CBO Report Army GCV Program and Alternatives Apr 2013

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

CBO
The Army’s Ground
Combat Vehicle
Program and
Alternatives

Current and Upgraded Israeli Namer rmored Personnel Carrier
A
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle

Notional Ground Combat Vehicle German Puma nfantry Fighting Vehicle
I

APRIL 2013

Notes
Numbers in the text, tables, and figures may not add up to totals because of rounding.

Unless otherwise noted, all years are federal fiscal years, which run from October 1 to
September 30, and all dollars are 2013 dollars.

CBO Pub. No. 4343

Contents

Summary 1
What Are the Program’s Objectives? 1
What Are the Program’s Challenges? 1
What Alternatives Did CBO Analyze? 1
How Were Differences Assessed? 3
Which Vehicles Would Be Most Capable? 3

1
The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program 5
The Army’s Rationale and Goals for a New Infantry Fighting Vehicle 5
BOX: THE ARMY’S EMPHASIS ON TRANSPORTING FULL NINE-MEMBER SQUADS 6
Concerns About the GCV Program 12

2
Alternatives to the Ground Combat Vehicle Program 19
Option 1: Purchase the Israeli Namer APC 21
Option 2: Upgrade the Bradley IFV 26
Option 3: Purchase the German Puma IFV 28
Option 4: Cancel the GCV Program 30

Appendix: CBO’s Methodology for Comparing the Army’s
Ground Combat Vehicle and Alternatives 33

List of Tables and Figures 36

About This Document 37

CBO

Summary

T he Army is planning to develop and purchase a
new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) that will serve the
accommodates only seven soldiers), it can be difficult for
leaders to organize and direct the soldiers immediately
dual purposes of operating as a combat vehicle and trans- after they exit the vehicle, especially if the forces are
porting soldiers to, from, and around the battlefield. The under fire.
GCV is intended to replace the current fleet of Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), which operate with the
service’s armored combat brigades. The Congressional What Are the Program’s Challenges?
Budget Office (CBO) estimates that implementing the The trade-off for providing better protection and the
GCV program on the most recent schedule would cost ability to accommodate more passengers typically is a
$29 billion (in 2013 dollars) over the 2014–2030 period. larger and heavier vehicle. Other objectives for the vehi-
cle, such as reduced cost and better maneuverability in
This report compares the Army’s plan for the GCV with urban settings, are more easily met with smaller and
four other options the service could pursue instead. lighter vehicles. Although the Army’s program allows
Although none of those alternatives would meet all of the contractors some flexibility in meeting various goals,
Army’s goals for the GCV program, all are likely to be less initial designs indicate that the GCV is likely to be
costly and less risky (in terms of unanticipated cost much larger and heavier than the current Bradley IFV
increases and schedule delays) than CBO anticipates (see Summary Table 1).
will be the case under the Army’s plan. Some of the
options also would offer advantages relative to the GCV Whether the GCV that results from the design process
in meeting the Army’s mission. will be well suited to a range of potential future opera-
tions is not known. The vehicle as envisioned should
provide improved protection against mines and impro-
What Are the Program’s Objectives? vised explosive devices—the most prevalent threat in
The search for a new GCV has forced the Army to find a operations such as those recently undertaken in Iraq and
balance among several objectives. While staying within Afghanistan. However, several Army officials have said
prescribed costs per vehicle, the service hopes to field that vehicles that are as large and as heavy as the GCV is
a fleet that will offer improvements over the current likely to be are not well suited to operate in situations
Bradley IFVs in several areas: that were common in Iraq and Afghanistan and that are
likely to be faced in the future.
 Protection against threats coming from all directions
and ability to operate after an attack,
What Alternatives Did CBO Analyze?
 Effectiveness as a weapon against enemy forces, CBO analyzed four alternatives to the GCV program.
For comparison with those alternatives, the agency used
 Mobility on- and off-road, and the characteristics of the Army’s notional model (known
as the GCV Design Concept After Trades vehicle).1
 Capacity for a full nine-member infantry squad along
with a vehicle crew of three.
1. The Army intends to change the requirements for the amount of
protection and the size of the GCV’s primary weapon. The sched-
Seating capacity for nine passengers is among the ule also has been delayed, and the final choice of contractor is to
Army’s highest priorities for the vehicle. If a squad is occur sooner than originally planned. CBO’s analysis incorporates
dispersed among several vehicles, as is the practice for those timing changes but could not account for changes in protec-
units equipped with the current Bradley IFV (which tion and weapons, because the details are still pending.

CBO

2 THE ARMY’S GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES APRIL 2013

Summary Table 1.
Vehicles Considered in the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options
Army's Estimate of
b
Unit Cost
Weighta Number of (Millions of Year of Entry
Vehicle (Tons) Passengers 2013 dollars) Into Service
Vehicles Requiring Development
c d e
Ground Combat Vehicle 50 to 65 9 13.5 2022
Upgraded Bradley IFV 35 to 41 7 9.6 2022

Existing Vehicles
f
Current Bradley IFV 33 to 39 7 n.a. 2006
Israeli Namer APC 68 to 70 9 11.0 2008
German Puma IFV 35 to 47 6 6.9 2011

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the Ground Combat Vehicle
Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to the Armed Services Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives
(March 2011), and other sources.
Note: IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; APC = armored personnel carrier; n.a. = not applicable.
a. The lower end of the range represents the weight of the vehicle without added armor or other protective measures. The upper end of the
range includes the weight of currently proposed protective equipment that could be or has been added to the vehicle.
b. Amounts are the Army’s estimates of the average procurement unit cost, which excludes development cost.
c. Based on the December 2010 version—the Design Concept After Trades—of the Ground Combat Vehicle after additional design trade-offs
that the Army made to reduce the average procurement unit cost to $13.5 million (in 2013 dollars).
d. The unit cost is capped at $13.0 million in 2011 dollars, or $13.5 million in 2013 dollars.
e. According to the Army’s current plans.
f. Version of the M2A3 Bradley IFV used in Iraq, which includes reactive armor and underbelly armor.

Option 1: Purchase the Namer APC two fewer than the Army’s desired nine—and it would
If the Army replaced its current IFV with the Israeli not be as mobile as the GCV.
Namer armored personnel carrier (APC), soldiers and
vehicles would probably survive combat at slightly higher Option 3: Purchase the Puma IFV
If the Army chose the German Puma, which carries just
rates than would be the case for the GCV. Moreover, the
six passengers, to replace the current Bradley IFVs, the
Namer, like the GCV, could carry a nine-member squad, service would need to buy five vehicles for every four of
although it would be less lethal (that is, have less capabil- its current Bradley IFVs. The advantage of the Puma,
ity to destroy enemy forces) and less mobile than the however, is that its capabilities are expected to be similar
GCV. The Namer probably would be produced, at least to or better than those of the GCV in other areas. It
in part, in the United States, but its fielding would never- would be much more lethal than other vehicles that CBO
theless require collaboration with foreign companies and evaluated—including the GCV. Its ability to protect
passengers and survive combat would be slightly better
governments.
than the GCV’s and it would be almost as mobile. If the
Army decided to field the Puma, the development and
Option 2: Upgrade the Bradley IFV
production of that vehicle, like the Namer, would require
An upgraded Bradley IFV would be more lethal than the
collaboration with foreign companies and governments.
GCV against enemy forces and would probably allow
soldiers and vehicles to survive combat at about the same Option 4: Cancel the GCV
rates as would the GCV. But like the current model, the If the Army reconditioned its current Bradley IFVs
upgraded Bradley would carry only seven passengers— instead of replacing them, the current capability of the

CBO

SUMMARY THE ARMY’S GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES 3

Summary Table 2.
Capacity, Risk, Cost, and Overall Improvement in Capability
Associated with the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options
Ability to Total Cost, Overall Improvement in
b a
Carry a Full 2014–2030 Combat Vehicle Capability (Percent)
Nine-Member Programmatic (Billions of Primary Secondary
c d
Squad Risk 2013 dollars) Metric Metric
e e
Army's Plan (Field the GCV) Yes High 28.8 16 36

CBO's Options
1. Purchase Israeli Namer APC Yes Low 19.5 6 25
2. Upgrade Bradley IFV No Intermediate 19.5 32 25
3. Purchase German Puma IFV No Low 14.5 45 38
4. Retain current Bradley IFV No None 4.6 0 0

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: GCV = Ground Combat Vehicle; APC = armored personnel carrier; IFV = infantry fighting vehicle.
a. The overall improvement in capability relative to the current Bradley IFV. CBO’s analysis of such improvements was based on the Army’s
analysis and data. See the appendix for a description of CBO’s methods for calculating overall improvement.
b. For the GCV program and Options 1 and 2, the total cost covers development and purchase of 1,748 vehicles. For Option 3, the total cost
covers development and purchase of 2,048 vehicles. For Option 4, the cost is the amount needed to extend the life of the Army’s current
Bradley IFVs and to continue research and development.
c. CBO’s primary metric determines the overall improvement in capability based on the weighting (derived from the Army’s analysis) of
improvements in four areas: protection and survivability (40 percent), lethality (30 percent), mobility (20 percent), and maximum number
of passengers (10 percent). See the appendix for details concerning CBO’s metrics.
d. CBO’s secondary metric gives equal weight to the improvement in each of the four areas in order to determine an overall increase in
capability; improved passenger capacity is 100 percent for those vehicles that can carry a full nine-member squad and zero for other
vehicles. See the appendix for details concerning CBO’s metrics.
e. Based on the December 2010 version—the Design Concept After Trades—of the GCV after additional design trade-offs that the Army
made to reduce the average procurement unit cost to $13.5 million (in 2013 dollars).

IFV fleet could be maintained through 2030. The Army secondary metric emphasized a vehicle’s ability to achieve
could continue to investigate ways to improve the current the Army’s goals by giving more weight to its capacity for
Bradleys, but it would not field any new or improved carrying passengers and by giving additional credit to
vehicles. vehicles that can carry a nine-member squad.

How Were Differences Assessed? Which Vehicles Would Be
To estimate the improvement in capability the GCV and
the alternative vehicles would yield compared with the
Most Capable?
On the basis of CBO’s primary metric, the Puma
current Bradley IFV, CBO applied two metrics based on would be the most capable of the vehicles, and both it
characteristics that are considered important in a fighting
and the upgraded Bradley IFV would be significantly
vehicle. Those measures combined the various improve-
more capable than the GCV (see Summary Table 2 and
ments the alternative vehicles offer in four categories
Summary Figure 1). In addition, fielding Pumas or
compared with the current Bradley IFV: protection of
upgraded Bradleys would cost $14 billion and $9 billion
soldiers and survivability of the vehicle in combat; lethal-
less, respectively, than the Army’s program for the GCV
ity; mobility to and around the battlefield; and passenger
capacity. and would pose less risk of cost overruns and schedule
delays. Although the Namer would be much less capable
CBO’s primary metric weighed improvements in each than the GCV overall, it would still provide the Army
category on the basis of soldiers’ preferences. The agency’s with a vehicle that could carry nine passengers, and

CBO


Summary Figure 1.
Cost and Improvement in Capability Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options,
Using Two Metrics
(Percentage improvement relative to the current Bradley IFV)
Primary Metric Secondary Metric
50 50
Option 3
(Puma) Option 3
(Puma) Army's Plan
40 40 (GCV)
Option 2
(Upgraded Bradley)
Option 2
30 30
(Upgraded Bradley)

Army's Plan Option 1
20 (GCV) 20 (Namer)

Option 1
10 (Namer) 10
Option 4 Option 4
(Current Bradley) (Current Bradley)
0 0
0 10 20 30 40 0 10 20 30 40

Cost (Billions of 2013 dollars) Cost (Billions of 2013 dollars)

Notes: The Army’s plan would field the GCV, Option 1 would purchase the Israeli Namer APC, Option 2 would upgrade the Bradley IFV,
Option 3 would purchase the German Puma IFV, and Option 4 would retain the current Bradley IFV.
For the GCV program and Options 1 and 2, the total cost covers development and purchase of 1,748 vehicles. For Option 3, the total
cost covers development and purchase of 2,048 vehicles. For Option 4, the cost is the amount needed to extend the life of the Army’s
current Bradley IFVs and to continue research and development.
For CBO’s primary metric, the overall improvement in capability is based on the weighting (derived from the Army’s analysis) of
improvements in four areas: protection and survivability (40 percent), lethality (30 percent), mobility (20 percent), and maximum
number of passengers (10 percent). For CBO’s secondary metric, improvements in the same four areas are weighted equally to
determine an overall increase in capability; improved passenger capacity is 100 percent for those vehicles that can carry a full
nine-member squad and zero for other vehicles. See the appendix for details concerning CBO’s metrics.
IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; GCV = Ground Combat Vehicle; APC = armored personnel carrier.

fielding it would cost $9 billion less than the Army’s plan Pumas would give the Army slightly more capability than
for fielding the GCV. a fleet of GCVs and at only half the cost of the GCV. The
Puma fleet also would pose a lower risk of cost overruns
The Puma is slightly more capable than the GCV, but the
or schedule delays.
upgraded Bradley IFV and the Namer are less capable
than the GCV in an evaluation of the various vehicles No improvement over the fleet’s current capability would
on the basis of CBO’s secondary metric, which empha- be achieved if the Army canceled the GCV program and
sizes the ability to carry a nine-member squad. Because
instead decided to rely on the current Bradley IFVs until
the GCV and the Namer are the only vehicles CBO
the need for additional capabilities became more pressing
studied that could carry a full nine-member squad, their
capability is higher relative to the other vehicles by that and new technologies were readily available. Nevertheless,
metric. As a result, the GCV is nearly comparable to the that approach offers other advantages: The cost to the
Puma, and the Namer is equal to the upgraded Bradley, Army would be $24 billion less than the projected cost
although less capable than either the GCV or the Puma. of the GCV program, and the service would incur
Even by CBO’s secondary metric, fielding a fleet of essentially no programmatic risk.

CBO

CHAPTER

1
The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program

T he Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) pro-
gram is part of its plan to modernize its fleet of combat
team of contractors, to design and produce the GCV
might affect the U.S. industrial base or employment.
vehicles. Although the service’s plan includes moderniz-
ing all existing combat vehicles by replacing or upgrading
them, the first priority is to develop and field a new The Army’s Rationale and Goals for a
“highly survivable” infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) that New Infantry Fighting Vehicle
can transport a full nine-member squad of soldiers (along For almost a decade, the Army has been planning to
with the vehicle’s crew) to, from, and around a battlefield. develop and field new combat vehicles, but the decision
The GCV is the Army’s first new combat vehicle to field a new IFV along the lines of the GCV has arisen
designed to better withstand the effects of improvised primarily from experience in Iraq.1 During the earliest
explosive devices (IEDs) that have been employed with years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, dozens of Bradley IFVs
such devastating effects in Iraq and Afghanistan. were destroyed or damaged by mines and IEDs and, in
some cases, their occupants killed or injured. The Army
This analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) subsequently improved the Bradley IFV by bolting on
of the GCV program and possible alternatives is based more armor and adding electronic equipment to prevent
solely on the Army’s goals and plans for that vehicle. As a remotely controlled IEDs and mines from exploding and
starting point, CBO accepted the Army’s goals for the damaging the vehicle or injuring the troops it carried. But
new IFV program—specifically, those for the vehicle’s the Bradley was designed in the 1970s and has been
performance and for the number of vehicles it estimates upgraded repeatedly over the past 30 years; the additional
are needed to equip and support its forces. CBO then weight and demands for electrical power associated with
assessed the ability of the GCV and the other vehicles to the improvements have strained the vehicle’s capacity.
meet those goals, determined the improvement in capa-
To remedy the shortcomings of the current Bradley
bilities the vehicles would provide relative to the capabili-
IFV—its vulnerability to damage from IEDs and mines,
ties of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (the Army’s
its overburdened suspension and electrical system, and its
current IFV), and estimated the cost of developing and
lack of capacity for more and newer equipment—the
purchasing the number of those vehicles needed to equip Army has decided to field an entirely new infantry fight-
and support its forces on the same schedule. ing vehicle that is better suited to the modern battlefield.
According to the Army, one lesson from operations in
Using the Army’s goals for the GCV program necessarily
Iraq is that the service “needs a Ground Combat Vehicle
limited the scope of CBO’s analysis. Different goals for a
new IFV would have changed the criteria that CBO used
1. The GCV program is in some ways a continuation of the Future
to evaluate the GCV program and the various alterna- Combat Systems program, which was canceled in 2009 by the
tives. For example, answers to questions about the threats Secretary of Defense. That program would have developed
the Army will face in the future and how its armored and fielded new combat vehicles to replace all of the Abrams
forces will confront those threats would affect which tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, self-propelled howitzers, and
M113-based vehicles in an armored combat brigade. For more
capabilities the service would emphasize in its new vehicle
details on the Future Combat Systems program, see Congressional
and the number of vehicles it would need to equip its Budget Office, An Analysis of the Army’s Transformation Programs
forces. Also outside the scope of this analysis were consid- and Possible Alternatives (June 2009), www.cbo.gov/publication/
erations of how the choice of a particular contractor, or 41186.

CBO


Box 1-1.
The Army’s Emphasis on Transporting Full Nine-Member Squads
The infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) is both the pri- in addition to crew members, thus accounting for
mary weapon and a means of transport for soldiers squad members and the platoon leader but no one
in the mechanized infantry squads that the Army else. Yet additional soldiers often are needed to
considers essential to its future operations. As cur- accompany mechanized infantry platoons during
rently configured, each mechanized infantry platoon operations, and it is to the platoon’s advantage
is staffed with a platoon leader, three squads of nine to have those supporting soldiers ride along in a
soldiers, and a three-member crew for each of the platoon vehicle. For example, radio-telephone opera-
platoon’s four Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles. tors, medics, and forward observers (who call for
Because the current Bradley can carry at most seven supporting fire from artillery and aircraft) typically
people in addition to the crew, squads must be accompany soldiers in a platoon. The four Bradley
divided among vehicles.1 The Army sees that inability IFVs assigned to each platoon have no room to
to carry a full nine-member squad as a liability accommodate such personnel.
because of difficulties with organization and commu-
nications that can ensue immediately after soldiers The Army is seeking to remedy that deficiency by
exit a vehicle, especially if the vehicle is under fire or replacing the Bradley IFV with the larger Ground
operating in a complex environment, such as a city. Combat Vehicle (GCV), which would carry a full
nine-member squad in addition to its three-member
A lack of space for additional passengers is a draw- crew. The Army plans to replace its current fleet of
back for a platoon as well. Between them, a platoon’s Bradley IFVs with an equal number of GCVs. A pla-
four Bradley IFVs can carry a total of 28 passengers, toon equipped with four GCVs could carry each of
three squads in separate vehicles, leaving the fourth
1. For more details, see Bernard Kempinski and Christopher vehicle available to transport the platoon leader, sup-
Murphy, Technical Challenges of the U.S. Army’s Ground porting personnel (such as forward observers and
Combat Vehicle Program, Working Paper 2012-15 medics), and any additional personnel needed.
(Congressional Budget Office, November 2012), pp. 3–5,
www.cbo.gov/publication/43699.

that incorporates protection against improvised explosive which has room for only seven soldiers in addition to its
devices, tactical mobility, and operational agility.”2 The crew, cannot do.3 The Army’s rationale is that keeping the
Army also wants a vehicle that can accommodate addi- squad together in one vehicle will improve the effective-
tional equipment so that the service can easily modify the ness of the squad when soldiers first exit the vehicle,
which is central to success in combat (see Box 1-1).4
vehicle as the operational environment changes and new
technology becomes available. Another key goal is the
Schedule, Fielding, and Cost of the GCV Program
capacity to transport a nine-member infantry squad on The Army wants to field the first GCVs in what would
the battlefield—something that the current Bradley IFV, be an unusually short time for such a complicated new
system. Technology development began in December
2. See Department of the Army, Capabilities Integration
Center, The Squad and Its Ground Combat Vehicle (2011),
3. Army documents disagree about the number of fully equipped
http://go.usa.gov/4fDJ. CBO has examined the Army’s goals for
soldiers that can be transported in a Bradley IFV. Most sources
the GCV as well as how mines, IEDs, and antitank weapons work
indicate that the vehicle can carry seven soldiers, but only under
and technical approaches (including advanced armor) to counter
cramped conditions.
those weapons. See Bernard Kempinski and Christopher Murphy,
Technical Challenges of the U.S. Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle 4. Department of the Army, Capabilities Integration Center,
Program, Working Paper 2012-15 (Congressional Budget Office, The Squad and Its Ground Combat Vehicle (2011),
November 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43699. http://go.usa.gov/4fDJ.

CBO

CHAPTER ONE THE ARMY’S GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES 7

2011 and will continue through June 2014.5 Then, 2014 through 2021. Because the program is still in the
more than four years of engineering and manufacturing early stages, it is difficult to project procurement costs
development will take place. Production is scheduled to accurately. However, in August 2011, when approving
begin in 2019, and the first production vehicle could be the program’s entry into technology development, the
available in 2020.6 Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics established an upper limit of $13.5 million
The GCV is slated as a replacement for the Army’s for the average cost to purchase a vehicle.9 Using that ceil-
Bradley IFV in armored combat brigades. At the end of ing as a basis, CBO estimated that the cost of purchasing
2012, the active component of the Army and the 1,748 GCVs would be $23.5 billion and that the total
National Guard together included 24 armored combat cost of development and procurement for the program
brigades, although that number is likely to be reduced would be $28.8 billion from 2014 through 2030.
by at least two as the Army trims its forces over the next
several years. On the basis of information supplied by Capability of the GCV
the Army, CBO estimates that the Army will require Because it is still in the early stages of development, the
1,748 GCVs to equip 22 armored combat brigades— GCV’s characteristics are still in flux. In August 2011,
each assigned 61 GCVs and 2 spare vehicles—and to two teams were placed under contract to begin develop-
provide additional vehicles for use in training and sup- ment, and they were given considerable flexibility in
port activities and in prepositioned sets of equipment.7 meeting the Army’s goals. One contractor, for example,
According to the current schedule, vehicle purchases will has proposed using a conventional diesel engine for the
begin in 2019. On the basis of the Army’s planning docu- vehicle; the other proposes a hybrid electric engine.
ments, CBO assumes that purchases will reach an annual Although the Army’s goals themselves are subject to
rate of 156 by 2021 and that procurement would extend change at any time during development, the average pro-
through 2030. curement cost of the vehicle cannot exceed the cap. Thus,
any extra cost from increasing capability in one area must
In preparation for beginning the first stage of be offset by savings in some other area. What trade-offs
development—a step known as Milestone A—the will be made, however, will not be known until develop-
Army generated a preliminary design and cost estimates ment is complete and the vehicle goes into production.
for development and procurement.8 On the basis of those
preliminary estimates, and as revised to reflect changes CBO conducted its analysis on the version of the GCV—
made in the program in January 2013, CBO projects a known as the GCV Design Concept After Trades, but
total development cost of $5.3 billion for the period from here referred to as the notional GCV—that the Army
proposed before beginning technology development in
5. Based on the schedule directed by Frank Kendall, Undersecretary August 2011. The cost, characteristics, and performance
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in an of that notional version are well documented and were
acquisition decision memorandum to the Secretary of the Army, described in a report the Army delivered to the Congress
January 16, 2013.
in March 2011.10 That notional version had already made
6. The original Army schedule was shorter than the current one.
Contracts signed in August 2011 with two companies that were to
8. Official estimates of the costs of major acquisition programs are
perform technology development were delayed by a protest until
typically not published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense
December 2011 (the first quarter of fiscal year 2012). That
until a program has entered into engineering and manufacturing
original schedule called for two years of technology development,
development. The GCV program is not scheduled to enter that
starting in 2012, followed by four years of engineering and
phase until June 2014.
manufacturing development, starting in early 2014. Thus,
production of the GCV would have begun in 2018, and the Army 9. That amount (known as the average procurement unit cost) is the
would have accepted the first production vehicle in 2019, seven procurement cost of all GCVs divided by the total of 1,748 to be
years after technology development began. purchased. An average cost of $13 million in 2011 dollars is equal
to $13.5 million in 2013 dollars.
7. Specifically, 15 vehicles for testing before full production begins,
1,386 to equip 22 armored combat brigades, 189 to equip three 10. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the
brigade sets stored aboard ships or overseas for contingencies, Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to the
120 for training, and 38 for the Army National Guard. Reducing Armed Services Committees of the United States Senate and House of
the number of armored combat brigades to fewer than 22 would Representatives, Tab B, “Ground Combat Vehicle Trade Impact
reduce the number of GCVs the Army would need to purchase. Analysis” (March 2011).

CBO


Table 1-1. compromises between various subsystems, such as can-
non size, type and amount of armor, and the inclusion of
Characteristics of the Current antitank missile launchers, to reduce the cost to an
Bradley IFV and the GCV amount that the Army considered affordable. All discus-
sions of the characteristics of the GCV in this report refer
Current
Bradley IFV
a
GCV
b to the notional GCV. (The Army intends to change the
requirements for the amount of protection and the size of
Number of Occupants
the GCV’s cannon. CBO’s analysis could not account for
Crew 3 3 those changes because the details are still pending.)
Passengers 7c 9

Physical Characteristics Description of the GCV
Weight (Tons) d
33 to 39 50 to 65 The Army envisions the GCV as providing protection for
Dimensions (Feet) soldiers as they are transported to, from, and around the
Length 23 28 battlefield and, if necessary, also engaging and destroying
Width 12.8 13.7 enemy vehicles and personnel. The GCV would replace
Height 10.6 13.7 the infantry version of the Bradley fighting vehicle within
Engine Capacity (Horsepower) 600 1,500 the Army’s armored combat brigades, but it would be
Armament larger and able to carry more soldiers into battle—nine
Cannon (Caliber in mm) 25 25
compared with the Bradley’s seven. It also would be
Antitank Missile TOW n.a. designed with enough interior space to accommodate
Machine Gun (Caliber in mm) new equipment as it becomes available (see Table 1-1 and
RCWS n.a. 12.7 Figure 1-1). In addition, because of the Army’s stringent
Coaxial 7.62 7.62 goals for soldiers’ protection, the GCV is to be heavily
armored; as a consequence, the notional vehicle weighs
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of the 65 tons when fully protected and equipped with the most
Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the Ground effective modular armor. At that weight, the vehicle
Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to would be 67 percent heavier than the current Bradley
the Armed Services Committees of the United States
Senate and House of Representatives (March 2011), and IFV, which weighs 39 tons even when equipped with
other sources. the additional armor needed for operations in Iraq. The
Note: IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; GCV = Ground Combat GCV is likely to have a turret equipped with a cannon—
Vehicle; mm = millimeters; TOW = tube-launched, optically the Army’s notional version includes a 25 millimeter
tracked, wire-guided; RCWS = remotely controlled weapon (mm) cannon similar to that on the current Bradley
station; n.a. = not applicable. IFV—and two additional machine guns and various sen-
a. Version of the M2A3 Bradley IFV used in Iraq, which includes sors to detect enemy forces.11 In order to meet the Army’s
reactive armor and underbelly armor. goals for off-road travel, the GCV will be equipped with
b. Based on the December 2010 version—the Design Concept tracks rather than wheels.
After Trades—of the GCV after additional design trade-offs that
the Army made to reduce the average procurement unit cost to The GCV program also includes the development of
$13.5 million (in 2013 dollars).
armor kits to protect against direct-fire weapons (rifles,
c. Army documents disagree about the number of fully equipped machine guns, and cannons), antitank weapons, mines,
soldiers that can be transported in a Bradley IFV. Most sources
indicate that the vehicle can carry seven soldiers, but only under
and IEDs. Various kits would be designed to meet differ-
cramped conditions. ing levels of threat (for example, medium-sized mines at
d. The lower end of the range represents the weight of the vehicle
one level versus large antitank mines at another). The
without added armor or other protective measures. The upper lowest level of protection, from direct-fire rounds and
end of the range includes the weight of currently proposed mines, would be provided by armor built into the vehi-
protective equipment that could be or has been added to the cle’s hull and chassis. Kits, known as modular armor, for
vehicle.

11. In January 2013, the service revised its goals for the vehicle’s can-
non to specify a caliber of 30 mm or larger. The goal established at
the beginning of technology development stipulated a minimum
caliber of 25 mm.

CBO


Figure 1-1.
Dimensions of the Current Bradley IFV and the GCV
Side View

Bradley IFV: 23 feet

GCV: 28 feet

Front View

13.7 feet
10.6 feet Bradley IFV Ground Combat Vehicle
(Notional)

12.8 feet 13.7 feet

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Army data.
Notes: GCV dimensions are based on the December 2010 version—the Design Concept After Trades—of the GCV after additional design
trade-offs that the Army made to reduce the average procurement unit cost to $13.5 million (in 2013 dollars), as described in
Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A)
to the Armed Services Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives (March 2011).
IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; GCV = Ground Combat Vehicle.

CBO


the other levels of protection would be added as needed recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Smaller reduc-
for specific operations. In that way, a vehicle need not tions were seen in the number of soldiers lost in scenarios
carry the added weight if greater protection is not that featured larger, more conventional battles against
required. enemies equipped with armored vehicles.

Improvements in Capability The GCVs themselves proved better at surviving an
The GCV would be more capable than the current attack than current Bradleys. On average, across all
Bradley IFV in some respects but potentially less so in scenarios, 22 percent fewer GCVs were lost (a vehicle is
others. The Army requires that the GCV carry two more considered lost if it is damaged beyond the ability to
soldiers than the current Bradley IFV can accommodate, operate); in one scenario, roughly 40 percent fewer GCVs
and the engine must be more powerful because the vehi- were lost. (However, in the simulation of the most intense
cle will be heavier and larger than the current Bradley. battle—set in northeast Asia—the GCVs’ survivability
The bottom of the GCV will clear the ground by at least was no greater than that of the current Bradley IFVs.)
7 inches more than the current IFV does, thereby reduc- The overall improvement was 27 percent in protection
ing its vulnerability to mines. Although the notional for soldiers and survivability of the GCVs compared with
GCV was equipped with a cannon of the same caliber as the current Bradley IFVs (see Table 1-2).13
that on the current Bradley, the vehicle did not have an
antitank missile launcher and so would be less effective Lethality. The GCVs destroyed fewer enemy forces (that
against enemy armored vehicles. is, enemy vehicles and personnel) than did the current
Bradley IFVs in the Army’s combat simulations. Specifi-
CBO compared the capabilities of the notional version of cally, on average across all scenarios, the notional GCVs
the GCV with those of the current Bradley IFV in four were 7 percent less lethal against enemy forces than were
areas. Specifically, the Army has established goals for the current Bradley IFVs.14 If the enemy was equipped
improvement in protection of occupants of the vehicle with armored vehicles, GCVs destroyed fewer enemy
and survivability (defined as the ability of the vehicle to vehicles than did the current Bradleys because GCVs
withstand attacks and still continue to operate), lethality lack the Bradleys’ antitank missiles. However, GCVs
(the ability to destroy enemy forces), mobility (the ability destroyed more enemy personnel in the simulations
to travel on- and off-road), and passenger capacity. As a because the vehicles survived longer and were equipped
basis for comparison, CBO used data and results from with an additional machine gun and with better sensors
the Army’s analysis of the performance of the GCV and for finding and identifying targets.
the Bradley IFV in those four categories.
Mobility and Passenger Capacity. The GCV would be
Protection and Survivability. The GCV would provide more mobile and carry more passengers than the current
better protection for soldiers and would operate longer Bradley IFV. Plans for the new vehicle indicate that
on the battlefield than the current Bradley IFV, according
the GCV will accelerate faster, attain higher off-road
to analyses that the Army conducted from February
speeds, and go farther on a tank of fuel. Despite its larger
through December 2010. In a series of computer simula-
size and weight, the notional GCV’s increased speed and
tions of combat, the Army replaced the current Bradley
acceleration yielded a 24 percent overall improvement in
IFV with the notional GCV.12 Units equipped with the
mobility. In addition, the GCV would accommodate two
GCV lost almost 30 percent fewer occupants—crew
and passengers—than did units equipped with current
Bradley IFVs. The largest relative improvement—60 per- 13. The assessment of the overall increase in protection and
survivability was based on a 67/33 weighting of the increase in the
cent fewer losses—occurred in simulations in which number of soldiers protected relative to the increase in the number
U.S. forces confronted unconventional threats and small of vehicles that survived in the Army’s simulations.
numbers of combatants, situations that were similar to
14. The overall increase or decrease in effectiveness against enemy
forces was based on a 60/40 weighting of the number of enemy
12. The Army simulated combat under several scenarios, including vehicles destroyed relative to the number of enemy personnel
incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan that employed company-sized killed. Those weights are based on responses from Army personnel
U.S. forces, a battalion-sized encounter in southwest Asia, and a to surveys regarding which attributes of combat vehicles are most
brigade-sized battle in northeast Asia. important to soldiers. See the appendix for more details.

CBO


Table 1-2.
Improvement of the GCV Compared with the Current Bradley IFV
Improvement in Capability (Percent)
Protection and Survivabilitya 27
Lethalityb -7
Mobilityc 24
Passenger Capacity
Increased number of passengers 29
Ability to carry a full nine-member squad 100

Overall Improvement Relative to the Current Bradley IFV
Primary metricd 16
Secondary metrice 36

Sources: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the Ground Combat Vehicle
(March 2011); and Department of the Army, personal communication to CBO staff, May 2012.
Notes: The GCV is the notional version, based on the December 2010 Design Concept After Trades, which includes additional design
trade-offs that the Army made to reduce the average procurement unit cost to $13.5 million (in 2013 dollars).
GCV = Ground Combat Vehicle; IFV = infantry fighting vehicle.
a. Protection is the vehicle’s ability to protect its occupants from effects of attacks. Survivability is the vehicle’s ability to withstand attacks
and still continue to operate. Improvement is determined by the reduction in losses of vehicles and personnel.
b. Lethality is the vehicle’s ability to destroy enemy personnel and vehicles.
c. Mobility is the ability to travel on- and off-road.
d. CBO’s primary metric determines the overall improvement in capability based on the weighting (derived from the Army’s analysis) of
e. CBO’s secondary metric gives equal weight to the improvement in each of the four areas in order to determine an overall increase in

more passengers than the current Bradley IFV, for a automotive characteristics as the rate of acceleration,
capacity increase of 29 percent. Because of that larger maximum off-road speed, turning radius, and range of
capacity, the GCV also would be able to transport a full operation on a single tank of fuel. The fourth area—
nine-member infantry squad, thus meeting one of the passenger capacity—was evaluated in two ways: CBO’s
Army’s main goals for the program. primary metric considered the percentage increase in the
number of passengers carried beyond the seven carried by
Overall Improvement. CBO used two metrics to gauge the current Bradley IFV, and its secondary metric took
the notional GCV’s overall improvement in capability into account whether a vehicle could carry a full nine-
relative to that of the current Bradley IFV (see the appen- member squad. (If a vehicle could carry a full squad, it
dix). Both metrics combined the GCV’s improved (or was considered to provide a 100 percent increase in capa-
reduced) capabilities—in protection and survivability, bility; if it could not, the percentage increase was deemed
lethality, mobility, and passenger capacity—to yield a to be zero.)
comprehensive measure of overall improvement. And
both used results from the Army’s combat simulations CBO combined the increase—or decrease—in capability
involving the current Bradley IFV and the notional GCV attributed to the GCV in those four areas by using
to measure changes in protection, survivability, and different weighting schemes for the two metrics. The
lethality. Also common to both metrics was an evaluation primary metric used a weighting scheme derived from
of the mobility of the two vehicles, based on such the one used by the Army in its analysis of alternatives

CBO


before the entry of the GCV program into technology Challenges in Meeting Goals,
development.15 That scheme—based on soldiers’ prefer- Cost Constraints, and Schedule
ences—places more emphasis on improvements in pro- The GCV program faces several obstacles to meeting the
tection and survivability, lethality, and mobility than on Army’s main goals for the GCV—protecting occupants
greater passenger capacity.16 The secondary metric, in against land mines and IEDs, carrying a nine-member
contrast, is designed to emphasize the GCV’s ability to squad, and operating in all possible future conflicts—
meet all of the Army’s goals for its new IFV. It gives equal within the prescribed cost per vehicle and the current
weight to improvements in each of the four areas, thereby schedule. Trade-offs will probably be necessary.
allotting improvement in passenger capacity a weight of
25 percent rather than 10 percent as in the primary met- Technical Challenges. The GCV program must overcome
ric. In addition, the secondary metric gives additional several technical obstacles before the vehicle goes into
credit to those vehicles that can carry a nine-member production if it is to meet the Army’s goals. One set of
squad. challenges involves the vehicle’s ability to generate and
store enough electrical power—many times that required
CBO’s primary metric indicates that the notional GCV for the Army’s current vehicles—to supply the systems
would yield an overall improvement in capability of that the GCV is likely to include over its lifetime. Other
16 percent; CBO’s secondary metric—which favors vehi- challenges involve protecting the vehicle’s occupants
cles that can carry nine soldiers—suggests that the GCV without increasing its weight beyond the capacity of the
would represent a 36 percent improvement in capability planned automotive system. Ceramic and other types of
(see Table 1-2 on page 11). The notional GCV also effective lightweight armor currently exist, but the mate-
would offer advantages over the current Bradley IFV in rials are either very costly to manufacture or will require
communications, future adaptability, and maintenance. several more years in development for use on a vehicle
For example, it would be equipped with the Army’s latest like the GCV. Alternatively, the Army could rely on an
communications and networking equipment and there- active protection system that uses vehicle-mounted sen-
fore could more easily maintain contact with other Army sors to detect incoming rounds or missiles and then
forces. In addition, the GCV would be better able to launches missiles or munitions to destroy or deflect them.
accommodate the added weight and increased demand Most active protection systems, however, have not yet
for electrical power typically associated with future proved reliable in countering incoming rounds under
improvements of such vehicles. In its assessments, the typical battlefield conditions.17 Without an effective
Army has concluded that the GCV also would be easier system for the new vehicle, its developers may need to
to maintain than the current Bradley IFV. add even more armor to achieve the Army’s goals for
protecting personnel and equipment.

Concerns About the GCV Program Challenges in Containing Costs and Meeting Schedules.
Defense analysts and policymakers have questioned An added difficulty concerns meeting technical chal-
several aspects of the GCV program, including its lenges while still keeping to target costs and schedules.
far-reaching objectives, its ambitious schedule, its appli- In fact, technical challenges and cost constraints have
cability in the current defense environment and in the already forced the Army to make trade-offs among
likely environment of the future, and its combination of capabilities. In establishing its goals for the GCV before
limited scope and significant cost. entering technology development, the Army had to give
up an antitank missile launcher—similar to one on the
current Bradley IFV—that could have been mounted on
15. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the
Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to the GCV’s turret. It also elected to forgo armor kits that
the Armed Services Committees of the United States Senate and would provide additional protection for two-thirds of the
House of Representatives, Tab I, “Ground Combat Vehicle planned vehicles, and it chose a 25 mm cannon rather
Affordability Strategy” (March 2011). See the appendix for a
description of the Army’s and CBO’s weighting schemes.
17. Many such challenges are discussed more fully in Bernard
16. The primary metric assigns weights to improvements in the Kempinski and Christopher Murphy, Technical Challenges of the
four areas: protection and survivability (40 percent), lethality U.S. Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program, Working Paper
(30 percent), mobility (20 percent), and passenger capacity 2012-15 (Congressional Budget Office, November 2012),
(10 percent). See the appendix for more details. www.cbo.gov/publication/43699.

CBO


than the larger 30 mm cannon originally specified. In effective active protection system unlikely) and an
addition, the sensors and optics on the notional vehicle increase in the goals for lethality (which will require a
are less sophisticated than those the Army had originally cannon with a caliber of 30 mm or greater).
hoped to include.
Inasmuch as the program was only slightly more than
Even so, questions regarding the cost of the Army’s a year old when the equipment requirements were
preliminary design were raised when the Army sought changed, it is likely that additional trade-offs will be
approval for the program’s entry into technology develop- necessary as the Army learns more about the technical
ment. The Office of the Director of Cost Assessment feasibility and cost of meeting its goals. Cost estimates
and Program Evaluation (CAPE) in the Office of the produced during the early stages of weapons programs
Secretary of Defense estimated that the average per-unit generally are revised upward as work progresses: Histori-
procurement cost for the notional version of the GCV cally, actual costs have averaged about 50 percent
that was approved in August 2011 was $4 million more higher than the costs projected at the time a system
than the cost the Army had estimated for the vehicle. enters the technology development phase.21 In particular,
Nevertheless, when the Undersecretary authorized the if CAPE’s cost estimate proves to be more accurate than
GCV program’s entry into technology development in the Army’s, or if the costs of some subsystems rise unex-
August 2011, the Army’s estimate of $13.5 million was pectedly, further trade-offs will be necessary to prevent
accepted as the baseline cost.18 procurement costs from exceeding the cap.22

Concerns about the program’s affordability and feasibility The GCV program’s ambitious schedule and technical
may have contributed to the Army’s being assigned sev- challenges also create concern. The schedule established
eral tasks as a prerequisite to the GCV program’s entering in August 2011, which would have begun production in
the second stage of development, and they certainly 2018, was particularly ambitious. Representatives of the
contributed to the Army’s revision of its goals for the Government Accountability Office highlighted the risk
program in January 2013. When the Undersecretary inherent in that schedule in testimony in October 2011,
approved the entry of the GCV program into technology noting that the Army faced a major difficulty in its
development in August 2011, he directed the Army to attempts to deliver a feasible, cost-effective GCV pro-
continue to evaluate possible alternatives before entering gram that could be carried out according to the Army’s
the next phase.19 Specifically, the Army was directed to schedule.23 That challenge was acknowledged when the
update the analysis of alternatives it had conducted before Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
August 2011 and to explore trade-offs between specific and Logistics directed the Army in January 2013 to
capabilities and costs. As a result of those assessments, in extend the technology development phase of the program
January 2013 the Army revised its requirements in order by six months to allow additional time to react to the
to achieve a more affordable and technically feasible
design.20 Those revisions include a reduction in the
20. Frank Kendall, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Army’s goals for protection (which makes the need for an Technology, and Logistics, informational memorandum to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 16, 2013.
18. At the same time, the Undersecretary required a review of the
21. Mark V. Arena and others, Historical Cost Growth of Completed
cost estimate before the program could enter the next phase
Weapon System Programs, TR-343 (RAND Corporation, 2006),
(engineering and manufacturing development)—now scheduled
www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR343.html.
for June 2014—and CAPE was directed to assess whether the
trade-offs that the Army makes during technology development 22. CAPE’s estimate of the cost of the GCV program could be more
would be sufficient to keep the vehicle’s unit cost below the cap. accurate than the Army’s estimate, but CBO chose to use the
Army’s figures in large part because CAPE had no cost estimates
19. The Army was also directed to support its findings with assess-
for development or purchase of alternative vehicles. (See
ments of existing combat vehicles to determine whether they were
Chapter 2 for a discussion of the various programs’ costs.)
adequate alternatives to a new vehicle or whether some of the
designs or capabilities of existing vehicles should be incorporated 23. Answers for the record, by Belva M. Martin, Director, Acquisition
into a new GCV. The results of studies by the GCV contractor and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office,
teams (concerning technology demonstrations and trade-offs submitted subsequent to the hearing on Army Acquisition and
between various capabilities and their costs) during the technology Modernization Programs before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air
development phase were to be considered in the updated analysis and Land Forces of the House Committee on Armed Services
of alternatives as well. (October 26, 2011), http://go.usa.gov/4cWV.

CBO


Army’s revised requirements.24 The Army also was tanks and antitank missiles). For that reason, vehicles
directed to extend the second phase of the program— designed for use in battles envisioned during the Cold
engineering and manufacturing development—with the War had well-protected fronts, with less protection on the
result that 2019 is the earliest that production may begin. sides and top and very little at the back or on the bottom.
If this is the type of threat that the GCV is likely to face
Role in Future Conflicts in the future, then it may be overprotected.
What role the GCV will have and what its utility
in future conflicts is likely to be are unclear now, in If future engagements are similar to those in Iraq and
part because U.S. military strategy has changed but also Afghanistan, the value of the GCV’s additional armor
because the vehicle would be so large and heavy. The might be diminished by the fact that its size and weight
current Administration’s strategy emphasizes protecting could limit its usefulness. Similar vehicles—the Army’s
U.S. interests in Asia and the Pacific Rim and deploying Bradley IFVs and Abrams tanks—were not used exten-
armed forces that can respond rapidly to threats. Some sively in cities in Iraq and not used at all in Afghanistan.
analysts assert that the new strategy would make the use And statements by Army leaders in 2010, notably by
of large numbers of armored Army forces less likely in the then-Army Chief of Staff General George Casey, indi-
future than it has been in the past. The other services— cated the belief that the GCV should be much smaller
the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps—already have a and lighter than currently planned. According to reports
large, dispersed presence in the Pacific region that is likely in the press, General Casey said that “soldiers who have
to increase in the next few years.25 Furthermore, it would served in Iraq and Afghanistan have told [me] that big,
take at least three weeks to move even a single armored heavy vehicles just aren’t practical in urban combat” and
combat brigade—equipped with 61 GCVs—from the that the Army “stopped using tanks and Bradleys on the
United States to the site of a conflict in Asia, for example. streets of Baghdad just because of the size.”27 Moreover,
large vehicles can be too heavy for many countries’
Questions about the sorts of threats that the Army will roads and bridges, leading one expert to suggest that
face in future combat combine to create another area of “an optimal weight for a vehicle in an irregular warfare
uncertainty. If large numbers of the Army’s armored environment is 40 to 45 tons”—significantly less than
forces were involved in a large-scale conflict with an the 65 tons that the fully protected notional GCV was
armored foe, the combat vehicles used by U.S. forces estimated to weigh.28
might not need the amount of protection from all possi-
ble threats that the GCV aims to provide.26 In the past, Program Scope and Affordability
the most damaging attacks on individual armored vehi- The GCV program is the Army’s first priority, the service
cles in combat have come from the front (from enemy asserts, as it attempts to modernize its ground combat
fleet. In answers for the record after testimony in October
24. Frank Kendall, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Tech- 2011, Lieutenant General Robert Lennox, who at the
nology, and Logistics, acquisition decision memorandum to the
time was the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for financial
Secretary of the Army, January 16, 2013.
management, stated that the GCV is among the Army’s
25. Testimony of Robert M. Scher, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Plans, and David F. Helvey, Acting Deputy Assistant
most important programs because it will allow “an infan-
Secretary of Defense for East Asia, before the Readiness try squad to accompany tanks in both open and complex
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, terrain, from initial contact to the objective” and that
U.S. Posture in the U.S. Pacific Command Area of Responsibility
“the GCV will fill capability gaps that currently exist in
(August 1, 2012).
26. For a discussion of armor needs in different types of conflicts,
27. Matthew Cox, “U.S. Army Chief of Staff Wants Lighter GCV,”
see Bernard Kempinski and Christopher Murphy, Technical
Defense News (June 20, 2010).
Challenges of the U.S. Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle Program,
Working Paper 2012-15 (Congressional Budget Office, 28. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Tries Again for a New Tank,”
November 2012), www.cbo.gov/publication/43699. National Journal (August 7, 2010).

CBO


Figure 1-2. Scope. As the GCV program is now constituted, the new
vehicle would replace only a fraction of the Army’s com-
Distribution of Armored Vehicles in an bat equipment. And some analysts assert that the vehicles
Armored Combat Brigade slated for replacement are not those that should be first in
(Number of vehicles) line. Specifically, according to the Army’s current plan,
the GCVs will replace the 61 Bradley vehicles that are
Other
a configured as IFVs in each of the Army’s armored combat
Vehicles Abrams
Artillery (31)
brigades. Those vehicles represent only a small portion—
Tanks
Vehicles (58) 18 percent—of the 346 armored combat vehicles in each
(32) The Ground Combat armored combat brigade (see Figure 1-2).30 Moreover,
Vehicle will replace
armored combat brigades made up only one-third of the
Bradley Infantry 61 of the 346 total
Fighting Vehicles armored vehicles Army’s total combat brigades at the end of 2012 (see
M113-Based (61) in an armored Figure 1-3).31
Vehicles combat brigade
(107) Furthermore, the GCVs are scheduled to replace vehicles
Other Bradley
b
Vehicles that are far from the oldest armored vehicles in the
(57)
armored combat brigades. The more numerous M113-
based vehicles—which constitute more than 30 percent
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Colonel William of the armored combat vehicles in an armored combat
Sheehy, “HBCT Industry Day Brief,” October 10, 2011. brigade—are far older, both in terms of age of design and
Note: An armored combat brigade is a unit of about 3,800 soldiers, chronological age. The M113 was designed in the wake
equipped with armored vehicles such as tanks, armored
of the Korean War as an armored personnel carrier
infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and
self-propelled howitzers. intended to protect soldiers from small-arms fire, artillery
a. Includes recovery and armored Knight vehicles.
fragments, and the effects of nuclear weapons. Those
vehicles are not worth upgrading, in the Army’s estima-
b. Includes cavalry, engineer, and fire support vehicles.
tion, and the service stopped doing so in 2007. As a
the [armored combat brigades] for protection, survivabil- result, the Army’s M113-based vehicles were, on average,
ity,... mobility, and lethality.”29 He also stated that in the 13 years old at the end of 2012.
event of future constraints on available resources,
the Army intends to continue to fund the GCV program In contrast, the Army’s Bradleys are much newer, both in
fully. terms of design and average age. Although the Bradley
fighting vehicle was originally designed in the 1970s, the
The GCV program is planned as a replacement for a basic model has been upgraded and modernized several
small portion of the Army’s equipment but could times since then. As a result, all of the current Bradley
demand a significant share of the service’s annual vehicles have been upgraded since 1996, and most have
resources for procurement. Given the current budgetary received additional improvements designed to increase
climate and despite its high priority, it is unclear whether
the Army can afford to develop and purchase the GCV, 30. Each armored combat brigade includes 57 additional Bradley
even in the relatively small quantities that the service vehicles that are configured to scout out enemy forces and
currently envisions. perform reconnaissance missions, spot potential targets for
artillery, and support the brigade’s engineers.
29. Answers for the record, by Robert Lennox, Deputy Chief of Staff 31. At the end of 2012, armored combat brigades made up 38 percent
of the Army for financial management, submitted subsequent to of the combat brigades in the active Army and 25 percent of the
the hearing on Army Acquisition and Modernization Programs combat brigades in the Army National Guard. Changes in the
before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces of the Army’s force structure during the next five years may change the
House Committee on Armed Services (October 26, 2011), mix of combat brigades in the Army, but it is unlikely that their
http://go.usa.gov/4cWV. share will increase.

CBO


Figure 1-3. combat vehicles—the Bradley IFVs—and assigned a
lower priority to replacing its much older and more
Distribution of Army vulnerable M113-based vehicles.34
Combat Brigades at the End of 2012
(Percent) Affordability. Even if the Army could deliver GCVs at the
cost per unit now projected, the affordability of the GCV
60
National Guard
program is still in question, given that the service’s future
50
resources are likely to be restricted. In January 2013, rec-
Active Army ognizing that the program as originally structured might
40 not be affordable, the Undersecretary for Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed the Army
30 to restructure its program to reduce the funding that it
would require from 2014 through 2018.35 Specifically,
20 he directed the Army to contract with one company,
rather than two, to carry out the engineering and
10 manufacturing development portion of the program and
to delay the start of production by one year. Together,
0
Armored Infantry Stryker
those changes would reduce funding required for the
GCV program from 2014 through 2018 by almost
Type of Combat Brigade $4 billion, according to estimates from the Department
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Army data. of Defense.36 (The nearly $1.5 billion saved during that
period by deferring the start of production by one year
Note: Combat brigades include roughly 3,400 to 4,200 soldiers.
Armored combat brigades, which have roughly 3,800 sol- would not yield any savings over the life of the program,
diers, are equipped with armored vehicles, such as tanks and however. That cost would merely be deferred to the years
armored infantry fighting vehicles. Stryker combat brigades, after 2018.)
which have about 4,200 soldiers, are equipped with several
variants of the Stryker vehicle, such as infantry carriers and The large amounts of funding needed for the GCV pro-
command and control vehicles. Infantry combat brigades, gram when the vehicle goes into production—probably
which have 3,400 to 3,500 soldiers, are not equipped with at least $2 billion annually for the 2019–2028 period—
any armored combat vehicles. would limit the funds available for the service’s other
programs.37 If the Army’s procurement budget remained
protection and survivability in the years since 2005.32
at the amount that the service has estimated for 2017
Furthermore, because of the extensive recapitalization
program that the Army undertook for equipment
34. The Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle Program is designed
brought back from Iraq, the Bradley IFVs that the GCVs
to replace the M113-based vehicles in armored combat brigades,
are slated to replace were less than seven years old, on but it is of lower priority—in terms of modernization efforts—
average, at the end of 2012.33 Thus, in its focus on the than the GCV program.
GCV program, the Army has placed a higher priority on 35. Frank Kendall, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Tech-
replacing some of its most capable and newly rejuvenated nology, and Logistics, acquisition decision memorandum to the
Secretary of the Army, January 16, 2013.
32. Most of the Bradley vehicles in units in the active Army include 36. Frank Kendall, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
improvements introduced since 2005. Some of the Bradley Technology, and Logistics, informational memorandum to the
vehicles used by the National Guard may be older models Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 16, 2013. Estimates of
introduced in the 1990s. savings included in the memorandum—more than $4 billion
from 2014 through 2018—are expressed in nominal dollars.
33. The Army’s recapitalization program included the total over-
haul—and, in some cases, an upgrade—of vehicles brought back 37. Although the Army spent $2.2 billion to $3.7 billion annually to
from Operation Iraqi Freedom. As a result, most of the Army’s purchase hundreds of tanks each year from 1981 to 1989, it has
Bradley IFVs have been restored to an “as-new” condition at some not devoted $2 billion annually for several consecutive years to a
point during the past seven years. single program since then.

CBO


(according to documents associated with the President’s improving and must be replaced soon. The rest of the
2013 budget request) through 2030, the large sums Army’s armored combat vehicles have been reconditioned
needed for the GCV program in each of the years from or upgraded in the past 15 years as they were prepared
2020 through 2028 would absorb 10 percent or more of for or returned from operations in Iraq. As armor and
the Army’s annual procurement funds in those years.38 new electronic devices were added to tanks and Bradley
fighting vehicles to protect soldiers from IEDs and other
The Army has other pressing investment needs, even
weapons in Iraq, the capacities of the electrical systems
within its own combat vehicle fleet. The service has
and power trains of its combat vehicles were pushed
concluded that its M113-based vehicles are not worth
to their limits. As a consequence, the Army will need to
spend a significant amount on modifying its Abrams
38. The Army has not devoted more than 10 percent of its procure-
ment funds to any one program since 1990, when the Apache tanks, the Bradley fighting vehicles that remain in service,
helicopter program received 11 percent of the service’s annual and other combat vehicles so that they can continue to
procurement budget. perform for another 20 years.

CBO

CHAPTER

2
Alternatives to the
Ground Combat Vehicle Program

T he Congressional Budget Office has examined four
alternatives to the Army’s current plans for modernizing
seating among its vehicles for a minimum of
28 soldiers—three 9-member infantry squads and
some of its combat vehicles. Each would cancel the the platoon leader (see Table 2-1).
Army’s planned Ground Combat Vehicle program, and
three of the four would field new or upgraded vehicles.1 The GCV schedule includes a delay of three years
The four alternatives are as follows: between the initial purchase of GCVs and their assign-
ment to Army units. Thus, it is likely that 2022 would be
 Option 1: Purchase the Israeli Namer armored the first year in which an Army unit could be equipped
personnel carrier. with a new or improved vehicle and realize the benefits of
the improvement, and it would probably be 2032 before
 Option 2: Develop and procure an upgraded version the Army could field the full fleet in its various units.
of the current Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle that
would incorporate a larger engine and improved CBO compared the options on the basis of the vehicles’
drivetrain along with upgraded electronic and acquisition cost, programmatic risk, and improvements
communications equipment. offered in a set of basic capabilities (see Table 2-2).3 To
make comparisons, CBO used the same two metrics that
 Option 3: Purchase the German Puma IFV. it used to evaluate the GCV’s capabilities, examining
the combined improvements offered by each vehicle in
 Option 4: Field no new vehicles after canceling the four categories: protection and survivability, lethality,
Army’s GCV program. Under this option, the Army mobility, and passenger capacity. (See the appendix for a
would maintain the capability of the current Bradley discussion of CBO’s methodology.) For mobility and pas-
IFV fleet through a life-extension program and a low- senger capacity, CBO had enough data to make its own
level research and development effort to investigate comparisons of the vehicles’ capabilities with those of the
future improvements.

Under CBO’s Options 1, 2, and 3, the Army would pur- 2. Because the Namer and Puma are already developed and being
chase enough vehicles to equip its armored combat bri- produced overseas, it is conceivable that purchases could begin
gades on the same schedule that CBO assumed it would before 2019. For ease of analysis, however, CBO assumed that all
vehicles examined in the options would be purchased on the same
follow for purchasing the GCV—that is, beginning in
schedule.
2019 and ending in 2030.2 Each option would involve
purchasing enough vehicles to ensure that every mecha- 3. For each option, CBO estimated the acquisition cost only—that
is, the cost of research and development and procurement. As a
nized infantry platoon would have sufficient passenger
basis for comparing the capabilities of the GCV with those of
the other vehicles, CBO used the Army’s notional version of the
1. In August 2011, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, GCV, known as the GCV Design Concept After Trades, which
Technology, and Logistics asked the Army to evaluate a similar list was described in Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report
of options, including the Israeli Namer APC and versions of the on the Results of the Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives
Bradley IFV. Although the German Puma was not mentioned at (Milestone A) to the Armed Services Committees of the United States
the time, the Army is evaluating it and the Swedish CV9035 IFV Senate and House of Representatives, Tab B, “Ground Combat
as alternatives to the GCV. Vehicle Trade Impact Analysis” (March 2011).

CBO


Table 2-1.
Passenger Capacity of Combat Vehicles Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options
CBO's Options
Army's Plana 1. Purchase 2. Upgrade 3. Purchase 4. Retain Current
b
(Field the GCV) Israeli Namer APC Bradley IFV German Puma IFV Bradley IFV
Vehicles per Platoon 4 4 4 5 4

Seating Capacity per Vehicle
Crew 3 3 3 3 3
c
Passengers 9 9 7 6 7

Allocation of Passenger
Seats per Platoon
Platoon members 28 28 28 28 28
Accompanying soldiersd 8
___ 8
___ 0
___ 2
___ 0
___
Total 36 36 28 30 28

(March 2011); Department of the Army, personal communication to CBO staff, December 2012; and other sources.
a. Based on the December 2010 version—the Design Concept After Trades—of the GCV after additional design trade-offs that the Army
b. Version of the M2A3 Bradley IFV used in Iraq, which includes reactive armor and underbelly armor.
c. The Namer can carry nine passengers and a crew of two or three, depending on the configuration of the seats.
d. Space available for medics, radio operators, or other solders who are not members of the platoon but who habitually accompany the
platoon on missions.

current Bradley IFV; for lethality and protection and platoon, Options 1 and 2 would field four vehicles per
survivability, the agency used results from the Army’s platoon, the same as that for the current Bradley IFV and
analyses of the various vehicles to compare capabilities.4 as planned for the GCV. Option 3 would field five Pumas
per platoon. The consequences of the different seating
CBO also compared the total passenger carrying capacity capacities and equipping strategies are addressed below.
that each option would provide to an individual platoon.
The vehicles that CBO evaluated carry different numbers The programmatic risk associated with each option that
of passengers: The Namer APC can carry nine, the involves purchasing new or upgraded vehicles depends on
upgraded Bradley IFV can carry seven, and the Puma IFV several factors, including whether a vehicle is produced
can carry six (see Figure 2-1 on page 22).5 To provide a currently and whether it is being produced for the U.S.
minimum carrying capacity of 28 passengers for each Army. The risk that a program’s cost will rise or its sched-
ule will lengthen generally diminishes as a vehicle
4. Although the Army’s analysis depended in part on computer sim- approaches production. So, although there is always a risk
ulations of combat, the technical data were insufficient to simulate associated with integrating a vehicle produced for a for-
the performance of the Namer or the Puma. Instead, the Army’s eign army into U.S. forces, the cost and schedule risks
analysts estimated how those two vehicles would have performed associated with purchasing the Namer and the Puma
relative to the current Bradley IFV. The analysis is discussed in
Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of
would be considered low because those vehicles are
the Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to already in production outside the United States. The risk
the Armed Services Committees of the United States Senate and associated with the GCV program, by contrast, would
House of Representatives (March 2011). be high because that vehicle is in the early stages of devel-
5. Although earlier Army reports concluded that the Puma could opment and several years will elapse before it reaches
accommodate seven passengers, more recent data indicate that it production. There is virtually no programmatic risk
can transport only six. associated with retaining the current Bradley IFV.

CBO

CHAPTER TWO THE ARMY’S GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES 21

Table 2-2.
Total Cost, Programmatic Risk, and Improvement in Capabilities
Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options
CBO's Options
Army's Plan a 1. Purchase 2. Upgrade 3. Purchase 4. Retain Current
b
Total Cost, 2014 to 2030
(Billions of 2013 dollars) 28.8 c 19.5 c 19.5 c 14.5 d 4.6 e
Programmatic Risk High Low Intermediate Low None
Improvement in Capability in Four Categories Relative to the Current Bradley IFV (Percent)
Protection and Survivability 27 33 27 28 0
Lethality -7 -36 60 103 0
Mobility 24 4 15 22 0
Passenger Capacity
Number of occupants 29 29 0 -14 0
Ability to carry a full
nine-member squad 100 100 0 0 0
f
Overall Improvement in Combat Vehicle Capability Relative to the Current Bradley IFV (Percent)
Using Primary Metricg 16 6 32 45 0
Using Secondary Metrich 36 25 25 38 0

Percentage Improvement per $1 Billion Invested
g
Using Primary Metric 0.6 0.3 1.6 3.1 0
Using Secondary Metrich 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.6 0

(March 2011); and Department of the Army, personal communication to CBO staff, May 2012.
c. The cost to develop and purchase 1,748 vehicles.
d. The cost to develop and purchase 2,048 vehicles.
e. The cost to extend the life of 820 Bradley IFVs and continue research and development.
f. Overall improvement is based on a weighted combination of the improvement in the categories shown.
g. CBO’s primary metric determines the overall improvement in capability based on the weighting (derived from the Army’s analysis) of
h. CBO’s secondary metric gives equal weight to the improvement in each of the four areas in order to determine an overall increase in

Option 1: Purchase the purchase 1,748 Namer APCs on the procurement sched-
ule that CBO assumed the Army would follow for the
Israeli Namer APC GCV (see Table 2-3). By purchasing the Namer, the
Under this option, the Army would purchase the Israeli
Army could save $9 billion between 2014 and 2030
Namer APC to replace its current Bradley IFV. Specifi-
relative to the cost of fielding the GCV, and the
cally, the service would cancel the GCV program and
programmatic risk would be smaller (see Table 2-2).

CBO


Figure 2-1.
Characteristics of Selected Combat Vehicles
Top View Side View Crew Passengers

Notional
Ground Combat Vehiclea

Israeli Namer
Armored Personnel Carrier

Current and Upgraded
Bradley Infantry Fighting
Vehicle

German Puma
Infantry Fighting Vehicle

0 10 20 30
Feet

(March 2011); Department of the Army, personal communication to CBO staff, December 2012; and other sources.
a. Based on the December 2010 version—the Design Concept After Trades—of the Ground Combat Vehicle after additional design
trade-offs that the Army made to reduce the average procurement unit cost to $13.5 million (in 2013 dollars), as described in the
Army’s March 2011 report.

The Namer offers the greatest degree of protection of all does not provide the lethality that the Army seeks, and its
the vehicles that CBO analyzed. In addition, the Namer mobility is less than that of the notional GCV.
can carry a full 9-member squad; as a consequence, a
platoon equipped with four Namers would provide seat- Overview
ing for 36 soldiers in addition to the vehicles’ crews. The Namer APC is used by the Israeli army as a troop
However, because the Namer is only lightly armed, it carrier and is, according to some sources, among the

CBO


Table 2-3.
Number and Total Cost of Vehicles Developed and Purchased
Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options
Total,
2014–2020 2021–2025 2026–2030 2014–2030
Number of Vehicles
Army's Plan and CBO's Options 1 and 2 216 780 752 1,748
CBO's Option 3 216 950 882 2,048

Total Cost (Billions of 2013 dollars)
a
Army's Plan (Field the GCV) 9.1 10.9 8.9 28.8
CBO's Options
a
1. Purchase Israeli Namer APC 3.5 8.6 7.3 19.5
a
2. Upgrade Bradley IFV 5.5 7.5 6.5 19.5
b
3. Purchase German Puma IFV 2.6 6.5 5.4 14.5
c
4. Retain Current Bradley IFV 0.8 1.7 2.1 4.6

a. The cost to develop and purchase 1,748 vehicles.
b. The cost to develop and purchase 2,048 vehicles.
c. The cost to extend the life of 820 Bradley IFVs and continue research and development.

world’s best-protected APCs, providing soldiers with an Abrams tank. Its large, 1,200 horsepower diesel engine
protection equal to that offered by a modern main battle enables it to traverse difficult terrain.
tank. The Namer was developed at least partly in
response to long-range attacks by antitank missiles during Although the Namer is better protected than the current
fighting in Lebanon in 2006. After observing that heavy Bradley IFV, it has less firepower. Army experts estimated
tanks were the only vehicles that could protect occupants the Namer’s likely performance in combat and concluded
from such attacks, the Israeli Ministry of Defense devel- that, relative to the Bradley, the APC’s extensive armor
oped the Namer—a troop carrier that is a turretless would result in 33 percent fewer losses of U.S. personnel
version of the Israeli Merkava tank. The first Namer and vehicles in combat. But the same experts also con-
was delivered to the Israeli army in 2008, and two were cluded that the lightly armed Namer would destroy sig-
in combat in Gaza that year. Ultimately, the Israeli army nificantly fewer enemy personnel and vehicles during
expects to field about 250 Namers as replacements for its combat, yielding a reduction in lethality of 36 percent
older APCs. relative to the Bradley. Although the Namer’s mobility is
4 percent greater than that of the current Bradley IFV, its
The primary goal of the Namer’s design is to protect its mobility would be less than the GCV’s because of its slow
occupants, and it is equipped with more armor, particu- acceleration and slower off-road speeds.
larly underneath, than the other vehicles that CBO evalu-
ated. “Floating” seats, which have no direct contact with Using its primary metric for evaluation, CBO estimated
the floor, protect occupants against blasts that come from that the vehicle would provide only a slight improve-
below the vehicle, and the advanced armor protects ment—6 percent—in overall capability relative to the
against attacks from the front, the sides, and overhead. current Bradley IFV (see Figure 2-2). But because the
The Namer’s primary weapon is a 12.7 millimeter heavy Namer can carry a full nine-member infantry squad, it
machine gun that can be operated from inside the vehi- would provide a 25 percent improvement by CBO’s
cle, but a manually operated 7.62 mm machine gun also secondary metric, which emphasizes passenger capacity.
can be mounted on the roof (see Table 2-4). The Namer
is built on a tank chassis and, depending on its armor According to the Army’s assessments, the Namer would
configuration, weighs 68 to 70 tons—almost as much as be superior to the current Bradley IFV in its ability to

CBO


Table 2-4.
Characteristics of Combat Vehicles Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options
CBO's Options
a
Army's Plan 1. Purchase 2. Upgrade 3. Purchase 4. Retain Current
b
Physical Characteristics
Weight (Tons) c 50 to 65 68 to 70 35 to 41 35 to 47 33 to 39
Dimensions (Feet)
Length 28 24 23 24 23
Width 13.7 13.1 12.8 12.2 12.8
Height 13.7 9.0 11.1 10.0 10.6
Engine Capacity (Horsepower) 1,500 1,200 800 1,073 600

Armament
Cannon (Caliber in mm) 25 n.a. 25 30 25
d
Antitank Missile n.a. n.a. TOW Spike TOW
Machine Gun (Caliber in mm)
RCWS 12.7 12.7 7.62 n.a. n.a.
Coaxial 7.62 n.a. 7.62 5.56 7.62

(March 2011), and other sources.
Note: GCV = Ground Combat Vehicle; APC = armored personnel carrier; IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; mm= millimeters;
TOW = tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided; RCWS = remotely controlled weapon station; n.a. = not applicable.
c. The lower end of the range represents the weight of the vehicle without added armor or other protective measures. The upper end
includes the weight of currently proposed protective equipment that could be or has been added to the vehicle.
d. The Spike antitank guided missile was developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in Israel, which produces it for domestic and
international sales outside of Europe. EuroSpike GmbH, a consortium of two German companies and a Dutch holding company owned by
Rafael, produces the missile for sales to European countries.

accommodate future improvements that could add Advantages and Disadvantages
weight and require more electrical power. Among the The Israeli Namer APC is alone among the alternative
vehicles that CBO considered, the Namer is exceeded vehicles that CBO considered in meeting the Army’s goal
only by the GCV in that area. of carrying a full nine-member squad along with a crew.
The vehicle offers three other important advantages over
Cost the Army’s planned GCV: First, the advanced armor and
The projected cost of this option—$19.5 billion from the design of the underbelly would provide better protec-
2014 through 2030—would be $9 billion less than the tion for occupants than would be afforded by the
cost of the Army’s planned GCV program. Because the notional GCV or any other vehicle that CBO examined.
Namer is already in production, adapting it for the U.S. Second, at roughly $20 billion over the 2014–2030
Army should be relatively inexpensive. CBO assumed period, the expected cost of this option is about $9 billion
that development would cost about $300 million, and less than the expected cost of the GCV program. And
that most of the cost of the option would be for procure- third, purchasing the Namer should be less risky than
ment of 1,748 Namer vehicles, at an average unit cost of purchasing the GCV because the Namer is already in
$11.0 million.

CBO


Figure 2-2.
Improvement in Capabilities Under the Army’s Plan and Three of CBO’s Options
(Percentage improvement relative to the current Bradley IFV)
150
Army's Plan Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
125
(GCV) (Namer) (Upraded Bradley) (Puma)
100

75

50

25

0
* * *

-25

-50
Protection and Lethality Mobility Number of Full Nine-Member Primary Metric Secondary Metric
Survivability Passengers Squad

Passenger Capacity Overall Improvement

Notes: The Army’s plan would field the GCV, Option 1 would purchase the Israeli Namer APC, Option 2 would upgrade the Bradley IFV, and
Option 3 would purchase the German Puma IFV.
IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; GCV = Ground Combat Vehicle; APC = armored personnel carrier; * = zero.

production and therefore likely to require little in the way than would a GCV and even fewer than the current
of development. Bradley IFV.

Fielding the Namer would yield some results similar to Despite the superior protection and survivability the
those for the notional GCV. If each platoon was Namer offers—and its larger capacity for passengers—
equipped with four Namers, there would be enough according to CBO’s primary metric, the Namer is only
space to accommodate extra personnel, such as medics, 6 percent better overall than the current Bradley IFV.
from outside the platoon. And, as for the GCV, the Because of that small advantage, the cost-effectiveness of
Namer’s size and weight could pose difficulties for tra- this option—a 0.3 percent increase in capability for each
versing bridges in undeveloped areas, for maneuvering in $1 billion spent—also would be the least of all options
urban areas, and for being transported by air or rail. that involve new or upgraded vehicles (see Figure 2-3).
According to CBO’s secondary metric, however, the
Purchasing the Namer, however, also would pose dis- Namer would offer roughly the same increase in capabil-
advantages relative to the GCV. The APC is not heavily ity per $1 billion invested as would be offered by the
armed; its largest weapon is a 12.7 mm machine gun, GCV (1.3 percent).
which would be considered only a secondary weapon on
the other vehicles that CBO examined. Thus, the Army’s In addition, the ability of the Namer to protect its occu-
experts have concluded, in combat the Namer would pants may have been overstated in the Army’s estimates.
destroy many fewer enemy personnel and vehicles As part of its examination of alternatives before the
beginning of technology development for the GCV, the

CBO


Figure 2-3.
Cost-Effectiveness of the Army’s Plan and Three of CBO’s Options
(Percentage overall improvement relative to the current Bradley IFV fleet per $1 billion invested)
Primary Metric Secondary Metric
3.5 3.5

Option 3 (Puma)
3.0 3.0
Option 3 (Puma)
2.5 2.5

2.0 Option 2 2.0
(Upgraded Bradley)
1.5 1.5
Option 1 (Namer)
1.0 1.0
Army's Plan (GCV)
Army's Plan (GCV)
0.5 0.5
Option 2
Option 1 (Namer) (Upgraded Bradley)
0 0
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030

Notes: The Army’s plan would field the GCV, Option 1 would purchase the Israeli Namer APC, Option 2 would upgrade the Bradley IFV, and
Option 3 would purchase the German Puma IFV.
IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; GCV = Ground Combat Vehicle; APC = armored personnel carrier.

Army assumed that the Namer’s protective capability One final disadvantage of this option is that it involves
would be enhanced by an active protection system of fielding a foreign-made system that, although already
as-yet-undemonstrated effectiveness and reliability.6 developed and in use by an ally, would need to be inte-
However, in 2010, the Israeli Ministry of Defense grated into the Army’s logistics system. Nevertheless,
scrapped its original plans to install an active protection establishing full or partial manufacturing of the vehicle
system on the Namer. If the Army’s assessments of the in the United States might not be an obstacle. A U.S.
Namer relied on an assumed degree of effectiveness of company has already negotiated a contract with the
the Namer’s active protection system, those assessments Israeli Ministry of Defense to manufacture an unspecified
may yield an overly optimistic picture of the Namer’s true number of Namer vehicle hulls and other components for
protective capability. the Israeli army at a production facility in the United
States.
6. CBO’s analysis was based on the characteristics of the Namer, the
upgraded and current versions of the Bradley IFV, and the Puma
that were included in Department of the Army, Headquarters,
Option 2: Upgrade the Bradley IFV
Under this option, the Army would cancel the GCV
Report on the Results of the Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of
Alternatives (Milestone A) to the Armed Services Committees of the program and instead upgrade its existing Bradley IFVs.
United States Senate and House of Representatives, Tab D, “Ground Specifically, the Army would purchase 1,748 upgraded
Combat Vehicle AoA Systems Book” (March 2011). Those char- Bradley IFVs on the procurement schedule that CBO
acteristics do not reflect insights that the Army may have gained assumed for the GCV and the Namer. CBO estimates
during its evaluation of nondevelopmental vehicles in the summer that the Army would realize savings relative to the cost of
and fall of 2012.

CBO


its planned GCV program of $9 billion between 2014 itself would reduce losses by 27 percent overall. In addi-
and 2030 (see Table 2-2 on page 21). In addition, by tion, the added machine gun and the improved optical
CBO’s primary metric, the Army would gain an expected systems would render the upgraded Bradley IFV more
improvement in capability relative to the current IFV of lethal than the current version. In the Army’s simulations,
32 percent, with less programmatic risk than that associ- the upgraded Bradley was 60 percent more effective at
ated with the GCV program. Nevertheless, under this destroying enemy personnel and vehicles than the current
option, some of the Army’s goals would remain unmet. Bradley IFV. Finally, the upgraded Bradley IFV’s larger
According to CBO’s secondary metric, which emphasizes engine and improved suspension would result in a
a vehicle’s ability to carry a nine-member squad, fielding 15 percent increase in mobility compared with the
the upgraded Bradley IFV would yield a 25 percent current version.
improvement in capability relative to the current IFV.
Cost
Overview In CBO’s estimation, fielding an upgraded Bradley IFV
An upgraded Bradley IFV would confer several improve- as described above would cost $19.5 billion from 2014
ments relative to the current Bradley IFV: a more through 2030. Of that amount, $2.7 billion would be
powerful engine, an improved suspension, additional needed from 2014 through 2019 to develop and integrate
armor under the vehicle and more effective reactive armor the technologies that would improve the Bradley’s
tiles, improved optical systems for acquiring and tracking protection, mobility, and lethality. The remaining
targets, and an extra 7.62 mm machine gun that could be funds—$16.8 billion—would be needed to purchase
operated from inside the vehicle.7 1,748 vehicles at an average unit cost of $9.6 million.

Taken together, the improved suspension and added Advantages and Disadvantages
armor and tiles would significantly increase the protec- This option would offer several advantages over the
tion afforded to the Bradley IFV’s occupants. The Army’s plan: First, upgrading the fleet would cost about
improved suspension would allow the vehicle to ride $9 billion less than implementing the GCV program.
higher off the ground, even though with the upgrades Second, because the vehicle already exists, there would be
the vehicle would weigh about 2 tons more than the cur- no need to develop an entirely new logistics stream for
rent Bradley IFV. The increased ground clearance, when spare parts or procedures for maintenance. And third,
combined with the added armor on the underside of the upgrading the existing vehicle would be less risky than
vehicle, would offer greater protection against mines. developing an entirely new GCV.

All of those enhancements would confer a significant Although the upgrades to the Bradley IFV would them-
increase in the upgraded Bradley’s capabilities relative to selves require significant development, assessments that
those of the current IFV. Results from the Army’s combat the Army made in 2010 showed that the needed technol-
simulations indicate that the improved protection of the ogy was more mature than the technology required for
vehicle’s occupants and the survivability of the vehicle the GCV. Moreover, although undertaking an upgrade of
existing vehicles would pose some risk for cost growth,
7. Reactive armor mitigates damage to vehicles. The most common the fact that a vehicle has already been produced should
type consists of explosives placed between two metal plates. moderate that risk compared with that for a new vehicle,
When incoming munitions penetrate the outer metal plate, the such as the GCV.
explosives detonate, and the outer metal plate flies off to destroy
or deflect the incoming round. Typical reactive armor consists of
modules or tiles attached to the outside of the vehicle. Although The upgraded Bradley IFV would offer several opera-
the armor can be added to an existing vehicle, that vehicle must tional advantages over the current Bradley, including an
have sufficient support structure and armor to withstand the estimated overall improvement in capability of 32 percent
explosion of the tiles. The Army has developed and deployed according to CBO’s primary metric. That increase is
reactive armor for its Bradley fighting vehicles, Abrams tanks, twice as large as the increase attributable to the Army’s
and Stryker vehicles. For a discussion, see Bernard Kempinski and
Christopher Murphy, Technical Challenges of the U.S. Army’s
design of the GCV. An upgraded Bradley IFV would pro-
Ground Combat Vehicle Program, Working Paper 2012-15 vide roughly the same protection and significantly more
(Congressional Budget Office, November 2012), pp. 55–56, lethality than the notional GCV. Fielding a smaller,
www.cbo.gov/publication/43699. lighter upgraded Bradley also would allay some concerns

CBO


that have been raised about whether the GCV could Option 3: Purchase the
maneuver easily in cities, traverse some bridges, and be
easily transportable on foreign rail networks.8
German Puma IFV
As a third option, the Army could purchase German
Puma IFVs instead of developing and purchasing GCVs.
Despite the estimated improvement in capability to be Specifically, the Army would purchase 2,048 Puma vehi-
gained in an upgraded Bradley IFV, the vehicle would not cles from 2019 through 2030 at a cost that CBO projects
meet several of the Army’s goals for an infantry fighting would be $14 billion less than the cost of the Army’s cur-
vehicle as well as the GCV would. The vehicles would rent plan (see Table 2-2 on page 21). The Puma also
carry only seven soldiers apiece, so infantry squads would poses a lower programmatic risk of cost growth and
need to be spread among the four vehicles in a platoon— schedule delays. Moreover, by some measures, the Puma
as is the case for the current Bradley IFV. Although suffi- is the most capable of the vehicles that CBO evaluated,
cient to carry three nine-member squads and the platoon although it would not meet all of the Army’s objectives
leader, the four vehicles assigned to each platoon would for its future IFV.
not be able to carry additional soldiers from outside the
platoon. Instead, medics and radio operators that accom- Overview
pany the platoon would have to do so in their own The Puma, like the Bradley IFV and the GCV, is a true
vehicles, as they do today. infantry fighting vehicle. Its development as a replace-
ment for the German Marder vehicle began in the 1990s,
In part because the upgraded Bradley would carry fewer production began in 2008, and the first vehicles were
squad members than the GCV, it would represent a delivered to the German Army in 2011. The Puma is
smaller improvement compared with the current Bradley equipped with a 30 mm cannon, it has a 5.56 mm
IFV than the potential increase attributable to the machine gun as a secondary weapon, and it carries a
GCV—25 percent versus 36 percent—when gauged launcher for Spike antitank guided missiles, all of which
using CBO’s secondary metric. The upgraded Bradley are mounted on an unmanned turret.9
would also fall short of the GCV in other areas, according
to the Army’s assessments: It would be harder to improve The Puma was designed to accommodate various kinds of
in the future because of its relatively smaller interior and armor (as is the notional GCV). The base vehicle—with-
smaller capacity for increased electrical supply and equip- out additional armor—weighs 35 tons. The proposed
ment, and its communications and networking features armor package, which provides greater protection, adds
might not be as capable as the GCV’s. 12 tons to the gross weight. The vehicle’s underbelly is
protected by armor against mines and improvised explo-
Yet if upgrades to the current Bradley IFVs are judged on sive devices. Like the Namer, the Puma has floating seats
the basis of the investment needed to carry out the option to protect passengers and crew from explosions under the
($19.5 billion) and on the degree of improvement such vehicle.
an approach would provide, they would be more cost-
effective than adopting the Army’s plan. CBO estimates Because the Puma can carry only 6 passengers, a platoon
that, on the basis of its primary metric, this option would equipped with four vehicles could not transport three
deliver an improvement of 1.6 percent for every $1 bil- 9-member squads and a platoon leader. To carry
lion of investment—almost three times the percentage 27 soldiers and the platoon leader—a total of
improvement (0.6 percent) for every $1 billion invested 28 people—a platoon would need at least 5 Pumas.
under the Army’s plan to purchase the GCV. When com- Under this option, therefore, the Army would purchase
pared using CBO’s secondary metric, the upgraded
Bradley IFV would yield a 1.3 percent improvement per
$1 billion investment, the same as the GCV.
9. The Spike antitank guided missile was developed and is produced
for domestic and international sale outside Europe by Rafael
8. The Army’s GCV designs have been too wide or too tall to fit Advanced Defense Systems in Israel. EuroSpike GmbH, a consor-
through railroad tunnels in Europe and South Korea without tium of two German firms and a Dutch holding company owned
substantial disassembly. by Rafael, produces the Spike for sale to European countries.

CBO


2,048 vehicles, 300 more than would be purchased under could accommodate additional equipment in the future
the Army’s plan or under Options 1 and 2.10 more easily than the upgraded Bradley IFV, but not as
easily as the notional GCV. The relatively narrow Puma
By CBO’s primary metric, the Puma would confer an would be more maneuverable in urban streets than the
estimated improvement in capability of 45 percent larger GCV. According to the Army, the Puma’s commu-
relative to the current Bradley IFV. The Puma’s cannon nications and networking capability would be less than
(30 mm) is larger than the one on the Bradley IFV that of the GCV or the upgraded Bradley IFV.
(25 mm), and it has a greater effective range against all
types of targets. Thus, the Puma was assessed by Army Cost
experts to be 103 percent more lethal than the current This option would be less expensive than fielding the
Bradley IFV.11 Its modern modular armor and higher GCV or any new or upgraded vehicle. The average cost
ground clearance make it better protected than the to procure a Puma IFV, at $6.9 million, is below the aver-
current Bradley IFV. Consequently, the Army’s experts age cost of the Namer and the upgraded Bradley IFV and
concluded that U.S. forces equipped with the Puma almost 50 percent less than that of the GCV. Further-
would sustain 28 percent fewer losses of occupants and more, because the Puma is already in production, CBO
vehicles in combat than would similar forces equipped estimated that only $500 million in development funds
with the current Bradley IFV. In addition, the Puma is would be needed to integrate it with U.S. forces and set
22 percent more mobile than the current Bradley IFV, up a full or partial production line in the United States.
which makes it roughly equivalent to the GCV in that Therefore, even though this option would involve pur-
category. chasing almost 20 percent more vehicles than the Army’s
plan, its cost over the 2014–2030 period would be
Like the current Bradley, however, the Puma cannot $14.5 billion, CBO estimates, or $14 billion less than
accommodate a full nine-member squad (it carries just the cost of the Army’s planned GCV.
six passengers). As a result, using CBO’s secondary
metric—which emphasizes capacity for a nine-member Advantages and Disadvantages
squad—the Puma would provide an estimated 38 percent This option, which features an infantry fighting vehicle
improvement in capability relative to the current Bradley of recent design, would offer several advantages over the
IFV, rather than the 45 percent improvement under Army’s plan and some other options that CBO consid-
CBO’s primary metric.12 Compared with the GCV, ered: First, by either of CBO’s metrics, the Puma would
which would carry nine passengers, the Puma would pro- provide the greatest overall increase in capability of the
vide significantly greater overall capability based on vehicles CBO evaluated. Second, although the least
CBO’s primary metric but only slightly greater overall expensive of the options, the Puma would provide a sig-
capability based on CBO’s second metric. nificant improvement in the Army’s IFV fleet. Third,
when judged against the current Bradley IFV, the Puma
In other areas, the Puma’s capabilities show mixed results would provide the greatest increase in capability per dol-
when compared with those of the other vehicles in this lar invested, regardless of the metric used. And fourth,
analysis. Because the Puma has such a large engine and is because the Puma is already being produced, its adoption
a relatively new vehicle, the Army’s analysts judged that it would pose a relatively lower programmatic risk.

12. The Army delivered two reports that provided the Congress
10. The 300 additional vehicles provide one additional vehicle for
with assessments of the Puma (one in March 2011 and the other
each of the 12 mechanized infantry platoons in each of the Army’s
in the fall of 2012). According to both reports, the Puma could
22 armored combat brigades and 12 for each of the 3 brigade sets
accommodate seven passengers, matching the Bradley IFV. Other
stored aboard ships or overseas for contingencies.
assessments, however, show that the Puma can accommodate only
11. Because available technical data were insufficient to simulate the six passengers, although it might be possible to add a seventh, in
performance of the Puma, the Army’s analysts estimated its perfor- cramped conditions. CBO’s analysis is based on a six-passenger
mance relative to the current Bradley IFV. Department of the capacity for the Puma. A change in estimated capacity from six to
Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the Ground Combat seven passengers would not appreciably alter CBO’s quantitative
Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to the Armed Services results, which would show a 1 percentage-point increase in overall
Committees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives capability relative to the current Bradley IFV—from 45 percent to
(March 2011). 46 percent.

CBO


The Puma does, however, have two disadvantages: It Bradley in its inventory—including the Bradley IFV.
does not meet the Army’s goal of capacity for a full nine- According to the Army, that modification program will
member infantry squad—indeed, it is likely to carry invest roughly $2 million per vehicle to improve the
one passenger fewer than the current Bradley IFV—and vehicle’s tracks, suspension, power train, and electrical
it was developed and is produced by a foreign manufac- system so that it can accommodate the extra weight and
turer. On the first issue, because Pumas can carry only six demands for power of systems added in the past 10 years.
passengers, mechanized infantry platoons would need to (The cost of that program is not included in the estimates
be equipped with five vehicles, rather than four as in the presented here.) Although those modifications will not
other options. Five vehicles would provide the capacity improve the vehicles’ overall capability, the Army states
to carry a total of 30 soldiers, which could include three that they will return the Bradleys to the level of perfor-
9-member squads, the platoon leader, and 2 additional mance that the vehicles exhibited in 2000, before being
soldiers from outside the platoon. However, each squad modified for combat in Iraq.
would be divided between two vehicles. Moreover, the
Army would need to modify tactics for its mechanized Cost
platoons, because those platoons are currently equipped Under this option, the Army would retain all of its
with four infantry fighting vehicles. current Bradley IFVs and would invest $4.6 billion to
maintain their effectiveness through 2030. To prevent
the average age of the Army’s 1,748 Bradley IFVs from
Option 4: Cancel the GCV Program exceeding 10 years at any point between 2014 and 2030,
Under this option, the Army would retain its current
the Army would need to rebuild roughly 820 more
fleet of Bradley IFVs and spend $4.6 billion to maintain
Bradley IFVs during that period than it would need to
their effectiveness through 2030 (see Table 2-2 on
rebuild under its own plan or Options 1, 2, and 3.13
page 21). Specifically, the option calls for canceling the
Those activities would require $2.9 billion, CBO esti-
GCV program, investing a total of $2.9 billion in pro-
mates. In addition, the Army would invest $100 million
curement funds in a life extension program for the
annually in research and development to investigate
current Bradley IFVs, and spending $1.7 billion in
improvements to the Bradley IFV’s current capabilities,
research and development funds that would maintain a
for an additional cost of $1.7 billion over that period.
modest effort to investigate possible upgrades to the
Bradley IFV. Carrying out this option would allow
the Army to retain a fleet of capable IFVs without Advantages and Disadvantages
investing in a new fleet of vehicles. Of all the alternatives considered, the option to retain
and maintain the current fleet would be the least risky
Overview and least expensive, yielding savings of almost $24 billion
The Army fields Bradley vehicles in several different compared with the cost of the Army’s plan to develop and
versions in addition to its IFVs, including those that are purchase the GCV. The option would involve essentially
configured to scout out enemy forces and perform recon- no programmatic risk because development and purchase
naissance missions, spot potential targets for artillery, and of new or improved vehicles would not occur. And the
support engineers. Although the service has planned to cost of the required investment—$4.6 billion from 2014
replace its Bradley IFVs with new GCVs, its plans call through 2030—would be roughly 16 percent of the cost
for retaining other versions of the Bradley for at least to implement the Army’s plan for the GCV. An overall
20 years. The Army fields those vehicles in numbers goal of this option would be to maintain the capability of
roughly equal to its IFV version, and although they the current IFV fleet until the need for additional capa-
transport fewer soldiers, they operate under the same bilities became clearer and new technologies were mature
battlefield conditions and suffer from the same vulnera- and readily available.
bilities that affect the Bradley IFVs. Yet the Army has
no plans to replace those other Bradley vehicles in the The option would have several disadvantages, however.
foreseeable future. Some critics have asserted that because the current

The service does have a program, however, to remedy 13. The Department of Defense has set a goal of maintaining the
some of the current shortcomings of all models of the average age of its fleets of combat vehicles at 10 to 15 years.

CBO


Figure 2-4. were added to the vehicles in 2005, and underbelly armor
and electronic equipment designed to defeat IEDs were
Average Age of the IFV Fleet Under the added after that. As a consequence, the number of people
Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options killed in Bradley vehicles and losses of the vehicles them-
(Years) selves declined substantially over the duration of the
12
conflict.

Option 4 The funding through 2030 that would be provided under
10
this option for research to improve the Bradley IFV does
not include procurement funding to incorporate any new
8
equipment or technologies that might emerge from the
research program. Therefore, the option would not
6
increase the operational capability of the current Bradley
Army's Plan and IFV fleet. The vehicles would thus continue to suffer
4 CBO's Options 1, 2, and 3 from the shortcomings that the GCV is meant to address:
namely, the IFV’s inability to carry a nine-member squad,
2 its lack of modular armor kits and other equipment that
can be adapted to meet a range of threats, and its lack
0 of extra capacity to accept new systems that add to the
2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029
vehicle’s weight and the demand for electrical power.
Notes: The Army’s plan would field the GCV, Option 1 would Finally, under this option, the Army’s IFV fleet would
purchase the Israeli Namer APC, Option 2 would upgrade be older, on average, than under the Army’s plan and
the Bradley IFV, Option 3 would purchase the German Puma Options 1, 2, or 3, because fewer new or reconditioned
IFV, and Option 4 would retain the current Bradley IFV. vehicles would be purchased. The 1,748 new vehicles
IFV = infantry fighting vehicle; GCV = Ground Combat purchased under the Army’s plan and under Options 1
Vehicle; APC = armored personnel carrier. and 2, and the 2,048 vehicles purchased under Option 3,
would result in an average age of the fleet of slightly more
version of the Bradley IFV sustained significant losses
than 5 years in 2030 (see Figure 2-4). By comparison,
from IEDs and rocket-propelled grenades in the early
this option would introduce just 820 as-new vehicles.
months of operations in Iraq, it is no longer suitable for
Thus, from 2016 through 2030, the average age of the
combat. In response, however, the Army improved the
fleet would be 10 years.
vehicle to make it more survivable and better able to
protect its occupants. In particular, reactive armor tiles

CBO

Appendix:
CBO’s Methodology for Comparing the
Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle and Alternatives

T he Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used two
metrics to compare the Army’s current Bradley Infantry
Overall Improvement
CBO’s two metrics took slightly different approaches to
Fighting Vehicle (IFV) with four possible alternative combining improvements across the four categories. The
vehicles: the Army’s planned Ground Combat Vehicle primary metric arrived at a measure of overall improve-
(GCV), the Israeli Namer armored personnel carrier, an ment by combining the improvement in each category
upgraded version of the current Bradley, and the German via a weighting scheme derived from the one the Army
used in its analysis of alternatives for a new GCV.1
Puma IFV. CBO’s primary metric assessed improvements
Improvements in each category were weighted on the
in capability, relative to the current Bradley IFV, that the basis of rankings given by soldiers who had been
GCV and the other vehicles would provide. A secondary deployed with combat brigades in Iraq, Afghanistan,
metric also considered each vehicle relative to the current Kosovo, or Bosnia to the vehicle’s most important charac-
Bradley IFV but emphasized the ability to meet the teristics. The Army’s analysis included several categories
Army’s goal of fielding new vehicles that can carry a full that CBO assessed differently—such as cost—or
nine-member infantry squad along with a crew. excluded altogether for a variety of reasons, including an
insufficiency of data for analysis of all four vehicles.
Both metrics assessed the vehicles’ capabilities in four Thus, the weights CBO applied for the primary metric
categories: are based on those associated with the four remaining
categories of the eight categories considered in the Army’s
 Protection of soldiers and survivability of the vehicle analysis (see Table A-1).
(the ability to withstand attacks and still continue to
CBO’s secondary metric emphasized the Army’s goal of
operate);
fielding vehicles that can accommodate a full nine-
 Lethality (the ability to destroy enemy personnel and member squad. CBO measured improvement in the same
four categories but made two changes: CBO gave equal
vehicles);
weight to each category—thereby increasing the weight
 Mobility on- and off-road, and for passenger capacity from 10 percent in the primary
metric to 25 percent in the secondary metric, and it used
 Passenger capacity. an all-or-nothing measure for passenger capacity. If the
vehicle was designed to carry a full nine-member squad,
This appendix discusses CBO’s measurement of the
vehicles’ relative capabilities in each category and how 1. Department of the Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the
Ground Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to the
the results are combined to yield measures of overall
Armed Services Committees of the United States Senate and House of
improvement for each vehicle compared with the current Representatives, Tab I, “Ground Combat Vehicle Affordability
Bradley IFV. Strategy” (March 2011).

CBO


Table A-1. Reports on the Army’s analysis of improvements in pro-
tection and survivability gave no indication of the relative
Weights Given by the Army and CBO to importance ascribed by soldiers or commanders to the
Various Categories of Characteristics protection of people as opposed to the survivability
Used in the Used in of vehicles. CBO arrived at a combined increase in
Category Army's Analysis CBO's Analysis protection and survivability for each vehicle by assigning
Cost 0.25 n.a. a weight of one-third for an improvement in survivability
Protection and Survivability 0.20 0.40 of the vehicle and a weight of two-thirds for an improve-
Lethality 0.15 0.30 ment in protecting soldiers.
Mobility 0.10 0.20
Communications 0.10 n.a.
Growth Potential 0.10 n.a. Improvement in Passenger Capacity
Sustainability 0.05 n.a. Although both the primary and the secondary metrics
Passenger Capacitya 0.05
____ 0.10
____ assessed the passenger capacity of the vehicles—six pas-
Total 1.00 1.00 sengers for the Puma, seven for the current and upgraded
Bradley IFVs, and nine for the GCV and the Namer—
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Department of the
the value was calculated differently for the two metrics.
Army, Headquarters, Report on the Results of the Ground
Combat Vehicle Analysis of Alternatives (Milestone A) to The primary metric used the numerical percentage
the Armed Services Committees of the United States increase in capacity compared with the current Bradley
Senate and House of Representatives, Tab I, “Ground IFV, the reference vehicle. Thus, under the primary met-
Combat Vehicle Affordability Strategy” (March 2011). ric, the capacity of the GCV and the Namer is 29 percent
Note: n.a. = not applicable. greater than the current Bradley’s, the capacity of the
a. Number of passengers. upgraded Bradley is the same as that of the current ver-
sion, and the capacity of the Puma is 14 percent less than
the secondary metric gave it a full score; if it was not, the
that of the current Bradley (see Table 2-2 on page 21).
vehicle was assigned a zero for the category.
The value for capacity was combined with the values for
improvement in the other three categories—each being
Improvement in Individual Categories given the appropriate weight—to determine an overall
CBO combined the vehicles’ performance in two or more value for each vehicle (see Table A-3).
specific attributes in each category to determine improve-
ment in three categories—protection and survivability, In CBO’s secondary metric, which emphasized a vehicle’s
lethality, and mobility. To arrive at scores for improve- ability to carry a nine-member squad, each vehicle was
ments in lethality and mobility, for example, CBO relied either capable of carrying a full squad (in the case of the
on the weighting schemes the Army derived in response GCV and the Namer) or not (in the case of the Bradley
to soldiers’ survey responses. Lethality attributes included IFV and the Puma). CBO therefore calculated that the
capability against enemy vehicles and effectiveness against vehicles increased the capacity for passengers either by
enemy personnel. Based on soldiers’ responses, by a ratio 100 percent or by zero. To determine a value of the sec-
of 60 to 40, lethality against enemy vehicles was rated as ondary metric for each vehicle, the increase in capability
more important than effectiveness against enemy person- in the category of passenger capacity was combined with
nel.2 CBO also used the Army’s weightings as it evaluated the increase in each of the other three categories, and the
six attributes of mobility—rate of acceleration; off-road value for each category was given equal weight.
speed; range on a full tank of fuel; and the vehicle’s turn-
ing radius, width, and weight—and combined them into 3. CBO chose not to include one aspect of mobility that the Army
used in its analysis—long-distance transportability—because the
a single score for mobility (see Table A-2).3
agency did not have enough data regarding types and numbers of
conveyances that would be needed to move the various vehicles
2. Department of the Army, personal communication to CBO staff, long distances by rail, ship, or air. Excluding transportability
May 2012. increased the weights given to the other six attributes of mobility.

CBO

APPENDIX THE ARMY’S GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES 35

Table A-2. Table A-3.
Weights Given by the Army and Weights Given to Improvement in
CBO to Various Mobility Attributes Various Categories Under
Used in the Used in
CBO’s Two Metrics
Attribute Army's Analysis CBO's Analysis
Primary Secondary
Acceleration (Seconds) a 0.25 0.29 Category Metric a Metric b
Average Off-Road Speed
Protection and Survivability 0.40 0.25
(Miles per hour) 0.20 0.24
Lethality 0.30 0.25
Range on a Tank of Fuel (Miles) 0.15 0.18
Mobility 0.20 0.25
Turning Radius (Feet) 0.05 0.06
Passenger Capacity 0.10
____ 0.25
____
Vehicle Width (Feet) 0.10 0.12
Bridge-Crossing Capacity (Tons) b 0.10 0.12 Total 1.00 1.00
Long-Distance Transportabilityc 0.15
____ n.a.
____
Total 1.00 1.00
Note: Improvement in capability is measured relative to that of the
current Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.
Sources: Congressional Budget Office and Department of the Army,
personal communication, May 2012. a. CBO’s primary metric determines the overall improvement
in capability by weighting the improvements in the four
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
categories on the basis of soldiers’ preferences.
a. Time to accelerate from zero to 30 miles per hour.
b. CBO’s secondary metric gives equal weight to the improvement
b. Bridge weight capacity necessary to accommodate the vehicle. in each of the four categories in order to determine overall
c. Ease of transporting the vehicle by rail, ship, or plane. improvement and emphasizes a vehicle’s ability to carry a full
nine-member squad.

CBO


List of Tables and Figures
Tables
S-1. Vehicles Considered in the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options 2

S-2. Capacity, Risk, Cost, and Overall Improvement in Capability
Associated with the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options 3

1-1. Characteristics of the Current Bradley IFV and the GCV 8

1-2. Improvement of the GCV Compared with the Current Bradley IFV 11

2-1. Passenger Capacity of Combat Vehicles Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options 20

2-2. Total Cost, Programmatic Risk, and Improvement in Capabilities
Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options 21

2-3. Number and Total Cost of Vehicles Developed and Purchased
Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options 23

2-4. Characteristics of Combat Vehicles Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options 24

A-1. Weights Given by the Army and CBO to Various Categories of Characteristics 34

A-2. Weights Given by the Army and CBO to Various Mobility Attributes 35

A-3. Weights Given to Improvement in Various Categories Under
CBO’s Two Metrics 35

Figures
S-1. Cost and Improvement in Capability Under the Army’s Plan and
CBO’s Options, Using Two Metrics 4

1-1. Dimensions of the Current Bradley IFV and the GCV 9

1-2. Distribution of Armored Vehicles in an Armored Combat Brigade 15

1-3. Distribution of Army Combat Brigades at the End of 2012 16

2-1. Characteristics of Selected Combat Vehicles 22

2-2. Improvement in Capabilities Under the Army’s Plan and Three of CBO’s Options 25

2-3. Cost-Effectiveness of the Army’s Plan and Three of CBO’s Options 26

2-4. Average Age of the IFV Fleet Under the Army’s Plan and CBO’s Options 31

CBO

APRIL 2013 THE ARMY’S GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM AND ALTERNATIVES 37

About This Document
T his Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report was prepared at the request of the former
Chairman and the former Ranking Member of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Armed Services. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective and
impartial analysis, the report makes no recommendations.

Frances Lussier prepared the report under the general supervision of David Mosher and
Matthew Goldberg. Bernard Kempinski created the line drawings and silhouettes of the armored
vehicles. Philip Webre and Derek Trunkey of CBO provided helpful comments, as did Scot A. Arnold
of the Institute for Defense Analyses and Gilbert F. Decker, formerly Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research, Development, and Acquisition. (The assistance of external reviewers implies no
responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)

Leah Mazade (formerly of CBO) and Kate Kelly edited the report, and Maureen Costantino and
Jeanine Rees prepared it for publication. The report is available at CBO’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).

Douglas W. Elmendorf
Director

April 2013

CBO

CBO Report Army GCV Program and Alternatives Apr 2013

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