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Big Data Security
Facing the challenge
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© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 3
About me
• Father of a 5 year old child
• Technical leader in Architecture and Security team at Stratio
• Sailing skipper
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
In your opinion, how difficult is it to manage security in your
projects?
4
● Very difficult
● Difficult
● Easy
● Very Easy
● What is security?
DATA
GOVERNANCE
LOGS
CENTRALIZATION
PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES
In a monolithic application centric it with data silos these
initiatives never get accomplished
HUNDRED OF MILLIONS OF EUROS SPENT DURING THE YEARS IN GLOBAL IT CROSS INITIATIVES
SAS
CRM
Earnix
(Pricing)
Towers Watson
ERP
Data Warehouse
Lab H0
(Plataforma Big Data
compartida por el grupo)
WebFocus
Oracle
Mainframe
MONITORING
SECURITYDATA SECURITY AUDIT
PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES
DATA
GOVERNANCE
LOGS
CENTRALIZATION
MONITORING
DATA SECURITY AUDIT
1
2 3
4
5
PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES
DATA
GOVERNANCE
LOGS
CENTRALIZATION
MONITORING
DATA SECURITY AUDIT
1
2 3
4
5
ETL
PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES
DATA
GOVERNANCE
LOGS
CENTRALIZATION
MONITORING
DATA SECURITY AUDIT
1
2 3
4
5
GALGO CHASING ELECTRONIC RABBIT…
COMPANIES ALWAYS TRY TO GET THE RABBIT
In an application centric company with data silos you never will be able to
achieve successfully those projects
DATA
GOVERNANCE
LOGS
CENTRALIZATION MONITORING SECURITY
DATA
SECURITY AUDIT
STRUCTURAL INITIATIVES ARE SOLVED COMPLETELY WITH DATA CENTRIC
DaaS (data as a service)
Data
Data Intelligence
DATA
GOVERNANCE
LOGS
CENTRALIZATION
MONITORING
SECURITYDATA SECURITY AUDIT
Functionalities Implemented in the product
RABBIT IN A JAIL
MINIMUM EFFORT AND
COST TO GET THE RABBIT
12
Facing the challenge
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 13
SECURITY IN A DATA CENTRIC
Protect the data
• Perimeter security to access the cluster.
• Support identity management and authentication to prove
that a user/service is who claims to be.
• In a multi-data store platform ACLs should be centralized
to simplified the correct authorization to different data
stores.
• Audit events must be centralized to control misuse of the
cluster in real time.
• Data integrity and confidentiality in network
communications to protect data on the fly.
Protect the service
• Perimeter security to access the cluster.
• Support identity management and authentication to prove
that a user/service is who claims to be.
• A user/service should be authorized so more resources than
expected are not used.
• A user/service should not interfere with other
users/services when it is not needed.
• To control the use of resources, it should be audited.
DATA CENTER
OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS
SERVICE
ORCHESTATION
CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING
TERRAFORM
Kafka Zookeeper
VAULT
BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD
SQL
PRIVATE CLOUD
Docker
DaaS
Apps Apps
Docker
Microservices
Microservices
Docker
Data Intelligence as a Service
Microservices
Apps with
Standalone
Applications
Standalone
Applications
A
P
P
S
SERVICE DISCOVERY
STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System)
Microservices
Apps with
Docker Docker Docker
MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER
StratioDataCentric
INFRAS
NETWORK
ISOLATION
CALICO
DATA CENTER
OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS
SERVICE
ORCHESTATION
CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING
TERRAFORM
Kafka Zookeeper
VAULT
BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD
SQL
PRIVATE CLOUD
Docker
DaaS
Apps Apps
Docker
Microservices
Microservices
Docker
Data Intelligence as a Service
Microservices
Apps with
Standalone
Applications
Standalone
Applications
A
P
P
S
SERVICE DISCOVERY
STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System)
Microservices
Apps with
Docker Docker Docker
MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER
StratioDataCentric
INFRAS
NETWORK
ISOLATION
CALICO
DATA CENTER
OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS
SERVICE
ORCHESTATION
CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING
TERRAFORM
Kafka Zookeeper
VAULT
BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD
SQL
PRIVATE CLOUD
Docker
DaaS
Apps Apps
Docker
Microservices
Microservices
Docker
Data Intelligence as a Service
Microservices
Apps with
Standalone
Applications
Standalone
Applications
A
P
P
S
SERVICE DISCOVERY
STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System)
Microservices
Apps with
Docker Docker Docker
MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER
StratioDataCentric
INFRAS
NETWORK
ISOLATION
CALICO
DATA CENTER
OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS
SERVICE
ORCHESTATION
CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING
TERRAFORM
Kafka Zookeeper
VAULT
BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD
SQL
PRIVATE CLOUD
Docker
DaaS
Apps Apps
Docker
Microservices
Microservices
Docker
Data Intelligence as a Service
Microservices
Apps with
Standalone
Applications
Standalone
Applications
A
P
P
S
SERVICE DISCOVERY
STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System)
Microservices
Apps with
Docker Docker Docker
MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER
StratioDataCentric
INFRAS
NETWORK
ISOLATION
CALICO
DATA CENTER
OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS
SERVICE
ORCHESTATION
CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING
TERRAFORM
Kafka Zookeeper
VAULT
BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD
SQL
PRIVATE CLOUD
Docker
DaaS
Apps Apps
Docker
Microservices
Microservices
Docker
Data Intelligence as a Service
Microservices
Apps with
Standalone
Applications
Standalone
Applications
A
P
P
S
SERVICE DISCOVERY
STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System)
Microservices
Apps with
Docker Docker Docker
MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER
StratioDataCentric
INFRAS
NETWORK
ISOLATION
CALICO
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
In order to guide the security priorities in the product roadmap, we are focused on helping to comply with LOPD within the platform.
Every release of the Stratio platform, the security status is notified through:
• Results of the OWASP tests for the main components of the platform.
• Results of additional general purpose security tests defined to assure the quality expected.
• Security Risk Report that includes the known issues found.
• When Critical and High issues are found:
‐ We explain how can be mitigated.
‐ We plan to solve them during the next release.
19
SECURITY OVERVIEW
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 20
PERIMETER SECURITY: NETWORKING
Public
Network
Private network
Private Agents
Admin network
Admin Router
Master Nodes
Admin network
Admin Router
Public Agents
• The default network configuration allows a zone-based network
security design:
‐ Public.
‐ Admin.
‐ Private.
• Using Mesos roles to identify nodes ensures that only tasks
specifically configured with this role will be executed outside
the Private zone.
• Using Marathon labels, endpoints can be registered dynamically:
‐ Admin Router for the Admin zone.
‐ Marathon LB for the Public zone.
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
The solution is integrated with LDAP and Kerberos owned by the
company where Stratio DCS is installed.
21
AUTHENTICATION, AUTHORIZATION AND AUDIT
• Authentication:
‐ Web: OAuth2.
‐ Services & Data Stores: Kerberos or TLS-Mutual.
• Authorization:
‐ OAuth2
‐ goSec Management: API Rest and website used to
manage roles, profiles and ACLs. Also it shows users,
groups and audit data.
• Audit:
authentication and authorization events are
structured and stored in a data bus (Kafka) to be
computed and collected.
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
Plugins are lightweight programs running within
processes of each cluster component.
They are responsible for:
• Authorization (using goSec ACLs).
• Audit of every request sent to the component.
Currently plugins have been developed for:
• Crossdata
• Sparta
• Zookeeper
• HDFS
22
AUTHENTICATION, AUTHORIZATION AND AUDIT
• Kafka
• Elasticsearch
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• It is a good practice to manage secretes by key management system
instead of store them locally.
• For this purpose Stratio DCS uses HashiCorp Vault
23
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Can applications obtain authentication tokens in a secure way?
• Where applications save vault’s tokens?
• How are tokens protected?
• How will I know if someone steal tokens?
24
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets
Mesos
First secret
management
Application
MarathonAdmin
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Can applications obtain authentication tokens in a secure way?
• Where applications save vault’s tokens?
• How are tokens protected?
• How will I know if someone steal tokens?
25
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets
Mesos
First secret
management
Application
Marathon
one time secret
Run Application
Env: one time secretAdmin
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Can applications obtain authentication tokens in a secure way?
• Where applications save vault’s tokens?
• How are tokens protected?
• How will I know if someone steal tokens?
26
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets
Mesos
First secret
management
Application
Marathon
one time secret
login
Run Application
Env: one time secret
token < - > ACL
Admin
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way?
• Where applications save vault’s tokens?
• How are tokens guarded?
• How will I know if someone steal tokens?
27
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets
Mesos
First secret
management
Application
Marathon
one time secret
Run Application
Env: one time secretAdmin
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way?
• Where applications save vault’s tokens?
• How are tokens guarded?
• How will I know if someone steal tokens?
28
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets
Mesos
First secret
management
Application
Marathon
one time secret
login
Run Application
Env: one time secretAdmin
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way?
• Where applications save vault’s tokens?
• How are tokens guarded?
• How will I know if someone steal tokens?
29
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets
Mesos
First secret
management
Application
Marathon
one time secret
login
Run Application
Env: one time secretAdmin
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way?
• Where applications save vault’s tokens?
• How are tokens guarded?
• How will I know if someone steal tokens?
30
KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets
Mesos
First secret
management
Application
Marathon
one time secret
login
Run Application
Env: one time secret
Logs Alert
Admin
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Spark jobs need access to multiple data stores so that
Spark needs to support the security of Stratio DCS.
• Spark 2.x compilation has been modified by Stratio in order
to:
‐ Access secrets that are stored in the KMS.
‐ Allow access to Kerberized HDFS.
‐ Allow access to PostgreSQL with TLS authentication.
‐ Allow access to Elasticsearch TLS authentication.
‐ Allow access to Kafka with TLS authentication.
31
DATA PROCESSING ENGINE: SPARK
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
ADMIN
NETWORK
PUBLIC NETWORK
PRIVATE NETWORK
32
PROTECT THE DATA
GOSSEC
SSO
AUDIT
KAFKA
KMS
LDAP KERBEROS
TABLEAU
MARATHON-LB
GOSEC
MANAGEMENT
ZOOKEEPER
HDFS
ADMIN
ROUTER
ZOOKEEPER
Admin
Perimeter security
Authentication, Authorization, Audit
Ciphered communications
- use case -
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
ADMIN
NETWORK
PUBLIC NETWORK
PRIVATE NETWORK
33
PROTECT THE DATA
GOSSEC
SSO
AUDIT
KAFKA
KMS
LDAP KERBEROS
TABLEAU
MARATHON-LB
GOSEC
MANAGEMENT
ZOOKEEPER
HDFS
ADMIN
ROUTER
ZOOKEEPER
Admin
Perimeter security
Authentication, Authorization, Audit
Ciphered communications
- use case -
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
ADMIN
NETWORK
PUBLIC NETWORK
PRIVATE NETWORK
34
PROTECT THE DATA
GOSSEC
SSO
AUDIT
KAFKA
KMS
LDAP KERBEROS
TABLEAU
MARATHON-LB
GOSEC
MANAGEMENT
ZOOKEEPER
HDFS
ADMIN
ROUTER
ZOOKEEPER
Admin
Perimeter security
Authentication, Authorization, Audit
Ciphered communications
- use case -
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
ADMIN
NETWORK
PUBLIC NETWORK
PRIVATE NETWORK
35
PROTECT THE DATA
GOSSEC
SSO
AUDIT
KAFKA
KMS
LDAP KERBEROS
TABLEAU
MARATHON-LB
GOSEC
MANAGEMENT
ZOOKEEPER
HDFS
ADMIN
ROUTER
ZOOKEEPER
Admin
Perimeter security
Authentication, Authorization, Audit
Ciphered communications
- use case -
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
ADMIN
NETWORK
PUBLIC NETWORK
PRIVATE NETWORK
36
PROTECT THE DATA
GOSSEC
SSO
AUDIT
KAFKA
KMS
LDAP KERBEROS
TABLEAU
MARATHON-LB
GOSEC
MANAGEMENT
ZOOKEEPER
HDFS
ADMIN
ROUTER
ZOOKEEPER
Admin
Perimeter security
Authentication, Authorization, Audit
Ciphered communications
- use case -
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
ADMIN
NETWORK
PUBLIC NETWORK
PRIVATE NETWORK
37
PROTECT THE DATA
GOSSEC
SSO
AUDIT
KAFKA
KMS
LDAP KERBEROS
TABLEAU
MARATHON-LB
GOSEC
MANAGEMENT
ZOOKEEPER
HDFS
ADMIN
ROUTER
ZOOKEEPER
Admin
Perimeter security
Authentication, Authorization, Audit
Ciphered communications
- use case -
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Stratio DCS cluster resources (memory, disk, cpus and port ranges) are managed by Mesos.
• Mesos, Marathon and Metronome security can be activated post-installation in order to limit the use of the available resources for each
framework.
• Once it is activated, admins will be able to:
‐ Reserve resources for a Mesos role.
‐ Grant permissions for each user/framework to do actions such as register frameworks, run tasks, reserve resources, create volumes, etc.
• Grant a minimum set of resources to a specific mesos role
38
MULTI-TENANCY CAPABILITIES: RESOURCES ISOLATION
Mesos Cluster
MASTER
Marathon
AGENT 1
role=slave_public
AGENT 2
role=*
AGENT 3
role=postgresql
AGENT 5
role=*
AGENT 4
role=*
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 39
MULTI-TENANCY CAPABILITIES: NETWORKS ISOLATION
• What about network isolation into containerized world?
• For this purpose Stratio DCS uses Project Calico
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
• Virtual networks topologies can be created dynamically.
• Virtual networks topologies can be managed by network policies.
• Virtual networks can manage all Mesos supported containerized technologies.
• Virtual networks barely impacts big data performance.
• Frameworks/apps are authorized into a network.
• Frameworks/apps can be isolated into a virtual network.
• Frameworks/apps IP addresses and ports are managed by instance.
40
MULTI-TENANCY CAPABILITIES: NETWORKS ISOLATION
© Stratio 2015. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
Network Isolation components
41
© Stratio 2015. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
Network Isolation Virtual Networks
42
© Stratio 2015. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
Network Isolation Integration
43
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
MESOS
44
PROTECT THE SERVICE
CALICO &
DOCKER ENGINE
Admin
Framework authentication
Check resources for the role
Authorization to launch tasks
Authorization to use the network
Audit (logs and Mesos API)
- use case -
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
MESOS
45
PROTECT THE SERVICE
CALICO &
DOCKER ENGINE
Admin
Framework authentication
Check resources for the role
Authorization to launch tasks
Authorization to use the network
Audit (logs and Mesos API)
- use case -
At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
MESOS
46
PROTECT THE SERVICE
CALICO &
DOCKER ENGINE
Admin
Framework authentication
Check resources for the role
Authorization to launch tasks
Authorization to use the network
Audit (logs and Mesos API)
- use case -
net_2: Deny from framework 1
At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
MESOS
NETWORK B
2 CORES
5Gb RAM
NETWORK A
0.5 CORES
1Gb RAM
47
PROTECT THE SERVICE
CONTAINER 1
User
2. Launches FRAMEWORK 1
CALICO &
DOCKER ENGINE
CONTAINER 2
Admin
User
2. Launches FRAMEWORK 2
Framework authentication
Check resources for the role
Authorization to launch tasks
Authorization to use the network
Audit (logs and Mesos API)
- use case -
net_2: Deny from framework 1
At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
MESOS
NETWORK B
2 CORES
5Gb RAM
NETWORK A
0.5 CORES
1Gb RAM
48
PROTECT THE SERVICE
CONTAINER 1
User
2. Launches FRAMEWORK 1
CALICO &
DOCKER ENGINE
CONTAINER 2
Admin
User
2. Launches FRAMEWORK 2
Framework authentication
Check resources for the role
Authorization to launch tasks
Authorization to use the network
Audit (logs and Mesos API)
- use case -
net_2: Deny from framework 1
At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
© Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved.
MULTI-DATA CENTER
49
- a use case -
Big Data Security: Facing the challenge
Big Data Security: Facing the challenge

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Big Data Security: Facing the challenge

  • 1. Big Data Security Facing the challenge
  • 3. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 3 About me • Father of a 5 year old child • Technical leader in Architecture and Security team at Stratio • Sailing skipper
  • 4. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. In your opinion, how difficult is it to manage security in your projects? 4 ● Very difficult ● Difficult ● Easy ● Very Easy ● What is security?
  • 5. DATA GOVERNANCE LOGS CENTRALIZATION PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES In a monolithic application centric it with data silos these initiatives never get accomplished HUNDRED OF MILLIONS OF EUROS SPENT DURING THE YEARS IN GLOBAL IT CROSS INITIATIVES SAS CRM Earnix (Pricing) Towers Watson ERP Data Warehouse Lab H0 (Plataforma Big Data compartida por el grupo) WebFocus Oracle Mainframe MONITORING SECURITYDATA SECURITY AUDIT
  • 6. PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES DATA GOVERNANCE LOGS CENTRALIZATION MONITORING DATA SECURITY AUDIT 1 2 3 4 5
  • 7. PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES DATA GOVERNANCE LOGS CENTRALIZATION MONITORING DATA SECURITY AUDIT 1 2 3 4 5
  • 8. ETL PROJECTS FOR EVER ONGOING IN BIG COMPANIES DATA GOVERNANCE LOGS CENTRALIZATION MONITORING DATA SECURITY AUDIT 1 2 3 4 5
  • 9. GALGO CHASING ELECTRONIC RABBIT… COMPANIES ALWAYS TRY TO GET THE RABBIT In an application centric company with data silos you never will be able to achieve successfully those projects DATA GOVERNANCE LOGS CENTRALIZATION MONITORING SECURITY DATA SECURITY AUDIT
  • 10. STRUCTURAL INITIATIVES ARE SOLVED COMPLETELY WITH DATA CENTRIC DaaS (data as a service) Data Data Intelligence DATA GOVERNANCE LOGS CENTRALIZATION MONITORING SECURITYDATA SECURITY AUDIT Functionalities Implemented in the product
  • 11. RABBIT IN A JAIL MINIMUM EFFORT AND COST TO GET THE RABBIT
  • 13. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 13 SECURITY IN A DATA CENTRIC Protect the data • Perimeter security to access the cluster. • Support identity management and authentication to prove that a user/service is who claims to be. • In a multi-data store platform ACLs should be centralized to simplified the correct authorization to different data stores. • Audit events must be centralized to control misuse of the cluster in real time. • Data integrity and confidentiality in network communications to protect data on the fly. Protect the service • Perimeter security to access the cluster. • Support identity management and authentication to prove that a user/service is who claims to be. • A user/service should be authorized so more resources than expected are not used. • A user/service should not interfere with other users/services when it is not needed. • To control the use of resources, it should be audited.
  • 14. DATA CENTER OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS SERVICE ORCHESTATION CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING TERRAFORM Kafka Zookeeper VAULT BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD SQL PRIVATE CLOUD Docker DaaS Apps Apps Docker Microservices Microservices Docker Data Intelligence as a Service Microservices Apps with Standalone Applications Standalone Applications A P P S SERVICE DISCOVERY STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System) Microservices Apps with Docker Docker Docker MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER StratioDataCentric INFRAS NETWORK ISOLATION CALICO
  • 15. DATA CENTER OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS SERVICE ORCHESTATION CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING TERRAFORM Kafka Zookeeper VAULT BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD SQL PRIVATE CLOUD Docker DaaS Apps Apps Docker Microservices Microservices Docker Data Intelligence as a Service Microservices Apps with Standalone Applications Standalone Applications A P P S SERVICE DISCOVERY STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System) Microservices Apps with Docker Docker Docker MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER StratioDataCentric INFRAS NETWORK ISOLATION CALICO
  • 16. DATA CENTER OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS SERVICE ORCHESTATION CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING TERRAFORM Kafka Zookeeper VAULT BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD SQL PRIVATE CLOUD Docker DaaS Apps Apps Docker Microservices Microservices Docker Data Intelligence as a Service Microservices Apps with Standalone Applications Standalone Applications A P P S SERVICE DISCOVERY STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System) Microservices Apps with Docker Docker Docker MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER StratioDataCentric INFRAS NETWORK ISOLATION CALICO
  • 17. DATA CENTER OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS SERVICE ORCHESTATION CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING TERRAFORM Kafka Zookeeper VAULT BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD SQL PRIVATE CLOUD Docker DaaS Apps Apps Docker Microservices Microservices Docker Data Intelligence as a Service Microservices Apps with Standalone Applications Standalone Applications A P P S SERVICE DISCOVERY STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System) Microservices Apps with Docker Docker Docker MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER StratioDataCentric INFRAS NETWORK ISOLATION CALICO
  • 18. DATA CENTER OPERATING SYSTEM MESOS SERVICE ORCHESTATION CONTAINERS NODE PROVISIONING TERRAFORM Kafka Zookeeper VAULT BAREMETAL PUBLIC CLOUD SQL PRIVATE CLOUD Docker DaaS Apps Apps Docker Microservices Microservices Docker Data Intelligence as a Service Microservices Apps with Standalone Applications Standalone Applications A P P S SERVICE DISCOVERY STRATIO EOS (Enterprise Operating System) Microservices Apps with Docker Docker Docker MARATHON CONSUL DOCKER StratioDataCentric INFRAS NETWORK ISOLATION CALICO
  • 19. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. In order to guide the security priorities in the product roadmap, we are focused on helping to comply with LOPD within the platform. Every release of the Stratio platform, the security status is notified through: • Results of the OWASP tests for the main components of the platform. • Results of additional general purpose security tests defined to assure the quality expected. • Security Risk Report that includes the known issues found. • When Critical and High issues are found: ‐ We explain how can be mitigated. ‐ We plan to solve them during the next release. 19 SECURITY OVERVIEW
  • 20. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 20 PERIMETER SECURITY: NETWORKING Public Network Private network Private Agents Admin network Admin Router Master Nodes Admin network Admin Router Public Agents • The default network configuration allows a zone-based network security design: ‐ Public. ‐ Admin. ‐ Private. • Using Mesos roles to identify nodes ensures that only tasks specifically configured with this role will be executed outside the Private zone. • Using Marathon labels, endpoints can be registered dynamically: ‐ Admin Router for the Admin zone. ‐ Marathon LB for the Public zone.
  • 21. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. The solution is integrated with LDAP and Kerberos owned by the company where Stratio DCS is installed. 21 AUTHENTICATION, AUTHORIZATION AND AUDIT • Authentication: ‐ Web: OAuth2. ‐ Services & Data Stores: Kerberos or TLS-Mutual. • Authorization: ‐ OAuth2 ‐ goSec Management: API Rest and website used to manage roles, profiles and ACLs. Also it shows users, groups and audit data. • Audit: authentication and authorization events are structured and stored in a data bus (Kafka) to be computed and collected.
  • 22. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. Plugins are lightweight programs running within processes of each cluster component. They are responsible for: • Authorization (using goSec ACLs). • Audit of every request sent to the component. Currently plugins have been developed for: • Crossdata • Sparta • Zookeeper • HDFS 22 AUTHENTICATION, AUTHORIZATION AND AUDIT • Kafka • Elasticsearch
  • 23. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • It is a good practice to manage secretes by key management system instead of store them locally. • For this purpose Stratio DCS uses HashiCorp Vault 23 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
  • 24. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Can applications obtain authentication tokens in a secure way? • Where applications save vault’s tokens? • How are tokens protected? • How will I know if someone steal tokens? 24 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets Mesos First secret management Application MarathonAdmin
  • 25. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Can applications obtain authentication tokens in a secure way? • Where applications save vault’s tokens? • How are tokens protected? • How will I know if someone steal tokens? 25 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets Mesos First secret management Application Marathon one time secret Run Application Env: one time secretAdmin
  • 26. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Can applications obtain authentication tokens in a secure way? • Where applications save vault’s tokens? • How are tokens protected? • How will I know if someone steal tokens? 26 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets Mesos First secret management Application Marathon one time secret login Run Application Env: one time secret token < - > ACL Admin
  • 27. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way? • Where applications save vault’s tokens? • How are tokens guarded? • How will I know if someone steal tokens? 27 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets Mesos First secret management Application Marathon one time secret Run Application Env: one time secretAdmin
  • 28. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way? • Where applications save vault’s tokens? • How are tokens guarded? • How will I know if someone steal tokens? 28 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets Mesos First secret management Application Marathon one time secret login Run Application Env: one time secretAdmin
  • 29. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way? • Where applications save vault’s tokens? • How are tokens guarded? • How will I know if someone steal tokens? 29 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets Mesos First secret management Application Marathon one time secret login Run Application Env: one time secretAdmin
  • 30. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Can applications obtain tokens in a secure way? • Where applications save vault’s tokens? • How are tokens guarded? • How will I know if someone steal tokens? 30 KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM the secret of secrets Mesos First secret management Application Marathon one time secret login Run Application Env: one time secret Logs Alert Admin
  • 31. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Spark jobs need access to multiple data stores so that Spark needs to support the security of Stratio DCS. • Spark 2.x compilation has been modified by Stratio in order to: ‐ Access secrets that are stored in the KMS. ‐ Allow access to Kerberized HDFS. ‐ Allow access to PostgreSQL with TLS authentication. ‐ Allow access to Elasticsearch TLS authentication. ‐ Allow access to Kafka with TLS authentication. 31 DATA PROCESSING ENGINE: SPARK
  • 32. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. ADMIN NETWORK PUBLIC NETWORK PRIVATE NETWORK 32 PROTECT THE DATA GOSSEC SSO AUDIT KAFKA KMS LDAP KERBEROS TABLEAU MARATHON-LB GOSEC MANAGEMENT ZOOKEEPER HDFS ADMIN ROUTER ZOOKEEPER Admin Perimeter security Authentication, Authorization, Audit Ciphered communications - use case -
  • 33. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. ADMIN NETWORK PUBLIC NETWORK PRIVATE NETWORK 33 PROTECT THE DATA GOSSEC SSO AUDIT KAFKA KMS LDAP KERBEROS TABLEAU MARATHON-LB GOSEC MANAGEMENT ZOOKEEPER HDFS ADMIN ROUTER ZOOKEEPER Admin Perimeter security Authentication, Authorization, Audit Ciphered communications - use case -
  • 34. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. ADMIN NETWORK PUBLIC NETWORK PRIVATE NETWORK 34 PROTECT THE DATA GOSSEC SSO AUDIT KAFKA KMS LDAP KERBEROS TABLEAU MARATHON-LB GOSEC MANAGEMENT ZOOKEEPER HDFS ADMIN ROUTER ZOOKEEPER Admin Perimeter security Authentication, Authorization, Audit Ciphered communications - use case -
  • 35. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. ADMIN NETWORK PUBLIC NETWORK PRIVATE NETWORK 35 PROTECT THE DATA GOSSEC SSO AUDIT KAFKA KMS LDAP KERBEROS TABLEAU MARATHON-LB GOSEC MANAGEMENT ZOOKEEPER HDFS ADMIN ROUTER ZOOKEEPER Admin Perimeter security Authentication, Authorization, Audit Ciphered communications - use case -
  • 36. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. ADMIN NETWORK PUBLIC NETWORK PRIVATE NETWORK 36 PROTECT THE DATA GOSSEC SSO AUDIT KAFKA KMS LDAP KERBEROS TABLEAU MARATHON-LB GOSEC MANAGEMENT ZOOKEEPER HDFS ADMIN ROUTER ZOOKEEPER Admin Perimeter security Authentication, Authorization, Audit Ciphered communications - use case -
  • 37. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. ADMIN NETWORK PUBLIC NETWORK PRIVATE NETWORK 37 PROTECT THE DATA GOSSEC SSO AUDIT KAFKA KMS LDAP KERBEROS TABLEAU MARATHON-LB GOSEC MANAGEMENT ZOOKEEPER HDFS ADMIN ROUTER ZOOKEEPER Admin Perimeter security Authentication, Authorization, Audit Ciphered communications - use case -
  • 38. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Stratio DCS cluster resources (memory, disk, cpus and port ranges) are managed by Mesos. • Mesos, Marathon and Metronome security can be activated post-installation in order to limit the use of the available resources for each framework. • Once it is activated, admins will be able to: ‐ Reserve resources for a Mesos role. ‐ Grant permissions for each user/framework to do actions such as register frameworks, run tasks, reserve resources, create volumes, etc. • Grant a minimum set of resources to a specific mesos role 38 MULTI-TENANCY CAPABILITIES: RESOURCES ISOLATION Mesos Cluster MASTER Marathon AGENT 1 role=slave_public AGENT 2 role=* AGENT 3 role=postgresql AGENT 5 role=* AGENT 4 role=*
  • 39. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. 39 MULTI-TENANCY CAPABILITIES: NETWORKS ISOLATION • What about network isolation into containerized world? • For this purpose Stratio DCS uses Project Calico
  • 40. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. • Virtual networks topologies can be created dynamically. • Virtual networks topologies can be managed by network policies. • Virtual networks can manage all Mesos supported containerized technologies. • Virtual networks barely impacts big data performance. • Frameworks/apps are authorized into a network. • Frameworks/apps can be isolated into a virtual network. • Frameworks/apps IP addresses and ports are managed by instance. 40 MULTI-TENANCY CAPABILITIES: NETWORKS ISOLATION
  • 41. © Stratio 2015. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. Network Isolation components 41
  • 42. © Stratio 2015. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. Network Isolation Virtual Networks 42
  • 43. © Stratio 2015. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. Network Isolation Integration 43
  • 44. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. MESOS 44 PROTECT THE SERVICE CALICO & DOCKER ENGINE Admin Framework authentication Check resources for the role Authorization to launch tasks Authorization to use the network Audit (logs and Mesos API) - use case -
  • 45. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. MESOS 45 PROTECT THE SERVICE CALICO & DOCKER ENGINE Admin Framework authentication Check resources for the role Authorization to launch tasks Authorization to use the network Audit (logs and Mesos API) - use case - At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
  • 46. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. MESOS 46 PROTECT THE SERVICE CALICO & DOCKER ENGINE Admin Framework authentication Check resources for the role Authorization to launch tasks Authorization to use the network Audit (logs and Mesos API) - use case - net_2: Deny from framework 1 At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
  • 47. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. MESOS NETWORK B 2 CORES 5Gb RAM NETWORK A 0.5 CORES 1Gb RAM 47 PROTECT THE SERVICE CONTAINER 1 User 2. Launches FRAMEWORK 1 CALICO & DOCKER ENGINE CONTAINER 2 Admin User 2. Launches FRAMEWORK 2 Framework authentication Check resources for the role Authorization to launch tasks Authorization to use the network Audit (logs and Mesos API) - use case - net_2: Deny from framework 1 At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
  • 48. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. MESOS NETWORK B 2 CORES 5Gb RAM NETWORK A 0.5 CORES 1Gb RAM 48 PROTECT THE SERVICE CONTAINER 1 User 2. Launches FRAMEWORK 1 CALICO & DOCKER ENGINE CONTAINER 2 Admin User 2. Launches FRAMEWORK 2 Framework authentication Check resources for the role Authorization to launch tasks Authorization to use the network Audit (logs and Mesos API) - use case - net_2: Deny from framework 1 At least 1 core, 1GB to framework 1
  • 49. © Stratio 2017. Confidential, All Rights Reserved. MULTI-DATA CENTER 49 - a use case -

Editor's Notes

  • #4: So.. thank you very much, I’m Carlos Gómez ….
  • #14: Limitaciones: denegación de servicio por alto tráfico de red. Gstion de identiades Gestion de secretos Retos Sistemas distrubiodos Sustemas dinamicas Integracion global de soluciones
  • #15: Authentication, Authorization and Audit. Secure communications. Secure data processing. Multi-tenant capabilities.
  • #16: Authentication, Authorization and Audit. Secure communications. Secure data processing. Multi-tenant capabilities.
  • #17: Authentication, Authorization and Audit. Secure communications. Secure data processing. Multi-tenant capabilities.
  • #18: Authentication, Authorization and Audit. Secure communications. Secure data processing. Multi-tenant capabilities.
  • #19: Authentication, Authorization and Audit. Secure communications. Secure data processing. Multi-tenant capabilities.
  • #20: Ayudamos a cumplir: INCIDENCIAS Bajo: Registro de incidencias: tipo, momento de su detección, persona que la notifica, efectos y medidas correctoras. Procedimiento de notificación y gestión de las incidencias. Medio: SOLO FICHEROS AUTOMATIZADOS - Anotar los procedimientos de recuperación, persona que lo ejecuta, datos restaurados, y en su caso, datos grabados manualmente. Autorización del responsable del fichero para la recuperación de datos. CONTROL DE ACCESO Baja: Relación actualizada de usuarios y accesos autorizados. Control de accesos permitidos a cada usuario según las funciones asignadas. Mecanismos que eviten el acceso a datos o recursos con derechos distintos de los autorizados. Concesión de permisos de acceso sólo por personal autorizado. Mismas condiciones para personal ajeno con acceso a los recursos de datos. Alta: Registro de accesos: usuario, hora, fichero, tipo de acceso, autorizado o denegado.Control de accesos autorizados.Identificación accesos para documentos accesibles por múltiples usuarios. IDENTIFICACIÓN Y AUTENTICACIÓN Baja: Identificación y autenticación personalizada. Procedimiento de asignación y distribución de contraseñas. Almacenamiento ininteligible de las contraseñas. Periodicidad del cambio de contraseñas (<1 año). Medio: Límite de intentos reiterados de acceso no autorizado. GESTIÓN DE SOPORTES Baja: Inventario de soportes. Identificación del tipo de información que contienen, o sistema de etiquetado. Acceso restringido al lugar de almacenamiento. Autorización de las salidas de soportes (incluidas a través de email) Media: Registro de entrada y salida de soportes: documento o soporte, fecha, emisor/destinatario, número, tipo de información, forma de envío, responsable autorizado para recepción/entrega. Alta (NO CUMPLIDO??): Sistema de etiquetado confidencial.Cifrado de datos en la distribución de soportes. Cifrado de información en dispositivos portátiles fuera de las instalaciones (evitar el uso de dispositivos que no permitan cifrado, o adoptar medidas alternativas). COPIAS DE RESPALDO Baja: Copia de respaldo semanal. Procedimientos de generación de copias de respaldo y recuperación de datos. Verificación semestral de los procedimientos. Reconstrucción de los datos a partir de la última copia. Grabación manual en su caso, si existe documentación que lo permita. Pruebas con datos reales. Copia de seguridad y aplicación del nivel de seguridad correspondiente. Alta (NO CUMPLIDO??): Copia de respaldo y procedimientos de recuperación en lugar diferente del que se encuentren los equipos. AUDITORIA Informe de detección de deficiencias y propuestas correctoras. TELECOMUNICACIONES Alta (No cumplida en todos los casos, pero si perimetral): Transmisión de datos a través de redes electrónicas cifradas.
  • #22: Web: CAS Server with OAuth2 support. Its purpose is to permit a user to access multiple applications. It offers a consistent way to sign on the different modules and tools that have a web interface. Services/Data Stores: authentication with Kerberos and TLS-Mutual, when the technology does not support Kerberos.
  • #24: Applications/services need secrets: certificates, keytabs, passwords, tokens, API keys...
  • #25: Although secrets are centralized in the Stratio KMS (Vault), each application need vault’s authentication tokens. To manage these token dynamically DCS makes use of AppRole auth backend. Each app is associated with a Vault’s Approle A third party component manages temporary secrets to frameworks. To get framework’s secrets, framework must log-in with its temporary secret.
  • #26: Although secrets are centralized in the Stratio KMS (Vault), each application need vault’s authentication tokens. To manage these token dynamically DCS makes use of AppRole auth backend. Each app is associated with a Vault’s Approle A third party component manages temporary secrets to frameworks. To get framework’s secrets, framework must log-in with its temporary secret.
  • #27: Although secrets are centralized in the Stratio KMS (Vault), each application need vault’s authentication tokens. To manage these token dynamically DCS makes use of AppRole auth backend. Each app is associated with a Vault’s Approle A third party component manages temporary secrets to frameworks. To get framework’s secrets, framework must log-in with its temporary secret.
  • #28: Although secrets are centralized in the Stratio KMS (Vault), each application need vault’s authentication tokens. To manage these token dynamically DCS makes use of AppRole auth backend. Each app is associated with a Vault’s Approle A third party component manages temporary secrets to frameworks. To get framework’s secrets, framework must log-in with its temporary secret.
  • #29: Although secrets are centralized in the Stratio KMS (Vault), each application need vault’s authentication tokens. To manage these token dynamically DCS makes use of AppRole auth backend. Each app is associated with a Vault’s Approle A third party component manages temporary secrets to frameworks. To get framework’s secrets, framework must log-in with its temporary secret.
  • #30: Although secrets are centralized in the Stratio KMS (Vault), each application need vault’s authentication tokens. To manage these token dynamically DCS makes use of AppRole auth backend. Each app is associated with a Vault’s Approle A third party component manages temporary secrets to frameworks. To get framework’s secrets, framework must log-in with its temporary secret.
  • #31: Although secrets are centralized in the Stratio KMS (Vault), each application need vault’s authentication tokens. To manage these token dynamically DCS makes use of AppRole auth backend. Each app is associated with a Vault’s Approle A third party component manages temporary secrets to frameworks. To get framework’s secrets, framework must log-in with its temporary secret.
  • #32: Spark is the data processing engine in Stratio DCS.
  • #33: Admin logins Admin configures identities Admin configures secrets Admin configures Authorization Crossdata requests HDFS secrets Crossdata establish HDFS auth User send identity and requests data Crossdata requests user’s authorization Crossdata audits HDFS audits Response to User
  • #34: Admin logins Admin configures identities Admin configures secrets Admin configures Authorization Crossdata requests HDFS secrets Crossdata establish HDFS auth User send identity and requests data Crossdata requests user’s authorization Crossdata audits HDFS audits Response to User
  • #35: Admin logins Admin configures identities Admin configures secrets Admin configures Authorization Crossdata requests HDFS secrets Crossdata establish HDFS auth User send identity and requests data Crossdata requests user’s authorization Crossdata audits HDFS audits Response to User
  • #36: Admin logins Admin configures identities Admin configures secrets Admin configures Authorization Crossdata requests HDFS secrets Crossdata establish HDFS auth User send identity and requests data Crossdata requests user’s authorization Crossdata audits HDFS audits Response to User
  • #37: Admin logins Admin configures identities Admin configures secrets Admin configures Authorization Crossdata requests HDFS secrets Crossdata establish HDFS auth User send identity and requests data Crossdata requests user’s authorization Crossdata audits HDFS audits Response to User
  • #38: Admin logins Admin configures identities Admin configures secrets Admin configures Authorization Crossdata requests HDFS secrets Crossdata establish HDFS auth User send identity and requests data Crossdata requests user’s authorization Crossdata audits HDFS audits Response to User
  • #45: Admin manages resources Admin manages networks and policies Users launchs frameworks Policy applied
  • #46: Admin manages resources Admin manages networks and policies Users launchs frameworks Policy applied
  • #47: Admin manages resources Admin manages networks and policies Users launchs frameworks Policy applied
  • #48: Admin manages resources Admin manages networks and policies Users launchs frameworks Policy applied
  • #49: Admin manages resources Admin manages networks and policies Users launchs frameworks Policy applied
  • #50: Hacer spoiler a Nacho
  • #51: This is our programme. You will be able to see information and updates + our schedule by scanning this QR code