Chapter 9International RelationsChapter Objectives1. Explain.docx

Chapter 9
International Relations
Chapter Objectives
1. Explain the international relations theory of realism
including its basic assumptions.
2. Discuss the liberal theory of international relations along
with its different types.
3. Define constructivism and its central principles.
4. Explore feminist international relations theory and its
recommendations for change.
5. Examine causes of war and peace in the international arena.
When Twitter was first introduced in 2006, its founders
probably could not have imagined how people would potentially
use it. Over the past twelve years, Twitter has expanded to more
than 330 million active monthly users throughout the world.
Governments have even gotten into the act: Twitter Government
(@TwitterGov) even highlights how governments and
politicians throughout the world use Twitter. Politicians and
elected officials quickly took to Twitter, using it as a means to
communicate with voters directly. Former president Barack
Obama even originated a Twitter handle for presidents
(@POTUS) in 2013.
The current US president, Donald Trump, has utilized Twitter to
a far greater extent than his predecessor, although he does so
from his own personal account (@realDonaldTrump) rather than
the official @POTUS handle. In interviews, he has argued that
communicating via Twitter allows him to get his message to
voters without the filter of the media with the implicit argument
that the media does not do a faithful and true job in reporting
his actions. As such, President Trump’s tweets often come
directly from the president himself with no staff filtering or
discussion. One area where the president’s tweets have been
particularly influential is in the US relationship with North
Korea.

As of October 2018, President Trump has tweeted about North
Korea more than 150 times since taking office. And while the
tweets may not appear on the official @POTUS account or come
in a statement on White House letterhead, they have played an
integral role in American-North Korean relations. For example,
on August 11, 2017, the president tweeted this:
Military solutions are now fully in place, locked and loaded,
should North Korea act unwisely. Hopefully Kim Jong Un will
find another path!
At a mere twenty-three words, the president stated what could
have easily been seen as a military threat against North Korea
that could have led to direct conflict. Realizing the potential
implications of tweets like this from the president, US officials
at the February 2018 Munich Security Conference reportedly
told their counterparts not to pay attention to what the president
is tweeting.1 However, in March 2018, North Korea’s leader
Kim Jong-un, apparently under pressure because of the
president’s rhetoric, broached the idea of a summit between the
two leaders. What followed was a historic meeting between the
two leaders in June 2018 in Singapore as well as enhanced
relations between North and South Korea.
Unlike the other subfields of political science where we were
able to discuss individual concepts like public opinion, public
policy, institutions of government, democracy, or so on,
international relations is more organized around different
theories of how states behave. This chapter summarizes and lays
out the major arguments of four major theories of international
relations: realism, liberalism, constructivism, and feminism. It
ends by talking about one important area of research for
international scholars aside from theoretical approaches, and
that is the incidences of war and peace.
Before diving into the different theories of international
relations, we should note here that these theories are just that—
theories. Theories are built on simplified models of human
behavior and as such, cannot explain all of the nuances of
human action. Although it is easy to see some, or many, of the

following characteristics in how states behave, we do not expect
to see every characteristic. In other words, while these theories
may help us explain and interpret state behavior, they probably
won’t explain every individual situation.Realism
For most of the history of the world, states have sought to
achieve power and expand the area in which that power can be
exerted. If a state is an entity that has a monopoly on the
legitimate uses of force in a given area, states have usually
sought to expand that area of power and influence. This rational
motivation rooted in self-interest can be traced back to the days
of Athens and Sparta; the Greek historian Thucydides identified
the Athenian quest for power as a key driver of the
Peloponnesian War. Machiavelli, in giving advice to his patron
in The Prince, also endorsed this idea of states acting to protect
their own sovereignty, as did Thomas Hobbes. This long
tradition of realism in international relations has led to a large
body of work expounding on these ideas and using them to
explain the actions of states around the world and throughout
history. Not only has realism been influential in academia but it
has also made its mark on actual international relations around
the world with many practitioners of foreign policy adopting the
rationale.
Basic Assumptions
While there are many variants of realism, theories of realism all
begin from the same four assumptions. One, when it comes to
actors on the global stage, states are the main players. We know
in the United States that there are a lot of political variables
that go into calculations of what the United States will do in the
world from public opinion to the balance of power between the
political parties, but as far as realists are concerned, none of
that matters. Realists view states as black boxes; situations go
into the black box and reactions come out, but we are never
privy to what goes on inside the box that leads from situation to
decision. In that sense, the people involved in making decisions
or the politics in play are not areas of interest for realists—only

how states react and respond to one another. What happens
inside the black box is seen as the purview of policy scholars
who study how states make policy, including foreign policy.
A second assumption involves the idea of rationality and argues
that states act in a rational, self-interested manner. What does
the idea of rationality mean? People often mistake rationality
for behavior that is the best choice in a certain situation, but
this is not the case. Rationality is acting according to an
individual’s (or in this case a state’s) ordered preferences. As
uncomfortable as it may be, the easiest way to think about
rationality is the case of Hitler. Many people would argue that
Hitler acted irrationally in many ways, from expanding German
territory to the Holocaust of the Jews. However, rationality
means that Hitler acted in accordance with his preferences; in
his list of preferences, expanding German power and
eliminating the Jewish population were at the top. Therefore, as
difficult as it is for us to think it, Hitler was acting rationally.
In the international system, a third assumption is that there is no
higher authority than states; there is nobody to tell states what
they can and can’t do. In realist terms, the state system is
anarchic; there are no rules and nobody to enforce rules if there
were any. This naturally leads to the last assumption that in a
world where there are no rules, states will do anything they can
to assure they survive. Survival means ensuring that they have
the means to outlast threats from other states. The means by
which that can be achieved is power, represented by military
capability. If a state’s military is strong enough and its
capabilities sufficient, it will be able to outlast any challenge to
its sovereignty or its territory.
Consequences of Realist Theory
From these four basic assumptions, realist theory emerges.
Much like Thomas Hobbes’s conception of human nature as
inherently malevolent, realism accepts the same about states.
The consequences, then, of state behavior do not necessarily
lend themselves to a stable and peaceful international

environment. If states want to ensure their security by building
up military power, other states may interpret that build-up as
threats to their own society; this is what’s known as a security
dilemma. The arms race may not be directed offensively, but
other states may not believe one state’s intentions as stated. If
other countries begin to build up their own capabilities without
sufficient cooperation and communication, the entire region
may soon find itself in a devastating military conflict.
Arms races have happened often enough throughout history. In
fact, World War I is a classic example of security dilemmas
leading to war. States usually realize the futility of security
dilemmas but all too often find themselves caught up in the
system. This does not mean, however, that they do not try to
find ways out of the conundrum. Paying close attention to
a balance of power in a region is one of the solutions. If power
is distributed roughly equally, no one state has an upper hand
on any other. The Treaty of Westphalia discussed in Chapter 8
tried to enshrine a balance of power within Europe so as to
avoid the devastating conflict that had pervaded Europe for
centuries. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the
United States engaged in a balance of power battle that largely
led to a stalemate between the two countries directly. The
balance of power can forestall the consequences of military
buildups as long as all of the states in a region decide to abide
by it.
There are other proposed solutions to the security dilemma
posed by the search for power, one of them proposing that
instead of a balance of power system wherein two or more
powerful states exist so as to create a sort of equilibrium in the
system; a unipolar world would find one country more powerful
than all of the others and can police the rest of the system. This
variation of realism assumes that a single hegemon or dominant
actor seeking to expand their influence and power is able to
amass enough power to keep other states weak. If weaker states
attempt to move against others, the hegemon can strike and
control the weak state’s actions.

National Interest
These assumptions have led to a rich body of work examining
realism in international relations. In the post–World War II
period, the theorist Morgenthau achieved prominence with his
writings on realism. In an era where the Cold War had yet to
fully begin and new faith was placed on institutions such as the
United Nations to mediate conflict (to be discussed later in this
chapter), the new question became what the United States’
major interests were. Morgenthau equated the US predicament
with the conflict between whether man (and therefore states) is
either inherently moral or immoral, the classic question of the
original state of human nature.2 Morgenthau argued that abiding
by the principles of realism in foreign policy rather than trust
the liberal institutions and appeals to morality would lead to far
more acceptable outcomes for the United States.
If one theme runs throughout Morgenthau’s writings it is that
following the motivation of national interest and abiding by the
principle of balance of power is the smartest strategy in foreign
policy. He also endows realism with the highest of scientific
principles in that realists also believe that objective laws of
political science can be deduced through reason.3 He utilizes
the idea of scientific principles not only to seek out the laws of
realism but as a yardstick by which to measure alternative
theories of international relations.4 Given that Morgenthau is
also writing at a time where political science itself is continuing
to press the idea of science and behavioralism in the study of
politics, this is not at all surprising. Morgenthau thus presents
realism not only as the natural and best way for a state to
conduct its foreign policy but he also holds it up as a truly
scientific, rational, and objective theory of international
relations.
Another prominent realist theorist is Waltz. Waltz was a
proponent of what he called structural realism—also known as
neorealism. Neorealism differs from traditional realism in the
emphasis on what causes states to behave as they do. For

traditional realists like Morgenthau, it is the search for security
in a world that is dominated by other self-interested and selfish
states. Waltz and his fellow neorealists, however, recognize a
more important role for the global system itself. States must
respond to the conditions created by an anarchic state of
international relations more than pressures from other states.
Neorealism is a natural reaction to a changing world where
globalization is increasing and international organizations like
the United Nations exist. The United Nations, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), and other international organizations undoubtedly do
impact the international environment. A good example of this is
the passage of sanctions in the UN Security Council or going to
the UN Security Council to have security actions endorsed.
Therefore, neorealists are still hemming to the original
assumptions of realism, but they recognize the increased
importance of the international environment to the conditioning
of states’ actions. Even with the end of the Cold War, Waltz
still argues that neorealism is essential to understanding the
international system; even though the world became unipolar
with the fall of the Soviet Union, it does not mean that the
nature of the system changed. Instead, a changed world system
“awaits the day when the international system is no longer
populated by states that have to help themselves.”5
Realism in Practice
Realism has been dominant not only in academic debates but in
real-life foreign policy. A well-known proponent of realist
theory, Henry Kissinger served first as national security adviser
and then concurrently as secretary of state in the Richard Nixon
administration. In this position, Kissinger was a constant
advocate for following US interests in crafting foreign policy.
This ultimately led to the reopening of relations between the
United States and China in 1972. Even though the United States
had foreclosed relations with China following its establishment
of a communist government, Kissinger and Nixon realized that

they could exploit the schism between China and its erstwhile
communist ally Russia. The main interest of the United States
was to reduce tension with the Soviet Union, and to do that, it
reopened relations with China to make the Soviets fear a
renewed friendship between China and the United States. If that
happened, the Soviets were afraid that both countries would
turn against Russia. Therefore, the Soviet Union was forced to
moderate its policies toward the United States, and America was
thus the beneficiary not only of a new relationship with China
but a better relationship with the Soviet Union.
Modern research into realism generally focuses on the relevance
of realism to a changed world. Not only has globalization
continued to increase the importance of international
organizations in moderating state activities but non–state actors
like terrorist organizations have emerged as major players on
the international stage. Neither traditional realism nor
neorealism have a place for these non–state actors; this has been
reflected in the political science literature. Walker and Morton
find that despite a dominance of realism in the international
relations field from the end of World War II until 1970,
international relations research from 1970 to 2000 has seen a
reduced role for realism.6 Instead, liberalism (discussed in the
next section) has become an integral driver of international
relations research.
This is also reflected in the research that has been devoted to
adopting realism to modern realities. For example, Patomaki
and Wight argue for what they call critical realism, Chernoff
presents a theory of scientific realism, and Sleat tries to
combine liberalism and realism in a theory of liberal realism.7
And yet the traditional tenets of realism, while not being
acknowledged as frequently as during the Cold War, continue to
exert an influence on American reactions to the rest of the
world. This is quite apparent when crises arise in other parts of
the world and when considering whether the United States
should become involved or not; analysts inevitably bring up
questions of the interests that the United States has in becoming

involved—the stipulation becomes that if the United States has
no national interest in the resolution of the crisis—we should
not become involved. But what about the people who do believe
we should get involved in crises around the world—particularly
those of a humanitarian or moral stripe? This alternative theory
is known as liberalism.Career Guidance
Ambassadors and their support staff are the face of a state to the
rest of the world. In the United States, many of these personnel
are drawn from the ranks of the Foreign Service. Foreign
Service officers serve throughout the world and in different
functional areas, including politics, economics, and public
affairs. While there is no specific educational requirement to
become a Foreign Service officer, to join, you must pass the
Foreign Service exam and an interview, a very selective
process. For more information on the Foreign Service, visit its
homepage at https://careers.state.gov/work/foreign-
service/officer.Liberalism
Recall from Chapter 3 that liberal political ideology stems
directly from the Enlightenment and its rejection of the divine
right of kings. In accepting that people have natural rights and
that one of those rights is freedom and liberty, the liberal
ideology was inaugurated. Liberal political theory posits that
the best normative outcome would be a situation where states
integrate democratic principles and the idea of natural rights. Of
course, liberalism in international affairs is a slightly different
animal, but they both share the same ideological ancestor.
Liberalism in international relations theory also rejects its
international relations predecessor: realism. Proponents of
liberalism argue that states pursue many more objectives than
simply power—how else to explain states getting involved in
conflicts that have nothing to do with their national interest?
Liberalism also recognizes the growing role for international
organizations and the possibility that those organizations can be
used to not only mediate conflict but avoid it altogether.
Particularly in an era where our global connections are
increasing by the day, liberals argue that cooperation in

international affairs is the only route to sustained good relations
in the community of states.
Because of its focus on increased interactions between states,
liberalism is really a theory of its time. The earliest The
earliest formulation of liberal theory came from the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant in his essay “Perpetual Peace”
published in 1795.8 In the essay, Kant argues that peace could
be achieved within a region through a certain set of steps that
all states would take. First among these was establishing a
republican form of government and then recognizing the
sovereignty of each state within its own territory. States would
then proceed to establish open relationships between one
another, stand down their armies, and agree to certain laws of
war when conflict does emerge. Many of these ideas would later
be enshrined in agreements such as the Geneva Convention and
the UN treaty, but achieving peace and cooperation around the
world still proves more difficult to achieve.
Basic Assumptions
As liberalism continued to develop as a theory, it too stipulated
three assumptions to the theory. First, liberalism rejects the
notion that states are only out for power as well as the idea that
anarchy is the ultimate state of affairs. To be sure, believing
that only anarchy reigns is a fairly dispiriting belief; there must
be some other outcome possible than states constantly fearing
the actions of another and preparing for an eventual war that
must come. Liberals explicitly reject this, believing that
something other than war can be a natural outcome of relations
between states.
A second principle of liberalism is that international
cooperation is not only possible but it can benefit the global
community. If states are constantly wary of one another’s
search for power and military buildups, conflict might be the
only possible result. But liberalism argues that states can
cooperate for the betterment of not only themselves but the rest
of the world. We need only look at modern cooperation between

states on issues ranging from poverty and hunger to global
warming. Cooperation may be difficult and states still may not
trust one another, but cooperation is just as plausible as
conflict.
Finally, liberalism prescribes the establishment of organizations
that can grease the wheel of cooperation among states. These
international organizations ease cooperation, but they can also
independently change the international environment—thus,
shaping states’ desires and preferences. The role for
international organizations also parallels the role of economic
and cultural exchanges between countries. Liberal theorists
propose that increased connections between states and between
the peoples of free states will decrease the potential for conflict
between them. For example, the extent of economic relations
and ties between the United States and China greatly decrease
the potential that either country would want to engage in a
conflict that would disrupt the flow of goods that is so vital to
each country. International organizations represent just one of
the many types of ties that pull countries together and therefore
encourage them to avoid conflict.
Liberalism in the Twentieth Century
Liberalism as an approach to international relations came into
its own in the twentieth century. The first significant attempt at
implementing liberal principles came at the end of World War I.
Among Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points was a proposal to
establish an institution called the League of Nations. The league
was designed as a solution to the arms races and hostilities that
led to the initiation of war in the first place. Although many
countries signed on to it in the wake of World War I, the US
Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles because it
would obligate the United States to joining the league. At that
point in American history, many in the United States were wary
of continued involvement in world affairs, believing that the
conflicts of other countries would only draw the United States
into a continuous war.

Needless to say, the League of Nations failed in its ultimate
goal of eliminating conflict. However, the failure of the league
did not prevent states from trying again after World War II.
This time, the United States did agree to join the new
organization called the United Nations. In addition to the
establishment of the United Nations, the United States and its
European allies entered into an alliance: NATO. The NATO
treaty specifically obligates its member states to the idea of
collective security. Collective security is a means of
discouraging conflict; it compels states to the defense of other
states in the case that they are attacked. The so-called Article 5
means that if one state is attacked, the others must respond as if
they were attacked as well. The idea behind collective security
is that it will dissuade a state from attacking another state for
fear of reprisals from others.
Types of Liberalism
A strain of liberal thinking that specifically focuses on the role
of international institutions is called liberal institutionalism.
Liberal institutionalists share some of the core beliefs of
realists, primarily that the natural state of global affairs is
anarchic. However, they depart in thinking from there. Liberal
institutionalism argues that international organizations can be
arranged in such a way as to provide order and structure in the
world. These institutions can serve as a global police force that
ensures states do not begin the often-deadly spiral of the
security dilemma. Treaties and agreements between states can
also fill the role of liberal institutions. In the process of states
agreeing to certain practices or rules in areas like nuclear
weapons and environmental degradation, they stipulate
principles that the states must adhere to and procedures for
policing the adherence to the treaties.
Another variant of liberalism is an idea called the democratic
peace theory. Democratic peace theory posits that democratic
states are much better able to avoid conflict than nondemocratic
states. What is it about democracies that seem to prevent

conflict? The cornerstone of modern democratic states today is
that ultimately people have an opportunity to ratify the
decisions of their representatives and leaders. Since leaders
have to listen to the voices and opinions of their voters, liberals
argue, they will be less likely to engage in a war or conflict that
their countries don’t support. A good example of this was the
war in Vietnam and, more recently, the US war in Iraq. When
public opinion turned negative on both of these conflicts,
American leaders were forced to rethink their approach and end
hostile engagements.
So what do democratic peace theorists believe will lessen the
incidence of conflict? If democracies are less likely to go to
war, then they would prescribe more democratic governments
around the world. Obviously, the extent to which states around
the world can enforce this idea is doubtful. While the United
States and other democratized countries can support the idea of
spreading democracy, actually implementing that is very
difficult. Many thought that the advent of the Arab Spring
heralded a new wave of democratization, but nine years after
the first protests, little in the way of actual democratic
government has emerged in the Middle East. While the reasons
for this are many and out of the scope of this book, it
demonstrates the difficulty of prescribing democracy in regions
where it is not the normal order of the day.
There is also an economic corollary to the democratic peace
theory that is colloquially known as the McDonald’s thesis. The
theory is that no two states with a McDonald’s have ever gone
to war with one another. As Friedman puts it, “The question
raised by the McDonald’s example is whether there is a tip-over
point at which a country, by integrating with the global
economy, opening itself up to foreign investment and
empowering its consumers, permanently restricts its capacity
for troublemaking and promotes gradual democratization and
widening peace.”9 In other words, the more economic ties that
exist between countries, the less of a chance that either of those
states would want to disrupt those flows through conflict.

Adding all of these ideas together leads to the theory that the
more relationships that exist between the people and their
governments and then between states around the world leads to
decreased conflict. These relationships can be diplomatic and
formal, economic, cultural, or through international
organizations, but the bottom line is that when added together,
they reduce conflict or the chance of conflict.
While it would seem that the establishment of liberalism would
preclude further exploration of the meaning of it, current
political science research into liberalism has delved back into
the realm of deep theory. While some examine liberalism in
modern political theory such as that of John Rawls (discussed in
Chapter 3), others go back to the period of Enlightenment for
insight on international relations. For example, Walker goes
back to Kant and his ideas of perpetual peace and compares
them to the writings of a contemporary, Thomas Paine of
“Common Sense” fame.10 Walker argues that Paine and Kant,
while describing early iterations of liberalism, recommend
different types of intervention thereby demonstrating Walker’s
overall argument that differences in liberal thought appeared
early on. Ward also brings another Enlightenment thinker to
bear on liberalism: this time, John Locke.11 Rengger also notes
this trend of tying international relations theory to political
theory, naming it international political theory.12
Another stream of research into liberalism connects us with the
next topic to be discussed: constructivism. As we will see
shortly, constructivism argues that ideas and words hold power,
and we can imbue those words and ideas with certain
perspectives that bias them one way or another. This line of
research, therefore, looks at the power of ideas in liberalism
from uncertainty to balance of power; these scholars attempt to
show the power of language and perspective in the policy
prescriptions liberals advocate.13Constructivism
Have you ever stared at a word for so long that all of a sudden it
doesn’t look like a word anymore? Or have you wondered why a
certain word has the meaning that it does? For example, in

feminist circles, there has been a controversy over the
word bitch and whether women should try to reclaim the word
for themselves instead of allowing it to be a derogatory term.
These examples highlight the fact that for most ideas and
concepts, society determines their meaning and whether the
meanings are correct or not. This is the heart
of constructivist theory; they reject both the ideas of liberals
and realists and instead argue that all of international relations
is socially and culturally constructed. What this means for
international relations is that anarchy, power, or other
consequences stemming from following either of these theories
is not necessary nor inevitable; instead, we imbue these words
with certain ideas that can be changed and often do change.
Wendt is one of the first political scientists to try to
conceptualize constructivism. In his 1992 article, he attempts to
explore what anarchy means, arguing that “anarchy is what
states make of it.”14 In this basic principle, it’s obvious just
how radical a departure constructivism is from realism or
liberalism. Both assumed that anarchy meant one thing: no
structure or overriding control of the international system. If
words or concepts have no exact meaning except the meaning
we give them, situations are liable to change. If situations can
change, then maybe anarchy is not the natural end state; perhaps
states can create a situation of their own liking simply by
changing their thinking about the international system.
Constructivist Concepts
Although constructivism is not constructed in the way that
liberalism and realism were with assumptions and conclusions
that then follow, Wendt provides some idea as to the concepts
that constructivists are concerned about. The first of these is
identity. “Actors acquire identities—relatively stable, role-
specific understandings and expectations about self—by
participating in such collective meanings.”15 Collective
meanings are the definitions we give other actors and concepts;
they “constitute the structures which organize our actions.”16

Thus, in a given situation, actors take on identities based on
their own understanding of who they are and who others believe
them to be. Wendt’s example is that the way we perceive
enemies and allies is affected by the identities we ascribe to
them. What’s key in the idea of identity is that identity can shift
and change. Just because one state has taken on a particular
identity does not mean that it becomes permanent and incapable
of change. On the contrary, constructivists stress the idea that
changing identities can lead to change in the international
system.
Constructivists also emphasize in a way that would be familiar
to liberals, that identity can even be shared across states. A
good example of this is the European Union. Even though
European states fought against each other for centuries, in
recent decades, they have been able to engage in the project
called the European Union, establishing broader diplomatic and
economic ties, hoping to foster a European identity. This shared
identity is also indicative of the way in which constructivists
argue that identity can change and for the better; if peoples
across multiple states identify with one another, relations
between states could become more peaceful.
Identity becomes very important in defining another key
concept of constructivism: that of interests. Whereas realists
assume that a state’s interest is stable, the pursuit of power and
security, constructivists believe that the interests of a state are
not at all stable and are instead capable of changing and being
changed. Wendt argues that “identities are the basis of
interests,” states “define their interests in the process of
defining situations.”17 A good example of how this may work is
how the United States and the former Soviet Union changed
their interest with the end of the Cold War. Because Russia no
longer had the identity of a Cold War, ideological enemy, the
United States became uncertain of its interests with respect to
them. The ability for interests to change once again highlights
constructivism’s focus on the idea that concepts are socially
constructed. Interests are backed by ideas about what is best for

a country, and those ideas can and do change based on
circumstances around the world.
While this focus on ever-changing ideas, interests, and
identities demonstrates the fact that words mean only what we
believe them to mean, Wendt’s constructivism does allow for
some entities that are stable in the international arena.
Institutions are “relatively stable” sets of identities and
interests.18 These institutions are formed through norms and
rules that are codified and known to all. Examples can include
something as real as the United Nations or something as
amorphous as the idea of self-help.19 Institutions can still
change as they are subject to what actors know or believe, but
they do provide some stability in constructivist theory.
A final concept integral to constructivism is the idea of norms
or beliefs about what are acceptable behaviors, institutions, or
ideas in the rest of the world. An example of just such a norm
would be a prohibition against torturing or killing prisoners of
war. Norms set the rules for how states can or should behave in
regard to one another.
The key insight of constructivism is that not every action or
belief in the international system is set in stone. Just because
states want one thing today does not mean that it won’t change
tomorrow. Just because relations between states are one way
today doesn’t mean that they can’t get better or worse.
Constructivism highlights the power of ideas and beliefs and the
ability we have to change them for ourselves. Much like the
saying “Behave your way to success,” constructivism says we
can create the world we want if we only change the way we
think.
Constructivist Research
Political research into constructivism today continues to flesh
out constructivism as a theory as well as discuss connections
between it and other theories of international relations. For
example, Barkin argues that although realism and
constructivism seem diametrically opposed, they are in fact

compatible in the study of power politics.20 Similarly, Sterling-
Folker argues that realism and constructivism are not only
compatible but that they “need one another to correct their own
worst excesses.”21 Others have examined the connections
between constructivism and liberalism as well as constructivism
and the feminist approach to international relations.22 All of
this research aims to flesh out the relationships between
constructivism—a relatively new approach to international
relations and more traditional approaches.
Since constructivism is such a new theory, other political
scientists have continued to sketch out a research agenda and
methodology for the field. Farrell attempts to lay out a research
agenda for constructivists by laying out potential objects
subject to study.23 Farrell does note the difficulty in such a
task, especially for constructivists who may not completely
agree on the roles or meanings of concepts. Pouliot expands on
this foundation in laying out how knowledge may be developed
in constructivist theory thus allowing for theories to be
generated and tested.24Feminism
Much how constructivism urges us to think about international
relations from a different vantage point than traditional
conceptions about power and conflict, feminist international
relations theory also asks us to look from another angle. For
most of the history of the world, everything from business to
government to social relations have been driven by men.
Women have been in a historically disadvantaged position
comparatively. Feminist theory reminds us that international
politics and the international system may indeed be biased
toward the view of men. If women are “brought back in” to the
realm of international affairs, we can better understand state to
state relations.
A Gendered Experience
Feminist international relations theory goes beyond the simple
notion that the world discriminates against women to try and
emphasize that ideas can be “gendered,” or rather take the

position of masculine ideas rather than feminine. This mirrors
the constructivist idea that the ideas behind words and concepts
have significance and can change. Gendered norms and concepts
have the same emphasis, but feminist theorists argue that the
gendered norms can have significant effects on how states get
along with one another. One reason this may be important is
that historically, women have been discriminated against and
feminine ideals and characteristics derided. Take for instance a
scenario where a world leader is caught crying; it doesn’t matter
if that person is a man or a woman, crying is seen as weak and
feminine. But what makes crying inherently terrible? What
makes it undesirable are the social norms and ideas associated
with crying as a feminine characteristic.
Feminist theory also focuses on the fact that much of the world
of international affairs is dominated by men. With no offense
directed toward either gender, research has shown that men and
women do indeed think differently. For example, research into
the presence of women in state legislatures shows that
legislatures that have more women in them tend to be more
cooperative and pass more legislation. What if more world
leaders were women? Would the way the world works change?
Cohn writes about this very phenomenon in her study of the
male-dominated world of defense intellectuals.25 After
spending a year immersing herself in the environment of
defense studies, Cohn describes that she found her own thinking
changing about nuclear strategy. From this experience, she
argues that we should pay better attention to the words we use
to study and describe different phenomenon because different
language allows us to communicate in different ways with
different people.
Following up on Cohn’s piece, Enloe, one of the primary
contributors to feminist international relations theory, argues
that our attention to feminist issues must go beyond just the
language that is used in international affairs; instead, we need
to remember the role that women and girls play in the
international system.26 Women not only make up half of the

world’s population but they are intimately involved in the
rearing and educating of children—both boy and girl. They pass
on social identities and norms; they function as the heart of the
family. In many countries, they are the breadwinners and
supporters of their families. They are often also responsible for
the care of older family members. In a way that directly ties
into the international system, girls are often sold into slavery,
taken across borders as slaves—sexual or otherwise—forced to
carry drugs and carry out vicious attacks, and often exploited by
men for their own purposes. The issues these girls and young
women face are significantly tied to the international system,
and without worry or concern for the most vulnerable of
participants, feminists argue that we will never really get
anywhere in issues of war and peace.Know a Political
Scientist Cynthia Enloe
Cynthia Enloe is a prolific feminist theorist who has taught
around the world. Raised on Long Island, Enloe received her
PhD in political science from the University of California,
Berkeley, in 1967. Afterward, she joined the faculty at Clark
University, where she spent the rest of her career. During her
career, Enloe received Fulbright scholarships to study in
Malaysia and Guyana and served as a guest professor in Japan,
Britain, and Canada. Enloe’s research has focused not just on
feminism but the role that gendered variables play in
international and national politics. To that end, she has
published fourteen books and countless articles. She received
the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award in
2007 and the Peace and Justice Studies Association’s Howard
Zinn Lifetime Achievement Award in 2010.
Modern conflicts today also involve issues of women. Issues in
the Middle East and in Islamic societies naturally bring up
discussions of the role of women in society. This can be a
sensitive topic. While we in the West would look at prohibitions
on women driving, voting, and being full participants in society
as vindictive and cruel, in many of those societies, they are
culturally and socially accepted norms. This does not mean that

practices such as genital mutilation, the marrying off of young
girls, or harsh punishments for women who escape from
marriage are any more acceptable in those societies than they
would be here. But it does make relations with those countries
far more difficult and nuanced. In fact, Youngs argues that
understanding the role of women and gender is paramount if we
are truly to understand the relationships of states.27
Recommendations for Change
While it would seem as if feminism lacks the concepts and
assumptions of the theories that we have previously discussed,
they do adopt a particular point of view about how we
should change the way we view international relations. For
example, feminist theorists have developed feminist
perspectives on all types of traditional concepts examined by
international relations theorists. For example, Sjoberg advances
a feminist view of war in Gendering Global Conflict.28 By
taking traditional concepts like international organizations,
anarchy, and realism, Sjoberg shows not only how these
concepts are gendered but proposes how feminist theory might
be constructed around them. Zalewski takes this same approach
to describing a feminist approach on issues like human rights
and the military.29
Like constructivism, a strain of feminist theory has also
endeavored to not only expand feminist theory but establish a
methodological foundation to studying feminist issues.
Responding to the critique that feminist theory has little in the
way of testable theories like realism and liberalism do, Tickner
attempts to identify the possible research questions that
feminists can pursue using traditional social science methods.30
This in and of itself can be tricky; if traditional social science
itself is dominated by men and potentially gendered in its own
beliefs and views, why should feminists use such a standard by
which to measure their academic work? Tickner notes that
feminists have actually been loath to develop a methodological
standard by which they can perform their research. Instead, they

focus on methodological pluralism, descriptions of knowledge,
discussions and critiques, and understanding how women view
their lives and the world around them.31 Partially as a response
to Tickner, Caprioli argues that feminist scholarship would do
well to engage multiple methodologies and goes on to show how
work on gender, social justice, and quantitative methods can all
be combined to create a fruitful research project.32
To this end, Ackerly and True take on the daunting task of
developing a standard by which feminist research may be
judged—something they call the feminist research ethic.33 They
argue that there are “four commitments that undergird a
feminist research ethic: attentiveness to the power of
epistemology, boundaries, relationships, and the situatedness of
the researcher.”34 The last standard, the situatedness of the
researcher, highlights a potentially dangerous flaw in how
scholars engage feminist theory; if we are studying the
projection of power in the world and at the same time are
engaged in continuing to propagate and contribute to that
structure, how can we objectively identify solutions and
assumptions? Thus, Ackerly and True call for the researcher
engaging in feminist scholarship to pay very close attention to
their own subjectivities and bias.War and Peace
At the end of the day, theories like realism, liberalism,
constructivism, and feminism are merely theories. Real actions
throughout the world actually affect the life and death of
millions of global citizens. It’s only natural, then, that causes of
war and peace would be a topic that scholars of international
relations tend to study. War is particularly amenable to study
because it is a phenomenon that happens, unfortunately, all too
often. It is also chronicled in histories of past periods, thereby
giving scholars a bevy of information to work with in divining
the causes of conflict throughout the centuries.Defining War
And yet, even though political scientists have lots of
information with which to avail themselves, settling
on the cause or causes of war has eluded us. Why? Well, first of
all, deciding on what specifically is a war has been difficult.

While this might seem silly, defining our concepts is an
important part of doing political science. Is it a war when states
have fought for one day, one week, or one month? In other
words, is there a timetable or length associated with it? Or is it
a war when so many people have died? If that’s the case, then
how many people must die before a conflict is declared to be a
war? Do wars differ in size and scope, and if so, how? Two
political scientists took up just these questions in inaugurating
what would become the Correlates of War project. Small and
Singer sought to conceptualize and define what political
scientists mean in invoking the terms war or state. Small and
Singer defined states as entities with populations of more than
half a million with diplomatic recognition from other states or
international organizations such as the League of Nations or the
United Nations.35 With respect to the definition of wars, Small
and Singer delimited wars as being conflicts with deaths of over
1,000.36 They also identify different types of wars from
interstate wars to imperial or colonial conflict.
Defining our concepts is only one barrier to understanding the
patterns of war. Even though historians and political scientists
have more access than ever before to information about the
thoughts and actions of leaders and states, it is still difficult to
dive down into the brains of the participants and to uncover
exactly what was being thought about at the moment in which
war is initiated. Indeed, when leaders do make statements or
speeches about going to war, how can we be sure they are
telling the truth about why and not playing to politics and
giving the politically acceptable answer? An excellent example
of this was the US intervention in Iraq, beginning in 2003.
Although the George W. Bush administration claimed they were
sending troops to Iraq because the Iraqis had weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) and supported terrorism, some critics
argued that the Bush administration was really going to war to
secure oil supplies in the Middle East. While this says nothing
about ultimate causes or whether the motivation was correct or
not, it does go a long way to demonstrating how and why it can

be difficult to truly understand what states and their leaders are
thinking in a time of war.
Causes of War
In looking at causes of war, there are a few directions at which
we can come at the subject. The first approach is through the
theories that we have just elaborated on. Realists argue that war
is the result of power politics and states seeking out the
assurances of their own security. The search for security can
lead to the security dilemma and staggering arms races that
ultimately lead to conflict. For realists, it is only rational that
states do what it takes to stake their place in the global system
and to protect their people, even if that means the result is war.
Liberals, on the other hand, argue that “dissension and strife do
not inhere in man and society; they arise instead from mistaken
belief, inadequate knowledge, and defective governance. With
the evils defined, the remedies become clear: educate men and
their governors, strip away political abuses.”37 In other words,
men (and women) are naturally at peace with one another; when
states do enter into conflict, it is usually because of
miscommunication or mistakes of one kind or another. The
liberal solution, then, is to institute better forms of government
and new forms of international organizations to minimize the
chances of states coming to blows with one another.
These two perspectives on the causes of war are called
structural theories; they represent explanations of war and
conflict at the global, large-scale level. There are other ways
that we can look at war, however. Realism and liberalism indict
(or vindicate in the case of liberalism) the global system that all
states live in. But what about causes at the lower levels? The
next step down from the global level would be the state level.
What is it about states, or types of states, that cause conflict?
The democratic peace theory is an example of a theory that
explains conflict, or the lack thereof, in states as a result of
states being democratic. Are there other types of states that are
more likely to engage in conflict? The research on this is wide

and varied and not at all possible to fully in engage in here.
However, we can think of some examples that may help to give
us clues as to the types of states that may go to war more often.
In thinking back only on the twentieth century, the two most
significant conflicts were World War I and World War II. World
War I was triggered when Franz Ferdinand, nephew of the
Austrian emperor, was shot but the major contributing cause
was the arms race in Europe in the preceding years. For World
War II, Germany was engaged in an imperialist project of
overtaking or retaking portions of Europe that they deemed to
be German territories. In both of these cases, the actions
of aggressive states led to ultimate conflict. For the United
States, in particular, this was not the end of war in the period.
During the rest of the twentieth century, the United States
engaged not only in the Korean and Vietnam Wars but countless
smaller-scale conflicts and the moderately sized endeavor of
pushing the Iraqi army back into Iraq from Kuwait. For Vietnam
and Korea, the United States became involved because of an
ideological conflict with communism—therefore suggesting that
states with different types of regimes may be more likely to
engage in war with one another. In the case of the first Gulf
War, the United States and other countries were responding to
the actions of an aggressor country: Iraq. These examples point
the way toward the main explanations that political scientists
have developed to explain war at the state level: imperialist
aggression and conflict between states with dissimilar regimes.
The next level of analysis just below the state is that of the
politics of the state. Some political scientists argue that instead
of looking at states as black boxes as many realists and some
liberals do, we need to peer inside the box and see what types of
politics are occurring in the country. There are any number of
political dramas on the big screen and television screen that
demonstrate these ideas, and that is perhaps one of the best
ways to describe them. First, in a little bit of art imitating life,
the 1997 film Wag the Dog depicts an American president
(fictional, of course) enduring a sex scandal. In order to take

attention off the scandal, the president hires a movie producer
to “produce” a war that will redirect the public’s attention.
Although the movie is fictional, the scenario is very real.
Following the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, the
government of Russia began to come in for criticism aimed at
the amount of money it had spent to prepare the Olympics site
(approximately $50 billion). Partially as a means of disrupting
such criticism, Russia invaded the country of Ukraine under the
pretext of protecting pro-Russian separatists in the eastern part
of the country.
Finally, we come to the lowest level of analysis, the individual
level. At this level, political scientists seek to explore and
understand individual behavior and how that may push countries
to war. In some situations, wars could be attributed to the
actions of one leader who may be off balance mentally. While
we may colloquially ascribe the term crazy to any number of
individual leaders, Hitler and Napoleon are two potential
candidates for such a label who have pushed their countries to
the brink. Other political scientists will argue that a leader need
not be “crazy” or “insane” to take a country to war.
Charismatic, well-loved leaders could influence their countries
on the path to war simply because they are well liked or well
spoken. In generalizing the argument, then, we could say that
states that go to war may likely be influenced by significant and
important leaders who have the ability to sway the opinion of
the public to support engagement.
Other analysts stop short of the crazy label and argue, like
Hobbes, that human aggression is natural as is the will to go to
war. We can see that plain as day on our television screens most
Sundays in the fall and winter as football players go helmet to
helmet on the field. The desire for combat—whether it be in
soldiers or athletes—could be part of the reason that states enter
into conflict; the need to satisfy the desire for hard-won battles
may also be part of why states go to war.
Other human characteristics can just as easily lead us down the
path to war. The likelihood of individuals miscommunicating or

misunderstanding each other can initiate a war. Part of
international relations between leaders is being able to
understand and correctly interpret the behaviors and actions of
others. A good example of this was the former Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein. Although the Bush administration claimed that
Saddam had WMDs, following the American invasion, it was
discovered that this claim was false. Some analysts have argued
that Saddam had an interest in maintaining the idea that he
possessed WMDs in order to make Iran believe that it retained
the ability to fight a destructive war with them. (Iraq and Iran
had previously engaged in a war in the 1980s that was fought to
a stalemate.) This is just one example of how leaders may
misrepresent their own actions in order to make others believe
something they wouldn’t otherwise. However, we can just as
easily see how this can lead to war, particularly in the case of
the second war in Iraq.
Chapter Summary
· Realist international relations theory proposes that states are
the main actors in international relations, that they act
rationally, and that their main motivation is protecting their
own power. The changing geopolitical system, however, places
greater pressure on realists to respond to actors other than
states.
· Liberal international relations theory does not believe that
anarchy is the natural state of the world; rather, it believes
cooperation among states is possible. Cooperation can be
encouraged through international organizations, increased
economic ties, and the spreading of democracy.
· Constructivists believe that the world as we know it can be
changed by changing how we see it. In that sense, “anarchy is
what we make of it.” Concepts such as identify, global norms,
and interests can contribute to more peaceful outcomes.
· Feminist international relations theorists argue that
historically, international relations has been gendered toward
men—that is, men have dominated decision making, often
leaving women and their interests out of the equation

altogether. They suggest that by including more women in
international decision making, the issues and concerns of
women will be better integrated in the global system.
· The causes of war are numerous and complicated. Scholars can
use three levels of analysis to identify causes of war: systemic
level, state level, and individual level.
Key Terms
· balance of power: How evenly distributed power is across a
region or the world
· collective security: Compels states to defend other states if
they are attacked
· constructivist: Argues that all of international relations is
socially and culturally constructed
· democratic peace theory: Theory that democratic states are
much better able to avoid conflict than nondemocratic states
· feminist theory: Argues that the international system may be
biased toward the view of men, systematically disenfranchising
and ignoring the role and views of women
· liberal institutionalism: Posits that international organizations
can be arranged in such a way as to provide order and structure
in the world
· liberalism: An international relations theory that proposes that
states pursue things other than power and can cooperate with
one another; anarchy is not a natural outcome of the global
order
· neorealism: A variant of realism where states must also react
to the anarchic state of the world in addition to the actions of
states themselves
· rationality: Acting in accordance with one’s ordered
preferences
· realism: An international relations theory that posits states are
the main actors in world affairs, that they act rationally, and
that the world is naturally anarchic
· security dilemma: Can occur when states interpret another
state’s arms and military buildup to be a threatening act
· unipolar world: Situation wherein one country has amassed

more power than any otherNotes
1. Michael Birnbaum, “Donald Trump’s Tweets on NATO,
Russian Meddling, and North Korea Should Be Ignored, Say
Top US Security Officials,” Independent, Feb. 19,
2018, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-
politics/donald-trump-ignore-tweets-nato-europe-russia-
collusion-north-korea-munich-conference-hr-mcmaster-
a8217201.html.
2. Hans J. Morgenthau, “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National
Interest of the United States,” American Political Science
Review 46, no. 4 (1952): 961–988.
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle
for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1978).
4. Morgenthau, “Another ‘Great Debate.’”
5. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold
War,” International Security 25, no. 1 (2000): 39.
6. Thomas C. Walker and Jeffrey S. Morton, “Re-assessing the
‘Power of Power Politics’ Thesis: Is Realism Still
Dominant?” International Studies Review 7, no. 2 (2005): 341–
356.
7. Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, “After Postpositivism?
The Promises of Critical Realism,” International Studies
Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000): 213–237; Fred Chernoff, “Scientific
Realism as a Meta-Theory of International
Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 46, no. 2 (2002): 189–
207; Matt Sleat, “Liberal Realism: A Liberal Response to the
Realist Critique,” The Review of Politics 73, no. 3 (2011): 469–
496.
8. Immanuel Kant (trans. Mary Campbell Smith), “Perpetual
Peace,” Project Gutenberg, Jan. 14,
2016, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50922/50922-h/50922-
h.htm.
9. Thomas K. Friedman, “Foreign Affairs Big Mac I,” New
York Times, Dec. 8,
1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/08/opinion/foreign-

affairs-big-mac-i.html
10. Thomas C. Walker, “Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine,
and the Question of Intervention,” International Studies
Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 449–468.
11. Lee Ward, “Locke on the Moral Basis of International
Relations,” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3
(2006): 691–705.
12. Nicholas Rengger, “Political Theory and International
Relations: Promised Land or Exit from Eden,” International
Affairs 76, no. 4 (2000): 755–770.
13. Brian C. Rathbun, “Uncertain about Uncertainty:
Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in
International Relations Theory,” International Studies
Quarterly 51, no. 3 (2007): 533–557; Deborah Boucoyannis,
“The International Wanderings of a Liberal Idea, or Why
Liberals Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Balance of
Power,” Perspectives on Politics 5 no. 4 (2007): 703–727.
14. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The
Social Construction of Power Politics,” International
Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 395.
15. Ibid., 397.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 398.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. J. Samuel Barkin, “Realist Constructivism,” International
Studies Review 5, no. 3 (2003): 325–342.
21. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Realism and the Constructivist
Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or
Rereading,” International Studies Review 46, no. 1 (2002): 73–
97.
22. Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Competing Paradigms or Birds of
a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism
Compared,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 1 (2000):
97–119; Birgit Locher and Elisabeth Prugl, “Feminism and
Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle

Ground?” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (2001): 111–
129.
23. Theo Farrell, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a
Research Program,” International Studies Review 4, no. 1
(2002): 49–72.
24. Vincent Pouliot, “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist
Methodology,” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2 (2007):
359–381.
25. Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of
Defense Intellectuals,” Signs 12, no. 4 (1987): 687–718.
26. Cynthia Enloe, “‘Gender’ Is Not Enough: The Need for a
Feminist Consciousness,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004):
95–97.
27. Gillian Youngs, “Feminist International Relations: A
Contradiction in Terms? Or: Why Women and Gender Are
Essential to Understanding the World ‘We’ Live
In,” International Affairs 80, no. 1 (2004): 75–87.
28. Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global conflict: Toward a
Feminist Theory of War (New York: Columbia University Press,
2013).
29. Marysia Zalewski, “Well, What Is the Feminist Perspective
on Bosnia?” International Affairs 71, no. 2 (1995): 339–356.
30. J. Ann Tickner, “What Is Your Research Program? Some
Feminist Answers to International Relations Methodological
Questions,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (2005): 1–
21.
Chapter 8
Comparative PoliticsChapter Objectives
1. Outline the comparative method.
2. Explore the meaning of the state and its key characteristics.
3. Define democracy, and identify ways in which it is measured.

4. Discuss patterns in postcommunist transitions and state
development.
5. Define nationalism, and identify how it can often lead to
conflict.
Today’s China is an interesting amalgam of communist ideology
and capitalist practice. In 1949, Mao Zedong established the
People’s Republic of China with himself as the ruler. Mao’s
influence on China can hardly be overstated; under his
dictatorial leadership, China underwent significant social,
cultural, and economic change. Mao’s “Little Red Book” of
communist thought and ideology was, and still is, required
reading throughout China. His modernization programs quickly
industrialized the country, but the Cultural Revolution
decimated professional classes and easily set China back.
Following his death, the Communist Party of China instituted a
term limit for presidents at two five-year terms in order to limit
the type of power Mao had acquired. While Chinese presidents
remain quite powerful, perhaps even authoritarian, politicians
since Mao have abided by these rules.
However, in March 2018, China’s National People’s Congress
agreed to abolish term limits on China’s president, which had
been in place since Mao Zedong in order to allow its current
president, Xi Jinping, to hold power for many years to come. In
addition to his position as president, Xi also holds the positions
of general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central
Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission.
While many in the West had hoped that economic reforms in
China, allowing for some capitalist practices, would eventually
lead the country to a democratic future, Xi’s consolidation of
power for the foreseeable time means that nothing like
democratic principles appear to be at work. The challenge, then,
for political scientists, is to understand the complex politics of
a country as large and as complicated as China. With its long
historical traditions and blending of communism and capitalism,
it is a country that the West often misunderstands.
Comparative politics is the study of countries and politics

around the world; comparativists examine the same thing
political scientists do in American politics but do it in an
international manner. They study institutions, political parties,
public opinion, and voting all around the world. Some will
compare patterns in one country to patterns in another or study
the politics of an entire region. The name comparative
politics also applies to another aspect of study: the methodology
used. In comparing and contrasting countries, comparativists
seek to understand why politics is different or the same around
the world.
There are many ways of looking at politics around the world.
We can look at different political institutions, the executives,
legislatures, and court systems around the world. We can
examine countries that are liberal democracies and those that
are authoritarian. We can look at democracies versus
monarchies versus oligarchies. We can look at health policy
around the world or education policy or foreign policy. We can
even look at the development of countries, from industrialized
countries to developing countries, to the least developed.
So how to break up this chapter? If you were taking an
introductory course to comparative politics, your professor may
choose one of two main ways to organize the class: around
regions and countries or around topic. In the country approach,
you may study three or four countries in each of the following
categories: industrialized democracies (think Europe here);
communist and postcommunist countries such as Russia and
China; and developing states such as those in Latin America,
Africa, or the Middle East. Because patterns of politics are
generally similar in countries in the same region or stage of
development, by learning about the politics of some of these
states, you can better understand the larger region. In the
second approach, you may learn about major concepts such as
the state, democracy, regime change, policy, and economics.
This way, you learn not only about major concepts in
comparative politics but can learn how to apply them across
different countries. Either of these approaches is a valid and

constructive way of learning about comparative politics.
For our purposes here, we’ll be using the second approach to
exploring comparative politics. We certainly will not be able to
address every major topic of study in comparative politics, nor
will the ones addressed be considered by everyone to be the
most important. However, major topics like states, including
their structure, development, economy, and democracy, are
some of the most important concepts you’ll come across in
comparative politics. But first, we’ll need to address the
methodological component of comparative politics, the
comparative method.The Comparative Method
In 1971, Lijphart wrote, “Among the several fields or
subdisciplines into which the discipline of political science is
usually divided, comparative politics is the only one that carries
a methodological instead of a substantive label. The term,
‘comparative politics’ indicates the how but does not specify
the what of the analysis.”1 Lijphart identifies the comparative
method as one of the basic scientific methods that allows
scientists to test out propositions and hypotheses; it is “a
method of discovering empirical relationships among
variables.”2
One immediate thing about this process to be noted is that there
are many outside variables that could affect the main
relationship; Lijphart calls this the problem of many variables,
small number of cases. Given the large number of
characteristics that could affect any hypothesis, it will not
always be possible to find enough cases, enough countries, or
enough governments to properly test the hypothesis, and even
then, you may not be able to get enough cases with
similar enough characteristics. And further, just because a
relationship may be apparent in a test of five countries, who is
to say that that relationship will hold for other regions,
countries, or periods of time?
One other major problem can also be confronted when using the
comparative method. Because scientists are picking the cases to

study and test their hypotheses with, we sometimes see
something called selection bias, or selecting on the dependent
variable. This means that scientists pick the cases to study so as
to ensure that their theory is not disproved. In a more technical
way, Collier and Mahoney define selection bias as selecting
extreme cases that could lead to biased “estimates of causal
effects.”3 To be sure, scientists may not be doing this on
purpose, they may not even realize that they are biasing their
own results. This just means that comparativists must pay very
close attention to how they choose the cases they study to
ensure that selection bias does not happen.
That being said, the comparative method, when used properly,
can offer political scientists the ability to understand patterns of
politics around the world—particularly for countries that are
similar in region, similar in history, or similar in government.
This allows every state and every government in the world to
come up for examination, including America. Therefore, when
one studies political science in Europe, they do not recognize a
difference between comparative and American politics; for
everyone else, they comprise the same thing. The comparative
method can be used in any study of politics, even in
America.The State
Here in America, when we say state, we’re usually referring to
one of the fifty United States. While this is a legitimate use, the
term state also refers to governments and countries around the
world. In fact, when we refer to places like the United
Kingdom, South Africa, China, or Chile, the proper term to use
is state. Theorists going as far back as the Enlightenment and
Thomas Hobbes have struggled with the meaning of the state—
what it is, what defines it, what differentiates it from society or
government. Social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke
theorized that the state arises from the social contract entered
into by citizens. Steinberger argues that under Hobbes’s social
contract, not only is a sovereign created in which all powers are
bestowed but a commonwealth that allows the sovereign to exist
and act.4

Idea of the State
Early political scientists also homed in on the idea of a state,
attempting to define what exactly constituted a “good” state.
Weber, the same prolific German sociologist so influential in
early conceptions of bureaucracy and public administration,
defined the state as an entity that has a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force. Force does not include only physical,
military, or police, but legal coercion. For example, the state
can coerce us to pay taxes or drive the speed limit by
threatening us with
State Formation
Aside from identifying what the state is or is not, political
scientists also try to understand what causes states to form and
why. The origins of the modern state system date back to the
times of Hobbes himself with the signing of the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648. The treaty ended the Thirty Years’ War in
Europe and established principles of territorial sovereignty with
competing states held in check by a balance of power. The
Westphalian system led to a decline in traditional political
authority like monarchies and feudalism, an increase in
sovereignty over carefully defined land masses, and an increase
in the complexity of governmental institutions.10
Vu takes the ideas of the state and state formation one step
further, arguing that the way in which states form can tell us
something about the meaning of the state itself.11 For many
European states, war and the subsequent need for rulers to
acquire resources to fight wars helped lead to state formation. A
homogenous civil society with competing groups also seems to
be a prerequisite. These characteristics can tell us a lot about
when states do or not form, which is important because the
largest growth in the number of states did not occur in the early
period of state formation but much later. In fact, Germany as a
state did not emerge until the late 1800s! Many states in Latin

America and Africa did not emerge until late because they had
been colonial outposts of European nations. Even then, it was
not always easy for states to form; colonial powers had no
interest in seeing countries develop economically and therefore
compete with their mother countries. Other former colonies had,
and still have, severe ethnic conflicts because colonial masters
drew lines with no thought toward historical and natural
conflicts. Conflicts in the Middle East and Africa demonstrate
how these two problems have intertwined to either lead to late
state development or the lack of development altogether.
State Strength
This last issue leads us to concerns about the strength of states.
How strong or weak states are can be used to explain why state
formation does or does not occur, why revolutions do or don’t
happen, and how countries respond to crisis. For example, prior
to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the state of Iraq under
Saddam Hussein could be considered to be strong. Saddam was
able to forcibly keep his country together despite the fact that
three different ethnic groups all had reason to pull apart. And
pull apart they did once Saddam’s regime fell; the result has
been a weak Iraqi state that has been penetrated by outside
forces such as the Islamic State. It isn’t easy for scholars to
agree on what constitutes a strong state and what constitutes a
weak state. Some have identified state strength as the ability of
states to control political outcomes. Davidheiser identifies three
criteria for a strong state: how deeply the state penetrates into
society, the breadth of that penetration, and state autonomy.12
Correspondingly, fragile states are those that “lack the capacity
to discharge their normal functions and drive forward
development.”13
Fragile states can very often lead to failed states. Failed states
exist where there is no entity that can exert sovereignty over
their territory; this can lead to dangerous situations where no
rule of law exists and chaos can reign. A prominent example of
a failed state is Somalia, which has given safe harbor to

modern-day pirates precisely because there is no legitimate
authority or law in place to stop them. Piazza has come to this
very conclusion; in studying 197 countries between 1973 and
2003, he finds that failed states are more likely to be home to
transnational terrorist groups, giving safe haven to groups that
are likely to strike outside of their home territory.14 On the
other hand, Patrick questions this link, arguing that state failure
is only imperfectly related to transnational security threats. In
any case, failed states have come in for as much examination as
states that do exert control over their territory.15
Democracy
In America, we often take the term democracy for granted.
We’re taught that America represents the pinnacle of democracy
without seriously thinking about what that means. For political
scientists who study democracy around the world, the meaning
of democracy is a very important thing, especially if we want to
know what promotes democracy and what prevents it from
taking hold.
Defining Democracy
Theories of democracy go back to ancient Greece, where we are
told democracy means rule by the people. But what does rule by
the people mean? Does it mean all people or just some people?
Does it have to be all the time or just some of the time? And
what if the majority of people act to take away important rights
or rules? Does the fact that the majority says something is
acceptable make it democratic? If we simply think about the
history of American democracy, there were large periods in
history where African Americans and women were not allowed
to participate and had limited rights; does that mean America
wasn’t a democracy? These are just some of the basic concerns
of democratic theorists in trying to understand precisely what
democracy is.
In the mid-twentieth century, various definitions
of democracy were put forward. Lipset defined democracy as
follows:

[It is] a political system which supplies regular constitutional
opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social
mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal
decision-making among conflicting interest groups which
permits the largest possible part of the population to influence
these decisions through their ability to choose among
alternative contenders for political office.16
Lipset’s definition focuses mainly on the requirement of
elections, but how often do those elections need to occur? And
do they need to be fair? Dahl adds to this definition by
requiring that a democracy have elections that are fair, or
rather, that everyone’s vote count equally.17 Downs goes one
step further by saying that democratic elections should be held
periodically.18 Combining these early definitions of democracy,
comparativists came to the maxim that democracies are
countries that have free, fair, and frequent elections.
But what about civil liberties—things that protect citizens’
rights or the structure of government itself? Bollen argues that
democracy is better defined as “the extent to which the political
power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelite is
maximized.”19 His definition encompasses many of the
structures that would allow this to happen: elections and civil
liberties, protections for citizens from government. Similarly,
Muller defines democratic states as follows:
(1) The executive must be elected or be responsible to an
elected assembly, in (2) at least two consecutive and free and
fair competitive elections in which (3) at least approximately a
majority of the population has the right to vote, and during
which (4) the rights of freedom of speech and assembly are
respected.20
Measuring Democracy
Knowing the definition of democracy is only half the battle;
how do we measure how democratic a country is? There are a
number of indices, or ways, of measuring democracy that have
been put together in studies of comparative politics. Some

measures are simply dichotomies; either a country is democratic
or is not. In their study of measures of democracy, Bollen and
Paxton divide measures of democracy into two traditions: one
where measurements utilize voter turnout statistics, composition
of legislatures, or availability of the vote, and a second that
utilizes subjective determinations by a group of experts who
rate how democratic a country is.21
One example of the later approach is the Freedom House
ratings, which are released every year and widely used in
comparative politics. Figure 8.1 shows how the percentage of
countries rated as free, partly free, and not free have changed
since 1985, according to Freedom House. Another set of
measurements is the Polity data set, which scores states on a
scale of −10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (democracy)
(see Figure 8.2). The rankings depend on specific variables:
freedom of group opposition, competitiveness of the political
nomination process, election of chief executive, and
effectiveness of the legislature.
Figure 8.1 Freedom House Rankings through the YearsAfter
years of major gains, the share of free countries has declined
over the past decade, while the share of not-free countries has
risen.
So what contributes to countries becoming democratic? In a
comprehensive study of civic attitudes and democracy, Muller
and Seligson find that the only attitude that positively
contributes to democracy is a belief in gradual rather than
sudden, revolutionary reform.22 Ross, in “Does Taxation Lead
to Representation?” (which ironically appeared in the British
Journal of Political Science), tests the idea of whether the need
to raise taxes forces countries to democratize and finds support
for this thesis.23 In studying Latin America, a region where
patterns of democratization have been uneven, Perez-Linan and
Mainwaring demonstrate the influence of history on
democratization; in states with a stronger history, a stronger
experience with democracy, democratization is more likely to

proceed.24 All of these studies suggest that ideas in civil
society and beliefs about what the government should or
should not do contribute to the building of democracy. If we
draw this line of inquiry out, democracy, then, can be very
sensitive to place, time, and culture.
Culture is a concept that plays a role in a lot of comparative
research. Some of the earliest research examining the
relationship of culture to democracy was published by Almond
and Verba in 1963 in a book called The Civic Culture. In
examining the United States, Germany, Mexico, Italy, and the
United Kingdom, Almond and Verba argue that what they call
the civic culture supports a strong and vibrant democracy. Later
generations of political scientists and comparativists have
continued this tradition of research. Examining twenty local
governments throughout Italy, Putnam identifies distinct
historical legacies throughout Italy, which he argues have
contributed to the strength of democracy throughout the
country.25 Putnam adapted Almond and Verba’s concept of
civic culture and focused on something called social capital. For
Putnam, social capital represents the connections we have with
one another that contribute to our resources for and abilities to
contribute to a democratic life. Taken together, these two
studies represent some of the major works linking culture to
democracy.
Being able to measure how democratic a country is allows
comparativists to study not only how democracies come about
but what the effects of democracy are. Baum and Lake find that
democracies lead to increased life expectancy in poor countries
and increased education levels in richer countries.26 Li and
Reuveny show that increased levels of democracy lead to
decreased levels of environmental degradation.27 Boehmke
finds an increased presence in interest group and associated
activity as democracy increases.28 What else do you think
democracy affects?
Globalization
A not-so-old saying says that when America sneezes, the rest of

the world gets a cold. The saying refers to the connections of
the global economy; if the American economy experiences a
hiccup, the effects of that hiccup quickly reverberate around the
world. Growing up today, it’s easy to notice the increased
economic and other connections between states around the
world; we call this globalization. In fact, globalization is often
associated in many ways with democracy, political economy,
and even culture. Without a doubt, the connection between
economics, democracy, and globalization are often subtle and
diverse. Does more democracy lead to globalization, or does
globalization lead to democracy? How does the economy play a
role in mediating these linkages?
Globalization as a process can be traced throughout history; for
example, trade caravans in the Middle East, the Silk Road to
China, and European colonialization beginning in the 1500s all
represent globalization. While the first real coordinated efforts
at setting the foundations for an international economy began at
the Bretton Woods Conference after World War II, political
science research into globalization did not begin in earnest until
the 1980s. Kapstein describes the natural conflict inherent in
the process of globalization: “how to benefit from increased
economic intercourse while pursuing legitimate national
objectives, such as bank safety and soundness.”29 Countries
want to take advantage of increased opportunities for trade and
commerce, but if one country sneezes, others need to avoid a
cold.
Economic globalization means that individual state economies
are increasingly knit together, something exemplified in
international trade agreements like the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (recently renegotiated and pending
ratification) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). American
critics of these sorts of trade agreements argue that by
eliminating or reducing barriers to trade, companies will
outsource their manufacturing to other countries where wages
and costs are lower, thereby reducing employment opportunities
and wages for American workers. However, Scruggs and Lange

find that as far as union membership is concerned, increased
economic globalization produces no effect.30 While this may be
the case for developed countries, Ha shows that among
developing countries, globalization is associated with increased
income inequality.31
Globalization does not just occur with economics but with
politics; political globalization is the increasing connectedness
of political institutions, particularly international organizations
like the United Nations, the European Union, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and other nongovernmental
organizations. Think about the European Union in particular;
the European Union is a confederation in which member states
have given up some of their state sovereignty to the central
political framework, especially in economics. This brings
countries as different as France, the United Kingdom, Greece,
and Germany together in a political and economic relationship
where the actions of one affect the actions of all others.
One of the areas in which political science research has proven
fruitful has been in tracing the consequences of globalization.
Li and Reuveny, for instance, show that while economic
changes can contribute to the spread of democracy, the more
powerful factor is the spread of democratic ideas.32 One easy
way to see this finding in action is the history of the Arab
Spring movement in 2011. One of the things that allowed the
Arab Spring to spread across the Middle East was access to the
Internet, which helped not only to organize the protestors but to
familiarize them with democratic ideals. Although the effects of
the Arab Spring are rather questionable, it still demonstrates the
power of ideas and increased global connectedness.
Globalization also has social impacts. Gray, Kittilson, and
Sandholtz as well as Richards and Gelleny find that increased
globalization generally leads to the betterment of the status of
women.33 For women, globalization often means employment
and educational opportunities. An example of this is in the field
of microlending, where organizations lend women in developing

countries small amounts of money to develop a business, which
leads to increased income for the women and their families.
Mukherjee and Krieckhaus show that globalization positively
affects human well-being; both child and infant mortality fall,
and life expectancy rises as globalization
increases.34Communism and Postcommunism
Perhaps no other topic in comparative politics has been as
researched and discussed as the phenomenon of communism.
The Cold War, driven by the ideological conflict between
communism and democracy, was a political battle of wills
between the two great superpowers of the twentieth century. As
such, it was a natural topic of research for political scientists.
This brief examination will be by no means a complete record
or analysis of research into communism but will briefly discuss
some of the more pertinent aspects of what communism is as a
concept; how political scientists have studied it; and how
countries, most prominently Russia, have transitioned from
communism.
Communism in Practice
The first thing to understand about communism is that the brand
of communism actually practiced by the Soviet Union, China,
and their subsidiaries is not the theoretical construct of
communism initially envisioned by Marx and Engels in The
Communist Manifesto. Recall from Chapter 3 that Marx and
Engels looked at history and saw in it a history of class
struggles. The owners of the means of production, the
bourgeoisie, sought to have control over the working class, the
proletariat. They theorized that once a society had become
industrialized and education had spread so that the proletariat
came to realize how they were being used, a final revolution
would occur. The proletariat would overthrow the bourgeoisie
and eliminate any form of the state or government; the resulting
society would be one in which all people were considered equal
and shared ownership of both the means and results of
production.

It’s obvious why such an ideology would be attractive to those
outside of the bourgeoisie. Particularly in countries where
poverty and inequality were rampant, communism was easily
able to gain a foothold. However, those same countries, Russia
and later China, were not the theoretical hotbeds of communism
that Marx and Engels envisioned. Neither were industrialized
(both were incredibly agrarian in their economy), and neither
country had an educated working class that had come to realize
and support the communist doctrine. Instead, both countries saw
revolutionary leaders emerge that took the seed of communist
ideology and infused it with local flavor and characteristics that
made the communism that came to be practiced unique in each
country.
In Russia, the conflict between communist forces and czarist
loyalists came during World War I. The Bolshevik revolution,
first headed by Leon Trotsky, was soon to be taken over by
Vladimir Lenin, who formed the intellectual heart of Soviet
communism. Lenin, realizing that the requirements for a true
communist revolution were not yet in place in Russia, modified
the theory of Marx and Engels and believed that before a
communist revolution could occur, there must first be a
dictatorship of the proletariat to prepare the state for the coming
communist movement. The leadership would ensure that
conditions like industrialized and class consciousness improved
such that communism could eventually be fulfilled as Marx and
Engels wrote. Lenin would become the first leader of the Soviet
Union to be followed by the murderous dictator Joseph Stalin.
As we know today, the dictatorship of the proletariat never
succeeded in preparing the way for communism; the Soviet
Union disintegrated in 1991.
Much of the ideological concern and conflict would not come to
a head until after World War II. Indeed, for the entirety of the
war, the Allies included not only France, the United Kingdom,
and the United States but also the Soviet Union. But in the
absence of a common foe and the introduction of the atom
bomb, the burgeoning conflict between the United States,

democracy, and capitalism on one side and the Soviet Union and
communism on the other blossomed into the Cold War. At that
time, the forces of communism seemed stronger than ever and
getting stronger by the day. Not only had the Soviet Union
matched the United States in terms of the atom bomb by 1949
but more countries were succumbing to communism either by
force or by choice. Many Eastern European countries that fell
under the Soviet Union’s purview following World War II had
communist governments pushed on them from the ultimate
dictator of the proletariat. And perhaps most significantly,
China adopted communism in 1949.
China’s road to communism, while sharing some similarities
with Russia’s, led to its own distinct form of communism. Like
precommunist Russia, China was largely agrarian with little
industrialization and little in the way of widespread education.
What China did have, however, was a strong streak of
nationalism that led to increased resentment as foreign powers
came into China in the beginning of the twentieth century. This
led to a Chinese civil war following World War II, which ended
with communists, led by Mao Zedong, defeating the Nationalists
led by Chiang Kai-shek.
As Lenin did for the Soviet Union, Mao did for China in
adopting Marxist thought to local conditions. This eventually
led to a sharp split between the Soviet Union and China. Mao
acknowledged that the vast majority of Chinese citizens were,
in fact, peasants, and therefore that Marxist ideology would
need to be adjusted to fit the circumstances in China.35 Writing
in 1951 on the nature of Chinese communism, Littlejohn says
this:
The ultimate oracle is at present in Moscow, whence come the
highest directives, but the application of all ruling is, in my
opinion, a matter of local usage. In fact I have a strong
suspicion that the Chinese will before long consider their
Communism to be superior to the Russian brand.36

Studies of Communism
Most of the political science literature on communism prior to
1960 focused on communism’s relation not only to individual
states like Russia and China but religion and how it manifested
in democratic countries like Australia. Scholar of Islam Lewis
analyzed how compatible Islam would be with communism,
notwithstanding Marxist communism’s prohibition on
religion.37 Priestley argued that China’s assault on Christian
churches had not so much to do with religion as it had to do
with overcoming potential obstacles to consolidation of the
regime.38 Also in regard to religion, Waddams explores the
relationship between churches in Eastern Europe and the
Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow government,
particularly in light of the Orthodox Church’s ability to avoid
complete disintegration.39
Regional- and country-specific studies of communism continued
into the Cold War. Recognition that communism was not as
monolithic as it wanted to appear became commonplace. The
United States was able to exploit this shift through an opening
of relations with China in the early 1970s. Recognizing these
distinct differences in brands of communism, Tucker, in 1967,
called for a more comparative approach to studying communism
that would allow analysts to more thoroughly understand the
similarities and differences in communism around the world.
By the 1980s, changes in the communist world began to take
their toll. With the opening of US-Chinese relations, China was
rapidly industrializing, and their economy began to become the
Goliath it is today. In the Soviet Union, partly under the
influence of President Ronald Reagan, political and economic
reforms were instituted. Under the leadership of Mikhail
Gorbachev, the twin policies of glasnost and perestroika were
introduced. Glasnost led to political reforms centered around
more transparency and openness while perestroika represented
economic reforms allowing for greater private ownership. Then,
in 1989, many of the Eastern European satellite communist
states finally rebelled against their political masters, tore down

(both literally and figuratively) the wall separating Eastern and
Western Europe and transitioned to democracy. By 1991, the
Soviet Union itself was incapable of surviving and collapsed.
One of the great failures of political scientists was their
inability to predict in advance the imminent fall of communism.
Therefore, in the years following the end of Soviet communism,
much of the research about communism focused on why it all of
a sudden failed. Schopflin identifies economic problems, a lack
of government legitimacy, and shifts in public opinion as key
drivers of the Eastern European transition.40 Di Palma adds to
this the existence of a civil society in Eastern European
countries that survived the communist takeover.41 Janos
reexamines communist theory and the historical record to try to
reconstruct patterns of political change in the communist
world.42
Postcommunist Transitions
Other political scientists focused not only on the effects of the
end of Soviet communism but on examining the transition from
communism. Schopflin sees possible problems for the formerly
communist Eastern European states stemming from their
intolerance of economic inequalities that would naturally occur
in capitalist societies, as well as a hostility toward a middle
class.43 White and McAllister looked at membership in the
Communist Party in Russia and found that while it still held
some sway as being the largest of the political parties to emerge
after the fall of communism, younger and more religious
Russians had left the party, leaving its future very much in
doubt.44 Finally, Mishler and Rose find that skepticism
abounds in postcommunist countries about government, which
could make consolidation of democracy more difficult to
achieve.45
Communism continues to be an intriguing topic for political
scientists because it has left marks on societies that will exist
for decades to come. Many comparativists continue to
investigate these legacies and the continuing changes in

communist countries that still exist today such as China. At the
base level of politics, the antagonism that existed between the
former Soviet Union and the United States continues to play out
on other levels today as both countries compete for influence
around the world and, in particular, in the Middle East.
Although the Cold War may be over, the possibility for research
is not.Authoritarianism
While communism was merely the theory behind the operations
of governments in states like the Soviet Union, it is critical to
remember that ideology and government type are distinct
concepts. For many of the major communist states of the
twentieth century, and for some noncommunist states, the style
of government adopted was that of authoritarianism or
totalitarianism. Totalitarianism and authoritarianism are related
in the sense that both are forms of government where the
governing authorities have almost total and complete power.
However, totalitarianism is a type of government in which the
authorities have total and complete control over their society,
whereas authoritarian government, while still exerting almost
complete control, allows for some political freedoms although
there are no political protections or democratic procedures in
place.46 A good example of the difference between these two
types of government is China. Under Mao in the twentieth
century, China was considered a totalitarian government with
Mao, as dictator, exerting near total control over the country.
However, over time, China has allowed its citizens some limited
political power although the state still controls the process. As
such, today, China is considered an authoritarian state.
Concerns about authoritarianism naturally arise because of its
lack of democratic principles and procedures but scholarly
consideration of it increased greatly after World War II and the
totalitarian and authoritarian governments involved in the war.
In the early 1950s, Adorno and his colleagues published The
Authoritarian Personality, which proposed that authoritarianism
was a psychological trait or personality type distinguished by
strict obedience to authority and oppression of diverse ideas and

beliefs.47 Although The Authoritarian Personality was based on
a Freudian psychological analysis, scholars since the 1950s
have tried to understand authoritarianism as a political attitude,
its origins and causes, and its implications for democratic
government. For example, if a greater number of people adopt
authoritarian attitudes, they might be more willing to allow for
greater government control, more limited civil liberties and
civil rights, and a weakening of democratic principles.
In considering the causes of authoritarian attitudes, political
scientists, sociologists, and psychologists have often linked it to
beliefs in traditionalism, a need to conform to group norms,
fundamentalism, a need for social cohesion, and even racial
prejudice. One dominant theme in the research is the influence
of parental authority when an individual was young; those with
more authoritarian attitudes have been found to have had
parents who imposed stricter rules during their upbringing. In
turn, authoritarian individuals tend to be more intolerant of
minorities, to support greater use of military force, and “to
condone and even endorse illegal and blatantly undemocratic
government behavior.”48
One of the major findings since the 1950s is that authoritarian
attitudes are often linked with right-wing, conservative political
beliefs. This does not mean that there are no authoritarians who
would be considered liberal but that there was a far higher
number of authoritarians with right-wing beliefs.49 In assessing
the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes in the United States,
for instance, Cizmar and her colleagues found that the number
of Americans exhibiting authoritarian attitudes has risen since
the mid-twentieth century with a clear impact on political
polarization itself.50 Indeed, Hetherington and Weiler make this
argument explicit: that increasing polarization in the United
States is most directly attributable to the rise of authoritarian
attitudes.51 The rise of authoritarian attitudes is not limited to
the United States; right-wing, authoritarian groups and political
parties have emerged across Europe in recent years promoting
racist policies, limits on judicial independence, and anti-

immigrant policies. Norris notes that the share of votes that
authoritarian leaders and parties have been achieving has
consistently risen over this same time period.52
Why authoritarian attitudes and leaders are on the rise is more
complicated. Norris suggests that the shift is a result of a
backlash against more progressive social
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict
One of the increasingly important concerns that has drawn
attention worldwide is the phenomenon of nationalism and the
consequences that flow from it. Before defining nationalism as
a concept, it is appropriate to draw the distinction between state
and nation. A state, while the definition is diffuse and
uncertain, refers to institutions and forms of government,
whereas nation refers to a social or ethnic grouping of people.
Based on this, nationalism is a sense of group identity and
belonging that often includes a desire for self-government based
on national identity. For centuries, small states were generally
referred to as nation-states or states that reflected national
identities.Career Guidance
State development requires the work of thousands of people
andorganizations other than state governments. International
nongovernmental organizations often assist less-developed
states in improving their infrastructure, health and social
outcomes, and economy. These organizations include the United
Nations and its subsidiaries such as the World Health
Organization and International Monetary Fund, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors without Borders, and Oxfam
International. Working for a nongovernmental organization such
as one of these can be an exciting career path for those with
degrees in political science and an interest in comparative
politics or development studies.
The concept of nationalism is not new; Hah and Martin note that
it was identified as early as 1836.65 Woodrow Wilson made
nationalism and self-determination a foundation of his Fourteen
Points proposal following World War I. Yet, while the former
political scientist Wilson was calling for self-determination, his

erstwhile allies in Europe, France and the United Kingdom,
were redrawing the borders of the Middle East. In their quest
for colonial territory, France and the United Kingdom drew
territorial lines with no concern for the traditional ethnic and
religious concerns that dominated the Middle East. As such,
somewhat artificial countries were created—for example, Iraq,
that had no common history but different religious and ethnic
groups that do not care to live together.
Conflicts spurred on by nationalist and ethnic identities are
increasing in the modern world. The end of the Cold War and
the increase of globalization has brought more groups into
contact with each other, leading to the potential for more
conflicts.66 But nationalism can be a potentially valuable
attitude as well; the belief in American values and ideals is a
sort of nationalism that binds and knits a country together. But
it “can just as plausibly be seen as a kind of particularism
denying non-citizens or culturally deviant citizens full human
rights and, in the extreme cases, even denying them membership
in the community of humans.”67 It is this more extreme case
that has led to conflict between groups such as the Hutus and
Tutsis in Rwanda, between Sunni and Shia Muslims in the
Middle East, and Arabs and non-Arabs in Darfur.
Nationalism can exist in many forms. Economic
nationalism promotes a country’s economy by protecting
industries and businesses within the country and instituting
tariffs and taxes to protect the domestic economy from outside
economies. There exists a thread of black nationalism in
American discourse. Then there is the ethnic nationalism that
can often lead to the deadly conflict we see around the world
today.
So why should nationalism necessarily lead to conflict? In many
ethnic conflicts, the concern is about territory and sovereignty
over a given parcel of land. If there are multiple ethnic or
religious groups in one area and both believe they should have
sovereignty, conflict will naturally develop. The Arab-Israeli
conflict is yet another example of the types of conflicts that

arise. And like the Arab-Israeli struggle, there is no easy answer
to the question; there is no way to create more land and both
groups want it and do not want to share it. Thus nationalism can
also prevent solutions to conflicts.
Certainly, political scientists have been able to connect
nationalism to a variety of consequences, most significantly
war.68 However, de las Casas suggests that the aspects of
nationalism that foster a sense of group identity and pride can
lead to outcomes such as a stronger economy and less
government corruption.69 It seems, then, that nationalism, like
many of the concepts we’ve discussed thus far, isn’t necessarily
good or bad; it’s in how it’s used that creates positive or
negative effects.
Chapter Summary
· Comparative politics is not only a field of study in political
science but a research method. The comparative method
provides a means of testing hypotheses while controlling for
potentially confounding variables.
· The idea of the state is a significant one in politics. States are
key actors in the political system, and being a strong or weak
state can come with significant consequences. However, given
increasing globalization and the role of international
organizations, the role of the state could be shifting.
· Communist countries played a key role in the twentieth
century and into the twenty-first century. Political scientists
have struggled to understand communist politics and patterns of
developing in postcommunist countries.
· Many states around the world continue to develop in terms of
politics, economics, and strength. Development studies examine
best practices and help to identify key goals, but they are often
hampered by pro-Western ideals that may not fit culturally
elsewhere.
· Nationalistic attitudes and beliefs have contributed to both
development and conflict. Ethnicity can reinforce nationalism

and contribute to conflicts around the world.
Key Terms
· authoritarian: Type of government that, while still exerting
almost complete control, allows for some political freedoms
although there are no political protections or democratic
procedures in place
· Cold War: Period of ideological conflict from the end of
World War II to 1991 between the Soviet Union and the United
States
· comparative politics: The study of countries and politics
around the world
· democracy: States that have free, fair, and frequent elections
and in which civil liberties are recognized and protected
· development: How advanced a state is in terms of economics
and social problems
· economic nationalism: Attitudes in favor of protecting a
country’s economic independence and autonomy
· failed state: No entity that can exert sovereignty over territory
· glasnost: Series of Soviet political reforms in the 1980s
· globalization: Increasing economic and other connections
between states
· modernization theory: Less-developed countries (LDCs) to
developmentally advance as they adopted more Western
political and economic practices
· nationalism: Sense of group identity and belonging that often
includes a desire for self-government based on national identity
· perestroika: Series of Soviet economic reforms in the 1980s
· selection bias: Occurs when the cases that are chosen to be
studied are systematically skewed
· state: Groups of people living under a single governmental
system
· state strength: The ability of states to control political
outcomes
· totalitarianism: Type of government in which the authorities
have total and complete control over their society
Discussion Questions

1. What is the comparative method? Give an example of how
you can use it to study comparative politics.
2. What are some of the different ways democracy can be
defined?
3. What are some ways in which democracy, globalization, and
development might be related?
4. Do you believe globalization is a good or bad thing? What
about nationalism? Why or why not?
Further Reading
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture:
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. Newbury
Park, CA: Sage, 1989.
Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972.
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1957.
Lijphart, Arend. “Comparative Politics and the Comparative
Method.” American Political Science Review 65, no.
3 (1971): 682–693.
Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions
in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994.
Freedom House: https://freedomhouse.org
United Nations Millennium Development
Goals: www.un.org/millenniumgoals
Notes
1. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative
Method,” American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971):
682 (emphasis in the original).
2. Ibid., 683.
3. David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls:
Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” World Politics 49, no.
1 (1996): 59.
4. Peter J. Steinberger, “Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Modern
Conception of the State,” The Journal of Politics 70, no. 3
(2008): 595–611.

5. J. P. Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World
Politics 20, no. 4 (1968): 559, 561.
6. Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative
Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative
Politics 16, no. 2 (1984): 223–246.
7. Krasner, “Approaches to the State.”
8. Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond the
Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” American Political
Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77–96.
9. Ibid., 78.
10. David J. Samuels, Comparative Politics (Boston: Pearson,
2003).
11. Tuong Vu, “Studying the State through State
Formation,” World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 148–175.
12. Evenly B. Davidheiser, “Strong States, Weak States: The
Role of the State in Revolution,” Comparative Politics 24, no. 4
(1992): 463–475.
13. Eghosa E. Osaghe, “Fragile States,” Development in
Practice 17, no. 4/5 (2007): 691.
14. James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and
Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” International
Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2008): 469–488.
15. Stewart Patrick, “‘Failed’ States and Global Security:
Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas, International Studies
Review 9, no. 4 (2007): 644–662.
16. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1
(1959): 71.
17. Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1956).
18. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1957).
19. Kenneth A. Bollen, “Issues in the Comparative
Measurement of Political Democracy,” American Sociological
Review 45, no. 3 (1980): 372.

20. Edward N. Muller, “Democracy, Economic Development,
and Income Inequality,” American Sociological Review 53
(1988): 54.
21. Kenneth A. Bollen and Pamela Paxton, “Subjective
Measures of Liberal Democracy,” Comparative Political
Studies 33, no. 1 (2000): 58–86.
22. Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Civic Culture
and Democracy: The Question of Causal
Relationships,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 3
(1994): 635–652.
23. Michael L. Ross, “Does Taxation Lead to
Representation?” British Journal of Political Science 34, no. 2
(2004): 229–249.
24. Anibal Perez-Linan and Scott Mainwaring, “Regime
Legacies and Levels of Democracy: Evidence from Latin
America,” Comparative Politics 45, no. 4 (2013): 379–397.
25. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994).
26. Matthew A. Baum and David A. Lake, “The Political
Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital,” American
Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (2003): 333–347.
27. Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, “Democracy and
Environmental Degradation,” International Studies
Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2006): 935–956.

Chapter 9International RelationsChapter Objectives1. Explain.docx

More Related Content

Similar to Chapter 9International RelationsChapter Objectives1. Explain.docx (9)

More from mccormicknadine86 (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

Chapter 9International RelationsChapter Objectives1. Explain.docx