leave Operations

protocols join leave
EDKAS 2 log n 2 log2 n-2
DHSA 1 1
ECDHSA 1 1

Table 5: The Comparison of Key Encryption Overhead At Join/ Leave Operations

EDKAS n n-2
DHSA 1 2log2n-2
ECDHSA 1 2log2n-2

Table 6: The Communication Overhead At Join and Leave Operations

EDKAS n-1 n-2
DHSA 1 2log2n-2
ECDHSA 1 2log2n-2

Total capital stock Income of main business Total assets
Pudong Development Bank 39.2 214.7 5730.7
Bank of China 459.4 3345.7 59876.9

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Vol 3, No.7, 2012

Figure 1. Parent binary code for member position discovery

Figure 2. Intermediate node code and corresponding node key calculation

Figure 3. Leave Operation on ECDHSA

41

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