Managing an Article V Constitutional Convention: The Con-Con

A Collection of Issue Briefs
Prepared in the Public Interest
By Sherman Institute
On The Cover: A standard sentence diagram of Article V of the United States
Constitution, as prepared by Dr. Karen Ruff, Dean of English for Sherman
Institute. Poster sized, glossy, suitable-for-framing copies of this diagram are
available. E-mail (k.ruff@shermaninstitute.org) for details. Becoming a “lost
art,” sentence analytics is essential to understanding the meaning of many of the
more complex (or compound, or both) sentences as contained in this
Constitution. Dr. Ruff teaches these skills at Sherman Institute, and her efforts
at parsing the English on Article V is also included in this document.
2014 marks the 225 Anniversary of the ratification of theth
Constitution. Ironic – just as so many people are
rediscovering the wisdom and content of this document, which
has preserved liberty for six generations, there is an opposite
movement afoot to destroy it. This book collects and presents
information to our generation about that movement toward
destruction, and what we can (and must) do to preserve,
protect, and defend this Constitution from all enemies – both
foreign and domestic.

Table of Contents
Introduction (Aaron Bolinger). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (3)
A Brief Synopsis (Aaron Bolinger). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5)
Model "COS" Resolution (Citizens for Self-Governance) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (10)
The Question of An Article V Constitutional Convention (David Whitney, D.D.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (11)
The Constitution (Article V) According to English (Karen Ruff, D.A.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (13)
Rebuttal to Goldwater Institute "Fact Sheet" (Aaron Bolinger).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (20)
Enforcement, Not Amendment, Is The Answer (Edwin Vieira, Jr., J.D., L.L.D). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (40)
Prudent Fear of the Unknown is No "Fallacy" (Dr. Edwin Vieira). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (45)
The Effort to Dismantle our Constitution (Jackie Patru) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (48)
On the Need to Pass State Resolutions to Rescind Previous Applications to Congress for a Constitutional
Convention (National Veterans Committee for Constitutional Affairs [NVCCA] Issue Brief). . . . . . (53)
Model State Resolution .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (54)
Legacy Document Collection
Con Con Q & A (Liberty Lobby, 1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (63)
American Legion Resolution (1987) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (75)
Testimony of Walter Dellinger Prof. of Law, Duke University (1985).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (78)
Statement of Warren Burger, Former Chief Justice (1987).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (95)
Quotes from "A New Constitution Now". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (96)
Letter to State Representatives (Marshall Peters)(1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (101)
New States Constitution (Model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (103)
Eagle Forum Articles
Good Advice About a Con Con (Phyllis Schlafly) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (121)
A warning about things to come (Phyllis Schlafly) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (122)
New American Magazine Articles
Article V: Con-Con or Nothing is the Cry of This Cause Célèbre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (123)
In Defense of Con-Con, Meckler Chooses Ridicule Over Rebuttal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (125)
Socialists & Soros Fight for Article V Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (128)
Appendices
Historical Evidence of Budget Balancing Provisions (NVCCA Issue Brief). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (131)
US Senate Accountability Issue Brief (NVCCA Issue Brief). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (140)

Introduction
or: If I Could Change the Constitution
By: Aaron Bolinger, Co-Founder, Sherman Institute
This brief was prepared to answer basic questions about the wisdom of opening a “Conference of States”
or “Convention of States” or any such otherwise titled meeting or assembly of delegates OFFICIALLY called1
for the purpose of “amending” or otherwise tampering with the Constitution of the United States under any
pretext whatsoever.
This document was prepared primarily for the use of citizen-action groups, and duly elected members of
state legislative assemblies, so that they better understand the full scope of the ramifications of an Article V
event; and to bring to light the hidden agendas of many of the groups that are, in the 21 Century and withinst
recent memory, promoting the notion of opening the first such convention since 1787.
Many people, across the full spectrum of political ideologue, have said to themselves, “if I could change
the Constitution, I would (insert notion here).” Personally, I have my own shopping list of ideas on ways to
improve on the Founding Father’s design. In general, they did a remarkable job. If they missed anything, it was
truly a case of nailing shut any room for a few of the nutty notions that have came about since the “great war”
(Civil), and during that time when there was arguably no legitimate Congress even functioning, due to the
absence of a quorum (many states were missing).
But aside from my own shopping list, which in this dialog, over time, I shall contribute, there is a
big-ole’ brew-ha-ha coming down the pike. Since I started paying attention, about 1981, we have seen this same
story about one good shot per decade. The big notion does not concern how we might draft a single (or several)
constitutional amendment(s) under the Article V process that has occurred for each change we now see in that
group of existing amendments. Nope, this idea is for a full blown, hold your breath, Constitutional Convention
— the other mechanism for change provided for in Article V.
The federal Constitution was drafted in 1787 when 55 men assembled and worked from May 14 until
September 17 (four solid months +three days) doing what they were absolutely told NOT to do. Their mission
statement, coming on direct orders of the states that sent them as delegates, was to “revise the Articles of
Confederation.” Instead, they set about to completely rewrite the framework of government into something
much more “national” than had ever been contemplated.
That is why I used the phrase “hold your breath” — because once again the calls for an Article V
convention are upon us, and one particular legislator, the President of the Indiana state senate, has called a
meeting for December 7, 2013, in Mount Vernon, Virginia, with other state legislators, “to set up the rules to be
followed if and when a constitutional convention is called.”
Check, one-two. Is this microphone working? We’ve tried that before, Senator (David) Long. It didn’t
work.
In a nation where about 90% of everything that transpires either politically or in our legal system occurs
based on the previous precedents established, by what stroke of genius do you believe that any convention,
called for any reason, is going to constrain itself to any rules you or even (heaven forbid) the Pope decreed? A
convention is, was the last time, and ever will be, a political nightmare. It is a SOVEREIGN assembly. Look
that word up, if you don’t get it. The sovereign is bound by no underlings beneath it. And a convention,
comprised of our 50 states (or any collection thereof that decide to attend the party), can, and will, do what it
bloody-well pleases.
“Officially” is defined as an event called under the guidelines of Article V of the1
Constitution for the united States of America. Such event can only happen by a petition to
Congress from the requisite number of state legislatures under the terms of Article V, which is
explained succinctly herein.
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I like the analogy given by an astute veteran, probably in 1985 if memory serves, where he spoke of
going to the ballpark for “the specific and exclusive purpose” of buying a hot dog. If a game broke out while he
was there, he promised the wife he would leave immediately.
This analogy is perfect for the notion of a constitutional convention. If your wife (the state that sent you)
sets limits on YOUR conduct, then you have two choices — obey her and leave, or ignore her and stay put. If
you obey, the game will still go on, with or with out you. By leaving, you only resign what input you may have
contributed — but the game still gets played.
Unfortunately, when the stakes are the Constitution — ALL OF IT — those are some pretty high stakes
to be playing with.
You see, it really doesn’t matter what the promoters of a convention CLAIM to be their reason for
calling one. Some want a “Balanced Budget Amendment” or “Term Limits” or a “Line Item Veto” or another
possible dozen mainstream ideas. Other prospects, from the full spectrum, are going to be much more radical
than even those. The fact is, everyone present will come in with their own preconceived notions, their own pet
projects, their own financial backers to look after, their own state’s interests to cater to, their own political
ambitions, axes to grind, or whatever.
But there is an even darker cloud on the horizon for liberty, should a convention happen in modern
times. In fact, it amounts to more than a single cloud. The prospect of a convention in the current temper of
both America and the world is to political science what a single cloud is to a hurricane. Or what a jackhammer
is compared to a 9.0 earthquake; or what a normal wave in San Diego is compared to an Indian Ocean tsunami.
Have you heard? There is an entirely NEW constitution that has been drafted by the global elite. It
creates new branches of government at the national level, and reduces every single right to a merely revocable
“privilege.” So much for freedom.
And the only way this NEW constitution could possibly come to fruition is in an open, Article V
convention. It would never make it through the traditional amendment process.
With normal amendments, every notion — every syllable of a change — gets scrutinized closely, and
has the opportunity to be debated in all states. It must first pass muster in Congress. Then it must be ratified by
a super-majority of the states. There be no such formula for the product of a convention. The entire constitution
is opened up for surgery, and the ratification process can become whatever its CREATORS deem salutary. Just
like the original convention changed its own document’s ratification process, so too would we expect the same
in such an event today.
The dangers of a convention have been well documented. Certainly this new push for such a once-or
maybe-twice-in-world-history event need not lead me to rehash all these realities. [Note: this document contains
many of those ancillary, and legacy reports.]
I will agree with the notion of changing the Constitution (so long as they are valid, corrective models) —
but even then only to the extent that any and all proposed changes, one at a time, submit themselves to the
tried-and-true Amendment process of Article V. In fact, if anyone cares to ask, I would gladly draft up a few
proposals to fix Washington run amok. I will also review anything of interest, to see if it is more smoke and
mirrors, or would actually do what proponents might assert.
Here’s the bigger problem, however. With a now 200 year history of IGNORING much of the existing
Constitution, of what benefit will be EITHER a Convention, or one or more amendments? Until we put people
into office that will honor their oath to it, no amendment, rule, or even tar/feather punishment clauses, will carry
much weight.
Note also that (unfortunately) seriously-concerned, well-intentioned people (principally Tea Party Patriot
groups) are now being sucked in, used, and manipulated into the bait & switch. (The “bait” is a “balanced
budget” or other beneficial outcome, but the “switch” is the convention itself, detrimental to everything we
uphold.) One of the founders of the Tea Party Patriots (Mark Meckler) is now a Founder of the so-called
“Citizens for Self-Governance” group promoting the Con con. As such, pro Con-Con materials are being piped
out to local Tea Party groups, pushing for their “convention of states.” Don’t be sucked into the wrong side of
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the debate. Political Science practitioners look for the hidden links between things to underscore the warfare
present. Here’s the link:
A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF A PROPOSAL BY “Citizens for Self Governance”
(and a Counter-Proposal)
By Aaron Bolinger
There are two competing ideas concerning
opening a modern-day constitutional convention:
One says that it is “necessary;” the other says “No.”
There are many ways to articulate both
sentiments, with 1000 ideas going around in various
activist groups about such an event. Arguments on
both sides have their merits, with contributions to
the dialog coming from the man on the street all the
way to justices of the US Supreme Court. Political
groups, veterans, tea party activists, fiscal
conservatives (and liberals), college professors,
lawyers and every other interested faction has their
opinion on any of a dozen valid questions about a
convention.
Of all the questions, one stands out: “can it
be limited to a single issue?”
In this brief we will examine two
documents: one proposed by a proponent of a
convention will get the premium attention. The
other alternative is also presented. These
documents are parallel opposites. The first includes
a model resolution put forward by a group calling
themselves “Citizens for Self Governance.” It is
targeted for state assemblies in 2014 and beyond, to
accumulate identical language from 34 states (the
constitutionally required number) that will result in
the convention.
In the handbook wherein this resolution is
found* are numerous arguments, among them
proposing that:
1. A Constitutional Convention is necessary to
fix the current evils in Washington;
2. A Constitutional Convention can be limited
to a particular agenda, wherein only those
items sought by the resolution are open for
debate; and
3. There is no danger to any other aspects of
national governance to be expected from this
Convention.
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* See: “Convention of States: A Handbook for Legislators and
Citizens” found on conventionofstates.com.
So let’s start with the resolution itself,
and analyze its own words, to see if the
arguments of the “Citizens” group (and
other Con Con proponents) pass muster
with their own rhetoric. The full text of that
resolution is reprinted following this
synopsis, so that it can be read for
verification of content.
Their primary argument, suggesting
that a convention can be limited to only the
defined parameters given by the resolutions
calling for it, is most interesting.
Suggesting such a “limiting set of
conditions” on the convention is a novel
idea. Isn’t that what the Constitution itself
was to do, set limits on Washington? I
would ask, how’s that working out? It
seems that history is replete with good
intentions going to a warm place, in a
handbasket.
Moreover, a Convention is a
sovereign entity. Though the Congress
itself may attempt to put conditions on the
convention, the fact is that the convention is
only bound by such rules to the extent that it
so desires. Broadly speaking, the
convention is an animal of its own, and will
do as it sees fit. There is no body with
oversight authority, legal standing to
constrain or attempt to constrain it, nor the
legal power requisite to enforce any rules on
its deliberations.
But beyond even that reality, the
chosen three items this “Citizens” group
seeks for the convention to address (* fiscal
restraints, limiting the “power and
jurisdiction” of the federal government, and
the imposition of term limits) are
deliberately so broad as to be, of them-
selves, completely wide open.
* See “Section 1" of the Resolution.
Anyone versed in the Constitution –
merely reading it – shows that document
has, by these three items alone, been opened
in its entirety for retrofitting.
Let’s start with the second item, to
prove the point: “Limiting the power of the
Federal Government.” To confine the
convention to merely limiting the “powers
of Congress” would still open up the
entirety of Article 1, as the powers of the
Congress are found there. Their language –
“federal government” does not even limit
the convention to merely and arguably the
worst abuser (or usurper) of powers – the
Executive Branch (found in Article II).
Limiting the power of the Judicial branch –
also part of the federal government, no
question about it – opens all of Article III
for consideration. So by using such a notion
as “limiting the power of the Federal
Government” you have already exposed
three entire Articles of the Constitution to
review.
But it gets worse. Article IV contains
the short list of “thou shalt nots” as
pertaining to the states. Now, if we remove
a federal power, guess what? Yep – you
will also and necessarily impact (and need
to change) Article IV to transfer a power
back to the states from whence it originated.
Amazing how we now have four of the six
articles already exposed, just in those two
words – “federal government.”
This “Citizens” group has absolutely
NOT chosen their words as carefully as did
the authors of the Constitution itself,
because we can drive a truck through the
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hole left by using the term “federal
government,” instead of being more
specific. And that is only one of their doors.
Their first notion, “fiscal restraints” is
equally large in scope. One look at the
Constitution reveals many locations where
“money” and “taxation” are subject of either
a power, or an existing restriction. If only
considering the “taxation” power, and if the
language of their model resolution were to
be so specific, there would still be numerous
provisions of the Constitution open for
debate. How so? With representation and
direct taxation connected (Article 1, § ,2 Cl.
3, and Art. 1 § 9, Cl. 4), any attempt to
“impose restraint” would very likely call
these provisions into question, and require
tinkering to create a new formula. And that
is just those types of taxes classified as
“direct.”
What about the “indirect” taxes –
duties, imposts and excise varieties? There
would be a whole new subject, and many
additional sections and clauses to tinker
with.
Then there is the 16 Amendment –th
that purports to enable taxes on “income”
(whatever that is) without apportionment.
As you can see, not just the
Constitution itself, but even certain existing
amendments are involved in the notion of
“fiscal” anything.
When reviewed for what the
Constitution already says, it would be
ludicrous to imagine any finer language to
restrain Washington. The problem is, none
of the three branches of government give a
whit about restraints. Their main interest,
greed, carries the day.
So how, pray tell, would
disconnecting direct taxation from
representation serve any purpose other than
to authorize Congress to tax even greater, if
the goal is to be a “balanced budget?” Basic
arithmetic says that when spending goes up,
so must taxation, if the books are to be
synchronized. Demanding a balanced
budget, when spending remains unchecked,
is merely asking for higher levels of, and
perhaps new locations on which they would
certainly impose, federal taxation of all four
varieties.
Next comes the “spending”
component. What aspects of “spending”
would be revised by this convention? The
potential is certainly only limited by the
innovative minds of conventioneers, and
necessarily encompasses every aspect of the
Constitution that authorizes the “federal
government” to appropriate for some cause.
For example, the Constitution
requires Congress to “maintain” a Navy.
Should that power be removed, in the
interest of budget balancing? What
restriction could you possibly include in
constitutional language that is not already
conditioned by Art. 1, §8, Cl. 18, that
requires all powers used by the Congress be
both “necessary and proper?” (Contrary to
popular misconception, there is nothing
“elastic” in proper construction of the
Queen’s English within that clause. These
are conditions, not elasticity.)
What about establishing and funding
the court system? The Post Offices? Where
such a deliberately broad term as “fiscal
restraints” is involved, nothing is sacred.
Their language is, in point of fact, overly
broad to the ridiculous.
Then there is another looming
congressional power – that of borrowing.
None of the model Balanced Budget
Amendments yet seen seek to cap the
endless propensity for Washington to
Page 8 of 156

attempt the impossible – borrowing us all
into prosperity. Attempting any sort of
“fiscal restraint” without addressing the
congressional power to borrow would be
idiotic. More tinkering with more clauses
would be required to accomplish this “fiscal
restraint” in any meaningful manner
whatsoever.
Further, the currently unconstitutional
transference of the power to “coin money”
to a private banking system (what Congress
did in 1913 in the creation of the Federal
Reserve) – and ipso facto the inherent
dilemma where every “dollar” in circulation
is now borrowed onto the playing field –
requires another level of intelligence to
understand the magnitude of the real
problem. That is, the mathematical
impossibility of ever balancing a federal
budget where every dollar is borrowed into
circulation, at interest.
Hence, our national debt.
Regardless of the “stimulating” effect
of inflationary paper, the principal of the
loan can never be reduced by any sinking
fund, much less the interest, under extant
circumstances.
Does this proposed convention seek
to collapse the entire economy by shutting
down the Federal Reserve? I hardly think
so – yet such would need to happen if there
is to be a restoration of interest-free,
constitutionally-mandated silver and gold
coinage, and an end to perpetual debt.
Nothing seen yet attempts to address
this specific problem. None of the model
“Balanced Budget Amendments” even
contemplate it.
By what level of imagination are we
to believe that a Convention would confront
this problem head-on, and solve it? The
model resolution does not touch it, except
with overly-broad “fiscal restraint”
language.
Only obedience to the clear, extant
language of the Constitution can address
this particular problem. (And so it is for
most other issues facing us from
Washington.) These two words that the
Constitution uses respecting the federal
power to “coin money” (Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 5)
make it clear the intent of the Constitution’s
framers. You cannot “coin” (used as a verb)
paper. Stamping silver and gold into
coinage was what made the “dollar” the
world standard. Since the retirement of the
last of these two metals, in 1964, nation
after nation has had to be bombed to compel
them to accept this paper as payment for
commodities in the world marketplace – oil,
produce, etc.
Not a word about this appears in the
“Citizens” document. But of course not.
Their intention is clearly neither to actually
address the major problems of Washington,
nor to limit a convention to any thing
substantive in particular.
CONCLUSION
The wording of their resolution
makes it plain that the entire Constitution
will be debatable under such far-reaching
“amendments” (plural used in the original),
and on such overly-broad topics, as it
suggests.
By their own language, their “model”
stands convicted of political double-speak:
On one hand, it purports to be limited, or at
least to establish limiting criteria. On the
other, the subject matter is couched in
language that is absurdly broad enough to
make the entire Constitution susceptible to
revision.
Page 9 of 156

Indeed, with a new Constitution
already written*, and based on the who’s
who of this “Citizens” group, the words of
Gore Vidal ring more clearly than ever.
There is far more to this suggested
convention than “fiscal restraint” or limiting
the power of Washington. The entire
Constitution goes on the chopping block if
this particular resolution is the foundation of
it.
By contrast, only the second model
resolution contained herein makes any sense
at all – rescind any and all existing calls for
a convention to protect the handiwork of the
Founding Fathers. Their wisdom clearly
supercedes anything the “Citizens” group
hath put forth.
* See The Emerging Constitution, by Rexford G. Tugwell,
pages 595-621
The publication of materials within this document by
diverse authors are covered under “Fair Use”
copyright terms. All works remain the property of their
authors, and may not be used otherwise without the
written permission of the author. This document is
intended for educational purposes of individuals and
state legislators considering calling an Article V
Constitutional Convention, and not for profit.
Page 10 of 156

The Question of An Article V Constitutional Convention
Pastor David Whitney
Dean of Theology at Sherman Institute.
There is a great deal of interest in an Article V Convention particularly in light of the publication of Mark
Levin’s book “Liberty Amendments.” The frustration American patriots are expressing with the growing tyranny
of Washington, D.C. is clearly warranted. The out of control actions of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
branches have reached a level unimagined even a year ago. How to curb that tyranny and return our civil
government to the bounds of the Constitution is a vitally important question.
Mark Levin’s proposal is attractive for many reasons, and the movement behind his idea is growing. The
most important question is this, is the process he proposes Constitutional? And the second question is would it
accomplish the purposes for which he sets the Liberty Amendments forward for consideration before the
American Republic?
First question, yes an Article V Amendment is constitutional.
“There are two ways of presenting amendments to the Constitution provided in that instrument. By the
first, by Congress whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem such amendments necessary: or by the
second, the same body, upon the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the States, may call a
convention for the purpose of proposing amendments. These two are the only modes in which, under
that instrument, amendments can be proposed to the Constitution. Either of these is adequate, and it was
the manifest intention of its framers to secure due consideration of any changes which might be proposed
to the fundamental law of our Government.”
Mark Levin’s proposal claims to follow this second route but with a significant difference.
Instead of applying to Congress as the text of Article V demands, his proposal would leave it in the hands of
the States without application to Congress. He would claim that the justification for this, which I think is clearly
an un-constitutional path, is the Convention of 1861 which met in Richmond, Virginia.
That argument however does not hold water. Listen to what Delegate Baldwin to that convention states,
“it was the manifest intention of its framers to secure due consideration of any changes which might
be proposed to the fundamental law of our Government. It is conceded on all hands that our action here
will amount to nothing, unless it meets the approval of Congress, and such proposals of amendment as
we shall agree upon are recommended by that body to the States for adoption. The session of the present
Congress is drawing to a close. There remain only fifteen or sixteen days during which it can transact
business. Can any one suppose that in the present state of the country, with the large number of
important measures before Congress and awaiting its action, any proposition of real importance
emanating from this Conference could be properly considered by either House in this short time? I am
assuming just now that this is a Convention which has the right, under the Constitution or by precedent,
to make such propositions. But if we do not remember, most certainly Congress will, that however
respectable this body may be, however large may be the constituency which it represents, it is, after all,
one which has no existence under, and is not recognized by the Constitution. In a recent speech in the
Senate, Judge COLLAMER, of Vermont, one of the ablest lawyers in that body, has more than intimated
a doubt whether Congress could, under the Constitution, entertain proposals of amendment presented to
it by such a body as this.”
Note the telling language, this Convention “is not recognized by the Constitution.” In other words the 1861
Convention was not an Article V Convention at all. Levin’s history lesson doesn’t teach what he claims it
teaches at all, but exactly the opposite.
In addition, there is another factor that must be considered which I believe answers the question of whether
the Liberty Amendments would actually accomplish the purpose that is claimed for them.
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A Convention is a higher law making body than a legislature. Therefore they can propose a whole new
constitution. It is not possible, as claimed, to limit a Convention once it is called. The proof is the Convention
which met in May 1787 in Philadelphia. That convention was given very specific and exacting instructions;
quoting from the Massachusetts resolution commissioning their delegates to the 1787 Convention they wrote,
“for the sole & express purpose of revising the articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress &
the several Legislatures, such alterations & provisions therein, as shall when agreed to in Congress, and
confirmed by the States….”
There was no warrant given to the delegates from Massachusetts or from any of the other participating States
to even consider a new Constitution nor to propose any new Constitution. Yet that is exactly what they did in
1787. Was what they did legal? Well, if what they did was not legal, then our 1787 Constitution would not be
legal. It is legal, however, and it demonstrates that what takes place in such a Convention cannot be limited by
anything written down by any State Legislature.
An even larger problem for such a Convention is the practical matter we face every day. If those in
Washington are not abiding by their oath of office to the current Constitution and its Amendments, why would
we think that they would abide by any new Amendments added to the existing Constitution? The solution is not
a Convention, but replacing unConstitutional office holders. But that means we must train up American voters
who understand the standards by which to choose office holders. And that’s what Sherman Institute offers,
education in the Founder’s tradition that will equip citizens with a working standard by which to choose
officials who know and will apply the ultimate standards for Law and Government.
Page 13 of 156

The Constitution According to English Article V
By Karen Ruff, D.A., Dean of English
The Roger Sherman Institute
Article V
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall
be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no
Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the First Article; and
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
The Cover of this book, is a Reed-Kellogg diagram of Article V of the Constitution for the United States. The following key applies to
the uses of colored lines in the diagram:
Black: baselines, conjunction lines, and all text
Red: one word modifiers, specifically adjectives and adverbs
Green: Prepositional Phrases
Blue: participial phrases and gerund phrases
The following conventional abbreviations are used in the diagram:
N: noun
V: verb
DO: direct object
rel pro: relative pronoun
LV: linking verb
Pro: pronoun
Pred. Adj: Predicate Adjective
The use of parenthesis where applicable indicates material that is understood in an elliptical clause or phrase.
For instruction / review of the parts of speech and word usage, contact The Roger Sherman Institute via http://shermaninstituteinfo
Page 14 of 156

The Constitution According to English: Article V
(written by Karen Ruff, D.A.)
Article V of the Constitution provides ways of making changes to the Constitution. The first is by adding
amendments, a method that has been used successfully to the point that we now have twenty seven tacked on.
(The wisdom of all of those amendments is another issue, but they were successfully created using the first
option.) The second method–holding a Constitutional Convention, ostensibly for the purpose of creating
amendments–has not been used since the original drafting of the Constitution, and our Founders urged that it
NOT be used. They knew from their own experience that a new Constitution had already been drafted (by James
Madison, referred to as the “Madison Plan” in analytical writings) before the Convention to “amend” the
Articles of Confederation even convened. Similarly a new Constitution, drafted decades ago, which abolishes
States boundaries and turns the US into 10 regions governed by an entirely new system, with new “branches” of
authority, and in conjunction with the United Nations, has already been written.2
Those who would think that
some such scheme is not the ultimate ambition of promoters of a new Article V grand event are not paying
attention to all the high-profile people who assisted in drafting the model now before us, and who are clamoring
vigorously for a modern convention.
In any case, the danger of an Article V Convention such as the “Convention of States” (that many uninformed
people are pushing for) is contained in the English language used in Article V itself. The following text, along
with the Reed-Kellogg diagram provided, parses Article V. A close study will illustrate that the Article makes
itself absolutely clear without interference of “constitutionalists,” Constitutional lawyers, judges, or politicians.
In short, the Constitution is conspicuously absent any “politics” whatsoever. The beauty of the diagram and the
parsing is simply that the English language is the English language. It knows no party; the parsing has no
agenda, there be no million dollar funding to be sure it is “interpreted “correctly, and it leaves within its clear
language a distinct shortage of any “wiggle room” for debate. It says what it says, and amazingly enough, not a
single word in Article V means anything different from what it meant over 200 years ago when it was written.
Article V is a long complex sentence. A complex sentence is merely one sentence containing one independent
clause and one or more dependent (subordinate) clauses. A “clause” is a construction consisting of a subject and
a verb. An independent clause is a complete sentence that can stand alone. A subordinate clause is also a
complete sentence but is made subordinate to the independent clause with the addition of a subordinating
conjunction, a conjunctive adverb, a relative pronoun, or a relative adverb. Article V contains the independent
clause and four subordinate clauses. (Words from the Article V are in italics rather than quotation marks for
ease of reading.)
This “New States Constitution” is indeed a totally new structure for government. It has been included2
later in this document, along with additional information about the agenda of many proponents of a 21 Centuryst
Convention. Because this PDF file contains many full-page scans, it is a rather large (file size) document, and may
take a while to download, primarily based on your Internet connection speed. Be patient for the download. (Also,
you must have Adobe Acrobat reader to open this or other PDF files linked herein. Download the most recent reader
directly from Adobe.com.) While most today think the notion for a “Convention of States” is a “new idea” to fix a
broken Washington, such notion is anything but new. (Calls for a modern-day convention have been with us since the
1970's, under assorted pretexts.) This new model Constitution was drafted beginning in 1964 under the auspices of
the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, a tax-exempt foundation. With over 100 contributors, and
funded with over $2,500,000 annually during their project, their preliminary version was selectively reviewed in
1970. The final version was published in 1974 in “The Emerging Constitution” by Rexford G. Tugwell (Harper &
Row publishers). It is unconscionable to perceive that such a monumental task as drafting this new “model” would
be ignored in a modern Convention. Like Madison before, having the plan in place before opening the doors of the
convention is a tactic totally consistent with the historical record, and completely within the vision of the American
Founding Fathers, as the language of Article V bears out, and certainly does not prohibit.
Page 15 of 156

Article V begins with its independent clause: The Congress . . . shall propose amendments to this Constitution
or. . . shall call a Convention for proposing amendments. Several words of the sentence are modified. We shall
discuss them as they occur or in the most logical manner. Notice the subject of the clause is Congress, a third
person noun, which is modified by the definite article The. The word “the” is the only definite article in the
English language; when used, it identifies a specific substantive, thus carrying weight that an indefinite article
“a” or “an” will not have. (“Substantive” is simply another word for a noun, but some words that are not nouns
can function as though they were. The word “substantive” rather than simply “noun” covers any word
functioning as a noun.) The word “the” when used throughout the article has the same definite effect as
indicated here. (The noun “Congress” is specifically defined by the Constitution as the House of Representatives
combined with the United States Senate. When functioning together, these two independent assembly bodies
constitute “Congress” by the clear language of other parts of this “Constitution.” So there is no ambiguity with
noun “Congress,” and particularly when coupled with the definite article “the.” We know which one they
mean.)
The main clause contains a compound verb, both parts of which are in the future obligatory tense. The
Congress shall. . . propose amendments to this Constitution or . . . shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments. . . . The verb phrase shall propose has the direct object Amendments which is modified with an
adjective prepositional phrase to this Constitution. The prepositional phrase identifies the kind of amendments
that shall be proposed while the demonstrative pronoun this specifies which Constitution. The amendments
shall be proposed to this constitution and no other.3
Further, the plural Amendments is used, signifying that this convention would be called not just to propose a
single amendment, but for drafting an unspecified number thereof. The Convention would be left to itself to
ascertain the number, and the subject matter, comprised within them.
The word shall is also worthy of mention. When used with first person, the word simply indicates the future.
When used with second and third person, in formal usage, the meaning changes; in second person, it is likely to
be interpreted as a command. In third person, it expresses an explicit obligation. (See the footnote for detailed
explanation of “will” vs “shall.”) Thus, under certain conditions, specified in the modifying clauses and phrases,
the Congress shall propose Amendments OR shall call a Convention. Either option can be used, but each option
has its own condition for when it must be used.
The first verb phrase with its direct object contains an adverb subordinate clause linked to the verb phrase shall
propose by the adverb whenever, which is functioning as a subordinate conjunction, and means “at whatever
time.” This subordinate clause says whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary. The number
two thirds is the subject, shall deem is the future tense verb phrase with the obligatory shall as its auxiliary, and
it is the direct object of the verb phrase. Necessary is an adjective qualifying the direct object it, and whenever,
along with providing the link to the verb in the main clause, modifies the verb phrase shall deem. (Adverbs
modify verbs, adjectives and other adverbs and provide the information where, when, how, and to what extent
the action of the verb phrase will apply). The subject two thirds is modified by the prepositional phrase of
Houses, with Houses being specified by the adjective both. (As noted, both houses, when operating in a
Constitutionally-appropriate manner, constitute the Congress.)
Given that fact that our the Articles of Confederation were completely replaced by this Constitution, is it3
impossible to assume anything other than a deliberate attempt on the part of the Founders to protect this Constitution
from the same demise. The demonstrative pronouns are “this,” “that,” “these,” and “those.” The word “that” can also
function as a relative pronoun. When used in the demonstrative case, these pronouns serve to point out or specify the
antecedent. In this instance, and in the prepositional phrase modifying the word valid, the Founders specified this
Constitution.
Page 16 of 156

The second verb phrase of the main clause is shall call. It is modified with an adverb prepositional phrase that
provides the condition of such a call. The prepositional phrase on the application of two thirds of the
Legislatures of the several States is broken down into four prepositional phrases, each modifying the one before
it. Application is modified by of two thirds, which is modified by of Legislatures. The word Legislatures is
modified by the prepositional phrase of States which is modified by the definite pronoun the and the adjective
several. The coordinating conjunction or indicates that Congress can engage in either action, when the
conditions for that action are met. Note that the condition for proposing amendments is different and separate
from the condition for calling a convention.
The verb phrase shall call has the direct object Convention. Convention is modified with the prepositional
phrase for proposing amendments. For is the preposition; the object of the preposition is the gerund phrase
proposing amendments. (A gerund is the present participle of a verb which always functions as a noun. Because4
it is a “form” of a verb, it can take its own direct object.) Proposing is the gerund, and its object is the
substantive Amendments.
Thus concludes that main clause and the first subordinate clause of Article V. From this point on, the Article
consists of qualifying modifications in the form of three more subordinate clauses and numerous prepositional
phrases. The 2 dependent clause of the sentence modifies amendments, the direct object of the gerundnd
proposing. It is a relative clause, so called because the “connection” is created with the relative pronoun which.
The word which functions as the subject of the clause while referring directly back to Amendments. The verb
phrase shall be is a linking verb followed by the predicate adjective valid.5
An adjective can be modified by an adverb or an adverb phrase. Thus valid is modified by three adverb
prepositional phrases telling us “to what extent,” and “where” the amendments will be valid. The first
prepositional phrase tells us that they will be valid in either case, referring to either of the two methods for
proposing amendments. The second says they shall be valid to all intents and purposes, while the third says
Students often complain that for every rule in English, there is an exception. In many cases, that is true,4
but for those who understand grammar and syntax, English is marvelously consistent. For example, a gerund is
formed by adding -ing to the base form of a word, thereby creating the “present participle.” While the present
participle can also be an adjective or adverb modifier, whenever it forms a gerund, the gerund is ALWAYS a noun.
There are no exceptions. Thus in this sentence, “proposing,” because it is a gerund, functions as a noun. A
preposition by definition MUST have an object. Otherwise, it is simply an adjective or adverb, more often the latter.
The object of a preposition MUST be a noun, pronoun or something “acting” like a noun or pronoun such as a
gerund or infinitive, or even a noun clause.
“The traditional rules for using “shall” and “will” prescribe a highly complicated pattern for use in which5
the meanings of the forms change according to the person of the subject. In the first person, “shall” is used to
indicate simple futurity: “I shall have to buy another ticket.” In the second and third persons, the same sense of
futurity is expressed by “will”: “The comet will return in 87 years.” The use of “will” in the first person and of
“shall” in the second and third may express determination, promise, obligation, or permission, depending on the
context. Thus “I will leave tomorrow” indicates that the speaker is determined to leave; “You and she shall leave
tomorrow” is likely to be interpreted as a command. In America, however, “will” is used to express most of the
senses reserved for “shall” in British usage, and “shall” itself is restricted to first person interrogative proposals, is in
“Shall we go?” and to certain fixed expressions, such as “We shall overcome.” “Shall” is also used in a formal style
to express an explicit obligation (emph. mine) as in “Applicants shall provide a proof of residence.” . . . Many early
American writers observed the formal distinction between “shall” and “will,” and many continue to do so.
Page 17 of 156

they will be valid as Part of this Constitution. It is noteworthy that once again we have Constitution modified by
the demonstrative pronoun this.6
The adjective valid is also modified with an adverb subordinate clause telling us “when” the amendments will
be valid. The word when is the subordinate conjunction, but is also an adverb modifying have been ratified. The
reader will notice three words that appear in parenthesis in the “ratified” clause (labeled “3") on the diagram.
The clause is an elliptical construction. Elliptical clauses are used when the material that is not included is clear,
easily understood, and does not require repetition. That is, the Constitution reads . . . valid when ratified. . . .At
first glance the word ratified would seem to be a participle modifier. However, the only word it could modify is7
Amendments. Any other placement makes for a very awkward construction, but Amendments is too far away for
clarity. Thus, the most logical conclusion, beginning with Amendments is to say Amendments which shall be
valid when (they have been) ratified.
The verb phrase (have been) ratified is modified by two adverb prepositional phrases that are vitally important
in telling “how” the ratification is to take place. They can be ratified by either the Legislatures of three-fourths
of the several States or by convention in three-fourths, thereof. Notice this entire section modifies Amendments
which have been proposed at a Convention. According to the construction of the sentence, the amendments can
be ratified by the State Legislatures OR by three fourths of the Conventions. Notice the word Conventions is
plural in this clause while it is singular in the main clause. Nowhere does the Article provide details as to the
delegates at such conventions, regarding either how such delegates will be chosen or whether the Conventions
that would do the ratifying are composed of the same individuals as those in the Convention for proposing the
amendments in the first place. Nor is there any information as to how many delegates will be at such a
Since the framers specified that a Convention is only for the purpose of amending THIS Constitution, it is6
easy to assume that the Constitution itself is protected. A look at history will dispel such belief. The Amendment
process alone allows for major–and often unwise–changes to the Constitution. The Eighteenth Amendment
(Prohibition) for example, was ratified in 1919; the surge of the bootleg liquor industry soon demonstrated the
foolishness of that amendment, but it lasted until 1933 when it was finally repealed. Also, the Constitution explicitly
forbids direct taxes without apportionment, but because of the language of the 16 Amendment, many believe (inth
error) that the apportionment formula was somehow changed by virtue of the 16 . The larger issue here (forgettingth
the politics of the income tax for a moment) lies in the non-political aspects of “ratification.” Some historians argue
that certain amendments were not actually ratified properly by the requisite number of states.
Thus, while it appears on the surface that calling for a Convention for the purpose of Amendments is safe
enough, a little forward thinking would create concern. What is there to prevent an “amendment” that repeals the
First, Second, Fourth, and Tenth, for starters? What would prevent an amendment that would completely abolish the
Bill of Rights. Such does not happen under the Amendment (rather than Convention) process because those in office
have taken an oath to uphold and protect the Constitution, and because any open proposal to do away with the Bill of
Rights would be met with immediate uproar and election consequences. There is no rule saying that the delegates to
a Convention would be required to take any such oath. And in a worst case scenario, what would prevent the
delegates from creating an amendment saying that the old Constitution is null and void and is replaced with some
new creation?
The common argument is that it could not happen because the States would not ratify it. Look a little
further. The State Legislatures don’t have to do the ratifying. Congress can decide that the ratification will take place
in Conventions. And in the case of the Constitution, some of the delegates to the Federal Convention returned home
and became the ratifiers. (Verification for this is a simple matter of cross-referencing the list of the 55 original
Federal Convention delegates to those of the state ratification bodies. This material is recorded in the five-volume
set known as “Elliot’s Debates.” (Out of print, occasionally available from republishers, or in antiquarian book
auctions such as http://lawbookexchange.com ) The potential for conflict of interest is overt, and not protected
against by the words of Article V.
The words “when ratified” look and feel like a prepositional phrase, but this cannot be, because the word7
“when” is never a preposition; also “ratified” is a participle which, without auxiliaries, must function as a modifier
rather than as an object of a preposition.
Page 18 of 156

Convention, whether States will have equal suffrage as they do in the Senate, or whether representation would
be proportional. [see footnote 4]
The final dependent clause of the sentence tells us that Congress will make the decision as to which Mode of
Ratification will be used. The subordinate clause beginning with the subordinating conjunction “as” tells us that
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by Congress. The adjective one modifies the first
“understood” use of the Mode of Ratification, while the definite article and the adjective other modifies the
second use of the same. The verb phrase may be proposed is modified by the adverb prepositional phrase by the
Congress.8
Article V could end at this point, but the Founders included one additional adverb participial phrase beginning
with the word provided. The phrase sets up two conditions for how the Mode of Ratification may be proposed.
The two conditions form the compound direct object for the participle provided. The first condition is that no
Amendment, which may be made prior to the Year 1808, shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses
in the Ninth Section of the first Article. Since we are well beyond 1808, we can ignore that half of the phrase.
The second object of the participle, however, still applies: provided that no State, without its consent, shall be
deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. This final phrase is the only protection specifically detailed for the
States. Either mode of ratification can be chosen by the Congress, but neither the mode of ratification nor the
amendments to be ratified shall deprive the States of their equal representation in the Senate.9
For those attempting to apply “logic” to politics, when one considers that the sole purpose of calling a8
convention purports to be to fix fundamental flaws either with the Constitution, or some of those operating under it,
including Congress, it is somewhat beyond the realm of normal inductive reasoning or logic itself to reflect upon the
reality that one of the greatest offenders of liberty would be Constitutionally in charge of either the Convention, the
calling thereof, or of the ratification process for it. Such is indeed the case, where Article V is concerned, according
to the very precise construction of the language it contains.
This is an amazingly simple item of language, but its inclusion within Article V necessarily raises an9
entirely separate study, as there is now a need to articulate the grammatical components of the 17 Amendment toth
ascertain what, if anything, it amended as to Article V. A cursory reading of that Amendment reveals that in
function, nothing other than the mode of their selection was altered. Indeed, when that review is undertaken, it is
clear that the 17 Amendment did not repeal anything within Article V (particularly this clause), nor did it alter theth
job description of the United States Senators who are a separate “house” of the Congress as a co-equal (but
integrated) component of “federalism.”
The Senate is in place (according to other terms of Article I particularly) specifically for those legislative
functions where the states must not only be represented in this Federal Assembly, but this Senate is to perform those
aspects of legislative power where the mutual interests of the states themselves must contain a super-majority of
votes (2/3) in order that they are able to act in their Senatorial capacity (i.e., binding the states into long-term treaties,
confirming supreme Court nominees, etc.) Therefore, those who claim some “state’s rights” rationale for desiring a
modern day convention need look no further than Article V to see that the state’s power in the United States
Congress (specifically the Senate), still retains all its original constitutional powers to enforce the will of the states
collectively in the federal legislature. Indeed, any State could put on their Senators the burden of introducing any
Amendment(s) that state would proffer (consistent with the “first option” for proposing amendment(s) contained
within Article V), without risking a wide-open, Article V Convention event (option 2). And in league with other
states, Assemblies could circulate the rationale and “dear colleague” ideas encouraging other assemblies to likewise
burden their Senators to co-sponsor and support such amendment(s) as they may feel meet to whatever circumstance
is presenting itself. There is no shortage even of organizations acting as collectives of state interests, outside the
Senate itself (American Legislative Exchange Council, National Conference of State Legislatures, Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, etc.) wherein these notions for one or more Amendments could be
proffered.
Because in a modern context, however, United States Senators often act as “representatives at large” rather
than as the suffrage in the federal assembly of the states from which they are sent, a minor side-bar study located in
the appendix can provide a bit of additional insight as to a possible means of the states resolving the “representative
Page 19 of 156

In conclusion, Article V both provides details of certain requirements for a convention and omits details. Both
should be cause for inquiry and concern.
First, here is what Article V DOES tell us.
1. Congress shall propose amendments whenever two thirds of both Houses agree that it is necessary.
2. Congress must call a Convention when two thirds of the State Legislatures apply for one. The
Convention is for proposing amendments (plural) which shall be valid as part of THIS Constitution.
3. Article V allows for two different methods of ratification, the State Legislatures or three fourths of the
Conventions.
4. Congress gets to choose the Mode of Ratification.
5. The States cannot be deprived of their equal suffrage in the Senate.
Here is what Article V does NOT tell us.
1. How will the delegates to the Convention be chosen?
2. How many delegates will represent each State? Will it be equal or proportional. If it is proportional,
what will prevent smaller States from being outnumbered by States like California and New York?
3. On what criteria will Congress decide what Mode of Ratification to use?
4. While there is one phrase protecting the States, what means is provided to protect the people or to
give them any real say in the process once it has been started?
5. Amendments may be ratified by conventions, in the plural. This is not THE Convention for proposing
Amendments, but rather State Conventions to perform the ratifying. Who will prevent delegates to THE
Convention from also being delegates to the State Conventions, thereby having the ability to ratify their
own work?
6. Since Congress is ultimately in charge of both calling the Convention and of choosing the Mode of
Ratification, what is there to prevent the Convention–which will be free to set its own rules at the time
of convening–from introducing an entirely different Constitution and then having it ratified by
“Conventions,” thereby cutting the citizenry–and possibly the States–completely out of the loop?
7. While the Constitution specifies that Amendments are to be valid when added to THIS Constitution,
what is there to prevent a body of people, working behind closed doors, from creating an Amendment to
repeal the Bill of Rights, and then to also ratify that amendment as a delegate to the State Convention as
indicated above?
Finally, those who are hard at work to force Congress to call a Convention have some names of public
individuals whom they claim are in agreement. Some of those people, like Sarah Palin, and Mark Levin, are
good people who have done some good work. However, which of them can provide answers and solid
guarantees regarding the issues Article V does not address?
at large” behavioral issue, the notion of “binding” U.S. Senators to the will of their respective state Assemblies, etc.
Page 20 of 156

Is there any such thing as:
A “Limited Constitutional Convention”
or “Convention of States”
or “Conference of States,” etc.
"A rose by any other name would smell as sweet" (Shakespeare)
By Aaron Bolinger, co-Founder, the (Roger) Sherman Institute
Instructor, Advanced Parliamentary Procedure,
State & Federal Government Curricula, Constitution Studies,
U.S. & World History, Theology
The following information is in review of a
Ten-Point “Fact Sheet”
prepared by Nick Dranias,
Director, Center for Constitutional Government
at the Goldwater Institute
Wherein is presented as “fact” a series
of statements that are refuted by
ample evidences.
Page 21 of 156

The Document Under Review (Page 1)
Page 22 of 156

The Document Under Review (page 2)
Page 23 of 156

INTRODUCTION
A document floating about (Goldwater Institute, source) makes a series of statements they portend to be
“10 Facts” about a runaway Constitutional Convention. What we have here, in reality, is a collection of
unsubstantiated assertions bearing near-zero substance in constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, their assertion
that any of these alleged “facts” substantiate a claim held that a convention will not exceed some specified
constraints does not rise to the level of anything more than a collection of opinions, rubber stamped by an
“Institute” as though authentic. In the realm of Political Science, and particularly where the stakes are as high as
they are where the entire Constitution is concerned, one would think such an Institution would at least adhere to
basic principles of logic in their statements. Instead, the only rules of dialog they have adhered to within this
document seems to be the use of antithetical dialectic, and subverted logic, to prove the unprovable.
Specifically, the document is tied to general notions that in themselves are laced with glittering
generalities (statements lacking substance whatsoever), appeal to emotion (because situation x exists, “we” have
to do “something”), appeal to novelty (“hey, we discovered this, so let’s do it”), an appeal to numbers (so many
people want to do this, it MUST be ok), appeal to fear (we have to do something, and if not, [y] is going to
happen), begging the question (circular reasoning), failing to provide the requisite burden of proof of such
assertions, false premises, and attempting to answer complex questions of law in a manner that addresses
nothing near the depth required for proving, or even preponderating the evidence enough to tip the scale, that the
convention proposed by the CSG, ALEC, et al., is, or will be, in some manner, “limited.”
We will go through them numerically, and identify these problems. In the Conclusion, I will proffer that
my primary objection to this “fact sheet” in question is not entirely the promotion of an Article V convention
itself, but the deception being employed to make it happen, regardless of the consequences, and under the false
premise that such an event can be somehow forcefully “limited” in its scope.
I will also point out that many other options are available in lieu of a convention, and that the most
important aspect of promoting a convention – showing hard evidence that something is truly “broken” in the
document itself – is not present in this (or other) information coming from convention promoters.
This final point – what is broken – is crucial to the dialog. If one is proposing one or more amendments
to “fix” something, it is absolutely essential to identify the broken component. That Congress, the Executive
Branch, the supreme Court, and the states themselves, are violating this contract known as the Constitution, is a
given. But violations are not problems within the language of the document, and call for other types of fixing
than a convention could achieve. Indeed, if one or more parties to this agreement violates it, no other language
added to it can be expected to fix anything.
In fairness to the Goldwater Institute, I will therefore grant that their “fact sheet” never purported to go
into these aspects of convention mechanics. That said, it is absolutely essential for people to understand that the
Goldwater “Fact Sheet” alone is totally insufficient as a lone source on which to base support for the notion of a
Constitutional Convention. Moreover, even the “runaway convention” arguments they tackle are based on some
rather weak suppositions – as we shall show.
REVIEW OF THE POINTS MADE IN THIS “Fact Sheet”
#1 Article V does not authorize a constitutional convention; it authorizes a convention for proposing specific
amendments.
This is a compound sentence, claimed as “fact,” when a clear reading of Article V specifically
contradicts the assertion. Of course, they could not actually write the language of this amendment, lest their
assertion fall to pieces. The Amendment reads (in part):
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments
to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, ...
Page 24 of 156

Notice the absence of a word they claim to be present – “specific.” Nothing in this language says
anything about “specific amendments.” It says “propose Amendments.” Basic English says the plural
(amendments) is not singular, and certainly not specified as to what these “amendments” may be. A convention
may take up anything the convention elects to propose, and in any quantity they see fit. There is nothing in this
language limiting the scope of the convention, as their “fact” asserts. Ergo, their “fact” is, in reality, fiction. It
is a fictitious statement posing as a fact, completely unsubstantiated and contradicted by the language of Article
V itself. It is misleading, does not meet the requisite burden of proof required of such an assertion, and is
embellished with a non-existent term apparently for the purpose of deception.
#2 When the Founders drafted the U.S. Constitution in 1787, they specifically rejected language for Article V
that would have allowed the states to later call for an open convention.
Nothing I can find in James Madison’s notes of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 backs up this so-
called “fact.” The debate on some of the language that eventually became Article V occurred on Monday, June
11, 1787, where this is recorded:
The thirteenth resolution, for amending the national Constitution, hereafter, without
consent of the national legislature, being considered, several members did not see the
necessity of the resolution at all, nor the propriety of making the consent of the
national legislature unnecessary.
Col. MASON urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be formed will
certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be.
Amendments, therefore, will be necessary; and it will be better to provide for them in
an easy, regular, and constitutional way, than to trust to chance and violence. It would
be improper to require the consent of the national legislature, because they may abuse
their power, and refuse their assent on that very account. The opportunity for such an
abuse may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendment.
Mr. RANDOLPH enforced these arguments.
The words “without requiring the consent of the national legislature,” were
postponed. The other provision in the clause passed, nem. con.
Therefore, the assertion of the “fact” itemized as #2 in this report seems to be a figment of someone’s
imagination, and amounts to the creating of purported “facts” that are unsubstantiated by the record of the
Convention which drafted the language of Article V. Indeed, this argument appears to fit into the class of
“historical revisionism.”
#3 Thirty eight (38) states must ratify any proposal from an amendments convention, requiring a broad
consensus that makes sure an amendments convention cannot “runaway.”
This is not a fact, but an interpretation based on a single possibility. Article V actually states (continuing
from the ... above):
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;
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There are, in reality TWO possible modes of ratification, just within the language of Article V itself,
with yet another on the periphery. The burden of proof rests with the one asserting a “fact” as such. The states
themselves (meaning the state legislatures), or by conventions, constitute the actual ways in which the product
of a convention is to be reviewed.
No where in this “fact” has the author identified what constitutes a ratification convention. This is a
huge omission. Making a blanket statement as #3 above, without clearly identifying the options, is, again,
either wishful thinking, claiming the power of clairvoyance to ascertain which mode Congress would choose for
ratification, and further claiming even greater clairvoyant powers to know the trustworthiness and character of
each person exercising suffrage, be they in a state assembly OR in a ratification convention, or merely it might
just be an inability to parse the Queen’s English in such manner as to make sense of a quite coherent
constitutional sentence.
But one other option seems to escape the prospects of the Goldwater document author. The Articles of
Confederation required (in their rules to the 1787 convention) that ALL extant states ratify the “amendments”
coming from the convention (100%). The authors of this Constitution, however, changed the ratification
process within their own document, thereby circumventing the previously “required” ratification process.
Because a Convention is a sovereign assembly, they have the right to do this again, in a new convention, should
it be called. Funny how this “fact” fails to mention this third option, which is completely possible (and even
likely) to make sure the convention gets their way with their proposals. Therefore, the “fact” of this item #3
fails (again) the test of burden of proof, it omits essential realities of political assemblies of this nature, and uses
glittering generalities to assert its fantasy.
By omitting the peripheral possibilities, a person non-conversant with assemblies of all these styles is
missing crucial information for their decision-making about the wisdom of a convention. In theory, at least, if
“Tea Party” supporters comprise the amendments convention, the powers that be could put “Acorn” styled
groups in charge of the ratification process.
#4 The limited scope of an amendments convention is underscored by the fact that it specifically says
amendments cannot alter the equal number of votes for each state in the U.S. Senate without the consent of the
affected state. This establishes that an Article V convention couldn’t simply rewrite the entire Constitution.
At best, this “fact” makes an assertion that an existing constitutional amendment (the 17 ) virtuallyth
nullifies. The removal of state legislatures from the process of selecting the Senators of each state has, for all
intents and purposes, denied the states their suffrage in the Federal Assembly already. While this subject
requires tomes of additional material to properly understand, the opening of this can of worms by the Goldwater
Institute requires it, if they are to prove their assertion. However, and even without going into another 20 pages
of discussion on the powers of the states to control their U.S. Senators, their assertion in this case is troubling.
(Request my “U.S. Senate Accountability Issue Brief” for more detail on this situation.)
With this (17 Amendment) precedent in place, few people today, except perhaps for myself, regard theth
current U.S. Senate as representatives of the states from which these Senators hail. No process is in place
whereby the states hold these Senators accountable to their Assemblies, no binding resolutions direct their
suffrage in Washington, no state has asked for the impeachment of a Senator for failing to appropriately
represent the state’s will in Washington, and likewise no reasonable jurist would consider this Constitutional
stricture on amendments any more binding in today’s world than would be noticed in proposing an amendment
for a balanced federal budget, when the existing constitution provides ample means for that end to be achieved.
The fact is, constitutional provisions are habitually ignored, and any amendment that even redefined the
boundaries of states, if coming from a convention, would not be any more or less interesting, despite
constitutional provisions respecting the means by which states are to be admitted to the Union.
But their 4 argument contradicts itself, and provides an opening for still more contradictions. If anth
affected state “consents” (which is itself a legal interpretation nightmare in both overt act(s) and/or by
omission), what state would fail to render its consent where the promise of money may be involved? Since this
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is how our modern state assemblies work – refusing to nullify federal acts for fear of losing federal revenues –
by what stretch of logic can the Goldwater author assert that suddenly the ratification bodies will “get religion”
and say “no” to any destructive idea coming from a convention, and particularly so when such big financial
interests are in play with this convention?
Surely, Mr. Dranias, you jest! Calling THIS numbered statement a “fact” is the epitome of hypocrisy.
#5 The states define the agenda of an amendments convention through their applications for the convention and
through the commission of delegates. Amendments conventions can be limited to specific topics.
This “fact” forgets may things, but let’s find a starting point. Let’s say, for sake of the argument, 34
states pass exactly the same “limiting” language in their calls for a convention. Congress calls the convention.
All 50 states are invited. The sixteen states that did NOT set any limits on their delegates, but merely sent folks
because a convention is happening, cannot have their behavior limited in such a way. This is like the gentleman
who promises his wife that he is going to the ballpark for the “specific and exclusive purpose of buying a hot
dog.” If a game starts, he promises to leave. So what? The ball game goes on without your cheers or other
input.
This entire argument does not even rise to the level of flimsy. The “fact” that one or even 34 states may
declare it a “felony,” – with a tar and feather clause for punishment if the convention delegates exceed their
“limited authority,” – neglects identifying who would enforce such a law. There is a major jurisdictional
problem. The delegates of Maryland, for example, are not bound by such a law passed by Ohio. At best, the
convention would begin under extreme circumstances of stress and animosity, much as were the opening salvos
at the 1787 convention. Knowing how Assemblies function even at their best, (having been a spectator at many
state legislative meetings over the past 30 years) such guidelines passed by one, or even 34 states, are useless
bones of contention. That is because every sovereign assembly sets its own rules. It would be more appropriate
not to even try to lay such stumbling-blocks before the delegates, so they could get on with the real business at
hand.
Congress sets its own rules, in each House, with each new election cycle. Each state does so as well, and
with every new election cycle. Check any state assembly, and look for an “HR1" or “SR1" type of resolution,
and you will find the rules of the House or Senate for that year/session.
A convention, under Article V, would be a co-equal branch of federal authority. Neither the Executive
of the United States, the supreme Court of the United States, nor the Congress itself, can constrain it. Congress
exists under Article I. The Executive Exists under Article II. The Courts exist under Article III. The States
(continued to) exist under Article IV, and the Convention is a creature of Article V. They are all co-equal
branches, and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of NONE of the other branches of Federal authority. They
will set their own rules, and their own agenda. What comes of them, comes of them, including the ratification
process itself.
The burden of proof required for #5 to be considered a statement of “fact” therefore fails miserably,
under any cursory understanding of authority, jurisdiction of law, sovereignty of assemblies, and for a plethora
of other reasons. At best, #5 is a misunderstanding. At worst, it is a deliberate attempt to deceive. State limits
are moot. Congressional limits are moot. The convention, as a sovereign and co-equal branch of government,
is on its own.
#6 The Constitution was sold by the Founders to the ratifying states on the basis that they retained their
ultimate authority over the federal government through their Article V amendment powers. James Madison in
Federalist No. 43 specifically argued that states should use the power to correct errors in the Constitution. And
Alexander Hamilton in the “final argument” of the Federalist Papers, in Federalist No. 85, said the Article V
amendment process was the means by which the states would rein in an out-of-control federal government. One
cannot take the Constitution seriously and contend that Article V was not meant to be used. It is a critical and
“deal closing” element of the balance of power created by the Constitution.
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This item constitutes the first real attempt at articulating a rational cause for pressing the Constitution’s
self-destruct button. The rhetoric is curious, and does actually (and finally) point at least to the Federalist
Papers. However, what the average reader might miss, who has not read these Federalist Paper numbers, is that
the standard amendment process of Article V – Congress passing an amendment, and submitting it to the states
directly – is equally effective, was the subject matter of much of the monologues in these Federalist numbers,
and has been used to correct defects (or get us in even crazier situations, such as the Prohibition Amendment),
for the past 200+ years, without the other event – a full-blown constitutional convention ever occurring. This
argument also neglects that the Federalist Papers themselves were something of “promotional literature”
intended to elicit ratification. Though quite useful in many aspects of constitutional research, it is a mistake to
rely entirely upon them, as the state ratification conventions themselves, and many other aspects of
constitutional understanding should be brought into the discussion. For brevity, I will grant the intended level
of insight from them.
Article V provides two means of Amendment – Congress submitting a proposed amendment to the
states, and a convention to propose the plural “amendments.” Why cannot the states, if an amendment or
amendments be necessary, direct and bind their United States Senators to introduce whatever language for an
amendment or amendments their state legislature directs? It appears that the classic bait and switch is being
employed, where the convention itself is the end desired, not one or more specific amendment(s). The argument
employed by the writer of this “fact” is (unfortunately) yet another deliberate confusion of cause and effect.
What the “fact” writer failed to do, again, is prove the point that the Constitution is so irretrievably
broken as to require massive surgery to correct horrific flaws. The much simpler (and real) “fact” that such
people could easily prove is that absolute and total disobedience to the provisions and existing strictures of the
Constitution is the proximate cause of the effects we now behold in the public spectacle that is American
National Governance. To prove that the Article V convention is the ONLY (or “best”) means remaining to
correct abuses from Washington requires establishing: first, that all other methods have been tried; and second,
that the Constitution is horribly broken. In point of “fact,” scarce few State Legislators even know the very real
and useful constitutional powers they possess (much less have they flexed these atrophied muscles).
In Federalist #43, for example, which the author of the “fact sheet” points to specifically, a very
important tenet of federalism is articulated which, unfortunately, the author fails to even mention. This tenet is
covered in the very section pertaining to Madison’s discussion on Art. V:
A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can
pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on
the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any
one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties,
absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void.
I would try to expound upon this further, but it is impossible. With such utter violations of the
Constitution present among the parties to it, the document is, for all intents and purposes, void as it stands. All
that remains is an “official” declarative statement to that effect. (In deference to Madison, he concludes #43
with an appeal to “moderation” and “prudence.” These are things convention proponents would likewise
display wisdom by observation thereto.)
A specific punch list of constitutional violations that occur on a daily basis in Washington could (and
should) be articulated by the “fact” writer (or more specifically, the state legislatures), who must then prove that
these violations require major surgery to prevent in the future.
If, for example, the argument wants to be put forward, as some convention proponents do, that the 17th
Amendment needs to be repealed, where can it be shown that, as was done with the “Prohibition” (18 )th
Amendment, an amendment was provided to repeal this (17 ) and Congress rejected submission to the states forth
it? Only when all avenues have been expended should the American people (and the world) be subjected to the
slings and arrows of a full-blown convention. Burden of proof not met, even for this small item, how be it that
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available remedies have been exhausted for the many Washingtonian problems where other available remedies
await trial? Is it a “fix” that convention proponents truly seek, or is the convention itself the end sought,
regardless of the prevarication required to obtain it under these (and like) false pretenses? And if so, why?
At the risk of doing their job for them, I will articulate but one more such instance. Where the budget is
concerned, Congress is required by Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 that:
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time.
Who, other than the conventioneers assembled in 1787, could write in a more perspicuous tone? Yet
how long has it been since an actual budget (forget the “balanced” part of it) has been proposed and passed by
Congress? This amounts to a flagrant congressional flaunting of a basic tenet of public trust. No business could
possibly borrow money unless its accounting was in order. No bank would give them a dime, nor would they be
trustworthy enough to open a common checking account. Yet “from time to time” as used in the Constitution
clearly means “annually” – or, “from year to year” – as the “year” is the fundamentally-understood unit of
measure of “time” itself. Indeed, such phrase is downright biblical in character, where such language as “time,
times and dividing of time” (Dan. 12:7, etc.) is universally interpreted by grammarians as “three and one half
years.” Such language was understood by the Constitution’s Framers, all themselves astute in the grammatical
arts, and the practice (an annual congressional budget) was implemented upon adoption of the Constitution. Yet
how many recent years have we had “continuing resolutions” (not “law” in the constitutional sense) to absolve
them of their fiduciary obligation to account to the people for what they are spending, and where they are
obtaining it? Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7, remains the corrective mechanism for the budget dilemma,
including the $500 hammers (misappropriation of public funds) acquired by the Department of Defense.
What constitutional amendment proposed by a convention could provide more clear, precise wording for
a requirement on Congress to have and hold to an annual budget, than the language of Article 1, § 9, Cl. 7? As
a practical matter, one must question whether a habitually-perjurious Congress would abide by any such
amendment if it were drafted.
There becomes the quandary. The Constitution, clearly, is not broken, at least in the case of the
Congressional Budget quackery we now observe, and which forms much of the rhetorical backdrop for the
supposed need for a convention to draft a so-called “balanced budget amendment.”
What is broken is the oath of office taken by the congressmen themselves. This constitutes de facto
perjury, among other crimes against the people.
Centering on this predicament brings us back full-circle to the United States Senate, which is one half of
the collective known as “Congress.” As part of the Congress, if the states would perform their obligation,
holding their Senators accountable to the strictures of the Constitution, then this budget problem would go
away. Moreover, the states already have it within their power to hold their Senators accountable, and compel
them to be their suffrage in the federal assembly, notwithstanding the 17 Amendment. Finding one stateth
legislator out of a hundred who understands this, however, is as daunting a task as locating a “fact” from the
Fact Sheet that is, in fact, a fact.
So now we are asked to trust a convention of states to tinker with such precise constitutional language,
when they are themselves so unfamiliar with it as to allow Congress to abdicate its fiduciary responsibility to the
people of their respective states?
The rules of logic do not even define such a mockery of the mental exercises required to convince us that
such a convention, in this temper of public ignorance of constitutional mandates, would provide anything useful
after going through the exercises required to stage such an event.
I posit that we need not a new Constitution, nor any amendments. Let’s try a bit of obedience to it for a
few years, and see if things don’t clear up on their own.
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The states should clearly define, if necessary, state law on “perjury” to include violation of oath of office,
and begin prosecution for the state crimes evinced by such practices. Compel United States Senators to impeach
members of the Executive and Judiciary branches that equally circumvent constitutional strictures, usurp powers
not possessed, or that commit other such clearly unconstitutional acts and omissions.
Indeed, as the “fact expositor” concludes, Article V was meant to fix any errors. On that I will concur.
The burden of proving that the flaws in government that exist are constitutional, however, rests squarely on the
proponents of a convention. Propose the amendment(s) as you will, and indeed use the Amendment process that
Article V otherwise contains to implement them. If this fails, then think of the “convention” option, having also
an educated group of potential candidates to comprise this convention.
Thus far, we are not seeing any proposals from the mainstream sources that have the language requisite
to actually fix a purported constitutional problem, nor have we seen any indication of what the purported
Constitutional problem is, or problems (plural) are. We do, however, see plenty of instances of disobedience to
it, and tomes of rhetoric pushing for a “grand event” of historic magnitude, based on an alleged need to “fix” an
“antiquarian” historic document. The later is more ad hominem or “red herring” in argumentative style than
substantive. If one cannot properly read the language of the Constitution, seek the input of a grammarian.
The convention is an entirely different colored horse. Circular reasoning, as evinced by the purported
“facts” contained within this document, does not prove the necessity of a convention. Such burden of proof is on
the maker. Indeed, with even the Federalist Papers referenced, the arguments about Article V lean more
towards using the first (congressional amendment) provision to make any needful fixes, than opening a full-
scale convention to do so.
Moreover, James Madison, the father of the Constitution itself, is quoted thus:
“Having witnessed the difficulties and dangers experienced by the first Convention which assembled
under every propitious circumstance, I should tremble for the result of a Second, meeting in the present
temper of America and under all the disadvantages I have mentioned ...”
Whatever statements he may have made promoting the Constitution itself, in the Federalist Papers or
otherwise, were at least conditioned by this statement from a letter he penned to George Turberville, in
November of 1788. He knew, as well as any man alive, the struggles facing a convention. He also understood a
new event of such magnitude would be equally (if not more so) “in the present temper of America,” likewise
under extreme stress. Funny how this “fact” of History is omitted by modern Con Con proponents.
#7 There is zero precedent that any convention of the states has ever “runaway” from its assigned agenda.
There have been 12 interstate conventions in the history of our country. All of them stayed within their stated
agenda. Even the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was not convened to “amend” the Articles of
Confederation, but to “revise” and “alter” the Articles to establish an effective national government. This was
fully consistent with the Articles of Confederation because the Articles authorized alterations – a term that had
revolutionary significance because it echoed the language of the Declaration of Independence. The broad
purpose of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was specifically mentioned in the call of Congress and in
nearly all of the commissions for the delegates for each state. The 1787 convention did not runaway at all; it
did what it was charged to do – like all interstate conventions preceding it.
Item seven (recited above) actually contains seven sentences, each of them a statement. And like other
statements of this document in question, the statements’ maker fails to meet any burden of documentation or
proof of the quality or factual nature of any of the statements contained within it.
In reply to sentence 1, there has only every been ONE federal “constitutional convention” in recorded
history, at a fully national level. It occurred in 1787. If any precedents exist, it would be found in this single
event. Other references are moot, or “red herrings” in logical understanding.
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In sentence two, the author alludes to 12 interstate conventions, but fails to identify them. In reality,
there have probably been thousands of “interstate conventions” – because by definition, any meeting of officials
between any two or more states could be construed as some sort of “interstate” event. For example, if a parcel
of land resting in one state is purchased by a municipality sitting in another, as often happens when lake
impoundments of water are owned by a water company belonging to a municipal operation, the meeting of the
two states involved is necessary to solidify an agreement over jurisdiction, expenses relating to it, and etc.
Therefore ...
When in sentence # 3 it is proffered that these 12 “interstate conventions” stayed within their agenda,
giving no specific evidence as to what conventions are incorporated by reference, or the purpose for which these
interstate meetings took place, the burden of proving that any such convention’s outcome would have any
precedential impact on a modern-day, full scale, federal constitutional convention, is absent.
Sentence #4 posits that the purpose of the 1787 convention was to “establish an effective national
government.” Based on the writings of Anti-Federalist authors, the tenor of the debates in the state conventions
that ratified the Constitution, and tomes of historical material readily available for research, such statement leaps
beyond the absurd. The mere notion of switching from fully “federal” to “national” in the form of American
governance was contained in no writing of states sending delegates to this 1787 convention. The type of
argument articulated in this sentence forces a person to accept a negative, as the affirmative is prima facie
unplausible to the contention.
“We say so, therefore it must be true,” exists in no form of polite debate nor is it an accepted premise of
argument. Indeed, the evidence provided by Anti-Federalist writers, and the state conventions, indicates utter
shock that this 1787 convention, comprised of delegates under very strict orders to confine themselves to
amending the Articles of Confederation (not as asserted, to create a new national government) had come up with
the type of plan they offered at the conclusion of their event.
On reading the credentials of the deputies, it was noticed that those from Delaware
were prohibited from changing the article in the Confederation establishing an
equality of votes among the states. (May 25, notes of James Madison)
On May 30, the following exchange among delegates occurred:
Mr. CHARLES PINCKNEY wished to know of Mr. Randolph, whether he meant to
abolish the state governments altogether. Mr. RANDOLPH replied, that he meant by these general
propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which explained the outlines of the system he had in
view.
Mr. BUTLER said, he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open to the
light which discussion might throw on it. After some general observations, he
concluded with saying, that he had opposed the grant of powers to Congress
heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one body. The proposed
distribution of the powers with different bodies changed the case, and would induce
him to go great lengths.
Gen. PINCKNEY expressed a doubt whether the act of Congress recommending the
Convention, or the commissions of the deputies to it, would authorize a discussion of
a system founded on different principles from the Federal Constitution.
Mr. GERRY seemed to entertain the same doubt.
Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS explained the distinction between a federal and a
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national supreme government; the former being a mere compact resting on the good
faith of the parties, the latter having a complete and compulsive operation. He
contended, that in all communities there must be one supreme power, and one only.
Mr. MASON observed, not only that the present Confederation was deficient in not
providing for coercion and punishment against delinquent states, but argued very
cogently, that punishment could not, in the nature of things, be executed on the states
collectively, and therefore that such a government was necessary as could directly
operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it.
Mr. SHERMAN admitted that the Confederation had not given sufficient power to
Congress, and that additional powers were necessary; particularly that of raising
money, which, he said, would involve many other powers. He admitted, also, that the
general and particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed,
however, not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing system;
intimating, as one reason, that it would be wrong to lose every amendment by
inserting such as would not be agreed to by the states.
It was moved by Mr. READ, and seconded by Mr. CHARLES COTESWORTH
PINCKNEY, to postpone the third proposition last offered by Mr. Randolph, viz.,
“that a national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme
legislative, executive, and judiciary,” in order to take up the following, viz.:
“Resolved, that, in order to carry into execution the design of the states in forming
this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation, a more
effective government, consisting of a legislative, executive, and judiciary, ought to be
established.” The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, ay, 4; New York,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, no, 4.
On the question, as moved by Mr. BUTLER, on the third proposition, it was resolved,
in committee of the whole, “that a national government ought to be established,
consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary.”
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, ay,
6; Connecticut, no, 1; New York, divided, (Colonel Hamilton, ay, Mr. Yates, no.)
If, as the Goldwater Institute writer supposes, that the purpose of the convention (from the perspective of
the states sending to it their delegates) was to create a national government, such intent would have certainly
been well-known by all the delegates in the convention. Why then the comments above by Mssrs. Pickeney,
Butler, et al.? Clearly the Convention was treading into unfamiliar waters. And while perhaps within the
general scope of some of their perceived mission statements, such was certainly NOT the case for them all, nor
were they at all comfortable going to the lengths proposed by the Madison plan for this new style of
government. Such a blanket statement as Item #7 is therefore far less clear-cut than supposed by its presenters,
and moreover constitutes a deceptive practice in their argument for a convention’s ability to be “limited” in its
scope.
The “authorized alterations” (i.e. “Amendment”) for the Articles of Confederation contained within its
own terms, is a given. On that point we may have found the first or second “fact” properly couched within this
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document thus far. (Neither prove the assertion, however. The misappropriation of fact is a common element of
Con Con proponents, and has been for the past 30 years.)
However, as can clearly be seen, the product of the convention was no collection of amendments tacked
onto the extant language of the Articles of Confederation. An entirely new document emerged from this
convention. Therefore, and in direct contrast to the argument presented by the Goldwater Institute, the only true
federal convention did indeed “runaway.” The other (12) events referred to in this item #7 did not constitute a
federal constitutional convention under any stretch of fantasy, and their primary thesis was not only
unsubstantiated, but is clearly refuted by the historic record, and in the words of the attendees themselves.
Indeed, if any evidence is to be found about the “excess” employed by this one and only ever in history
federal convention, the words of two more of the attendees – Robert Yates and John Lansing, delegates from
New York – in a letter to their Governor (George Clinton) explaining their departure from this convention,
ought to suffice (underlining emphasis mine):
We beg leave, briefly, to state some cogent reasons, which, among others, influenced us to decide against a
consolidation of the states. These are reducible into two heads: --
1st. The limited and well-defined powers under which we acted, and which could not on any possible construction,
embrace an idea of such magnitude as to assent to a general constitution, in subversion of that of the state.
2nd. A conviction of the impracticability of establishing a general government, pervading every part of the United
States, and extending essential benefits to all.
Our powers were explicit, and confined to the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation,
and reporting such alterations and provisions therein, as should render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of
government, and the preservation of the Union.
From these expressions, we were led to believe that a system of consolidated government could not, in the remotest
degree, have been in contemplation of the legislature of this state; for that so important a trust, as the adopting measures
which tended to deprive the state government of its most essential rights of sovereignty, and to place it in a dependent
situation, could not have been confided by implication; and the circumstance, that the acts of the Convention were to receive a
state approbation in the last resort, forcibly corroborated the opinion that our powers could not involve the subversion of a
Constitution which, being immediately derived from the people, could only be abolished by their express consent, and not by
a legislature, possessing authority vested in them for its preservation. Nor could we suppose that, if it had been the intention
of the legislature to abrogate the existing confederation, they would, in such pointed terms, have directed the attention of their
delegates to the revision and amendment of it, in total exclusion of every other idea.
Reasoning in this manner, we were of opinion that the leading feature of every amendment ought to be the
preservation of the individual states in their uncontrolled constitutional rights, and that, in reserving these, a mode might have
been devised of granting to the Confederacy, the moneys arising from a general system of revenue, the power of regulating
commerce and enforcing the observance of foreign treaties, and other necessary matters of less moment.
Exclusive of our objections originating from the want of power, we entertained an opinion that a general
government, however guarded by declarations of rights, or cautionary provisions, must unavoidably, in a short time, be
productive of the destruction of the civil liberty of such citizens who could be effectually coerced by it, by reason of the
extensive territory of the United States, the dispersed situation of its inhabitants, and the insuperable difficulty of controlling
or counteracting the views of a set of men (however unconstitutional and oppressive their acts might be) possessed of all the
powers of government, and who, from their remoteness from their constituents, and necessary permanency of office, could not
be supposed to be uniformly actuated by an attention to their welfare and happiness; that, however wise and energetic the
principles of the general government might be, the extremities of the United States could not be kept in due submission and
obedience to its laws, at the distance of many hundred miles from the seat of government; that, if the general legislature was
composed of so numerous a body of men as to represent the interests of all the inhabitants of the United States, in the usual
and true ideas of representation, the expense of supporting it would become intolerably burdensome; and that, if a few only
were vested with a power of legislation, the interests of a great majority of the inhabitants of the United States must
necessarily be unknown; or, if known, even in the first stages of the operations of the new government, unattended to. These
reasons were, in our opinion, conclusive against any system of consolidated government: to that recommended by the
Convention, we suppose most of them very forcibly apply.
It is not our intention to pursue this subject farther than merely to explain our conduct in the discharge of the trust
which the honorable legislature reposed in us. Interested, however, as we are, in common with our fellow citizens, in the
result, we cannot forbear to declare, that we have the strongest apprehensions, that a government so organized, as that
recommended by the convention, cannot afford that security to equal and permanent liberty which we wished to make an
invariable object of our pursuit.
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We were not present at the completion of the new constitution; but before we left the convention, its principles were
so well established as to convince us, that no alteration was to be expected to conform it to our ideas of expediency and
safety. A persuasion, that our further attendance would be fruitless, and unavailing, rendered us less solicitous to return.
We have thus explained our motives for opposing the adoption of the national constitution, which we conceived it
our duty to communicate to your Excellency, to be submitted to the consideration of the honorable legislature.
We have the honor to be, With the greatest respect, Your Excellency's Most obedient, and Very humble servant,
Robert Yates, John Lansing, jun.
#8 The procedures for conducting an amendments convention are similar to Congress’
long-established rulemaking powers. Constitutional text, language and custom make clear
that Congress calls the convention, setting a time and location; states appoint delegates by
way of resolutions and commissions (or general state law); delegates initially vote as states at
the convention; and majority votes will decide what amendments are proposed for ratification.
An amendments convention is simply an interstate task force.
In this statement shines more truth or “fact” than any other yet. However, what is not said (in this
argument particularly) is as important, or more important, than the substance it contains. “Omission” is the sin
here. Further, it presents an irrelevant “red herring” type of argument, where a concept being discussed is more
a distraction than substantiation of a premise. (Or, again, this may amount to a misappropriation of a fact for
purpose of deception.)
For example, the word “initially” is found in sentence 2 (pertaining to how votes are counted). What
happens following the adoption of internal rules, after this “initial” phase runs its course? This
discussion/consideration is omitted completely. (Not that such consideration is really of a highly interesting
nature in itself, but this bears out the circular or diversionary argument applied whereby apples and oranges are
proverbially combined, perhaps with an intention to create an illusion of authenticity, or support, for the notion
of a convention.)
As a co-sovereign federal authority & assembly, which a convention actually is, like Congress, and like
the states, the first order of business is the adoption of their own rules of proceeding. That “initially” the
delegates may vote as a unit on behalf of their state, it is self-evident from Madison’s notes of the first
convention. However, on many occasions the states were divided on major (and minor) issues of importance.
So charged was the atmosphere that on July 5, Yates and Lansing, delegates of New York, left the convention in
disgust (for the reasons articulated so eloquently above).
The impact of this departure was not that the convention saw the error of their ways and corrected their
“runaway” conduct. On the contrary, the convention went on without the participation of the New York
delegates, that may have had additional contributions to make, had they stayed and played the game of excess
with their counterparts.
So what would a modern convention’s “initial” rules look like? Perhaps a peek into a very recent (2013)
document laying out the guidelines for a STATE (South Carolina) constitutional convention is more realistic
than the “fact sheet’s” writer’s previous reliance on a dozen so-called “interstate conventions” (Item #7 of the
“fact sheet”).
Linked HERE, this shows that for the “initial” meeting, the state’s chief supreme court justice is
installed in the chairman’s slot. (What would happen to the notion of “constraining the judiciary” if the sitting
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Roberts, was made chair of the federal convention?)
The Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Procedure is installed as the basic “rule book.” Etc.
Knowing contemporary thinking is far more interesting to the notions of having a “conservative”
convention than looking even to the precedential history of the 1787 event.
Further, ascribing the moniker “interstate task force” to such an event is a bit hyperbolic, albeit
potentially realistic, considering the probability of a “runaway” convention. This is perhaps a literary device of
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the author, designed more to elicit some form of “authority” to the event, whereby the public
contemporaneously perceives “task forces” as salutary toward governance, in that they are under some form of
official directive as to their “task” (singular) at hand. Applying, however, the singular (task) adjective to a
convention is deceptive, as the “task” is, in reality, a pluralistic concept involving constitutional powers (plural)
of money, taxation, authority, states’s rights, and a shopping list of constitutional provisions, all under the
microscope of such an autonomous, and deliberately uncontrollable (by other authority) event.
If anyone was ever in a position to render an opinion on the ability of a convention to be constrained
inside of some man-made box, Former Chief Justice Warren Burger sits as likely as any for the distinction. In a
letter dated January 30, 1987, he stated:
So much for any Congressional, or even state, rule-making over the convention – “grand waste of time”
notwithstanding.
#9 The limited scope of an amendments convention is similar to that of state ratification conventions that are
also authorized in Article V, but no one worries about a ratification convention “running away,” even though
such a convention does make law.
I revel in the superfluity of this sentence. No one has ever accused a ratification convention of “running
away,” as such deliberative body actually does NOT “make law” as the presenter implies. Their sole purpose is,
and no other, ratification. Perhaps it could be argued that they “confirm” the legal language of the convention,
or “enact” the (constitutional) law(s) proposed. They have only a “yes” or “no” decision to make. Even if they
do propose additional amendments (for clarity or otherwise), their suggestions are without any force of law.
The presenter of this fact has one point correct within it – no one worries about a ratification convention
running away. We do, however, have every reason to fear a runaway GENERAL convention. If the point of
this “fact sheet” is to argue in favor of a convention, and prove it has no ability to, in fact, “run away,” this item
(#9) fails in ways that would make even a Freshman-level rhetorician walk away giggling. The “red herring” is
again, overt.
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#10 An amendments convention, because it only proposes amendments and does not make law, is not an
effective vehicle for staging a government takeover.
Let me get this straight (if that be possible). In item #9, the writer says that a ratification convention
“does make law” (which it does not). Then, in #10, he states as “fact” that an amendment convention “does not
make law” (which indeed it can). To say the logic is warped, that fantasy has completely taken over, and that
this document is as factual as a professional wrestling match, could be too gentle. But giving the writer the
benefit of the doubt, as much as it pains me in this case, perhaps the operative word used in this alleged “fact”
would be the adjective “effective.” If another adjective were substituted, and the sentence were slightly
truncated, then item #10 would be a “fact.” It should be worded thus:
An amendments convention is the only vehicle for staging a government takeover.
Many people, unhappy with the limits of the Constitution on their official behavior, have commented on
these restrictions derogatorily. Those with political ambitions above their grasp frequently make such statements
as this:
"Let us face reality. The framers have simply been too shrewd for us. They have outwitted us. They
designed separated institutions that cannot be unified by mechanical linkages, frail bridges, tinkering. If
we are to 'turn the founders upside down' — to put together what they put asunder — we must directly
confront the Constitutional structure they erected ... " — James M Burns, p.160 Reforming
American Government: The Bicentennial
Papers of the Committee on the
Constitutional System.”
The only vehicle that can “directly confront the Constitutional structure they erected”is an Article V
Convention of states. It alone can effect a full government takeover.
Of the many radical proposals for change presented over the past century, none were either appropriate,
nor proper, for inclusion within the fundamental charter of our general government. To pass these measures, the
ONLY vehicle that can achieve the goal of those who would ‘turn the founders upside down’ lies in a
convention, such as proposed by the contemporary CSG, ALEC, and like groups.
Though most of the current promoters of a convention are of the “conservative” ilk, hopeful for such
things as “states’ rights” and additional protections on personal liberty to come from a modern convention,
writers and activists on the radical left are quite hopeful for a convention as well. Unfortunately, there is no way
to guarantee that any particular bent of ideology will control such an event as a plurality or majority. Indeed, the
left welcomes such an event, and smirks at conservatives for their gullibility. For example, Gore Vidal is
quoted in San Francisco as saying:
Further, many of the modern promoters of an Article V event (specifically a Convention, rather than a
standard amendment) are totally unaware that an entire replacement constitution has already been drafted, and
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that the movement for a Convention is not at all of recent origin. The efforts expended over a full decade, at a
cost of over $25 million, and contributed to by over 100 people, are laid out in what has been dubbed the “New
States Constitution.”
"In the event you would be inclined to dismiss the relevance of the proposed new constitution, bear in
mind that it is the product of a tax-exempt think-tank which took ten years, $25,000,000.00 and the
collaboration of over one-hundred like-minded individuals. . . It would be folly to believe this investment
is intended to be merely an exercise in political theory. The frightening reality is, the planners are
serious in their efforts to impose a new constitution upon the people of America as we enter the 21st
Century." — Col. Arch Roberts, Committee to Restore the Constitution
In 1942, constitutional scholar Henry Hazlitt authored “A New Constitution Now” in book form. This
was part of the political dialectic, needed to get public opinion swayed toward such a thing. With this
momentum, think tanks began their work on such a “revision” of this “outdated” mode of governance. Quotes
from this book, showing the radical agenda of transforming our nation from one of a representative republic,
into a parliamentary democracy, include:
Some might not see what Burns is suggesting. Cutting through the rhetoric, a convention is a simpler
way to achieve the goal (implementing this “parliament” for America).
In simple terms, the government proposed by Burns in this paragraph represents the ultimate in having a
new system that self-destructs on a rather routine basis. It is perfect for those wanting to easily control various
branches of government, but antithetical in every way to a Constitutional republic. It seems more suited for
third-world status nations, than a world leader of any flavor.
Then, another book, entitled “The Emerging Constitution” was released in 1974 (First Edition, Harper’s
Magazine Press, ISBN- 0061282251) actually containing the verbiage of this New States Constitution. Modern
“conservatives” would do well to actually read it (this new Constitution), and compare the “rights” secured by
the first, with the “privileges” this new government would conditionally give to the masses. It creates entirely
new branches of government. That document is reprinted, in its entirety, in a companion Issue Brief. The 2nd
Amendment is gutted entirely, with only military and police having the right to bear arms. Other typical
American liberties have been couched with an “except in a declared emergency” clause. “Conservatives” need
to know the content of this document, as it is a certainty that the New States Constitution will find its way to an
Article V event, should it occur.
Not coincidentally, in the wake of the release of this book, Nelson Rockefeller (then Vice-President)
started pushing openly for a Convention, in which this New States Constitution could “modernize” the
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“antiquated” handiwork of Madison, et al. This verbiage even showed up in the 1974 book, giving push to the
proposed “bicentennial event” of Rockefeller.
If I were analyzing Burns for rhetorical devices, the first of these adjectives (anachronistic) means
“misplaced in proper or time-sensitive sequence” – in a word, “outdated.” He was pointing derision at the
document itself.
The second, (the inflexible nature of its design) was deliberate. The Constitution’s Framers understood
exactly that such things as separation of powers, checks and balances, and etc. were never suited for flexibility.
They also understood that political winds, and flavors of the week, would destroy any government that would
endlessly bend with these winds. It was established rock solid, and inflexible in both structure and in its
protections for the people, with due thought and consideration (much to the chagrin of would-be tyrants).
As for irresponsible, that adjective could, properly rephrased with its containing sentence, actually
represent the politicians involved. Yet by saying the “system of government” is irresponsible, just reeks of
prejudice against the Constitution itself. Indeed, such word is indicative of spite toward both the Constitution
and the men who framed it.
Then finally, in 1985, the book “Reforming American Government: The Bicentennial Papers of the
Committee on the Constitutional System” (Westview Press, ISBN: 0813371147) detailed exactly where funding
was coming from to support radical “reforms” to our Constitution.
This CCS document also spoke the “facts” about a modern convention’s potential, as well as its declared
agenda, to wit:
and ...
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With such documented evidence present about the aims, objectives, and eventual outcome of a modern-
day convention, its “conservative” proponents would do well to take a deep breath, do a bit more research, and
ponder the realities. In American politics today, with so many well-entrenched special interests pushing hard to
legalize those things they are now achieving by corrupt practice, the only means available to them to achieve
their radical agenda is an Article V event. If the goal is removing constitutional limits on government, such as
only a convention can achieve, by what stretch of fantasy are we to perceive that a “convention of states” will do
anything less than authorize still greater levels of government-sponsored theft from taxpayers, further erosion of
protected liberties, and etc.?
This brief snapshot of the generational history for this convention was provided not so much to address
what is being said by the Goldwater Institute’s “fact sheet,” but to show those new to the Convention notion that
the notion itself is nothing new at all. You have been sucked into a now-generation-long battle to reduce the
American Constitution to the history books, and to supplant it with a totally new, global-friendly system of
governance. The replacement Constitution guts individual liberties, and was funded and created by the very
people that Tea Party Patriots rail against for their sins. Do not allow yourself to be used as a pawn in this
battle.
CONCLUSION
The document proffered as a “Fact Sheet” supporting a modern-day convention would be more
appropriately entitled “Fantasy Land” where conclusive, jurisprudential evidence to establish even one “fact” or
“facts” about the ability of a convention to be “limited” in any manner whatsoever is wholly missing from the
writing. The collection of misleading, uninspiring, and even reverse-logic employed in this document is, at best,
political-science fiction.
As a person who has watched, and participated in the debate over a proposed convention since
approximately 1981, I have seen a continuing saga of decade-spaced attempts to open a convention. To date, all
have been in vain. As conservative group after group has “discovered” the possibility for a grand, silver-bullet
to “fix Washington” by way of our states, the dismal failures of each generation of convention proponents has
made laughing-stocks of them all.
As each generation of gullible politicians drops in their respective hopper new resolutions for Article V
events, corresponding public outcries have dashed their potential careers to pieces. So begins a new effort, this
time complete with mock “rules” said to be “in place” to keep the convention from becoming a “runaway.”
And once again, the political careers of the promoters of an Article V convention will hang in the
balance as the generationally-hardened opponents of a convention go to work against them.
As usually happens, eventually the agenda of globalists are uncovered, and the hopes of Convention
promoters turn to dust. The ability of some to say “oops, I was wrong on this one” often determines their fate,
and strengthens them for the next round of battle. Saving face in the public eye is not easy, when ardent
defenders of the Constitution make examples of those who are either deceived themselves, or make gallant
efforts to deceive others.
Such is the nature of this particular Goldwater Institute document. Those espousing its claims would do
well to read the counterpoints of more prudent jurists and writers, than to merely succumb to the “bandwagon”
of misguided Tea Partiers.
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At one level, I am not so adverse to the notion of having a convention as may be perceived by this
particular writing. Were I to be handed a guilded invitation, and if it were so that others I know and trust were
also guaranteed slots in such an event, at least in that case there would be present a few wilderness voices for
liberty.
At another level, the theological side of me thinks that perhaps finally having a convention would be a
good thing. The collapse of this idolatry-filled nation would be assured, as the thunder of arms resounded from
the internal revolution that such an event would bring (Divine Judgement) on this nation, at last.
However, and those things said, what bothers me more than the prospect of a convention is the prospect
of one being foisted upon a gullible and deceived people. I object not to a TRULY INSPIRED Article V event,
where everyone calling for the convention is doing so knowing completely that it cannot be limited, that any
modeled rules for it would be subject to the convention’s own whims and fancy of the day, and that every
article, section and clause of the extant Constitution would be, including the Bill of Rights, up for debate,
revision, enhancement or elimination. The extant separation of powers, the thoughts of a parliamentary
democracy, the establishment of an American Monarchy, and every other notion for government would be “fair
game” in a convention. This is the debate that should occur. Is such a convention – wide open to everything –
desirable, or should other options be exhausted properly?
Should we perhaps mandate obedience to the articles, sections and clauses it contains before relegating it
to the status of a failed experiment? Can we strengthen state perjury laws, impose state law upon United States
Senators, compel a published actual budget from the Congress, or arrest those in violation of their public
fiduciary oath?
If not, then go for it. Introduce resolutions calling for an open, wide open, Article V convention.
Propose whatever language you can that your skills permit, to establish more firm guidelines on liberty. Or, if
the public will confirm it, eliminate all rights and liberties, and establish a banana republic, parliamentary
democracy, or install a king or queen for that matter. It will not matter, except by a question of degree. Liberty
will be lost, and with it, the historical realities that most of our schools cannot teach in the current environment
of political correctness, regardless of the Constitution, and what it provides.
But let there be no convention called for, or opened, by people who have been deceived into thinking
they are getting a balanced budget amendment, when what they are actually getting is a full blown constitutional
convention, with a new Constitution having already been written. Let not charlatans parading fantasy around,
passing it off as “fact,” sway the opinion of our servant, if not somewhat gullible, state legislators.
Let them know the truth. And as noted in Federalist #43, there is yet another option – simply declare the
Constitution void for violations, and revert our states back to fully independent status. Let them provide for
their own defense, and eliminate every federal entity we all (as conservatives) loathe. Department of Education
– gone. Department of Homeland Security – Gone. National Security Agency – gone.
If, however, with knowledge – full knowledge – that this potential convention is an open event, then let
them make their decision to call for such an event be based on that knowledge, and all it entails. Start over
completely. Let the experiences we have had this past century weigh into a voluminous Bill of Rights – even
adding more federal restrictions on our states. “No state shall pass any law violating the right of conscience ...
requiring an occupational license ... etc.” “The Congress shall not delegate any enumerated power to any other
entity.” “The Congress shall not charter any corporation whatsoever” ... etc.
But the wide-open nature of any Article V event – that is the reality, that is the one and only “fact” of
interest, in this debate. And shame on anyone who employs deception to open such an event on an unsuspecting
populace. (Moreover, shame on the people themselves for allowing themselves to be deceived!)
What I object to is all this DECEPTION. Trying to claim as “fact” the notion of a convention being
“limited” is the epitome of prevarication. And shame on anyone, including the Goldwater Institute, for saying
otherwise. Their “fact sheet” has proven nothing, other than the level of deception employed by this round of
convention promoters.
It hasn’t even identified a single constitutional defect – something absolutely required before calling for
an event to “fix” something that is easily arguable to be unbroken.
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ENFORCEMENT, NOT AMENDMENT, IS THE ANSWER
[Ed Note: This article originally appeared at http://newswithviews.com/Vieira/edwin261.htm as a reply to a
particular author who had broached the subject of opening a modern day constitutional convention. The logic of
Dr. Vieira is impeccably delivered. As a recent, contemporary writing on the subject, we felt it mete to include
herein. Used with permission of Dr. Vieira, and in its entirety.]
By Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., Ph.D., J.D.
September 24, 2013
In his recent column, "I Want a Real Liberty Movement", Timothy Baldwin has presented a very
challenging argument in favor of a new constitutional convention. I believe, however, that his basic contentions
do not stand up well to critical analysis.
I. Mr. Baldwin tells his readers that he
agree[s] with [Mark] Levin that the only way to change the jurisprudence of our constitutional law
(specifically put, to redefine what the Courts have defined regarding Congress' power under the commerce and
tax power) is for the people to change it through amendment. To be clear, there is no other way to do this and
fix the constitutional structure that encourages abuse of federal power.
Until certain federal and state powers are redefined in the Constitution by the States through Article V,
Congress will continue to act accordingly (meaning, to regulate in all cases whatsoever), regardless of what pet
remedies you think are the answer, like recalling public officials, voting, state nullification, the militia, informed
juries, coordination, impeachment, civil disobedience, etc. None of these remedies correct the jurisprudence
created by the Judiciary. None fix the inherent diffusive congressional power structure developed over time,
which makes Congress essentially accountable to no one.
Unfortunately, this argument accepts as valid a very bad principle as the reason for the action Mr.
Baldwin proposes.
The notion that "the jurisprudence created by the Judiciary"—which Mr. Baldwin doubtlessly recognizes
as a false jurisprudence, or he would not be advocating amendments of the Constitution in order to set it
aside—can be corrected only by various constitutional amendments is even more obviously false and pernicious
than the false jurisprudence it intends to nullify through amendments. At base, the argument is
self-contradictory. If the Constitution has to be amended, then the supposedly "false" jurisprudence is actually a
"true" jurisprudence, because if it were false it would be unconstitutional, by definition, and could not require
for its correction an amendment of the Constitution to which it has no legitimate relationship. On the other
hand, if this jurisprudence is actually a false jurisprudence, then it has nothing to do with the Constitution ab
initio, except to violate it; and therefore some remedy other than amendment of the Constitution would be called
for. (As I have already examined what other remedies are available, in my book How To Dethrone the Imperial
Judiciary, I shall direct the reader there for the details.)
The problem stems from the truly anti-constitutional—I should add "absurd" or even "idiotic"—notion
that "the Constitution is what the judges say it is". The Constitution is neither "correct" nor "incorrect"; it is
simply what it is, to be deduced by right reason from what it says. A judicial opinion about the Constitution,
however, can be correct or incorrect. Even the Supreme Court has admitted as much in the most palpable
manner possible, by reversing itself on constitutional questions numerous times. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 827-830 (1991) (collecting cases). In these situations, we are entitled to ask, was the Court
incorrect in the first instance, and correct in the second; or correct in the first instance, and incorrect in the
second; or incorrect in both instances? How can one know, except by adherence to the rule: "the Supreme Court
does not determine what the Constitution means; rather, the Constitution determines whether an opinion of the
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Supreme Court is correct or incorrect"? Must the Constitution be amended every time some majority of
Justices—or, put more bluntly, "the fifth fool" on the Court—renders some dopey or dishonest opinion? If so,
then judicial usurpation and tyranny have actually succeeded, and the Constitution has been overthrown. The
record of the Supreme Court's decisions—the so-called United States Reports, if not the greatest then surely the
longest work of fiction in the history of the world—is actually "the constitution"; and the document known as
the Constitution is nothing more than a blank slate on which the Justices write whatever comes into their heads.
That, apparently, is what the advocates of a new constitutional convention accept as the predicament in which
this country now finds itself. If that is the best these people can do, one must despair of any good coming out of
a process of constitutional amendment which they mediate or in any way significantly influence.
II. But leave aside the problem of what American constitutionalism really means in terms of the
relationship of principal and agent between We the People and their ostensible "representatives", and focus
solely on the practicalities of the process of amendment. If a new constitutional convention were convened
under Article V, what amendments might it propose? The proponents of a convention say that its agenda can be
controlled by law, so that it will not become a "runaway" convention. Perhaps yes, perhaps no.
But if it did turn out to be a "runaway" convention, proposed all sorts of amendments wholly
inconsistent with any rational conception of "liberty" (that is, acted like the legislatures of Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, and California, to name a few contemporary "peoples
republics" in what passes for "the land of the free"), and some or all of these amendments were eventually
ratified, would the courts as they are now constituted declare those amendments invalid, because of the
"runaway" nature of the convention? Very unlikely. How long have people tried to bring to the Supreme Court
the question of the invalidity of the supposed ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, without any result,
notwithstanding the significant body of evidence in support of that conclusion?
If, on the other hand, the convention were not a "runaway" convention, the amendments it proposed
might nonetheless be badly drafted, and therefore could not be supported, even by "the liberty movement" itself.
(And some of the proposed amendments I have seen I for one would never support.) So the entire effort could
turn out to be largely a waste of time and effort.
If the convention were not a "runaway" convention, and the proposed amendments were good, they
would still have to be ratified by three fourths of the States. How long that would take is anyone's guess.
If one or more of those amendments were ratified, they would then have to be implemented. At that
point in time, the compositions of Congress and of the courts would be similar to what they are now—in
personality types, if not actually the very same persons—because (according to Mr. Baldwin) "recalling public
officials, voting, * * * [and] impeachment" are nothing more than "pet remedies", and therefore whatever
reforms those actions could effect would not have been achieved by the members of "the liberty movement"
who spent their time working on behalf of constitutional amendments instead.
A Congress composed of individuals who score near the top of "the prostitution to special interests
index" will not accept the diminution of the unconstitutional power which (as Mr. Baldwin points out) "makes
Congress essentially accountable to no one". Such a Congress will never change its ways on its own initiative.
Instead, it will merely pass "stealth legislation", artfully drafted to attempt to sneak around the limits the new
constitutional amendments interpose. Whether it succeeds in this deception, and whether old statutes which the
new amendments arguably negate will be overturned, will depend entirely upon the courts—because that, of
course, is the way of "the jurisprudence of our constitutional law" which Mr. Baldwin accepts as so controlling
that it can be changed, or even challenged, only by amendment of the Constitution. Being the appointees of a
rogue Presidents and Senators , the judges will oppose these amendments in principle, and in practice will do
everything possible to avoid deciding cases that apply them, or to construe them in some grossly deformed
manner. The judicial dishonesty that created the problem supposedly necessitating the new amendments will
pale into insignificance in comparison with the judicial dishonesty that will be employed to render those
amendments as innocuous, if not as meaningless, as possible. So the all-important question remains to be
answered by the people in "the liberty movement" who are proposing a constitutional convention: "Exactly how
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are the new amendments to be enforced—in a timely and effective manner, if at all—if the first level of totally
corrupt enforcers in Congress and the courts simply refuses to enforce them as they should be enforced?
In any event, even with a completely honest Judiciary at every level of the federal system, it will take
Heaven alone knows how long to have each of the amendments "construed" and "applied" by the courts. Years
will be consumed as various "cases" and "controversies" wend their ways from United States District Courts to
United States Courts of Appeals, or from State trial courts to State intermediate courts to State supreme
courts—then many months more while petitions for writs of certiorari go to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court accepts vanishingly few such petitions, however. And doubtlessly it will be reluctant to accept one on the
interpretation and application of a brand-new amendment until the crucial controlling issues have been
identified, fought over, and clarified in several lower-court decisions. Even then, the "cases" and "controversies"
finally heard will be limited to their specific facts. So only bits and pieces of the total effect of each amendment
will be dealt with in each "case" or "controversy". To determine the full meaning of an amendment could thus
take decades, or even longer. (How many provisions of the Constitution as it now stands are still not completely
"construed" in the Supreme Court's opinions?) And for all anyone knows, some or perhaps many of these
"cases" and "controversies" will be argued by incompetent counsel, or the opinions in them written by
incompetent Justices or their incompetent law clerks, making a first-class rat's nest out the results.
So I fail to comprehend how a new constitutional convention can be viewed by anyone as a plausibly
workable remedy for the problems it is supposedly designed to address. To me, it looks much more like a "crap
shoot"—with the dice heavily loaded against the shooter, at that.
III. Now compare, in a few particulars, a new constitutional convention to revitalization of the Militia. I
suppose I should do this in any event—but I am especially encouraged to take on the task by Mr. Baldwin's
disparaging inclusion of "the militia" in his catalogue of "pet remedies" that he apparently believes are so
inferior to a convention that all efforts in their direction people in "the liberty movement" should turn instead to
a convention. (Actually, I cannot become too exercised about this, because—even though Mr. Baldwin does not
seem to recognize the logical necessity of it—amendment of the Constitution is just as much someone's "pet
remed[y]" as any of the other "remedies" on his list. But, on the other hand, Mr. Baldwin has provided me with
"a teaching moment" which I should hate to waste.)
A. If "the militia"—by which I presume Mr. Baldwin means "the Militia of the several States" which the
Constitution incorporates into the federal system—are anyone's "pet remedies", they are the Founding Fathers'
"pet remedies"; for the Founders included the Militia in the Constitution as "being necessary to the security of a
free State", a characterization which they did not append to the process of amendment in Article V (or anything
else). Importantly, the verb "being" is in the present tense, because the Militia are always "necessary". An
amendment of the Constitution, while surely useful, is by its very nature an extraordinary event which the
Constitution presumes may occur in the future, but does not expect to occur every day (although, if Mr. Baldwin
is right to imply that amending the Constitution is the only way to correct "the [faulty] jurisprudence created by
the Judiciary", then America could conceivably need a continuous process of amendments for every
constitutional blunder of the Supreme Court in each of its Terms, as well as for all of the unconstitutional
decisions the lower courts hand down every year that are never reviewed by the Supreme Court). Unlike a
constitutional convention, as permanent constitutional institutions the Militia are fully capable of exercising
their authority every day of every year. And their authority is as extensive as the laws of both the Union and the
States—where the term "laws" includes the Constitution itself. True enough, the Militia cannot amend the
Constitution. But they can execute (that is, enforce) the Constitution according to its true (or, as some people
like to say, its "original") intent, and in doing so largely obviate what Mr. Baldwin rightly deprecates as "the
[false] jurisprudence of our constitutional law". For "[t]he [false] jurisprudence of our constitutional law" is of
little moment if it cannot be enforced, because the Militia refuse to enforce it, as the Constitution would require
them to refuse.
B. Application to Congress for a constitutional convention requires two thirds of the States. Adoption of
a proposed amendment cannot be effected by less than three fourths of the States, let alone by a single State.
Ratification of a proposed amendment in one State does nothing to help that State or any other State right away.
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Ratification in one State does not allow that State to operate under the proposed amendment. Ratification in one
State does not show what the effect of adoption of the amendment would be even in that State, let alone in other
States or throughout the country. And, although ratification in one State may encourage other States to ratify in
their turn, it also may not, as the history of the proposed but never ratified Equal Rights Amendment proves.
Conversely, revitalization of the Militia can be accomplished in one State at a time, simply by the
passage of a statute. One State does not need the concurrence of any other State, or of the General Government,
to revitalize her Militia, because the Militia are "the Militia of the several States" taken as individual polities,
not as a collective. Revitalization of the Militia in one State helps that State immediately. And revitalization of
the Militia in one State shows other States exactly what can in fact be done, because it is being done, and
therefore encourages them in the most instructive manner possible to revitalize their Militia, too.
C. The ultimate deficit this country faces is one of time. T-I-M-E. Time. There is too little time to
engage in a process as lengthy, complex, and problematical as will involve and grow out of a constitutional
convention and its aftermath. A major economic collapse is now confronting the United States, and even the
entire world. It will not take ten or twenty years to come to its poisonous fruition. Anyone familiar with the
alternative financial media—and even much of the "mainstream" media, as well—knows that the Federal
Reserve System and the United States Treasury are in deep trouble. Indeed, "central banking", "fiat currencies",
"monetization" of public debt, and Ponzi schemes bottomed on "fractional reserves" (or in most instances
fictional "reserves") are disintegrating across the globe. Most crucially, the status of the Federal Reserve System
as the de facto "world central bank" and of the Federal Reserve Note as the de facto "world reserve currency" is
threatened. A collapse of the monetary and banking systems will result in depression, hyperinflation, or
depression coupled with hyperinflation. No State is adequately prepared at present to deal with the economic
chaos, social dislocations, civil unrest, and civil disobedience which will then ensure. And no possible
amendments of the Constitution can prevent this collapse from occurring, even if they were ratified tomorrow,
because the economic die has already been cast, and irretrievably so.
The present situation is very much like a scene which might have taken place on the doomed liner
Titanic: The ship has struck the iceberg; it is going down fast by the head. In the Grand Salon, Mr. Andrews, the
ship's designer, meets with a group of marine engineers and skilled workmen. They pour over blueprints, plans,
specifications, engineering tables of one kind and another, and lists of available materials and tools. Then they
announce to Captain Smith that, in principle, they can save the ship, by shoring up some old bulkheads, building
some new ones, and concentrating the pumps in a certain area. Captain Smith asks them how long it will take.
About twenty hours, Andrews replies. Unfortunately, at that moment Titanic has only an hour left to live. The
movement for a constitutional convention presents an exact parallel. Arguably, if everything went according to
plan (which raises an host of other questions) a set of good amendments could, in principle, go far towards
saving this country. But it would take five, ten, or twenty years to see significant results. And America can count
on far less time than that before the economic roof falls in on her head.
Actually, the Titanic scenario is far more realistic, because it involves solely a problem of engineering, a
solution for which can be worked out mathematically, and an accurate prediction of its effects made. Moreover,
everyone on Titanic would have wanted the problem to be solved as quickly as possible, because if the work
could have been done Titanic would not have sunk. Such a unanimity of purpose among Americans, especially
those high up in the political class, does not exist with respect to the proposal, ratification, or implementation of
new amendments truly favorable to "liberty". And, in any event, no one can predict the actual effects those
amendments may have when implemented. But it is certain that they can have no effect whatsoever on the
present economic situation and its immediate consequences, certainly not in time to correct the underlying
problem or significantly to mitigate its most disastrous effects.
America needs a solution to this problem—even a partial and imperfect solution—that can be put into
operation right now—or as I like to say, immediately if not sooner. The Militia are "necessary to the security of
a free State" in every sense, including "economic security". However, they are moribund. But they can be
revitalized in any State, and in every State, simply by the enactment of a single State statute in each jurisdiction.
Revitalization of the Militia does not constitute or depend upon "nullification", "interposition", or "civil
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disobedience"; neither does it require or entail violence. Anyone who suggests otherwise is simply ignorant of
the subject-matter.
For example, adoption by a State of an alternative currency in anticipation of the collapse of the Federal
Reserve System does not turn on establishing the unconstitutionality of the banking-cartel in the courts, or
ratifying a new constitutional amendment under the aegis of which the cartel would have to be disestablished.
For, whether that System is constitutional or unconstitutional in whole or in part now, or could be outlawed by
some new amendment later on, each State at this very moment retains reserved powers under the Constitution to
maintain her own Militia, to make gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, and to administer her
system of alternative currency through her Militia, without any consideration of the Federal Reserve. Similarly,
any State can insulate herself from the national para-military police state being set up under the Department of
Homeland Security by revitalizing her Militia and incorporating all State and Local "law-enforcement" and
"emergency-management" agencies within her Militia—whereupon no official of the DHS can give any
commands to those agencies, because no official of the DHS can be an "officer" in the Militia, inasmuch as the
Constitution explicitly reserves to each State the authority to appoint all of the "officers" in her own Militia
(other than the President of the United States). These actions can be taken right now, without the need to ratify
any new constitutional amendment, simply by the passage of a single statute in each State (if the matter is
handled competently), and even within what Mr. Baldwin describes as "the jurisprudence of our constitutional
law". So, until these relatively simple actions have been taken in at least one State, and their merits scientifically
falsified by the experiment's failure to produce the desired results, why would any prudent person want to
eschew them in favor of a highly problematic program aimed at a new constitutional convention?
Correctly revitalized, the Militia will prepare the people in each State for dealing with all sorts of
emergencies, including economic collapse, monetary chaos, civil disorder, massive food shortages, epidemics,
natural disasters, and so on. True enough, it may be that revitalization will help each State in her own particular
way, and perhaps at first only a single State. But "it is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness". And
it may be true that revitalization in one State will amount to just the first step in what ends up as a long and
difficult political and legal march through the rest of the States. But (as the Chinese proverb has it) "a journey of
a thousand li begins with a single step". After all, although Titanic sank, and hundreds died needlessly because
not enough lifeboats were available, it was nevertheless a blessing that some lifeboats were at hand, and that
some passengers were saved. Similarly, a "real liberty movement" (to use Mr. Baldwin's term) may not be able
to revitalize all of the Militia in all of the States, or to revitalize any of them in any of the States to the greatest
possible degree, in time to fend off all of the very worst effects of the coming economic collapse. But whatever
is accomplished will have some salutary effect, somewhere, for some people. And something achieved on that
score is better than nothing—and certainly is a far more realistic and attainable goal than the pie-in-the-sky
promises offered, without any assurances whatsoever, by the proponents of a new constitutional convention.
Personally, I am sick and tired—as no doubt are the readers of this column—of watching "the liberty
movement" commit suicide with the death of a thousand cuts at its own hand, day after day, year after year. But
launching another "children's crusade", which even if successful in obtaining its objective at some unpredictable
time in the future could not possibly deal with the great danger now confronting this country, is quixotic
behavior at best.
Yet the more I observe this situation, the more I sense that perhaps Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt
was sapient in his two negative replies to Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, as depicted in the Twentieth Century
Fox movie "The Desert Fox"—the first, when Rommel (played by James Mason) suggests that von Rundstedt
(played by Leo G. Carroll) should approach Hitler and try to convince him to change his insane strategy, and
von Rundstedt begs off; the second, when Rommel later tries to bring von Rundstedt into the German
resistance-movement's plan to depose Hitler, and von Rundstedt declines. As applied today in this country, the
lesson "The Desert Fox" teaches is that it may be too late to save "the liberty movement", and that the wise man
who has tried his best in the past to do so, but without a scintilla of success, is now entitled to stop beating his
head against a brick wall, and instead to sit back and view the entire matter with serene detachment, as merely
another sorry episode in the long chronicle of mankind's follies. Personally, I am not yet ready to embrace this
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lugubrious conclusion. But the more I observe "the liberty movement" at work today, the more I wonder
whether perhaps von Rundstedt might have been right, after all.
Edwin Vieira, Jr., holds four degrees from Harvard: A.B. (Harvard College), A.M. and Ph.D. (Harvard Graduate School of
Arts and Sciences), and J.D. (Harvard Law School).
For more than thirty years he has practiced law, with emphasis on constitutional issues. In the Supreme Court of the United
States he successfully argued or briefed the cases leading to the landmark decisions Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson, and Communications Workers of America v. Beck, which established constitutional and statutory
limitations on the uses to which labor unions, in both the private and the public sectors, may apply fees extracted from nonunion
workers as a condition of their employment.
He has written numerous monographs and articles in scholarly journals, and lectured throughout the county. His most recent
work on money and banking is the two-volume Pieces of Eight: The Monetary Powers and Disabilities of the United States
Constitution (2002), the most comprehensive study in existence of American monetary law and history viewed from a constitutional
perspective. www.piecesofeight.us
He is also the co-author (under a nom de plume) of the political novel CRA$HMAKER: A Federal Affaire (2000), a
not-so-fictional story of an engineered crash of the Federal Reserve System, and the political upheaval it causes. www.crashmaker.com
His latest book is: "How To Dethrone the Imperial Judiciary" ... and Constitutional "Homeland Security," Volume One, The
Nation in Arms...
He can be reached at his new address:
52 Stonegate Court
Front Royal, VA 22630.
E-Mail: Not available
PRUDENT FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN IS NO "FALLACY"
By Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., Ph.D., J.D.
October 16, 2013 (Source: http://newswithviews.com/Vieira/edwin262.htm)
Timothy Baldwin's latest column, "The Fallacies of Anti-Article V Advocates", is (as usual with him) a
well-presented statement of his position on the advisability—perhaps he would say the urgency or even the
necessity—of calling "an ‘amendment-proposing convention'". Yet I detect at least three problems with his
argument: two of these relating to the main issue of the utility of such a convention, the third to whether such a
convention is really the course of action the law and the times dictate.
I. Article V of the Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress, * * * on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments". The
language "shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments" sets out a constitution duty in Congress. It
embraces a constitutional power as well. That brings into play Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, which delegates to
Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers [that is, in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1 through 17], and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof". The power to
"call a Convention for proposing Amendments" is one of those "all other Powers". Therefore, pursuant to that
power, Congress may enact whatever "Law[ ] which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the * * * Power[ to call a Convention]".
What might such a "Law[ ]" entail? First, it would not necessarily have to accede to every jot and tittle of
whatever proposals appeared in "the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States". Article
V does not require Congress, in the manner of a robot, mechanically to adopt "the Application of th[os]e
Legislatures" word for word. An "Application" amounts to a request to Congress for it to exercise its power in
the premises, not a dictation by the States of how that power must be exercised. This raises an host of both
substantive and procedural questions.
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First, Congress could arguably influence the substance of such a "Convention". Presumably, an honest
Congress would include in its ultimate "call[ing of] a Convention" the particular amendments the States had
proposed, as part of the "Convention's" agenda. But nothing seems to preclude an honest Congress (and
certainly a dishonest one) from offering its own proposed amendments for consideration at the
"Convention"—if, for example, the "necessary and proper" "Law[ ]" Congress enacted for "call[ing] a
Convention" were passed by a two-thirds majority in each House, so that it could be said that the "Law[ ]" also
satisfied the requirement of Article V that "[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments". This would not be a "run-away convention" according to the plain text
of Article V; but it certainly might be according to the fears of many opponents of a new "Convention",
especially given the rogue Congress that now sits in the Disgrace of Columbia to the vexation of this country.
Second, Congress arguably could influence—I should think could control—the procedures employed at
the "Convention", with decided, if not decisive, effects upon the "Convention's" substantive outcome. And,
self-evidently, some procedures must be specified. For example, Congress might determine how delegates to the
"Convention" were to be selected, or perhaps could select them itself. Congress might determine when, where,
and for how long the "Convention" would meet. It might specify what rules of order were to be used, including
whether a simple majority of the delegates, or some super-majority, or voting by individual delegates or only by
States were allowable. And so on.
II. Who is to say that such a "Law[ ]" as hypothesized above would not be, at least in the collective mind
of Congress, "necessary and proper"? Indeed, who is to say that some such "Law[ ]"—embracing the
composition, agenda, and rules of procedure of a "Convention"—would not be "necessary and proper" in the
mind of any rational individual? According to what I take to be Mr. Baldwin's view of "judicial supremacy",
though, only the Supreme Court would enjoy the ultimate, final, and unreviewable authority to pass on the
"necessity" and "propriety" of that "Law[ ]". Now, I do not share Mr. Baldwin's opinions as to the powers, the
role, and especially the supremacy of the Supreme Court in America's constitutional system. In this country,
only WE THE PEOPLE, not any (or all) of their fallible agents, enjoy such supremacy.
There is, for example, no question that the more grotesque of what Mr. Baldwin charitably calls "judicial
errors" can be corrected by impeachment of errant Justices pour encourager les autres. Impeachment would
seem to be a far simpler exercise of Congressional power than amendment of the Constitution, especially
inasmuch as an admitted "judicial error" (let alone a "judicial crime") is, by legal hypothesis, not part of the
Constitution at all, and therefore does not need to (and logically cannot) be expunged by an amendment.
Impeachment, of course, is not the only way, short of an amendment, to deal with "judicial errors" that derive
from simple stupidity, let alone those better characterized as calculated usurpation and tyranny. I have dealt
extensively with this problem in my book How To Dethrone the Imperial Judiciary, and will not repeat all of
that here.
But let us take as a given, for purpose of argument, that Mr. Baldwin is correct, and that "judicial errors",
no matter how corrupt, dishonest, or even criminal, can be corrected only by an amendment of the Constitution.
What, then, if the scenario posited above actually occurs, the proponents of Mr. Baldwin's
"‘amendment-proposing convention'" find themselves hoisted with their own pétard, some of them somehow
manage to bring a "Case" or "Controversy" to the Supreme Court (perhaps in the Court's "original Jurisdiction"
in the name of one or more of the States which originally submitted the "Application"), and the Supreme Court
rules in favor of what Congress has done?! Then what?
Obviously, Mr. Baldwin has, somewhat imprudently, left out of consideration the problem that, if the
need for a new "Convention" arises out of the long list of "judicial errors" which derive from the (false) doctrine
of "judicial supremacy", but that (false) doctrine is not corrected before the new "Convention" is held, then the
"Convention" (as well as its aftermath) will remain at the mercy of the (false) doctrine it is meant to correct.
Holy self-contradiction, Batman! That does not appear to be a plausible way of dealing with the problem,
especially in light of the vast amount of time-consuming and costly political wheel-spinning which would have
to be put into obtaining the "Convention" in the first place.
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It would seem, therefore, that any proposal for a "Convention" must, first and foremost, describe in some
detail exactly how the "Convention" will solve, or at least circumvent, the problem of "judicial supremacy".
Absent such a solution, the call for a new "Convention" appears to be little more than "pie in the sky" without a
crust to hold it all together.
III. Finally, I feel the need to emphasize once again (and as far as I am concerned, for the last time in this
context) that the constitutional remedy which I contend is actually "necessary" at this juncture in the course of
human events, and which the Constitution itself tells us is "necessary" at all times—that is, revitalization of "the
Militia of the several States"—does not posit, let alone require, (in Mr. Baldwin's words) "having to use force",
in some "revolutionary" manner, in order to enforce the Constitution. The Constitution itself delegates to the
Militia the authority and the responsibility "to execute the Laws of the Union" (and the laws of the several States
within the States, especially to the extent that those laws might contravene "the Laws of the Union"). This
authority and responsibility is thus to be exercised within the Constitution, perforce of the Constitution, and for
the purpose of enforcing the Constitution—not extra-constitutionally let alone unconstitutionally.
And it is an authority and responsibility to be exercised by the Constitution's very principals, WE THE
PEOPLE themselves, not simply by their incompetent and even disloyal "representatives" and other putative
"agents". As I have written several books on this subject, I need do no more than remind readers of this column
that printing has been invented, and that they should take advantage of this invention.
In sum, it seems that the debate on this subject takes us back, once again, to the Grand Salon of Titanic
on that fateful night. The great liner is sinking—about that no possible doubt can be entertained. Mr. Andrews
(the ship's designer), Captain Smith, and other well-meaning and well-informed individuals are gathered around
a table, drafting plans for a new and better liner. As Mr. Andrews points out (perhaps correctly), if in the new
ship the watertight bulkheads are raised well above "E deck", the calamity which has befallen Titanic will be
obviated. That, however, will not save Titanic, let alone the hundreds who must perish with her. In the case of
the great ship of state America, the lives, fortunes, and freedoms of millions, not just hundreds, are now at stake.
And time is rapidly running out. Can we really afford to be drafting new designs for a future which may never
come? Or should we instead focus on maximizing damage-control with the very tools the Constitution describes
as "necessary", and which are available now if only we put them to use? On the theory that "it is better to light
one candle than to curse the darkness", I submit that it is more prudent to go about lighting the actual candle we
have at hand than to concern ourselves with other merely theoretical candles which may very well turn out to
contain neither wick nor wax.
© 2013 Edwin Vieira, Jr. - All Rights Reserved
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The Effort to Dismantle Our Constitution
By Jackie Patru
(revised and updated January, 2001)
Under article V of the Constitution, our founding fathers established two methods for future generations
to add amendments to the Constitution.
Under method 1: Two-thirds of both houses of Congress can propose an amendment, and then three-fourths
of the states ratify it... or not.
Under method 2: Two-thirds (34) of the states call for a federal constitutional convention, and then
three-fourths of the states ratify whatever amendments are proposed by the convention.
Notice that ratification by states does not specify state legislatures !
Those who insist there's nothing to fear from a con-con maintain that even if it were to get out of control it
would take three-fourths of the states to ratify it. They ask, "Would 38 states ratify a bad amendment?" At first
glance, it seems unlikely... but three facts are never mentioned by con-con advocates, and these are crucially
important points:
1) The convention could abolish or alter the rules of ratification as was done in 1787.
2) Article V authorizes Congress to decide on the mode of ratification: either by State Legislatures or by
special State Ratifying Conventions. In 1933 the 21st Amendment – lifting the prohibition on alcohol – was
ratified in special state conventions, thus circumventing the legislatures of the states.
[That incident bares further research. It appears that the BATF was created as a result of the
implementing legislation for Amendment 21. Maybe prohibition was instituted to create the ‘crime’ of distilling,
distributing, and consuming alcohol to justify the need for the "revenuers" and the ensuing crime bills. Maybe
Title 27, the Code of Federal Regulations used by the IRS is part of all that, since the IRS is under Title 26 and
there is no CFR for Title 26. Whatever the case, the proponents of the 21st Amendment, circumvented the
States in favor of ratifying conventions to get the amendment ratified because they knew they wouldn’t get
ratification by the state legislatures.]
3) Advocates of a convention deceptively offer false assurances that a convention can be limited to a single
subject. Some state legislators feel safe with their state's call for a con-con because they have added to it a "null
and void" clause if the convention not be limited to the specific purpose of proposing an amendment to balance
the budget.
Article V authorizes the states only to apply for a convention. Once underway, the convention makes its own
rules and could reject any or all restrictions on its activity and assert its supreme power by virtue of its direct
authority from the Constitution.
The Unbridled Power of the Delegates to a Con-Conhas been acknowledged several times by various State
Supreme Courts; and a letter from former U.S. Chief Justice, Warren Burger confirms the danger.
All 27 amendments to our Constitution originated in Congress and were then ratified by the states. The
second method, by federal convention, has never been used because it places too much power in the hands of
few. The first and only convention was held in 1787, during which our Constitution was framed.
In 1787 the founders had convinced the people a Conference of States should be held for the purpose of
"making some changes" in the Articles of Confederation. The delegates to the Conference in Philadelphia were
under strict instructions from their respective states and the Congress to meet ‘for the sole and express purpose’
of revising the Articles of Confederation. As we know, they did much more than that. They threw out the
Articles of Confederation and drafted a new constitution.
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The 55 men present at that conference locked the doors – and even nailed the windows shut – to the public
and the press, and proceeded to draft an entirely new document which replaced the Articles of Confederation.
Many believe that what our founders did was providential; however, it hardly seems wise to trust the special
interests of today with powers that could be used "lawfully" to re-write or worse... replace our Constitution.
At the Conference of States, the delegates created a Committee of the Whole, passed a resolution repealing
the Articles of Confederation and continued on with what became known as the first and only Constitutional
Convention. Can you imagine hearing, "The Constitution for the United States of America is hereby
dissolved."? It happened that way in the 1787 Convention. . . it could happen again.
Some Modern History
In 1964 the Ford Foundation funded and orchestrated – via the CSDI (Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions – the drafting of a new constitution for America. This model constitution, drawing upon the efforts
of more than 100 people, took ten years to write. The 40th draft was published in a book titled The Emerging
Constitution, by Rexford G. Tugwell (Harper & Row, 1974). The project cost $2.5 million per year and
produced the Proposed Constitution for the Newstates of America.
In case you would be inclined to dismiss the relevance of the proposed new constitution, bear in mind that it
is the product of a globalist minded, tax-exempt think-tank which took ten years, $25,000,000, and the
collaboration of over one-hundred like-minded individuals.
"It would be folly to believe this investment is intended to be merely an exercise in political theory. The
frightening reality is, the planners are serious in their efforts to impose a new constitution upon the people of
America as we enter the 21st Century." – Col. Arch Roberts, Committee to Restore the Constitution (This link
opens in a new browser window).
After the completion of the proposed Newstates Constitution (1974), Nelson Rockefeller, then president of
the U.S. Senate, engineered the introduction of HCR 28 calling for an unlimited Constitutional Convention
(Con-Con) in 1976. Public opposition defeated this effort so the convention backers then went to the states
promoting a "limited convention" for the ostensible purpose of adding a balanced budget amendment.
Since 1976 the advocates of a Con-Con convinced 32 of the required 34 states to pass resolutions calling for
a convention. The last state to apply was Missouri in 1983 and since then legislators in three states (Alabama,
Florida and Louisiana), having realized the dangers of this action rescinded their call.
The Nevada House of Representatives "purged" its resolution. However, since both chambers passed the
resolution, it is questionable whether the one-chamber purge would be accepted as a rescission. Conversely, it
has been argued that because the resolution was actually purged from the records – as though it never passed – it
would negate the initial resolution which must pass in both chambers to be complete.
We should not consider Nevada’s purge, nor the rescissions of Alabama, Florida and Louisiana as a
safety margin.
According to Article V of the Constitution, Congress must call a convention when 2/3rds of the states apply.
That magic number is 34 states. Since three states have formally withdrawn (rescinded) their calls, that would
seemingly leave us 5 states away from having a Con-Con. However, we have been informed that the advocates
of the convention are waiting to capture not five, but only two more. It is said that if they get two more states to
pass resolutions for a Con-Con, they plan to challenge the rescissions of the three states and throw them into the
courts while going ahead with a convention.
Considering the blatant corruption in courts at all levels today, it would be folly to rest on our laurels and feel
safe that the courts would uphold those rescissions. For that reason, it should be considered at this time that if
only two states pass resolutions calling for a con-con for the purpose of adding the balanced budget amendment,
Congress would be required by the Constitution to open a Convention.
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Renewed Efforts
After 1983, there were sporadic efforts by various states to pass the resolutions, each of which failed. In 1993
the push was on. Twelve States simultaneously introduced Con-Con resolutions. When that effort was
unsuccessful, the forces promoting the Con-Con went back to the planning board.
While the Tenth Amendment State Sovereignty Resolution was being introduced in many states in 1994,
those desiring the ultimate elimination of the states spent the year laying the foundation for an historical repeat
of 1787... a Constitutional Convention.
The Conference of States was scheduled to take place in "historic" Philadelphia, October 22nd through 25th,
1995 – coincidentally falling on the October 24th, Fifty-year Anniversary of the UN. So sure of success were the
powers behind the effort , a Canadian newspaper in 1995 (according to Allen Watt) informed its readers that
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, would be out of the country in October, attending an "important
convention" in Philadelphia. We discovered later that Margaret Thatcher’s secretary was an advisor to the COS.
Although the COS was billed as a plan by Governors Michael Leavitt of Utah and Ben Nelson of Kansas, it
became clear from a 1987 ACIR-CSG paper that in reality the Governors were merely delivery boys for the
scheme led by the Rockefeller founded Council of State Governments. In addition to Leavitt’s Memorandum of
5-17-94: Subject: Conference of States, with its veiled intentions, our first piece of real evidence that the COS
was, in fact, planning a Con-Con, appeared in the Salt Lake Tribune 5-25-94, of which unfortunately we did not
have knowledge until February, ‘95 after twelve states had passed the resolution. According to the Tribune
article, Leavitt had taken
"... his plan for an informal states’ conference and a possible constitutional convention to the Western States
Summit in Phoenix."
Because of the outrage of many Summit attendees of his stated goal for a constitutional convention, Leavitt
and company pulled in their horns and proceeded more carefully, denying plans of a con-con clear to the
bitter-sweet end. Bitter for the planners, that is; sweet for those of us who worked ‘round the clock for months,
praying fervently for divine guidance in our efforts to preserve the Constitution. Our prayers were granted, just
as Jesus promised, "ask and it shall be given you". In reality, the outcome was sweet for all Americans, most of
whom had no clue the battle for their freedom was raging.
Conservatives More Dangerous Than Liberals
Interestingly, the organizations and leaders who purport to be ‘conservative’ are the strongest proponents of a
Constitutional Convention.
Foremost among them are the *American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), *National Taxpayers'
Union (NTU), *Republican National Committee (RNC) and most notably the *Committee on the Constitutional
System (CCS), chaired by Senator Nancy Kassebaum from Kansas, former Secretary of the Treasury, C.
Douglas Dillon, and former Counsel to the President, Lloyd N. Cutler. Lloyd N. Cutler was Ross Perot’s
advisor; Jimmy Carter’s White House Counsel; and reared his ugly head for a brief period during one of
Clinton’s scandals.
When Ross Perot appeared on the scene in 1992, he publicly called for a Constitutional Convention. We
have transcripts of Perot's separate guest appearances with Barbara Walters, Phil Donahue and Larry King
during which he stated emphatically that we need a Parliamentary Government (for which Paul Weyrich pines)
and bragged that "his people" could get the remaining states needed for a Constitutional Convention call, "in
their sleep". When Perot supporters – members of United We Stand America – discovered their ‘hero’ was in
actuality setting them up to take a fall, UWAS as an organization began to disintegrate.
Jesuit-trained Paul Weyrich, founder of ALEC, and apparently the supreme commander at the Council for
National Policy meetings, has been a major behind-the-scenes player. ALEC’s hired hand – lawyer John Armor
– was the foremost lobbyist to state legislators in the decades-long effort to win the required number of state
calls via the "balanced budget amendment" resolution. Weyrich stated in a Washington Post article he authored,
titled A Conservative’s Lament, that America needs
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"... some type of shadow government... " because "Unlike European parliamentary democracies, we have no
‘shadow cabinet’, no group of experts who are groomed by their party for decades before they take high
office...".
We've come to realize that, even though the liberals are blamed for the downfall of America, the phony
conservative leaders have held the door open for them to do so. We urgently appeal to true conservative state
legislators and Americans in all political parties to open their eyes to the fact that the Democrat and Republican
parties are a single two-headed monster.
What Would America Look Like Under The Constitution for the Newstates of America?
As outlined in the proposed Constitution for the Newstates of America, the fifty united sovereign States will
be segmented into ten regions. As we know, that step has already been completed by Nixon’s executive order,
although it could simply be undone by state legislative action. States would be eliminated as will elected
representation by and for the people, replaced by over-seers in the 10 regions with appointed bureaucrats to keep
their subjects in line. This plan, promulgated by the International elite, would more efficiently and effectively
control the 280 million people in America under an intended World Government, the seat of which would be the
United Nations.
The Bill of Rights would be replaced by "privileges" given to us by the world government and taken away at
its whim. For example...
Article 1-A Sec.1 - "Freedom of expression shall not be abridged except in declared emergency". A perpetual
state of emergency could be declared which would prevent anyone from writing the material you are now
reading. In fact, we could face imprisonment for the mere reading of this type information.
Article 1A Sec.8 - "The practice of religion shall be privileged".
Article 1B Sec. 8 - "Bearing of arms shall be confined to the police, members of the armed forces, and those
licensed under law."
Article VIII states that the judge decides if there is to be a jury. It is very similar to the "constitutions" under
which people in Russia and other Communist countries live. Of course, we are all to believe that Communism is
dead and the UN is "democratizing" all the nations of the world.
Here are a few other items:
Farms – Rexford Tugwell, the lead author of the Newstates Constitution said that private ownership of farms
had not proved good for society.
Depression – Senator Kassebaum’s CCS says they want to wait until the U.S. is in a 1929 type depression to
call a convention, because only then would the public accept the radical changes they want.
Schools – Article 1-A Sec. 11 says that free education would only be for those who pass appropriate tests.
In conclusion... for those who believe our Constitution is already dead, and for those of you who claim the
Constitution was a scam perpetrated by the Brotherhood – the very fact that the International Elite have been
trying for decades to open it up for their proposed changes, should be a clue that we have something they want.
How about the Bill of Rights? The Second Article of Amendment? The Ninth and Tenth Articles of
Amendment? Article V, which cannot be touched, and which declares that "No State, without its consent, shall
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."
Did you know that ours is the only Constitution in the world which refers to the Citizens as the People?
Other nations’ Constitutions refer to the people as "subjects". We have papers that lay out the NAFTA
Implementation Schedule, which shows that by 2005 the U.S. and Canada are to be merged. Allen Watt, a
Canadian and frequent guest on the Sweet Liberty broadcast recently told us about a Canadian TV program he
saw. A group of professors discussing a recent summit they had attended, each and all came to the conclusion
that it could never happen unless they could somehow repeal our 2nd Amendment.
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James M. Burns, on page 160 of Reforming American Government stated:
"Let us face reality. The framers have simply been too shrewd for us. They have outwitted us. They designed
separated institutions that cannot be unified by mechanical linkages, frail bridges, tinkering. If we are to ‘turn
the founders upside down – to put together what they put asunder – we must directly confront the Constitutional
structure they erected...""
In 1787, before the Constitution was ratified and while a few state officials were still uneasy about certain
parts of it, there began a movement to reopen the convention. JAMES MADISON, the prime motivator of the
first convention, was horrified by the mere suggestion of reconvening. In a letter to George Turberville, he said:
"Under these circumstances it seems scarcely to be presumable that the deliberations of the body could be
conducted in harmony, or terminate in the general good. Having witnessed the difficulties and dangers
experienced by the first Convention which assembled under every propitious circumstance, I should tremble for
the result of a Second".
So should we all tremble for the result of a second.
May our Heavenly Father / Creator Continue to Guide and Bless Our Work
(remember... we must ASK)
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ISSUE BRIEF
Prepared by the National Veterans Committee on Constitutional Affairs (NVCCA)
On the Need to Pass State Resolutions
To Rescind Previous Applications to Congress for a
Federal Constitutional Convention
The following states have passed resolutions calling for a Constitutional convention ostensibly to
balance the federal budget. (These resolutions passed during the mid 1980's, and should be the first
targets for the con con removal resolution below. The model following would repeal and any all open
calls for a convention, regardless of the subject matter.
ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, COLORADO, DELAWARE, FLORIDA,
GEORGIA, IDAHO, INDIANA, IOWA, KANSAS, LOUISIANA, MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI,
MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NEW MEXICO, NORTH CAROLINA,
NORTH DAKOTA, OKLAHOMA, OREGON, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH
DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, TEXAS, UTAH, VIRGINIA and WYOMING.
© 2008 by the NVCCA
www.nvcca.net
All Rights Reserved.
This booklet may NOT be sold, but is distributed free of charge to
State Legislators and activists working to prevent
a 21 Century Constitution Convention in America.st
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MODEL STATE RESOLUTION
Author: The Late Edward Calliteau
Applicability: (State) In states were the legislatures have applied to Congress to open a Constitutional Convention, this resolution can
be offered to repeal those open calls.
To Rescind Previous Applications for a Constitutional Convention
To rescind any and all previous applications by the Legislature of the State of ______ to the Congress of the
United States of America for the purpose of calling a convention for any purpose, limited or general, to make
specific amendment of general revision of the Constitution of the United States of America.
WHEREAS, the legislature of the State of ______, acting with the best intentions, has previously made
application to the Congress of the United States of America for the calling of a constitutional convention for the
limited purpose of proposing certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America; and
WHEREAS, the best legal minds in the nation today are in general agreement that a convention,
notwithstanding whatever limitation might be placed upon it by the call of said convention, would have within
the scope of its authority the complete redrafting of the Constitution of the United States of America, thereby
creating a great danger to the well-established rights of our people and to the constitutional principles under
which we are presently governed; and
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the United States of America, while it has been amended many times in the
history of the nation and may yet be amended many times, has been extensively interpreted and had proven to be
a sound document which protects the freedom of all Americans; and
WHEREAS there is no need for a new constitution, the adoption of which would create legal chaos in America
and only begin the process of another two centuries of litigation over its interpretation by the courts; and
WHEREAS, such changes as may be needed in the present Constitution of the United States may be proposed
and enacted by the well-established method of amendment contained therein.
BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED that the Legislature of the State of ______ does hereby rescind any and all
previous applications to the Congress of the United States made by the Legislature of the State of ______
pursuant to Article V of the Constitution of the United States for the calling of a constitutional convention for
any purpose, limited or general.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that a copy of this Resolution be transmitted to the presiding officers of the
Senate and the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America, to the members of the
_______ delegation to the Congress of the United States, and to the presiding officers of each house of the
legislatures of the several states.
ON THE SUPPOSED NEED TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION
Across America, people see the federal government as a different colored horse from the one created by
fifty five men during the summer of 1787. Some particularly goofy ideas have come out recently that purport to
be "solutions" to our national woes, but serious students of history and political science generally agree that
many of the proposed solutions would be worse than the problem.
Some may argue our that the primary task of “conventioneers” would be to propose ideas in a
convention to downsize the federal government. On the contrary however, it is important to at least keep in
mind proposals currently before the public that would actually increase the size and scope of the federal
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government, while curtailing the civil liberties now enjoyed by Americans. Many proposals would, if allowed to
come into legal existence, both increase the powers of the federal government, and legalize that which is now
forbidden by the chains of the Constitution. At best, they would continue the trend of tampering with the
balance of power, or give the feds authority even in our bedrooms. We want to halt the march toward tyranny, or
in the words of the creative accountants in our taxation offices, at least slow the rate of its growth.
Before we review three specific recently suggested constitutional changes, let's review the process of
amending the constitution. This is key to understanding one angle of the `crisis of federalism,' as pundits are
proposing institutional change as a method of `restoring the federalism balance.' Such changes are not necessary.
This will heighten your awareness of the potential problem.
The Founding Fathers made provisions within the Constitution to enable amendments. They recognized
that changing needs could necessitate governmental change, and that a Constitution so inflexible and rigid that
could not adapt, would eventually create yet another revolution sometime in the future. Amendments can be
proposed in two ways: the congressional amendment and a Constitutional convention. Here is Article V of the
Constitution for the United States of America, in its entirety:
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article, and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suffrage
in the Senate.
The original Constitutional convention gave us a framework for government without a Bill of Rights. On
the insistence of the states, the first ten amendments were drafted and submitted for ratification. Those ten
amendments, history has shown, were a very good idea.
Since the Bill of Rights, seventeen new amendments have been added. For a nation to survive over 200
years, and to only require that few number of changes, it seems the Constitution, as originally written, has
served America well. In all instances, Congress proposed the needed changes, under Article V, and passed them
to the states for their approval. A second Constitutional convention (Con-con) has never occurred.
These amendments did various things, including correcting some discriminatory policies of the states
(14th, 15th, 18th, 24th & 26th Amendments), realigning the dates Congress is in session (20th) and other minor
mechanical changes.
One amendment (the 18th) proved so unenforceable (alcohol prohibition) that it was repealed (by the
21st). In fact, that one amendment proves conclusively it requires a constitutional amendment for the federal
government to come into the states to regulate any specific item not regulable under the terms of the
Constitution. (How then can Congress mandate anything else within the states absent a specific amendment for
each proposed regulation?)
The amendment process is simple. A member of Congress pens an idea into a proposed amendment. The
proposal is voted on by the Congress. A proposal that passes by the required margin of 2/3 of the members of
Congress is then submitted to the states for agreement (ratification). That process has been repeated for every
change proposed since 1789.
Constitutional amendments proposed by Congress happen slowly. Once the states have the amendment
in their legislatures for consideration, thorough debate occurs on the suggestion. That way, each change gets
considered on its own merits. If public support and common sense favors the change, then it happens. The
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evidence supporting the proposed change must be overwhelming. Two-thirds of the Congress and three-fourths
of the states must approve. In other words, the idea better be a sound one if it has any chance for success.
There are three significant constitutional amendment proposals floating about today. All three have their
proponents and detractors, and all three seem to cut across the traditional `lines in the sand.'
Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA)
The first significant proposal is a Balanced Budget Amendment (BBA). The concept is one that is hard
to argue with at first glance. Both `liberals' and `conservatives' know Congress is fouling our nation with debt,
and some significant problems are resulting. Proponents of a BBA neglect, however, the existing formula for
raising revenue and extinguishing year-end deficits. Furthermore, since the 1970's, numerous proposed
`Amendments' have been brought forward, and upon review, they all allow Congress `loopholes' to continue
business-as-usual deficits. None address the Federal Reserve specifically, which is a requirement if there is ever
to be a balanced budget.
The BBAs which have been proposed in the past several years don't appear to have been written by a
person whose true motive was a balanced federal budget. That explains why few people are taking any
amendment seriously, and what is behind the "foot-dragging."
In looking at the proposed amendments, it is the consensus of opinions of economists, lawyers,
Congressmen, and other "experts" that the BBAs offered to date won't end deficit spending. While there have
been too many amendments proposed to get into the specifics of each in this limited space, most of them have
several things in common.
• They fail to define key words,
• Allow deficits,
• Exclude borrowing and other contributing factors,
• Are based on predictions,
• Upset the balance of power, and
• Provisions of them supersede existing powers of Congress.
LACK OF DEFINITIONS
For some bizarre reason, the proposed amendments usually fail to define key words. Knowing the
semantic tactics of our lawyers on the Potomac, I am immediately suspicious of any amendment lacking
ironclad wording. Congress should not be given the ability to make up the rules as they go. As an example,
words like "receipt" and "outlay" can have their meanings change within the context of the amendment by a
future act of Congress removing an item from the "official" budget and declaring it an "off-budget" item. The
proposed amendments seen to date have such language in them, and don’t plug the holes.
THEY ALLOW DEFICIT SPENDING
The proposed BBAs usually contain provisions giving Congress the ability to ignore the amendment.
Would the bill of rights been ratified had a provision enabled Congress to suspend them? How easy would it be
to get Congress to vote for big spending bills (circumventing a BBA) if such a loop-hole were created?
EXCLUSION OF BORROWING
Deficit spending is caused by borrowing. There will never be a balanced federal budget as long as the
Federal Reserve exists, and borrowing continues to finance last year's programs and cost overruns. The BBAs
proposed to date exempt borrowed funds from being counted as a receipt; hence the maintenance of the status
quo is inevitable.
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EXCLUSION OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Nothing in the proposed BBAs address the Federal Reserve. The Fed alone is the cause of inflation.
Inflation contributes to budgetary problems. Deficits necessitate borrowing, which in turn results in
accumulating debt, compounded by interest. Interest drains available revenue from circulation necessitating
additional borrowing to make up for the shortfall. It is a devastating cycle that gets worse each year. All
contributing factors--the Federal Reserve System, borrowing from it, interest payments to it, the practice of
`monetizing' foreign debts through international bodies, the oppressive levels of inland excise taxes--all must be
addressed by any budget balancing proposal. If not, a BBA will be impotent. ("Monetizing a debt" is the process
of using the `commercial paper' of the creditor as the "reserve requirement" to justify the emission of paper
"money." That exact process is the excuse for the Federal Reserve to cause paper to be printed for U.S.
government obligations. Compounding our own budgetary problems is the scenario of the Fed "collateralizing"
foreign debts with U.S. obligations, and then "monetizing" the foreign debt in the United States. For all intents
and purposes, the budgets of foreign governments are being placed squarely on the back of the United States
taxpayer. This is what the "professionals" are doing while you are allowing them to "handle" our monetary
"needs." Any questions? If so, direct them to your Congressman.)
PREDICATED ON PREDICTIONS
Under the proposed BBAs, Congress is given the power to predict the future. A budget that is "balanced"
on paper, based on projected `receipts' and `outlays' (whatever they are), is constitutional as far as the
amendment is concerned. If revenue fails to be generated as predicted, it would not effect the constitutionality of
the resultant deficit. If spending is added at a later time in response to an "emergency" (whatever that is), the
budget would need not be modified. Borrowing would therefore continue to be the solution to the borrowing
problem, and `supplemental appropriations bills' will continue to be the preferred method of `sneaking' in pork.
This same practice occurs in many states. Necessary items are left out to fund the pork up front, then necessities
are tacked on as supplemental appropriations. Smoke and mirrors, prestidigitation, call it what you want. It is
criminal politics in action.
UPSET THE BALANCE OF POWER
The "escape clauses" (which allow deficits, interest and indiscriminate borrowing) are in contrast to the
clear wording of the existing Constitution. The very language of the BBAs is confusing (according to State
Senator Howard Dennis of Maryland, "an algebra formula"). The Constitution's original wording is concise.
Adding a BBA to the Constitution would therefore allow the current dishonest and unaccountable practices of
the Congress to continue unchecked. A return to the principles and original intent of the Constitution would end
deficits. The proposed BBAs would, in fact, legalize that which is now forbidden by the Constitution, and shift
the balance of power toward the federal government. To display the proper balance of power, all the people need
do is to enforce that which now exists.
SUPERCEDE THE EXISTING POWERS OF CONGRESS
There exists in the Constitution a power, an emergency power, to accomplish a balanced annual federal
budget. That power, to impose an emergency direct tax on the states, is referred to elsewhere in this book as the
rule of apportionment, and is identified publicly sometimes as the `Fair Share Method' or the `State Rate Tax.'
(Many 3rd Parties are or have adopted this as their balanced budget proposal, and information about it is
contained later in this book, and in the Appendix.) Its only purpose is to give Congress the mechanism by which
to prevent year end or continually accumulating deficits. However, if any of the proposed BBAs, in their current
forms, were to be adopted, this existing power would be, for all practical purposes, erased.
Much research has recently been devoted by patriots to exposing to public awareness the amazing
realities of this seldom discussed power of Congress to quash deficits. After a BBA is passed, a judge ruling on
a constitutional question about this power would likely say: "Yes, you are right. Congress could have balanced
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the budget using this power. However, since this amendment was adopted for the specific purpose of achieving
a planned balanced budget, the previous powers are considered moot under the blanket of the amendment."
BBA SUMMARY
Many groups and individuals support the notion of a BBA. Unfortunately, most who do are either
unaware of, or they neglect, the ability Congress has to effect an annually balanced federal budget under the
"State Rate Tax" (apportionment) method. Until now, this has been attributed to a general lack of public
knowledge about Congress' monetary abilities under the provisions of the Constitution. Recent revelations of
historical proofs now show conclusively a BBA is unnecessary–if members of Congress are compelled by the
states to obey the Constitution they took an oath to uphold.
Why does anyone think that Congress will obey another amendment to the Constitution, when that body
has consistently ignored its existing provisions, and more precisely, its legislative intent?
Passing a BBA (at least the ones seen thus far), would allow the current spend/borrow/tax policies of
Congress to continue. Passage would jeopardize other Constitutional provisions, and would summarily fail to
achieve the goal of a balanced annual federal budget. Other proposals offered by "budget conscious"
Congressmen (read that–"tax and spend") only serve to add additional burdens to our industries and production
base. In an economy already succumbing to the pressure of over-taxation, the question now is: "How much more
can we bear?" Proposed BBAs using words like `unless' and `except' are colossal farces, at best. At worst, every
BBA thus far proposed would in fact legalize that which is now forbidden.
These proposed BBAs are dangerous toys in the hands of a Congress who epitomizes irresponsibility.
They are subversive to the intent of the founders of this nation, positively will not cure the problems we now
face as a nation, and are merely based on political vote catering to so-called conservatives who do not have a
clue what is really going on.
Americans need to promote a budget balancing method, not amendments. That method is found at
Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution for the United States of America, and is supported by the other
pieces of documentation.
Many people are trying to convince the American public that a BBA is the only solution to the nation's
budgetary dilemma. This has been done prior to answering the basic question: is the budgetary problem an
institutional one requiring constitutional change, or is the problem a policy and procedural one whereby
changing policy and/or the officials that make that policy would be a better answer to the problem?
The majority of Americans trust their attorney-representatives and senators to understand the law and to
propose workable solutions to our national problems of debt. Unfortunately it appears that neither the Congress
nor the general public has enough knowledge of how our government is supposed to operate to even address the
issue with a modicum of intelligence. The people believe the nightly news version, or the wording of the
proposed BBAs will actually accomplish the desired end result.
Many also believe in Santa Claus.
Is Congress serious about limiting its own power?
Who really believes that any government official is going to be a knowing party to any measure that
would limit his power? If anything, their "good intentions" must be carefully scrutinized for excuses to increase
it!
LINE ITEM VETO (LIV)
Straight from the pages of England's handbook on Parliamentary government is the notion of a line-item
veto. Under this provision, the President would have the ability to `cut' single items from Congress' revenue
bills. This is supported seemingly across the board by both liberals and conservatives.
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At first glance, the line item veto seems a good way to give the President the power to eliminate any
`pork' he finds in the budget. In reality, it gives the President powers to encourage pork.
How? Imagine the power of a President with LIV authority. A congressman wants a new defense
manufacturing facility built in his home district. The President simply targets that item as a `potential' cut, and
immediately that congressman must lick the boots of his fearful master or his pet project is threatened.
The line-item veto amounts to transferring enormous powers of the purse to the executive, in complete
and flagrant disregard for the separation of powers. It would encourage Congress to fund all sorts of items, in
exchange for the favoritism the President will ask for in return for his support. No my friends, the line item veto
is a MOST dangerous farce.
TERM LIMITS
The final proposal we will address is the notion of imposing term limits on members of Congress. As
with the other suggested changes to our United States Constitution, term limits viewed through traditional
`liberal' and `conservative' eyes are a good thing. Viewed by the framers of the Constitution, reasonable doubt
appears.
When debating the length of time members of Congress would serve, the plan was drafted to have
frequent elections in the U.S. House of Representatives. Simply put, people who serve in Washington were to
have very close ties to home--to the economics and interests of their territories. Obviously, career politicians
loose touch quickly. This is why there is already a two year election mandate, and members of Congress deemed
out of sync with their districts should be retired by the constituencies thereof.
Term limits are a double edge sword. There are members of Congress who are very solid on the issues of
their constituencies. Mandatory term limits would prevent voters from reelecting a good individual--just as they
may achieve the beneficial result of retiring the NWO connected.
Our nation was founded on the principles of self government. Allowing the people the right to elect, or
reelect, whomever they choose, is a solid foundation of republican government. Telling the public they cannot
reelect a good congressmen by an arbitrary passage of time is simply a restriction on the minds of the people. It
is another control by force. However desirable it may be to retire some hard-line anti-federalists, it must not be
done at the expense of the liberty of the public to elect whomever they feel best represents their views. Better
would be the concerted efforts of patriots to involuntarily retire by criminal prosecution those who would
circumvent our Constitution's terms and conditions.
Our focus should be working during the campaigns to retire at the ballot box those who are not acting in
the interests of the people. Those who have been in Congress with an utter disregard for the principles identified
in the Federalist Papers, should be voted out–even if they have only been there two years.
When the most recent term limit constitutional amendment proposal came up before Congress, many of
the five-plus term members voted for the amendment. Who are they trying to kid? If that crowd wanted to make
a statement in favor of term limits, they should simply resign! (Truth is, they knew well in advance what the
final vote would be prior to casting it, and enough of them "supported" the idea to make themselves appear
conservative in the eyes of their constituencies. Bah! We are educated to some degree in this nation, not total
idiots!
America would be far better off without the vast majority of the long-term members now in office. I put
together some "Vote'em Out" pamphlets as part of LEADERS a few years back, and surveyed the voting records
of five-plus term members to ascertain how they voted on key Constitution-related issues in the past ten years.
Only nine out of 189 members surveyed [4.8%] scored 80% or better. [43.4% of the House has been in office 5+
terms!] Only two members scored 90%, and none voted in conformity to the Constitution 100% of the time!
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SUMMARY
Numerous proposals exist today that are not as desirable as the `conservatives' would have us believe.
These include the notions for a balanced budget amendment, a line item veto amendment, and a constitutional
amendment dictating term limits. In reality, every excuse is being used to OPEN A CONVENTION – WHICH IS
THE REAL GOAL! Be it “immigration” or “federalism” excuses, there is a concerted movement afoot to open a
convention – the first since 1787. Let no amount of smoke and mirrors blur the notion of why this convention is
desirable by those who would reduce our rights to revokable privileges. A BBA would be useless, the line item
veto would erode the separation of powers even further–transferring dangerous powers of the purse to the
President, and term limits would be ill advised because the people already have a way to VOTE OUT their
Congressmen every two or six years. (The state legislatures should monitor the United States Senate, and advise
the people of their state accordingly on their performance.)
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The desire for a Constitutional convention can be founded on only two ideas. First, there could be an
agenda to put aside what the Founding Fathers created. Secondly, a complete misunderstanding of the language
of the Constitution could cause people to support concepts (like the BBA, LIV, Term Limits, Immigration
Reform, etc.) which would not be in their best interest. The convention is also promoted as a way to "restore
federalism." Both are sick reasons for a venture into a Constitutional convention (Con-con).
Promoters of a convention today cite `problems with federalism' as the rationale to have a convention.
Do they have ulterior motives? Is the public so ignorant of the Constitution that they believe whatever the
nightly news tells them? Sadly, both appear to be true.
Today the winds of change are blowing. The people recognize that, for some reason, the federal
government has outstepped its constitutional boundaries. Christians are even being herded into the push for
constitutional change for such items as an amendment precluding gay marriages. (As anyone with a pulse
realizes, marriage is [or should be] neither a federal nor a state regulatory [licensing] matter. That institution is
properly governed entirely by the churches, and at the Higher level, by God and the couple. Making a ‘federal’
matter of it is inviting all sorts of separation of Church & state problems!)
It is increasingly obvious that the majority of Americans are fed up to their 1040's with the federal
government. Using the `crisis of federalism' as a rallying call for `conservative reforms,' the promoters of a
convention have moved dangerously close to opening pandora's box. If a convention is opened, not one
amendment at a time, but the entire Constitution would be laid on a surgical table for review and/or elimination
in favor of a `21st century Ivy League' version.
A convention shall be convened by Congress when two-thirds of the states petition as such. With 50
states, that means thirty-four must do so. Over two-hundred years have passed since the last Constitutional
convention met in Philadelphia. Today, we stand on the verge of a second.
Ever since the 1700's various states have called, at one time or another, for a Constitutional convention.
A real push began in 1974 with the notion of an “Equal Rights Amendment.”
The momentum began fizzling out though when the American people began to balk at the thoughts of
major surgery on the framework that had preserved them for so long. Various special interest groups have been
identified as having agendas not consistent with their rhetoric. No other states, despite repeated attempts to do
so, were able to get Con-con calling resolutions through since the 1980's. Three states passed resolutions
repealing their earlier calls for a convention.
Although being brought to the brink of institutional change, the Congress has failed to respond to the
sense of urgency felt among the people and the states. The calls for a convention cited the need for Congress to
get its fiscal house in order by balancing the federal budget. Congress should have been terrified at the thought
of the states playing with power like that. Why were they not? The answer could only be that, as a body,
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Congress would welcome a modern convention, with the public ignorance factor so high. They could walk out
even more omnipotent!
Some groups are not advocating a return to limited national government the way the rhetoric of Con-con
promoters would leave one to believe. One such group, the Committee on the Constitutional System (CCS),
suggested a platform of "reforms" to be made in the form of constitutional amendments. While the CCS does
not claim to advocate a Constitutional convention to achieve these changes, the CCS says they will be ready if
one is convened.
What changes do they want?
CCS changes would give the President the power to: declare "no confidence" in Congress and force an
unscheduled congressional election; Appoint congressmen to his cabinet (eliminating the requirement that they
first resign their congressional seat); Appoint members of his cabinet to Congress; To appoint one additional
congressman for every five duly elected.
Other Proposals would:
1. Run candidates on a party slate (Voters would therefore vote for party, not for any individual candidate based
on his qualifications.)
2. Restructure the terms of office from 2 years to 4 years for representatives, and from 6 to 8 years for senators;
3. Repeal the two term limit for a President to hold office.
The program of CCS "reforms" is outlined in their book "Reforming American Government: The
Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System."(*) The changes the CCS proposes would
create a Parliamentary system of government. Would those changes improve the political climate of America, or
restore state sovereignty? You have got to be joking!
(*) "Reforming American Government: The Bicentennial Papers of the Committee on the Constitutional System" Edited by Donald L. Robinson.
Boulder Westview Press, 1985.
Under the auspices of balancing the federal budget, a second Constitutional convention could be
convened in the very near future--if the needed states ratify calls to Congress for one. The CCS could achieve
`reforms' that would create an entirely foreign form of government. Do their suggestions seem like desirable
`reforms?'
Other proposals are floating around as well. (**) Indeed the radical left has many "draft" new
constitutions ready and waiting for a convention to open the door to more "modern" ideas in government. Of
course, these ideas are not new. But they are ready, the first chance they get.
(**) See also the proposed "Constitution for the Newstates of America" found in "The Emerging Constitution" by Rexgord G. Tugwell (Harper &
Row, 1974)
Many claim that opening a Constitutional convention today could bring on a national crisis of equal or
greater repercussions than the Civil War. Why? Because of the unknowns.
The United States is considered a safe haven for foreign investment, and many billions of dollars (maybe
not `dollars,' but investment paper, nonetheless) flow into America annually. A Constitutional convention could
easily trigger a sudden reversal in that trend. Foreign investors would not know what kind of government might
emerge from a convention. They would therefore feel their funds to be in jeopardy and take steps to remove
massive quantities of cash from circulation suddenly.
After the convention of 1787, when talk was brewing of holding yet another convention, Madison
warned against it. Holland had recently loaned America money to keep it solvent, and Europeans feared a
convention would negate that loan by some new procedure. Madison stated:
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"Having witnessed the difficulties and dangers experienced by the first convention which assembled
under every propitious circumstance, I should tremble for the result of a second, meeting in the present
temper of America ...the prospect of a second convention would be viewed by all of Europe as a dark
cloud hanging over the Constitution." Letter to George Turberville from James Madison, 1787
The prospect of opening a Con-con in today’s climate immediately calls into question the financial
impact of a Con-con on Wall Street, in Tokyo, in London, and in the investment centers of the world. With
billions of foreign investment money in the United States today, how would international investors view the
prospects of an event which could alter the financial structure of the United States? How would foreign
investors view a convention `in the current temper of America?'
Could this be the way already planned to collapse the American Dollar, and usher in the new “Amero”
(Canada-US-Mexico) common currency?
All things considered, this is the one aspect of calling for a Con con that bothers me almost as much as
the prospects of scrapping the bill of rights. The `giant sucking sound' might come from the fast withdraw of
investment funds from banks and companies in these United States. A depression would likely result. Such a
depression would cause the people to willingly accept any promise of food that a new government would make.
In fact, the people would probably forget everything they knew about freedom in such a time of crisis (much as
they did during the vacuum of money leaving the USA in the 1930's, which permitted Roosevelt’s promise of
"two chickens in every pot" to be graciously accepted, even with the corresponding loss of liberties that
accompanied it).
That is but one negative aspect of opening a convention in the 21st Century.
Is supporting the concept of a convention the same as supporting the concept of balancing the federal
budget, as promoters of a convention assert? Historical evidence indicates that Congress has it completely
within its powers to effect an annually balanced budget. Therefore a convention is completely unwarranted on
that basis.
"Hold on, my friends, to the Constitution of the United States. Miracles do not cluster; what has
happened once in 6,000 years may never happen again. Hold on to your Constitution; for if the
American Constitution should fall, there will be anarchy throughout the world." Daniel Webster, 1851
The Constitution has served America well for over 200 years. It provided the means by which
amendments could be proposed and debated one at a time, so that any and all changes would have to be
reviewed by the states and agreed to by three-fourths thereof.
A Constitutional convention has inherent risks. Although the debate will continue to rage over whether a
convention can be limited to a single issue like balancing the federal budget, there is another issue on the minds
of the states. The paradox: the only way to find out if a convention will be limited is to have one. That is a
dangerous experiment.
Many state legislators now realize this as a result of tremendous grass-roots pressure being applied.
Despite repeated attempts to pass Con-con calling resolutions, all recent efforts have been thwarted. The people
realize the state legislatures themselves can be bypassed in the ratification process if Congress declares state
conventions are to be used to ratify proposed changes. Conventions would operate totally outside the public
election process, and could theoretically be picked by the dominant party or power structure of each state! A
federal Constitutional convention is a dangerous experiment indeed!
Use the model resolution in any state listed at the beginning of this brief to repeal existing state calls for
a Constitutional convention. Present it to your state legislators, and let's end this potential threat to freedom.
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CON-CON Q & A
Following are some commonly asked questions concerning the proposal for a Constitutional convention.
(Excerpted from “White Paper On The Constitutional Convention, prepared by LIBERTY LOBBY, 300
Independence Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20003.)
HOW DOES A CONVENTION OPERATE?
A convention will consist of delegates presenting proposals to modify, alter, amend or change our U.S.
Constitution. It will be an opportunity for delegates to toy with new ideas for American governance. Any part
of the Constitution is fair game in a convention.
The bill of rights, the separation of powers, the electoral system, the terms of office for elected officials--
all of these and more will be subject to change or elimination when the doors of a convention close behind the
delegates. The proceedings will, most likely, be conducted in secret, as was the case in the convention of 1787.
What changes will be made in the government of the United States is limited only by the minds of the
participants. Does America really need a `secret meeting' of political insiders performing surgery on the
Constitution?
FACT: The Congressional amendment process limits change to one issue at a time. All proposals therefore
have time to be debated, argued, and extensively studied before they are either ratified or rejected. Because no
limitations can be placed on a convention, the entire Constitution is exposed to radical surgery when a
convention is opened. Clearly, the risk of ill-conceived change is far greater, and even the Bill of Rights could
be reduced to the level of a bargaining chip on the convention table.
WHO WILL BE THE DELEGATES TO A CONVENTION?
Practically every special interest group in the world will be lobbying for rights to attend a convention.
The Constitution itself offers no guidelines. It seems safe to assume those able to exert the largest degree of
influence on those who hold the keys to the convention will be the individuals who will ultimately decide the
form of government a convention might create.
Also, there is the question of how the delegates will be chosen. Presumably, each state will set its own
rules since there are no established guidelines. If Congress passes its own Con con implementation bill, and
follows the rule of apportionment, then California would be allowed to send 45 delegates, while Wyoming, for
example, would only be able to send one.
Certainly, that rule would place an unfair advantage in favor of the large states. If the rule of each state
having the ability to send two delegates were to be used, the small states would have the advantage. Power
plays in the rules process will cause much contention and strife where the selection of delegates is concerned.
This will likely start the convention out on a sour note, not unlike the problems which were encountered in the
1787 convention which led to the "great compromise" and the creation of a bicameral Congress (having two
houses) with the states represented in the Senate, and the people in the House.
A key factor to keep in mind is that currently no rules exist. By calling for a convention prior to the
establishment of guidelines, many questions remain unanswered. Will Congress pass an implementation bill,
and if passage occurs once a Con con has already begun, would it stand up to a legal challenge?
FACT: Currently there are a number of groups aligned with radical factions whose agendas could be adopted at
a convention. It has been discovered that although some of these groups are using "conservative" rhetoric to
quiet fears about a convention, they, in fact, have agendas of their own to accomplish in a convention.
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WHERE WILL THE CONVENTION BE HELD?
Here again, no guidelines exist in the Constitution. As with other aspects of a convention, the powers
that be will make that determination after the 34th state has called for a convention.
WHY IS A CONVENTION DESIRED?
There are two answers to that question depending to whom you are talking. Supporters of a convention
often cite the inability of Congress to deal with matters relating to balancing the federal budget. They believe
that since Congress is reluctant to make the hard choices necessary to cut spending, or to agree on a particular
amendment to submit to the states for ratification, corrective state action is necessary. The holders of this
notion neglect the abilities the states have to correct irresponsible actions of their Congressional delegations.
These abilities are ALREADY A PART OF THE CONSTITUTION.
The second answer you are likely to hear is that under our Constitution, cooperation between the
President and the Congress is difficult because of the separation of powers built into the structure of our
government. The framers knew what they were doing. They knew that a corroboration of branches could result
in tyranny, hence there is a need to keep the branches separate and distinct. Our system of "checks and
balances" is carefully intertwined by precise wording and skillfully thought out plans for the operation of
government.
The groups who support a convention on the grounds that the branches of government should
"cooperate" with each other (rather than keep a jealous eye on the activities of the other branches) ignore the
true causes which led to the formation of the union. These groups are proposing ideas for changing American
government that are literally the reverse of the protections given us by the Founding Fathers. They would have
us believe the lack of cooperation between the branches of government is the cause of our budgetary strife.
They neglect the realities of the process and the temptations of office while proposing solutions far worse than
the problems.
A Con con will jeopardize every American's rights and freedoms under the Constitution. Is any political
ambition worth risking our Bill of Rights to obtain? What freedoms are you willing to sacrifice in the name of
a balanced federal budget? If the Constitution already provides the means by which to effect a balanced federal
budget (as it must for the U.S. routinely had surpluses in the first 150 years of its history), then is a convention
justified, or is our current budgetary crisis a contrived smoke screen by which those who don't like the
limitations the Constitution imposes can change the things they deem "inconveniences"? Could a convention be
part of a plot whereby the agendas of special interest groups could be adopted as public policy?
IS IT SAFE TO ASSUME THAT A CONVENTION WOULD LIMIT ITSELF TO THE SINGLE ISSUE OF
BALANCING THE FEDERAL BUDGET?
A better question to ask would be: "What single issue?" One can easily see that the budget is not one
item, but a mass of hundreds of programs including monetary and trade policy, taxation, social welfare
programs, categorical grants, student aid, defense appropriations, social security, foreign aid, community grants,
and no less than hundreds of other worthwhile or controversial programs that the Congress has involved itself
in. In convention, all of the above, and more, go on the chopping block. (Not that most of the above shouldn't
be chopped . . . but the convention is NOT the proper way to handle it.)
Congress must call a convention upon receiving applications from 2/3 of the states. If thirty-four states
ask for a limited convention, a convention will be opened. However, the convention will also be attended by
delegates from the 16 other states which have not asked for a convention, limited or otherwise. It is very safe to
assume that these states are under no binding agreement to limit the scope of what their delegates could propose
at a convention.
Similarly, the states could even charge their delegates with the duty to explore other issues. The scope
of these debates could be, as stated before, limited only by the minds of the participants. Because no guidelines
exist, constitutional or statutory, it is unwise to assume anything.
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CAN THE CONGRESS MANDATE A ONE ISSUE CONVENTION?
As noted, there is no single issue where the budgetary matters of Congress are concerned. Even if there
were, no Constitutional authority exists for Congress to attempt to limit the scope of a convention. History
shows that although the Continental Congress attempted to limit the scope of the 1787 convention, the delegates
ignored the commands of Congress and their states.
The convention of 1787 considered itself above the authority of Congress, since they were making
changes in the form of government that were beyond the purview of Congress. They considered themselves
agents of the states which had created the federal government in the first place. Hence, they were superior to the
creation, being agents of the creators.
If Congress were to pass a law to limit the scope of a convention, the delegates would not likely be
bound to obey it. In 1985 a proposal was introduced into Congress in the form of an act to establish procedures
for implementing a Con con. The act was never passed into law because, as statements of Sen. Joe Biden (D-
Del.) In Senate Report 99-135 reflect:
"The purpose of this legislation is to minimize the possibility that a Constitutional convention called on
a particular subject will turn into a convention that will put the entire Constitution at risk. No one can be
certain that this legislation, or any legislation, can accomplish that purpose. Indeed, some of this Nation's
foremost Constitutional scholars have expressed to the (Judiciary) Committee their opinion that Congress
cannot statutorily limit a convention. I have joined in supporting S-40 for the simple reason that if a
Constitutional convention is called on a particular subject, it is important that Congress do its utmost to keep
such a convention from turning into an open ended convention that would threaten the soundness and stability
of our Constitution.
"The Constitutional Convention Implementation Act of 1985 is not intended to encourage state
legislatures to apply for a Constitutional convention. Nor should S-40 be interpreted to express an opinion on
the part of the Judiciary Committee that a Constitutional convention is desirable. Indeed, I have great
reservations about the wisdom of convening a Constitutional convention."
HOW WOULD THE PRODUCT OF A CONVENTION BE RATIFIED?
According to Article V, it could be ratified in one of two ways. The legislatures of the states could do it,
or state conventions could have the authority. Conventions could be made up of some of the writers of the new
document, or others with enough clout to be made a part of the ratification convention. However, both of these
maxims assume that Article V itself survives the double con. In convention, the ratification process itself could
be changed to make a big spending, foreign sympathetic Congress the ratifying body. What if? That is a
question few Con-con promoters would try to answer.
FACT: Henry Hazlitt, National Taxpayers Union advisor and author of "A New Constitution Now," stated:10
"An amendment to the Constitution could be proposed that would strike out everything after the
paragraph `We the people . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution.' This amendment could be in itself an
entirely new Constitution . . ."
Would we allow the current breed of self-serving politicians the opportunity, in a convention, to mold
the shape of government to suit the situation? How can we consciously give them the opportunity to rewrite the
rule book when they have shown their inability to follow existing rules?
The idea that calling for a convention is the same as supporting the concept that our national legislature
needs to balance its budget is not only wrong, it is dangerous. It is a thought created by people who do not like
“A New Constitution Now” Henry Hazlitt, NY, McGraw (1942); 2 edition Arlington House, 1974.nd10
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the chains of the Constitution; and/or people who have ideas for structural changes in our form of government
that would be more suitable for their purposes. Many of these changes would legalize that which is forbidden
by the Constitution in its current form.
Many state legislators, when questioned, stated that when they originally passed resolutions calling for a
Constitutional convention, they had no idea that they were endorsing a resolution which could open the
Constitution for the United States of America to radical surgery. They honestly believed they were asking
Congress to balance the budget. Why?
MYTHS & REALITY: BAIT AND SWITCH
A classic political tactic is being used to get state legislators to support concept `A' resulting in their
unwittingly supporting concept `B.' Concept `A' in this case is a balanced budget amendment. Concept `B' is
the call for a convention.
Supposedly, the "threat of a convention" is what will force Congress to pass a balanced budget
amendment. The question which has not been asked or answered is whether or not an amendment is necessary.
Legislators have been lied to with two very innocent sounding claims.
#1. THE THREAT OF A CONVENTION WILL FORCE CONGRESS TO ACT.
Nothing could be further from the truth. If Congress was afraid of a convention, it would have already
submitted an amendment to the states. Since 1983, this nation has been on the verge of a convention. Any fears
Congress would have had with respect to a convention should have materialized by now. It is rather largely in
favor of a convention, as the restrictions on its conduct could be removed. A Congress now so controlled by
powerful special interests is unlikely to suddenly act against these interests who favor a convention, and those
interests will certainly work hard to control the agenda of a convention with so much at stake.
#2. AFTER 34 STATES HAVE CALLED FOR A CONVENTION, THE STATES COULD REFUSE TO
PARTICIPATE IN A CONVENTION OR RESCIND THEIR CALLS FOR A CONVENTION.
He who would assert a state would refuse to participate in a convention that takes up other issues is
making a statement not unlike the man who claims to go to the ball park for the "specific and exclusive
purpose" of buying a hot dog. If a ball game breaks out, he promises his wife to come home immediately.
When members of the New York delegation believed the convention of 1787 was beginning to exceed
its authority, some of them simply left. So what? The Articles of Confederation were scrapped, a new form of
government was created, and it happened without the participation of disgusted members from New York.
Furthermore, he who would assert a state could rescind its call for or participation in a convention after
the requisite number of states have called is without historical, legal, constitutional, precedental or other actual
authority to make this assertion. There is simply no basis whatsoever for this claim. Congress is commanded by
Article V to call a convention upon the application of the legislatures of 2/3 of the several states. They have no
option. If any state would attempt to rescind its call after the 34th state has called for a convention, the
rescission would likely be held invalid, or at best the convention would happen without their input. It is a door
which once opened will likely never be shut.
". . . That confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism: free government is founded in jealousy and
not in confidence; it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited Constitutions to bind down those
whom we are obliged to trust with power: that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which and
no further our confidence may go . . . In questions of power then let no more be heard of confidence in man, but
bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution." 11
Thomas Jefferson from the Kentucky Resolution of 1798.11
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THE CON-CON PROMOTERS
The promoters of a Constitutional convention fall into two subgroups:
A. The organized and well-financed groups who have agendas to promote in a convention; and
B. The people who believe one of the stories sponsored by the leadership of convention-promoting groups.
We will now examine the groups which are actively organized to promote either the opening of a
convention or the special agendas they have planned for a convention if one is ultimately opened. These are the
folks who are asking us to align ourselves on a given side of the issue of balancing the federal budget.
There are two main organizations promoting changes in our Constitution. These groups, which were
mentioned earlier in this report, represent both "conservative" and "liberal" lines of thought. 12
THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
Many members of the CCS represent a profoundly left-wing or `liberal' view. It is co-chaired by Former
U.S. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.); C. Douglas Dillon, former Secretary of the Treasury; and Lloyd
Cutler, a high power CFR member and Washington lawyer who likes to represent presidents of the United
States.
James MacGregor Burns, a member of the board of directors of the CCS, wrote a book in 1984 entitled
"The Power to Lead." In it he stated that the Founding Fathers created divisions of power that could not be...
"unified by mechanical linkages . . . If we are to turn the founders upside down . . . we must directly
confront the constitutional structure they erected." 13
Obviously Mr. Burns doesn't like the system of checks and balances the Founding Fathers devised in
order to prevent tyranny.
The notion of calling a Constitutional convention is a plot to change our Constitutional republic. It
could (and probably would) legalize that which is now forbidden, and in the words of Professor Burns, "turn the
founders upside down." Proposals to modify our form of government in this manner would be tantamount to
rewriting our Constitution and attaching the title "Parliamentary Democracy of America" in place of our existing
republic.
The CCS is made up of highly influential people--many members of other influential `clubs.' Network
media executives, ranking political figures, multinational corporation executives and others compose the
membership of the CCS. These people are quite capable of molding public opinion to be just what they want it
to be through their many resources. Their efforts to change the Constitution by publicizing the kind of issues
appealing to the majority of blue and white-collar Americans (balancing the federal budget, for example) have
been highly successful. A large measure of that success is due to the large financial base and patriotic rhetoric
employed by . . .
THE NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION
The “cooperating antithesis” of the CCS is the NTU, an organization which purports to be a lobby
working in the interest of the taxpayers of the U.S. To promote the concept of a BBA, which is the adopted
Note: Much of this was written and the original writing remains unchanged since the author worked it up12
in 1988. The names of contemporary promoters of a convention may have changed, but the desire for a convention
among many people, including Lloyd Cuttler, has not (see also the Committee to Preserve an Elected Congress,
headed by Phyllis Schlafly, at http://www.electcongress.org)
“The Power To Lead” James M. Burns, 1984 p. 16013
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position of the NTU, Jim Davidson , NTU chairman, is promoting the concept of a convention. He hopes to be14
a delegate to a convention and sincerely believes he will be if one is ultimately convened.
At one time Davidson was cautious about publicly revealing his real ambition: achieving the first
Constitutional convention in the history of the U.S. since 1787. To his disadvantage he brazenly testified that he
does not oppose a Con-con and that it doesn't make any difference to him whether it is limited to one issue.
His advisor, Henry Hazlitt, wrote the book from which the plans of the CCS were taken. "A New15
Constitution Now" supports the idea that a parliamentary government would be a preferable system of
government for America. Davidson, himself a graduate of Oxford University in England, may not have the
interest of the American taxpayer at heart (as he professes).
Davidson attended Oxford as a Rhodes scholar. Cecil Rhodes, founder of the scholarship program, was
a man who, in his time, wanted the United States to again fall under possession of the British crown. Many
Rhodes scholars active in this nation have displayed an obsessive infatuation with British-style parliamentary
government. (Former President Bill Clinton is a Rhodes Scholar also, in addition to his membership in the
other aforementioned `club'-- the CFR.)
Mr. Davidson is obviously not concerned with the reality that under a BBA, Congress will continue to
borrow as usual. With a background of British government knowledge and an advisor like Henry Hazlitt (who
advocates scrapping the Constitution in favor of a parliamentary form of government) behind him, is it so hard
to believe that the NTU could be promoting a hidden agenda masked by the hoopla surrounding the issue of
balancing the federal budget?
It is also worthy of note that another link exists between the NTU and the CCS. One CCS director,
former Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh, has also been the co-director of the NTU front group
Citizens In Support of a Balanced Budget Amendment.
"Our government is suffering from a division of authority, a paralysis between the executive and
Congress . . . A parliamentary system is much more flexible."
J. William Fulbright, former Arkansas senator
The National Tax Limitation Committee (NTLC) has also been actively promoting a convention using
the same basic strategy as the NTU, and works with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). 16
SECTION C: PROPOSAL FOR A "CONFERENCE OF STATES"
Since the momentum for a Constitutional convention, under that name, has apparently fizzled, those who
seek institutional changes to the federal Constitution have taken a new route. There is now a movement afoot to
call a "Conference of States" (COS) through a device called a "State's Petition." 17
Proponents of COS are attempting to circumvent the Article V two-thirds rule by asking for the
`conference' upon the application of the legislatures of 26 states (a bare majority). They feel that under the 10th
Amendment, the states can abolish the federal government at will, and cite constitutional scholars who sound
the federalism crisis horns through the media at the snap of their bosses fingers.
The current head of the National Taxpayers Union is John Berthoud. This piece was written in 1988.14
Whether or not the NTU is promoting a Con con today is uncertain.
Hazlitt does not currently appear on the roster of NTU staff. Source: http://www.ntu.org/main/staff.php15
NTLC: http://www.limittaxes.org/about.asp16
Again, this was written in 1988, with a few minor updates in 1995. The “State’s Petition” idea was also17
resolutely defeated, after the Constitution’s protectors, like Eagle Forum and others, caught wind of that attempt.
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The COS plan parallels the march toward a new Constitution mobilized by the states in 1787. The
promoters want a majority of states (not the 2/3rd rule of Article V) to get together. They seek delegates to be
appointed by the states giving them lawful authority by the legislature to propose changes to the Constitution.
The proposed by-laws of the Conference gives it authority to set its own agenda, and to submit the changes
directly to the states for ratification.
The Conference of States is being promoted primarily by two people (with the support of a number of
organizations), Governors Ben Nelson of Nebraska, and Mike Leavitt of Utah. 18
Nelson and Leavitt cite as their reason for suggesting COS their concern over imbalances in the state-
federal relationship. While no one in their right mind would argue the federal government is today a beast, it
does not take a Rhodes Scholar to see that the two "front line" supporters of COS do not put their money where
their mouths are.
Utah's Governor Mike Leavitt and Nebraska's Governor Ben Nelson have been on the COS campaign
trail for months. While their rhetoric (and media trumpets) would have one believe they are ardent opponents of
federal intervention into the affairs of the sovereign states, their track records prove otherwise.
Every taxpayer knows that federal funds come with federal strings attached. Why would two governors,
who purport to be champions of states rights, oversee the importation to their states of millions of federal
`dollars,' and their inherent federal mandates and restrictions? Why would two so-called "champions of states"
rights allow Congress to export monies from their states outside the constitutional rule of apportionment?
An example: Utah has been given $2.6 million under a federal program called "Goals 2000." The
Clinton Administration's ambition to make your children "globally competent" through the schools set up this
program and its funding, so long as the states receiving the money comply with the federal restrictions attached
with it. (Leavitt was even on the panel that helped compose the program!)
Would a champion of state's rights agree to such a program? At a time when the American people have
had enough of federal mandates, why would a person who truly wants to "restore a balance of power" between
the states and the federal government lock his State into yet another federal program?
Even more convoluted is submitting the children of Utah to an education program teaching them about
the benefits of world government. That seems counterproductive to a state's rights advocate. Far better would
the money be spent teaching children to be self governing, independent, and able to function in society. A true
state's rights advocate would prefer to see an emphasis on educating children about the principles of the United
States Constitution, and the history of the prosperity of America under the federal system as it existed before
Congress went `program crazy.'
But maybe Governor Leavitt would like to use the Conference of States to achieve a more "global"
agenda?
It is also interesting to note that Governor Leavitt was appointed by Clinton to the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR). According to the United States Government Manual, the ACIR falls
into the category of "Boards, Commissions and Committees." These animals `were established by congressional
or presidential action' and `are authorized to publish documents in the Federal Register.'
How is it possible for a person to serve two masters? If Leavitt is to be a federal agent by virtue of his
role with the ACIR, how can he hold an office of trust to represent the people of his State as Governor?
This is a conflict of interest at the most ludicrous level. The ACIR has, for years, been pushing an
agenda aimed at driving the states deeper into the federal web. It concocts and publishes `sample resolutions'
that can be introduced into state legislatures to foster the continued growth of the federal government at the
expense of states rights.
Nebraska's Governor Ben Nelson has also overseen the importation to his state of millions in federal aid
(at extreme cost to the taxpayers). The mechanisms for delivering highway funding, welfare funding, housing
Neither of these two are still in their governor offices.18
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construction funding, etc. are all illegal under the existing constitutional formula for distributing federal monies.
If Governors Nelson and Leavitt were truly concerned about the relationships of the states to the federal
government, both would immediately suspend the importation of federal `monies' into their states. These
monies increase the cost of doing business, result in higher taxes, and further erode the separation of powers
between the levels of government.
A "Conference of States" with official delegations moves dangerously close to lawful authority to tamper
with the Constitution and its separation of powers. It makes sense that those who seek to further erode the
Constitution need a lawful mechanism for change.
COS is not a debate about how to achieve a proper balance between the states and the federal
government. It is a PLOT to change the Constitution by people who are NOT concerned about states' rights.
There are several primary groups promoting the COS agenda. They include the National Conference of
State Legislatures, the National Governors Association, and the American Legislative Exchange Council.19 20 21
These COS promoting groups are already informal gatherings of state leaders who assemble to discuss mutual
concerns. They could help "restore the federalism balance" by promulgating an end to federal fiscal insanity and
illegal federal actions with numerous resources already at their disposal. Instead, they are promoting
institutional change in a most deceptive way.
SECTION B & C SUMMARY
Supporters of a Constitutional convention base their arguments on supposition and hearsay; supported by
nothing more substantial than someone else's opinion. No matter how educated that opinion may be, it is still
opinion. If certain issues were ever brought before the United States supreme Court, it is likely that any
decisions would follow the command of the powerful special interest clubs that supersede our own government
officials.
There exists a serious threat to our liberties. Many groups and individuals are displeased with our
republican form of government and its inherent limitations. It is not simply a few isolated groups who want
structural change, either. Virtually the entire Establishment is focused on this debate. The media, along with
the think tank "experts" and bureaucrats, all want the American people to believe the reason for the current
paralytic state of Congress lies in flaws in our government's structure. We're told the legislative and executive
branches must "work more closely" together in order to get anything done. A simple reading of the Federalist
Papers will contradict that thought nicely.
Congress wastes a lot of time on issues which center on this conflict between the legislative and
executive branches. Some of the more notable examples included the "Iran-Contra" affair and the federal
budget process.
As Americans and lovers of liberty, we must remember the words of former statesmen who warned us
not to trust folks in government with our liberties. Certain restricted areas are forever off limits to public
officials so long as the Constitution is the law of the land. By permitting a convention to be opened, however,
we are subjecting all our protected liberties to change or elimination. The supporters of a convention are trying
to convince us that the worst cannot happen. Their "facts" are unsupported by overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.
Former U.S. Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland (a elite member of `the club') once stated:
http://www.ncsl.org/19
http://www.nga.org/20
http://www.alec.org/21
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"The state legislatures that have called for a Constitutional convention are playing with fire." 22
His comment begs the question: "In a convention, what is likely to burn?" The right to bear arms? The
right to freely assemble? What about freedom of speech?
We, as a nation, have a history of jealously guarding our rights and liberties. If the majority of
Americans became aware of the plot to wreck the Constitution, there would be an uprising.
1983 was the last year when a Con-con resolution passed both houses of a state legislature. The people
became aware that not only is a convention potentially dangerous, but the purpose for which it is being called
(to propose a balanced budget amendment) is a farce. The change to a Conference of States strategy was a
politically sound one for the promoters of constitutional change. Luckily, the people caught on very fast to this
ill-advised notion also. (Although in 1995, 14 states passed COS resolutions. Patriots mobilized quickly
enough to defeat the proposal in every other state where introduced, however.)
STATE ACTION IN PROGRESS
The battle lines have been drawn. Legislators in the state capitols realize they should have a say in the
budgetary process. They have been duped by the National Taxpayer's Union, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, etc. ad nauseam to believe a Con-con, COS, or "State's Petition" is necessary to `restore
federalism.' These people suffer from one of two diseases: either they are constitutionally ignorant (curable), or
they have an ulterior motive (a terminal disease for which the only cure would be removal from office). If they
lack the Constitutional knowledge of measures used in past times of crisis, a copy of this book might help them.
If not, an indictment--or at least a vacation sponsored by the voters--is the only answer.
Corrective action in the states will require the immediate attention of every able-bodied American.
Legislators must be made aware of both the dangers of a convention, and the readily accessible solutions to the
federalism crisis right under their noses. Resolutions to rescind convention calls must be introduced and passed
immediately to protect our Constitution from the unknowns of a convention, and to preserve the freedoms we
have known for over 200 years. A return to the principles of the Constitution will protect us for 200 more!
Just as they have memorialized Congress to open a Con con or a Conference of States, the fifty
sovereign states could petition their respective congressional delegations to obey the existing Constitutional
provisions related to balancing the federal budget in emergency situations. Any time a deficit occurs, it is a
national emergency. The only way to prevent borrowing and the accumulation of interest payments is to prevent
the deficit from occurring.
For your information, the following states have passed resolutions calling for a Constitutional
convention ostensibly to balance the federal budget:
ALABAMA, ALASKA, ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, COLORADO, DELAWARE, FLORIDA, GEORGIA,
IDAHO, INDIANA, IOWA, KANSAS, LOUISIANA, MARYLAND, MISSISSIPPI, MISSOURI,
NEBRASKA, NEVADA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NEW MEXICO, NORTH CAROLINA, NORTH DAKOTA,
OKLAHOMA, OREGON, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH CAROLINA, SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE,
TEXAS, UTAH, VIRGINIA and WYOMING.
States that have passed Governors Nelson & Leavitt's COS resolutions (as of December 1995) were:
ARIZONA, ARKANSAS, DELAWARE, IDAHO, IOWA, KENTUCKY, MISSOURI, NEBRASKA, OHIO,
SOUTH DAKOTA, TENNESSEE, UTAH, VIRGINIA, and WYOMING.
Former U.S. Senator Charles Mathias @ pp.63, Supplemental Views, Report #99-135, U.S. Senate22
Judiciary Committee.
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Legacy Document Collection
Assorted documents proving the motivation for such a convention has NOTHING
to do with “balancing the federal budget” or “restoring federalism.” The true motive
is making STRUCTURAL CHANGES to the Constitution, up to and including
replacing the existing Constitution with the ALREADY DRAFTED:
CONSTITUTION FOR THE NEW STATES OF AMERICA
Included herein is a reproduction of the “new constitution” proffered for a
convention by Rexforg G. Tugwell. This is evidence and proof that IF a new
Constitutional Convention opens, the “new” constitution is already prepared for
adoption. Notice especially how ALL the rights we currently enjoy as
unconditional have been converted into revokable privileges any time the
president would declare “an emergency.” Note also the creation of an entirely
new branch of government dubbed the “regulatory branch.”
STOP THE INSANITY!
NO NEW CONVENTION!
NO NEW CONSTITUTION!
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“A man and his wife are having a conversation. ‘Honey, I am going to the ball park
for the specific and exclusive purpose of buying a hot dog.’
She inquires in response: ‘So if a ball game begins, you are LEAVING
immediately?’
‘Yes,’ he replies.
Question: Whether or not he is telling his wife the truth, WILL THE BALL GAME
CONTINUE, EVEN IN HIS ABSENSE?
This is the game our politicians are playing by trying to constrain a convention to
ANY single issue (balancing the budget, etc.)”
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National Legion OPPOSES Calling a Convention
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Can a Convention be limited to any single issue? Testimony before Congress shows otherwise.
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Statement of Former Chief Justice, Warren Burger
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Good Advice Against a Con Con
Phyllis Schlafly (Eagleforum.org) April 9, 2010
Suggestions that the United States call a new constitutional convention, as allowed in the Constitution's
Article V, have popped up in some state legislatures and even on a page in the Wall Street Journal. No longer do
these voices claim a convention can be limited to consideration of a single amendment (e.g., a Balanced Budget
Amendment); grandstanding politicians are proposing a wide assortment of many amendments to produce big
changes.
Speaking to us from across the years, the Father of the U.S. Constitution, James Madison, wrote this
warning on November 2, 1788, against calling another general constitutional convention.
"If a General Convention were to take place for the avowed and sole purpose of revising the
Constitution, it would naturally consider itself as having a greater latitude than the Congress appointed
to administer and support as well as to amend the system; it would consequently give greater agitation to
the public mind; an election into it would be courted by the most violent partisans on both sides; it
would probably consist of the most heterogeneous characters; would be the very focus of that flame
which has already too much heated men of all parties; would no doubt contain individuals of insidious
views, who under the mask of seeking alterations popular in some parts but inadmissible in other parts of
the Union might have a dangerous opportunity of sapping the very foundations of the fabric.
"Under all these circumstances it seems scarcely to be presumable that the deliberations of the body
could be conducted in harmony, or terminate in the general good. Having witnessed the difficulties and
dangers experienced by the first Convention which assembled under every propitious circumstance, I
should tremble for the result of a Second, meeting in the present temper of America, and under all the
disadvantages I have mentioned."
Madison's prophetic warnings against a general convention to amend our Constitution (now colloquially
called a Con Con) are even more compelling today. Let's examine them.
A new convention would "naturally consider itself as having a greater latitude than the Congress" to amend
the Constitution. Indeed, that's exactly what the Con Con advocates want: a convention to do what Congress
won't do.
A Con Con would "give greater agitation to the public mind." Indeed, a Con Con would attract dozens of
groups agitating for various changes, creating a bigger media event even than a presidential election and
dominated by Mainstream Media and theatrical demonstrators.
The election of Con Con delegates "would be courted by the most violent partisans on both sides." Although
Nancy Pelosi would probably be in charge of the numbers and apportionment of Con Con delegates, their
election would surely attract "violent partisans on both sides" of many issues.
The Con Con would "probably consist of the most heterogeneous characters . . . heated men of all parties."
Think a repeat performance of the way the Obama crowd turned out voters in 2008 through his "Organizing for
America." Think ACORN, illegal voters and vote frauds.
The Con Con "would no doubt contain individuals of insidious views, who under the mask of seeking
alterations popular in some parts . . . might have a dangerous opportunity of sapping the very foundations" of
our Constitution. A Con Con would, indeed, be a big attraction for individuals of "insidious" and "dangerous"
views that could eat away at the foundations of liberty and a sovereign independent republic.
These would include pressure groups seeking an elimination of the Second Amendment, global governance
through treaty law, deletion of the provision that requires a two-thirds majority of Senators to ratify treaties (the
favorite change urged by the Council on Foreign Relations), the addition of new constitutional rights (such as
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same-sex marriage and health care), elimination of the Electoral College, and other "insidious" and "dangerous"
changes.
We could not presume that "the deliberations of the body could be conducted in harmony." "Harmony"? You
must be dreaming! Indeed, it would be a wild and raucous political event of world-class magnitude.
Have you ever attended a hotly contested Republican or Democratic National Nominating Convention? Think
the Democrats in Chicago in 1968 or Republicans in San Francisco in 1964 or Chicago in 1952. Now imagine
the Obama demonstrators and the John McCain demonstrators trying to agree on language to adopt.
Madison trembled for the result of another convention in the "temper of America" in his time. We should,
indeed, tremble for the result "in the present temper of America." Think Obama's proclaimed goal of
"fundamentally transforming the United States of America."
Madison reminded us that the first Constitutional Convention "assembled under every propitious
circumstance." Those propitious circumstances included having George Washington as convention chairman.
Somehow, we don't see any George Washington or James Madison today, and we don't want to put our fate in
the hands of men who think they can improve on the work of George Washington and James Madison.
A Warning About Things To Come
Phyllis Schlafly (Eagleforum.org Feb 25, 2011)
Have you seen the television pictures of the tens of thousands of demonstrators at the Wisconsin State
Capitol who are protesting proposed budget cuts for state employees? If so, you've had an advance peek at the
sort of demonstrations that will take place if state legislatures are foolish enough to pass resolutions asking
Congress to call a national convention to consider amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Barack Obama's political arm, "Organizing for America," swelled the crowds by busing in protesters
from Wisconsin and from other states, too. A national convention to amend the U.S. Constitution would become
the media event of the century, with 24/7 TV coverage, giving us every reason to anticipate that "Organizing for
America" would flood the process of electing delegates and then demonstrate to hurl demands on their
deliberations.
All of a sudden, as though someone gave the signal, resolutions are pending in several state legislatures
to use the never-before-used power set forth in Article V to petition Congress to "call a Convention for
proposing Amendments." This campaign exploits the frustration of many Americans with Congress's
out-of-control spending, increase in the national debt (with much of it borrowed from China), and passage of
laws, such as ObamaCare, that severely limit our freedoms.
Many state legislators are promising that a Convention would be limited to consideration of only one
specific amendment. No way. Article V clearly specifies that a Convention is for the purpose of "proposing
Amendments" (note the plural).
Furthermore, various state resolutions support different Amendments. Some specify that the one
Amendment to be considered must be the Repeal Amendment (to allow states to repeal an act of Congress),
others want the one Amendment to be Debt Limitation, others want a Balanced Budget Amendment, others
want a change in the Electoral College, others want to abolish the 17th Amendment, and one proposal is for a
list of ten Amendments.
When the protesters assemble, we can be sure that many special-interest groups will be pushing their
own agendas. You can bet that a once-in-a-lifetime Convention will attract activists demanding union rights
(like the Wisconsin demonstrators), gay rights, gun control, abortion rights, ERA, and D.C. Statehood.
Calling a convention to amend the U.S. Constitution would be a plunge into darkness because the only
rules to govern it are those specified in Article V. It takes two-thirds (34) of the states to pull the trigger,
Congress controls and issues the Call, and the Convention must consider Amendments (in the plural).
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Anyone who has attended a national political convention knows very well that the guy with the gavel
exercises ruthless power. I've attended 15 Republican National Conventions plus many other national, state and
district political conventions, and I've seen every kind of high-handed tactic and rules broken with the bang of
the gavel, including cutting off mikes, recognizing only pre-chosen delegates, expelling unwanted delegates,
cheating on credentials and rules, fixing the voting machines, etc., etc.
Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, a national hero for winning the case that persuaded a judge to
declare ObamaCare unconstitutional, stated on the steps of the Capitol in Richmond on January 17: "What about
a runaway convention? Yes, it is true that once you assemble a convention that states have called, they can do
anything they want."
That blows away the silly claims by advocates of a new Convention, such as the so-called Goldwater
Institute in Arizona (which was never known by Barry Goldwater), that the state legislatures can "define the
agenda of an Amendments Convention," restricting it to a specific Amendment or a single subject.
The Goldwater Institute cites Article V language that no state can "be deprived of its equal suffrage in
the Senate" to allegedly prove that an Amendments Convention cannot "rewrite the entire Constitution." Au
contraire. Saying that a Convention cannot do one thing actually means that the Convention can do everything
else except that one thing.
Goldwater Institute spokesmen try to predict what procedures would be followed by an Amendments
Convention, but in fact nobody knows what procedures would be used. Congress has defeated all bills that tried
to establish rules, so we don't know how the delegates would be chosen, whether they would be paid, how they
would be apportioned among the states, whether they would have to have a super-majority to vote out a new
Amendment, etc., etc.
Goldwater Institute spokesmen try to claim James Madison is on their side, but their history is as faulty
as their arguments. Madison wrote: "Having witnessed the difficulties and dangers experienced by the first
Convention, which assembled under every propitious circumstance, I should tremble for the result of a Second."
Article V: Con-Con or Nothing is the Cry of This Cause Célèbre
By Joe Wolverton, II, J.D. (Thenewamerican.com)
Although leadership of the movement to call for an Article V “convention of states” go to great lengths
to assure supporters that this meeting would not be a “constitutional convention,” the message apparently hasn’t
reached the Illinois state legislature.
The “Short Description” of the bill provided on the official website of the Illinois General Assembly is
“US Constitutional Convention.” This Freudian slip will surely result in a phone call from some big-money
backer of the Article V convention within hours of the publication of this article.
In fairness, though, the rest of the bill performs the requisite grammatical gymnastics that are the
hallmark of ALEC-approved Article V legislative language.
As with other resolutions making their way through various state legislatures, the Illinois measure makes
critical errors in its application of the letter of Article V of the Constitution.
Article V reads:
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One
thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
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Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate.
Notice, concerned constitutionalists, that there is not a single word in that very important and
controversial provision that provides for a limited convention. That did not stop the state legislature of Illinois
from making that critical error, however.
Citing its opposition to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
and “related cases and events,” Senate Joint Resolution 42 calls for a convention “limited” to considering this
issue.
The plain language of Article V limits neither the scope of the convention it anticipates nor the number
of the amendments that may be proposed at such a meeting.
In fact, if the purpose of the suggested convention is to propose amendments to the Constitution, doesn’t
that make it per se a constitutional convention, regardless of how narrow an agenda those calling for the
convention say they will follow?
It seems very dangerous to rely on semantics as a balance to the risks that would attend such a
convention, regardless of the language preferred by its advocates.
Furthermore, those of us with faith in the work of the Founders likely agree that adding and deleting
words from the Constitution is a sin typically committed by enemies of our Republic, not by those who call
themselves “true constitutionalists.”
As John Locke wrote in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “Every man carries about him a
touchstone, if he will make use of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glitterings, truth from
appearances.”
When it comes to the United States of America, the touchstone each one of us carries is the Constitution.
We must insist that everyone — particularly those who would have us accept them as savior of the Republic —
adhere to the precise language of that sacred document and do not add or subtract from it for their own
purposes, no matter how noble they believe them to be.
Anyone claiming to revere the Constitution — particularly those on the right of the political spectrum —
should never be guilty of skulking about in constitutional “penumbras” to find justifications for their causes.
On another pressing point, there seems to be a substantial segment of the otherwise well-intentioned
constitutionalists, wary of the unchecked expansion of the federal government, that are giving into the lure of
the cult of personality pushing for an Article V convention. The names of the members of the corps of
conservative celebrities fighting for this historical event are well known and need not be repeated here.
What does need to be rehearsed, however, is the writing in 1787 by Samuel Bryan, a Pennsylvania
anti-federalist who employed the pseudonym "Centinel." Note how very applicable Bryan’s words are to our
own situation, particularly when it comes to the big names associated with the Article V movement:
Whether it be calculated to promote the great ends of civil society, viz. the happiness and prosperity of
the community; it behoves you well to consider, uninfluenced by the authority of names. Instead of that frenzy
of enthusiasm, that has actuated the citizens of Philadelphia, in their approbation of the proposed plan, before it
was possible that it could be the result of a rational investigation into its principles; it ought to be
dispassionately and deliberately examined, and its own intrinsic merit the only criterion of your patronage.
Let us avoid, my fellow constitutionalists, joining the ranks of those pushing for an Article V
constitutional convention (and, yes, it will be a constitutional convention) because of the influence of the
“authority of names” who have made the issue their latest cause célèbre.
Later, "Centinel" has a little more to say that seems like it was written after he read the Article V
con-con literature.
In nearly every piece of propaganda published by the “convention of states” proponents, the point is
made that if the people don’t take back the authority wrested from them by Washington, D.C. (read this article
for my response to that claim), the Republic will fall and the federal government will abolish liberty.
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Now, while I certainly agree that something needs to be done immediately to force the federal beast back
inside its constitutional cage and that the states are the ones to administer the remedy (unlike the COS, though, I
support the “rightful remedy” of nullification), I do not believe that without a convention our Constitution will
be thrown onto the scrap heap of history.
A very important, although as yet unanswered question, is why the Article V con-con proponents have
adopted this "convention or nothing" approach to fighting federal overreach? Should we not employ all our
weapons before launching this nuclear option?
Running the risk of holding a convention attended — as it most certainly would be — by an unknown
and uncontrollable bloc of progressive and socialist delegates is unnecessary and unwise.
Also, I reject the “all or nothing” false dialectic espoused by the COS. For a group that places so much
faith in state ratifying conventions, they believe states incapable of playing the role reserved to them in the
federal relationship established by the Constitution and as manifested through the nullification of
unconstitutional acts of the federal government.
Finally, there is the money being spent on this endeavor. There are several very wealthy and influential
men from both the Left and the Right, writing very big checks to pay the expenses of the traveling spokesmen
for the Article V movement, as well as for the advertising and collateral being distributed to sell the idea to
those across the political spectrum.
On this point again, consider the words and warnings of "Centinel:"
The wealthy and ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow
creatures, have availed themselves, very successfully, of this favorable disposition; for the people thus
unsettled in their sentiments, have been prepared to accede to any extreme of government; all the
distresses and difficulties they experience, proceeding from various causes, have been ascribed to the
impotency of the present confederation, and thence they have been led to expect full relief from the
adoption of the proposed system of government, and in the other event, immediately ruin and
annihilation as a nation.
Constitutionalists should be hopeful that all state legislators pause, resist the attraction of celebrity, the
lull of largesse, and the purported inevitably of the ruin of our Republic in the absence of an Article V
convention, and consider the alternatives. Then, that they exhaust all these alternatives before opening our
Constitution to the tampering of an unaccountable and uncontrollable group of delegates gathered at a
constitutional convention.
Joe A. Wolverton, II, J.D. is a correspondent for The New American and travels nationwide speaking on nullification, the Second
Amendment, the surveillance state, and other constitutional issues. Follow him on Twitter @TNAJoeWolverton and he can be reached
at jwolverton@thenewamerican.com.
In Defense of Con-Con, Meckler Chooses Ridicule Over Rebuttal
Joe Wolverton, II, J.D. (Thenewamerican.com)
LOL. Those are the letters with which Mark Meckler, president of Citizens for Self-Governance and a
leader of the movement to bring about an Article V constitutional convention to alter the Constitution, chose to
open his response to my article exposing the radical leftist fellow travelers in the “convention of the states”
movement.
At The John Birch Society, the parent organization of The New American, we take federalism and the
Constitution seriously, and we would choose three other letters to describe the situation: SOS.
This Republic is in trouble. This is something all of us agree on. We agree that Washington has run
amok, and we all believe the stables on Capitol Hill need to be washed clean, and we know it will take a
Herculean effort to do it.
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We all believe that the answer to our current awful situation is to restore the Constitution. Or do we?
There is so much sarcasm and side-stepping in much of the pro-constitutional convention responses that
it is difficult to determine what they truly recommend as a remedy (we know, though, it isn’t Jefferson’s
"rightful remedy" of nullification). In much of the material the leadership of the Convention of the States group
produces, it seems they would prefer to repair the Constitution rather than restore it.
Ask any antiques dealer and he’ll tell you that there is a big difference between restoration and repair.
Restoration is done in a way that will preserve the value and function of the original piece, while repair simply
attempts to “fix” what is broken or poorly functioning on the aged item. Someone repairing an invaluable
antique will introduce external material, believing that such will strengthen the broken parts.
A restorer, however, knows that only original pieces, no matter how difficult to preserve or attain, must
be used to return the treasure to its prior glory.
In the hands of experts, in fact, the antique can be restored in such a careful manner that it will not only
retain the value of the original, but it will increase it.
Perhaps the worst part of dealing in antiques restoration is trying to undo someone’s unskilled repair.
What could and should have been done delicately and according to tried and true techniques is scrapped by a
hasty repair job, making a proper, lasting restoration much more difficult.
The analogy is obvious. Our Constitution is indeed an antique, a priceless heirloom handed down to us
by our noble forefathers. Lately, some of the Constitution’s caretakers have damaged the document, and
admirers of the document recognize that it’s time to restore it and to restrain the federal government any time it
tries to put a hand on it.
Unwisely, the con-con collaborators have chosen to try to "fix" the broken Constitution. While there are
admittedly several qualified constitutional experts found among the “convention of the states” proponents, there
are many in their camp who would slap shoddy materials on the Constitution, leaving it worthless and
non-working.
As I revealed in a previous article, there are dozens of socialist, progressive, and radically leftist
organizations that are not only supporting the con-con movement, but behind them are billionaire fascists who
will throw good money after bad to ensure these organizations (that work for them) get a seat at the “convention
of the states.”
Which brings me to my next point: Are Messrs. Meckler, Levin, Dranias, et al. prepared to abide by the
radical amendments to our Constitution that could be the product of their beloved convention?
Legally and constitutionally speaking, there is nothing the “conservative” bloc of the convention
advocates could do to prevent delegates selected from the leftist wing of their movement from attending and
influencing the convention they propose.
Imagine for a minute some of the “repairs” to our Constitution that the progressive delegates would
offer. Actually, we don’t have to imagine. In an upcoming article, I will expose the shocking slate of items on
the radical agenda of the many representatives of the leftist lobby fighting for the Article V convention.
That’s not to say we are going to give the self-described “conservatives” a pass. Not at all. In fact, a
separate article will reveal strong ties between establishment Republicans and many of those pushing for a
con-con who claim to be from the Right Wing. Suffice for now to say that many of the rank and file in the army
calling for an Article V convention will be dismayed to learn the details of their leaders' association with groups
with records contrary to constitutional principles.
And what about some of the self-professed conservatives who are clamoring for a convention? Imagine
the good use the powers behind the promoters could make of a few popular, “conservative” Republicans. These
trusted representatives of the Right could effect small but significant changes to the Bill of Rights, and those
changes would be packaged and sold to the public as “improvements” for their safety.
These well-promoted tweaks, however, would effectively repeal fundamental rights: the Tenth
Amendment (“Let’s once and for all eliminate this nullification nonsense”), the Second Amendment (Even
conservatives shun the “militia types”), the First Amendment ("right to worship" replaces free exercise thereof),
and maybe the Sixth Amendment, too (“Sit down. Shut up! You don’t get a lawyer!”). Surely supporters who
Page 127 of 156

are savvy recognize that those changes mentioned are all being pushed by “conservatives” in the convention
movement.
Even if we could count on genuine conservative (I prefer the label “constitutionalist”) bona fides of the
organizers of the con-con movement, the irrefutable fact is that a convention would not occur in a conservative
vacuum. Lobbyists from every industry and every social and political band of the spectrum will slaver for a
chance to get their hands on the keys to the kingdom. How will we — those concerned for the Constitution and
zealous for its perpetuation — be able to verify the good intentions of the many delegates sent to the convention
of the states? Simply stated: We won’t.
And that brings up the issue of the election/selection of delegates. Article V is silent on the matter,
making it certain that states themselves will establish guidelines for who can be chosen as a delegate and how
they will be chosen. Suppose that a state legislature dominated by Republicans drafts the rules in such a way as
to gerrymander the convention, making it next to impossible for Democrats to get elected/selected as delegates.
Can you imagine the legal donnybrook that would break out? No matter the schedule set by the Article V
leadership, the opening of any “convention of the states” would undoubtedly be indefinitely delayed while the
multiple federal lawsuits filed by those who felt disenfranchised by the process worked their way through the
judicial system.
Next, the most frequent target of pro-convention vitriol is the suggestion, by those of us opposed to a
convention, of the so-called runaway convention. I believe history teaches us that there is a legitimate danger
that the convention, regardless of prior restraints, could break those chains and run off with the Constitution.
Article V advocates contend that the constitutional convention held in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787 did not exceed its mandate.
They claim that the historical record of the convention of 1787 proves that it was not a “runaway
convention” and that a modern-day convention could be carried out without exceeding a very limited purpose.
They are wrong for two reasons.
First, as soon as Edmund Randolph presented the Virginia Plan on May 29, 1787, the convention broke
through boundaries set by some of the participating states. The resolutions proposed by Randolph (and written
by James Madison) were not intended (and admittedly so) to “revise the Articles of Confederation,” but to
replace them. Look it up. I’ve yet to hear one cogent or convincing argument to the contrary. The fact is that the
Articles of Confederation document was the law, and there was a legal (constitutional) method for proposing
amendments. That method was mentioned in Congress' call for a convention in Philadelphia. That prescribed
method was disregarded from day one. That could happen again and this time, we won't be in the capable hands
of James Madison, James Wilson, et al.
Second, it is the unalienable right of the people “to alter or to abolish [our government], and to institute
new Government.” Article V establishes the constitutional method for calling a convention of the sovereign
people of the United States for this very purpose. Any intellectually honest and historically accurate proponent
of the Article V “convention of the states” must admit that this convention could exercise that God-given right
to rule and to replace the “broken” government with a “better” one. That happened in Philadelphia in 1787.
Over the next week or so, The New American will publish articles expanding on the points I presented
above. These articles are not intended to attack anyone personally. I will not do that. If I have done that in the
past, I’m sincerely sorry. I intend these articles to serve the purpose of educating and warning the many
good-hearted, well-intentioned constitutionalists currently found among the ranks of the army calling for a new
constitutional convention.
Despite what Mark Meckler claimed in his response to my earlier articles, I do not believe that the
constitutionalists on his side of this argument are dupes. I just don’t believe they are aware of who’s fighting
alongside them and how closely many of the front-line leaders of their movement are tied to establishment
Republicans and other big money lobbyists who are desperate to get their hands on the purse strings.
I am hopeful that Mr. Meckler, Mr. Levin, or some other chief of the Convention of the States coalition
would write a thoughtful rather than a sarcastic rebuttal to all the points I’ve put forth in this article. If any of
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you talk to either of them or see them around, maybe you can convince them to put down the poison pen and lay
out their case with respect — respect for the opposition and respect for the intelligence of their own adherents.
Socialists and Soros Fight for Article V Convention
Joe Wolverton, II, J.D. (Thenewamerican.com)
Recently, The New American has reported on the efforts by radio talk show host Mark Levin and others
to push for a constitutional convention (a convention of the states, in the parlance of the proponents).
In his new book, Levin argues that such a convention is the last hope “to reform the federal government
from its degenerate, bloated, imperial structure back to its (smaller) republican roots.”
Unfortunately, many otherwise well-educated and well-meaning conservatives have succumbed to
Levin’s siren song and they have gone so far as to deny the constitutionality of nullification and to insist that an
Article V convention is the only way to restore the balance of federalism in our Republic.
Fighting for the Constitution as given to us by our Founders is a noble goal and the anxiety of the
conservative con-con collaborators is understandable. We at The New American and The John Birch Society
welcome the help of all those courageous enough to enlist in the battle to defeat the forces of federal absolutism.
We part company with those pushing for an Article V convention, however, and we believe that a constitutional
convention is not the right way to stop the federal assault on our Constitution and the freedoms it protects.
The New American and many other liberty-minded organizations promote nullification as the “rightful
remedy” for curing the constant federal overreaching. We believe that as the agent of the states, the federal
government has exceeded its contractual authority and the states as principals have the right to refuse to ratify
any such usurpation.
Since the publication of Levin’s admittedly popular book, the battle between those promoting
nullification and those advocating for an Article V constitutional convention is a topic getting plenty of
coverage in the alternative media.
There is another uncomfortable aspect of the Article V movement that is not being discussed, however,
but needs to be, particularly in light of the good people who have associated themselves with it.
Within the ranks of those clamoring for an Article V convention are found numerous extremely radical,
progressive, and socialist organizations that otherwise would have little in common with the conservatives
fighting on the same side.
Wolf-Pac is one of the groups that this reporter suspects many Levin listeners would be surprised to
know is their compatriot in a call for a con-con.
On its website, Wolf-Pac pushes for an Article V “convention of the states” as the best way to
accomplish its “ultimate goal:"
To restore true democracy in the United States by pressuring our State Representatives to pass a much
needed 28th Amendment to our Constitution which would end corporate personhood and publicly finance all
elections in our country.
In order to persuade Americans to join its cause, Wolf-Pac will:
inform the public by running television commercials, radio ads, social media, internet ads, and using the
media platform of the largest online news show in the world, The Young Turks.
The Young Turks? Most constitutionalists (and I imagine most fans of Mark Levin) don’t spend much
time during the day watching the Young Turks, the YouTube-based news and entertainment channel that dubs
itself the “world’s largest online news network.”
As unfamiliar as they may be with the Young Turks, it seems certain conservatives pushing for a
con-con are even more unfamiliar with who pays the bills at this online purveyor of progressive ideology:
George Soros (shown). Dan Gainor reports:
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In fact, Soros funds nearly every major left-wing media source in the United States. Forty-five of those
are financed through his support of the Media Consortium. That organization 'is a network of the
country's leading, progressive, independent media outlets.' The list is predictable — everything from
Alternet to the Young Turks.
That’s right. George Soros — the financier of global fascism — is pumping millions of dollars into the
same Article V campaign that is being promoted by Mark Levin, Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, Glenn Beck,
and other popular conservative spokesmen.
What will those in Wolf-Pac do if they are able to get “their amendment” proposed and accepted by an
Article V convention?
“Celebrate the fact that we had the courage and persistance [sic] to accomplish something truly
amazing and historic together.”
Anything a group with this anti-constitutional agenda would do to our Constitution would certainly be
historic — in the worst way.
This should be enough to convince all true conservatives, constitutionalists, and friends of liberty to run
headlong away from the ranks of the Article V con-con army, regardless of how popular and persuasive their
generals may be.
It will likely surprise these devoted, but deluded, Article V advocates that Wolf-Pac is just the tip of the
iceberg. These good people would be wise to take a look at this heavily abbreviated roster of their radical fellow
travelers in the con-con movement, each of which is a registered “founding member” of the “Move to Amend”
coalition.
• Alliance for Democracy
• Center for Media and Democracy
• Code Pink
• Independent Progressive Politics Network
• Progressive Democrats of America
• Sierra Club
• Vermont for Single Payer
Mind you, hundreds more groups “committed to social and economic justice, ending corporate rule, and
building a vibrant democracy” are gathered under this umbrella.
This hardly seems to be a corps that most Levin listeners would be happy to stand shoulder to shoulder
with in the fight for a “convention of the states.” In fairness, these allies likely don’t share their conservative
cohorts’ love and loyalty to the Constitution.
It’s time these right-minded men and women know with whom they are associating.
Its doubtful that Mark Levin’s legion of listeners would be as eager to get behind his Article V con-con
agenda if they knew whom they were fighting beside and how radically their new allies want to change our
beloved Constitution.
And that’s the problem. Regardless of the soothing words of Levin or others in the con-con camp, they
cannot guarantee the outcome of such a convention. In fact, in light of the lists of leftist groups provided above,
the results of the convention could be an outright scrapping of the Constitution written by the Founders in favor
of one more in line with the progressive ideologies of Wolf-Pac, the Sierra Club, Code Pink, and others.
Remember, according to the history of Article V-style conventions, regardless of any state or
congressional legislation requiring them to consider only one amendment (a balanced budget amendment, for
example), the delegates elected to the convention would possess unlimited, though not unprecedented, power to
propose revisions to the existing Constitution, based on the inherent right of the People in convention to alter or
revise their government.
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The mind boggles at the potential proposals that could come out of a convention composed of such
radical representatives.
Don’t forget, George Soros’s billions are funding these fringe groups and politicians aren't known for
their ability to resist hefty campaign contributions.
Conservatives should shudder at the specter of a convention endowed with power of this magnitude,
populated by activists who have a Soros credit card in their pocket and a commitment to “social justice” as their
purpose. All the good intentions of the conservatives in the Article V camp would not be enough to force all
these devastating changes to the Constitution back inside the progressive Pandora's Box.
Readers are encouraged to click the links provided in this article and to investigate for themselves the
agenda of the various Article V advocates and to determine if it's worth the risk to our Constitution that would
be posed by the presence of these groups in the "convention of the states."
Finally, the startling information set out in this article is not meant as an attack on Mark Levin or anyone
else working to call a “convention of the states.” Rather, it is intended to help the thousands of committed
constitutionalists who find themselves believing in the Article V gospel he’s preaching to realize who’s sitting
in the pews with them and whose money built the church.
Page 131 of 156

Appendix of Related “worthy of consideration” materials.
NVCCA Issue Brief #10
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF CONGRESS EXERCISING
ITS EMERGENCY POWER OF DIRECT TAXATION TO
EXTINGUISH YEAR END DEFICITS (BALANCE THE BUDGET)
Taxation method a.k.a. “The State Rate Tax”
The following excerpts, each taken from different state documents ratifying the United States Constitution,
and other sources, verifies that if Congress does not raise sufficient revenue from its normal taxing power to
meet the public Exigencies (needs), then Congress is required, and has the ability to balance the budget, by the
imposition of a direct tax on the States, following the rule of apportionment [the agreed upon formula by which
each state contributes its fair share]. . . in so doing, a balanced budget is achieved!
FROM THE RATIFICATION DOCUMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:
And that the Congress will not lay direct Taxes within this State, but when the Monies arising from the
Impost and Excise shall be insufficient for the public Exigencies, nor then, until Congress shall first have
made a Requisition upon this State to assess levy and pay the Amount of such Requisition made
agreeably to the Census fixed in the said Constitution in such way and manner as the Legislature of this
State shall judge best, but that in such case, if the State shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion
pursuant to such Requisition, then the Congress may assess and levy this States proportion together with
Interest at the Rate of six per Centum per Annum from the time at which the same was required to be
paid.
FROM THE RATIFICATION DOCUMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE:
Fourthly That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the money arising from Impost, Excise and
their other resources are insufficient for the Public Exigencies; nor then, Congress shall have first made a
Requisition upon the States, to Assess, Levy, & pay their respective proportions, of suck requisitions
agreeably to the Census fixed in the said Constitution in such way & manner as the Legislature of the
State shall think best and in such Case if any State shall neglect, then Congress may Assess & Levy such
States proportion together with the Interest thereon at the rate of six per Cent per Annum from the Time
of payment prescribed in such requisition--
FROM THE RATIFICATION DOCUMENT OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA:
Resolved that the general Government of the United States ought never to impose direct taxes, but where
the monies arising from the duties, imposts and excise are insufficient for the public exigencies nor then
until Congress shall have made a requisition upon the states to Assess levy and pay their respective
proportions of such requisitions And in case any state shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion
pursuant to such requisition then Congress may assess and levy such state's proportion together with
Interest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum from the time of payment prescribed by such
requisition--
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FROM THE RATIFICATION DOCUMENT OF THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS:
Fourthly, That Congress do not lay direct Taxes but when the Monies arising from the Impost & Excise
are insufficient for the public exigencies nor then until Congress shall have first made a requisition upon
the States to assess levy & pay their respective proportions of such Requisition agreeably to the Census
fixed in the said Constitution; in such way & manner as the Legislature of the States shall think best, &
in such case if any State shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such requisition then
Congress may assess & levy such State's proportion together with interest thereon at the rate of Six per
cent per annum from the time of payment prescribed in such requisition.
FROM THE RATIFICATION DOCUMENT OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND:
8th. In cases of direct taxes, Congress shall first make requisitions on the several states to assess, levy
and pay their respective proportions of such requisitions, in such way and manner, as the legislatures of
the several states shall judge best; and in case any state shall neglect or refuse to pay its proportion
pursuant to such requisition, then Congress may assess and levy such state's proportion, together with
interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, from the time prescribed in such requisition.
FROM THE RATIFICATION DOCUMENT OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA:
III. When Congress shall lay direct taxes or excises, they shall immediately inform the executive power
of each state, of the quota of such State, according to the census herein directed, which is proposed to be
thereby raised: And if the legislature of any state shall pass a law, which shall be effectual for raising
such quota at the time required by Congress, the taxes and excises laid by Congress shall not be
collected in such state.
FROM THE RATIFICATION DOCUMENT OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA:
Third, When Congress shall lay direct taxes or excises, they shall immediately inform the Executive
power of each State of the quota of such state according to the Census herein directed, which is proposed
to be thereby raised; And if the Legislature of any State shall pass a law which shall be effectual for
raising such quota at the time required by Congress, the taxes and excises laid by Congress shall not be
collected, in such State.
THIS IS PART OF A UNITED STATES TREASURY REPORT TO CONGRESS IN THE PREPARATION
OF THE FIRST DIRECT TAX, AND SHOWS THE FAIR SHARE TOTAL OF EACH STATE AS
PRESCRIBED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
5th Congress.] No. 135. [2d Session.
APPORTIONMENT OF DIRECT TAXES.
COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 25, 1798.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1798.
Page 133 of 156

Sir:
Having been requested to exhibit a calculation of the quotas of the respective States, in a tax of two millions
of dollars, proportioned to the number of free white persons, and three-fifths of the number of slaves, as
ascertained by the census; also my opinion of what would be a proper rule for apportioning to individuals the
proposed tax on lands, houses, and slaves, I respectfully submit the following results and observations:
The enumeration, or census, by which the tax must be apportioned, was taken with reference to the first
Monday of August, 1790, when a number of persons in the United States was as follows:
Free white males of sixteen years and upwards,
including heads of families, - - 813,365
Free white males under sixteen years, - - 802,127
Free white females, including heads of families, - - 1,556,682
Other free persons, exclusive of Indians, - - 59,511
____________
Total number of free persons excluding Indians, 3,231,631
Slaves 697,697, of which number three-fifths parts are taken, or, 418,619
____________
Total, or representative number, - - 3,650,250
The following are the quotas of the respective States, in a tax of two millions of dollars, calculated according
to their relative numbers of free persons, exclusive of Indians, and including three-fifths of the number of slaves,
to wit:
The quota of New Hampshire, - - - $77,705 36.2
Massachusetts, - - - 260,435 31.2
Rhode Island, - - - 37,502 8.0
Connecticut, - - - 129,676 00.2
Vermont, - - - 46,864 18.7
New York, - - - 181,680 70.7
New Jersey, - - - 98,378 25.3
Pennsylvania, - - - 237,177 72.7
Delaware, - - - 30,430 79.2
Maryland, - - - 152,599 95.4
Virginia, - - - 345,488 66.5
Kentucky, - - - 37,643 99.7
North Carolina, - - - 193,697 96.5
Tennessee, - - - 18,806 38.3
South Carolina, - - - 112,997 73.9
Georgia, - - - 38,814 87.5
_________________
Total of the proposed tax, $2,000,000.00
THIS IS AN ACT BY THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO RAISE AND PAY ITS
APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DIRECT TAX LAID BY CONGRESS TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE
WAR OF 1812 (THE 2ND DIRECT TAX LAID BY CONGRESS)
CHAPTER XI
Page 134 of 156

An Act to provide for the payment of that part of the Direct Tax of the United States, which is apportioned
to the Commonwealth of Virginia, and for other purposes.
[Passed January 24, 1815.]
Virginia's quota 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That so much of
of the Direct Tax the Direct Tax of the United States, as is or may be,
assumed, to be during the present session of Congress, imposed on and
paid by a dis- apportioned to the Commonwealth of Virginia, shall be,
count of the ex- and the same is hereby assumed, to be paid in such
isting and future manner, and at such period, as is or may be prescribed
accounts of this and allowed by a law of Congress provided, the
State against the Executive of this State be able to effect the
United States. discharge and payment of the said assumed quota by a
discount of the existing or future accounts of this
State against the government of the United States.
Said accounts to 2. And be it further enacted, That the Executive be, and
be finally adjust- they are hereby empowered and requested, finally to
adjusted by the Execu- and settle the existing or future claims, and accounts
tive for the pur- of this Commonwealth, upon the government of the
pose of effecting United States, for the purpose of discounting and
such discount. setting off the whole or a part of the sum, which may
If this be imprac- be ascertained to be due this State against the quota
ticable, the Exe- of the aforesaid Direct Tax: and, should this be
cutive may re- impracticable, to receive, in discharge of the same,
ceive, in discharge Treasury notes or certificates of Stock of the United
of the same, Treasury States,
Notes or certificates
of stock. Communi- 3. And be it further enacted, That the Executive be
cation to be made to requested forthwith to communicate with the government
the Government of the of the United States, upon this subject, and use their
U, States, upon this efforts to carry this Act into effect.
subject.
Commencement 4. This Act shall be in force from and after the passage
thereof.
THIS IS AN ACT BY THE KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO RAISE AND PAY ITS
APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DIRECT TAX LAID BY CONGRESS TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE
WAR OF 1812 (THE 2ND DIRECT TAX LAID BY CONGRESS).
CHAP. XCVII.
AN ACT to provide for the payment of this state's
quota of the direct tax.
Approved, December 21, 1813.
Page 135 of 156

WHEREAS by a law of the Congress of the U.S.
entitled an act to lay and collect a direct tax, within
the United States, passed the second day of August,
Preamble. one thousand eight hundred and thirteen, it is en-
acted, that the quota thereof for the state of Kentucky,
should be one hundred and sixty-eight thousand
nine hundred and twenty-eight dollars, seventy-six
cents. By the seventh section of the said act it is
provided, "that each state may pay its quota into
the treasury of the United States, and thereon be
entitled to a deduction of fifteen per centum, if paid
before the tenth day of February next:" And where-
as it is deemed expedient that this state should ac-
cede to the proposition, upon the terms aforesaid:
Therefore,
Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, That for the purposes
The treasur- aforesaid, the treasurer of this state, by and with
er authorized the advice and direction of the governor, be em-
to borrow powered to borrow, on the credit of the state, the
100,000 dols. the sum of one hundred thousand dollars; or such
at 6 per cent. part thereof, as the governor may hereafter deem
necessary, at an interest not exceeding six per
centum per annum:
And for the purpose of reimbursing the money loan-
How to be reed to the state under the provisions of this act, an
paid. equal tax, according to the real value of each res-
pective article, shall be assessed and laid, on the real
value of all lands and lots of ground, with their
improvements, dwelling houses, slaves, and every
other species of property now subject to taxation
by the revenue laws of this state.
Taxes, & c. Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That a sufficient
pledged for portion of the taxes and other income arising from
the re-pay the state's fund in the bank of Kentucky, be, and
ment of the the same is hereby pledged for the payment of
loan. said loan, and the interest arising thereon: and the
To be paid said loan shall be paid and discharged within six
within 6 yrs. years, or such shorter period, from the time of
obtaining the same, in such payments as the governor
of the state shall direct.
Sec. 3. Be it further enacted, That the sum of
$45,000 to forty-five thousand dollars be, and the same is
be drawn out hereby appropriated out of the public treasury;
of the treas- which, together with the money directed to be
ury. borrowed as above, shall be, and is hereby applied,
to the payment of the said quota; and the treasurer
Treasurer's is hereby authorized and required to pay the same
duty. into the treasury of the United States, in discharge
Page 136 of 156

of the quota aforesaid, on or before the tenth day
of February next: And the treasurer, under the
direction of the governor, is further required to
give notice to the secretary of the treasury of the
United States, of the intention hereby manifested,
to pay such quota before the tenth day of January
next.
Bank of Ken- Sec. 4. Be it further enacted, That the bank of
tucky and its Kentucky, or any of its branches, may, in the dis-
branches au- cretion of its president and directors, loan to
thorized to the treasurer, for the use of the state as afore-
loan the state said, any sum of money, for any period of time
money for a longer than sixty days.
longer period
than 60 days. Sec. 5. Be it further enacted, by the authority
aforesaid, That the governor, for the time being,
Governor au- and his successors, be, and he is here au-
thorized to thorized and empowered, from time to time, within
appropriate the six years aforesaid, to draw any surplus
money not money which may be in the public treasury, and
otherwise not otherwise appropriated by law, to effect the
appropriated, the purposes of this act; and that he draw the
to carry this same at such times, and in such sums as he
act into effect. may deem most expedient.
THIS IS A PAGE FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE (1861) SHOWING EACH STATES' FAIR
SHARE OF THE DIRECT TAX LAID DURING THE CIVIL WAR, IT ALSO VERIFIES THAT
REPRESENTATION WITH PROPORTIONAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATION ARE "TWO FUNDAMENTALS
IN REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT", WHICH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED TO
GUARANTEE TO EVERY STATE [SEE ART. 4, SECT. 4, U.S. CONST.]
Mr. SUMMER. I should like to remind the Senator ---
Mr. DOOLITTLE, With all courtesy to my honorable friend I must decline to give way, because I desire not to
have the argument which I am making broken in upon. ... (approximately 8 paragraphes skipped at this point)
"The Constitution says:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within
this Union according to their respective number.
Under that authority, Congress, after the passage of the Collamer statue, did both--apportioned both direct
taxes and Representatives among the several States, including the southern as well as the northern and western
States of this Union. I read from the eighth section of this act of August, 1861:
`And be it further enacted, That, a direct tax of $20,000,000 be, and is hereby, annually laid upon the United
States, and the same shall be, and is hereby, apportioned to the States respectively, and in manner following:
To the State of Maine..................................$428,826 00
To the State of New Hampshire................... 218,462 66
Page 137 of 156

To the State of Vermont............................... 211,068 00
To the State of Massachusetts.. ................. 824,581 33
To the State of Rhode Island........................ 116,963 66
To the State of Connecticut.......................... 308,214 00
To the State of New York...........................2,608,918 66
To the State of New Jersey............................ 450,134 00
To the State of Pennsylvania.......................1,946,719 33
To the State of Delaware................................. 74,683 33
To the State of Maryland................................436,823 33
To the State of Virginia..................................937,550 66
To the State of North Carolina.......................576,194 66
To the State of South Carolina.......................363,570 66
To the State of Georgia..................................584,367 33
To the State of Alabama.................................529,313 33
To the State of Mississippi......................413,084 66
To the State of Louisiana........................385,886 66
To the State of Ohio...........................1,567,089 33
To the State of Kentucky.........................713,695 33
To the State of Tennessee........................669,498 00
To the State of Indiana..........................904,875 33
To the State of Illinois.......................1,146,551 33
To the State of Missouri.........................761,127 33
To the State of Kansas............................71,743 33
To the State of Arkansas.........................261,886 00
To the State of Michigan.........................501,763 33
To the State of Florida...........................77,522 66
To the State of Texas............................355,106 66
To the State of Iowa.............................452,088 00
To the State of Wisconsin........................519,688 66
To the State of California.......................254,538 66
To the State of Minnesota........................108,524 00
To the State of Oregon............................35,140 66
Sir, the question I put in the beginning, where are those eleven States? is answered here by Congress; I find
them all "included within this Union," to use the language of the Constitution, for the purpose, of direct
taxation. Every one of those eleven are found there and are taxed by name as States within the Union. Virginia
as well as New York; Arkansas by the side of
Michigan; Florida and Texas, by the side of Iowa and Wisconsin. Direct taxes and representation go together.
Has Congress spoken upon the subject of representation? Most certainly.
By an act approved the 4th of March, 1862, which by its terms was not to take effect till March 4, 1863,
Congress apportioned the Representatives upon the basis that those eleven southern States were still States in
the Union, with their right to representation unimpaired. By that act, modifying former
acts, Congress apportioned Representatives to the several States in this Union
as follows:
To Alabama.......................................................7
To Arkansas......................................................2
To California....................................................3
To Connecticut...................................................4
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To Delaware......................................................1
To Florida.......................................................1
To Georgia.......................................................7
To Illinois.....................................................13
To Indiana......................................................11
To Iowa..........................................................6
To Kansas........................................................1
To Kentucky......................................................9
To Louisiana.....................................................4
To Maine.........................................................5
To Maryland......................................................5
To Massachusetts................................................10
To Michigan......................................................6
To Minnesota.....................................................2
To Mississippi...................................................5
To Missouri......................................................9
To Nevada........................................................1
To New Hampshire.................................................3
To New Jersey....................................................5
To New York.....................................................31
To North Carolina................................................8
To Ohio.........................................................19
To Oregon........................................................1
To Pennsylvania.................................................24
To Rhode Island..................................................2
To South Carolina................................................6
To Tennessee.....................................................8
To Texas.........................................................2
To Vermont.......................................................3
To Virginia......................................................8
To West Virginia.................................................3
To Wisconsin.....................................................6
That law is still in force. Under that law the present House of Representatives was chosen; under that law
the present House is organized; under that law those eleven States of the South, have just as much right to
representation as the other twenty-five.
Whether those States are in a condition to choose Representatives, and whether they have chosen right
Representatives, are questions I will discuss hereafter. I now speak only of their right to have representation
under the existing law of Congress.
Thus, by the action of Congress, in apportioning direct taxes and representation--those two fundamentals in
republican government--the status of those eleven States as States included within this Union is declared, and
acted upon.
THIS IS PART OF A COURT CASE IN WHICH THE JUDGE COMMENTS ON THE STATE OF
MARYLAND PAYING ITS APPORTIONED SHARE [$436,823.33], OF THE DIRECT TAX LAID DURING
THE CIVIL WAR
JANUARY TERM, 1893.
MARYLAND REPORTS
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Wailes vs. Smith, Comptroller
SIDNEY I. WAILES vs. MARION DE KALB SMITH, Comptroller of the Treasury of the
State of Maryland.
ROBINSON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case has been very fully argued, and the interests involved are of more than ordinary importance. At the
same time, however, it does not seem to us that any great difficulties present themselves in the consideration of
the several questions upon which the petitioner's right to a mandamus depends.
Now, what is this case? [By an Act of Congress, approved 5th August, 1861, a direct tax of twenty millions of
dollars was levied upon real property, and this tax was apportioned as prescribed by the Federal
Constitution--the apportionment of this State being $436,823.33. Provision was made for the assessment and
collection of this tax against the individual owners of such property, but any State was allowed to assume and
pay its quota of said tax; and under this provision the State of Maryland assumed and paid into the Treasury of
the United States $371,299.83, being its apportionment, less fifteen percent allowed by the Act for the cost of
collection. And thus the tax against the property of her citizens was thereby satisfied and
extinguished.] (Brackets supplied).
Thirty years afterwards, by an Act of Congress, approved 2nd March, 1891, entitled " Ac Act to audit and pay to
the several states and Territories and the District of Columbia, all moneys collected under the direct tax levied
by the Act of 1861," the $371,299.83 thus paid was refunded to the State.
One year after the Wailes case was argued in the State of Maryland, another case involving direct taxation went
to the United States Supreme Court, Pollock v Farmer's Loan and Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 (1894) A
portion of Justice Fuller's written opinion is presented here which articulates, in a nutshell, the legislative intent
of our founding fathers, as related to direct
taxation.
"The reasons for the clauses of the Constitution in respect of direct taxation are not far to seek ... The
founders anticipated that the expenditures of the States, their counties, cities and towns would chiefly be met by
direct taxation on accumulated property, while they expected that those of Federal Government would be for the
most part met by indirect taxes. And in order that the power of direct taxation by the general government
should not be exercised except on necessity, and, when the necessity arose, would be so exercised as to leave the
States at liberty to discharge their respective obligations, and should not be so exercised unfairly and
discriminately, as to particular States or otherwise, by a mere majority vote, possibly of those whose
constituents were intentionally not subjected to any part of the burden, the qualified grant was made . . .
Page 140 of 156

“If It Is a ‘Federal’ Matter,
It Is ALSO a STATE Matter”
Repairing the broken link between the States and Congress:
Restoring state “suffrage” to the United States Senate.
By Aaron Bolinger & the NVCCA
Page 141 of 156

INTRODUCTION
This brief introduction was designed to give state legislators an understanding of the “big picture” of
federalism, and specifically how their state fits into it. The specific issues that can be addressed are left to the
intellect of the members. Knowing how to appropriately use your influence is the core of this monograph.
There is a general rule that three classes of people need constant supervision. Children, the feeble
among the elderly, and politicians. State legislators are the duly-constituted supervisors of their United States
Senators – with an obligation to over-see federal politicians with the title “Senator.”
Article V of the United States Constitution reads, in part:
“... that ... no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of it's equal Suffrage in the Senate.”
This component of our federal legislature is woefully misunderstood – both in its proper
historical context and in its application in the modern political arena. The United States Senate is
(supposed to be) the “voice of the states” in the federal government. Moreover, there is a positive
prohibition on amendments – in Article V – that prevents states from being “deprived of ... suffrage.”
Historically, the word “suffrage” means “vote.” As used in the Constitution, there is no
possibility that such word has any other meaning. The modifier “equal” prefacing this “suffrage”
implies that, as all states have the right to having two seated Senators, their “vote” would be twain,
and equal to all others. This, part of the “great compromise” of the Constitutional Convention of 1787
gave each state equal voice (or vote) in the Upper House of the legislature, and voting strength
based on population in the Lower House. No amendment, including the 17 , could alter thisth
provision of Article V, unless EVERY STATE agreed to it.
The misunderstanding that the 17 Amendment did, in fact, dis-assemble the right of theth
states to have “equal suffrage” in the federal legislature cannot survive even a cursory reading of the
Amendment in question. It states:
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected
by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive
authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments
until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator
chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
Since the states created the federal government to be a mechanical linkage between and
among them, in forming this “union” they sought to forever preserve their place in the decision-
making that this federal government would undertake.
Perhaps the most important operative (but overlooked) word in that constitutional phrase is
“suffrage,” because it is upon the principle of voting as representatives of the State governments
themselves – and doing so in harmony on matters of mutual importance – that the United States
Senate was created in the first place. This is not some elite club of “representatives at large” (the
way they are currently functioning), but the very “suffrage” of the independent states of the union who
must act in agreement on those elements of federal and international governance where their
interests meet. The provision requiring the United States Senate to overwhelmingly – by a 2/3
majority – agree on certain subjects (as defined in the Constitution), verify this pretext – that the
states reserved for themselves control over the actions, the votes, of their United States Senators.
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Suffrage, according to every dictionary and historic definition of the term in practice and legal
usage, is simply that – voting. And these United States Senators do, and must, vote to concur with
their sister body – the House of Representatives, on all matters involving federal legislation. In this
manner, the people AND the states, have voices in the federal system. Yet the Senate is a special
body of its own, that can make certain federal decisions independent of the House of
Representatives – such as confirming treaties (which bind our states into international agreements),
executive branch principals (department heads – which individuals act as agents for the states in
sundry roles) and court justices (who make important decisions where the states are involved in legal
actions at the federal level), etc.
HISTORY OF THE 17 AMENDMENTTH
[The following was extracted verbatim from the United States Senate web site:
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Direct_Election_Senators.htm]
Voters have elected their senators in the privacy of the voting booth since 1913. The framers
of the Constitution, however, did not intend senators to be elected in this way, and included in Article
I, section 3, "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state,
chosen by the legislature thereof for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote." The election
of delegates to the Constitutional Convention established the precedent for state selection. The
framers believed that in electing senators, state legislatures would cement their tie with the national
government, which would increase the chances for ratifying the Constitution. They also expected that
senators elected by state legislatures would be able to concentrate on the business at hand without
pressure from the populace.
This process seemed to work well until the mid-1850s. At that time, growing hostilities in
various states resulted in vacant Senate seats. In Indiana, for example, the conflict between
Democrats in the southern half of the state and the emerging Republican party in the northern half
prevented the election of any candidate, thereby leaving the Senate seat vacant for two years. This
marked the beginning of many contentious battles in state legislatures, as the struggle to elect
senators reflected the increasing tensions over slavery and states' rights which led to the Civil War.
After the Civil War, problems in senatorial elections by the state legislatures multiplied. In one
case in the late 1860s, the election of Senator John Stockton of New Jersey was contested on the
grounds that he had been elected by a plurality rather than a majority in the state legislature.
Stockton based his defense on the observation that not all states elected their senators in the same
way, and presented a report that illustrated the inconsistency in state elections of senators. In
response, Congress passed a law in 1866 regulating how and when senators were elected in each
state. This was the first change in the process of senatorial elections created by the Founders. The
law helped but did not entirely solve the problem, and deadlocks in some legislatures continued to
cause long vacancies in some Senate seats.
Intimidation and bribery marked some of the states' selection of senators. Nine bribery cases
were brought before the Senate between 1866 and 1906. In addition, forty-five deadlocks occurred in
twenty states between 1891 and 1905, resulting in numerous delays in seating senators. In 1899,
problems in electing a senator in Delaware were so acute that the state legislature did not send a
senator to Washington for four years.
The impetus for reform began as early as 1826 , when direct election of senators was first
proposed. In the 1870s, voters sent a petition to the House of Representatives for a popular election.
From 1893 to 1902, momentum increased considerably. Each year during that period, a
constitutional amendment to elect senators by popular vote was proposed in Congress, but the
Senate fiercely resisted change, despite the frequent vacancies and disputed election results. In the
mid-1890s, the Populist party incorporated the direct election of senators into its party platform,
although neither the Democrats nor the Republicans paid much notice at the time. In the early 1900s,
Page 143 of 156

one state initiated changes on its own. Oregon pioneered direct election and experimented with
different measures over several years until it succeeded in 1907. Soon after, Nebraska followed suit
and laid the foundation for other states to adopt measures reflecting the people's will. Senators who
resisted reform had difficulty ignoring the growing support for direct election of senators.
After the turn of the century, momentum for reform grew rapidly. William Randolph Hearst
expanded his publishing empire with Cosmopolitan, and championed the cause of direct election with
muckraking articles and strong advocacy of reform. Hearst hired a veteran reporter, David Graham
Phillips, who wrote scathing pieces on senators, portraying them as pawns of industrialists and
financiers. The pieces became a series titled "The Treason of the Senate," which appeared in
several monthly issues of the magazine in 1906. These articles galvanized the public into maintaining
pressure on the Senate for reform.
Increasingly, senators were elected based on state referenda, similar to the means developed
by Oregon. By 1912, as many as twenty-nine states elected senators either as nominees of their
party's primary or in a general election. As representatives of a direct election process, the new
senators supported measures that argued for federal legislation, but in order to achieve reform, a
constitutional amendment was required. In 1911, Senator Joseph Bristow from Kansas offered a
resolution, proposing a constitutional amendment. The idea also enjoyed strong support from
Senator William Borah of Idaho, himself a product of direct election. Eight southern senators and all
Republican senators from New England, New York, and Pennsylvania opposed Senator Bristow's
resolution. The Senate approved the resolution largely because of the senators who had been
elected by state-initiated reforms, many of whom were serving their first term, and therefore may
have been more willing to support direct election. After the Senate passed the amendment, which
represented the culmination of decades of debate about the issue, the measure moved to the House
of Representatives.
The House initially fared no better than the Senate in its early discussions of the proposed
amendment. Much wrangling characterized the debates, but in the summer of 1912 the House finally
passed the amendment and sent it to the states for ratification. The campaign for public support was
aided by senators such as Borah and political scientist George H. Haynes, whose scholarly work on
the Senate contributed greatly to passage of the amendment.
Connecticut's approval gave the Seventeenth Amendment the required three-fourths majority,
and it was added to the Constitution in 1913. The following year marked the first time all senatorial
elections were held by popular vote.
The Seventeenth Amendment restates the first paragraph of Article I, section 3 of the
Constitution and provides for the election of senators by replacing the phrase "chosen by the
Legislature thereof" with "elected by the people thereof." In addition, it allows the governor or
executive authority of each state, if authorized by that state's legislature, to appoint a senator in the
event of a vacancy, until a general election occurs.
RATIFICATION OF THE 17 AMENDMENTTH
[Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seventeenth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution#cite_note-148CongRecS9419-33
State Date of ratification
Massachusetts May 22, 1912
Arizona June 3, 1912
Minnesota June 10, 1912
New York January 15, 1913
Kansas January 17, 1913
Oregon January 23, 1913
North Carolina January 25, 1913
California January 28, 1913
Page 144 of 156

Michigan January 28, 1913
Iowa January 30, 1913
Montana January 30, 1913
Idaho January 31, 1913
West Virginia February 4, 1913
Colorado February 5, 1913
Nevada February 6, 1913
Texas February 7, 1913
Washington February 7, 1913
Wyoming February 8, 1913
Arkansas February 11, 1913
Maine February 11, 1913
Illinois February 13, 1913
North Dakota February 14, 1913
Wisconsin February 18, 1913
Indiana February 19, 1913
New Hampshire February 19, 1913
Vermont February 19, 1913
South Dakota February 19, 1913
Oklahoma February 24, 1913
Ohio February 25, 1913
Missouri March 7, 1913
New Mexico March 13, 1913
Nebraska March 14, 1913
New Jersey March 17, 1913
Tennessee April 1, 1913
Pennsylvania April 2, 1913
Connecticut April 8, 1913
Louisiana June 11, 1913
Alabama April 11, 2002
Delaware July 1, 2010
Maryland April 1, 2012
The following states did not ratify the Seventeenth Amendment:
Utah (explicitly rejected)
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Mississippi
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Virginia
If, by any stretch of the imagination, the language of the Amendment stripped “equal suffrage”
from the states, the mere failure of ratification of even ONE of the extant states would have voided
the Amendment, by virtue of the clear language of Article V. The specific rejection of Utah would be
sufficient to invoke Article V in such case, had any thing pertaining to a removal of “equal suffrage”
been involved.
Page 145 of 156

Obviously, each state retained two United States Senators, and the job description thereof, as
expressed in the Articles and Sections of the Constitution pertaining thereto, were not in the least
affected by the language of the 17 . Only the manner of the selection of these Senators wasth
modified by the 17 Amendment.th
Respecting the modern notion of repealing the 17 Amendment to somehow “restore theth
states to Washington,” in reality such a repeal would only renew the political problems associated
with having states try to select exactly unto whom to give this huge gift of federal Senatorship.
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS REQUIRE HISTORIC SOLUTIONS
State legislators are in a wonderful position to actually influence federal policy on economics,
treaties, Supreme Court appointments, and much more – when they regain control over the VOTES
(suffrage) of their United States Senators. Legislators apprised of how to exercise their influence
over these Senators need look no further than themselves to have a major impact on what
Washington does. Indeed it is the DUTY of state law-makers to be well versed in “federal matters” so
that their Senators appropriately represent the interests of their respective states in Washington.
History has proven that an unrestrained Congress is a worse national enemy than any terrorist
cell could ever be. No foreign state has ever destroyed our money system, nor can any of them
legislatively inflict injury on the liberties of our people. The only threat of tyranny from law arises from
Congress – who would think to pass bills eroding the liberties of Americans on one hand, or bind us
into ill-conceived international treaties (that can subject Americans to international “courts”, erode or
destroy our commerce, etc.) on the other. At this point, only the states can restore the American
dollar to its previous envy-of-the-world status, and rid our people of the insidious legislation that
brings our people into bondage. Moreover, the 17 Amendment need not be repealed to achieve thisth
small miracle.
Fortunately, that responsibility is not as daunting as it might seem.
The Constitution installed this “state branch” within the federal legislature, and the wording of
the 17 Amendment did not change the role of the states in this picture of governance. Senators,th
acting according to the will of the legislature of the state from which they hail, can impose the will of
their state back into the federal system. Furthermore, the states can, by their proxy Senators,
address a wide range of “federal” subjects, including:
• “Unfunded mandates,”
• Direct affirmative or negative votes upon supreme Court & executive department
nominees,
• Direct corrective legislation appropriate for various circumstances,
• Direct on such subjects as economics,
• Direct votes on treaties, and/or call for their repeal,
• Address a more “sane” and appropriate course of participation in the United Nations
organization, NATO, the WTO, and related international bodies that impact upon our
military, funding, international trade, and other subjects,
• Etcetera.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE.
The constitution for the United States of America provides the following duties and obligations
upon the United States Senate, and accordingly provides the relationship of representative suffrage
of the General Assemblies of our Sister States in that federal Assembly to carry out the wishes
thereof in these duties:
Page 146 of 156

• To try all Impeachments.(Art 1, § 3, Cl. 6)
• To concur on treaties (by a 2/3 margin), confirm the appointment of Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not otherwise provided for (Art II, § 2, Cl. 2).
• In Article 1, § 8, the following duties befall the Congress generally, the Senate being but one
chamber thereof.
Clause Duty
2 To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
3 To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes;
4 To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States;
5 To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures; *
6 To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United
States;
7 To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
8 To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
9 To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
10 To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against
the Law of Nations;
11 To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water;
12 To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer
Term than two Years;
13 To provide and maintain a Navy;
14 To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
15 To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions; **
16 To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress;
17 To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards and other needful Buildings;–And
18 To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.
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* Note the word “coin” is used as a verb, hence the congressional “economic” power is limited to minting metals (silver and
gold) for the primary coinage/money system of our nation. States wanting to fix another major aspect of our current
financial dilemma should see the companion Issue Brief we have prepared on the subject of Federalist Economics for a
detailed financial plan they could “bind” upon their United States Senators for introduction and subsequent passage at the
Federal level.
** In another major area where the States could influence Federal policy, the literal “invasion” of illegal immigrants to the
United States could be spotlighted by the proper binding of your state’s United States Senators into using this power to
repel such invasion.
By properly instructing U.S. Senators, using tools such as “binding resolutions” directed to the
United States Senators from their respective state, the states can regain leverage over a federal
government run amok. (A sample of such binding resolution follows this brief.)
All that is needed are state legislators courageous enough to exercise the powers they
inherently possess via the articles of the Constitution. U.S. Senators can, and should, be held to
account to their state for how they vote in Washington – while wearing the suffrage hat of their state
within the federal government. Though the 17 Amendment changed the mode of selection of theseth
officers, their job descriptions have not changed one iota. They still represent their state, voting on
its behalf, on all legislation proposed by the Congress Assembled; and they still perform the other
Senate-specific duties as articulated in the Federal Constitution on subject matter of common interest
to the states of our union, and as a part of the Congress, exercise all (or nearly so) common powers
with their sister House in the Federal legislature. (Bills to raise money must originate in the lower
House, etc.)
Each state has two United State’s senators. Constitutionally, they were (and still are), the
voice of the states in the five-tiered federalism picture (Executive, Judiciary, Congress, States, and
the people themselves). As a point of departure for further research and understanding this State-
Senatorial interaction, considerable detail may be found in Federalist Papers # 39, 45, 59 60, 62, 63,
64 & 68.
By contrast, the U.S. House of Representatives is comprised of those elected to represent the
people. The “people” have their voice in the House, and the States are positioned in the Senate – at
least that is how it is SUPPOSED to be. Common practice notwithstanding, problems can be fixed
by looking at this history for the answer.
The US Senate is elected by the people (following the 17 Amendment), but is still quiteth
capable of functioning as the STATE voice in the federal system. Not even the Senator’s length of
service was changed by the 17 – it is still 6 years, and rotated so that only 1/3 of the total can beth
changed in any single election cycle. (This provides stability in the general government.)
The selection process had to change however, because even though “no state may be
deprived of its equal suffrage” according to Art. V of the Constitution, prior to the 17 (when stateth
legislatures actually had to choose who to send to Washington) it was such a huge political perk to
get that slot that sometimes states denied themselves suffrage when they couldn’t agree on who to
send. It is easy to see why this was the case. The two-party system made it inevitable.
Imagine a state where Republicans control the state Senate in their assembly, and the
Democrats control the House. No Republican would get the nod from House, and no Democrat
could get Senate approval. Log-jams of this nature were frequent, and often a 2-year election cycle
made no progress, as the leadership of the respective bodies could flip in the opposite direction.
States could go absent one or both Senators for a very long time. Even in states where
compromises enabled senators to be selected, wheeling and dealing corrupted the process to the
degree that public confidence became significantly eroded in the state legislature and Senator both.
To prevent a lack of Senators in Washington, the decision on who to send to was taken away
from party politics and given to the normal election process of the people. It was a simple solution to
a common (and annoying) problem.
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So despite common misconceptions about the 17 Amendment, the United States Senate stillth
has the exact same duties and obligations under the Constitution. They still: confirm the appointment
of Presidentially-nominated ambassadors, court justices & executive branch officials, and confirm
treaties (per Art. 2 § 2, cl. 2). They also try cases of impeachment (Art 1 § 3, cl. 6). These duties are
reserved to the Senate simply because these situations and government officials in strong leadership
roles impact on the states, binding them into potentially long-term affairs potentially deleterious to
their general welfare. It requires 2/3 of the Senate to execute these confirmations & agreements to
certify the overwhelming support of the states to be bound by these people and agreements.
As shown, the states can be involved in the selection of the Supreme Court (Treasury
department heads, etc.) via the Senate. When a President proposes a candidate for the bench or
other official duty, states can independently investigate the candidate via their own committee
structures, and make a “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” recommendation to their United States
Senators on the confirmation. In all places where “consent of the Senate” is stipulated in the
Constitution, functioning state legislatures are plugged into the federal process, as the Constitution
intended. It gives the states a bit of extra work, but on behalf of the welfare of their state it is their
duty to see to it.
The Constitution presumed that the states would instruct their representatives to the federal
Senate on their wishes. History proves that so long as the states did supervise and instruct (and hold
accountable) their Senators, these Senators very well and faithfully represented the will of the state
legislature in Congress. This is nothing new at all. The only thing missing in the present day is using
the proper tools already at the states’ disposal to once again hold them accountable.
Common contemporary mis-belief is that “federal matters” are entirely the job of the federal
legislature, and most state assembly persons simply advise members of the public to “contact
Washington” for such discussion. This can only be either evidence of misunderstanding state-federal
relations, or a cop-out. Many would infer that state legislators who give a “that’s a federal matter”
response to valid localized questions or comments are doing so either 1) because they do not know
the real power over Washington that they have, 2) or they are hoping to “pass the buck” on a political
problem to avoid addressing it.
The only other answer is patent laziness, and experience is that most state officials are
anything but lazy. It is quite frustrating to the constituent, however, and totally unproductive (and
demeaning) to the state legislator who takes that position. One can only hope the reason they do so
is #1 above, as any lack of information can quickly be corrected.
It remains, however, a distinct duty of the state legislatures to contact and instruct United
States Senators when any federal matter is involved that has impact on their state’s welfare, security
or long-term health. This is clearly seen by the special legislative powers of the US Senate provided
in the Constitution. The public is certainly at liberty (and should) contact members of the House of
Representatives for many or even most “federal matters.” But where the states are being bound into
treaties, are being bankrupted by “unfunded congressional mandates,” or impacted by such things as
a fraudulent medium of exchange, then it is not only the right of the states to communicate specific
instructions to their United States Senators on how to handle it – it is their obligation! Ipso facto, the
Senators are duty-bound to obey lawful directives by the sovereign authority of their state
assemblies. Otherwise, the states are not sovereign at all, but mere tentacles of the federal system –
a “tail wagging the dog” situation.
A common practice in many states today is to send an endless string of “resolutions” to
Washington, addressed to the President & the members of their congressional delegation (both
House and Senate). These are found on all sorts of interesting subject matter, and represent
sincere attempts to notify Washington of the will of the legislature(s) of the state(s). Such courtesy
copies to the President and House – although certainly meritorious – are notoriously ignored. (Quite
frequently, the US Senators ignore these state pleadings as well.)
Page 149 of 156

To restore their place in the federalism structure, states should do more than simply
“memorialize Congress” with respect to implementing needed federal actions. The proper protocol is
to admonish their United States Senators in a “binding” manner, “by order of the General Assembly
of the State of (x)”. As no state can be denied its suffrage in the Senate, and United States Senators
are the voices of that suffrage, it is beyond ridiculous that state legislators do not take advantage of
this unique and unquestionable power that they have to reclaim their voice in the federal legislature.
Based on meetings with numerous state elected officials, it is apparent that many of them are
not conversant with this power (unless they are denying it out of fear of using it, but that hardly
seems the case). Some truly believe that anything deemed a “federal matter” must be left to federal
legislators to discern and deal with on their own. Such notion is purely untrue, based on the
language of the Constitution itself. States can impose themselves back into the federal system at any
time they so desire. Based on this current economic dilemma, and with numerous other situations
presenting themselves as problematic for the states, it is high time they do so.
Perhaps a better application of this power would play out in practice by enacting a short state
law (model following) that compels the attendance of the two United States Senators before a joint
session of the state legislature once or twice in each year. All “sense of the state” matters of federal
significance (at the time) would be communicated via this mechanism, and only to the Senators. Any
subsequently discovered situations would be dealt with via binding resolution communicated to their
Senators in Washington as warranted. In this manner, the State would make its wishes known on all
important federal subject matter, and at all times the Senators would be aware of exactly how they
should be voting in the interest of their State.
On a side note, part of this might encourage state legislators to involve themselves much more
in the selection process of these United States Senators. This is a rather simple thing to do as well –
and carrying with it many benefits. This is not to say there is any need to suggest repealing the 17 –th
as that would renew the problems it solved. But each state legislator does represent a large number
of citizens in their state capitol. As such, it would be quite easy to use available media (mail, press
conferences near election time, e-mail, etc.) to alert the voters as to how their Senators are doing
with respect to representing the common interest of the state as a whole. Certainly the ability to
influence the voters about who to send to Washington is a tactic that has also been ignored entirely
too long. Meanwhile Washington continues to borrow - spend - tax - repeat into infinitely higher
levels of debt burdens on future generations, and for dramatically unproductive and unpopular
expeditions of assorted flavors (mating habits of fruit flies to aggressive foreign wars – pick a
favorite).
When flexing this available muscle in these two small activities, state legislators would
immediately find U.S. Senators catering to them (as they rightly should). Senators would terribly fear
acting in favor of special (corporate or foreign) interests over that of their state, as doing so is sure to
incur the wrath of irritated state legislators who can tell significant voting blocks of the general public
to remove them from office at the next election.
In our modern age of rapid and targeted communication, this power is perhaps more potent
now than ever. Moreover, it is a power already possessed by every state legislator in America. It
requires no Constitutional Amendment or change to implement. It is available immediately if one
sees a U.S. Senator who is behaving badly. Reigning in official Washington is about as easy as
understanding the tools at your disposal, and then making the courageous decision to do so.
Without question, economic upheaval as we are now seeing is driving more and more people
to seek out answers as to why Washington would pursue such idiotic borrowing policies – the same
as those which created our dilemma. When the people see their state officials taking an active role
in reigning in these policies, the “free market” will again take over with investments of their own.
As you begin to understand the federalism picture of our nation’s economy, bear in mind the
simple changes to our state thinking that will preface other reforms. First, our states must come to
understand the Constitutional scope of their powers and duties. Only then can other changes be
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undertaken. A model “US Senate Accountability Act” follows that can be easily tailored or
customized for the particular needs of your state. It would implement the basic ideas contained in
this introductory monograph.
Is it essential? Certainly not. Simply using your influence over the voters COULD begin
reigning in your state’s 4% of the US Senate. Even the INTRODUCTION of such a bill (with
sufficiently powerful co-sponsorship to give it credibility) might result in a call from the Senators
wanting to make regular (albeit non-compulsory) visits to the State House. (They would probably
rather “volunteer” to come, than to be compelled by law to do so.) But with this situation as it is, a bit
of extra muscle flexing may get the message through loud and clear, and much faster. It would also
give the state a “fail safe” mechanism in case any Senator decides to back-slide into previous modes
of behavior after the pressure abates. The corrupting influence of special interests on the U.S.
Senate is not something they will seek to remove on their own, at least not for any protracted time
period. That is where the state legislators come in – take it out of their purview, and they will act
accordingly.
For many reasons it is high time the US Senate was reigned in by the states. It is also
apropos that our states quit being treated as the “red-headed stepchild” of the federal government.
After all, the states created the federal government in the first place, and the proper role for the feds
is that of “agent” in the “principle vs. agent” relationship we fondly call “American Federalism.” That
“principle/agent” legal concept is crucial to developing positive plans of action against everything from
“unfunded mandates” to wealth-transfer “bailouts.” For now, the important thing is knowing that we
are sovereign states, united via a federal government who is required to perform certain limited
functions to the benefit of our united sovereigns. Plugging the states back into this system is
essential if we are to straighten out our contemporary problems. The federal tail can only wag our
sovereign state dogs so long as we allow it.
OBJECTIONS & REBUTTALS
Certainly there will be ruffled feathers over the prospects of demanding accountability in
Washington. Below are a few likely objections, followed by some (perhaps witty) rebuttals to help
you make the case to your colleagues.
Have any states done this before?
There are two types of hunters: those who tread only on public lands using well-traveled
roads, and those who use a compass and hike across the ridges. The one taking the higher road
brings back more game than the path-finder. The Constitution is our compass. Since the states are
represented in Congress by our US Senators, it only stands to reason that we MUST provide
information to our Senators if we expect them to represent us. Previous to recent times, it was taken
for granted that the Senators would respect their sending state, and they did so quite admirably.
Only because we have lost our way in the woods do we now need to resort to the compass to find
our way back. This great constitutional experiment is still a work in progress. We might be trail-
blazing in that respect.
The 17 Amendment corrected a political problem (bickering among parties over who to send)th
that often left states without Senators in Washington. We now need to correct the vacuum of
Senator-to-state accountability that the 17 Amendment seemed to have caused, albeitth
unintentionally. The 10 Amendment says the states remain sovereign, so we can do whatever weth
want – so long as we do not do something the Constitutional-compass specifically forbids. Holding
our Senators accountable to our Assembly is perfectly reasonable, and absolutely within the scope of
the rule book, including its original intent & practice until very recently. If other states don’t do
something like this, that is their problem, not ours. Maybe we will be blazing the path others will
follow. That is bad, why?
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Didn’t the 17 Amendment change the role of the states?th
No. The 17 Amendment did not alter Article V, nor did it change any of the duties of theth
Senate based on their obligation to the state that sends them to Washington. The debates of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, the state ratification debates, Federalist Papers, and much more
comprise the documents of Constitutional History and these explain the intent of the framers of the
Constitution concerning “federalism.” This material comprises a considerable volume of information
on the state-federal relationship, and is the source of well entrenched and well accepted principles of
constitutional application. The manner of selecting Senators did not alter their role as suffrage in
Congress for the states. They are to be our voice in the federal legislature. It is high time they started
speaking for us as states, and this proposal moves the Senate back towards their proper and well-
accepted role.
What if Congress retaliates against us by cutting off funding?
The thought that the entire Congress would vote to disconnect a state from their desire to
spend generally is laughable. If they did, it would only prove further the point that they are totally out
of control, and need to be supervised better. Again, that is the job of the states via their US
Senators, and this proposal would do just that – at least from our state’s perspective. What others do
is entirely their business.
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Model United States Senate Accountability Act
WHEREAS, the Constitution for the United States of America, at Amendment Seventeen, specifies that United
States Senators are "elected by the People" (Clause 1). Said Constitution, in Article V, further states that "no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate;" and
WHEREAS, Nothing has altered the constitutional responsibility of the United States Senate to be the voice of
the states in the federal government. Even though popularly elected following the enactment of the 17th
Amendment, United States Senators are, in fact Representatives of the State Legislature of the State from which
they are elected, and as such, accountable to the same for their conduct. The will of this General Assembly is to
be expressed in the federal government by and through the two United States Senators elected by the People
thereof.
BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the General Assembly of the State of (X) that the two United States
Senators from the State of (X) are forever hereafter summoned to appear before a joint session of this General
Assembly each year on the (insert date and time); and be it further
ENACTED, that the purpose of this joint session is to exchange information by and between the State of (X)
and the United States Congress through its duly elected United States Senators; and be it further
ENACTED, that a joint standing committee is hereby established consisting of 10 members of the House of
Representatives and 6 members of the State Senate, and the presiding officer of each House. Such committee
shall be styled the "Joint Standing Committee Pertaining to the United States Senate." Upon convening, the
members of the said Committee shall appoint two co-chairs, one from each House of this General Assembly;
and be it further
ENACTED, that not later than thirty calendar days prior to this annual meeting the United States Senators shall
provide to this Committee certified copies of their most recent calendar year voting record on all bills and
resolutions on which they voted while serving in the United States Senate, certified copies of the said bills and
resolutions, and copies of each bill and resolution known to be under consideration in the Congress of the
United States in the immediate upcoming calendar year; and be it further
ENACTED, that each United States Senator shall be eligible to speak to the Assembly to discuss the actions of
the Congress of the United States as they pertain to the relationship of the several States to the Federal system,
to discuss pending legislation of the United States Congress as it pertains to the same, to justify their actions and
voting record as they pertain to the State of (X) and the General Assembly and citizens thereof, and to discuss
other matters the Senators wish to convey to the General Assembly; and be it further
ENACTED, that the Presiding Officers of both Houses of this State's General Assembly shall convey to the
United States Senators copies of any and all resolutions passed by this General Assembly expressing the ideas,
senses or desires of this General Assembly for introduction into the Congress of the United States. The
presiding officers of both Houses of the General Assembly shall direct said United States Senators to introduce
and support any such measures to benefit the General Assembly and People of the State of (X); and be it further
ENACTED, that the first occasion of this annual meeting will occur not more than 90 days following the
passage of this act (said date to be provided for by a subsequent resolution), and will then occur on the date and
time herein provided for each year forever hereafter; and be it further
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ENACTED, that forever hereafter the Senior United States Senator shall maintain routine contact with the
co-chairs of the Special Joint Committee Pertaining to the United States Senate for the purpose of ascertaining
the sense of this General Assembly as it relates to legislation pending before the Congress Assembled, and
treaties and appointments before the United States Senate. To the end that the General Assembly's wishes be
represented in the United States Senate, the Special Joint Committee shall, from time to time, poll the members
of this General Assembly to ascertain their position on pending considerations before the United States Senate,
and convey the results of such polls to the Senior United States Senator from the State of (X) ; and be it further
ENACTED, that failure to comply with the directives of this Act by any United States Senator shall constitute
nonfeasance of office by the offending United States Senator, and upon conviction thereof in the Circuit Court
located in the State Capitol of Harrisburg, said United States Senator shall immediately vacate his/her said
office in the United States Senate, and such position shall be filled according to the terms and conditions of
Clause 2 of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America; and be it further
ENACTED, that the Joint State Standing Committee Pertaining to the United States Senate be directed to
review the performance of each member of the United States Senate from the State of (X) , and to evaluate such
performance and voting records to ascertain the member's compliance to his or her Oath of Office and to the
terms and conditions of the Constitution for the United States of America. When the record indicates a member
has introduced or voted in favor of a bill or bills determined by the committee not in conformity to the
Constitution for the United States of America, the Committee shall issue a report to the General Assembly of
this State signifying the same. Upon a concurrence of a majority of the members of both Houses of this State's
General Assembly, the presiding officers of the Pennsylvania House and Senate shall direct the Attorney
General for the State of (X) to bring quo warranto proceedings against said United States Senator. In the absence
of a valid response to quo warranto, the Senator shall vacate his seat in the United States Senate, and the
Attorney General shall bring criminal charges of Violation of Oath as provided for in the ______ Annotated
Code, Article __, Section ____Any position created by removal from office shall be filled according to the terms
and conditions of Clause 2 of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America.
Following passage of the above Act, the wording for a “Binding Resolution” might include the following,
directing a proper “Balanced Budget Amendment” to be introduced by the U.S. Senators of the given state:
Model Binding Resolution on the United States Senators for the State of (X)
WHEREAS, following adoption of the Constitution for the United States of America, a series of Amendments
were proposed by the States eventually becoming referred to as the “Bill of Rights;” AND
WHEREAS, among these Amendments was one that did not receive the required state votes for ratification, the
text of which amounted to a “Balanced Budget Amendment” using the newly created and extant powers of
Congress, as follows:
Resolved that the general Government of the United States ought never to impose direct
taxes, but where the monies arising from the duties, imposts and excise are insufficient
for the public exigencies nor then until Congress shall have made a requisition upon the
states to Assess levy and pay their respective proportions of such requisitions. And in case any state shall
neglect or refuse to pay its proportion pursuant to such requisition then Congress may assess and levy
such state's proportion together with Interest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum from the
time of payment prescribed by such
requisition.
Page 154 of 156

AND, WHEREAS the States of New York, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
Rhode Island and Virginia included substantially similar language, expounding upon the Power of Direct
Taxation found at Article 1, § 2, Cl.3; and Article 1, § 9, Cl. 4 in their respective Ratification Documents,
suggesting and requesting such Amendment to ascertain and effect an annually balanced Federal budget and so
as to limit the necessity of borrowing, and hence the compounding interest that accompanies such borrowing,
and to further hold accountable to the States and people said Congress for its spending in the year such monies
are spent; AND
WHEREAS, the current profligate spending and borrowing habits of the Congress Assembled evinces a blatant
disregard for the financial well-being of this and our Sister States.
BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF THE STATE OF (X) ASSEMBLED
AND IN HARMONY THAT
The two United States Senators from this State are hereby directed to introduce into the Senate of the United
States the following Constitutional Amendment requiring an annually balanced budget, consistent with the
extant power of Congress to impose an emergency Direct Tax upon the States of this Union, apportioned by
voting strength in the lower House of Congress, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Congress ought not raise money from borrowing, but when the money arising from
imposts, duties and excise taxes are insufficient to meet the public exigencies, and Congress has raised
money by borrowing during the course of a fiscal year. In such case, Congress shall then lay a direct tax
at the beginning of the next fiscal year for an amount sufficient to extinguish the preceding fiscal year's
deficit, and apply the revenue so raised to extinguishing said deficit."
"SECTION 2. When Congress is required to lay a direct tax in accordance with Section 1 of this Article,
Congress shall immediately calculate each State's apportioned share of the tax based upon its number of
Representatives as allotted by the Constitution, and then notify the Executive of each State of its
apportioned share of the total tax being collected and a final date by which said tax shall be paid into the
United States Treasury."
"SECTION 3. Each State shall be free to assume and pay its quota of the direct tax into the United States
Treasury by the final date set by Congress, but if any State shall refuse or neglect to pay its quota, then
Congress shall send forth its officers to assess and levy such State's proportion against the real property
within the State with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per annum, and against the individual
owners of such property. Provision shall be made for a 15% discount for those States paying their share
by January 15th of the fiscal year in which the tax is laid, and a 10% discount for States paying by the
final date set by Congress, such discount being to defray the States' cost of collection."
AND BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that in such case as either United States Senator from the State of (X)
shall refuse or neglect to introduce and/or co-sponsor such Constitutional Amendment, and subsequently to
support and vote in favor of such amendment, either in a U.S. Senatorial Committee considering the same or on
the floor of the Senate when such vote shall be taken and recorded, that said Senator(s) shall be guilty of perjury
(violation of their oath of office) to serve as the suffrage of this State in the United States Senate, as the voice
thereof, as demanded and bound by this Resolution expressing the will of our Assembly upon them in their
official capacity. Such neglect shall make said Senator(s) culpable to be tried in this State for such violation
under the authority of the General Assembly, with the Attorney General of this State serving as the Prosecuting
Attorney on behalf of this State. Upon conviction thereof, such Senator(s) shall immediately vacate their office,
Page 155 of 156

and shall be replaced under the terms of vacancies within the United States Senate as provided for in the 17th
Amendment of the Constitution for the United States of America.
Page 156 of 156

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