Analysis and Evolution of SHA-1 Algorithm - Analytical Technique

International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.16, No.3, May 2024
DOI: 10.5121/ijcnc.2024.16306 89
ANALYSIS AND EVOLUTION OF SHA-1 ALGORITHM -
ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE
Malek M. Al-Nawashi1
, Obaida M. Al-hazaimeh1
, Isra S. Al-Qasrawi1
,Ashraf A.
Abu-Ein2
andMonther H. Al-Bsool1
1
Department of Information Technology, Al-Balqa Applied University, Jordan
2
Department of Electrical Engineering, Al-Balqa Applied University, Jordan
ABSTRACT
A 160-bit (20-byte) hash value, sometimes called a message digest, is generated using the SHA-1 (Secure
Hash Algorithm 1) hash function in cryptography. This value is commonly represented as 40 hexadecimal
digits. It is a Federal Information Processing Standard in the United States and was developed by the
National Security Agency. Although it has been cryptographically cracked, the technique is still in
widespread usage. In this work, we conduct a detailed and practical analysis of the SHA-1 algorithm's
theoretical elements and show how they have been implemented through the use of several different hash
configurations.
KEYWORDS
Cryptography, SHA-1, Message digest, Data integrity, Digital signature, National security agency
1. INTRODUCTION
In computing, a hash function is a procedure that accepts an input of variable length and returns
an output of fixed length, often called a "fingerprint." The index into a "HASHTABLE" is a
common application of such a function. Cryptographic hash functions are ideal for use in digital
signature schemes and message integrity verification because of their extra features. A public key
kp and a secret key ks are used in conjunction with two functions, Sign(M, ks), which generates a
signature S, and Verify (M, S, kp), which returns a BOOLEAN indicating whether or not the
given S is a valid signature for message M. Sign(M, Sign(M, ks), kp) = true for any given key pair
(ks, kp) is a necessary condition for any function to satisfy [1-7]. Conversely, it should be
unattainable to fabricate a counterfeit signature. Two sorts of forgeries can be differentiated:
Universal forgeries and Existential forgeries [8-19].In the first scenario, the attacker uses the
public key kp to generate a valid M, S pair. The attacker has no control over the message being
computed; as a result, M is often generated at random. The attacker generates a valid signature S
from the provided M and kp to establish a universal fake. Such a signature can be placed using a
public-private key cryptosystem, such as RSA [20-26]. Here, the private key pair (n, d) is used to
sign the message, while the public key pair (n, e) is used to authenticate the signature. Calculating
the private part of the RSA key scheme efficiently enough to pull off a universal forgery is
thought to be impossible. Finding an existential forgery, on the other hand, is a breeze: for any
arbitrary S, we can easily determine the matching message M by solving M = Se% n. A further
problem is that RSA can only sign messages up to a certain length; a simple but poor workaround
would be to split the message up into blocks and sign them individually. A new message with a
valid signature can be created, but an attacker can now rearrange the blocks to do so. In
conclusion, the RSA method is somewhat sluggish. These issues may be fixed by using
cryptographic hash functions. Such a hash function H, as was previously indicated, accepts a

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message of variable length as input and outputs a message digest D of defined length. A
communication's digest is now signed instead of the original message itself. It is necessary to
identify message M, given D, such that H(M) = D in order to establish an existential forgery. As
shown in Figure 1 [8, 27-31], the SHA-1 algorithm's block diagram.
Figure 1. Block diagram of SHA-1 algorithm
2. SHA-1 PROCESSES – ANALYTICAL EXAMPLE
The purpose of this section is to explain the SHA-1 algorithm and its relationship to SHA-0 and
SHA-2. Two distinct phases are discernible in each method, with the first being message
expansion, and the second being a state update transformation that is repeated for a certain
number of times (80 in SHA-1). We'll be utilizing the "and" operator, which performs a bitwise
left-to-right shift, and the "and" operator, which performs a bitwise left-to-right rotation, in the
next sections [32-34]. Messages up to 264 -1 bit in length can be fed into SHA-1, and the output
is a 160-bit message digest. The input is split into 512-bit chunks and padded using the following
method. After appending a 1, followed by zero padding until bit 448, the length of the message is
placed in the final 64 bits of the message with the most significant bits zero-padded. A sample
message and the same message with some zeros tacked to the end might collide if a 1 weren't
appended first [24, 35-37]. The sections that follow will elaborate on these aspects.
2.1. Encoding
Suppose we are using the SHA-1 algorithm to encode the word "Security". The binary
representation of the word, acquired from the code as depicted in Figure 2, is indicated in Table
1. The encoded message in binary is shown in Figure 3.
Table 1. Binary encoding for messages
Letter ASCII Binary
S 83 01010011
e 101 01100101
c 99 01100011
u 117 01110101
r 114 01110010
i 105 01101001
t 116 01110100
y 121 01111001

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Figure2. Message to binary sequence – Code
Figure3. Binary encoded message
2.2. Padding
The following approach is used to pad the input before processing it in chunks of 512 bits. After
appending a 1, followed by zero padding until bit 448, the length of the message is placed in the
final 64 bits of the message with the most significant bits zero-padded. The length of our message
is 64, therefore we add 383 zeroes to the end to make 484 and store the message length in the
final 64 bits, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure4. "Chunk" 0: 512-bits in size
2.3. Splitting
To illustrate, in Table 2 we see chunk 0 being divided into 16 words, each of which is 32 bits in
size.
Table 2. Split words
w [0] 01010011011001010110001101110101 w [8] 00000000000000000000000000000000
w [1] 01110010011010010111010001111001 w [9] 00000000000000000000000000000000
w [2] 10000000000000000000000000000000 w [10] 00000000000000000000000000000000
w [3] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [11] 00000000000000000000000000000000
w [4] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [12] 00000000000000000000000000000000
w [5] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [13] 00000000000000000000000000000000
w [6] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [14] 00000000000000000000000000000000
w [7] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [15] 00000000000000000000000001000000

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2.4. Extending
Utilize mathematical techniques based on Figure 5 and Figure 6 to elongate words into a total of
eighty words.
Figure 5. Procedure expansion Code
Figure6. Block diagram of the expansion procedures
For the sake of clarity, we've isolated the word number 16 in its entirety here:
w [16] = w [16-3] XOR w [16-8] XOR w [16-14] XOR w [16-16]
w [13] XOR w [8] =
00000000000000000000000000000000 XOR 00000000000000000000000000000000
= 00000000000000000000000000000000
(w [13] XOR w [8]) XOR w [2] =
00000000000000000000000000000000XOR10000000000000000000000000000000
= 100000000000000000000000000000000
((w [13] XOR w [8]) XORw [2]) XOR w [0] = 100000000000000000000000000000000 XOR
01010011011001010110001101110101
= 11010011011001010110001101110101
Left rotate by one= 1010011011001010110001101110101011
w [16] = 1010011011001010110001101110101011
Table 3 displays the 64 words formed after we iterated the techniques described above.

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Table 3. Generated words
w [16] 10100110110010101100011011101011 w [49] 01100010011000001000101001110111
w [17] 11100100110100101110100011110010 w [50] 11110010001001001110101001101001
w [18] 00000000000000000000000010000001 w [51] 10000110011111101011100101011011
w [19] 01001101100101011000110111010111 w [52] 01000011100100011010000110101001
w [20] 11001001101001011101000111100101 w [53] 01100001011011101000000010000000
w [21] 00000000000000000000000100000010 w [54] 01110001000000110010000000011010
w [22] 10011011001010110001101110101110 w [55] 01011110111100001010000010001111
w [23] 10010011010010111010001101001011 w [56] 10111110001101110101111111001100
w [24] 01001101100101011000111111010011 w [57] 00000011011100010011110011111011
w [25] 11111111111100111110011010111000 w [58] 10001011111110011111010000100110
w [26] 00100110100101110100011110010101 w [59] 11000110100000011001110110110100
w [27] 00000000000000000000010000001000 w [60] 00010001011111010111111101010100
w [28] 01101100101011000110111010111010 w [61] 11010010011101110011100000000101
w [29] 01001101001011101000110110101110 w [62] 10101000001000111011100001101101
w [30] 01111011110000111011001010011010 w [63] 00100111110110000111100001001100
w [31] 00110110011010100100101010000110 w [64] 11000001011101001010111100110101
w [32] 01001100111000111000100000101111 w [65] 10011110100110010110111101110100
w [33] 01011010111011100110001000001110 w [66] 00111011001010011000111101010100
w [34] 10110010101100011011100011101111 w [67] 11000001110010100001011010110101
w [35] 00000010111011000000000111100100 w [68] 01111010111011010010001100100111
w [36] 11001001100110011000110111111110 w [69] 10101101100000010010111010111101
w [37] 11011001101010010010111000010000 w [70] 01001101101110111010001000011101
w [38] 01011111001000100100111000000111 w [71] 00000001011010011000111000111110
w [39] 00100110100101110000010100010111 w [72] 10110010011101100101010011000100
w [40] 11111100100100001101110011110011 w [73] 00101101101001001101100001001100
w [41] 11110100011111111001110101110011 w [74] 01000001100010010001010000110001
w [42] 10111100001110110010100110101111 w [75] 11001110100101011100111110000000
w [43] 01100110101001001010100101100011 w [76] 11011100001011100111100010100101
w [44] 01010101000100111001100101011010 w [77] 11101011110110001000010110011010
w [45] 00111101101011011000000100101110 w [78] 10111010010111111111011111111111
w [46] 00011101010011011011101110100010 w [79] 10010001110111001000001001000001
w [47] 00111110000000010110100110001010 NULL NULL
w [48] 01111110110111101101101000111010 NULL NULL
2.5. Compression Function and Constants
The terms from Tables 2 and 3 were analyzed, and the results were then organized into four
categories (Function1, Function2, Function3, and Function4) as shown in Table 4. SHA-1
employs five 32-bit variables (A, B, C, D, and E) as the initial hash values as shown in Table 5.
These primary hash values come from the decimal parts of the square roots of prime numbers and
are used as constants.

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Table 4. Words categories – Based Functions
Function 1 Function 2
w [0] 01010011011001010110001101110101 w [20] 11001001101001011101000111100101
w [1] 01110010011010010111010001111001 w [21] 00000000000000000000000100000010
w [2] 10000000000000000000000000000000 w [22] 10011011001010110001101110101110
w [3] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [23] 10010011010010111010001101001011
w [4] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [24] 01001101100101011000111111010011
w [5] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [25] 11111111111100111110011010111000
w [6] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [26] 00100110100101110100011110010101
w [7] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [27] 00000000000000000000010000001000
w [8] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [28] 01101100101011000110111010111010
w [9] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [29] 01001101001011101000110110101110
w [10] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [30] 01111011110000111011001010011010
w [11] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [31] 00110110011010100100101010000110
w [12] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [32] 01001100111000111000100000101111
w [13] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [33] 01011010111011100110001000001110
w [14] 00000000000000000000000000000000 w [34] 10110010101100011011100011101111
w [15] 00000000000000000000000001000000 w [35] 00000010111011000000000111100100
w [16] 10100110110010101100011011101011 w [36] 11001001100110011000110111111110
w [17] 11100100110100101110100011110010 w [37] 11011001101010010010111000010000
w [18] 00000000000000000000000010000001 w [38] 01011111001000100100111000000111
w [19] 01001101100101011000110111010111 w [39] 00100110100101110000010100010111
Function 3 Function 4
w [40] 11111100100100001101110011110011 w [60] 00010001011111010111111101010100
w [41] 11110100011111111001110101110011 w [61] 11010010011101110011100000000101
w [42] 10111100001110110010100110101111 w [62] 10101000001000111011100001101101
w [43] 01100110101001001010100101100011 w [63] 00100111110110000111100001001100
w [44] 01010101000100111001100101011010 w [64] 11000001011101001010111100110101
w [45] 00111101101011011000000100101110 w [65] 10011110100110010110111101110100
w [46] 00011101010011011011101110100010 w [66] 00111011001010011000111101010100
w [47] 00111110000000010110100110001010 w [67] 11000001110010100001011010110101
w [48] 01111110110111101101101000111010 w [68] 01111010111011010010001100100111
w [49] 01100010011000001000101001110111 w [69] 10101101100000010010111010111101
w [50] 11110010001001001110101001101001 w [70] 01001101101110111010001000011101
w [51] 10000110011111101011100101011011 w [71] 00000001011010011000111000111110
w [52] 01000011100100011010000110101001 w [72] 10110010011101100101010011000100
w [53] 01100001011011101000000010000000 w [73] 00101101101001001101100001001100
w [54] 01110001000000110010000000011010 w [74] 01000001100010010001010000110001
w [55] 01011110111100001010000010001111 w [75] 11001110100101011100111110000000
w [56] 10111110001101110101111111001100 w [76] 11011100001011100111100010100101
w [57] 00000011011100010011110011111011 w [77] 11101011110110001000010110011010
w [58] 10001011111110011111010000100110 w [78] 10111010010111111111011111111111
w [59] 11000110100000011001110110110100 w [79] 10010001110111001000001001000001
Table 5. Words categories
h0 01100111010001010010001100000001
h1 11101111110011011010101110001001
h2 10011000101110101101110011111110
h3 00010000001100100101010001110110
h4 11000011110100101110000111110000

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Each 512-bit block is compressed using SHA-1's compression algorithm. There are a total of 80
iterations in the compression process, each of which operates on a single 32-bit word of the
message's schedule. Figure 7 depicts the actions that must be carried out for each round.
Figure 7. Compression algorithm
A logical operation is chosen from Function-1, Function-2, Function-3, or Function-4 depending
on the rounded value as illustrated in Table 6. Then the selected function is applied to the current
32-bit word, together with additional variables and constants, utilizing bitwise AND, OR, XOR,
and NOT operations. Finally, the result of the logical operation and the current word are used to
modify the five hash variables (A, B, C, D, and E).The SHA-1 round operation is illustrated in
Figure 8 [38-40]. To clarify, in this paper we will provide a thorough explanation of the first
element of the word, denoted as word [0], in the subsequent steps (Algorithm-1):
Table 6. Function determination
Function-1 Function-2
F1=([B] AND [C]) OR ([!B] AND [D])
K1= Constant Factor
K1= 011010100000100111100110011001
F2= [B] XOR [C] XOR [D]
K2= Constant Factor
K2=
01101110110110011110101110100001
Function-3 Function-4
F3= ([B] AND [C]) OR ([B] AND [D]) OR ([C]
AND [D])
K3= Constant Factor
K3=01101110110110011110101110100001
F4= [B] XOR [C] XOR [D]
K4= Constant Factor
K4=11001010011000101100000111010110
Figure 8. SHA-1 round operation

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Algorithm-1 - Steps Action
Step 1: Setup of hashing variables.
Set A=h0 = 01100111010001010010001100000001
Set B=h1 = 11101111110011011010101110001001
Set C=h2 = 10011000101110101101110011111110
Set D=h3 = 00010000001100100101010001110110
Set E=h4 = 11000011110100101110000111110000
Step 2: Function selection word[0] belong to Function-1 as shown in Table 4
Step 3:
Get the truth table value for
Function-1.
F1= (B AND C) OR (! B AND D)
B =11101111110011011010101110001001
C =10011000101110101101110011111110
!B =00010000001100100101010001110110
D =00010000001100100101010001110110
F1 =10011000101110101101110011111110
Step 4:
Calculate Temp:
Temp = ( ALrot 5 ) + F + E
+ K + Current word
[Lrot = Insert the first five
bits last]
A=01100111010001010010001100000001
(A Lrot 5) =
11101000101001000110000000101100
F= 10011000101110101101110011111110
E= 11000011110100101110000111110000
K1= 01011010100000100111100110011001
w [0]=01010011011001010110001101110101
Temp= 1011110011000110011111110000101000
Step 5:
Update the hash variables.
E = D
D = C
C = B Lrot 30
B = A
A = Temp
A = 11110011000110011111110000101000
B = 01100111010001010010001100000001
C = 01111011111100110110101011100010
D = 10011000101110101101110011111110
E = 00010000001100100101010001110110
Step 6:
A total of 79 times, iterate
Steps 1 through 5.
For (inti=0; i<=79; i++)
Step 7:
Update the constant
variables.
h0 = h0old + A
h1 = h1old + B
h2 = h2old + C
h3 = h3old + D
h4 = h4old + E
h0=4066173368
=11110010010111001110000110111000 =
(F25CE1B8)HEX
h1=2744761734
=10100011100110011011110110000110 =
(A399BD86) HEX
h2=0564491303
=00100001101001010111010000100111 =
(21A57427) HEX
h3=2717923764
=10100010000000000011100110110100 =
(A20039B4) HEX
h4=2973316571
=10110001001110010011010111011011 =
(B13935DB)HEX
Step 8:
Message Digest = Hash
(Security) = h0h1h2h3h4
Message Digest (Output) =
f25ce1b8a399bd8621a57427a20039b4b13935db
As previously stated in this document, the hash function receives an input and generates a 160-bit
(20-byte) hash value, also referred to as a message digest. The resulting value, represented in
hexadecimal as "f25ce1b8a399bd8621a57427a20039b4b13935db" is equivalent to 160 bits.

97
3. EVALUATION
The SHA-1 hash method was long thought to be impenetrable, however it has since been found to
be vulnerable to a number of attacks. It is possible to identify two different messages that
generate the same hash result, which is SHA-1's fundamental vulnerability. As shown in Table 7,
this can be used in a variety of attacks [31].
Table 7. SHA-1 attacks
Attack Description
Birthday
Attack
The birthday attack is a form of collision attack where an
attacker tries to identify two different messages that produce
the same hash value. A birthday attack on SHA-1 only
requires 280 calculations, which is well within the capabilities
of today's computers [6, 31].
Man-in-
the-
Middle
A man-in-the-middle attack is one in which a third party
eavesdrops on a conversation between two others and
modifies the information being exchanged. It is difficult to
detect tampered data when using SHA-1 since an attacker can
generate a fake message with the same hash value as the
original [36, 37].
Certificat
e Forgery
Digital certificates use SHA-1 to ensure that a website or
service is legitimate. Collision attacks, however, allow an
adversary to forge a certificate that has an identical hash value
to a legal certificate [33, 40].
Substitutes for SHA-1, Stronger hash algorithms, such as SHA-2 and SHA-3, are recommended
in place of SHA-1 because of its flaws. Table 8 shows comparisons between different SHA
families. The SHA-2 family of hash algorithms generates hash values of varying lengths, from
256 bits to 384 bits to 512 bits. The successor to SHA-1, SHA-2 is often regarded as more secure.
NIST developed SHA-3 in 2015, which is a more recent hash function that generates hash values
in a different way than SHA-2 [41-43].

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Table 8. The SHA family comparison
Algorithm
Bit
output
size
In-state
bit size
Bit-size
block
Rounds Operations
Initially
released
Reference
SHA-0
160
160
(5 × 32)
512 80
XOR, OR,
AND
(MOD 232
)
ADD, LROT
1993 [40]
SHA-1 1995 [6]
S
H
A-
2
SHA-224 224
256
(8 × 32)
512 64
XOR, OR,
AND
(MOD 232
)
ADD, LROT
2004
[27]
SHA-256 256 2001
SHA-384 384
512
(8 × 64)
1024 80
SHR, XOR,
OR, AND
(MOD 264
)
ADD, LROT
2001
SHA-512 512 2001
SHA-
512/224
224
2012
SHA-
512/256
256
S
H
A-
3
SHA3-
224
224
1600
(5 × 5 ×
64)
1152
24
XOR, ROT,
NOT, AND
2015 [3, 41-45]
SHA3-
256
256 1088
SHA3-
384
384 832
SHA3-
512
512 576
4. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
This paper aims to elucidate the theory of the SHA-1 algorithm, progressing from basic to
advanced concepts. Our goal is to provide a practical explanation of basic mathematics and the
implementation of the SHA-1 algorithm in real-world systems. Understanding this cryptographic
algorithm enables comprehension of its advantages and disadvantages, facilitating the
modernization and development of more efficient cryptographic algorithms.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Authors declare no conflicts of interest. There is no financial interest and all co-authors have seen
and approved the manuscript.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Everyone involved in the process, from the writers to the editors and anonymous reviewers,
deserves credit for the work that went into this manuscript.

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AUTHORS
Malek M. Al-Nawashi is a Lecturer in the Department of Computer Science and
Information Technology at AL-BALQA Applied University, Jordan. He has completed
his Ph.D. Degree at University of Salford Manchester in Computer Science in 2019. His
main research interests are image processing and machine learning. He can be contacted
at email: nawashi@bau.edu.jo.
Obaida M. Al-Hazaimeh earned a BSc in Computer Science from Jordan's Applied
Science University in 2004 and an MSc in Computer Science from Malaysia's University
Science Malaysia in 2006. In 2010, he earned a Ph.D. Degree in Network Security
(Cryptography) from Malaysia. He is a Full Professor at AL-BALQA Applied
University's department of computer science and information technology. Cryptology,
image processing, machine learning, and chaos theory are among his primary research
interests. He has published around 52 papers in international refereed publications as an author or co-
author. He can be contacted at email: dr_obaida@bau.edu.jo.
Isra S. Al-Qasrawi received the BSc Degree in Computer Science from AL-BALQA Applied University,
Jordan in 2004, the MSc in Computer Science from YARMOUK University, Jordan in 2009, she earned a
Ph.D. Degree in Business Intelligence from The World Islamic Sciences and Education University. She is
working as lecturer in AL-BALQA Applied University department of Information Technology. She can be
contacted at email: israonnet@bau.edu.jo
Ashraf A. Abu-Ein is a Full Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering. He
has completed his Ph.D. Degree at National Technical University of Ukraine in 2007.
Now, he is a lecturer at AL-BALQA Applied University, Jordan. He can be contacted at
email:ashraf.abuain@bau.edu.jo
Monther H. Al-Bsool received the BSc Degree in Computer Engineering from Jordan
University of Science and Technology in 1998, the MSc in Computer Information
Systems from Arab Academy for Financial and banking science, Jordan in 2004. . He is
working as lecturer in AL-BALQA Applied University department of Information
Technology. He can be contacted at email: monther.bsool@bau.edu.jo

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