Improving Security Posture through Increased Agility with Measurable Effectiveness at Scale
Speed Kills
1
2
Taken from the 2018 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report
https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2018_Report_execsummary_en_xg.pdf 3
What we are
going to talk
about
What is Vanquish?
Agility by Design
Agility through Measurability
Agility via Machine Learning
Lessons of Red October Pen Test
4
What is
Vanquish?
Near real-time security monitoring & analytics
platform for M365 Data Center infrastructure
• Detections
• Remediation
• Alerting
• Telemetry from Hosts
• Integrated Context
• Incident Management
• Analyst Tools
5
Collecting and Processing Security Data
M365SubstrateInfrastructure
Vanquish Cluster
(Kafka/Spark/CosmosDB/Kusto)
Hundreds ofthousandsofmachinesscored
innearrealtime
NRT processing withintelligentlogicfor
combiningsignals(triangulation)
AnalystToolsandDashboards
Thousandsofresults/day
Alertingand Automation
Approximatelyonepagingalert/day
Agility by
Design
Move fast, don’t impact customers
Treat detections as code not scripts
Leverage right technologies
Detections at the speed of attackers
Remediation and Investigation at the speed of
attackers
7
Vanquish is decoupled from monitored assets
MOVE FAST, BUT DON’T
IMPACT CUSTOMERS
DEPLOY NEW CODE
WITHOUT RISK TO
MONITORED ASSETS
APPLY FILTERS ACROSS ALL
DIMENSIONS IN SECONDS
CREATE IOCS ACROSS ALL
DIMENSIONS IN SECONDS
8
Detections are code – not scripts
Broken is not agile
Detections are tested – deployment is gated on passing tests
9
Leverage the
Best of Microsoft
& Open Source
Technologies
Microsoft Siphon
10
Detections at the speed of attackers
Detection
of Badness
Forensic
Analysis
Created
New
Detection
Added the
Detection
to ML
model
More
Badness
found
The Hunt for Red October
• Alerted <4 minutes after intrusion
• IOCs added in minutes
• New detection deployed within hours
11
Remediation: Too Slow
1. 9am: Decision to remediate
2. 1pm: Attacker starts pivoting
3. 4pm: Remediation complete
Ample opportunity to remediate
Delayed by tooling
Active attacker kept ahead of us
1
2
3
12
1
2
3
Investigation and Remediation at the speed of attackers
On-Host
Telemetry
Cloud Based
Detection
Remediation
Subsystem
Data-Center
Management
Service
On-Host
Remediation
or
Investigation
13
Agility through
Measurability
System is Up
Endpoints are Covered
Badness Detected
14
System is Up!
Run pipeline as a
service
Monitor for data
latency & completeness
Monitor Spark Jobs
15
Endpoints are covered!
We look for heartbeats and configuration correctness for each host
We have monitoring for HostIDS health
Remediation is automated for unhealthy endpoints
16
99th
Percentile
Badness Detected!
PEN TESTS ATTACKBOT (BROUGHT TO
YOU BY M365 RED TEAM )
17
Pen Test results
Pen tests in the last year which did not trigger a paging alert:
0
Before we get too overconfident – our Red Team is awesome
• Detecting them does not mean that they did not achieve their objective
M365 still believes in Assume Breach approach
18
AttackBot is constantly validating detections
Automated
Attacks Run
Frequently
Process
Signal/Create
Detections
Auto-Label
Detections
Measure
Results
Adjust (if
needed)
19
Measure your results
20
Agility via
Machine
Learning
Anomaly System Filters Normal Activity
ML Precisely Targets Known Bad
Automated Model Training Adapts Quickly
21
Anomaly Calculation
• A service in a Data Center is largely uniform
• Automate whitelists for normal behavior
• State snapshots: autorun reg keys, group membership
• Challenges:
• Anomalous ≠ Malicious
• Emerging behaviors create noise
22
Anomaly Detection is Not Enough
~500 Billion Events Per Day
23
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
8/25 8/27 8/29 8/31 9/2
Anomaly Detections per Day
+ We Catch Attacks
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
8/25 8/27 8/29 8/31 9/2
Anomaly Detections per Day
0
1
2
3
4
5
8/25 8/27 8/29 8/31 9/02
Alerts Per Day
Supervised Machine Learning
Maintain an archive of known malicious behavior
• Pen test, attack automation, others, etc.
• Any thing that our security analysts have labelled malicious/bad
New behavior
Is new behavior
similar / not similar
to known attacks?
Limitation - Can’t learn what we haven’t seen
• But there is value in auto-learning what we have seen
• With a world class Pen Test team you can auto-learn a lot
Challenge - M365 evolves quickly → Model becomes stale quickly
24
Repeatable Intelligent Automation
• Data processing, model training, evaluation & promotion takes time
when done manually
• AI & Automation is the key to agility & better results
Data Processing
Wrangling
Normalization
Sampling
Bootstrapping
Etc.
Features
Extraction
ML Model
Training
&
Evaluation
Model
Promotion
&
Threshold
Selection
Data Processing
Wrangling
Normalization
Sampling
Bootstrapping
Etc.
Features
Extraction
ML Model
Training
&
Evaluation
Model
Promotion
&
Threshold
Selection
Repeatable Intelligent Automation
Without Needing
Human Intervention
IntelligenceIntelligence
25
Model Performance and Automated Learning
Hunt for Red October
New malicious
behavior
identified and
labelled by
humans on a
couple of
machines
24 Machines
compromised
in 4 days
10
Alerted by ML
before
humans
6
Tied between
ML & humans
8
Missed by ML
10
Alerted by ML
before
humans
6
Tied between
ML & humans
ML learned in
and alerted
on the rest
New malicious behavior
learned in by ML
automatically
26
Agile Model Experimentation and Update
Adding/updating features to ML model doesn’t require a code change
Features
Extraction
<Features>
<Feature Type ="Numeric" Signal=“Detection1" Operation="Count" Field="ProcessName" /><!-- Number of processes captured-->
<Feature Type ="Numeric" Signal="Detection2" Operation="Max" Field="Score" />
</Features>
Normalized
Detections
Feature
Vectors
<Feature Type ="Numeric" Signal=“Detection3" Operation="MaxSum" Field="Bytes,IP,Port" /><!-- Max bytes transferred to a destination-->
New detection feature
27
Intelligent
Automated
Machine Learning
28
Auto adopts to service changes
Auto responds to active attacks
It takes a
village
Don’t build it all yourself
29
30
Takeaways
Design to move fast, without impacting customers
Build confidence through continuous validation
Effectiveness at scale through Intelligent Automated ML
If you are an M365 service – get onboarded with us :-)
31
Questions?
Bryan Jeffrey, Naveed Ahmad, David Hurley
O365 Signals - Security Signals Team
Members in Cambridge, Redmond, and Suzhou
Contact us:
O365f-enggsise@microsoft.com
Bryan.Jeffrey@microsoft.com
Navahm@microsoft.com
Davehur@microsoft.com
M365 Service that wants to onboard to Vanquish?
https://aka.ms/getvanquish
32

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BlueHat v18 || Improving security posture through increased agility with measurable effectiveness at scale

  • 1. Improving Security Posture through Increased Agility with Measurable Effectiveness at Scale Speed Kills 1
  • 2. 2
  • 3. Taken from the 2018 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report https://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2018_Report_execsummary_en_xg.pdf 3
  • 4. What we are going to talk about What is Vanquish? Agility by Design Agility through Measurability Agility via Machine Learning Lessons of Red October Pen Test 4
  • 5. What is Vanquish? Near real-time security monitoring & analytics platform for M365 Data Center infrastructure • Detections • Remediation • Alerting • Telemetry from Hosts • Integrated Context • Incident Management • Analyst Tools 5
  • 6. Collecting and Processing Security Data M365SubstrateInfrastructure Vanquish Cluster (Kafka/Spark/CosmosDB/Kusto) Hundreds ofthousandsofmachinesscored innearrealtime NRT processing withintelligentlogicfor combiningsignals(triangulation) AnalystToolsandDashboards Thousandsofresults/day Alertingand Automation Approximatelyonepagingalert/day
  • 7. Agility by Design Move fast, don’t impact customers Treat detections as code not scripts Leverage right technologies Detections at the speed of attackers Remediation and Investigation at the speed of attackers 7
  • 8. Vanquish is decoupled from monitored assets MOVE FAST, BUT DON’T IMPACT CUSTOMERS DEPLOY NEW CODE WITHOUT RISK TO MONITORED ASSETS APPLY FILTERS ACROSS ALL DIMENSIONS IN SECONDS CREATE IOCS ACROSS ALL DIMENSIONS IN SECONDS 8
  • 9. Detections are code – not scripts Broken is not agile Detections are tested – deployment is gated on passing tests 9
  • 10. Leverage the Best of Microsoft & Open Source Technologies Microsoft Siphon 10
  • 11. Detections at the speed of attackers Detection of Badness Forensic Analysis Created New Detection Added the Detection to ML model More Badness found The Hunt for Red October • Alerted <4 minutes after intrusion • IOCs added in minutes • New detection deployed within hours 11
  • 12. Remediation: Too Slow 1. 9am: Decision to remediate 2. 1pm: Attacker starts pivoting 3. 4pm: Remediation complete Ample opportunity to remediate Delayed by tooling Active attacker kept ahead of us 1 2 3 12 1 2 3
  • 13. Investigation and Remediation at the speed of attackers On-Host Telemetry Cloud Based Detection Remediation Subsystem Data-Center Management Service On-Host Remediation or Investigation 13
  • 14. Agility through Measurability System is Up Endpoints are Covered Badness Detected 14
  • 15. System is Up! Run pipeline as a service Monitor for data latency & completeness Monitor Spark Jobs 15
  • 16. Endpoints are covered! We look for heartbeats and configuration correctness for each host We have monitoring for HostIDS health Remediation is automated for unhealthy endpoints 16 99th Percentile
  • 17. Badness Detected! PEN TESTS ATTACKBOT (BROUGHT TO YOU BY M365 RED TEAM ) 17
  • 18. Pen Test results Pen tests in the last year which did not trigger a paging alert: 0 Before we get too overconfident – our Red Team is awesome • Detecting them does not mean that they did not achieve their objective M365 still believes in Assume Breach approach 18
  • 19. AttackBot is constantly validating detections Automated Attacks Run Frequently Process Signal/Create Detections Auto-Label Detections Measure Results Adjust (if needed) 19
  • 21. Agility via Machine Learning Anomaly System Filters Normal Activity ML Precisely Targets Known Bad Automated Model Training Adapts Quickly 21
  • 22. Anomaly Calculation • A service in a Data Center is largely uniform • Automate whitelists for normal behavior • State snapshots: autorun reg keys, group membership • Challenges: • Anomalous ≠ Malicious • Emerging behaviors create noise 22
  • 23. Anomaly Detection is Not Enough ~500 Billion Events Per Day 23 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 8/25 8/27 8/29 8/31 9/2 Anomaly Detections per Day + We Catch Attacks 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 8/25 8/27 8/29 8/31 9/2 Anomaly Detections per Day 0 1 2 3 4 5 8/25 8/27 8/29 8/31 9/02 Alerts Per Day
  • 24. Supervised Machine Learning Maintain an archive of known malicious behavior • Pen test, attack automation, others, etc. • Any thing that our security analysts have labelled malicious/bad New behavior Is new behavior similar / not similar to known attacks? Limitation - Can’t learn what we haven’t seen • But there is value in auto-learning what we have seen • With a world class Pen Test team you can auto-learn a lot Challenge - M365 evolves quickly → Model becomes stale quickly 24
  • 25. Repeatable Intelligent Automation • Data processing, model training, evaluation & promotion takes time when done manually • AI & Automation is the key to agility & better results Data Processing Wrangling Normalization Sampling Bootstrapping Etc. Features Extraction ML Model Training & Evaluation Model Promotion & Threshold Selection Data Processing Wrangling Normalization Sampling Bootstrapping Etc. Features Extraction ML Model Training & Evaluation Model Promotion & Threshold Selection Repeatable Intelligent Automation Without Needing Human Intervention IntelligenceIntelligence 25
  • 26. Model Performance and Automated Learning Hunt for Red October New malicious behavior identified and labelled by humans on a couple of machines 24 Machines compromised in 4 days 10 Alerted by ML before humans 6 Tied between ML & humans 8 Missed by ML 10 Alerted by ML before humans 6 Tied between ML & humans ML learned in and alerted on the rest New malicious behavior learned in by ML automatically 26
  • 27. Agile Model Experimentation and Update Adding/updating features to ML model doesn’t require a code change Features Extraction <Features> <Feature Type ="Numeric" Signal=“Detection1" Operation="Count" Field="ProcessName" /><!-- Number of processes captured--> <Feature Type ="Numeric" Signal="Detection2" Operation="Max" Field="Score" /> </Features> Normalized Detections Feature Vectors <Feature Type ="Numeric" Signal=“Detection3" Operation="MaxSum" Field="Bytes,IP,Port" /><!-- Max bytes transferred to a destination--> New detection feature 27
  • 28. Intelligent Automated Machine Learning 28 Auto adopts to service changes Auto responds to active attacks
  • 29. It takes a village Don’t build it all yourself 29
  • 30. 30
  • 31. Takeaways Design to move fast, without impacting customers Build confidence through continuous validation Effectiveness at scale through Intelligent Automated ML If you are an M365 service – get onboarded with us :-) 31
  • 32. Questions? Bryan Jeffrey, Naveed Ahmad, David Hurley O365 Signals - Security Signals Team Members in Cambridge, Redmond, and Suzhou Contact us: O365f-enggsise@microsoft.com Bryan.Jeffrey@microsoft.com Navahm@microsoft.com Davehur@microsoft.com M365 Service that wants to onboard to Vanquish? https://aka.ms/getvanquish 32