China's Incomplete Military Transformation

China’s Incomplete
Military Transformation
Assessing the Weaknesses of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Michael S. Chase, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung,
Kristen A. Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska,
Samuel K. Berkowitz
C O R P O R A T I O N

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iii
Preface
Since the mid-1990s, the People’s Republic of China has invested enor-
mous resources in developing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into
a modern force that can secure various national interests both at home
and now increasingly abroad. The stunning U.S. victory in Opera-
tion Desert Storm (Iraq) in 1991; U.S. involvement in the 1995–1996
Taiwan Strait Crisis; and U.S. military intervention in Kosovo in 1999,
during which the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade, motivated Chinese leaders to invest considerable
resources in the transformation of the PLA into a more modern, profes-
sional, and operationally capable fighting force. These conflicts bluntly
demonstrated to the People’s Republic of China that it lacked a mili-
tary that could effectively fight and win wars against modern oppo-
nents, especially adversaries who could effectively harness the infor-
mation revolution and successfully conduct joint operations. Although
the modernization drive is now over two decades old and has yielded
impressive results, numerous weaknesses persist. This report assesses
many of the weaknesses in the PLA’s human capital and organizational
realms, in the PLA’s combat capabilities across various domains (land,
sea, air, space, cyber, and electromagnetic), and in China’s defense
research and industrial complex. It does so by examining how these
weaknesses affect the PLA’s performance of missions Beijing tasks or
may task the force to carry out and by reviewing Chinese assessments
of the PLA’s shortcomings and their potential implications. This study
should be of interest to military analysts, policymakers, lawmakers, or

iv China’s Incomplete Military Transformation
anyone interested in Chinese military affairs and their security impli-
cations for the United States and its allies and partners.
This research was sponsored by the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission (USCC), which Congress established in
2000 to monitor and report on the economic and national security
dimensions of U.S. trade and economic ties with the People’s Republic
of China.
This research was conducted within the International Security
and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research
Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense
and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign
policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and founda-
tions and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense
and national security analysis.
For more information on the International Security and Defense
Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp.html or
contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page).

v
Contents
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures and Tables.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: The Importance of Understanding the People’s
Liberation Army’s Weaknesses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Defining Weakness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Sources and Methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Limitations of Sources and Knowledge Gaps.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Organization of This Report.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CHAPTER TWO
People’s Liberation Army Modernization: Mid‑1990s to 2025. . . . . . . . . . 13
People’s Liberation Army Modernization Since the 1990s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Likely Trajectory of People’s Liberation Army Modernization Through
2025.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Factors That Could Change the Direction of People’s Liberation Army
Modernization.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CHAPTER THREE
Missions of the People’s Liberation Army.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
The People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Objectives.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
People’s Liberation Army Mission Sets, Relevant Campaigns, and
Intended Campaign Effects.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

vi China’s Incomplete Military Transformation
People’s Liberation Army’s Capabilities to Conduct Missions Through
2025.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
CHAPTER FOUR
Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army Organization and
Human Capital.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Potential Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army Organization and
Human Capital.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Impact on the People’s Liberation Army’s Ability to Achieve Its
Missions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
How the People’s Liberation Army Is Attempting to Address These
Weaknesses.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
CHAPTER FIVE
Weaknesses of People’s Liberation Army Combat Capabilities.. . . . . . . . . 69
The Two Incompatibles and the Two Gaps. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
The Land Domain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
The Sea Domain.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
The Air Domain.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
The Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Nuclear Deterrence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
CHAPTER SIX
Weaknesses in China’s Defense Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
China’s Improving Defense Industry Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Weaknesses of China’s Defense Industry.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Potential Impact of Weaknesses in China’s Defense Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion: People’s Liberation Army Weaknesses and Their
Implications.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
APPENDIX
Critical Assumptions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Abbreviations.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

vii
Figures and Tables
Figures
4.1. PLA Manpower, 1990–2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.1. Numbers of PLA Main Battle Tanks, by Generation,
1990–2014.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2. Comparison of Main Battle Tank Inventories Possessed by
China’s Neighbors, 1990–2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3. Numbers of PLA Air Defense Surface Combatants by
SAM Range, 1990–2014.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.4. Comparison of Principal Surface Combatants Possessed by
China’s Neighbors, 1990–2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.5. Numbers of Modern and Legacy PLA Fighter Aircraft,
1990–2014.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.6. Comparison of Fighter and Fighter Ground Attack
Aircraft Possessed by China’s Neighbors, 1990–2014.. . . . . . . . . 103
5.7. Numbers of PLA Special-Mission Aircraft by Role,
1990–2014.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Tables
4.1. Major PLA Organizational Changes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.1. The Impact of Identified Land Domain Weaknesses on
PLA Missions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.2. The Impact of Identified Sea Domain Weaknesses on
PLA Missions.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

viii China’s Incomplete Military Transformation
5.3. The Impact of Identified Air Domain Weaknesses on
PLA Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

ix
Executive Summary
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has undergone a remarkable
transformation since the mid-1990s. With most of the attention cur-
rently devoted to the PLA’s growing capabilities, it is easy to forget that,
in the 1980s and 1990s, the PLA was not only saddled with outdated
equipment but also hamstrung by problems with personnel quality,
poor training, and the distractions and massive corruption associated
with involvement in an array of commercial activities. Reflecting the
high priority attached to modernizing the PLA, sustained increases in
defense spending, reaching double-digit percentage increases in most
years, have fueled the PLA’s rapid progress since the mid- to late 1990s.
Along with the substantial resources China is devoting to national
defense, the PLA’s progress has been impressive overall, and the PLA
is clearly becoming an increasingly professional and capable fighting
force. It is thus understandable that assessments of the PLA tend to
focus on the achievements of its rapid modernization over the past
two decades. Analysts have devoted insufficient attention, however, to
studying the PLA’s persisting weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
We have found that the PLA suffers from potentially serious
weaknesses. These shortcomings could limit its ability to successfully
conduct the information-centric, integrated joint operations Chinese
military strategists see as required to fight and win future wars. Chi-
nese military writers and outside analysts generally agree that these
weaknesses fall into two broad categories. The first is institutional. The
PLA faces shortcomings stemming from outdated command struc-
tures, quality of personnel, professionalism, and corruption. The second

x China’s Incomplete Military Transformation
set of weaknesses centers on combat capabilities. These shortcomings
include logistical weaknesses, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities,
limited numbers of special-mission aircraft, and deficiencies in fleet air
defense and antisubmarine warfare. Although the PLA’s capabilities
have improved dramatically, its remaining weaknesses increase the risk
of failure to successfully perform some of the missions Chinese Com-
munist Party leaders may task it to execute, such as in various Taiwan
contingencies, maritime claim missions, sea line of communication
protection, and some military operations other than war scenarios.
Our premise was that understanding where the PLA falls short of
its aspirations, or perhaps has not fully recognized the need for improve-
ment, is just as essential as understanding the PLA’s strengths. The PLA
is increasingly capable of threatening its neighbors and holding U.S.
bases and other high-value assets at risk, but shortfalls threaten its abil-
ity to accomplish many of its assigned missions. It is also important to
know what Chinese military officers think about the PLA’s shortcom-
ings: Understanding the PLA’s self-assessments can enable U.S. plan-
ners and policymakers to respond more effectively to the challenges
China’s impressive, but incomplete, military transformation poses.
Assessing a rapidly modernizing military’s emerging operational
concepts and capabilities in peacetime is a difficult analytical task, but
understanding that military’s shortcomings is perhaps even more com-
plex. Some weaknesses are readily apparent in the form of a brittle
capability or a single point of failure, but other weaknesses truly mani-
fest themselves only when a gap exists between the requirements of a
mission and the actual ability of a military to perform it. Indeed, accu-
rately and completely assessing PLA weaknesses requires understand-
ing the various missions and the potential threat environment in which
the missions may be conducted. Far from the infantry-centric army of
the past, which sought to draw invaders deep into Chinese territory
to fight a guerilla war, the PLA today performs an increasing number
of missions that span the spectrum of conflict and military operations
other than war both at home and, increasingly, regionally and globally.
Although the PLA has dramatically improved its ability to per-
form assigned missions, including countering U.S. military interven-
tion, if necessary, we found that a number of serious challenges remain.

Executive Summary xi
The PLA itself seems to be well aware of its shortcomings. Indeed, PLA
publications are replete with references to problems in many areas,
and discussions of these problems often highlight what Chinese writ-
ers refer to as the “two incompatibles,” reflecting their assessment that
the PLA’s capabilities are still unable to (1) cope with the demands of
winning a local war under informatized conditions and (2) successfully
carry out the PLA’s other missions.1
Chinese military writers, as well as expert foreign observers, note
that many of the key weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces stem
from shortcomings in organizational structure and the challenges
involved in bringing the PLA’s human capital up to the proficiency
levels required to perform its missions effectively. The PLA’s organiza-
tional structure is often portrayed as an obstacle to greater “jointness”
and to the PLA’s ability to execute modern informatized military oper-
ations. Weaknesses in the realm of human capital include continuing
concerns about insufficient educational accomplishments and levels of
technical proficiency among soldiers and officers; shortcomings in the
realms of mental and physical health; and problems with corruption,
morale, and professionalism, including difficulties accepting military
discipline and maintaining operational security.
The PLA also faces shortfalls in terms of its combat capabilities.
Many Chinese strategists identify the inability to conduct integrated
joint operations at the desired level of competence as the central prob-
lem China faces as it aspires to project combat power beyond its land
borders. Indeed, Chinese sources highlight several problems that con-
tribute to the PLA’s shortcomings in the area of joint operations and
suggest that there is still a large gap between China and developed
countries’ militaries, especially the United States. PLA publications
also highlight continuing shortfalls in training, despite years of effort
to make training more realistic and more valuable in terms of address-
ing shortcomings and improving the PLA’s operational capabilities.
1 Informatized conditions is a PLA concept characterized by a “system-of-system operations
. . . [focus that] requires enhancing systems and weapons with information capabilities and
linking geographically dispersed forces and capabilities into an integrated system capable of
unified action” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2014, p. 9).

xii China’s Incomplete Military Transformation
In addition, the publications point to persistent challenges in combat
support and combat service support functions and forces, as reflected
by frequent discussions of shortcomings in logistics and maintenance
capabilities that appear in PLA newspaper reports and journal articles.
Many shortfalls specific to China’s naval and air forces remain
despite major advances in their capabilities in recent years. While the
People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) new surface combatants
and submarines boast impressive capabilities comparable with those
of a modern world-class navy, the PLAN still faces a number of chal-
lenges. These exist in such areas as the integration of increasingly com-
plex modern weapons and equipment platforms; the training of PLAN
personnel, who currently are not fully equipped to operate or maintain
them; and the mastery of such capabilities as antisubmarine warfare
and amphibious operations. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
has similarly made enormous strides but must still cope with such chal-
lenges as a large force comprising multiple generations of aircraft, a
shortage of key special-mission aircraft, unrealistic training, and insuf-
ficient strategic transport capability.
The PLA also faces potential weaknesses in its ability to pro-
tect Chinese interests in space and the electromagnetic spectrum and
to operate successfully in these areas to support military campaigns
requiring information dominance. Indeed, as China places more and
more satellites in orbit, the PLA is becoming more dependent on space
capabilities for such important functions as intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance; navigation and positioning; and communications.
Chinese military publications suggest that the PLA still sees itself as
less dependent on space than the U.S. military but also appear to rec-
ognize, albeit largely implicitly, that increasing reliance on space brings
greater vulnerability. China also sees itself as potentially vulnerable
in the electromagnetic spectrum. One area in which this concern has
been particularly pronounced is Chinese concern about cybersecurity
weaknesses. Indeed, the PLA clearly views itself as occupying a rela-
tively disadvantageous position due to its perceived inferiority in the
key aspects of “network military struggle.” This problem may become
more pressing as the PLA increases its reliance on technology that is

Executive Summary xiii
potentially vulnerable to disruption, thus creating a weakness an adver-
sary could exploit.
Although China’s defense industry has made tremendous prog-
ress in terms of its ability to deliver advanced weaponry and equipment
to the PLA over the past two decades, it also suffers from a number of
problems that have yet to be resolved. Indeed, China’s defense industry
is still in transition from central planning to a more market-oriented
system, and many major obstacles remain to be tackled. The main
problems the defense industry faces include widespread corruption,
lack of competition, entrenched monopolies, delays and cost overruns,
quality control problems, bureaucratic fragmentation, an outdated
acquisition system, and restricted access to external sources of technol-
ogy and expertise.
The PLA can be expected to attempt to address these self-assessed
weaknesses and vulnerabilities and to develop new capabilities to fill
gaps in its ability to protect China’s expanding international interests.
As the PLA continues to modernize, it is critical for U.S. analysts, plan-
ners, and decisionmakers to improve their understanding of the PLA’s
shortcomings—and how the PLA itself sees these weaknesses and vul-
nerabilities. This is key to identifying the PLA’s future modernization
paths; enhancing military-to-military engagement; tailoring deterrence
strategies to be the most effective in influencing the Chinese leader-
ship’s decision calculus; and if deterrence fails, exploiting the PLA’s
weaknesses to ensure the United States and its allies are able to prevent
China from using force to achieve its policy objectives.

China's Incomplete Military Transformation

xv
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Caitlin Campbell and the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission for their flexibility and
patience during the preparation of this report. We would also like to
thank Seth G. Jones, Director of the International Security and Defense
Policy Center at RAND, for his support and guidance; Dennis Blasko
of CNA Corporation, who generously provided a treasure trove of data
that we readily incorporated; and Karl W. Eikenberry and Cortez A.
Cooper III for their thoughtful and incisive reviews.

1
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: The Importance of Understanding
the People’s Liberation Army’s Weaknesses
Much of the growing scholarly and analytical attention devoted to the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) focuses on improvements in
its capabilities; the military modernization of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) has achieved impressive results since the 1990s. In
recent years, observers have chronicled China’s deployment of increas-
ingly capable equipment, including modern multimission surface
ships; advanced submarines; more-modern fighter aircraft; and con-
ventional cruise and ballistic missiles, including an antiship ballistic
missile (ASBM) designed to target U.S. aircraft carriers (Office of the
Secretary of Defense [OSD], 2014). Scholars and analysts have also
highlighted Chinese efforts to enhance the PLA’s command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (C4ISR) systems and its space and cyber warfare capabilities (for
example, Pollpeter, 2012, and Tellis, 2007). Other studies have high-
lighted China’s transition to a more-credible nuclear deterrent force.
In addition, a number of studies have addressed improvements in PLA
“software,” such as in the areas of personnel quality, education and
training, and joint operations capabilities (for example, Ayuso and
Henley, 2014).
It is certainly understandable that assessments of the PLA typi-
cally focus on the achievements of its rapid modernization over the past
two decades, but studying its weaknesses and vulnerabilities is equally
essential. It is also important to know what Chinese military officers
think about the PLA’s shortcomings. In particular, better understand-
ing of how the PLA itself sees these weaknesses and vulnerabilities is

2 China’s Incomplete Military Transformation
key to understanding its future modernization priorities; enhancing
military-to-military engagement; tailoring deterrence strategies to be
the most effective in influencing the Chinese leadership’s decision cal-
culus; and if deterrence fails, exploiting these weaknesses to ensure that
the United States and its allies will be able to prevent China from using
force to achieve its objectives.
Understanding the PLA’s weaknesses is clearly important, but
assessing a rapidly modernizing military’s shortcomings is not straight-
forward. Some weaknesses are readily apparent in the form of a brittle
capability or a single point of failure, but other weaknesses truly mani-
fest themselves only when a gap exists between the requirements of
a mission and the actual ability of a military to perform it. Indeed,
to accurately and completely assess PLA weaknesses, it is essential to
understand the various missions assigned to the force and the potential
threat environments in which these missions may be conducted.
Defining Weakness
For the purposes of this report, military weakness can take three forms:
(1) outright inability to perform a mission, (2) high risk of mission fail-
ure, or (3) inefficiencies that degrade mission outcomes.1
Clausewitz (1984, p. 95) famously stated that the “end for which
every soldier is recruited, clothed, armed, and trained, the whole object
of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should
fight at the right place and right time.” This is as true of the soldiers
in the PLA today as it was for the Prussian army in Clausewitz’s time.
Keeping this in mind, the most obvious weakness that might assail the
PLA (or any military force) is the very inability to fight or, to take some
liberty with the above quote, to perform missions where and when
called on to do so. Utter inability to perform a mission constitutes the
1 This definition is only intended to provide a functional, policy relevant means of consid-
ering weakness as it relates to the realm of military affairs. Furthermore, it not intended to
be PLA specific but rather applicable to all militaries.

Introduction 3
most severe form of military weakness.2 We refer to this as a Type 1
weakness.
Weaknesses are also present if the mission has a high risk of fail-
ure. This type of weakness might originate from an external source,
such as the threats an adversary’s relative military capabilities or the
operating environment itself might pose.3 The source might also be
internal, derived from reliance on single points of dependency. Such
weaknesses might be known ahead of time and would therefore con-
stitute calculated (or reckless) risks. Pressing ahead in this instance is a
form of gambling. Alternatively, weaknesses might be recognized only
in retrospect, when decisions to press ahead have been made in igno-
rance. We refer to this as a Type 2 weakness.
The third form of military weakness occurs when inefficiencies
in military capabilities degrade a military operation’s outcome. These
inefficiencies could originate from numerous sources (processes, per-
sonnel, equipment, leadership, force structure, etc.) and are often,
although not exclusively, due to factors within a military. Unlike the
binary nature of the first weakness mentioned, this weakness is usu-
ally recognized through comparison, either by comparing one mili-
tary’s performance to another’s or by using some other measuring stick.
Although problematic, this form of weakness is the least severe because
the probability of (eventual) mission achievement is the highest. We
refer to this as a Type 3 weakness.
Sources and Methodology
Our methodology is empirical and inductive. Our approach relied
on the collection, synthesis, and analysis of a wide range of Chinese
military publications, including volumes on military strategy and
campaigns, journal articles, and newspaper reports. We also reviewed
unclassified U.S. government and foreign government publications
2 This should not be confused with effort, as a military may exert considerable effort but
still fail.
3 Numerous militaries, even in the 21st century, cannot effectively fight at night.

that address various aspects of Chinese military modernization, such as
the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) annual reports on military
and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China,
various assessments by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center
(NASIC) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and previous
RAND research on the transformation of the PLA. In particular, such
publications helped us corroborate the material that appears in Chinese
self-assessments and facilitated the exploration of weaknesses Chinese
sources may overlook, as discussed in greater detail later.
Regarding primary sources, this analysis relied on official docu-
ments, such as Chinese defense white papers, and on key PLA publica-
tions on military strategy and campaigns. Some of the Chinese military
books we relied on most heavily in areas related to military strategy are
the three editions of The Science of Military Strategy (Gao Rui, 1987;
Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, 2005; and Shou Xiaosong, 2013),
which were published by Military Science Press, the publishing house
of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science.4 We consider these three
volumes to be authoritative representations of PLA thinking on issues
of military strategy. Furthermore, they are core textbooks in the PLA’s
masters-level professional military education curriculum taught to the
cohort of midcareer PLA officers from whom the PLA’s future general
officers will be chosen.
With respect to issues related to campaigns, we relied most heav-
ily on three sources:
1. The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Wang Houqing and Zhang
Xingye, 2000)
2. The Science of Campaigns [战役学] (Zhang Yuliang, 2006)
3. Campaign Theory Study Guide [战役理论学习指南] (Bi Xing-
lin, 2002).
To the best of our knowledge, these are the most authoritative publicly
available sources on Chinese military thinking about the campaign
4 The 2005 English edition of The Science of Military Strategy is a direct translation of a
2001 Chinese-language edition of that work.

Introduction 5
level of warfare. These books are not doctrinal publications, but we
believe they are informed by Chinese military doctrinal publications,
which are known as campaign outlines or campaign essentials [纲要],
and that they are very likely to reflect official views on doctrinal issues.
That said, doctrine is always evolving, and the PLA can be expected to
continue to revise or update its doctrinal thinking along with changes
in China’s military strategic guidelines and the expected reform of the
PLA’s organizational structure.5
We also used a number of books and other sources that focus
more narrowly on particular aspects of Chinese military moderniza-
tion, specific types of operations, or certain components of the PLA.
For example, two important books that specifically address strategic
missile force issues are
1. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns [第二炮兵战役学]
(Yu Jixun, 2004)
2. Intimidation Warfare: A Comprehensive Discussion of Missile
Deterrence [慑战－导弹威慑纵横谈] (Zhao Xijun, 2005).
The former is a detailed volume that covers virtually all aspects of mis-
sile force campaign operations, from deterrence actions to conventional
missile strike campaigns and nuclear counterattack campaigns. The
latter, edited by a former deputy commander of the PLA Second Artil-
lery Force (PLASAF), covers a wide range of subjects related to the
employment of the strategic missile force for deterrence and the intimi-
dation of potential rivals.
We also reviewed more than 300 recent articles from authorita-
tive Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and military journals and news-
papers that discuss problems and shortcomings. These sources include
such journals as China Military Science; PLA Daily; the official service
newspapers and military region newspapers; and defense industry peri-
odicals. The main Chinese military newspapers we used in the prepara-
tion of this report are the following:
5 On organizational restructuring, see “Full Text of 18th CPC . . . ” (2013); “China Plans
Military Reform . . .” (2014); Mulvenon (2014a, 2014b); and Heath (2014).

1. Liberation Army Daily [解放军报], the official newspaper of the
PLA
2. People’s Navy [人民海军], the official newspaper of the PLA
Navy (PLAN)
3. Air Force News [空军报], the official newspaper of the PLA Air
Force (PLAAF)
4. Rocket Force News [火箭兵报], the official newspaper of
PLASAF.
Additionally, each of the military regions publishes a newspaper,
of which we have consulted various editions:
1. Advance News [前进报], from the Shenyang Military Region
2. Vanguard News [前卫报], from the Jinan Military Region
3. People’s Armed Forces [人民军队], from the Lanzhou Military
Region
4. People’s Front [人民前线], from the Nanjing Military Region
5. Battle Flag News [战其报], from the Chengdu Military Region
6. Soldiers News [战士报], from the Guangzhou Military Region
7. Comrade-in-Arms News [战友报], from the Beijing Military
Region.
Unlike similar discussions in the past that were vague and anon-
ymous, most of these recent articles, presumably with Xi Jinping’s
encouragement or inspiration, discuss more openly the who, what,
when, and where of the self-criticism related to continued military
weakness. This may signify that, under Xi Jinping, China’s leaders are
more focused on identifying and correcting the PLA’s weaknesses than
they were under Hu Jintao’s leadership.
We have attempted to evaluate the level of authoritativeness of
the Chinese-language publications we cite here. Particularly as China’s
publishing landscape has become more complex and as the availability
of Chinese language publications on military affairs has increased in
recent years, it has become more and more important to attempt to
ascertain whether a given publication reflects the views of an individual
author or is more representative of broader thinking in the PLA. In all,
these sources provide a broad view of Chinese military shortcomings,

Introduction 7
although they have their limitations and still leave a number of impor-
tant knowledge gaps.
Limitations of Sources and Knowledge Gaps
On the whole, we believe the sources on which we have relied paint
an accurate picture of the PLA’s strengths and weaknesses. Such docu-
ments as China’s defense white papers and PLA professional military
education publications present what we consider to be a reliable, highly
authoritative description of the Chinese military’s roles and missions
and of the types of campaigns it must be prepared to execute. While
professional military education publications are not doctrine, we assess
that they are doctrinally informed and that they make up the curricu-
lum of what the PLA is teaching its midlevel officers, including those
who will ultimately become senior officers. With respect to human cap-
ital issues, the PLA newspaper articles and many of the other sources
that address these problems are official publications aimed first and
foremost at an internal audience.
While the available data provide an excellent window on relatively
open assessments of the state of Chinese military modernization, the
fact that these articles come from officially censored Party and military
publications raises questions about the nature of some of the content.
The repetitive pattern of the critiques seems to indicate preapproved
talking points to shape the narratives, while excluding other topics and
details. This raises questions about the political intentions—such as
whether they are intended to support Xi Jinping’s political agenda and,
if so, whether they being used primarily to consolidate his power across
the military rather than to discuss shortcomings critically. Is this a
shift to greater openness as China’s capabilities improve? Does it reflect
substantive changes in China’s quest for modern military power? Addi-
tionally, service newspapers offer considerable insight into areas that
senior officers appear to recognize as requiring greater attention, but in
most cases, they do not provide finely grained assessments. We believe
it is reasonable to assume that, because these are unclassified Chinese
publications, they probably do not talk about certain particularly sen-

sitive or otherwise potentially high-risk weaknesses and vulnerabilities
that the PLA presumably wishes to conceal from outside observers.
Further deep mining of Chinese open sources (including books,
professional journals, newspaper articles, and theses and dissertations)
over a longer period could add further details on the problems being
discussed across the services. On the other hand, we should also con-
sider the elements of propaganda these may serve—disinformation and
exaggeration—domestically and internationally. Domestically, these
could be a push to energize change and break deadlocks in implement-
ing reforms. Concurrently, at the international level, these may encour-
age complacency and debate to influence how Asia-Pacific neighbors
and others view the challenges of China’s rising combat power and,
especially, to undermine the ability to formulate strategies individually
or collectively to manage the challenges of a rising China.
Furthermore, the PLA certainly understands that these publica-
tions are also accessible to external audiences, which raises the possibil-
ity that at least some of the content is intended to influence the percep-
tions of foreign observers. However, we judge it is extremely unlikely
that the PLA would be able to employ this vast body of literature pri-
marily for denial and deception without confusing and misleading the
PLA officers and other personnel who constitute the vast majority of
the audience for these publications.
Capturing more detail from Chinese open sources will still not
resolve all outstanding questions about China’s current and future
combat capabilities. Confirmation from direct and/or third-party
observation is critically important. This information gap could be
addressed to some degree by exploiting other open sources that discuss
Chinese military capabilities in Russian and other third-party sources;
exploiting information from military-to-military activities between
China and other countries; and of course, collecting intelligence.
Chinese military publications are replete with references to areas
in which PLA officers themselves acknowledge China’s military still
falls short of the requirements for a broader and more-complex set of
missions. Yet these publications may not tell the full story, for a variety
of reasons, so it is necessary to corroborate the self-assessments to the
degree possible. To judge the extent that such publications offer accu-

Introduction 9
rate insights into the PLA’s actual shortcomings, we compared them
with external assessments. The sources we used to corroborate the char-
acterizations of PLA weaknesses that appear in Chinese publications
include studies from think tanks and research institutions, such as the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the RAND Cor-
poration, and CNA Corporation; congressional testimony and other
public statements from senior U.S. military officers and intelligence
officials; various unclassified reports from ONI and NASIC; DoD’s
annual reports on Chinese military power (Office of the Secretary of
Defense [OSD], 2014, and earlier editions); and assessments of PLA
modernization that appear in similar reports from the governments of
Taiwan (Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China, 2013, and
earlier editions) and Japan (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2014, and pre-
vious editions).
Further discussion in the relevant sections of this report will also
discuss what these external sources have to say, if anything, about the
weaknesses identified in PLA sources, to try to corroborate the validity
of the Chinese-language primary sources. Specifically, our compari-
sons appear at the end of each of the sections that address potential
weaknesses in the land, sea, and air domains. Overall, we found the
PLA publications to be consistent with the judgments contained in
these analyses of Chinese military modernization, and there is sub-
stantial overlap between the findings of outside analysts and the PLA’s
own assessments in a number of key areas related to the PLA’s strengths
and weaknesses. Indeed, in many cases, the outside assessments track
relatively closely with self-assessments from PLA authors.6 Two promi-
nent examples are the clear match between the judgments of outside
observers and PLA sources that the PLA’s command structure is in
6 Some external assessments of PLA capabilities and weaknesses were drawn in part from
the same primary sources we examined and should therefore be seen as reflecting, rather than
corroborating, the judgments that appear in the Chinese publications. We have attempted
to ensure that we do not cite external judgments as corroboration when they appear to be
based on the same Chinese primary sources we reviewed for this report. Additionally, we
have attempted to address this problem by relying less on Western publications that depend
largely on the same types of Chinese publications we reviewed in the course of this study and
more on U.S. and foreign government assessments that draw on other sources of information.

need of reform and that the PLA still falls short of its desired capability
to carry out “integrated joint operations.” It is notable, however, that
we are unable to compare these publications to PLA self-assessments in
some cases. For example, in some areas, the coverage does not overlap
enough to make a clear judgment about the validity of the PLA’s own
assessments of its weaknesses.
On the whole, we believe that our approach, despite its limita-
tions, represents the best available way to address the research ques-
tions. There are, however, some potential problems our approach can
mitigate but not fully address. For example, a number of possible weak-
nesses may not be discussed in PLA publications and may not be readily
apparent or easily identifiable by outside observation, while others may
be exaggerated for effect in PLA publications and may be difficult or
impossible to independently verify. Because the objective of this report
is to highlight potential weaknesses that an external audience might
not otherwise recognize and because we believe that understanding the
PLA’s subjective evaluation of its own weaknesses is important even
if some of the PLA self-assessments may be mistaken or perhaps even
deliberately over- or understated, we err on the side of including all
available sources that appear to shed light on the research questions.
On the whole, we believe the available sources paint a fairly clear
picture of the PLA’s sense of its own weaknesses, and in many cases,
these track with the openly available assessments contained in a variety
of external reports on the Chinese military. Where divergences exist,
we believe the Chinese sources remain useful, even though it is possible
that the PLA is attempting to deceive outside observers. If so, analysts
may gain a better understanding of which capabilities or weaknesses
the PLA may seek to exaggerate or conceal. It is also possible, however,
that divergences could arise because the PLA may suffer from organiza-
tional or cultural biases that complicate self-assessments. In such cases,
the perceptions of Chinese military officers still matter. Even if these
subjective assessments do not correlate with actual weaknesses, they are
still likely to inform the PLA’s thinking about its modernization pri-
orities and are potentially relevant to efforts to deter China from using
force to resolve disputes with its neighbors.

Introduction 11
In the course of our analysis, we identified some important knowl-
edge gaps that should be highlighted. One of the key knowledge gaps
is the extent to which a rapidly changing military, one that is clearly
becoming much more capable despite persistent weaknesses, may con-
vince Chinese leaders that they have policy and strategy options they
previously lacked. Another is how China’s thinking about its defense
requirements and the PLA’s weaknesses might change in the event of a
major shift in its threat environment, such as a sharp downturn in the
U.S.-China relationship or a major deterioration of Sino-Indian rela-
tions accompanied by a perception of an increasing nuclear threat from
India. The self-assessments the PLA presents to senior CCP leaders and
how they interpret the judgments the PLA presents to them constitute
another key gap that is not easy to fill using the available Chinese-
language publications or the outside assessments in government and
think tank reports. This is a particularly important issue because what
the PLA tells Party leaders about its ability to perform various missions
presumably influences Beijing’s calculus about scenarios in which it
might consider employing military power to achieve its national secu-
rity objectives.
Organization of This Report
The rest of this report is organized as follows. Chapter Two details
the overall scope and scale of PLA modernization since the mid-1990s
and assesses its likely trajectory through 2025. Chapter Three presents
an overview of the missions CCP leaders have assigned to the PLA.
Chapter Four provides an assessment of the PLA’s organizational and
human capital weaknesses. Chapter Five provides detailed assessments
of weaknesses in the PLA’s operational capabilities in the land, sea,
air, cyber, space, and electromagnetic domains and nuclear deterrence.
Chapter Six offers an analysis of shortcomings in China’s defense
industry. Chapter Seven compares many of the potential weaknesses
identified through examining PLA self-assessments with outside ana-
lysts’ views and then highlights some final thoughts on the importance

of conducting further research on the PLA’s weaknesses and strengths.
Finally, the appendix outlines the assumptions for our analysis.

13
CHAPTER TWO
People’s Liberation Army Modernization:
Mid‑1990s to 2025
To provide broader context for this assessment of the PLA’s shortcom-
ings, this chapter provides an overview of the overall scope and scale of
PLA modernization since the 1990s, during which the PLA has under-
gone a rapid transformation characterized by a series of important
changes in such areas as equipment, doctrine, personnel, and train-
ing. The chapter also assesses the PLA’s likely trajectory through 2025.1
Finally, it offers a brief discussion of internal and external events that
might alter the direction of PLA modernization over the next decade.
People’s Liberation Army Modernization Since the 1990s
The PLA has undergone a remarkable transformation since the 1990s.2
With all the attention currently devoted to the PLA’s growing capabili-
1 It is important to note that the PLA is only one component of the PRC’s armed forces.
The other components are the People’s Armed Police and the militia. The scope of this report
is limited specifically to the PLA, which includes the PLA Army (PLAA), PLAN, PLAAF,
and PLASAF and the PLA’s leadership organizations, which are the military regions, Cen-
tral Military Commission (CMC), and four general departments. Although we refer to the
People’s Armed Police and militia in passing when directly relevant to the discussion of issues
falling within the scope of the study, we consider both organizations to be beyond the scope
of this report.
2 We chose the 1990s as the starting point for our assessment for several reasons, including
the importance of the PLA’s assessments of the 1991 Gulf War, the promulgation of China’s
new military strategic guidelines in 1993, and the increases in defense spending that date
to this period. We acknowledge, however, that various other starting points could be used.
Some analysts might prefer an earlier starting point, such as the period following China’s

ties, it is easy to forget that, not long ago, the PLA was widely dismissed
as a “junkyard army,” one that was not only saddled with outdated
equipment but also hamstrung by problems with personnel quality,
poor training, and the distractions and massive corruption associated
with involvement in a dizzying array of commercial activities.
The PLA was well aware of these problems, which were thrown
into sharp relief as PRC leaders assessed the outcome of the First Gulf
War. This conflict not only highlighted the impressive performance
of the U.S. military but also underscored the implications of major
changes in the nature of modern warfare for the PLA. In 1993, China
issued a new set of military strategic guidelines [军事战略方針] to
provide guidance and direction for the PLA (Finkelstein, 2007). Yet
even though China clearly recognized the key changes that were under
way, the PLA faced many problems. Indeed, Chinese military officers
and U.S. and international observers at the time reached largely simi-
lar conclusions about the PLA’s principal weaknesses.3 Many observers
viewed the PLA as unable to effectively execute its newly emerging doc-
trine for high-tech local wars and therefore incapable of successfully
performing the tasks assigned to it by CCP leadership. Beijing reached
similar conclusions about the implications of the PLA’s shortcomings,
and modernization of the PLA became a higher priority. Subsequently,
Washington’s involvement in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis high-
lighted the potential for U.S. military intervention in a regional con-
flict, and the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
1979 border war with Vietnam, or Deng Xiaoping’s 1985 reassessment of the international
situation. Others might suggest that the most important trends only began to emerge later,
perhaps following the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which highlighted the likelihood of
U.S. military intervention in the event of a cross-strait conflict, or after the May 1999 acci-
dental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force, which
convinced Beijing that the PLA would need more-advanced asymmetric capabilities to deter
or counter any future military threats from the United States.
3 One representative study by a U.S. analyst characterized the PLA as severely constrained
by its “short arms and slow legs,” borrowing a phrase a PLA officer had used to describe the
Chinese military’s many problems (Howard, 1999, p. 28).

People’s Liberation Army Modernization: Mid-1990s to 2025 15
in May 1999 convinced Beijing it needed to accelerate its development
of asymmetric capabilities to deter or counter the United States.4
Reflecting the higher priority attached to modernizing the PLA,
its progress since the mid- to late 1990s has been fueled by sustained
growth in defense spending, reaching double-digit percentage increases
in most years.5 In 2013, China’s announced military budget was about
$119.5 billion. Most analysts believe China’s actual military spending is
higher than the announced figures, in part because the official budget
excludes some important categories of expenditure, such as procure-
ment of foreign weapon systems and equipment. DoD estimates that
China’s actual military spending in 2013 was more than $145 billion
(OSD, 2014, p. 43).
With the substantial resources China is devoting to national
defense, the PLA is clearly becoming an increasingly professional and
capable fighting force. The PLA has devoted considerable attention to
modernizing its ground forces (see, for example, Blasko, 2007), but
the most notable improvements have come in China’s naval, air, mis-
sile, space, and C4ISR capabilities. The PLAN’s surface ships have
improved dramatically since the 1990s, when China began acquiring
modern destroyers from Russia. In recent years, China has shed its reli-
ance on imported surface ships and produced a number of classes of
modern surface combatants, including guided missile frigates (FFGs)
and guided missile destroyers (DDGs) with greatly improved antisur-
face and antiair warfare capabilities. Along with improvements to its
surface fleet, the modernization of China’s submarine fleet has focused
on qualitative improvements resulting in a more-modern and -capable
undersea warfare force. In addition, China commissioned its first air-
craft carrier in September 2012.
Since the early to mid-1990s, the PLAAF has pursued an ambi-
tious modernization program, one that has decreased the overall
number of aircraft in its inventory but rapidly increased the number of
4 On the impact of the May 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy, see Zhang
Wannian (2011, pp. 414–421).
5 For a Chinese perspective on defense budgets and related issues, see Wu Xizhi and Huang
Jing (2013).

modern combat aircraft either developed indigenously or acquired from
Russia. Today, the PLAAF has more than 2,800 total aircraft, exclud-
ing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Among these are approximately
1,400 fighter aircraft, slightly fewer than one-half of which are mod-
ern.6 Although the PLAAF’s inventory still includes a large number
of older fighters, it is clearly moving in the direction of becoming a
modern air force, one that some Chinese military writers have referred
to as a “strategic air force” that is commensurate with China’s grow-
ing influence and its emerging international interests (see, for example,
Zhu Hui, 2009). In addition, the PLAAF is upgrading its older fight-
ers and bombers, improving its capabilities to conduct such missions as
airborne early warning and control (AEW&C); aerial refueling; strate-
gic transport; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
and is developing new capabilities, such as fifth-generation fighters and
a wide variety of UAVs. The PLAAF is also fielding more capable air-
to-air and air-to-surface missiles and upgrading its electronic warfare
(EW) capabilities. In addition, it is making impressive improvements
in its surface-to-air missile (SAM) capabilities, not only by importing
advanced long-range SAMs but also by indigenously producing its own
highly capable long-range SAM systems.
For decades after its formation in 1966, PLASAF fielded nuclear
missiles that were outdated, few in number, and potentially vulner-
able. In the 1990s, however, it assumed a conventional strike mis-
sion. PLASAF also began to focus on improving its nuclear deterrent
capabilities. It has since progressed to an increasingly sophisticated
and much more survivable arsenal of nuclear missiles capable of hold-
ing regional and continental U.S. targets at risk and has deployed the
world’s most numerous, diverse, and comprehensive conventional bal-
listic and cruise missile force.7
6 We define modern fighter aircraft as those fitting the commonly accepted Western defi-
nition of fourth generation and above. This includes the PLA’s inventory of J-10, J-11, and
Su-30 fighter aircraft. China’s own definition of fighter generations is somewhat different.
7 For a brief overview of PLASAF developments from a Chinese viewpoint, see Jing Zhi-
yuan (2010).

Over the past two decades, China has developed impressive space,
cyber, and EW capabilities. High-level official statements and a variety
of Chinese military publications identify space and the electromag-
netic spectrum as arenas in which China has growing national security
interests at stake. These are also areas in which Chinese analysts believe
China faces serious challenges and threats to its national security.8 In
particular, Chinese strategists see space as an arena in which military
competition is intensifying (Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 178–188), and
the PLA has made considerable progress in this area, including launch-
ing a range of satellites to support its military operations and develop-
ing multidimensional counterspace capabilities.9
PLA publications suggest that information dominance is the key
to seizing the initiative in and ultimately winning informatized local
wars and underscore the role not only of space but also of network
and EW capabilities. Accordingly, for the PLA, preserving the abil-
ity to operate effectively in space and the electromagnetic spectrum
while degrading or denying an adversary’s ability to do so is an essen-
tial wartime task, and developing its capabilities in these areas serves
China’s interests by strengthening deterrence. Chinese military media
reports frequently highlight the importance of training to operate in a
“complex electromagnetic environment,” reflecting the PLA’s focus on
preparing for conflicts in which cyber and EW will play vital roles. In
addition, Chinese military publications reflect the view that the strug-
gle for military advantage in cyberspace is growing both in importance
8 From a PLA perspective, Chinese military strategists see space and the electromagnetic
spectrum as increasingly vital arenas for military competition because of their centrality in
modern information-centric military operations. Some describe space as the high ground
that both sides will seek to control because of its influence on the struggle for information
superiority. Chinese analysts write that space systems serve as key enablers by providing
support in such areas as ISR, early warning, communications, navigation and positioning,
targeting for precision weapons, surveying and mapping, and meteorological support. Space
systems thus serve as force multipliers that support joint operations and enhance the effec-
tiveness of ground, air, naval, and missile forces. (See Pollpeter, 2012.)
9 Beijing has at its disposal a variety of capabilities that could be employed against an
enemy’s space systems. These include “soft kill” capabilities, such as jammers, and a “hard
kill” capability in the form of the ground-launched antisatellite interceptor China tested in
January 2007.

and intensity, as major military powers devote increasing attention to
network reconnaissance, network attack and defense, and network
deterrence (Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 188–197).
Along with these impressive improvements in the PLA’s hard-
ware, Beijing has also emphasized updating the PLA’s doctrine, as
reflected by the issuance of “new generation operations regulations”
in June 1999, an event that David Finkelstein of CNA Corporation
views as a major step forward in what he terms the PLA’s “revolution in
doctrinal affairs” (Finkelstein, 2005). The PLA also undertook a series
of improvements designed to increase the realism and complexity of
military training. In addition, China ordered the PLA to divest itself
of most of its business interests (Mulvenon, 2001), implemented a wide
range of reforms in such areas as military education, and increased the
PLA’s participation in military diplomacy and other types of interna-
tional military exchanges,10 initiatives that were intended to improve
the professionalism of the PLA.
These improvements in Chinese military capabilities could pose
serious challenges to the interests of the United States and its allies. As
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed:
Beijing’s investments in cyberwarfare, antisatellite warfare, anti-
aircraft and antiship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles
could threaten the United States’ primary means to project its
power and help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea assets,
and the networks that support them. (Gates, 2009)
Although the PLA has dramatically improved its ability to per-
form its assigned missions, including countering U.S. military inter-
vention if necessary, it still faces a number of challenges. These include
such problems as widespread corruption, which undermines confidence
in the PLA’s professionalism and could have negative repercussions for
its operational capability, and an outdated command structure that
constrains the PLA’s ability to execute the integrated joint operations
it envisions as crucial to its evolving doctrine for future military cam-
10 For Chinese perspectives on military exchanges and foreign relations, see Zhang Fang
(2014) and Zhang Yingli (2009).

paigns. The PLA itself seems to be well aware that, even though its
capabilities have improved dramatically, it still faces a variety of short-
comings. Indeed, PLA publications are replete with references to prob-
lems in such areas as personnel, training, education, organization, and
logistics and maintenance. Discussions of these problems often high-
light what Chinese writers refer to as the “two incompatibles,” reflect-
ing their assessment that the PLA’s capabilities are still incompatible
with the demands of winning a local war under informatized condi-
tions and successfully carrying out the PLA’s other missions.11
Likely Trajectory of People’s Liberation Army
Modernization Through 2025
Over the next ten years, the PLA is likely to focus on addressing its self-
assessed weaknesses and improving its capabilities to protect Chinese
national interests at home and abroad. There will also be noteworthy
improvements in PLA weapon systems and equipment, particularly
in the such priority areas as the PLA’s naval, air, missile, and space
capabilities.
PLAN will build new surface combatants to improve area air
defense capabilities, a critical requirement for “distant seas” opera-
tions.12 It will also add new submarines, including more Yuan-class
air independent propulsion attack submarines and Type 095 nuclear-
powered guided missile submarines. These submarines and some
PLAN surface ships may have land-attack cruise missiles, which would
bolster China’s conventional precision strike capabilities. China will
likely make progress with its aircraft carrier capabilities as well, includ-
11 For an overview of these PLA self-assessments, see Blasko (2013).
12 Near seas refers to the Yellow Sea, South China Sea, and East China Sea. Near seas defense
includes operations in the Yellow Sea, South China Sea, and East China Sea, as well as
operations somewhat further afield that may be required to protect Chinese interests in the
near seas. Distant seas or far seas refers to more-distant regions, and examples of distant seas
operations include PLAN participation in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the
dispatch of a PLAN FFG to help escort Syrian chemical weapons destined for destruction.
For a further discussion, see Erickson and Strange (2014).

ing embarking a carrier air wing on the Liaoning and developing
domestically produced carriers. The PLAN will continue to expand its
operations in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. In addition, the
PLAN will play an increasingly important role in nuclear deterrence as
its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) begin patrols
(O’Rourke, 2013).
According to DoD, the PLAAF “will likely become a majority
fourth-generation force within the next several years” (OSD, 2014,
p. 9). It is also developing fifth-generation fighter capabilities, as
reflected by its testing of the J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters. Over the
next ten years, the PLAAF will likely introduce a number of other new
capabilities into its inventory, improving its capabilities in such areas as
large transport aircraft and UAVs.
The future direction of China’s strategic missile force is likely to
include improving its long-range conventional strike capabilities with
the deployment of such systems as conventional intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs) (OSD, 2014, p. 40). PLASAF can also be
expected to strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture with the addi-
tion of more road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
including new road-mobile ICBMs capable of carrying multiple inde-
pendently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) (OSD, 2014, p. 7).
China is also likely to emphasize further development of its space
and counterspace capabilities. China can be expected to continue
expanding its space-based capabilities in such areas as ISR, communi-
cations, and navigation and positioning. In addition, China will likely
continue to develop counterspace capabilities for strategic deterrence
and to attempt to ensure its own ability to use space while limiting or
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.
Beyond these force modernization programs, China under Xi Jin-
ping is likely to promulgate its new military strategic guidelines for the
PLA and to continue revising and updating PLA doctrine. The PLA
can be expected to continue to improve its training and exercises and
to strengthen its professional military education system. In addition,
the PLA is rumored to be pursuing a major reorganization and restruc-
turing of the command system to better prepare the PLA for future

“informatized” local wars and to help the PLA move toward its goal of
being able to conduct “integrated joint operations.”13
All these developments are likely to contribute to further improve-
ments in the PLA’s overall combat capabilities. They will also make it a
more credible force for deterrence and coercive diplomacy. In addition,
they will likely improve its ability to conduct military operations other
than war (MOOTW), such as counterpiracy, humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief (HADR), and noncombatant evacuation operations
(NEOs), which will enable the PLA to protect China’s growing global
interests more effectively.14
Factors That Could Change the Direction of People’s
Liberation Army Modernization
Although PLA modernization seems likely to proceed at least roughly
along these lines over the next decade, a number of internal or external
events could alter its direction. Internal events with the potential to
change the focus of PLA modernization could include any number of
domestic problems, such as the following:
• A major slowdown in China’s economic growth rate. Since the
1990s, rapid economic growth has enabled China to increase
its defense budget year after year while managing to maintain
defense spending at a relatively low percentage of China’s gross
domestic product. This has allowed Beijing to devote growing
resources to national defense without shortchanging other impor-
tant categories of government spending. If China experiences a
major slowdown in economic growth, however, this could create
sharper trade-offs between defense spending and the govern-
ment’s other budgetary priorities. Additionally, if domestic prob-
lems, such as pollution and its associated health costs, continue to
13 For a brief overview, see Mulvenon (2014a).
14 For PLA perspectives on diversified military tasks and MOOTW, see, for example, Gai
Shijin and Zhang Peizhong (2009) and Song Guocai, Shi Limin, and Yang Shu (2009).

get worse, pressure to spend more on these issues could increase,
and competition for government budget resources could become
more intense.
• Worsening social instability or an increase in the number or severity
of terrorist attacks in China. If domestic instability increases to a
level that the CCP sees as a serious threat to its grip on political
power, this could require the PLA to focus much more heavily
on domestic security missions. Similarly, increased frequency of
terrorist attacks or even a small number of dramatic attacks with
numerous casualties or other severe consequences could compel
the PLA to devote more attention to domestic counterterrorism
activities, potentially diluting its focus on its core deterrence and
warfighting missions.
• Extremely large-scale or serious violence or unrest in Tibet or
Xinjiang. If unrest in China’s restive ethnic minority regions,
especially Tibet or Xinjiang, increases to a level that exceeds what
police and paramilitary forces are capable of handling, this could
require large-scale PLA intervention that might need to take place
over a prolonged period. This, too, could potentially make it more
difficult for the PLA to focus on its external security missions.
Other events with the potential to alter the trajectory of PLA
modernization over the next decade could include external develop-
ments, such as the following:
• A sharp downturn in U.S.-China relations that heightens China’s
perception of the United States as a potential adversary. China is
already concerned that the United States seeks to contain China
or otherwise check its rise to ensure that its growing power will
not undermine U.S. interests. Chinese perceptions of the United
States as a threat to its security could be intensified by a further
downturn in the U.S.-China relationship. This could result from
a regional crisis over China’s maritime disputes with U.S. allies
Japan or the Philippines; another incident between U.S. and Chi-
nese aircraft or ships operating in close proximity, such as the
2001 EP-3 incident; or even another entirely unexpected occur-

rence, such as the May 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese
Embassy in Yugoslavia. Such a downturn could convince Chi-
nese leaders they need to further increase spending on capabilities
aimed at deterring the United States or countering U.S. military
intervention.15
• A deepening strategic rivalry with India. Chinese security analysts
tend to be rather dismissive of India’s potential to seriously chal-
lenge Chinese interests, in sharp contrast to the attention Indian
analysts devote to evaluating Chinese capabilities and intentions
in the Indian Ocean region. However, such developments as a
more confrontational political and diplomatic relationship with
India, or unexpectedly rapid advances in Indian defense capabili-
ties that appear relevant to dealing with China could potentially
shift China’s focus more heavily toward the Indian Ocean or its
disputed border with India.
• A failed attempt to use force against one of China’s neighbors.
Although some unofficial Chinese commentators have suggested
that a rapid and decisive use of force against one of China’s
weaker neighbors might bolster the PLA’s warfighting capability
by giving it more-recent combat experience and might perhaps
serve as a useful deterrent to other countries that might otherwise
be inclined to challenge Chinese interests, there is no guarantee
that such a conflict would go as planned. Failure to rapidly and
decisively accomplish its mission or complete failure could embar-
rass the PLA and potentially motivate even greater investments in
defense and accelerated military modernization.
• A North Korean collapse. Beijing may very well see North Korea
as more of a liability than an asset at this point, but it could not
ignore the potential national security ramifications of a North
Korean collapse scenario. Depending on how such a scenario
played out, it could intensify Chinese security concerns. For
example, if Beijing was uncomfortable with the role of U.S. forces
in Korea after its unification under Seoul, Chinese perceptions of
15 In 2001 a PLA J-8 fighter collided with a U.S. EP-3 electronic surveillance plane in air-
space over China’s 200-km exclusive economic zone.

a more-threatening U.S. military presence along its borders could
intensify Beijing’s concerns about what it tends to view as U.S.
“containment” of China.
• Peaceful unification with Taiwan. Even though China-Taiwan
relations have improved dramatically since Ma Ying-jeou’s vic-
tory in Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election, the PLA retains a
strong focus on preparing for Taiwan-related missions. Peaceful
unification with Taiwan appears unlikely to come about in the
near term, given the many sensitive and, in some cases, seemingly
intractable issues in the cross-strait relationship. Nonetheless, it is
a possibility in the future, and its realization could allow the PLA
to focus much more heavily on other missions.
• Change in Russia’s strategic orientation. A major change in Rus-
sia’s strategic orientation would change China’s external security
environment in ways that could have important implications for
the trajectory of PLA modernization. For example, if China’s rela-
tionship with Russia became more competitive or even confron-
tational, it would require the PLA to increase emphasis on deter-
ring or preparing for possible contingencies involving Russia.
Another possibility is that escalating tension between Russia
and the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) allies could lead the United States to devote greater
attention to European security issues, potentially changing the
PLA’s perception of Washington’s willingness and ability to sus-
tain the policy of “rebalancing” to Asia.
• Technological surprise. The emergence of a major technological
surprise could create new challenges for PLA modernization. For
example, unexpectedly rapid advances in a potential adversary’s
development of directed-energy capabilities or hypersonic weap-
ons might diminish the utility of some of the PLA’s antiaccess
and area denial systems or increase the vulnerability of high-value
assets, potentially compelling the PLA to shift its approach to
force modernization and change its thinking about future mili-
tary campaigns.

25
CHAPTER THREE
Missions of the People’s Liberation Army
This chapter assesses the missions Beijing has assigned to the PLA. Far
from the infantry-centric army of the past that sought to draw invaders
deep into Chinese territory to fight a war of attrition, the PLA today
performs an increasing number of missions that span the spectrum of
conflict and MOOTW both at home and, increasingly, regionally and
globally. Although the PLA recognizes that its quest for a high-tech
military is far from being fully realized, the sustained modernization
drive started in the early 1990s is already paying dividends, allowing it
to carry out “diversified military tasks” of increasing scope and scale.
Not content to wait until the PLA has fully achieved its modernization
goals, Beijing has increasingly called on the PLA to perform various
missions both at home and abroad.
The People’s Liberation Army’s Strategic Objectives
Preservation of the political supremacy of the CCP is almost certainly
the PLA’s most important strategic objective. Additionally, such offi-
cial publications as The Science of Military Strategy and China’s defense
white papers indicate that the main strategic objectives of the PLA are
to “safeguard China’s national sovereignty, national security, and ter-
ritorial integrity and support China’s peaceful development.”1 Under-
1 These objectives are regularly referred to in official PRC texts as the PLA’s “sacred mis-
sions” (Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, 2005, p. 14, and Information Office of the State
Council, 2013).

neath these grand strategic objectives are the core missions, which the
PLA must carry out to accomplish and/or preserve these grand strate-
gic objectives. These core missions can be categorized, albeit roughly,
as either “traditional” or “new” missions.
The traditional core missions of the PLA are ones that have domi-
nated Beijing’s threat perceptions and responsibilities since the found-
ing of the PRC. While both the threat environment and the PLA’s
ability to respond to various threats have changed dramatically since
1949, these broad missions have remained largely constant and include
“resisting aggression” from both neighboring countries, such as India
and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), and countries that can proj-
ect power into China’s territorial and maritime domains, such as
the United States; “containing separatist forces” in the provinces of
Xinjiang and Tibet and deterring Taiwan moves toward independence;
and “safeguarding border, coastal, and territorial air security” from
intervention or interference from either state or nonstate threats. “Pro-
tecting national security interests in space and cyberspace,” while not
traditional in the sense of historical focus, is a mission consistent with
China’s aforementioned strategic goals of national sovereignty, secu-
rity, and territorial integrity. Indeed, China clearly sees its interests as
increasingly extending into these domains, which creates new chal-
lenges and opportunities for the PLA (Information Office of the State
Council, 2013).
As mentioned earlier, these broad traditional core missions are
specifically focused on maintaining China’s sovereignty, security, and
territorial integrity through the emphasis of PLA’s general operational
concepts of “active defense” and “winning local wars under informa-
tized conditions” in conflict situations.2
In contrast, the new core missions of the PLA are ones that received
official recognition under the rubric of former President Hu Jintao’s
“New Historic Missions” concept. These missions call on the PLA to
2 Active defense, a concept first defined by Mao and then later adjusted by Deng, is a set of
warfighting principles that “emphasize using precise and well-timed offensive operations,
gaining and retaining the initiative, attacking only under favorable conditions, and exploit-
ing an opponent’s most vulnerable weaknesses” (Information Office of the State Council,
2013, and OSD, 2012, p. 3).

Missions of the People’s Liberation Army 27
perform internal and external missions in peacetime and include “par-
ticipating in emergency rescue and disaster relief,” both internally in
China and increasingly internationally; “subduing subversive and sabo-
tage attempts and cracking down on separatist forces” to support anti-
terror efforts; “accomplishing security provision and guarding tasks,”
both at home and abroad through involvement in United Nations
(UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs); “merchant vessel protection”
from nonstate actors and possibly state actors; “evacuation of Chinese
nationals” for the hundreds of thousands of overseas workers in coun-
tries where security has significantly deteriorated; and “security sup-
port for China’s interests overseas,” such as protecting maritime com-
merce through antipiracy operations.3
These broad new missions focus specifically on the CCP’s evolv-
ing conceptions of how the PLA can “support China’s peaceful devel-
opment,” on which CCP legitimacy is largely based. Furthermore,
international perceptions are increasingly important to China as it con-
tinues to develop as a great power. China therefore seeks ways to use
many of the policy tools at its disposal, including the PLA, to provide
global public goods commensurate with its status as a rising power,
although it is reluctant to take on more responsibility than it believes
serves its interests. As with other militaries charged with participation
in similar types of operations, the PLA’s general operational concept for
accomplishing most of these missions is MOOTW.
People’s Liberation Army Mission Sets, Relevant
Campaigns, and Intended Campaign Effects
To analyze the PLA’s core missions more discretely, we extrapolated
broad mission set categories from numerous versions of China’s bian-
nual defense white papers resulting in the following eight mission
sets: (1) border missions, (2) periphery missions, (3) Taiwan missions,
3 The PLA has a long history of internal disaster relief involvement within China, but this
task is likely being codified as a major mission for China’s armed forces, which also include
the People’s Armed Police and the militia (Information Office of the State Council, 2013).

(4) maritime claim missions, (5) HADR missions, (6) NEOs, (7) sea
line of communication (SLOC) missions, and (8) strategic deterrence.
This section explores the ways (campaigns) and the operational ends
(intended campaign effects) to accomplish these mission sets.4 The fol-
lowing section explores the PLA’s means to conduct these mission sets
through 2025.
Border Missions
As territorial integrity, national sovereignty, and national security are
core national interests potentially subject to external threat, safeguard-
ing China’s border and coastal areas is a fundamental mission of the
PLA (Information Office of the State Council, 2013). Border secu-
rity troops under the People’s Armed Police and China’s Coast Guard
under the State Oceanic Administration are responsible for the day-to-
day patrol and guard missions along China’s international borders and
coastal regions, respectively. However, if necessary, the PLA could be
mobilized either to augment existing forces or to independently ini-
tiate various border operations.5 This would occur if external events,
either anticipated or occurring, were to overwhelm the capabilities of
the two internal security organs. While active state-based threats to
national security are a virtual guarantee of PLA involvement, nonstate-
based threats, such as nearby instability or the flow of displaced per-
sons threatening border security or integrity, may also prompt PLA
mobilization.
Border and coastal safeguarding missions are characteristically
defensive:
• The positional defense campaign [阵地防御战役] is the pri-
mary defensive campaign concept for ground operations in gen-
eral, including border defense. The object of this campaign is “to
4 Operational ends (i.e., campaign effects) should not be confused with the strategic ends
of “national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and support China’s peaceful
development.”
5 The People’s Armed Police is under the Ministry of Pubic Security and the State Oceanic
Administration, which is under the control of the Ministry of Land and Resources.

hold a specified area . . . effectively checking the enemy’s incur-
sion” (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 292). While the PLAA would
constitute the main component, air, naval, and missiles units
would augment them based on the threat.6
• The urban defense campaign [城市防御战役] is used in the con-
text of border missions to “hold a [Chinese] city” in the face of
enemy assault (Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 453). Primarily conceived of
as an army campaign, it is used to protect cities on or near China’s
terrestrial borders.
• The air defense campaign [防空战役] is intended to “thwart an
enemy’s air raid” aimed at the destruction of military, political, or
economic targets within China (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 602).
Various aviation and air defense units (e.g., SAM, anti-aircraft
artillery) are used to carry out this campaign.7
• The counterlanding campaign [抗登陆战役] is a campaign “to
resist an enemy’s cross-channel landing operations” (Bi Xinglin,
2002, p. 432). Although it is unlikely that another state would
conduct an amphibious assault against the PRC mainland, this
joint campaign provides the operational concept to defeat such an
action if required.
• The naval base defense campaign [海军基地防御战役] is
“designed to resist an enemy’s offensive against a naval base”
(Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 539). Primarily a naval campaign, this
campaign stresses defeating the enemy force before it reaches
shore.
• The joint border counter attack campaign [边境地区联合反
击战役] is an “offensive campaign against local invading armies
. . . to destroy and expel the invaded enemy and restore territorial
6 Some analysts now refer to the PLA’s ground component as the PLAA, while others refer
to it as the PLA ground force. We use these terms interchangeably in this report, although we
note that China began calling the ground force the PLAA in its 2010 national defense white
paper. (See Information Office of the State Council, 2011.)
7 This campaign is similar to the anti–air raid campaign (discussed below), with the excep-
tion that it does not seek to destroy an enemy’s ability to generate air raids, primarily through
counterattacking enemy airfields, but rather to limit or ideally halt enemy air raids when they
penetrate Chinese airspace.

sovereignty” (Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 264). This joint campaign is
used either under the active defense concept, as mentioned above,
to preempt an attack or in reprisal for an assault that has wrested
territory from China’s control.
Relevant border campaigns are based on the domain directly threat-
ened (land, air, or sea). Accordingly, the PLA might commence a posi-
tional defense campaign; an urban defense campaign; an air defense
campaign; a counterlanding campaign; or a naval base defense cam-
paign. It should be further noted that the PLA does not rule out using
active defense to preempt an opponent’s impending attack (Informa-
tion Office of the State Council, 2013). This strategic concept was
successfully demonstrated against the Indian Army during the 1962
Sino-Indian Border War. Should China confront a similar threat in
the future, the relevant campaign would be the joint border counter
attack campaign.
Periphery Missions
For a variety of reasons, the PLA might be tasked to conduct opera-
tions emanating beyond China’s borders into disputed territory or the
territory of another country, either as an invited guest or as a hostile
intruder. While border missions are commonly defensive and designed
to maintain China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, peripheral mis-
sions are mostly offensive and undertaken to advance China’s national
interests in adjacent regions.
Historically, periphery operations, in which the PLA is invited
to assist a friendly neighboring state dealing with external or internal
threats, have been one of the main forms of PLA operations beyond
China’s borders. North Korea and North Vietnam during the Korean
and Vietnam Wars, respectively, sought Chinese assistance in response
to U.S.-led operations. Furthermore, PLA assistance operations in
neighboring states facing external threats could take the form of offen-
sive operations, as in the Korean War, or defensive operations, as in
the Vietnam War. Although there is no historical case in point, China
might also support a country facing terrorism or insurgency, as the

Peace Mission exercises held under the auspices of the Shanghai Coop-
eration Organization appear to emphasize.
China has in the past and may in the future seek to advance
national interests in contravention of a neighboring state’s wishes. Such
actions without an invitation would be intended either to coerce or
to take a state’s territory, either through conquest or to unilaterally
settle territorial disputes. The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, undertaken
by the PRC to compel Hanoi to reverse its actions in Cambodia, is an
example of the former (see Mulvenon, 1995). The PRC’s invasion and
subsequent annexation of Tibet in 1950–1951 and possibly the 1969
Sino-Soviet Border conflict fall in the latter category. While China
has settled a number of territorial disputes amicably with its neighbors
(e.g., Russia, Tajikistan, and Vietnam), it still has unresolved disputes
with India (over the areas of Aksai Chin/Jammu and Kashmir and of
Arunachal Pradesh), Bhutan, Burma, and North Korea (Central Intel-
ligence Agency, 2013).
While campaigns for border missions are based on defense of a
specific area, relevant PLA campaigns for periphery missions are gener-
ally based on the specific objective to be taken or achieved:
• The positional offensive campaign [阵地进攻战役] is the
generic army offensive campaign to used to assault “an enemy
defending field or fortified positions” (Zhang Yuliang, 2006,
p. 426).
• The maneuver warfare campaign [动运战战役] is an army
offensive campaign “against an enemy that is on the move or has
not yet established a foothold” (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 391).
• The mountain offensive campaign [山地进攻战役] is an army
campaign used to assault an enemy defensive position in a moun-
tainous region (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 391).
• The urban assault campaign [城市进攻战役] is an army cam-
paign used to “wipe out or drive out defending enemies, so as to
seize and occupy a city” (Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 292).
• The airborne campaign [空降战役] is an air force offensive cam-
paign designed to “achieve specific strategic and campaign goals”
by “carrying out operational activities in the depth of the ene-

my’s territory” through the use of the PLAAF’s paratroop forces.8
China is unlikely to prosecute this campaign independently, but
rather to support another concurrent campaign.
• The air offensive campaign [空中进攻战役] is an air force cam-
paign to “achieve strategic and campaign goals” through the
use of air strikes (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 575). This could be
an independent campaign or could be prosecuted jointly with a
ground offensive.
• The anti–air raid campaign [反空袭战役] is a joint campaign
that is both offensive and defensive; it seeks to defeat enemy air
raids both incoming and at their source through strikes against
the air bases prosecuting enemy air sorties (Zhang Yuliang, 2006,
p. 331). This campaign stands alone and is prosecuted indepen-
dently to protect China’s territorial sovereignty while other cam-
paigns are waged.
Based on specific circumstances, China would use an airborne cam-
paign, air offensive campaign, and/or an anti–air raid campaign in
conjunction with one of the other campaigns, although each of these
campaigns could also be prosecuted independently.
Taiwan Missions
Beijing ultimately seeks to reincorporate Taiwan into greater China
under the “One-China Principle,” and the PLA continues to play a
leading role in achieving this strategic objective (Taiwan Affairs Office
and Information Office of the State Council, 2000). Through either the
threat of violence or the application of limited violence, the PLA might
be used coercively to compel the island nation to either undertake or
reverse various courses of action. During the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis
(1995–1996), Beijing conducted missile tests and military exercises to
influence the outcome of an upcoming Taiwanese election. While the
aforementioned coercive operations were relatively minor in scale, Bei-
jing may also seek to compel Taiwan on a larger scale by blockading
8 Note that the PLA’s airborne troops are subordinate to the PLAAF and not the PLAA
(Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 589).

the island. Alternatively, if coercive actions are considered incapable of
achieving important policy objectives, Beijing might decide to commit
the PLA to an outright invasion to take control of the island.
The following campaigns might come into play with respect to
Taiwan:
• A conventional missile attack campaign [常规导弹突击战役]
is a “series of conventional missile attacks” to “attack the ene-
my’s important targets” (Yu Jixun, 2004). Although the PLASAF
would take the lead in this campaign, PLAAF and PLAN units
would also play important roles. Such a campaign could be used
by itself or in conjunction with other campaigns, such as the joint
blockade and joint landing campaigns.9
• The joint blockade campaign [联合封锁战役] is a “protracted
campaign” undertaken to “sever enemy economic and military
connections” and thereby “compel the enemy to [ultimately]
submit to campaign goals” (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 292). The
PLA’s naval, air, and conventional missile units would primarily
conduct this campaign.
• The joint island landing campaign [登岛战役] is a campaign
designed to “seize and occupy a whole island or important target.”
For this to happen, numerous intermediate campaign goals, such
as sea-crossing, destruction of the enemy’s defenses, and securing
a beachhead, must also occur (Bi Xinglin, 2002, pp. 225–226).
• As mentioned previously, the anti-air raid campaign [反空袭
战役] is a joint campaign that is both offensive and defensive; it
seeks to defeat enemy air raids both in the skies and at their source
through strikes against the air bases or aircraft carriers prosecut-
ing enemy air sorties (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 331).
Relevant PLA campaigns intended to coerce Taiwan include the con-
ventional missile attack campaign and/or the joint blockade campaign.
9 A coercive or demonstrative use of conventional missile firepower, such as the series of
launches China conducted during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, could also be related
to this type of campaign and could escalate to a conventional missile attack campaign if
intimidation short of that level fails to achieve the desired objectives.

The primary PLA campaign to seize Taiwan would be the joint-island
landing campaign, which likely would be augmented by a conventional
missile attack campaign and an anti–air raid campaign. If necessary,
the PLA would undertake a conventional missile attack campaign and
an anti–air raid campaign to counter U.S. or another country’s inter-
vention into a hypothetical Taiwan conflict. These two campaigns
form the PLA’s core antiaccess and area denial challenge to U.S. mili-
tary operations in the region.10
Maritime Claim Missions
Because China claims approximately 90 percent of the South China
Sea, Beijing finds itself simultaneously at odds with all other claimants
(Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines). In the East
China Sea, Beijing and Tokyo are at odds over the Senkaku/Daioyu
Islands. Similar to the periphery missions mentioned above, maritime
claim missions are also generally offensive, although there is always a
chance that China might be forced to defend its gains at some future
point.
At stake is sovereignty over very small islands, reefs, and fea-
tures and over waters containing hydrocarbons beneath their depths.
Through naval actions against the Republic of Vietnam in 1974, the
PLA has already successfully extended China’s dominion over the
entirety of the Paracel Islands in the northern reaches of the South
China Sea. A naval battle almost a decade and a half later over Johnson
South Reef (1988) increased China’s holdings in the Spratly Islands at
the southern end of the South China Sea at Vietnam’s expense. In the
South China Sea, China currently is engaged in a standoff with the
Philippines over Second Thomas Shoal and recently parked an oil rig
in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone. In the East China Sea, China
contests Japan’s control of the Senkaku/Daioyu Islands through vari-
ous means, including the recent enactment of an air defense identifica-
10 While antiaccess and area denial is a Western construct, the Chinese clearly plan to coun-
ter intervention by a “strong enemy”—a euphemism for the United States—in regional con-
tingencies. Not only has the PLA has developed the doctrine, it has also developed the capa-
bilities to attack the primary facet of U.S. power projection: U.S. airpower.

tion zone. The zone covers much of the East China Sea and covers the
airspace above the disputed islands.
Relevant PLA campaigns intended for China to make immediate
further maritime territorial gains include the following:
• The sea force group campaign [消灭敌海上兵力集团战役] is
an “offensive campaign . . . to eliminate . . . or inflict heavy losses
on the enemy’s . . . large naval formations or battle groups.”11
• The coral reef offensive campaign [对珊瑚岛礁进攻战役] is a
campaign “against coral island reef areas” (Zhang Yuliang, 2006,
p. 535).
• The sea blockade campaign [海上封锁战役] is an “offensive
campaign to cut off or weaken the enemy’s marine contact with
the outside world” (Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 327).
• The naval coastal raid campaign [海上袭岸战役] is a campaign
“to attack enemy bases, harbors, and other important coastal tar-
gets” (Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 341). This campaign could be used to
destroy a rival claimant’s ability to project power to a disputed
area.
• As described previously, the anti–air raid campaign [反空袭战
役] is a joint campaign that is both offensive and defensive; it
seeks to defeat enemy air raids both near disputed areas and at
their source through strike against the air bases generating enemy
air sorties (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 331). This campaign could be
carried out in conjunction with the other campaigns listed above.
A sea blockade campaign, albeit at a low level and applied somewhat
unevenly, is likely how China is dealing with Philippine forces stationed
in Second Thomas Shoal.12 This approach is patient compared to the
coral island offensive campaign and could also be used in numerous
other locations where islands and features are already occupied. Finally,
11 The Campaign Theory Study Guide refers to this campaign somewhat differently as the
“enemy naval group assault campaign” [进攻敌海上兵力集团战役] (Zhang Yuliang, 2006,
p. 523; Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 254).
12 The Philippines has met with some success in resupplying its marines stationed in the
shoal aboard an intentionally beached amphibious landing ship (Perlez, 2014).

should China seek to strike a dramatic blow against other claimants’
abilities to threaten China’s maritime claims from their source, the
PLA might be tasked to conduct a naval coastal raid campaign.
As with the other missions described earlier, any of these cam-
paigns could be conducted simultaneously with an anti–air raid cam-
paign, should the United States or another third party become involved.
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Missions
PLA military diplomacy includes HADR operations. Participation
in UN PKOs dates back to the early 1990s, with China contributing
peacekeepers, police, and observers. Most recently, China dispatched
peacekeepers to support the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabili-
zation Mission in Mali. Outside the structure of international organi-
zations, the PLA has dispatched its hospital ship, Peace Ark, to under-
take medical assistance missions in the Indian Ocean and Caribbean,
and sent PLAA units to engage with the militaries of Peru and Gabon
in multilateral medical exercises. The PLA has been directly involved
in international disaster relief over a dozen times, sending PLAA rescue
and medical teams; PLAAF aid airlifts; and, most recently, Peace Ark
to respond to disasters occurring in foreign countries.
PLA doctrinal writings do not describe relevant campaigns for
HADR missions. Most likely this is because they are considered inde-
pendent operations, too small in scale to be properly considered cam-
paigns. It is quite possible, however, that the antiterrorism stability
maintenance campaign [反恐维稳作战役] is informed by the PLA’s
participation in counterterror-focused UN PKO operations, such as
the aforementioned UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali operation.13
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
While there have been numerous NEOs of Chinese overseas citizens,
including a 2014 NEO in Libya, the PLA regularly does not play an
operational role. To date, the PLA has been called to actively support
13 The antiterrorism stability maintenance campaign is described as consisting of “opera-
tional activities to deter and attack terrorism activities” (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 460).

only one NEO, to Libya in 2011. Instead, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs often singlehandedly directs these operations by arranging
for chartered aircraft and passenger ships to take overseas Chinese to
safety. However, given the high numbers of Chinese overseas in unsta-
ble and remote areas, it seems likely that the PLA will play more of a
role in future NEOs. The PLA potentially extends reach into areas that
chartered flights might shy away from. This may have been the case
with the PLAAF’s dispatch of four transports during the 2011 NEO
to Sabha, which is in the interior of Libya. Should circumstances war-
rant, the PLA might also be dispatched to deter acts of violence against
overseas Chinese citizens. Overwatch from the PLAN frigate Xuzhou
may have played a role in the relatively uneventful exodus of thousands
of Chinese workers from Benghazi, Libya, in 2011 aboard chartered
cruise ships. The PLA can also be used to enter nonpermissive areas
and mitigate or resolve man-made humanitarian crises, should they
occur.
As with HADR missions, PLA doctrinal writings do not describe
relevant campaigns for NEOs. This is likely because NEOs are gener-
ally too small to be properly considered campaigns and are considered
independent operations.
Sea Line of Communication Missions
As an export-driven economy and oil importer, China depends on sea
lanes that are safe for maritime commerce. For much of recent history,
China left maritime security to the oversight of others. This changed
at the very end of 2008, when the PLA sent a task force to the Gulf of
Aden to mitigate the effects of Somali piracy on its maritime traffic.
Since then, the PLAN has continuously operated antipiracy patrols in
the region and recently dispatched its 19th task force.
China fully recognizes that ensuring “peaceful development” in
a self-help world requires acting individually, if need arises, to pro-
tect vital interests. In the Gulf of Aden, Chinese merchant demand for
security exceeded multinational supply, and Beijing recognized that it
could not continue to free ride, relying on others to provide security,
without accepting significant risk. This is certainly not the first time
in recent history that Chinese maritime commerce has faced threats.

During the Iran-Iraq Tanker War (1984–1988), at least one Chinese-
flagged vessel was struck, even though Beijing declared itself a neutral
party (Central Intelligence Agency, 1987).
Two campaigns are of interest here:
• The sea-line guarding campaign [海上保交战役] is a defensive
campaign “waged to ensure the safety of, and free passage along,
sea lines” (Zhang Yuliang, 2006, p. 539).
• As mentioned previously, the naval coastal raid campaign
[海上袭岸战役] is a “campaign to attack enemy bases, harbors,
and other important coastal targets” (Bi Xinglin, 2002, p. 224).
This campaign could be used to directly attack a state or nonstate
actor’s abilities to disrupt maritime commerce.
The relevant PLA campaign for SLOC missions is the sea-line guard-
ing campaign. At some time in the future, Beijing may wish not merely
to guard its maritime commerce and mitigate a particular threat but
also actively seek to degrade or destroy an actor’s ability to create the
threat. Should the PLA be tasked to undertake such a mission, it likely
would do so under the naval coastal raid campaign construct.
Strategic Deterrence
China’s concept of strategic deterrence is a broad one that includes a
variety of military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, but
a key component of it is resident in a nuclear arsenal that is growing but
remains significantly smaller than either the U.S. or Russian nuclear
arsenals. Because of its stated no-first-use policy, this arsenal has three
general missions.14 The first is the day-to-day mission of preventing a
nuclear strike against China through maintaining a credible nuclear
deterrent. Historically China has kept its nuclear forces on low alert,
relying on the survival of at least a few missiles and warheads to present
unacceptable risks to any would-be attacker after a hypothetical first
strike. The second mission is escalation control. Should China enter a
14 If China did not adhere to a no-first-use policy, it would have an additional fourth mis-
sion, not described above, of nuclear attack.

crisis or even outright war with another nuclear power, China’s nuclear
arsenal serves as a hedge to escalation that might otherwise spiral out to
eventual nuclear war. It also prevents the occurrence of nuclear black-
mail, whereby an adversary could seek to coerce China to take certain
courses of action it otherwise would not choose by threatening nuclear
attack. Should deterrence and/or escalation control fail, the third mis-
sion is responding to an adversary’s use of nuclear weapons. This mis-
sion has one relevant campaign:
• The nuclear counterstrike campaign [核反击战役] consists of
a series of nuclear missile strikes intended to “thwart the enemy’s
strategic intentions, shake the enemy’s will, paralyze the enemy’s
command systems, retard the enemy’s operational activities,
weaken the enemy’s war potential, and deter the escalation of
nuclear warfare” (Bi Xinglin, 2002, pp. 384–385). Such a cam-
paign could involve nuclear strikes against a number of types of
targets intended to shake the adversary’s will, unhinge its strategy,
and diminish its ability to successfully execute its military opera-
tions.
People’s Liberation Army’s Capabilities to Conduct
Missions Through 2025
This section briefly analyzes the PLA’s means of carrying out the mis-
sions just described through 2025. Chapter Five takes a closer look at
the weaknesses that might impinge on the successful execution of these
missions.
Border Missions
As the largest army in the world, the PLAA constitutes a substantial
deterrent to another state’s potential incursions. Even if the PLA’s mod-
ernization trajectory to date were to stop at its current level, it is diffi-
cult to see how the PLA would be unable to successfully defend territo-
rial incursions on the Chinese mainland. If modernization continues,
the overall efficacy of these operations will continue to be honed, fur-

ther allowing the PLA to respond quickly and even preemptively to
challenges that appear.
Periphery Missions
Except against its largest neighbors, Russia and India, the PLA cur-
rently possesses substantial but not unlimited ability to conduct mis-
sions away from its borders. The PLA’s ability to conduct effective
offensive actions into neighboring countries is impeded by continuing
logistics shortfalls and a lack of substantial power-projection capabili-
ties (such as aerial tankers and airlift).
Taiwan Missions
China has the ability to coerce Taiwan in a number of ways, from
missile strikes to blockade operations. It currently lacks the amphibi-
ous lift necessary for forced entry in an outright invasion—although
this could be rectified by 2025. If the United States were to become
involved, China’s coercive leverage over the island would diminish, and
the PLA’s ability to transport and sustain forces on the island would
become problematic.
With large amphibious ships, such as the Yuzhao-class landing plat-
form dock, the PLAN has the ability to take most islands or features
in the South China Sea. In such scenarios, the PLAN could also assert
naval superiority over other claimant’s naval power-projection capabili-
ties in both surface and subsurface warfare. Furthermore, sea-based air
defense, through either ship-based SAMs or, eventually, carrier-based
fighters, is generally sufficient against the air threats other South China
Sea claimants pose. Currently lacking, however, is long-distance air-
borne surveillance to find, track, and fix incoming airborne threats.
While the absence of these capabilities is unlikely to affect the mission
outcome, it could increase losses of PLAN surface ships. Similar to
the Taiwan missions, the great equalizer is potential U.S. involvement
on behalf of one of the South China Sea claimants. In the East China
Sea, China faces a much more difficult task squaring off against Japan
and possibly the United States because it could only seek to degrade

rather than destroy either country’s power-projection capabilities. Fur-
thermore, fleet air surveillance and air intercept capabilities against an
advanced military would be insufficient.
China’s abilities to conduct HADR missions are growing. The PLAN’s
Peace Ark hospital ship is the perfect ambassador for both mission types.
It has completed a number of humanitarian voyages and recently aided
the Philippines in the aftermath of a typhoon. Future additions to the
PLA’s airlift fleet will further extend the reach of such aid.
Lack of forward basing and heavy airlift significantly impedes the
PLA’s ability to participate in NEOs. Large numbers of overseas Chi-
nese workers in countries wracked by instability further exacerbate this
problem. Without developing a more globally deployed force, these
issues will endure through 2025.
China’s ability to conduct SLOC missions in the Gulf of Aden against
nonstate actors (Somali pirates) has taxed the PLAN’s at-sea logistics
capabilities. Although the PLA is addressing these issues, China would
be severely strained to conduct SLOC operations against a state-based
threat without possessing access to nearby naval bases for logistics,
rearmament, and repair support. Such operations could also require
access to nearby airfields to enable airborne surveillance and possibly
even the generation of air superiority or air strike sorties to support
ongoing SLOC operations.
Strategic Deterrence
Substantial improvements to China’s nuclear forces are occurring,
including quantitative improvements, such as increasing missile stock-
piles, and qualitative improvements, such as enhanced survivability
(from mobile launchers) and MIRVs. The main question for China
through 2025 is whether these advances will continue to keep pace
with the potential threat landscape, which includes continued advances

in conventional precision guided munitions and antiballistic missile
systems.

43
CHAPTER FOUR
Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army
Organization and Human Capital
Chinese military writers, as well as expert foreign observers of the PLA,
have noted that many of the PLA’s weaknesses stem from problems with
organizational structure and human capital. Organizational weaknesses
arise from the fact that the PLA, as an organization, is fundamentally
a collection of institutional relationships and practices, some of which
are poorly suited to its current requirements for historical or political
reasons. As a result, the very structure itself can create a system riddled
with inefficiencies, stovepiped information, and lack of oversight. By
contrast, human capital weaknesses stem directly from the personal
characteristics of the individuals who make up the PLA. Some of these
weaknesses arise from the pool of potential recruits from which the
PLA draws on for its annual conscription efforts, who are often under-
educated and/or do not meet physical or even mental health standards.
Other weaknesses in human capital affect the careers of PLA members
throughout their careers, such as low levels of professionalism.
This chapter first identifies weaknesses and assesses contribut-
ing factors in PLA organization and human capital. Next, it evaluates
how these weaknesses might affect the PLA’s ability to achieve its mis-
sions through 2025. Finally, it describes how the PLA is attempting to
address these weaknesses and assesses how successful the PLA has been
to date or is likely to be in the future.

Potential Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army
Organization and Human Capital
Because the identified organizational weaknesses are so numerous, this
section further categorizes them according to organizational structure,
organizational culture, force structure, and command structure. Fewer
identified factors contribute to human capital weakness and are less
easy to categorize, so we examine them in a separate subsection on
human capital.
Organizational Structure
Party-Military Relations
As the armed wing of the CCP, the Chinese PLA is not the armed
forces of the Chinese government or nation but rather the ultimate
guarantor of the ruling status, political prerogatives, and perquisites of
the CCP. This may affect morale because PLA soldiers and officers are
essentially fighting to preserve a system that benefits the approximately
80 million members of the CCP rather than the broader population of
1.3 billion Chinese people. As a consequence, with the growing pro-
fessionalization of the armed forces and China’s increasing integration
into the outside world as a result of its economic reform and opening
policies, Party officials and PLA leaders have repeatedly admonished
officers and enlistees not to heed calls for “getting the Party out of the
Army [军队非党化],” “depoliticizing the military [军队非政治化],” or
“nationalization of the armed forces [国家化].”1 To date, no promi-
nent Chinese military officers are known to have publicly advocated
for “nationalization,” but it is likely that frequently repeated remind-
ers to the force to embrace its existing relationship with the Party and
reject the idea of nationalization reflect an awareness of the potential
appeal of nationalization within the force. For the CCP leadership, of
course, the PLA’s status as a Party army is an important strength, not
a weakness.
1 See, for example, Qi Biao (2009). Qi is a researcher with National Defense University’s
Party History and Party Building Research Center. More recently, CMC Vice-Chairman
Fan Changlong has echoed such calls (see “Fan Changlong: Resolutely Resist . . . ,” 2013).

Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army Organization and Human Capital 45
Civil-Military Relations
Because the Chinese military is not an element of the state, it has no
official points of contact with state bodies or state leaders, except in their
capacity as officers of the CCP, where they sit on various leading small
groups or elite Party committees (such as the Political Bureau of the
Party). This has, in the view of some outside experts, resulted in a civil-
military gap that leads to problems in coordinating the PLA’s activi-
ties with China’s broader overall foreign and security policies, com-
pounded by what one observer characterizes as “a pattern of hands-off
management by top civilians” (Scobell, 2009). Examples have included
divergences between the positions of some in the state bureaucracies
and the PLA during the April 2001 aircraft collision incident; the 2003
severe acute respiratory syndrome crisis; the 2006 Kitty Hawk incident;
and the 2007 antisatellite missile test (Scobell, 2009; Gill and Kleiber,
2007).2 Another interesting case that revealed some of the challenges
inherent in civil-military relations in China was the May 2008 Sichuan
earthquake, which exposed what appeared to be a serious rift between
Premier Wen Jiabao and CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong over com-
mand and control (C2) of the disaster response mission.3 According to
one observer, as the disaster demonstrated, “even such a senior cadre
as Premier Wen Jiabao had difficulty soliciting the full support of PLA
and People’s Armed Police divisions in emergency situations” (Lam,
2009; see also Lam, 2008). Specifically, the PLA reportedly refused
to colocate its disaster response headquarters, the “PLA Command
Group for Resisting the Earthquake and Providing Disaster Relief
[军队抗震救灾指挥组],” with the “State Council Headquarters for
Resisting the Earthquake and Providing Disaster Relief [国务院抗震
救灾总指挥部],” which was led by Wen.4 According to some accounts,
Guo insisted that, as CMC vice chair, he was responsible for report-
2 For an alternative view of the 2007 antisatellite weapon test that concludes that the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs was fully read-in on the PLA’s missile shot before it occurred, see
Kulacki and Lewis (2008).
3 On civil-military relations following the earthquake, see Nan Li (2010).
4 For an assessment of the PLA leadership’s response to the earthquake, see Mulvenon
(2008a).

ing to CMC Chairman Hu Jintao, not to Wen as China’s Premier.
The dispute was reportedly resolved only when Hu intervened at Wen’s
request, and Guo did not appear together publicly with Wen until Hu
Jintao arrived on the scene.5 It is not entirely clear, however, whether
this incident resulted from poor relations among some of the top per-
sonalities involved in the disaster relief efforts or reflected a systemic
weakness inherent in the PLA’s status as a party army and the implica-
tions of that status for its ability to coordinate effectively with the State
Council and other civilian organizations.
Drawing on interviews with Chinese specialists, some Western
experts have described the PLA as functioning as something akin to
an “interest group” in Chinese policymaking. Accordingly, it can act
to push the country’s overall security policy in directions not always in
tune with those of the state, a pattern that may become significantly
more important during security crises, when the military’s informa-
tional and expertise advantages give its perspectives additional weight
(Jakobson and Knox, 2010). Still, at other times, the PLA appears to
have functioned quite effectively together with the state, even under
high stress and in crises, such as during the response to the 2008 Sich-
uan earthquake (Mulvenon, 2008a), the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games
security effort (Mulvenon, 2008b), and the 2011 mission to evacuate
Chinese civilians from Libya (Collins and Erickson, 2011), despite the
civil-military relations challenges discussed above.
Civilian Oversight
A final issue associated with the PLA’s status as a Party army is that
the Chinese armed forces are characterized by extremely weak civilian
control and an almost total absence of oversight. Indeed, at present,
the only civilian in the Chinese military chain of command is CMC
Chairman Xi Jinping (previously, there were two civilians, when Hu
Jintao was chairman and Xi was a vice chairman). Additionally, the
Ministry of Defense, a state position, is largely a shell organization
with no role in C2, no civilian defense experts who could help refine
5 For a report on Hu’s arrival that contains photos of the top leaders involved in the C2 of
the relief efforts, see “Chinese President Arrives . . . ” (2008).

the PLA’s combat capabilities or doctrine, and no ability to provide
oversight or ensure fidelity between the goals of the national command
authority and the actions of the armed forces.
While the PLA’s budget is processed as a part of the overall fiscal
outlays approved by the legislature, National People’s Congress largely
rubber stamps it, with no discussion or debate over the levels or allo-
cations of funding; size of the armed forces; strategy and doctrine; or
planning, procurement, and acquisition. Although Chinese-written
sources do not mention this as a source of weakness, Chinese ana-
lysts and experts have mentioned it in interviews with U.S. and other
foreign researchers, expressing the view that the absence of a civilian
bureaucracy and an empowered legislature that can query the military
on its planning and operations limits the PLA’s effectiveness and allows
it to demand and spend its budget without accountability.
For nearly two decades after its costly border conflict with Viet-
nam, the PLA was forced to support itself in part through participation
in the civilian economy. Over time, this constrained or even further
eroded the force’s focus on warfighting while fueling corruption, smug-
gling, and an emphasis on getting rich in the civilian economy rather
than on issues of national defense. In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen
Square massacre, the decision was made to begin increasing defense
budgets substantially to ensure the loyalty of the force, a trend that was
accelerated following the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995–1996) and
the 1998 decision to force the PLA to abandon commercial ventures
and return its focus exclusively to national defense.
Organizational Culture
A separate subset of organizational weaknesses relates to the PLA’s
organizational culture. This category includes such issues as
• the high-level corruption that is suspected to plague the PLA as
a whole
• low pay levels relative to those that prevail in the civilian economy
• a tendency to elevate all problems to the center and a correspond-
ing reluctance to devolve decisionmaking authority to lower levels

• a culture of engaging in insufficient training, of training in insuf-
ficiently challenging or realistic circumstances, and of striving to
avoid failure in training by ensuring that success is prearranged
through scripted exercises rather than embracing failure as an
opportunity to learn
• an organizational history that privileged the PLAA specifically
and combat arms over the supporting elements more generally
• a lack of overseas experience and combat experience, resulting in a
force that is widely believed to be both relatively xenophobic and
ignorant about the outside world and also somewhat naïve about
how difficult it can be to control the paths that armed conflict
can take.
Corruption
As noted in the previous section, the PLA enjoys an almost absolute
immunity from external oversight, budgetary transparency, and/or
accountability to the legislature for how it spends its funds and oper-
ates. As a consequence, the PLA is believed to be riddled with cor-
ruption (Garnaut, 2012). Examples of such corruption abound, from
the 2000 arrest of Ji Shengde, Director of Military Intelligence in the
PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD); to the 2012 detention of the
former deputy director of the General Logistics Department (GLD),
Lieutenant General Gu Junshan; and culminating in the 2014 arrest
and expulsion from the Party of former CMC Vice Chairman Xu
Caihou. Xu’s co–Vice Chairman, General Guo Boxiong, is also widely
rumored to be under investigation for personal and family members’
corruption (“Son of Former CMC Deputy . . . ,” 2014).
There have also been concerns that military awards and commen-
dations have been distributed far too liberally as a way to put an offi-
cial gloss on corrupt activities, something that the PLA has recently
announced efforts to address (“China’s New Rules . . . ,” 2014). Cor-
ruption at lower levels also abounds, with widespread stories of PLA
officers privatizing their military-assigned housing and selling it on
the open market, speeding through traffic with immunity (police will
not ticket a military-plated vehicle), parking in illegal spaces, and put-
ting military plates on their personal vehicles to avoid paying highway

tolls and to enjoy free fill-ups at gas stations (military vehicles report-
edly do not have to pay for gasoline). Additionally, it is widely believed
that positions in and promotions within the PLA can be bought (and
often have to be), with disgraced General Gu Junshan alone believed to
have sold “hundreds” of commissions, a practice reported to be “wide-
spread” (Lim and Blanchard, 2014). Reports of lavish banquets, red
carpet treatment, extravagant travel abroad, and expensive hotel stays
are also prevalent (Tejada, 2012), as are reports of abuse of retirement
perks to obtain valuable urban property (“Retired Military Officials
. . . ,” 2014).
Determining the full extent of corruption is not possible because
corruption is, by nature, a clandestine activity. Its true extent is almost
certainly greater than the number of cases that have been made public.
Determining remaining knowledge gaps is probably impossible using
only open sources. Given the absence of oversight, it is possible that the
PLA suffers levels of corruption equal to or even greater those in the
civilian economy; it is also possible, however, that military discipline
serves to reduce the level of overall corruption below that of society as
a whole. If the assessment that the PLA is highly corrupt is accurate
and if the PLA’s corruption seriously limits its warfighting capabilities,
it may mean that the United States might be inclined to assume China
has more sway in international affairs than its actual combat power
merits. On the other hand, if the PLA is a highly capable fighting force
despite its problems with corruption, the United States might risk over-
estimating the hollowness of the Chinese armed forces and be insuf-
ficiently cautious of confrontation with a PLA that is actually more
capable than stories about widespread corruption in the ranks might
suggest. It is impossible to judge the impact of corruption with great
precision, but it appears likely that it not only undermines attempts
to enhance the PLA’s professionalism but also negatively influences its
combat capabilities.
Compensation
For approximately two decades, from the early 1980s through the early
2000s, the PLA typically provided its staff with levels of compensation
and overall benefits lower than in the civilian economy. This not only

made it difficult for the PLA to compete with that economy in recruit-
ment and retention, it also incentivized (together with such other fac-
tors as the lack of institutional checks and balances and the rule of law)
the spread of corruption within the force.
Operational Initiative
The tendency to avoid decisionmaking at lower levels and push deci-
sions up the chain of command restricts the ability of lower-ranked
actors to exercise operational initiative. This may constrain the ability
of the PLA’s front-line commanders and soldiers to innovate, take the
initiative, respond quickly to developments or targets of opportunity in
their area(s) of operational responsibility, and/or lead to greater confu-
sion and weaker morale due to frustration at lower levels as they await
decisions from above.
Realistic Training
Another tendency is to avoid training sufficiently or under challenging
conditions. Often, exercises are seen as failures if “red” (i.e., the PLA)
does not win, so exercises are not seen as a chance to identify problems
during training that can be remedied before actual wartime operations
commence. Additionally, political pressures and a culture of treating
exercises and training as opportunities to impress one’s superiors fur-
ther erode the utility of exercises as tools to surface and address prob-
lems in military organization, planning, and execution. As one recent
report notes, 319 individuals in the Shenyang Military Region were
disciplined for misbehavior during military exercises, mostly related
to cheating to reduce the difficulty of carrying out field exercises or to
ensure that successful results (An Baijie, 2014b).
Information on PLA exercises is widely reported in the Chinese
and foreign media, and many exercises are held jointly with third-
country militaries. While the overwhelming majority of the PLA’s
exercises are not major news items in international media outlets, PLA
service journals and websites routinely carry at least some informa-
tion about these exercises. It is possible that the PLA may be seeking
to present itself as less capable in some dimensions, to shape potential
adversaries’ expectations and planning; however, in many aspects it
would be hard to have carried out more, and more realistic, large-scale

exercises than are publicly aired. For example, the Stride-2009 and
Mission Action 2010 and 2013 exercises, three recent large-scale trans-
military region mobility exercises, were widely observed and analyzed
by foreign experts. Still, our knowledge of PLA exercises and training
in the open sources is constrained by what is reported in the media,
which covers a subset of the total exercises and training that the PLA
undertakes.
Legacy of Ground Force Domination
The PLA’s internal culture is also shaped by its legacy as a force defined
from its earliest days by the centrality of ground warfare and extremely
strong service branch identities. The dominance of the PLAA on the
CMC was complete until 2004, when the chiefs of staff of the PLAAF,
PLAN, and PLASAF were promoted to an expanded CMC. In 2012,
the PLAAF commander, General Xu Qiliang, was promoted to be the
first-ever non-PLAA general to serve as a vice chairman of the CMC;
that year also marked the first time that the CMC ever had two serving
members (Xu plus his successor as commander of the PLAAF, General
Ma Xiaotian) from a service branch other than the PLAA. The cul-
tural preeminence of the army has long constrained the PLA’s think-
ing about armed conflict, power projection, and jointness. Indeed, as
research on the PLA’s political commissar system has shown, the politi-
cal commissars of the PLAAF and PLAN have often been transplants
from the PLAA, further exemplifying the difficulty of generating gen-
uine advocacy for the roles of air and naval power (Allen, Clemens,
et al., 2013).
In addition to the cultural influence of the PLAA and the diffi-
culty of overcoming separate service identities to produce an emphasis
on “jointness,” it is important to bear in mind that the combat service
arms were traditionally seen as more important than the support ser-
vices, such as maintenance, repair, transport, and logistical support.
This pattern, which is only being recognized and addressed in recent
years and which is still controversial within the PLA, has resulted in a
relative neglect of capabilities that have proven increasingly important
as China shifts toward power projection and strives to sustain combat
power further and further from its shores while operating increasingly

sophisticated platforms. The relative neglect of training noted above
has compounded the weaknesses in maintenance, repair, engineering,
transportation, and logistical sustainment. One PLASAF report, for
example, explained that, as a consequence of “an enduring peaceful
environment and few personnel [having] been assigned to their estab-
lishment, some brigades and regiments neglected the training for . . .
‘trivial’ support elements,” such as engineering armament support
(Zhao Jinhu, 2008).
Challenges of Developing a Professional Worldview
Thefinalorganizationalculturearearelatestocontacts,perceptions,and
experience. The PLA, out of a concern over foreign influences affecting
the political reliability of the officers in operational control of the force,
strongly limits contact between field officers and foreigners (Kaufman
and Mackenzie, 2009). This approach reinforces a view of the outside
world as threatening, hostile, and alien and may lead PLA field officers
to hold exaggerated or inaccurate perceptions of foreign governments,
their militaries’ capabilities, and their intentions. This problem is com-
pounded by the firewall within the PLA between commanders with
operational or line control over fielded forces and those who serve in
foreign affairs and professional military education. One PLA officer
who engages with foreigners stated that it is difficult even for him to
have contact with officers in the operational chain of command. Such
considerations are further reinforced by the absence, until recently, of
substantial overseas activities or multilateral military engagements. In
addition to lacking overseas contacts and experience, the PLA has not,
by and large, experienced modern warfare and may therefore be more
cavalier about the prospects for achieving political goals through mili-
tary means, having few officers with any personal taste of the horrors
of combat or direct appreciation of the many sources of friction that
can derail the best prepared plans when they are put into practice in
a confrontation against a capable enemy. Some PLA officers acknowl-
edge that the PLA’s lack of combat experience since China’s 1979 con-
flict with Vietnam could present problems for these reasons. Lacking
recent combat experience, the PLA can attempt to mitigate these issues
at least in part by analyzing the weaknesses or other potential vul-

nerabilities that its growing participation in other types of real-world
operation—PKOs, the evacuation of Chinese citizens from Libya, anti-
piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and the search for the missing
Malaysian Airlines plane MH370—have revealed.
The divisions between PLA officers with operational field control
and those who are largely academics or tasked with managing rela-
tions with foreign militaries are frequently reported in conversations
between foreign experts and academic PLA officers. The strictness of
the ban on contacts between academic and foreign area officers and
operational commanders is difficult to gauge and constitutes a remain-
ing information gap in Western understandings of the PLA. The impli-
cations, however, are that military-to-military engagements with the
PLA are unlikely to result in substantial change in PLA-wide views of
U.S. or foreign militaries. Neither are personal ties and contacts built
up between foreign and PLA counterparts likely to have much influ-
ence on operational behavior.
Force Structure and Personnel Enablement Policies
Another broad group of organizational challenges for the PLA is related
to force structure. These include the size of the overall armed forces;
issues of recruitment, retention, and post-demobilization life; weak-
nesses in the noncommissioned officer corps; a surfeit of commissioned
officers; and the role political commissars play in the force.
Size of the People’s Liberation Army
The overall size of the PLA—roughly 2.3 million men and women
under arms—is an enormous burden on the country’s defense budget.
It takes massive administrative and logistical efforts to feed, clothe,
house, care for, and manage this force. While the PLA has significantly
reduced its overall force size since 1990 (see Figure 4.1), many analysts
believe it is still too large (Kamphausen and Scobell, 2007).
Recruitment, Retention, and Veteran’s Benefits
The PLA has had and continues to have trouble recruiting and retain-
ing qualified personnel, especially for technical positions. It has also
experienced widespread dissatisfaction within the community of active
and retired PLA forces over their (anticipated or actual) postservice

treatment in terms of employment and benefits. Such considerations
as housing, salaries, food, opportunities for personal development,
and post-PLA service life can all weaken the force by depriving it of
high-quality recruits and weakening the morale of those who do join
the PLA. Anecdotally, it appears that many PLA recruits are dissatis-
fied with having to serve in remote areas, where hardship is a part of
life. Competition for educated recruits has grown more challenging as
wages rise in coastal urban areas, making it more attractive for young
Chinese to join the civilian economy rather than serve in the PLA.
Although we were unable to locate specific data on attrition rates, they
are reportedly high for midcareer soldiers, in part because of the lim-
ited range of opportunities the PLA provides for professional develop-
ment, continuing education, and acquisition of skills that will serve the
soldier after he or she returns to civilian life. Similarly, retired soldiers
have repeatedly been at the center of protests and calls for better vet-
erans’ benefits and pensions, a development that is almost certainly
noted by and worrisome to currently serving PLA soldiers and offi-
Figure 4.1
PLA Manpower, 1990–2014
SOURCE: IISS, various years.
RAND RR893-4.1
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
3.5
Numberofsoldiers(millions)
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
PLAN
PLAAF
PLAA
PLASAF

cers still looking ahead to their own demobilizations (Hancock, 2014;
Kuhn, 2010).
Noncommissioned Officer Corps
The Chinese armed forces have been seeking to develop a noncommis-
sioned officer (NCO) corps, especially technologically adept NCOs,
because this has been an area that internal PLA assessments have evalu-
ated as constituting a critical weakness. The PLA has striven to raise
its qualification and training levels for NCO recruitment in recent
years, putting in place more valuable remuneration packages and rais-
ing training and educational opportunities (“China Reveals Plan . . . ,”
2009). Separately, China tends to use its NCOs primarily in technical
capacities but not for small-unit leadership. Given the role the political
commissars play in the force and the cultural proclivity to push deci-
sionmaking up, rather than down (both discussed further later), the
prospects of making the most of the NCO corps in a unit leadership
capacity appear limited (McCauley, 2011).
Force Composition
The PLA has been seeking to shift its internal structure for some
time, with some observers assessing that the PLA’s force structure is
too bottom heavy (too many two-year conscripts) and too top heavy
(too many officers and civilian administrative cadres at the higher-
headquarters level) with not enough backbone forces (such as NCOs)
(NASIC, 2010).
Role of Political Commissars
Many foreign military analysts regard the role the political commis-
sars play in the force as a weakness that hampers military effectiveness
by taking time away from training to focus on the study of Marxism-
Leninism, the latest policy line from the top leadership, and loyalty
to the CCP. Allen, Chao, and Kinsella (2013) notes that the political
commissars’ role is to implement CCP decisions in the military, to
instill Party discipline among the military, to provide political educa-
tion to the troops, and to work with other components of the politi-
cal system. Srikanth Kondipalli (2005) adds to this an emphasis on
enhancing troop morale and providing entertainment, as well as con-

stant assessment of the political thinking of the force and tracking the
articulated positions of its various members. Still another important
aspect is the role political commissars play in promotions, which could
have broad implications for the professionalism and operational com-
petence of the PLA.
Because of the critical role the political commissar system plays
in ensuring the PLA’s institutional role as a Party army, the CCP and
PLA generally see the system as a necessary institution, not a weakness.
In contrast, many foreign observers regard it as a distraction from con-
siderations related more directly to operational military effectiveness,
with Easton (2014) assessing that political meetings consume as much
as 15 hours out of a 40-hour workweek. While the role of the politi-
cal commissars has changed substantially since the late 1970s, moving
toward a greater focus on ensuring the political reliability of the force
and providing for its entertainment and morale, there are still elements
of this institution that will likely take time away from purely opera-
tional and C2 decisions.
Command Structure
This subsection discusses weaknesses in the nontechnical aspects of
PLA C2; possible technical challenges confronting PLA C2 are dis-
cussed elsewhere in this report. PRC and foreign observers of the PLA
have identified a substantial number of problems associated with the
nontechnical side of C2 over the PLA, including the role of the CMC
and the four general departments; the PLA’s military region–based
national command structure; and the use of the PLA’s GSD to serve as
PLAA staff headquarters.
Central Military Commission
Command authority is exercised within the PLA through the
11-member CMC, rather than through a single minister advising the
national command authority, as in many other countries.6 The system
6 As of mid-2014, the CMC of the PLA consisted of the chairman, Xi Jinping; two vice
chairmen, PLAA General Fan Changlong and PLAAF General Xu Qiliang; the minister of
national defense, PLAA General Chang Wanquan; the director of the GSD, PLAA Gen-
eral Fang Fenghui; the director of the General Political Department, PLAA General Zhang

cumbersome, especially because it involves not only decisionmaking
but also operational control and implementation, under the PLA’s four
general departments (Wortzel, 2003, p. 6). To improve this system,
China announced in late 2013 that the
leadership system of the army will be reformed, and the function
and institution settings of the CMC will be optimized . . . [and]
joint operation command authority under the CMC, and theater
joint operation command system, will be improved. (“China to
Optimize . . . ,” 2013)
Military Regions
The operational PLA is divided up into seven military regions
(Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Chengdu, and Lan-
zhou) that cluster large provinces and urban areas together but bear
little relationship to regional affairs or power projection. PRC-based
military analysts and foreign observers alike assess that the military
region system, as currently structured, contributes little to the PLA’s
ability to generate combat power and may, in fact, hamper decision-
making and effective action. For example, PLAN officer Hua Xiaoping
has argued that “military region leadership organizations cannot say
that they are a real command organization, and this makes it difficult
to meet the needs of commanding multidimensional operations under
high technology conditions” (Pollpeter, 2010, p. 210). See Table 4.1 for
more on the relevant history.
General Staff Department
The PLA has tended to use the GSD as an unofficial service headquar-
ters for the PLAA, meaning that—in addition to managing military
operations, training, mobilization, intelligence, EW, communications,
training, cartography, meteorology, military affairs and foreign affairs,
and running the national main and alternate C2 systems—the GSD
Yang; the director of the GLD, PLAA General Zhao Keshi; the director of the General
Armament Department (GAD), Zhang Youxia; the commander of the PLA Navy, Admiral
Wu Shengli; the commander of the PLAAF, General Ma Xiaotian; and the commander of
PLASAF, General Wei Fenghe.

has to worry about Army-specific considerations. Seen from another
angle, this means that Army-specific considerations are highly likely
to shape and color overall PLA approaches to the issues that the GSD
is responsible for managing, thereby potentially constraining the influ-
ence of the PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF and making jointness more
difficult to achieve. This issue reflects considerations discussed above
under the section on PLAA cultural and institutional dominance
within the PLA as a whole. Observers tend to agree that it is an imbal-
anced arrangement that shapes the PLA’s overall institutional culture
and effectiveness in directions that tilt away from jointness and effi-
cient generation of combat power.
Human Capital
Quality of Recruits
As the PLA has sought to mechanize and subsequently to informa-
tionalize [信息化], the skill sets its recruits require have expanded sub-
stantially. Operating increasingly sophisticated weapon platforms in a
Table 4.1
Major PLA Organizational Changes
Year Organizational Change
1949 PLAN, PLAAF established.
1955 Number of military regions increases to 13.
1958 Number of general departments decreases to three (General Political
Department, GLD, GSD).
1966 PLASAF established.
1969 Number of military regions decreases to 11.
1985 Number of military regions decreases to 7 (Shenyang, Beijing, Nanjing,
Guangzhou, Jinan, Chengdu, Lanzhou).
1998 Number of general departments increases to 4 (GAD established).
2013–? China reportedly planning PLA organizational structure reforms
(possibilities include reductions in military region numbers, creation of
ground force headquarters).
SOURCES: Nan Li, 1999; Allen, 2002; “Full Text of 18th CPC Central Committee 3rd
Plenum Communiqué,” 2013.

combined arms and eventually (aspirationally) a joint arms approach to
combat requires highly qualified recruits. While education levels have
increased in China, many recruits are still drawn from rural areas with
limited education and training and insufficient exposure to advanced
technologies to master and maintain complicated equipment.
Mental and Physical Health
The mental and physical health of its force is another challenge for
the PLA. While all militaries have to ensure that their soldiers are
physically and mentally fit for combat and military operations, the
PLA appears to face somewhat unique challenges in this regard that
stem from the growing levels of development in Chinese society and
Chinese demographic policies. For example, air pollution levels and
modern sedentary lifestyles have reportedly reached such serious levels
that health and lung strength are impaired for broad swaths of society,
even among what would normally be expected to be healthy segments
of the population. To meet recruiting goals, the PLA has reportedly
lowered the minimum height requirement for recruits, raised
the maximum weight limit, reduced eyesight standards . . . [and
even] removed mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, depres-
sion, and bipolar disorder, as barriers to recruitment. (Zheng Xin,
2013)
To some extent, the changes seen in China’s recruits today merely
reflect a maturing, increasingly urbanized, and wealthy industrial soci-
ety. As Xinhua reported in early 2014, a recent study by the GAD had
determined that
the average Chinese soldier is two centimeters taller and their
waistline five centimeters larger than 20 years ago . . . [meaning
that] a soldier with a normal body figure can even feel “cramped”
in some commonly used tanks, with the vehicle designs based on
average physiques 30 years ago . . . [Additionally,] firearm stocks
that are too short can also affect firing accuracy. (“Chinese Sol-
diers Outgrowing . . . ,” 2014)

Professionalism
The final set of human capital weaknesses has to do with corruption,
low morale, and shortcomings in professionalism, including difficul-
ties accepting military discipline and maintaining operational security.
Many of these problems come from underlying issues or trends in Chi-
nese society, such as the “little emperor” phenomenon of spoiled chil-
dren stemming from the one-child policy, which produces recruits who
may not be tough enough to withstand military discipline. Highlight-
ing this issue, one recent report notes that Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu
of PLA National Defense University has related that “at least 70 per-
cent of PLA soldiers were from one-child families, and the figure rises
to 80 percent among combat troops” (“Soldiers of the One-Child Era
. . . ,” 2014).
Impact on the People’s Liberation Army’s Ability to
Achieve Its Missions
Unlike the following chapter looking at PLA weaknesses in combat
capabilities, it is difficult to tie identified organizational or human capi-
tal weaknesses directly to the success or failure of any of the various
PLA missions mentioned. Instead of increasing mission risk substan-
tially or even more dramatically preventing a mission from being car-
ried out, these weaknesses generally erode the PLA’s abilities to carry
out missions equally.
As a result, the identified organizational weaknesses—
organizational structure, organizational culture, force structure, and
command structure—constitute Type 3 weaknesses that degrade the
efficiency of the PLA to carry out its missions. The various subissues,
such as corruption, leadership, and training, at the very least tax the
resources used to develop modern forces. At worst, they constrain the
ability of the PLA to capably accomplish its missions. However, it is
possible that, in a hypothetical protracted war, some of the friction
documented earlier in this chapter might lead to a breakdown of civil-
military relations. As a result, organizational structure might consti-
tute a Type 2 weakness under certain extreme contingencies.

The identified human capital weaknesses—quality of recruits,
mental and physical health, and professionalism—likely constitute
Type 3 weaknesses. Certainly, developing a force to deter and win
wars and accomplish “diversified military tasks,” while using “infor-
matized” equipment in a “complex electromagnetic environment,” as
the PLA seeks to do, requires officers and enlisted personnel who can
conceive of, plan, and execute complicated missions under challenging
and potentially rapidly changing circumstances.
How the People’s Liberation Army Is Attempting to
Address These Weaknesses
This section looks at how the PLA is attempting to address its organiza-
tional and human capital weaknesses to the extent observable. Where
possible, this section also seeks to provide some analysis of how suc-
cessful the PLA will be by looking at the earlier aspects related to the
PLA’s organization (organizational structure, organizational culture,
force structure, and command structure) and human capital.
Organizational Structure
Party-Military Relations
Determining how effective the PLA has been at addressing the issue of
popular sentiment within the force favoring nationalization is a diffi-
cult challenge. The frequently repeated calls from Chinese military offi-
cers and Party leaders for the PLA to reject nationalization can be read
as evidence that the CCP and the PLA leadership regard the issue as a
serious challenge and one that probably cannot be “solved” so much as
“managed.” It is not clear that the PLA’s attitude toward China’s politi-
cal system will necessarily change in any fundamental ways between
2014 and 2025. If global trends toward democracy and increased access
to information and social networking continue, the pressures on the
PLA to move away from its current role as defender of the Party’s pre-
rogatives will probably grow. On the other hand, if CMC Chairman
Xi Jinping’s drive to emphasize nationalism and socialism through a
substantial anticorruption drive paired with the promotion of a “China

dream” are broadly embraced within China, it is more likely that the
PLA may continue (or increasingly come to) embrace its status as the
ultimate guarantor of the CCP’s political power and interests.7
Civil-Military Relations
As the differing assessments of foreign observers of the importance of
the disconnect between the PLA and the bureaucratic organs of the
state testifies, expert analysts differ on whether (and if so, how much)
this gap matters to the production of effective military power and
response capabilities. If the assumption that the PLA suffers from chal-
lenges in coordinating with the state is inaccurate, it would imply that
China’s coordination of a response to any damages inflicted during the
course of a conflict might be faster and more effective than anticipated,
giving the country additional resilience. Chinese sources rarely mention
this issue as a weakness, and the PLA does not appear to be trying to
address this weakness. Out to 2025, as China’s interests become more
global, as the number of actors participating in or affected by Chinese
foreign and security policy decisionmaking expands, and as the PRC’s
citizenry comes to expect its military to protect it from threats both
at home and abroad, it is possible that effective coordination between
the PLA and the state will grow in importance. It is too early, however,
to state definitively that the Chinese military cannot effectively use its
existing ad hoc or Party-based coordination channels or develop new
ones, such as the National Security Commission formed in late 2013.
Civilian Oversight
As noted earlier, Chinese military writers do not address this as a weak-
ness, and there is little evidence that the PLA (or broader PRC system)
is seeking to develop a cadre of civilians who can provide oversight
or advice. There also do not appear to be plans to add civilians to the
CMC chain of command (although the successor-designate to Xi Jin-
ping in 2022 could conceivably be added sometime in the 2017 time
frame to allow him to gain experience with and build contacts among
the military). Finally, there are no signs that the National People’s
7 The China dream is a concept championed by Xi Jinping that “envisions a strong nation
with a strong military” (Swaine, 2013, p. 10).

Congress will become more active in exercising budgetary or policy
oversight over the PLA. As one U.S. expert discussing these and other
indicators of enhanced civilian oversight and control concluded, “such
developments are unlikely to occur in the near future” (Scobell, 2009,
p. 20).
Organizational Culture
Corruption
Since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, the PLA has appeared,
much like the rest of the PRC, to have come under heavy and sustained
pressure to clean up corruption. The PLA reportedly established an
internal “auditing group” in 2012 dedicated to monitoring “expendi-
tures of large amounts of money, such as construction projects, hous-
ing management, procurement and the operation of military hospi-
tals” and is also tightening up auditing and accounting procedures
and regulations (An Baijie, 2014a). Anecdotally, banquets, gift-giving,
and abuse of military perquisites are down substantially in the wake of
CMC Chairman Xi’s calls to avoid displays of ostentation. Xi’s call to
focus on core military competencies to prepare to “fight and win wars”
appears at least partially designed to clean up and combat corruption in
the armed forces to improve their ability to project military force and
generate effective combat power. Xi’s ability to curb corruption with-
out undertaking structural changes that demand greater transparency,
accountability, and civilian oversight seems likely to be constrained,
and it remains an open question whether fear, disciplinary inspections,
and hortatory calls alone will suffice to produce long-lasting changes
that will outlive Xi Jinping’s time in office. Importantly, Xi’s emphasis
on and extension of anticorruption efforts at senior levels of the PLA,
as reflected by the recent expulsion from the CCP of former CMC Vice
Chairman Xu Caihou, could be part of an effort to further consolidate
Xi’s control of the military and accomplish key reform and restructur-
ing goals (for example, Tiezzi, 2014). Little if any information is avail-
able to evaluate this hypothesis, but it is a possibility that appears to
merit further analytical attention.
In addition, if the PLA initiates a genuine house cleaning on
corruption, this too carries certain risks for morale within the force,

resentment over corruption as it is revealed, and suspicion that pock-
ets will persist. It could also conceivably lead to the removal of officers
who, while corrupt, are also competent and/or creative commanders,
thereby cleaning up but also weakening the force.
Compensation
In recent years, the PLA has reportedly raised salaries quite substan-
tially and appears to be planning to do so for many years to come. It
is also seeking to provide troops with better food, clothing, barracks
living accommodations, and entertainment (“People’s Liberation Army
to March . . . ,” 2009; “Fifth-Generation Barracks . . . ,” 2012; Guo
Renjie, 2014). Even so, a 2011 report noted that the average PLA offi-
cer’s annual income was only about U.S. $9,900, or about U.S. $3
more per day than the median income of a Beijing resident (“Chinese
Military Officers’ Wages . . . ,” 2011). While the PLA now reportedly
pays its officers and soldiers better than in the past, many of the ben-
efits of service in the PLA have reportedly come in the form of nonsal-
ary compensation (clothing, housing, etc.), and yet others may stem
from the opportunity to engage in corruption of varying levels of value.
Realistic Training
Out to 2025, the PLA will increasingly need to be able to operate in dif-
ficult environments—far from home, in bad weather, and potentially
against adversaries that innovate and take courses of action that PLA
planning constructs have not anticipated. While the PLA has begun
to train in more-realistic geographic settings, incorporating opposing
force units whose tactics and operational practices more closely mimic
potential real-world adversaries, in poor weather conditions, at night,
in complicated electromagnetic environments, and in spite of break-
downs in machinery, the PLA is still only beginning to adopt a more-
realistic and more-effective training and exercise regimen (“PLA Kicks
Off . . . ,” 2014). Still, it is likely that, by 2025, the PLA will have made
further progress in training under more-realistic and challenging con-
ditions. This has been a consistent area of emphasis in PLA training
guidance for many years and appears likely to remain a high priority
for the PLA over the next decade.

Army-Centric Force
PLA sources generally do not discuss the prominent role of service
identities as a weakness, but foreign experts are widely agreed on this
point and also report that Chinese observers agree with this assessment
in private conversations, even if they are not at liberty to argue so in
print. Moreover, the transformation of the CMC over the past decade
(adding the service branch chiefs in 2004 and promoting an air force
general to the vice chairmanship in 2012) would appear to be driven
at least in part by a desire to respond to concerns about the needs for
jointness and increased input from the PLAAF, PLAN, and PLASAF
that will be important for projecting power farther away from China’s
shores and for executing more-complex, joint operations.
While the PLAA has dominated the PLAAF and PLAN for
decades, the PLAAF and PLAN have nonetheless been gaining increas-
ing influence and a deeper sense of their own service identities in recent
years. China appears to be moving from an era when one service pre-
dominated to one in which service identities as a whole are growing
stronger, even as the PLA appears to realize operationally that what it
needs to accomplish most urgently is to transition to an era of genuine
“jointness.” Recent PLA moves to address this concern may be coming
in the form of a new “joint operational command system” that would
“result in more coordinated and combat-capable forces” that could
respond more efficiently to crisis (Zhao Shengnan, 2014).
Force Structure and Personnel Enablement Policies
Size of the People’s Liberation Army
The PLA is believed to be planning additional force reductions as it
transitions toward an increasingly professional force, investing more in
high-technology platforms for power projection, rather than remain-
ing a force designed primarily for garrisoning the country’s borders
and preparing to counter a ground invasion. In late 2013, the Third
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee reportedly reached a
decision to continue to “optimize” the PLA’s size and structure and to
adjust other aspects of the PLA’s C2 (“China to Optimize . . . ,” 2013).
At present, no information has come to light about the exact size of
the force reductions or which service branches will be affected. Thus,

information about the ultimate planned size of the PLA remains a key
gap in our understanding of the forces that the PLA is likely to field
out to 2025.
Recruitment, Retention, and Veteran’s Benefits
In response to these concerns, the PLA has sought to increase patri-
otic sentiments in society at large—for example, through normative or
hortatory calls to military service and production of nationalistic video
games designed to appeal to young potential recruits (Dewey, 2013)—
while also increasing the material benefits for those who serve, such
as better food, clothing, and recreational and educational opportuni-
ties. At the same time, there have been continuing efforts to encour-
age localities to provide jobs and living stipends to retired PLA officers
and NCOs, attempting to address at least part of their concerns. Some
retired NCOs have been brought back in to share insights and experi-
ences and provide continuing leadership and technical expertise. How
effective these actions have been and how widespread dissatisfaction
over living standards, professional development opportunities, and
postservice life are remain difficult to assess in the absence of system-
atic survey data. The PLA’s efforts to address these issues appear likely
to make at least some headway out to 2025. While unlikely to fully
resolve these issues, these efforts may help manage the challenges we
identified in the realms of standard of living, professional development,
and postservice life.
Noncommissioned Officer Corps
Information gaps continue to exist with respect to the challenges aris-
ing from insufficient numbers in or quality of the NCO corps. Given
China’s commitment to making progress on this issue, it seems reason-
able to suspect that it will make at least some progress in addressing
the issue of the NCO corps by 2025, although this too is likely to be
an area in which the PLA is constantly striving to make improvements
and managing the consequences of the issue, rather than “solving” the
problem.

Command Structure
Central Military Commission
While appearing to view the CMC-led system as being open for fur-
ther refinement, China does not appear primed to move away from the
system in any fundamental way or to regard it as something that is a
critical constraint on the ability to generate military power. For this
reason, even as the PLA contemplates the reform of its organizational
structure, there is little reason to believe the PLA is planning funda-
mental changes in the CMC system. Any such changes would most
likely driven by the personal decisionmaking style and preferences of
the top leader, whose stamp is placed on the functioning of that body
(albeit with certain constraints coming from the factional rivals he and
his allies must bargain with).
Military Regions
A reorganization of the PLA, possibly accompanied by a reduction in
the number of military regions from seven to five, has been discussed
for some time, most recently in early 2014 (Zhao Shengnan, 2014).
While rumors of such reorganization have been around for years,
Xi Jinping may be able to exert sufficient leadership strength to suc-
ceed where his predecessors have failed. If so, this would potentially
take place along with other potential changes to the military strategic
guidelines we discussed earlier in this report. Looking out to 2025, the
need for changes to the C2 structure to facilitate complex joint opera-
tions both within and beyond China’s borders is apparent. Premised
on internal geographical divisions within the Chinese state, the current
system of C2 will increasingly be seen as a constraint on the effective
generation of military power and the control of such power, thus fur-
ther fueling calls for changes.
Human Capital
Quality of Recruits
According to China Daily, the PLA is trying to address the weaknesses
in the educational levels of its force by recruiting more high school
graduates and college degree holders (“China’s Army Eases Curbs . . . ,”
2014). PLA recruiters in 2014 have reportedly been specifically ordered

by the Ministry of National Defense to “take in more college students
than in 2013” (“China Army Wants . . . ,” 2014), and the age limit for
bachelor degree holders has been raised from 23 to 24 to expand the
pool of potential recruits (“China Army Recruitment . . . ,” 2014). Edu-
cation levels among officers are also something that the PLA is hoping
to raise, although the pressures to do so are also fueling some concerns
about false or sham educational credentials.
Mental and Physical Health
The PLA is making an effort to accept conscripts with lower entry-level
physical and mental aptitude scores and train them up, although how
well this will pan out is not yet clear. It is not clear how a foreign mili-
tary could take advantage of such weaknesses on the part of the PLA.
Professionalism
To address the emotional and psychological needs of its service person-
nel, the PLA has reportedly implemented a special training program
for “spoiled boys and girls” to strengthen their fighting capability, with
one PLA soldier interviewed by the South China Morning Post report-
ing that “recruits usually need two years to adjust to life within a unit
through tough routine training and psychological counseling” (“Sol-
diers of the One-Child Era . . . ,” 2014).

69
CHAPTER FIVE
Weaknesses of People’s Liberation Army Combat
Capabilities
This chapter addresses weaknesses in the PLA’s combat capabilities
through the lens of the “two incompatibles,” a concept Chinese publi-
cations often use to highlight what the PLA perceives as a gap between
its current capabilities and its goals. The chapter consists of six sec-
tions. The first section discusses the concept of the two incompatibles
in greater detail. The second evaluates weaknesses in the land domain.
The third addresses weaknesses in the maritime domain. The fourth
reviews weaknesses in the air domain. The fifth reviews weaknesses in
space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The sixth assesses
potential weaknesses in China’s approach to nuclear deterrence.
The Two Incompatibles and the Two Gaps
The PLA is acutely aware that weaknesses persist in army-building
efforts to date and that the sustained modernization drive of the last
two and a half decades has yet to achieve its goals. Specifically, the
PLA’s own weakness assessments revolve around a concept alternately
referred to as two incompatibles [两个不相适应] or the two gaps [两个
差距].1 Originally promulgated by former President Hu Jintao (“Firmly
Grasping . . . ,” 2006), the two incompatibles are
1 Both terms connote the same concepts but are used to highlight slightly different aspects,
as we will explore later.

• The modernization levels of China’s armed forces have yet to meet
the requirements of winning local wars under informatized con-
ditions.
• The military capabilities of China’s armed forces have yet to live up
to the historical missions.
Specifically, the PLA recognizes incongruities between the envi-
sioned development of military capabilities and current realities.
The first incompatible acknowledges that the PLA’s ability to capa-
bly fight wars is insufficient, especially against modern information-
age opponents that have incorporated advances from recent revolu-
tions in military affairs (Fan Zhenjiang and Lou Yaoliang, 2009). The
second incompatible acknowledges that the PLA’s ability to conduct
MOOTW also falls short of the levels the CCP desires.
Although the two incompatibles and two gaps reference the same
concept, the literature uses them to highlight different aspects. Men-
tions of the two incompatibles are intended to state what the problem
is, while mentions of the two gaps seek to diagnose why the problem
exists and, often, how to solve it. According to CMC member and
PLAN commander Wu Shengli, the two incompatibles and two gaps
serve a dual role, as official problem recognition and as the basis for the
PLA’s attempts at “scientific” problem solving (Wu Shengli, 2010, p. 1).
Far from empty rhetoric, the two incompatibles and two gaps thought
has permeated every general department, service, military region, and
fleet as hundreds of PLA articles and speeches by CMC members attest.
Indeed, these terms can be considered the capstone concept of Party
guidance directing the PLA’s continued development because they are
considered the “principle contradiction” in PLAA building and mili-
tary training (Tang Xiaohua and Li Jie, 2012).
What are the problems identified with the first incompatible,
PLA’s lack of modernization? The available literature denotes several
areas that are broad and endemic to the force in the realms of training,
organization, human capital, force development, and logistics as being
particularly problematic:

Weaknesses of People’s Liberation Army Combat Capabilities 71
• Training has not kept pace with modernization, according to one
commenter, as old training practices have not changed “in line
with the new mode of generating combat power . . . and current
training is not sufficient for training under informatized condi-
tions” (“Promoting the Scientific . . . ,” 2011).
• Organizationally, China’s armed forces are not prepared to
address continued “problems related to administrative structures
and mechanisms” and remaining “institutional obstacles and
structural conditions” (Peng Bo, 2008, p. 11). The PLA’s human
capital is an issue because the “quality of officers and soldiers is
incompatible with the requirements imposed by their duties and
missions” (Wang Jianping and Yu Linxiang, 2014). More specifi-
cally, “existing staffing of China’s armed forces cannot fulfill the
requirements of informatized war” because “the quality of [infor-
mation technology, or IT] personnel does not match the require-
ments for the development of combat effectiveness” (Peng Bo,
2008, p. 11; “Major Initiatives . . . ,” 2011).
• Force development suffers because the PLA, according to one
commenter, is not an informatized force but a 20th-century
mechanized force (“Promoting the Scientific . . . ,” 2011). Other
commentators are even harsher in their assessments. According
to CMC Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang, although the PLA seeks
to become an informatized force, it is not fully mechanized (Xu
Qiliang, 2013, p. 6). Beyond modernization levels, the PLA faces
structural challenges to force development that are due to “dis-
persed resources, redundant construction, and low efficiency”
(“Putting Greater Emphasis on Reform, Innovation . . . ,” 2011).
The PLA also recognizes that it has a long way to go to become a
joint force, in which all the services can act together. One journal
article stated that the “military’s foundation for integrated joint
operations was still relatively weak” (Fan Zhenjiang and Lou Yao-
liang, 2009).
• Logistics is also cited as an area of weakness, specifically being at
an “insufficient . . . modernization level . . . to win informatized
local wars” (Zhao Jianwei and Tang Xiangdong, 2008).

What problems are identified with the second incompatible,
the inability of the PLA to fully carry out the new historic missions?
The available literature points to similar problems of training, orga-
nization, and logistics, but interestingly appears less focused on force
development:
• Training for the new historic missions is “insufficient” because
“traditional ideas and habitual practices have not been drastically
changed” (“Firmly Grasping . . . ,” 2006).
• The organizational aspects, specifically human capital, are also an
issue; “the overall level of talented personnel in our army does not
meet the requirements for fulfilling its historic mission in the new
century” (“Major Initiatives . . . ,” 2011).
• The “construction and development” of PLA logistics are “not
meeting the requirements” because there is “insufficient support
capability for the requirement of fulfilling the historical missions”
(Tang Xiangdong and Fan Juwei, 2007, p. 1; Zhao Jianwei and
Tang Xiangdong, 2008).
As mentioned earlier, the literature switches from using the phrase
two incompatibles, which is a statement of what the problem is, to the
phrase two gaps when it seeks to explain why the problems exists and
how the problems can be addressed.
Why is the first incompatible, PLA’s level of modernization in
fighting informatized wars, problematic? According to a speech CMC
Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang delivered to the Third Plenum in 2013,
this is because a “substantial gap” endures between the PLA “and the
advanced militaries of the world . . . ” (Xu Qiliang, 2013, p. 6). Accord-
ing to Xu, this is of particular concern because the PLA may one day
find itself “left behind” (Fan Zhenjiang and Lou Yaoliang, 2009; “New
Year Message . . . ,” 2008). At least one Chinese PLA scholar has further
diagnosed why the PLA is relatively underdeveloped, stating that it is
the result of China’s intentional focus on other areas of Chinese society,
most notably building the economy (Yang Yi, 2006).Far from being an
abstract issue, the PLA’s current lack of modernization is considered to
have significant implications for China’s national sovereignty and secu-

rity today. Because of the gaps in modernization, the PLA cannot fully
defend China’s national sovereignty through the “protection of oce-
anic rights and security in space and electromagnetic domains” (Yang
Chunchang and Wang Hanshui, 2009). Furthermore, “actual and
potential threats” already exist on China’s “periphery, especially in the
maritime direction . . .” that are either unaddressed or underaddressed
because of PLA’s weaknesses (“Persistently Direct . . . ,” 2013, p. 1).
Why is the second incompatible, PLA’s military lack of capabili-
ties to prosecute the historic missions, problematic? Commentators rec-
ognize that “there is still a gap between the current military power
of our military and the requirement of fulfilling the historic mis-
sion” (“Making a Firm Effort . . . ,” 2006, p. 1). Specifically, the PLA
“cannot fulfill . . . domestic and international demands . . . to perform
the nontraditional missions of counterterrorism, upholding stability,
and peacekeeping” (Peng Bo, 2008, p. 11). In particular, “a wide gap
between . . .” the “organization and command of forces to respond to a
variety of threats and complete diverse military tasks” remains (“Build-
ing High-Quality . . . ,” 2008, p. 1).
How does the PLA seek to generally address problems the two
incompatibles raise? First and foremost, the PLA seeks to investigate
“prominent contradictions and problems” and resolve these problems
by “implementing scientific development” (“Attaining Greater . . . ,”
2010, p. 1; “More Resolutely . . . ,” 2012, p. 1). Commenters have fur-
ther pointed to the need for new policies and administrative structures
to oversee these changes (“Attaining Greater . . . ,” 2010, p. 1). Specifi-
cally, they have emphasized strengthening defense technology, deep-
ening training reform, and accelerating modernization as the major
means of solving the two incompatibles. Defense technology must also
be strengthened by building a research and development system that
is more capable and that is endowed “with Chinese characteristics”
to “spur new innovations” (Liu Sheng, 2013, p. 3). At least one com-
menter considers training reform to be the “basic path to resolving” the
two incompatibles (“Promoting the Scientific . . . ,” 2011, p. 1; Tang
Xiaohua and Li Jie, 2012). Finally, the PLA has set a goal for itself to
become a fully mechanized force by 2020 while simultaneously work-
ing to become more informatized by keeping “a tight grip,” a likely

euphemism for high-level oversight of modernization efforts (Wu
Jieming, 2014; Zhang Qinsheng, 2011).
The rest of this chapter will assess the weaknesses presented in
PLA sources, the majority of which mention the problems framed by
the two incompatibles, and/or PLA sources that mention the two gaps
and therefore address why these problems exist and how to deal with
them. We will address these issues for the land; sea; air; space, cyber,
and electromagnetic warfare; and nuclear domains.
The Land Domain
Through focusing specifically on the available “two incompatibles/two
gaps” literature, this section looks at potential weaknesses in the land
domain, how they might affect the PLA’s ability to achieve its missions,
and how the PLA is attempting to address weaknesses in the PLAA and
the conventional units of the PLASAF.2 These forces bear the brunt of
responsibility for campaign operations in the land domain.
Potential People’s Liberation Army Army and People’s Liberation
Army Second Artillery Force Weaknesses
People’s Liberation Army Army
The Chinese sources often discuss shortcomings in a disaggregated,
laundry-list fashion and do not necessarily link their tactical problems
to the overarching operational and strategic problem of achieving joint
operational capabilities. Nonetheless, many Chinese strategists identify
the inability to conduct integrated joint operations as the central prob-
lem China needs to solve to be able to project combat power beyond
its land borders.
Chinese sources highlight several problems that contribute to the
PLA’s shortcomings for conducting integrated joint operations. Over-
all, they suggest there is still a large gap with developed countries’ mil-
itaries, especially the United States (Feng Aiguo, 2013; Li Yuming,
2 As a result of the deployment of the DF-21D ASBM, PLASAF also has an important role
in the maritime domain, at least in scenarios that involve U.S. military intervention.

2014; “Fully Understand . . . ,” 2014). According to one source, the
“gap between the modernization level and national security demands
is still very large, and the gap with advanced military levels around
the world is also still very large” (“12 Questions . . . ,” 2013). Chinese
sources attribute this gap to a number of problems.
Ideological Thinking
One roadblock the PLA must overcome is conceptual, or what are
described as problems in ideological thinking. PLA sources blame
this for everything from parochialism between the services to a struc-
tural or systemic problem to the equipment level (Li Dongxing and
Tao Lianpeng, 2014, p. 5). The implication appears to be that correct
thinking should be able to solve any of these problems. One potential
complicating factor here is that this may reinforce the perspective of
the preeminence of Party ideology over professional military thinking.
Personnel
Another challenge highlighted in PLA publications is the quality of
personnel. For many years, the PLA has attached a high priority to
improving the level of its personnel. One frequently cited formulation
that underscores the importance of talented personnel is: “[W]e would
rather have talent and wait for equipment than have equipment and
wait for talent” (Zhang Yang, 2009). Yet PLA publications suggest that
the PLA still faces problems in a number of areas. One is education
and training (Fang Guangfeng, 2013; Zhou Ruifeng, 2012). Another
is achieving sufficient discipline within the service to follow orders and
procedures and to enforce standards (“Cheerful Sight . . . ,” 2013). As
one source puts it: “We must clearly acknowledge that the thinking of
some officers and men with regard to supporting war is still not firmly
established and that problems still exist in . . . training, exercises, and
testing in an improper, insubstantial, or lax manner” (Zhang Jianshe,
2013).
Still another personnel problem the PLA has identified con-
cerns its senior leaders’ leadership abilities. According to one report,
the “capability for fighting modern warfare is still insufficient, and the
capability of cadres at all levels for commanding modern warfare is also
still insufficient” (“12 Questions . . . ,” 2013). Some PLA sources link

this to insufficient understanding of modern operational art. This is
traced to insufficient comprehension of what is important and what is
merely peripheral (Wu Zhiwei, Pan Linjun, and Zhang We, 2013) and
to a peacetime mentality (Fu Biao et al., 2013) that reportedly prevails
because China has not been in a major conflict since its 1979 war with
Vietnam and has not been involved in sustained combat for over 50
years, since the Korean War.3
Some PLA publications also lament an inability to use new equip-
ment properly (Wang Ning and Chen Hao, 2012), which could be
because the PLA has been receiving so much new equipment so quickly
(Fu Wenwu, Zhang Jianhui, and Yang Yongjun, 2012). According to
one source, “one can only end wars by having the capability to fight
. . . . It is a very slow and hard chore to get results from combat power
building . . . . [It is] a ‘lonely long-distance run’ by generations of sol-
diers in a relay struggle on training ground” (“Preparing to Go . . . ,”
2013).
PLA publications also lament resistance to change to support
modernization (You Chengfeng et al., 2012) and inadequate problem-
solving ability (Wang Zhuang, 2013) and adaptability (Wu Zhiwei,
Pan Linjun, and Zhang Wei, 2013). Additionally, PLA sources state
that China still has a long way to go to realize its goal of building
a modern and professional corps of NCOs on par with those of the
world’s most advanced militaries. PLA sources cite such problems as
insufficient numbers, rate of rotation out of military, and training and
education levels (Yu Hequan, Yan Xiaohui, and Jiang Honglin, 2012;
Chen Xiang, 2014; Lan Guohong, Zhang Fang, and Ouyang Zhimin,
2012).
Finally, PLA publications highlight personnel challenges associ-
ated with an emerging generation gap and the resulting age and expe-
rience issues (Yu Xiangxi, Zhang Meng, and Zhang Shengtao, 2013;
Feng Chunmei, Liu Yi, and Wang Renfei, 2013; “Strive to Fulfill . . . ,”
3 Zhang Youxia, director of the GAD, was quoted as saying that “forgetting war will cer-
tainly bring about dangers. Only by getting ready for war fighting will one be able to fight
and win . . . . [A]lways maintain strategic alertness, resolutely overcome peacetime inertia
and bad habits” (Fu Biao et al., 2013).

2014). The gap between younger personnel and older cadre is becom-
ing more acute, and the limitations of an older, less technologically
inclined leadership will make it difficult to realize combat potential for
a modern battlefield.
Training
PLA publications also highlight continuing shortfalls in training,
despite years of efforts to make training more realistic and more valu-
able in terms of addressing shortcomings and improving the PLA’s
operational capabilities. According to some reports, training is some-
times still too formalistic and does not focus on strengthening combat
effectiveness (Fu Biao et al., 2013; Wang Xueping, 2011; Xu Longkui,
2012; Zhong Wei, 2013; Sun Weiguo, 2013). Other challenges cited in
PLA publications include lack of appropriate training materials, equip-
ment, and standards of performance (Zhang Wei, Li Yong, and Ren
Xingzhi, 2013); lack of “suitable training grounds” (Li Dayong, Cai
Bo, and Huang Tengfei, 2013; Zhang Jun, 2014; Wang Xuefeng et al.,
2012); and insufficient night training (Zhao Xihong, 2013; Liu Shi-
long et al., 2013).
Informatization
Even though the PLA has made dramatic improvements in its ISR and
communications capabilities in recent years, Chinese military publica-
tions suggest that the PLA still has a long way to go to improve its level
of informatization enough to meet its broader objectives.
PLA publications highlight a limited number of trained and
experienced personnel throughout the force. They also point to lack of
training materials and standards of performance (Fu Wenwu, Zhang
Jianhui, and Yang Yongjun, 2012) and suggest that some personnel are
not following proper procedures and adhering to standard IT operat-
ing procedures (An Weiping, 2013). Additional problems highlighted
in PLA newspapers and journals include design and effectiveness of
equipment, integration of systems across the force, lack of “up to date
data and management” (Zhang Xiaozhan, 2013), and access to geopo-
sitional and operational information. Some Chinese analysts also ques-
tion the effectiveness of “system of systems” and IT equipment and cite
what they see as a lack of a sufficiently innovative and robust IT indus-

try base to support the PLA, which results in too much dependence on
foreign IT (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the
People’s Republic of China, 2012).
Weapons and Equipment
PLA sources that discuss weaponry and equipment shortfalls affect-
ing the PLAA focus on such issues as training of personnel to oper-
ate and repair the equipment (Wang Wenzhui, Zeng Zhengxiong, and
Luo Hong, 2013), limited amounts of new equipment to train on (Ma
Qichao, 2013), and difficulties linked to integration of various types
of new and old equipment (“Winning Battles . . . ,” 2014). This is cor-
roborated in open-source publications. For example, Figure 5.1 shows
that the PLA’s main battle tank fleet in 2014 continues to consist over-
whelmingly of first- and second-generation tanks. Although modified,
Figure 5.1
Numbers of PLA Main Battle Tanks, by Generation, 1990–2014
NOTE: China defines its tank generations differently, but for our purposes, the
World War II generation consists of T-34 tanks; the first postwar generation of T-54,
Type-59, and Type-69 tanks; the second generation of Type-79, Type-80, Type-85,
Type-88, and all subvariant tanks; and the third generation of Type-96, Type-98,
Type-99, and all subvariant tanks.
RAND RR893-5.1
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
Numberoftanks
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
WWII generation
1st generation
2nd generation
3rd generation

certain first-generation tanks, such as the Type-59, were initially pro-
duced in the 1950s (Jane’s Information Group, 2014b).
How do these numbers compare with those of China’s imme-
diate neighbors? While it is beyond the scope of this report to take
into account the full range of qualitative differences in tank types and
operating concepts and make a holistic system-of-systems compari-
son, Figure 5.2 shows that China maintains a significant quantitative
advantage over its immediate neighbors in main battle tanks and has so
for quite some time. Although not depicted, India maintains an arse-
nal of approximately 900 third-generation main battle tanks, although
over two-thirds of its force consists of second-generation T-72 tanks
(IISS, 2014, p. 242). Vietnam’s army consists solely of first- and second-
generation main battle tanks, with the T-62 as its premier tank (IISS,
Figure 5.2
Comparison of Main Battle Tank Inventories Possessed by China’s
Neighbors, 1990–2014
SOURCE: IISS, various years, and RAND estimates.
NOTES: Does not include main battle tanks thought to be in storage. This affects
the totals for India and Russia, which have had up to approximately 1,000 and
20,000 tanks in storage, respectively, during many of the periods examined. IISS,
2014, reports only total numbers for Russia from 2003 through 2010, including tanks
in storage. We therefore made a straight-line estimate for this period (dashed line).
RAND RR893-5.2
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
1,000
3,000
5,000
7,000
9,000
10,000
Numberoftanks
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
China
North Korea
Russia
India
Vietnam

2014, p. 287). Finally, although Russia’s operationally ready force con-
sists of only 2,500 main battle tanks, it has another 18,000 in storage
(IISS, 2014, p. 181).
Logistics Support
The PLAA also faces persistent challenges in support, as reflected by
frequent discussions of shortcomings in logistics and maintenance
capabilities that appear in PLA newspaper reports and journal articles.
As one publication states, logistics challenges include such issues as
“scattered logistic disposition, few mobile support forces, insufficient
informatized logistic equipment, and weak long-distance delivery”
(Wang Kun, 2013). Maintenance problems addressed in PLA articles
and newspaper reports include shortcomings related to IT equipment
(Fan Jingzhi and Yan Jiaji, 2013), army aviation (helicopters) (Ouyang
Hao and Ye Jianjun, 2013), emergency repair (wartime) capability (Fu
Biao et al., 2013), and high-tech equipment maintenance capacity
(Zhang Pengcheng and Chen Jincai, 2013; Feng Tao, 2013; Liu Yun,
2013).
Mobilization
The PLA has emphasized mobilization capabilities but is still dissatis-
fied with the level of civil-military integration, problems with support
(Sheng Haipeng, Chai Junwei, and Nie Feng, 2012), and what some
sources identify as a relatively low level of IT integration (Lai Bing
and Sun Shaojian, 2013). Notwithstanding emphasis on reserve force
building, some sources suggest reserve forces still suffer from lax prepa-
ration, standards, and enforcement (Zhang Xicheng, Ji Hongwei, and
Sang Shixin, 2010), resulting in a considerable gap between require-
ments and performance (Xu Bin, 2013).
People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force
PLA publications suggest that, from a Chinese point of view, PLASAF
still suffers from a variety of weaknesses. Indeed, PLASAF and other
PLA publications highlight a number of what they characterize as key
elements of PLASAF’s shortcomings. One area that a number of the
Chinese sources discuss is perceived shortfalls in the quality of missile
force personnel. According to articles in PLA official newspapers, these

challenges reportedly include problems in management capabilities
(Yang Hongpeng and Yang Hua, 2011); problems in leadership ability,
including an unmet need for modern war skills and knowledge (Shan
Quan, 2012); “softening” of warfighting thinking caused by “habits
formed in peacetime” (Li Hongjun, 2013); and insufficient attention
to evaluation of personnel. Some sources state that PLASAF has devel-
oped adequate standards to evaluate personnel only recently (Chen
Guodong and Ge Song, 2013) and lament lack of discipline and lax
attitudes, low morale, and formalism and superficiality (Lu Chunfu,
2012; Shan Quan, 2012). Still others emphasize shortcomings in the
development of PLASAF NCOs (Xu Yeqing, Yu Wenwu, and Zeng
Yuan, 2011) and lack of sufficiently high levels of professionalism. In
addition, some sources criticize officers for having shallow knowledge
and emphasize the need for continuous self-study to correct this prob-
lem (Yang Hongpeng and Yang Hua, 2011).
Joint Operations
PLA sources note that one set of challenges relates to PLASAF par-
ticipation in joint operations, coordination, and information sharing.
Specific problems that are mentioned in military media reports include
formalism during joint exercises and the lack of interaction and coordi-
nation between the branches (Liu Quan and Li Jianwen, 2013). Another
challenge relates to logistics training, which one article in Rocket Force
News, PLASAF’s official newspaper, criticizes as compartmentalized;
this training is also said to be lacking because it emphasizes functions
rather than joint operations support (Jia Ziguo, 2013).
Training
PLASAF’s newspaper and other Chinese sources suggest that PLASAF
training has been improved by making it more challenging and more
similar to actual wartime conditions but still note some persistent
problems that continue to require attention. Chinese reports highlight
the following issues: neglect of deficiencies, wishful thinking, and the
lack of sense of urgency (“Are We Able . . . ,” 2013); incompatibility
between the needs of the force and actual training provided at acad-
emies (Cao Fan and Liu Yidai, 2013; Zhang Yanhe, Xia Bo, and Tian
Liang, 2013); problems related to the application of remedial training

(Liu Zhongjiu and Ding Rongzhen, 2012); and the problem of formal-
ism, which one source refers to as “training just for muddling through
tests, for demonstration, or just for fancy shows” (Zha Xianfa, 2014).
Weapon Systems
PLASAF clearly feels as though it has made important strides in the
development and deployment of modern weapons and equipment, but
this, too, is an area that is sometimes highlighted as one in which the
missile force still faces challenges. PLASAF has received some advanced
equipment, and this is seen as a sufficient foundation but not enough to
meet all the force’s requirements. There is also a shortage of self-reliance
and innovation and a limited number of trained personnel to operate
advanced equipment (Wu Xun, 2013).
It is also possible that, even with an impressive number of conven-
tional missiles, PLASAF might not have enough weapons to execute its
mission successfully, especially in a long-duration campaign against a
technologically advanced adversary. Some Chinese publications hint at
this problem when they note that the limited number of conventional
missiles in PLASAF’s inventory requires discretion in the rate of their
expenditure (Yu Jixun, 2004).
Logistics
Chinese military publications also note shortcomings in PLASAF logis-
tics (Wang Haitao and Song Weigang, 2008). According to one report,
the PLASAF still has not built a comprehensive logistics network. It is
still operating at a lower level than desired because the degree of infor-
matization is limited and because the focus is mainly on transportation
and storage; further limitations include the logistics facilities, logistics
equipment, and the quality of logistics personnel. Additional problems
reportedly include the following:
• The system suffers from scattered management, with multiple
decisionmakers involved.
• There is an unhelpful subdivision of specialties.
• No dedicated agency is in charge of emergency logistics (inter-
nal emergency management at each level is organized relatively
soundly, but the system is staffed by heads and relevant opera-

tional personnel on a part-time basis who are drawn from other
departments).
• A large number of emergency support plans are in place, but com-
prehensive exercises are rare.
• In such areas as mechanization, automation of loading and
unloading, and technical logistics equipment, especially in sup-
porting accessories, there is a significant gap between PLASAF
and military units in other advanced countries.
• For most logistics activities, it is still impossible to operate in a
paperless mode. As a result, logistics efficiency is very low.
• There is a lack of talent, especially senior professional personnel.
• As far as the degree of “social support” (outsourcing of some sup-
port functions to civilian enterprises) is concerned, the scale of
joint efforts with civilians is still small. Some joint logistics activi-
ties between individual agencies and individual logistics enter-
prises have been initiated, but the scope of application is rather
narrow. Basically, social support is stalled in the stage of technol-
ogy introduction and academic exchange.
• The operating mode is insufficiently regulated and unified.
• Warehouse utilization efficiency is low. In some cases, warehouses
are empty.
How People’s Liberation Army and People’s Liberation Army Air
Force Weaknesses Affect the People’s Liberation Army’s Ability to
Achieve Its Missions
This subsection briefly examines how the weaknesses affect the PLA’s
ability to achieve its various missions through 2025. These missions
and their associated campaigns are discussed in greater detail in Chap-
ter Three. Table 5.1 uses our earlier definitions of military weakness
by type—(1) outright inability to perform a mission, (2) high risks
of mission failure, or (3) inefficiencies that result in degraded mission
outcomes—to present a snapshot of the identified weaknesses and their
likely effects on the various missions relevant to the land domain. We
next discuss this further by mission.

Border Missions
As the largest army in the region, the PLAA is more than a match for
any potential external force that may seek to infringe on Chinese ter-
ritorial integrity, national security, or national sovereignty. The PLAA
and PLASAF weaknesses we have noted might contribute to inefficien-
cies in combat operations, such as lack of jointness, but are likely to
constitute relatively low-level, Type 3, weaknesses.
Periphery Missions
Operations beyond China’s borders would stress the PLA’s logistics
system, very likely resulting in Type 2 weaknesses that constitute severe
risks to mission success. Such other concerns as mobilization and per-
sonnel constitute Type 3 weaknesses resulting in inefficiencies.
Taiwan Missions
Logistics, or lack thereof, could severely hamper PLAA involvement in
the joint island landing campaign, resulting in a Type 2 weakness. Sim-
ilarly, PLASAF involvement in the various Taiwan missions involves
Table 5.1
The Impact of Identified Land Domain Weaknesses on PLA Missions
Missions
Border Periphery Taiwan HADR
Ideological thinkinga Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3
Personnela Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3
Training Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3
Communicationsa Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3
Weapons and equipment Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3
Logistics Type 3 Type 2 Type 1 Type 3
Joint operationsb Type 3 Type 3 Type 2 or 3 N/Ac
Mobilizationa Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3
a Data on identified weakness pertain only to PLAA.
b Data on identified weakness pertain only to PLASAF.
c The identified weakness is unlikely to affect the mission.

its participation in the conventional missile attack campaign. Lack
of jointness could also hamper PLASAF effectiveness, again a Type 2
weakness. However, lack of amphibious lift, an aspect we will look at
in the “Sea Domain” section, is currently a Type 1 weakness, likely
inability to perform the mission, for the joint island landing campaign.
It is unlikely that weaknesses for these missions will constitute any-
thing more than a Type 3 weakness, provided that these missions are
either in China or in nearby countries, such as Pakistan.
How the People’s Liberation Army Is Attempting to Address
Weaknesses in the People’s Liberation Army Army and People’s
Liberation Army Second Artillery Force
Training
The PLA is attempting to address its training weaknesses by taking such
measures as improving in training to make it more realistic and more
closely linked to real war conditions, improving ideological education,
and fielding new equipment (including IT) to the PLAA. Although
the PLAA continues to intensify its attempts to improve, some changes
have been largely incremental.
PLASAF and PLA newspaper articles underscore the need for
remedial action to address these problems. With respect to training,
for example, Chinese military publications highlight the need for
PLASAF missile units to train in a complex and difficult environment
to improve combat capabilities (Sun Jinming, 2013) and to raise the
level of realism (Shi Xiangyang, 2014) and strictness (Wei Fenghe,
2014) of training.
Weapon Systems
To deal with land domain weaknesses, the size, diversity, and sophisti-
cation of PLASAF’s conventional ballistic and cruise missile force have
grown dramatically since fielding of conventional missiles in the early
1990s. Today, PLASAF fields well over 1,000 conventional short-range
ballistic missiles and conventional medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs), including the world’s first ASBM, along with an impressive
arsenal of conventional land-attack cruise missiles. PLASAF continues

to strengthen its conventional missile capabilities, which will eventu-
ally include conventional IRBMs that will allow it to attack targets
as far away as Guam with conventional weapons.4 PLA publications
are replete with references to PLASAF’s accomplishments in improving
the quality of training and personnel and modernizing its command,
control, and communications capabilities. China’s conventional mis-
sile force is clearly emerging as the cornerstone of the PLA’s long-range
strike capability and is giving China options for conventional strikes
against a wide range of regional targets in support of deterrence, coer-
cive diplomacy, or a variety of PLA campaigns, whether as part of a
joint campaign or as a standalone conventional missile strike campaign.
Comparison of People’s Liberation Army Publications and External
Assessments of Land Domain and People’s Liberation Army–Wide
Issues
The following list compares PLA assessments of weaknesses in PLAA
and PLA-wide capabilities with outside analyses of such issues as infor-
matization, weapons and equipment, joint operations, mobilization,
and logistics:
• Informatization: Although its difficult to find analyses from
DoD publications on the exact weaknesses related to informatiza-
tion, a report from OSD mentioned “almost all of the PLA’s 2013
exercises focused on operating in ‘informationized’ conditions”
(OSD, 2014, p. 10). The focus here is obviously on either gaining
proficiency or increasing overall proficiency.
• Weapons and Equipment: Although identified weaknesses were
not specifically analyzed, a recent OSD publication noted that the
“PLA is investing heavily in its ground forces” and noted improve-
ments were made to its “armored, air defense, [and] aviation . . . ”
capabilities (OSD, 2014, p. 12).
• Joint Operations: The PLA’s self-assessment that is has a long
way to go before it will be ready to seamlessly conduct “integrated
4 Historically, PLASAF has been able to target Guam with the nuclear-armed DF-3
(CSS‑2) IRBM, which entered service in the early 1970s, but it has not had a conventional
ballistic missile with a range sufficient to strike targets on Guam.

joint operations” tracks closely with the observations of indepen-
dent observers. For example, according to DoD’s most recent Chi-
nese military power report, the PLA is emphasizing this goal, as
suggested by recent joint exercises, such as Mission Action 2013
(OSD, 2014, pp. 12, 34, 53), but achieving China’s aspirations
will require further progress in a number of areas. As DoD ana-
lysts Wanda Ayuso and Lonnie Henley found in a recent assess-
ment of the PLA’s joint operations capabilities, the PLA has yet to
achieve its ultimate goals in this crucial area: The PLA “continues
its long transition toward truly integrated joint operations [一体
化联合作战] but has made less progress to date than Chinese
military leaders would wish,” and although the PLA continues
to work toward making this transition, “these efforts are not pro-
ducing rapid results” (Ayuso and Henley, 2014, p. 171). In con-
clusion, they assessed that China is putting in place some of the
pieces required to achieve its objectives, but achieving them is
likely to remain a long-term objective (Ayuso and Henley, 2014,
p. 191).
• Mobilization: This identified weakness related to mobilization of
the reserves is not specifically analyzed in publicly available DoD
publications.
• Logistics: Somewhat surprisingly, DoD and other external pub-
lications have devoted relatively limited attention to logistics
weaknesses related to the land domain. However, a recent report
from OSD mentioned that the PLAA is “emphasizing the abil-
ity to deploy campaign-level forces across long distances quickly”
(OSD, 2013, p. 8).
The Sea Domain
The PLA’s combat capabilities in the sea domain reside almost entirely
within the PLAN.5 Through focusing specifically on the available
“two incompatibles/two gaps” literature, this section looks at potential
5 It should be noted that the PLA’s ASBMs are under the control of PLASAF.

PLAN weaknesses in sea domain, the impacts these weaknesses have
on the PLA’s ability to achieve its missions, and what the PLAN is
doing to overcome these weaknesses.
Potential People’s Liberation Army Navy Weaknesses
The PLAN has successfully deployed an increasingly modern fleet
over the last decade, used to conduct missions that range ever farther
from China’s shores. While the PLAN’s new combatants and subma-
rines boast impressive capabilities comparable with those of a modern
world-class navy, they present challenges that must be addressed for
successful deployment. Chief among these challenges is the integration
of increasingly complex modern weapons and equipment platforms.
Equally important is the training of PLAN personnel who are not cur-
rently fully prepared to operate or maintain them, which appears to
be a major concern for the Chinese navy, given the volume of PLA
literature published on this issue. Other challenges include the mastery
of such capabilities as antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and amphibious
operations, where the PLA has significant limitations.
Fleet Air Defense
The PLAN knows that fleet air defense is essential to protect blue-water
fleets and conduct carrier operations, and has upgraded several of its
destroyers and frigates with an Aegis-like capability.6 The most numer-
ous of these ships include the Luyang II–class Type 052C DDG, which
is based on the stealthy Type 052B platform and features a phased
array or planar radar designed to be used in conjunction with a SAM
vertical launch system for air defense missiles (see Figure 5.3).7 This
6 Aegis-like capabilities center on radar that provides 360-degree air surveillance cover-
age and is integrated with a shipboard SAM system to protect against airborne threats. This
system itself is often further integrated into a larger surveillance network of other sea, air,
land, and space sensors.
7 Compared to previous launching systems, in which an single above-deck missile launcher
was fed by a below-deck magazine, today’s shipboard vertical launch systems offer a number
of advantages. This includes allowing ships to be fitted with a mix of missile types best suited
to mission needs, reducing the ship’s radar cross-section, allowing all missiles to be immedi-
ately ready for launch, and providing the scalability to serve as a launch platform for future
missile types (Jane’s Information Group, 2013a).

system, the HQ-9 SAM, indigenously developed and capable of far
greater range than previous onboard air defense systems, represents a
major technological leap for the PLAN. A follow-on to the Type 052C,
the Luyang III–class Type 052D destroyer features upgraded radar and
a new vertical launch system capable of housing surface-to-air, surface-
to-surface, and antisubmarine missiles (O’Rourke, 2012, pp. 155–156;
see also Jane’s Information Group, 2013b). Another ship that the PLAN
currently deploys is the Jiangkai II–class Type 054A FFG, which fea-
tures a similar type of “mini-Aegis” system designed to augment the
PLAN’s fleet air defense capabilities.8
How do the numbers of principal surface combatants compare to
the navies of China’s immediate neighbors? Although the full range of
qualitative differences in surface ship types and operating concepts and
a holistic system-of-systems comparison are beyond the scope of this
8 “China’s Intensive . . . ,” 2013; “Service Conditions of the Type 054A Finally Revealed,”
n.d.
Figure 5.3
Numbers of PLA Air Defense Surface Combatants by SAM Range,
1990–2014
RAND RR893-5.3
0
10
20
25
5
15
30
Numberofsurfacecombatants
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
10–13 km (HQ-61, HQ-7)
30–35 km (HQ-16, SA-N-7)
100–150 km (HQ-9, SA-N-20)

report, Figure 5.4 suggests that China has maintained a quantitative
advantage over its immediate neighbors in surface ships since 2000.
The figure does not depict the numerous qualitative improvements the
PLAN fleet has undergone since the early 1990s, which we will discuss
later.
While the Type 052C/D and the Type 054A represent an expo-
nential improvement in the quality and capability of the PLAN’s
force, there are some limitations to what they can do with regard to air
defense. For example, although the Type 054A is considered a “mini-
Aegis” type, the Chinese nonetheless recognize the limitations of the
concept. Because these ships are small, they cannot carry enough long-
range missiles to give an actual area defense capability or deal with
saturation attacks from antiship missiles. The ships would have to
carry 100 or more long-range ship-to-air missiles, while most “mini-
Aegis” types typically carry only 30 to 50, or even fewer, such missiles.
Figure 5.4
Comparison of Principal Surface Combatants Possessed by China’s
Neighbors, 1990–2014
NOTE: Principal surface combatants are defined as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers,
and frigates and do not include corvettes, amphibious ships, patrol craft, submarines,
logistics ships, and support ships.
RAND RR893-5.4
0
100
200
50
150
250
Numberofsurfacecombatants
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
USA
China
Russia
India
Taiwan
Japan
Vietnam

In addition, such ships lack the power plant necessary to consistently
sustain Aegis radars at full capacity, further limiting their capability.
Together, the small size and lower power of mini-Aegis systems neces-
sitates placing their antennas as high above the waterline as possible,
which affects stability and seakeeping.
The effectiveness of an Aegis-like system is substantially enhanced
when it is integrated into a broader ISR system of systems. However, a
small fleet of radar-equipped aircraft and lack of sea-based ISR aircraft
diminish the PLAN’s air defense capability far from China’s shores.
Even a full-scale Aegis system’s detection range against sea-skimming
missiles is usually barely a dozen miles (about 25 km). Finally, plac-
ing such large and numerous radar and computer systems in compara-
tively small hulls severely limits capacity for future upgrades, which
is especially problematic when using mini-Aegis–type vessels as back-
bone surface combatants, as the PLAN does. Thus, in the Chinese
view, the present Type 054A and the Chinese Aegis system aboard the
Type 052C destroyers remain limited designs deficient in face of the
supersonic and hypersonic antiship missiles that potential adversaries
have developed and are developing, which will enter their arsenals in
increasing numbers in the decades ahead (Xiao Feizhu, 2011).
Logistics Support
Logistics support remains a key obstacle preventing the PLAN from
operating more extensively beyond its coastal waters, which is a con-
cern for China’s ability to protect such critical interests as SLOCs in
distant seas. China has made good use of its naval relationships in this
regard. For example, the PLAN has effectively built a network of com-
mercial ports in the Gulf of Aden to support its counterpiracy mission
and is looking to establish more partnerships in the Indian Ocean.
This is not to suggest that China’s success to date in brokering agree-
ments with local ports in the Gulf of Aden can be easily repeated for
future expeditionary missions. Operations that require greater num-
bers of ships; regular consumption of high-tech parts or ordnance, such
as missiles; or confront the likelihood of damage would be severely
strained by this approach. Most civilian ports cannot accommodate
such warfighting needs. Furthermore, foreign capitals are likely to be

reticent about foreign military use of their infrastructure and territory
for operations that involve combat.
This weakness, and how to remedy it, is widely discussed in PLA
literature. Some Chinese military analysts note that China simply does
not have the projection capabilities (i.e., bases and aircraft carriers) to
be able to guarantee passage through critical SLOCs. Arguing that
China must build overseas bases, PLA Colonel Dai Xu notes: “Because
the Chinese Navy lacks the modern protective power of aircraft car-
riers, completely unarmed commercial vessels are normally forced to
travel long distances and periods in a state of insecurity” (Dai Xu,
2009).
Interestingly, some less-prominent official publications indicate
some debate at higher levels about the need to expand China’s overseas
presence to protect SLOCs. A late 2011 article on escorts off the coast
of Somalia in Friends of Party Members and Cadre, a publication aimed
at Party cadres, repeated the familiar refrain that the PLAN does not
have enough adequate ships for its foreign missions and revealed that
there is still some debate over whether or not China should establish
bases abroad. The author, Liu Weidong, cited the case of Major General
Yin Zhuo, who has advocated building “independent logistics bases”
[独立后勤基地] on foreign coasts to reduce military supply costs in
escort missions (Liu Weidong, 2011).9
Some Chinese policy analysts also express concern over China’s
ability to maintain open SLOCs, particularly those critical for energy
transportation. In a 2012 Study Monthly piece, Shanghai Institute of
American Studies fellow and Fudan University professor Zhou Yunx-
iang wrote that China is dependent on Southeast Asian maritime routes
for energy but cannot guarantee the safety of these SLOCs, let alone
ensure the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf (Zhou Yunxiang, 2012).
Zhou is hardly alone in his views: In a 2010 Journal of the University
of International Relations article, University of International Relations
9 The Liu article does not explicitly state that Yin advocates building bases overseas, but
a quick review of Chinese newspapers from that period reveals that this is in fact what Yin
originally proposed. After the Western media sounded the alarm over the possibility of the
Chinese building bases abroad, Yin was quick to point out that he was in fact calling for
overseas “replenishment points” [补给点]. See “Chinese General Publicly Clarifies . . . , 2010.

professor Wu Hui and Zhang Dan of the State Oceanic Administra-
tion also argue that it is critical for the PLAN to improve “far seas”
defense capabilities and logistics support to protect energy and trade
routes (Wu Hui and Zhang Dan, 2010).
Finally, no matter how many aircraft carriers and surface ships
China ultimately produces, the PLAN’s ability to deploy force beyond
neighboring waters will remain severely limited unless it has a sufficient
number of fleet replenishment oilers (O’Rourke, 2013). These ships
allow surface action groups to travel far distances by replenishing fuel,
food, and water while en route and at station. The PLAN currently
possesses only five replenishment ships, three of which are relatively
new and have contributed to the Gulf of Aden antipiracy missions.
These regular counterpiracy missions, plus exercises near Japan and in
the South China Sea, have stretched the oiler fleet beyond its capacity.
Antisubmarine Warfare
Along with logistical support, another limitation the PLAN faces in
its operations, particularly those away from coastal waters, is its lack
of an ASW capability. Until recently, the PLAN has not placed much
emphasis on ASW, perhaps because it was more focused on antiaccess
than on expeditionary deployments and because its fleet was not
mature enough to warrant such capabilities. Now that the PLAN has
a good number of large, modern combatants, it appears to be address-
ing its lack of ASW capabilities. For example, numerous articles in
Chinese naval publications have called on the PLAN to address its lack
of ASW capabilities, including addressing crew training—proficient
ASW operations requires technical expertise, coordination of sophis-
ticated weapon systems, and operational experience (for example, You
Min, 2013).
Training
One of the most frequently discussed gaps in the PLAN’s capabilities
is the lack of crewmember training, including technology, armaments,
maintenance, and combat readiness over long distances. Problems with
lack of crewmember training include not having enough knowledge
to properly operate and maintain the modern equipment and weapon
systems aboard today’s newest PLAN ships, discomfort operating

advanced armaments (one submarine unit was reluctant to operate
armaments because its personnel were worried whether the armaments
were “really okay or not”), and general lack of combat training at sea
under realistic conditions (Gao Yi, 2009; “With Good Training Style
. . . ,” 2013).
Chinese experts also recognize that the PLAN’s naval combat
training needs to be brought up to standard. One article quotes a flo-
tilla commander in an East Sea Fleet training mission as stating that
training was being “regularized”: “All the warships carried full loads of
munitions according to actual combat standards, and the weapons and
equipment were turned on 24 hours a day, with the personnel being
on combat duty 24 hours a day” (Li Lin, 2012). Another article notes
that the PLAN is increasing training intensity and simulating real-life
enemy situations, including seizure of Chinese territory in disputed
waters (Hou Rui and Liu Yuxun, 2014).
Impact of People’s Liberation Army Navy Weaknesses on the
People’s Liberation Army’s Ability to Achieve Its Missions
This section briefly examines the impacts of the weaknesses on the
PLA’s—specifically, the PLAN’s—ability to achieve various missions
in the sea domain. These missions and their associated campaigns are
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. Referring to the earlier
definition of military weakness by type, Table 5.2 presents a snapshot
of the identified weaknesses and how they are likely to affect the vari-
ous missions relevant to the land domain. We next discuss these by
mission.
Taiwan Missions
Substantial stress on the at-sea logistics system during a joint blockade
campaign likely represents a Type 2 weakness (severe risk). Should the
United States become involved, other Type 2 weaknesses would appear
in the realms of fleet air defense and ASW. If an island landing cam-
paign were enacted, the PLAN would face a Type 1 weakness because
it lacks amphibious lift sufficient to transport sufficient ground units to
Taiwan’s shores. This could be remedied between now and 2025, and

the PLA could also ameliorate the weakness by increasing the capacity
to deliver more forces by air or special operations means.
When dealing with the other claimants in the South China Sea, the
PLAN’s naval superiority likely mitigates the weaknesses of air defense,
logistics support, ASW, and training in prosecuting the various cam-
paigns. As a result, these could be seen as Type 3 weaknesses. If the
United States were to become involved or if the adversary were Japan,
all identified weaknesses would become Type 2.
Because these missions occur in a benign environment, the weaknesses
of logistics and training identified constitute Type 3 weaknesses. The
identified weaknesses of fleet air defense and ASW for these missions
are not applicable and so do not constitute a weakness in these missions.
Table 5.2
The Impact of Identified Sea Domain Weaknesses on PLA Missions
Missions
Taiwan
Maritime
Claims HADR NEO SLOC
Fleet air
defense
Type 2 Type 2 or 3a N/Ab N/Ab Type 2c or
N/Ab
Logistics
support
Type 1 or 2d Type 2 or 3a Type 3 Type 3 Type 2 or 3e
ASW Type 2 Type 2 or 3a N/Ab N/Ab Type 2c or
N/Ab
Training Type 3 Type 2 or 3a Type 3 Type 3 Type 3
a Type 2 weakness if United States or Japan is the adversary; otherwise, Type 3
weakness.
b The identified weakness is unlikely to affect the mission.
c Type 2 weakness if state-based threat is present; otherwise, the weakness is
unlikely to affect the mission.
d Type 1 weakness if island landing campaign is prosecuted; otherwise, Type 2
weakness.
e Type 2 weakness if state-based threat is present; otherwise, Type 3 weakness.

The identified weaknesses of training and logistics may constitute a
Type 3 weakness, although NEOs are often over quickly, and naval
vessels often play only a supporting role. It is difficult to identify plau-
sible NEO scenarios that would involve the identified weaknesses of
fleet air defense or ASW.
Against nonstate threats, the identified weaknesses of training and
logistics constitute Type 3 weaknesses, especially in distant waters. For
state threats to SLOCs, all identified weaknesses, including fleet air
defense and ASW, constitute potential Type 2 weaknesses.
How the People’s Liberation Army Navy Is Attempting to Address
Weaknesses
This section describes some efforts the PLAN has made to address
noted gaps and weaknesses. The PLAN is aware of all the weaknesses
cited in this chapter, and in some cases, the solutions to issues are
under robust debate, as shown in the literature. However, truly filling
these gaps will take time, money, and expertise. The PLAN has made
some headway on such issues as combat and technical training and air
defense but appears to be just starting to address ASW and logistical
support. Resolving the former issues is essential for the PLAN to be a
regional naval power; addressing the latter two issues would indicate
that the PLAN is potentially looking to build greater expeditionary
capabilities. The PLAN’s priorities will determine which gaps it focuses
on addressing over the next five years.
Fleet Air Defense
PLA sources note that improvements to the next iteration of stealth
frigates, the Type 054B, would focus on the electronic equipment used
in the combat information command system and on changes to the
weapon configuration. This could indicate that the Type 054B will
be equipped with new air defense and antiship missiles.10 In addition,
10 “China’s Intensive Construction of the Type 054A Frigate—First Type 054B Soon to Be
Launched,” 2013; “Service Conditions of the Type 054A Finally Revealed,” 2013.

the PLAN has started commissioning its new-generation Type 052D
destroyers. These ships feature a large actively electronically scanned
array, a new type of vertical launch system similar to those on Western
destroyers, and stealth naval guns (Zhang Junshe, 2014). With these
improvements, the ship will have stronger area air defense capabilities
than its predecessors and could feasibly be deployed as part of a car-
rier battle group or to protect amphibious assault ships during a beach
landing. As one article notes,
the new type of destroyer may become the “patron saint” of first
choice. It can also act as the core of formations, complementing
small-scale formations, such as escort vessels and replenishment
vessels, and independently carrying out tasks, thereby enlarging
at-sea defensive depth and improving the Chinese Navy’s oper-
ational capabilities to carry out distant sea maneuvers. (Zhang
Junshe, 2014)
However, with technological advances comes the need to improve
training on the new ships, a problem the PLAN leadership recognizes:
China’s new generation of destroyers still has a relatively long
way to go. Modern destroyers are equipped with every kind of
air defense, antisubmarine, and antiship weapons and equipment.
They are complex systems that integrate numerous weapon plat-
forms. Much of the equipment still has to be repeatedly broken
in and validated after deployment, and only then can their opera-
tional potential be exploited. In addition, informatization stan-
dards have not yet been improved; the degree of technical matu-
rity is still insufficient; the number of weapons units is relatively
few; and so forth. (Zhang Junshe, 2014)
Another example discusses the intense training program the crew
of a South Sea Fleet Type 052C DDG underwent to properly operate
the ship:
[The crew]’s skills were widely varied and the new equipment
highly technical, so they started the “sailor night school,” estab-
lished military-civilian joint training mechanisms, and studied

basic educational materials that covered ten specialties, such as
radar, communications, and engineering, all in the first year after
receiving the ship. (Xiao Yong, Hou Rong, and Gao Yi, 2013)
While we discuss training issues specific to the PLAN in more
detail later, it is clear from the above examples that the lack of technical
proficiency in the PLAN has real operational consequences.
Logistics Support
Last year, to bolster fleet logistics support, the PLAN commissioned
two new oilers, upgraded Qiandaohu-class Type 903s, and plans for
more replenishment vessel construction are under way (Jane’s Informa-
tion Group, 2013c). The two new oilers could be used to support car-
rier operations for the Liaoning; however, the dearth of replenishment
ships will likely be a constraining factor for PLAN out-of-area opera-
tions for some time to come.
Antisubmarine Warfare
The PLAN has recently fielded some capabilities to address its weak-
nesses in ASW. These include the new Type 056 corvette (also called
a “light frigate”), which has not been equipped with the standard
Chinese rocket and depth-charge launchers but instead possesses two
three-unit mount torpedo launch tubes for more accurate and long-
range antisubmarine capabilities. The Type 056 has been in rapid pro-
duction since its introduction in 2012 (Wang Jin, 2012).
Additionally, the PLAN, which has lacked sufficient numbers
of shipborne helicopters and maritime patrol craft to conduct ASW,
has fielded the Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft since 2011. The patroller
is equipped with a surface search radar, an infrared sensor, a magnetic
boom for detecting submerged submarines, and a bomb bay for torpe-
does and other weapons. Finally, some Western analysts point out that
China is deploying an ocean surveillance network of fixed acoustic
arrays to strengthen its antisubmarine capability.11
There is also evidence that the PLAN has been training to improve
its ASW proficiency. One example from PLA literature cites a recent
11 For an excellent description of this, see Goldstein and Knight (2014).

antisubmarine training exercise by a destroyer flotilla in the East China
Sea, which simultaneously commanded three types of shipborne heli-
copters for the first time. The commander stated that the drill prac-
ticed such critical phases as command processes, communications
organization, electromagnetic integration, and operational patterns
between ship and helicopter (Zhang Qian, Ju Zhenhua, and Wang
Zhipeng, 2014). Other articles note that the PLAN’s combatants have
been undergoing “combat readiness distant seas training,” which some-
times includes ASW training, more frequently than in the past (Ni
Guanghui and Liu Qian, 2014).
Training
The PLAN is taking the development of technical expertise seriously.
In 2011, the PLAN introduced the Navy-wide “Surface Ship Crew-
member Maintenance Skills Competition,” recognizing the technical
skills of individual sailors from across the three fleets (Jing Enyan and
Li Xiao, 2013). In 2013, the East Sea Fleet established crew member
training centers in the Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Fujian shipyards, so
that when ships dock at the shipyards, the sailors receive hands-on
experience repairing the ships (Gao Yi, 2009). The PLAN is also invest-
ing in virtual training systems that can be used for training crews on
various types of combat ships. For example, one article states that a
research institute under the PLAN Headquarters Armament Depart-
ment recently developed a “virtual maintenance training system for
the propelling unit of a certain type of comprehensive landing ship.”
The system can also be used in maintenance training of a particular
model of landing craft and can be modified for maintenance training
for other types of ships (PLAN Develops . . . ,” 2014).
In addition, as the PLAN deploys further from China’s shores,
it is increasingly relying on automated equipment diagnostics to aug-
ment crew capabilities. For example, the newest Luyang-class destroy-
ers and likely the Jiangkai II–class frigates are outfitted with electronic
equipment–management systems, and such systems will likely be stan-

dard on all future PLAN surface combatants.12 These systems moni-
tor and collect key equipment parameters, such as oil quality, bear-
ing vibration, noise, temperature, and rotation rate. The collected
maintenance history files are used to provide feedback to equipment
manufacturers (Qiao Changchao and Xiao Delun, 2011). Shore-based
equipment technical support groups can also access this information
electronically and thus manage the maintenance requirements of key
pieces of shipboard equipment from afar. Other solutions to boost
technical expertise include more civil-military integration and more
use of civilian experts.
Comparing People’s Liberation Army Publications and External
Assessments of Weaknesses in the Maritime Domain
The following list compares PLA assessments of weaknesses in naval
capabilities with outside analyses of such issues as fleet air defense,
logistics support, ASW, and training:
• Fleet air defense: U.S. government (USG) publications from
ONI and OSD have recognized the PLAN’s “historically weak”
air defense capabilities but point to recent production of the
Luyang III–class DDG and Jiangkai II–class FFG as attempts to
address this shortfall (ONI, 2009, p. 1; OSD, 2014, p. 8).
• Logistics support: OSD (2014, p. 38) observes that the PLA
lacks necessary logistics support including overseas bases for more
extensive extraregional operations. The PLA also lacks replenish-
ment ships and necessary amphibious lift to prosecute its mis-
sions, including the joint island landing campaign against Taiwan
(OSD, 2014, pp. 55–56).
• ASW: OSD (2014, p. 32) observes that the PLA faces challenges
with regard to ASW, stating that “PLA’s deep-water antisubma-
rine warfare capability seems to lag behind its air and surface war-
fare capabilities.”
12 “China’s Intensive Construction of the Type 054A Frigate—First Type 054B Soon to Be
Launched,” 2013; “Service Conditions . . . ,” 2013.

• Training: While not detailing the training shortfalls highlighted
in PLA assessments, such as lack of technical expertise, arma-
ments, maintenance, and combat readiness, USG publications do
seem to agree that training weaknesses in general do exist. Spe-
cifically, one report from ONI points to the “more complex and
realistic [training] scenarios . . .” that the PLAN has undertaken
in recent years, presumably to address training weaknesses (ONI,
2009, p. 34).
The Air Domain
The PLA’s combat capabilities in the air domain reside chiefly within
the PLAAF and the PLAN Air Force (PLANAF).13 Through focusing
specifically on the available “two incompatibles/two gaps” literature,
this section looks at potential PLA weaknesses in the air domain, how
these weaknesses affect the PLA’s ability to achieve its missions, and
what the PLA is doing to overcome these weaknesses.
Potential Weaknesses in People’s Liberation Army Air Force and
People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Forces Force Structure
Numerous weaknesses in the PLA’s ability to conduct combat in the air
domain are immediately apparent from the structure and composition
of its various aviation fleets. “Software” weaknesses that could con-
strain China’s ability to effectively employ its air domain capabilities
are perhaps less evident to an outside observer than the more obvious
shortcomings in PLAAF and PLANAF hardware, but they may be
no less important. As a result, we have relied on Chinese sources for
insights on various other issues, such as training and personnel, that
might otherwise be relatively opaque.
As Figure 5.5 shows, the PLA has substantially trimmed its out-
dated fleet of legacy fighter aircraft since mid-1990s and simultane-
13 While the PLAA possesses a variety of helicopters and appears to be increasing its empha-
sis in this area, we discussed these capabilities earlier, in the Land Domain section.
Although some analysts now identify the PLAN’s air component as PLA Naval Aviation,
we continue to use PLANAF in this report.

ously increased the numbers of modern fourth- and 4.5-generation air-
craft. How do the numbers of PLA fighter aircraft compare to the air
fleets China’s immediate neighbors? While the full range of qualitative
differences in aircraft types, operating concepts, and a holistic system-
of-systems comparison is beyond the scope of this report, Figure 5.6
shows that China has maintained a significant quantitative advantage
over its immediate neighbors in fighter and fighter ground attack air-
craft for virtually all periods. The figure also shows that modern fourth-
generation-and-above fighter aircraft depicted in Figure 5.5 constitute
slightly less than one-half of China’s entire fighter fleet. However,
significant numbers of legacy (second- and third-generation) fighters
remain, undercutting the quantitative advantage. Although Russia
Figure 5.5
Numbers of Modern and Legacy PLA Fighter Aircraft, 1990–2014
NOTES: Modern fighters are fighter aircraft in the PLAAF or PLANAF inventories that
fall under the Western convention of fourth-generation or above and include the
fourth-generation J-10 and Su-30 and the 4.5-generation J-11. Legacy fighters are
fighter aircraft within the Western convention of third generation or below. For the
periods examined, these include the first-generation J-5, the second-generation J-6
and some J-7 variants, the third-generation J-7 variants, and the J-8. The PLA has its
own convention for numbering fighter generations. Under the PLA’s own convention,
the J-10, J-11, and Su-30 are considered third-generation fighter aircraft
(NASIC, 2010, p. 25).
RAND RR893-5.5
0
500
1,000
1,500
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
5,000
Numberofaircraft
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Legacy fighters Modern fighters
PLANAF
PLAAF

maintains the second largest fleet of fighters, it currently possesses a
likely qualitative advantage over China because virtually all the fighters
in its inventory are fourth generation. Japan and Taiwan’s fighter fleets
also consist of fourth-generation fighter aircraft, although both are less
than one-third the overall size of China’s fighter inventory. India and
Vietnam’s fleets are still riddled with legacy fighter aircraft.
Multiple Generations of Aircraft
The PLA’s fleet is aging and contains multiple generations of air-
craft. Most obviously fighter aircraft inventories of the PLAAF and
PLANAF are still majority second- and third-generation aircraft con-
sisting of J-7 and J-8 fighters.14 These aircraft, originally produced in
the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, are simply not capable platforms
14 We are using the U.S. definitions of fighter generations, not the Chinese construct. For
more information about the Chinese application of fighter generations, see ONI (2007,
pp. 47–48) and NASIC (2010).
Figure 5.6
Comparison of Fighter and Fighter Ground Attack Aircraft Possessed by
China’s Neighbors, 1990–2014
RAND RR893-5.6
0
2,000
4,000
1,000
3,000
5,000
6,000
Numberofaircraft
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
China
Russia
India
Taiwan
Japan
Vietnam

against modern fourth- and fifth-generation fighters.15 As Figure 5.5
shows, the PLA is seeking to change this balance by growing its fleet of
fourth-generation (J-10) and 4.5-generation (J-11) aircraft. The J-10 is
indigenously designed and produced, while the J-11 is an indigenously
produced Russian Su-27. Furthermore, the PLA still relies on the Q-5
aircraft, another aircraft initially produced in the 1950s, for its attack
roles—although the PLA is increasing numbers of the more-advanced
JH-7 and JH-7A aircraft. Recognizing the problems that the aging fleet
poses, PLAAF Commander and CMC Member Ma Xiaotian stated in
early 2014 that the “contradiction of multiple generations of equipment
is becoming more prominent” (Ma Xiaotian, 2014).
China’s bomber fleet is improving its long-range strike capabilities
but still faces potentially serious challenges. Perhaps most importantly,
China’s limited aerial refueling capacity could require its bombers to
conduct long-range strike missions without fighter escorts, increasing
their vulnerability and potentially decreasing their ability to carry out
some regional strike missions effectively. Moreover, China’s current
bombers are derived from 1950s-era Soviet designs, although they have
been upgraded in many respects. Chinese military publications high-
light the need for a bomber capability that would allow China to con-
duct long-range conventional strikes against targets out to the Second
Island Chain (Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 223–224). Moreover, some
Chinese military officers have called for bombers capable of reaching
targets in the South China Sea, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean
and stated that the aircraft should have stealth and EW capabilities
sufficient to penetrate enemy air defenses (“Senior Officer . . . ,” 2013).
Special-Mission Aircraft
Special-mission aircraft are in short supply in the PLA. Although
special-mission aircraft are a combat multiplier for modern air forces,
both the PLAAF and PLANAF have few special-mission aircraft.
Indeed, the PLA possesses only 13 aerial tankers, which are con-
verted H-6 bomber aircraft (IISS, 2014, pp. 235–236). The ability of
15 These aircraft types could still be useful if the counterair threat were minimal or if the
PLA sought to saturate the skies with fighters in an attempt to frustrate the ability of a poten-
tial adversary’s to conduct offensive counterair missions effectively.

these aerial tankers to extend the range and time on station of combat
aircraft is further diminished by their inability to refuel the PLA’s
Russian-made or -designed aircraft (i.e., J-11, Su-27, and Su-30). Simi-
larly, few AEW&C aircraft are available to assist in the detection of
enemy aircraft, which limits the PLA’s situational awareness and its
ability to coordinate a response to deal with incoming air threats. Fur-
ther limiting situational awareness is that the UAV fleet is small and
continues to lack capability. The PLA operates ISR UAVs that have
either high-altitude (WZ-5 Chang Hong and Chang Kong 1) or long-
endurance (BZK-005) capabilities but appears to lack a platform that
has both, as the U.S. RQ-4B Global Hawk does (Jane’s Information
Group, 2014a).
Airlift
The PLA continues to lack substantial airlift capability. When the
PLAAF was tasked to send transports to Libya in 2011 to conduct a
NEO, the four aircraft dispatched constituted 40 percent of the PLA’s
entire heavy lift fleet. At present, that fleet consists only of Russian-
made Il-76 transports. Medium airlift is also limited, with a fleet of
fewer than 50 turboprop transports.16
Potential People’s Liberation Army Air Force and People’s Liberation
Army Navy Air Force Weaknesses Related to Training
Military hardware is, of course, just one aspect of combat capabili-
ties in the air domain. Another is the quality of PLA training. By its
own admission in numerous professional articles and speeches by high-
ranking officers, the PLAAF does not believe its training prepares its
pilots and other personnel for actual combat. The acting deputy chief
of staff for the Nanjing Military Region Air Force, Ni Wenxin, recog-
nizes this problem to consist of “unrealistic, lax, and easy training [in
the PLA]” (Ni Wenxin, 2013). Ni even has a name for this malady,
identifying it as the “peace disease” (Ni Wenxin, 2013). The peace
disease—unrealistic training—manifests itself in multiple of ways that
affect the PLA’s combat capabilities in the air domain.
16 This consists of approximately 44 Y-8 transport and 1 Y-9 transport (IISS, 2014,
pp. 235–236).

Close Air Combat
Because of safety concerns, close air combat has been underemphasized
in training and, when it has occurred, is unrealistic. Instead, train-
ing has emphasized either “middistance attack” or scripted close air
combat that uses “parallel maneuver” while opposing aircraft maintain
different altitudes (Xu Tongxuan, 2013). The PLA recognizes that this
is a problem, that there is a gap between the skills of Chinese pilots
in this area and those of pilots in “the air forces of powerful nations”
(Xu Tongxuan, 2013). Furthermore, to the extent that close air combat
training has occurred, it has regularly emphasized confrontations
between single aircraft and ignored combat between larger aircraft for-
mations (Huang Ziyue, 2013). Lack of realistic air combat training
may have played a role in a recent incident that a Pentagon spokesper-
son characterized as a “dangerous intercept” of a P-8 Poseidon aircraft
in August 2014 by a PLA aircraft in which the pilot “made several close
passes” and came “within 30 feet.”17
Sustained Operations
PLAAF and PLANAF training for sustained flight operations is a
relatively recent occurrence. The generation of multiple air sorties, 24
hours a day, for multiple days is a facet of modern warfare. While the
PLA recognizes this, only recently did training begin to incorporate
these features. For example, the Nanjing Military Region Air Force
held its first training for 24-hour flight operations in March 2013
(Qian Renyuan and Ouyang Chao, 2013).
Safety
The peace disease also affects air safety. Without providing either
empirical data or specific examples, a Air Force News (the PLAAF’s
newspaper) article implored commanders to “reduce the number of
accidents” that were occurring due to “training not being organized
correctly . . . standards not [being] adhered to . . . training that empha-
sized the wrong subjects” and lack of attendance at important train-
ing events (Lin Lusuo and Zhu Zhanghu, 2014). The article further
17 In a press conference, U.S. Navy Rear Admiral John Kirby also characterized the incident
as “unsafe and unprofessional” (“Pentagon . . . ,” 2014).

pointed out the root causes of many of these safety issues as being
“manmade factors,” such as “improper command, insufficient plan-
ning, careless preparations” (Lin Lusuo and Zhu Zhanghu, 2014).
Pilot Instruction
Finally, the ability of instructor pilots within the PLA is recognized
as being poor. In early 2014, PLAAF Political Commissar Tian Xiusi
called out the “chief instructor contingent” for being the “weakest
point” in the basic fight training of the PLA (Xu Tongxuan, 2014).
Specifically, Tian pointed to diminished “combat power . . . and flight
safety” resulting from the “weak capability and poor quality” of the
flight instructors.
Impact of People’s Liberation Army Air Force and People’s Liberation
Army and People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force Weaknesses on
the People’s Liberation Army’s Ability to Achieve Its Missions
Weaknesses in the air domain continue to impede the PLA’s overall
combat capability. Echoing the significance of the two incompatibles
as they apply to the PLAAF, PLAAF Commander and CMC Member
Ma Xiaotian in 2013 stated “there is still a big gap in comparison with
the requirements of the Air Force’s missions and tasks” (Guo Hongbin
and Su Xiao, 2013). He also goes on to mention that the big gap also
exists “in comparison with the air forces of advanced nations” (Guo
Hongbin and Su Xiao, 2013).
This section briefly examines the how these weaknesses affect the
PLA’s ability to achieve its various missions in the air domain. Chapter
Three discussed these missions and the associated campaigns in greater
detail. Referring to the earlier definition of military weakness by type,
Table 5.3 presents a snapshot of the identified weaknesses and their
likely effects on the various missions relevant to the air domain.
Border Missions
The multiple aircraft generations and insufficient special-mission air-
craft constitute Type 3 weaknesses against many of China’s neighbors
with weaker militaries but might constitute Type 2 weaknesses against
a regional power, such as India or Russia, in an air defense campaign.
Similarly, the concerns about close air combat and sustained operation

108China’sIncompleteMilitaryTransformation
Table 5.3
The Impact of Identified Air Domain Weaknesses on PLA Missions
Missions
Border Periphery Taiwan
Maritime
Claims HADR NEO SLOC
Multiple aircraft generations Type 2 or 3a Type 2 or 3a Type 3 Type 3 N/Ab N/Ab N/Ab
Special mission aircraft Type 2 or 3a Type 2 or 3a Type 2 Type 2 or 3c N/Ab N/Ab Type 3d or
N/Ab
Airlift Type 3 Type 2 Type 3 N/A Type 3 Type 1 or 2e N/Ab
Close air combat Type 2f or
N/Ab
Type 2f or
N/Ab
Type 2 Type 2 or 3c N/Ab N/Ab Type 3d or
N/Ab
Sustained operations Type 2f or
N/Ab
Type 2f or
N/Ab
Type 2 Type 2 or 3c N/Ab N/Ab N/Ab
Safety Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 N/Ab N/Ab N/Ab
Pilot instruction Type 3 Type 3 Type 2 Type 2 or 3c N/Ab N/Ab N/Ab
a Type 2 weakness if adversary is a regional power; otherwise, Type 3 weakness.
b N/A, or not applicable, denotes that an identified weakness is unlikely to affect a particular mission.
c Type 2 weakness if U.S. or Japan is the adversary; otherwise, Type 3 weakness.
d Type 3 weakness if state-based threat is present; otherwise, N/A.
e Weakness type based on scale of mission.
f Type 2 weakness if adversary is a regional power; otherwise, not applicable.

weaknesses constitute Type 2 weaknesses against regional powers but
may be not applicable against other adversaries. Airlift, safety, and pilot
instruction are Type 3 weaknesses.
Periphery Missions
As with border missions, multiple aircraft generations and insufficient
special-mission aircraft constitute Type 3 weaknesses against many of
China’s neighbors with weaker militaries but might constitute Type 2
weaknesses against a regional power, such as Russia or Japan, in an
air offensive campaign or anti–air raid campaign. The concerns about
close air combat and sustained operations constitute Type 2 weak-
nesses against regional powers but may be not applicable against other
adversaries. Lack of airlift poses a Type 2 weakness. Safety and mul-
tiple generations of aircraft constitute Type 3 weaknesses.
Taiwan Missions
The categories of special-mission aircraft, close air combat, pilot instruc-
tion, and sustained operations constitute Type 2 weaknesses against
Taiwan and the United States, should it enter the conflict, when pros-
ecuting the anti–air raid campaign or supporting a joint blockade or
island landing campaign. Airlift, safety, and multiple generations of
aircraft constitute Type 3 weaknesses.
The categories of special-mission aircraft, close air combat, pilot
instruction, and sustained operations constitute Type 3 weaknesses
against South China Sea claimants. They constitute Type 2 weaknesses
for a mission carried out against Japan or if the United States were to
become involved. Safety and multiple generations of aircraft constitute
Type 3 weaknesses.
Because these missions often occur in a benign environment, airlift
constitutes a Type 3 weakness.
Typically lack of heavy airlift constitutes a Type 2 weakness for the
PLA in NEO. However, if the situation is dire and numerous overseas

Chinese workers are in imminent danger in a country far away from
China, this might approach a Type 1 weakness.
The insufficient special-mission aircraft and close air combat training
may constitute Type 3 weaknesses against state-based SLOC threats.
How the People’s Liberation Army Air Force and People’s Liberation
Army and People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force Are Attempting
to Address Weaknesses
Multiple Generations of Aircraft
The PLA is abundantly aware of its weaknesses in the air domain.
While it has much to do, the PLA is rapidly shedding its second- and
third-generation fighter aircraft while producing increasing numbers
of fourth- and 4.5-generation fighters. However, PLAAF Commander
Ma Xiaotian’s observation that a big gap still exists “in comparison
with the air forces of other advanced nations” recognizes that these
efforts alone are ultimately not sufficient to keep pace (Guo Hongbin
and Su Xiao, 2013). The United States has already fielded one fifth-
generation fighter (the F-22), and another (the F-35) is under develop-
ment. Other countries, such as Russia, are in the process of developing
such fighters (the Sukhoi T-50). In response, China has begun its own
fifth-generation fighter program, with the J-20 (maiden flight in 2011)
and J-31 (maiden flight in 2012) prototypes already garnering signifi-
cant international attention (OSD, 2014, p. 67).
China is continuing to upgrade its H-6 bombers to improve
its strike capabilities (OSD, 2014, pp. 9, 33), and Chinese and other
regional media reporting suggests China is developing at least one new
long-range stealth bomber that could address the shortcomings of its
current bomber fleet and strengthen the PLAAF’s ability to project
power, at least regionally (for example, Zhang Ming’ai, 2013).
Special-Mission Aircraft
It is not entirely clear how the PLA is attempting to resolve its lack
of special-mission aircraft. While this fleet remains small in abso-
lute terms, as can be seen in Figure 5.7, aircraft numbers for certain
special-mission roles are increasing moderately, while others have not

increased. Numbers of PLA AEW&C aircraft have increased, largely
through PLANAF acquisitions, although numbers of aerial tanking
aircraft have been stagnant for quite some time. Part of this may be due
to the PLA waiting for the Y-20 heavy transport to become operational.
Variants of the Y-20 are expected to be developed that will provide
the PLA further aircraft for aerial tanking and AEW&C roles (OSD,
2014, pp. 10, 36). In the meantime, China is acquiring IL-78 tankers
from Ukraine to help improve its limited aerial refueling capabilities,
although this is likely a stopgap measure rather than a real solution,
such as the Y-20 portends to provide (for example, Lin and Singer,
2014). In the ISR role, “China is incrementally advancing its develop-
ment and employment of UAVs,” which includes developing stealthy
UAVs (OSD, 2014, p. 33).
Airlift
Seeking to overcome its weaknesses in airlift, the PLA is developing the
aforementioned Y-20 heavy transport and the Y-9 medium transport.
Assuming the Y-20 is eventually produced in significant numbers, it
will provide the PLA with substantial long-range and heavy-airlift
Figure 5.7
Numbers of PLA Special-Mission Aircraft by Role, 1990–2014
RAND RR893-5.7
0
5
10
15
30
25
20
35
Numberofaircraft
Year
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Tanker
AEW&C
PLAAF
PLANAF

options for missions ranging from humanitarian assistance and para-
drop to power projection. Although the range and payload are more
modest than the Y-20, adding Y-9s to the fleet could also support all
the above missions while providing the PLA with a transport compa-
rable to the C-130 (Jane’s Information Group, 2014c).
Close Air Combat
To deal with weaknesses in training, including the peace disease,
PLAAF Commander Ma Xiaotian stated that, when the PLAAF trains,
it must “train for battle” instead of “doing things for show . . . [or] going
through the motions” (Guo Hongbin and Su Xiao, 2013). To enhance
close air combat skills, the PLAAF has developed an annual fighter
confrontation competition; participating “top pilots” are selected to
hone their skills in “free form air combat training” (Xu Tongxuan,
2013). Furthermore, “new requirements” for close air combat were pro-
posed mid-2013 (Huang Ziyue, 2013).
Safety
For issues related to safety, one article suggests greater accountability,
calling for investigations into the command leadership up to two levels
above the unit when “consecutive serious accidents” occur (Lin Lusuo
and Zhu Zhanghu, 2014).
Pilot Instruction
According to Nanjing Political Commissar Tien, to improve pilot
instruction, the PLA should “make great efforts to cultivate high-
caliber new-type military personnel” (Xu Tongxuan, 2014). It is not
clear from Tien’s statements in the article in Air Force News what these
efforts might consist of.
Comparison of People’s Liberation Army Publications with External
Assessments of Weaknesses in the Air Domain
This following list compares PLA assessments of weaknesses in PLAAF
capabilities with outside analyses of such issues as multiple aircraft gen-
erations, special-mission aircraft, airlift, close air combat, sustained
operations, safety, and pilot instruction:

• Multiple aircraft generations: OSD and NASIC publications
have observed that the PLAAF and PLANAF are still riddled
with early generation aircraft. OSD (2014, p. 9) mentions that
the PLAAF possesses only 600 modern combat aircraft, while
NASIC (2010, p. 8) states that the transition from older- to newer-
generation aircraft “has been one of the more daunting challenges
facing PLAAF air units.”
• Special-mission aircraft: OSD (2014, p. 36) observes that the
PLAAF “is continuing to improve its ability to conduct . . . early
warning and reconnaissance missions,” and ONI (2009, p. 25)
states that the PLANAF “is expanding its inventory of Airborne
Early Warning” aircraft. While the reasons for these capability
improvements are not mentioned, this is ostensibly to deal with
weaknesses related to these missions. NASIC (2010, p. 7) men-
tions that the PLAAF “has only a limited aerial refueling capabil-
ity.”
• Airlift: OSD (2014, p. 35) states that the PLAAF has a “strategic
airlift deficiency.” One think tank has provided actual estimates
of both long- and medium-lift transports that further demon-
strate the paucity of these aircraft in the PLA’s inventory (IISS,
2014).
• Close air combat: Official DoD publications do not appear to
assess the potential weaknesses of PLAAF and PLANAF close
air combat capabilities. However, many publications do mention
the increasing complexity of pilot training and the emphasis on
“actual-combat” scenarios, which would ostensibly include close
air combat (for example, NASIC, 2010, pp. 62–63; ONI, 2007,
p. 49).
• Sustained operations: Official USG publications do not appear
to assess the potential weaknesses of PLAAF and PLANAF sus-
tained combat operations. However many of these publications do
mention the increasing complexity of training and emphasis on
“actual-combat” (NASIC, 2010, pp. 62–63) and “real-war situa-
tion” scenarios that include “longer flying periods” and “training
events that . . . [continue] without rest” (ONI, 2007, pp. 49–50).

• Safety: While official USG publications do not appear to specifi-
cally assess safety issues, this weakness possibly does not comport
with general analysis on trends within the PLA. Indeed, ONI
(2007, p. 91) and NASIC (2010, p. 62) both mention movements
away from the “excessive” safety considerations that were thought
to have previously undermined more realistic training.
• Pilot instruction: Although it does not assess pilot instruction
as a weakness, NASIC (2010, p. 132) provides possible rationales
for it. For example, rather than being chosen from the ranks of
veteran pilots who have logged substantial flight hours, instructor
pilots are chosen from the pool of pilots who have just graduated
from flight school.
The Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains
This section provides an overview of Chinese military capabilities and
weaknesses related to space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spec-
trum. It outlines the space, cyber, and EW concepts and capabilities
the PLA is developing to protect Chinese interests in space and the
electromagnetic spectrum, potential weaknesses in China’s capabili-
ties, factors contributing to these weaknesses, and the steps China is
taking to address what it perceives as the key problems in these areas.
Chinese Space, Cyber, and Electronic Warfare Capabilities
In keeping with the emphasis in Chinese military publications on the
importance of space systems in contemporary military operations,
China is making major strides in the development of its military space
capabilities. With the launch of numerous new satellites in recent years,
China is enhancing its space-based ISR, navigation and positioning,
communications, and meteorological capabilities. China also con-
tinues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities. According to
OSD (2014, p. 11), “China is developing a multi-dimensional program
to improve its capabilities to limit or prevent the use of space-based
assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.” These capabili-

ties include direct-ascent kinetic kill, directed energy weapons, and sat-
ellite jammers (OSD, 2014, p. 32).
The PLA is also focusing on training under what it refers to as
“complex electromagnetic conditions.” Moreover, the PLA is devoting
considerable attention to the development of its cyber and EW capa-
bilities. This would be especially important in a conflict against a high-
tech adversary, such as the United States. As OSD (2014, p. 35) points
out, the “PLA believes [EW] is one method to reduce or eliminate U.S.
technological advantage . . . PLA EW strategy focuses on radio, radar,
optical, infrared, and microwave frequencies, in addition to computer
and information systems.” The PLA sees EW as a potentially decisive
factor during modern military operations and is developing and train-
ing with jamming equipment that could be used against multiple types
of targets, including communication systems, radars, and the Global
Positioning System (OSD, 2014, p. 32). In addition, the PLA could
employ its cyberwarfare capabilities for intelligence collection, to delay
an adversary’s response to its actions, or as a “force multiplier” along-
side kinetic strikes (OSD, 2014, p. 35).
Potential Weaknesses in Space, Cyber, and Electronic Warfare
Capabilities
The PLA also faces some potential weaknesses in terms of its ability to
protect Chinese interests in space and the electromagnetic spectrum
and to operate successfully in these areas to support military cam-
paigns in which information dominance would be essential. Indeed,
although the PLA has made major strides in its capabilities in these
areas in recent years, its own assessments indicate that its ability to pro-
tect Chinese interests in space and the electromagnetic spectrum still
has potentially serious shortcomings. Multiple Chinese reports assert
that, in these areas, among others, organization, personnel, and capa-
bilities fall short of what the PLA needs (for example, Peng Bo, 2008,
and Yang Chunchang and Wang Hanshui, 2009, pp. 98–99).
Additionally, some Chinese sources suggest the PLA recognizes
that China’s dependence on space will increase along with the expan-
sion of its own space capabilities (Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 278–288).
Indeed, as China places more and more satellites in orbit, the PLA

is becoming more dependent on space capabilities for such important
functions as ISR, navigation and positioning, and communications.
Chinese military publications suggest that the PLA still sees itself as
less dependent on space than the U.S. military is but also recognizes,
albeit largely implicitly, that increasing reliance on space brings greater
vulnerability (Shou Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 278–288). Moreover, PLA
writers appear to see space as a largely offense-dominant domain, in
which it will likely be much easier for an attacker to exploit an adver-
sary’s space systems and supporting capabilities than it will be for the
target of any such attacks to protect its satellites, ground stations, and
communication links (for example, Zhao Xinguo, Hou Yingchun, and
Cao Yanhua, 2007).
Many Chinese analysts believe that China’s space systems face a
variety of potential threats. Some Chinese strategists appear to believe
that other countries are actively developing counterspace capabilities
that could threaten Chinese satellites, given what they characterize as
a long history of antisatellite weapon research, development, and test-
ing in the United States and Russia dating back to the Cold War (for
example, Yuan Liwei, Yang Jianjun, and Yang Jiahong, 2004). Con-
sequently, these strategists contend that the PLA needs to be better
prepared to protect its space assets through defensive measures or
deterrence.
China also sees itself as potentially vulnerable in the electromag-
netic spectrum. One area in which this concern has been particularly
pronounced is the PLA’s perception of Chinese cybersecurity weak-
nesses (Mulvenon, 2009). Although most attention devoted to Chi-
nese cyberactivities focuses on Chinese cyberespionage and the theft of
intellectual property, PLA analysts actually view China as potentially
very vulnerable to enemy cyberactions.
Another potential weakness for China in this general area may
exist in the need to integrate all the PLA’s disparate ISR capabilities
and incorporate them into the targeting process. Indeed, shortcomings
in China’s C4ISR capabilities, which could be both organizational and
technological, could hamper the speed, reduce the reliability, or other-
wise diminish the effectiveness of the PLA’s over-the-horizon targeting
capabilities. Problems with the potential to limit the effectiveness of

Chinese C4ISR and targeting could include not only technical chal-
lenges associated with integrating such a variety of new technologies
and complex systems but also procedural weaknesses, such as insuffi-
cient coordination among numerous intelligence organizations, opera-
tors, and higher-level decisionmakers.
Still another potential weakness in China’s approach to space,
cyber, and EW that Chinese analysts do not appear to have addressed
in great detail at this point is the possibility of unintended effects or
inadvertent escalation. As Kevin Pollpeter has pointed out, PLA ana-
lysts appear inclined to “accentuate the positive offensive outcomes
of information warfare while ignoring its limitations and unintended
consequences,” a troubling tendency, especially when coupled with the
emphasis the analysts place on seizing the initiative in the struggle for
information dominance (Pollpeter, 2012, p. 162).
How the People’s Liberation Army Is Attempting to Address
Weaknesses in Space, Cyber, and Electronic Warfare Capabilities
The PLA sees space, cyber, and EW capabilities as increasingly vital
aspects of its ability to deter or, if necessary, defeat a technologically
advanced adversary in a future informatized local war, whether over
Taiwan or the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, maritime territorial disputes
in the South China Sea, or elsewhere. Accordingly, the PLA places
a high priority on addressing its perceived weaknesses in space and
the electromagnetic spectrum and can be expected to focus significant
resources on continuing to improve its capabilities in both areas.
Chinese publications suggest China will want to improve the
survivability of its satellites. Chinese authors discuss a wide range of
measures to enhance satellite survivability, such as signature reduction;
hardening and other protective measures; electromagnetic protection;
satellite maneuverability; improving space situational awareness; and
leasing foreign space systems, which might raise the diplomatic costs
of any attack by dragging third parties into a conflict (Qi Xianfeng,
2005). Chinese publications also highlight the importance of address-
ing the vulnerabilities of communication links and satellite ground sta-
tions. In addition, China continues to develop new heavy lift capabili-
ties to support its space program, and the development of at least two

different rapid space launch systems could enable China to quickly
augment its space constellation or replace damaged satellites in the
event of a conflict (OSD, 2014, p. 10–11).
China can also be expected to continue developing its counter-
space capabilities. Chinese analysts view counterspace capabilities as
useful not only for disrupting an adversary’s military operations by
exploiting the potential vulnerabilities of its space systems but also
as an important contribution to strategic deterrence (Shou Xiaosong,
2013, pp. 178–179, 181–182, 186). The threat of retaliation against an
enemy’s space systems might deter that enemy from attacking China’s
satellites. According to Bao Shixiu, “under the conditions of American
strategic dominance in space, reliable deterrents in space will decrease
the possibility of the United States attacking Chinese space assets”
(Bao Shixiu, 2007). More broadly, the threat of damage to space sys-
tems that are essential, expensive, and not easy to replace could deter
an enemy, especially one that is heavily reliant on space, from engaging
in or escalating a conflict against China.
Given that Chinese strategists view operating successfully in the
electromagnetic spectrum, including through cyber and EW, as an
essential component of the PLA’s ability to deter and win wars, this is
another area that is likely to be a high priority for PLA modernization.
This is true for all PLA components, including ground, air, naval, and
missile forces. With respect to the PLAAF, for example, one Chinese
analyst cautions that, if a country pays attention to building up its
kinetic strike capabilities but neglects computer network attack and
EW capabilities, it will be unable to build a modern strategic air force
(Ruan Kexiang, 2009, p. 69). Accordingly, China has focused substan-
tial resources on upgrading the PLAAF’s EW capabilities. These trends
can be expected to continue as the PLA seeks to further improve its
ability to protect China’s growing interests in space, cyberspace, and
the electromagnetic spectrum.
In the cyber and electromagnetic arenas, the PLA clearly views
itself as occupying a relatively disadvantageous position because of its
perceived inferiority in the key aspects of “network military struggle,”
which include cyber reconnaissance, cyberattack and defense, and
cyberdeterrence. According to Shou Xiaosong (2013, p. 196), “com-

pared to the main strategic adversary, overall China remains at a dis-
advantage in network confrontation.” This problem may become more
pressing as the PLA increases its reliance on systems that will help
enable it to become more informatized but that are also a potential
weakness. This problem is likely to prove impossible to resolve com-
pletely, given that China sees offense as much easier than defense in the
network warfare domain, as is the case in space. Consequently, as the
PLA becomes more and more networked, it will become increasingly
dependent on technology that is vulnerable to disruption, thus creating
a potential weakness that an adversary could exploit.
Nuclear Deterrence
While not a domain per se, the PLA’s potential weaknesses in the realm
of nuclear deterrence warrant their own discussion. Accordingly, this
section provides an overview of Chinese concepts and capabilities for
nuclear deterrence. It focuses primarily on China’s nuclear deterrent
force but also touches on other capabilities that Chinese strategists
identify as making important contributions to the broader concept of
strategic deterrence. It outlines Chinese nuclear deterrence concepts
and capabilities, potential weaknesses in China’s capabilities and fac-
tors contributing to the shortcomings, and steps China is taking to
address what it perceives as the key problems in this area.
Chinese Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence Concepts
Chinese military publications highlight the importance of deterrence
as a means of protecting China’s national security interests, includ-
ing safeguarding what Chinese leaders have defined as an important
“period of strategic opportunity” for China’s development in the early
part of the 21st century. According to Shou Xiaosong (2013, p. 134),
PLA “preparations for military struggle” must not only improve the
PLA’s ability to win future local wars but also enable it to “establish
and strengthen a military deterrence system and military deterrence
capability to contain the outbreak of war and prevent the escalation
of war.” To this end, it is important to note that China views strategic

deterrence as a broad concept that encompasses nuclear, conventional,
space, and cyber capabilities, as well as certain nonmilitary elements
of national power. According to Chinese military publications, these
are all essential elements of a credible strategic deterrent posture (Shou
Xiaosong, 2013, pp. 135–136).
Within this broader context, nuclear weapons are seen as playing
an indispensable role. The cornerstone of China’s approach to nuclear
weapons, ever since its first nuclear test in 1964, has been its no-first-
use policy. Chinese writings on military strategy and missile force
campaigns are generally consistent with this approach. For example,
in China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia (2012, p. 66), the entry
that discusses planning for a nuclear counterattack assumes China has
been attacked with nuclear weapons first and is preparing to conduct
retaliatory strikes.
Beijing has indicated in such official documents as its biannual
defense white papers that it is determined to deploy a “lean and effec-
tive” nuclear force, which it views as required to meet China’s national
security needs (Information Office of the State Council, 2011). Impor-
tantly, this concept does not impose specific numerical limits on Chi-
nese nuclear forces. As Yao Yunzhu (2010) notes, “to keep the arsenal
lean, China has to exercise restraint in developing nuclear weapons; to
keep the arsenal effective, China has to modernize it to ensure credibil-
ity after a first nuclear strike.” As this description indicates, lean sug-
gests a relatively modest level of forces and underscores China’s desire
to avoid costly arms race but does not impose any specific quantitative
boundaries. The second adjective, effective, emphasizes the importance
of survivability and striking power sufficient to make nuclear deter-
rence credible in the eyes of potential adversaries.
The most recent edition of The Science of Military Strategy (Shou
Xiaosong, 2013) also emphasizes the importance of a “lean and effec-
tive” nuclear retaliatory force, which it describes as an essential com-
ponent of the PLA’s broader “deterrence system.” The concept of effec-
tiveness that volume and other more recent publications highlight can
be traced back to earlier works, such as the 1987 edition of The Sci-
ence of Military Strategy, which underscored the point that “China’s

nuclear counterstrike must take effectiveness as the foundation” (Gao
Rui, 1987, p. 116).
Taken together, the concept of a “lean and effective” nuclear force
suggests something of a sliding scale, one that is based on such factors
as threats to the survivability of Chinese nuclear forces and adversary
missile defense capabilities. It is a general concept, but one that can be
clearly linked to desired capabilities. For example, according to former
PLASAF deputy commander Zhao Xijun (2005, p. 78), to ensure China
will have a credible deterrent, it must continue to improve the surviv-
ability, rapid response capability, penetration capability, and striking
power of its strategic missile force. Similarly, Shou Xiaosong (2013,
pp. 233–234) highlights the importance of strengthening nuclear
deterrence effectiveness. It mentions increasing the number of ICBMs,
improving survivability, and strengthening penetration capability.
Chinese Nuclear Deterrence Capabilities and Weaknesses
China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear force, but it remains
small compared to those of the United States and Russia. Hans Kris-
tensen and Robert Norris estimate that China’s current nuclear stock-
pile includes a total of about 250 nuclear weapons.18 China’s deployed
nuclear force consists of MRBMs and IRBMs for regional deterrence
missions, silo-based ICBMs, road-mobile ICBMs, and an emerging
SSBN and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability.
China releases very little information about its nuclear weapons, but
outside experts assess China’s older missile systems carry multimegaton
warheads and that the more-modern road-mobile ICBMs have yields
of several hundred kilotons (for example, Kile, Schell, and Kristensen,
18 Others have argued that China might have a much larger nuclear arsenal. For example,
retired Russian military officer Viktor Yesin has stated that China could have as many as
1,600–1,800 nuclear warheads. However, these higher estimates do not track with publicly
available estimates from DoD sources. For example, in August 2012, General Robert Kehler,
then Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, disagreed with the higher estimates, stating:
“I do not believe that China has hundreds or thousands more nuclear weapons than what the
intelligence community has been saying, . . . [but] that the Chinese arsenal is in the range of
several hundred.” For the estimate that China has about 250 nuclear weapons, see Kristensen
and Norris (2013). For a report that cites Viktor Yesin’s assessment, see Gertz (2012). For a
report that highlights General Kehler’s statement, see Kristensen (2012).

2012). Although its nuclear force is relatively small, China is not stand-
ing still. Indeed, its nuclear posture has been evolving to meet the
country’s changing national security needs (Roberts, 2008).
China currently maintains the DF-3 (CSS-2) IRBM and DF-21
and DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 1 and CSS-5 Mod 2) MRBMs for theater
nuclear deterrence and strike missions. China still has about 5 to 10
DF-3 launchers (NASIC, 2013, p. 17), but many observers expect it
will likely retire these older systems in the near future (OSD, 2009,
p. 24). According to NASIC (2013, p. 17), PLASAF deploys a total
of fewer than 100 launchers for its nuclear-armed DF-21 and DF-21A
MRBMs.
China’s ICBM force consists of older, limited-range DF-4 (CSS‑3)
ICBMs, silo-based DF-5 (CSS-4) ICBMs, and road-mobile DF-31
(CSS-10 Mod 1) and DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) ICBMs. China cur-
rently deploys about 20 silo-based DF-5 ICBMs (NASIC, 2009, p. 21)
and is “enhancing its silo-based systems” as part of the moderniza-
tion of its nuclear missile force (Burgess, 2012). Kristensen and Norris
(2011) estimates that China has deployed a total of about 20 to 40
road-mobile ICBM launchers. This estimate is roughly consistent with
NASIC (2013, p. 21), which states that China has deployed about 5
to 10 DF-31 road-mobile ICBM launchers and more than 15 DF-31A
road-mobile ICBM launchers.
China is also moving toward a sea-based nuclear deterrent capa-
bility. Beijing’s long-standing pursuit of such a deterrent is also aimed
at enhancing the survivability of its nuclear force, and it is getting closer
to achieving an operational capability. Although most observers assess
that the first-generation Xia-class SSBN has never conducted a deter-
rent patrol, China’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent finally is taking
shape with the Type-094 (Jin-class) SSBN and the JL-2 SLBM. OSD
(2013, p. 31) indicates that China has delivered three JIN-class SSBNs
to the PLAN, with “as many as two more in various stages of construc-
tion.” The PLAN is expected to begin conducting deterrence patrols
with its Type-094 SSBNs sometime in 2014 (Karotkin, 2014). This
will undoubtedly represent a major improvement over China’s ill-fated
first-generation SSBN, but it almost certainly falls short of the ulti-
mate goals for a future sea-based nuclear deterrent. Indeed, an unclas-

sified chart released by ONI suggests the Type 094 is comparable to
older Soviet SSBN designs in terms of its quieting and vulnerability to
detection (ONI, 2009).19 In addition, China would likely prefer a new
SLBM to have a range longer than that of the JL-2 SLBM.
China most likely perceives the credibility of its nuclear deterrent
as increasing along with these advances in capabilities, but Chinese
strategists identify what they characterize as a number of potentially
serious challenges. Specifically, Chinese military writings and assess-
ments by Chinese civilian scholars and arms control experts indicate
that China views advances in adversary ISR, conventional precision
strike, and missile defense capabilities as potential threats to the cred-
ibility of its nuclear deterrent.
PLA publications warn that China faces a “complex nuclear secu-
rity environment” (Shou Xiaosong, 2013). According to Shou, the main
nuclear adversary China must take into account is the United States,
but other countries, including India, are emerging as possible chal-
lenges. From a technological perspective, the same volume highlights
not only missile defense but also conventional prompt global strike as
serious concerns for Chinese planners. In particular, it identifies con-
ventional prompt global strike as a potential conventional strike threat
against Chinese nuclear forces and warns that this development could
put China in a “passive position” (Shou Xiaosong, 2013). Moreover,
Shou also warns that it has the potential to “greatly influence China’s
nuclear counterattack capability” and “weaken China’s nuclear deter-
rent function.”
Chinese Attempts to Address Perceived Shortcomings
China’s focus on enhancing the striking power and survivability of its
nuclear missile force and improving its ability to counter missile defense
systems is giving China a more credible nuclear deterrent. Looking
to the future, Chinese military publications highlight increasing the
number of ICBMs, improving survivability, and enhancing the abil-
ity to penetrate enemy missile defenses as important means of further
19 For an assessment of the Type 094 that relies on the unclassified ONI chart and other
open sources, see Lewis (2009).

strengthening China’s nuclear deterrent (Shou Xiaosong, 2013). In line
with these assessments, China is enhancing its silo-based ICBMs and
deploying more survivable road-mobile ICBMs. Looking to the future,
the DF-41, a new mobile ICBM possibly capable of carrying MIRVs, is
currently under development (OSD, 2014, p. 7). The PLAN is expected
to conduct its first nuclear deterrent patrol with the Type‑094 SSBN
and JL-2 SLBM sometime in 2014, and China is planning a follow-
on Type‑096 SSBN and a new SLBM to enhance the sea-based com-
ponent of its nuclear deterrent. In particular, China likely intends its
next-generation SSBN to improve on the Type 094, which is relatively
noisy. In addition, China appears to be conducting research on hyper-
sonic glide vehicles to counter missile defenses (Keck, 2014).

125
CHAPTER SIX
Weaknesses in China’s Defense Industry
This chapter evaluates the weaknesses of China’s defense industry and
considers their potential implications. China’s defense industry has
made tremendous progress in terms of its ability to deliver advanced
weaponry and equipment to the PLA, especially since the 1998 defense
industrial reforms, which resulted in the establishment of the GAD,
among other changes. At the same time, however, China’s defense
industry continues to suffer from a number of problems that have yet
to be fully addressed. Indeed, China’s defense industry is still in tran-
sition from central planning to a more market-oriented system, and
China still faces many major obstacles, such as widespread corruption,
lack of competition and entrenched monopolies, delays and cost over-
runs, quality control problems, bureaucratic fragmentation, an out-
dated acquisition system, and restricted access to foreign technology
and expertise.
China’s Improving Defense Industry Capabilities
China’s defense industry was once largely unable to produce weap-
ons and equipment that met PLA requirements.1 In large part, this
1 The Chinese defense industry is defined as including civilian firms that are engaged in
defense-related and dual-use civil-military research, development, and production; civilian
regulatory agencies overseeing defense industrial matters; and the PLA research, develop-
ment, and acquisition apparatus that is involved in the management and conduct of military-
related science, technology, and industrial activities.

was because inefficiency, stovepiped bureaucracy, and a yawning gap
between its level of technological sophistication and world standards
plagued it. Yet, while previous attempts to reform the defense indus-
try failed to yield the desired changes, the defense industrial reforms
Beijing implemented in 1998, which included such important organi-
zational adjustments as the establishment of the PLA’s GAD, have pro-
duced much more meaningful results. Since the 1998 reforms, Beijing
has enacted further organizational changes, most notably the creation
of the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense as the successor to the Committee for Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense as part of a broader
government-restructuring plan enacted in 2008 (Cheung, 2009;
Mulvenon and Tyroler-Cooper, 2009; Medeiros et al., 2005).
Recently however, China has made considerable headway in mod-
ernizing its defense science, technology, and industrial capabilities and
has achieved impressive results in a number of areas since the turn of
this century. Generational improvements have been made in the devel-
opment and production of a growing array of weapons, from warships
to combat aircraft, although the Chinese defense industry overall still
lags technologically one or two generations behind the global frontier.
Sharply increased funding for research and development, sustained
high-level leadership attention, and the absorption of advanced foreign
technologies, especially from Russia, are some of the major reasons for
these gains.2
Weaknesses of China’s Defense Industry
This progress, however, has papered over deep-seated cracks that are
serious impediments to China’s efforts to become a world-class defense
industrial power. These weaknesses stem from the developmental
foundations of the Chinese defense industry and its uncertain efforts
to overcome the corrosive legacy of its difficult history. The institu-
tional and normative foundations and workings of the Chinese defense
2 For an overview of recent developments, see Cheung (2014).

Weaknesses in China’s Defense Industry 127
industry were copied from the former Soviet Union’s command defense
economy and continue to exert a powerful influence to the present
day. The PLA and defense industrial regulatory authorities are seeking
to replace this outdated top-down administrative management model
with a more competitive and indirect regulatory regime, but strong
vested interests do not want to see any major changes.
Senior Chinese military leaders have identified the replacement
of the existing management system for weapon research, development,
and acquisition (RDA) as one of the most important steps to address-
ing the obstacles to defense industrial modernization. General Zhang
Youxia, the director of the PLA GAD said in January 2014 that the
primary “bottleneck issue for armament development is no longer the
shortage of funds or technology. Instead, institutional systems and
mechanisms have become the greatest hurdle to the PLA’s armament
building and development” (“Speech by Zhang . . . ,” 2014). If the PLA
was unable to remove these structural obstacles, Zhao said future prog-
ress in weapon development “may just be empty talk.”
One of the biggest hurdles PLA and civilian defense acquisition
specialists point out is the defense industry’s monopoly structure.3 Little
competition exists to win major weapon systems and defense equip-
ment because each of China’s six defense industrial sectors is closed to
outside competition and is dominated by a select handful state-owned
defense corporations. Contracts are typically awarded through single-
sourcing mechanisms to these corporations. Competitive bidding and
tendering takes place for only noncombat support equipment, such
as logistics supplies. An effort in 1999 to inject more competition by
splitting each company into two did little to curb monopolistic prac-
tices because these firms focused on different areas of business in their
domains, and there was little direct rivalry.
A second serious weakness that has seriously handicapped the
effectiveness of Chinese defense economy is its bureaucratic fragmen-
tation. This is a common characteristic of the Chinese organizational
system (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988, pp. 35–42) but is especially
3 Interviews, Beijing and Changsha, November 2011 and June 2012.

virulent within the large and unwieldy defense sector.4 A key feature of
the Soviet approach to defense industrialization that China imported
was a highly divided, segmented, and stratified structure and process.
There was strict separation between the defense and civilian sectors
and between defense contractors and military end users, compart-
mentalization between the conventional defense and strategic weapon
sectors and among the different conventional defense industrial sub-
sectors, and division between research and development entities and
production units. Key reasons for this excessive compartmentalization
included an obsessive desire for secrecy and the powerful influence of
the deeply ingrained Chinese model of vertical functional systems [条
条] that encouraged large-scale industries, such those in the defense
and supporting heavy industrial sectors (e.g., iron and steel and chemi-
cals), to become independent fiefdoms.
This severe structural compartmentalization is a major obsta-
cle to the development of innovative and advanced weapon capabili-
ties because it requires consensus-based decisionmaking that requires
extensive negotiations, bargaining, and exchanges. This management
by committee is cumbersome and risk-adverse and results in a lack of
the strong ownership that is critical to ensuring that projects are able to
succeed the thicket of bureaucratic red tape and cutthroat competition
for funding.
When Chinese authorities began to pursue the development of
strategic weapons programs in the late 1950s, such as nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles, they recognized that the fragmented nature of the
defense industrial economy represented a potentially fatal weakness, so
they designed a special high-level leadership arrangement called the
Central Special Committee (CSC) to provide the decisive leadership
support needed for high-priority strategic projects (Cheung, 2012). The
CSC played a central role in ensuring the successful development of
China’s strategic weapons capabilities, so much so that the Chinese
authorities resurrected this leadership group in the late 1980s to over-
see the initial development of key strategic programs. The CSC played
an important role in the early development of the Shenzhou manned
4 See also Lieberthal and Lampton (1992) and Lampton (1987).

space project, for example, and has been mentioned in other major
strategic technology programs, such as nuclear submarine development
and other space projects.
The CSC’s continued existence shows the lack of institutional
development and maturity of the Chinese defense science, technology,
and industrial system. The CSC represents an old-fashioned technon-
ationalist response by an industrial latecomer that emphasizes the cen-
tral role of the state, massive mobilization of capabilities and resources,
and an underlying Cold War mentality driven by worries over external
threats and the need for an wholly indigenous response. The United
States used a similar state-led, top-down organizational model at the
beginning of its development of the atomic bomb with the Manhattan
Project but subsequently established effective bureaucratic institutions
to run strategic technology projects, such as the national laboratories
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, that did not
require constant high-level leadership interference.
This entrenched bureaucratic fragmentation is a prominent fea-
ture of the armament management system. Although the GAD is one
of the PLA’s four general headquarters departments with a seat on the
powerful CMC, it is responsible for managing the armament needs
only of the ground forces, People’s Armed Police, select space programs,
and the militia (Mao Guohui, 2012, p. 46). The navy, air force, and
PLASAF have their own armament bureaucracies, and competition
is fierce for budgetary resources to support the projects each of these
services favors. This compartmentalized structure intensifies parochial
interests and undermines efforts to promote joint undertakings.
Coordination gaps and bureaucratic rivalry are also problematic
between the GAD and the GSD and GLD in such areas as policy plan-
ning, resource allocations and drafting of longer-term development
plans (Mao Guohui, 2012, p. 45). This led to the creation of the Stra-
tegic Planning Department (SPD) in 2011, to be housed in the GSD,
with the role of “strengthening the strategic management functions of
the Central Military Commission,” according to CMC Vice Chairman
Gen. Guo Boxiong (“Chairman Hu Jintao . . . ,” 2011). However, the
nascent SPD is struggling to assert itself because of the GAD and GLD

are reluctant to allow any diminution of their authority and influence
in key management, budgetary, and planning issues.5
The RDA system also suffers from compartmentalization along
many process segments. Responsibilities for research and development,
testing, procurement, production, and maintenance are in the hands of
different units, and underinstitutionalization has meant that linkages
among these entities tend to be ad hoc, with major gaps in oversight,
reporting, and information sharing (Liu Hanrong and Wang Baoshun,
2009). The fragmented nature of the RDA process may help explain
why Hu Jintao was apparently caught by surprise by the first publicized
test flight of the J-20 fighter aircraft that occurred during the visit of
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates in January 2011 (Pomfret, 2011;
Bumiller and Wines, 2011).
A third major weakness is that the PLA continues to rely on out-
dated administrative tools to manage projects with defense contractors
in the absence of the establishment of an effective contract manage-
ment system. The PLA did implement the use of contracts on a trial
basis in the late 1980s, introducing a contract responsibility system
(Cheung, 2009, pp. 83–85). These are administrative contracts, how-
ever, and have few legal rights because the defense industry lacks a
developed legal framework. Consequently, contracts are vague and do
not define contractual obligations or critical performance issues, such
as quality, pricing, or schedules. Contracts for complex weapons proj-
ects can be as short as one to two pages, according to analysts.6
Moreover, many of the tools and management approaches the
PLA acquisition apparatus uses are backward compared to those of its
counterparts in the United States and other advanced military powers.
It has yet to adopt total life-cycle management methods, for example,
and many internal management information systems are on stand-
alone networks that prevent effective communication and coordina-
5 Interviews with PLA officers who have interacted with the SPD within the first six months
of its establishment, Beijing, June 2012.
6 Interview with PLA acquisition specialist, Beijing, November 2011.

tion. One analyst said that this often meant that the only way for proj-
ect teams to exchange information was through paper transactions.7
A fourth serious weakness is the lack of a transparent pricing
system for weapons and other military equipment, representing a lack
of trust between the PLA and defense industry. The existing armament
pricing framework is based on a “cost-plus” model that dates to the
planning economy, in which contractors are allowed 5-percent profit
margins on top of actual costs (Mao Guohui, 2012, pp. 158–159).
This model has a number of drawbacks that hold back efficiency and
innovation. One is that contractors are incentivized to push up costs
because this also drives up profits. Another problem is that contrac-
tors are not rewarded for finding ways to lower costs, such as through
more streamlined management or more cost-effective designs or man-
ufacturing techniques. Contracts rarely have performance incentives,
which discourages risk-taking and any willingness to adopt new, inno-
vative approaches. Yet another issue is that contractors are dissuaded
from making major investments in new technological capabilities or
processes because of the low 5-percent profit margin that is available.
To address this long-standing problem, the PLA, Ministry of
Finance, and the National Development and Reform Commission
held a high-level meeting on armament pricing reform in 2009. They
concluded that the outdated pricing system had seriously restricted
weapon development and innovation (Zong Zhaodun and Zhao Bo,
2009). A number of reform proposals were put forward, including (1)
provide incentives to contain costs, (2) switch from accounting proce-
dures that focus on ex post pricing to ex ante controls, and (3) expand
from a single pricing methodology to multiple pricing methods. Some
of these ideas were incorporated in a document issued after the meeting
entitled “Opinions on Further Pushing Forward the Reform of Work
Concerning the Prices of Military Products.”
At the beginning of 2014, the GAD announced that it would
conduct and expand on pilot projects on equipment pricing. These
reforms include strengthening the pricing verification of purchased
goods; improving cost controls; and shifting from singular to plural
7 Interview with PLA acquisition specialist, Beijing, November 2011.

pricing models, from “after-purchase pricing” to “whole process pric-
ing,” and from “individual cost pricing” to “social average cost pricing”
(“Armament Work . . . ,” 2014). These represent modest steps in the
pricing reform process, but the PLA will continue to face fierce opposi-
tion from the defense industry on this issue.
A fifth impediment is corruption, which appears to have thrived
with the defense industry’s uncertain transition from centralized state
planning to a more-competitive and indirect management model.8
PLA leaders have highlighted the RDA system as one of a number of
high-risk areas in which corruption can flourish; other areas included
the selection and promotion of officials, the enrollment of students in
PLA-affiliated schools, funds management, and construction work.
At the PLA’s annual conference on military discipline inspection
work in January 2014, CMC Vice-Chairman General Xu Qiliang,
who heads the PLA’s anticorruption efforts, pointed out that arma-
ment research, production, and procurement was one of two areas
that required “better oversight” (“CMC Vice Chairman . . . ,” 2014).
The other area was construction projects, which has been plagued by
a number of high-profile corruption scandals in recent years, includ-
ing the case of GLD Deputy Director Lieutenant General Gu Jun-
shan, who amassed a huge fortune from lucrative real estate kickbacks
(“How a PLA General . . . ,” 2014).
The almost complete absence of public reporting on corruption
in the defense industry and RDA system means that the extent of the
problem is not known. Military authorities justify this lack of transpar-
ency by pointing out that many of the cases are likely to involve classi-
fied programs. The latest anticorruption crackdown, which began with
Xi Jinping’s ascent to power at the 18th Party Congress in November
2012, has produced only a handful of cases of defense industry exec-
utives being arrested on corruption charges (for example, “Wu Hao,
Deputy General Manager . . . ,” 2014).
8 Corruption is defined broadly in China as covering the improper behavior of state, party,
or military officials, but the more common Western definition is the abuse of public office for
personal gain in violation of rules.

Potential Impact of Weaknesses in China’s Defense
Industry
This discussion of the weaknesses of the defense industry shows how
much of a risk it faces of falling into a “trapped transition,” in which
key segments are left unreformed or only partially reformed because
of strong opposition from powerful interest groups. The negative con-
sequences of this selective reform process have so far been masked
by the abundance of resources flowing through the defense industry
and RDA system since the late 1990s. But any tightening in budgets
because of slowing economic growth could expose the fragilities of this
deeply fragmented and flawed system.

135
CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion: People’s Liberation Army
Weaknesses and Their Implications
This concluding chapter of the report recaps our key findings and then
offers some final thoughts on their implications that underscore the
importance of conducting further research on the PLA’s weaknesses
and its strengths. The PLA has made impressive progress in a relatively
short time. It is clearly becoming a more professional and more capable
military. Its capabilities aimed at deterring or, if necessary, countering
U.S. military intervention in the Asia-Pacific region, including systems
designed to hold U.S. military bases, aircraft carriers, space systems,
and computer networks at risk, are becoming an increasingly serious
cause for concern among defense analysts in the United States. At the
same time, however, an assessment of the PLA’s missions and a com-
parison of them with its capabilities indicate that the PLA’s transforma-
tion remains incomplete. Chapter Five explored these potential vulner-
abilities and their effects on the PLA’s combat capabilities in numerous
domains through 2025. On the whole, we found substantial overlap
between the findings of outside analysts and the PLA’s own assess-
ments in many areas.
Overall, the PLA has made impressive strides in its ability to per-
form its assigned missions, including advances in capabilities designed
to counter U.S. military intervention in a crisis or conflict in the region,
but it still faces a number of serious challenges. Chinese military publi-
cations reflect a keen awareness of these shortcomings. Indeed, Chinese
military media reports and PLA books and journal articles contain
voluminous discussions of the PLA’s problems, which some Chinese
writers refer to as the “two incompatibles/two gaps,” a phrase that

highlights perceived incongruencies between current PLA capabilities
and the demands of winning a local war under informatized condi-
tions and successfully executing the PLA’s other missions.
Some of the key weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces result
from problems with the PLA’s organizational structure, which appears
to be an obstacle to the achievement of the level of joint operations
capability to which the PLA aspires, and the shortcomings of its
human capital, which include such problems as insufficient education
and technical proficiency and rampant corruption. The PLA also suf-
fers from shortfalls in terms of its combat capabilities. PLA publica-
tions highlight shortfalls in joint operations capabilities; training; and
combat support and combat service support functions, such as logistics
and maintenance capabilities.
In the maritime domain, China has made important strides but
still faces such challenges as the integration of increasingly complex
weapons and equipment, training, and the mastery of such potentially
critical capabilities as ASW. China’s air power achievements have been
very impressive, but it still faces such challenges as insufficient num-
bers of special-mission aircraft and inadequate strategic transporta-
tion. The PLA also faces potential weaknesses in its ability to protect
China’s growing interests in space and the electromagnetic spectrum.
This problem may become more acute as the PLA’s reliance on systems
that are potentially vulnerable to disruption continues to grow along
with advances in its space and C4ISR capabilities. In addition, China’s
defense industry suffers from a number of problems that have yet to
be resolved, despite major advances in its capabilities since the 1998
defense industrial reforms. These reportedly include such problems as
widespread corruption, lack of competition, delays and cost overruns,
and quality control issues.
The underlying premise of this report is that studying the PLA’s
weaknesses is crucial for several reasons. First, assuming we can gain
greater knowledge of what the PLA sees as its own shortcomings, this
is likely to offer a useful guide to assessing the future direction of PLA
modernization and reform. The PLA’s perceptions are subjective, of
course, and may not fully align with outside assessments in all cases.
Even if some of them may be inaccurate, as long as they are believed

Conclusion: People’s Liberation Army Weaknesses and Their Implications 137
within the PLA, they are likely to inform the PLA’s priorities. Once the
PLA diagnoses what it perceives as shortfalls to mission accomplish-
ment, it can be expected to devote substantial resources to developing
and implementing solutions.
Second, studying PLA weaknesses may inform the U.S. approach
to forging a military-to-military relationship with China that advances
U.S. interests and contributes to regional security and stability. Of
course, China has a number of objectives in terms of its military
exchanges with the United States. To the degree that the PLA views
one of these as helping it gain knowledge that could allow it to close
gaps in its capabilities, deepening our understanding of its weaknesses,
and of its own views of these gaps, could provide some insight into
how China is likely to approach this important military-to-military
relationship.
Third, understanding the PLA’s weaknesses, and its own assess-
ment of them, can help to improve the ability of the United States and
its allies and partners to deter China from using force or the threat of
force to resolve disputes with its neighbors. For example, the United
States and other countries could take such actions as revealing the
development and testing of new capabilities designed to exploit spe-
cific PLA weaknesses, releasing details about new operational con-
cepts that enable these countries to capitalize on PLA vulnerabilities,
or highlighting training and exercises that demonstrate the ability to
take advantage of gaps in the PLA’s capabilities. There are, of course,
circumstances under which it is unlikely the United States would be
able to deter China from using force to defend what it perceives as its
most important security interests, despite the PLA’s awareness of its
own shortcomings. When leaders in Beijing would see the cost of inac-
tion as unacceptable because it would result in damage to China’s core
interests or undermine the CCP’s hold on power, they might choose to
use force, and the PLA would do the best it could with what it has. The
perceived costs of inaction, at least in some possible scenarios, could
grow if Beijing becomes increasingly concerned that China’s populace
expects its leaders to exercise power in accordance with China’s rising
international status.

Fourth, if deterrence fails, knowing the PLA’s weaknesses could
help devise strategies for countering Chinese use of force. Indeed, under
such circumstances, exploiting these weaknesses could help to prevent
the PLA from successfully using force or other forms of coercion to
achieve China’s objectives. For example, an opponent could conceiv-
ably strive to present the PLA with challenges that are fast paced,
unexpected, and intended to overload or outmaneuver a slow-moving
decision system that could have difficulty keeping up with a rapidly
developing situation. All these factors underscore the importance of
carefully studying the PLA’s weaknesses and potential vulnerabilities
and its strengths.
In closing, this report attempted to outline a framework to assess
how capability level and capability shortfalls affect the PLA’s ability to
accomplish its assigned missions. The most important consequence of
weaknesses in PLA capabilities, of course, is that they create some level
of risk that the PLA will not be able to successfully accomplish one or
more of its missions if China’s leaders call on the PLA to do so. We
acknowledge that a detailed application of the framework outlined in
this report sets demanding standards for analysis. In this context, our
report should be seen not as the definitive study of this topic but as a
preliminary step in this direction, one that we hope will inspire future
research along these lines. Indeed, we hope this work will serve as a
starting point for further, more rigorous analysis. Using the framework
as a starting point, a logical next step would be to conduct a detailed
assessment of the potential implications of the PLA’s weaknesses in
light of one or more specific operational scenarios.

139
APPENDIX
Critical Assumptions
This section presents an overview of some of the general assumptions
on which our assessments are based and an overview of the possible
implications if some of those assumptions are incorrect.
Assumption 1. Preservation of Chinese Communist Party
as Top Priority
Preservation of the CCP will remain the top priority of the Party, state,
and military leadership, and the CCP will remain firmly in control of
the PLA. The implications of this are as follows:
• The political commissar system will continue within the Chinese
armed forces, and the Party will continue to directly influence the
pace and content of the military’s development of combat power.
• The Party’s investment in the promotion of nationalism as one of
its key pillars of legitimacy will continue to affect China’s interac-
tion within the Asia-Pacific region and globally in unpredictable
and sometimes erratic and counterproductive ways.
• Despite its verbal and sometimes physical aggressiveness, the CCP
tends to avoid conflict and wants to sustain a peacetime envi-
ronment to ensure the strength of another pillar of legitimacy—
economic development.

Assumption 2. Centrality of Joint Operations
China’s ability to project combat power depends on coordination across
all domains—air, land, sea, space, cyber, and electromagnetic—of mil-
itary power, and the PLA recognizes that it must enact organizational
and training reforms to achieve the level of joint operational capability
to which it aspires. The implications of this are as follows:
• The objective of improving the PLA’s ability to conduct integrated
joint operations must dominate plans for organizational restruc-
turing and training reforms, and a joint operations capability
must be realized sooner rather than later, to ensure that the PLA
will be able to deter or, if necessary, win future informatized local
wars.
• The PLA’s ability to realize the objective of being able to conduct
truly integrated joint operations depends on a higher level of tech-
nically and operationally capable personnel and leadership.
Assumption 3. Continued Dominance of the People’s
Liberation Army
Even though the Army’s traditional dominance may stand in the way
of plans to restructure the military and improve its ability to perform
its assigned missions, ground forces will continue to attempt to main-
tain their traditional position and dominate the PLA. They will be at
least partially successful because of the role the army plays as a coercive
force to ensure the centrality of the CCP and also to absorb underedu-
cated manpower. The implications of this are as follows:
• The PLA’s transition to integrated joint operations will be incre-
mental over the medium to long term. Tough decisions will be
deferred or watered down if they affect the entrenched power of
the CCP.
• Because of the influence of the ground forces, continental think-
ing will continue to dominate in operational art and leadership
thinking.

Critical Assumptions 141
• Younger officers with talent and ability to help transition to a
modern force will likely be discouraged by obstacles to their
desires for reform.
Assumption 4. Personnel Turnover
China’s recruitment and relatively short rotation of personnel will not
change significantly in the short to medium term. The implications of
this are as follows:
• China’s military personnel system will continue to be plagued by
undertrained and inexperienced officers and men in the areas of
modern combat, which will impede the force’s ability to apply
modern equipment and concepts effectively in line with China’s
concepts for force employment in future joint operations.
• The cycle of retraining will continue following the training and
recruitment rotation, which will inhibit the establishment of
combat capability.
• For the short to medium term, the cadre of officers and NCOs
will remain too small, ill-trained, and inexperienced to transform
combat power as rapidly and decisively as senior leaders wish.
Assumption 5. Role of Nuclear Weapons (1)
We assume that Chinese leaders will continue to believe that nuclear
weapons underpin China’s great power status and serve as a central
component of China’s broader suite of strategic deterrence capabilities.
If we are incorrect and Chinese leaders do see the strategic utility of nuclear
weapons as declining, the leaders may choose to emphasize other aspects of
strategic deterrence—such as long-range conventional strike, counterspace
or cyberwarfare capabilities—more heavily than nuclear forces.

Assumption 6. Role of Nuclear Weapons (2)
We assume that Chinese strategists will continue to view nuclear weap-
ons as useful primarily to deter nuclear coercion; nuclear attack; major
power war; and, potentially, certain types of conventional strategic
attacks against China, rather than in tactical roles. If we are incor-
rect and China begins to see nuclear weapons as more useful in tactical
roles, it could result in the development of tactical nuclear capabilities that
most Chinese strategists thus far have seen as unnecessary and potentially
destabilizing.
Assumption 7. Nuclear Force Modernization
We assume that China will continue to see deterring the United States
as the primary focus of its nuclear force modernization. If China begins
to see other countries closer to its borders, such as India, as represent-
ing a growing nuclear threat, it could increase China’s focus on theater-
range nuclear deterrence and strike capabilities.
Assumption 8. Defense Budget
We assume that China will continue to have a large enough defense
budget to devote the necessary resources to recruiting, training, and
retaining highly qualified personnel; conducting necessary operations
and maintenance; and investing in a wide range of force moderniza-
tion programs, some of which may be very expensive, such as Chi-
na’s pursuit of an indigenous aircraft carrier program. For example,
we assume China will be able to continue qualitatively and quantita-
tively strengthening its nuclear deterrent force without facing sharp
trade-offs between nuclear force modernization and conventional force
modernization priorities. Similarly, we assume that, within the portion
of the budget devoted to conventional force modernization programs,
China will be able to afford to develop and deploy a number of big-
ticket items simultaneously, such as stealth fighters, aircraft carriers,

national security space capabilities, and other types of potentially very
costly modern platforms. If we are incorrect and an economic down-
turn or shift in government spending priorities significantly curtails defense
spending, it is conceivable that China could be forced to face trade-offs it
has thus far managed to avoid. In a tighter budget environment, one possi-
bility is that China might have to prioritize some of its major conventional
force modernization programs at the expense of others, perhaps leading to
slower progress or the purchase of fewer platforms in certain areas. Another
is that Beijing might have to consider slowing its nuclear force modern-
ization to accommodate expensive conventional weapon programs or that
China could have to shortchange some of its big-ticket conventional pro-
grams to continue to support its nuclear modernization adequately if it saw
the latter as a higher priority.
Assumption 9. Civil-Military Relations
If the assessment that the role of the PLA as a Party army constitutes a
weakness is wrong, this would imply a stronger degree of acceptance by
the PLA of the CCP’s leading role in Chinese polity and national secu-
rity decisionmaking. It would also make efforts to defeat the PLA by
playing on the political weaknesses of the CCP more difficult because
the PLA would be expected to fight harder to preserve the Party’s
ruling status. In previous U.S. military operations, most notably the
conflict with Iraq under Saddam Hussein, a central component of the
U.S. war effort at the outset was in trying to encourage the opposing
force to abandon the regime and lay down its arms. If the PLA firmly
accepts the CCP’s leading role, it will be far less amenable to such calls.
Assumption 10. Civilian Oversight
If the assessment that the absence of civilian oversight is a weakness
is inaccurate, the United States might mistakenly conclude that the
PLA is less efficient or effective at generating combat power because
of the absence of oversight and coordination. If China can effectively

coordinate without substantial civilian input, a warfighting strategy
that seeks to complicate Chinese military operations by striking at the
seams of civilian and military coordination may be misplaced. How-
ever, if the assessment is correct, the United States might complicate
China’s ability to generate combat power if it could induce doubt into
the minds of the Party about the honesty and fidelity of the PLA to
the broader leadership of the CCP. From a separate angle, the United
States might seek to cause the PLA to doubt the wisdom of the broader
policies of the Chinese state and to question whether the line agencies
of the government are actually supporting their mission or are leaving
the PLA to fight on its own without sufficient economic, diplomatic,
policing, or other forms of institutional support for its security mission.
Assumption 11. Operational Initiative
If the assessment that lower levels are not given operational decision-
making authority is wrong, the PLA may prove capable of greater tacti-
cal flexibility and operational-level innovation than might otherwise be
expected. PLA responses to this issue have not yet come to light, and
the efforts to improve the NCO corps are not believed to be driven by
an effort to create a more competent and trustworthy set of leaders at
lower levels who could step into this role.
Assumption 12. Realistic Training
If the assessment that the PLA’s training and exercise practices consti-
tute a weakness is wrong and if the PLA is in fact mastering the art of
operating under a more complicated, challenging, and realistic set of
conditions than has been described above, the implication would be
that the Chinese armed forces are more capable of undertaking com-
plicated combined or even joint force operations than most outside
observers have assessed to date. It would also imply that the broad com-
munity of PLA watchers has grossly overestimated its ability to evalu-
ate the relationship of observed exercises to effective combat capabili-

ties. This would require a major reassessment of our knowledge of the
PLA but would fall in line with recent statements from senior United
States officials, including former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
and former U.S. Pacific Command Commander Admiral Robert Wil-
lard, that the United States has consistently underestimated China’s
capacity to innovate and catch up in the military domain (Holmes and
Yoshihara, 2011).
Assumption 13. Professional Worldview
If the assessment that there is a large gap between academic and foreign-
area officers in the PLA and those who have operational control over
the force is wrong, engagement may provide more opportunities to
shape the PLA’s worldviews than had previously been considered pos-
sible. Messages could be communicated much more easily to top levels
of leadership. On the other hand, it may suggest that the operational
officers, who are generally regarded as the most hawkish, are immune
to outside influences because the gaps that had been postulated would
apparently not exist.
Assumption 14. Professionalism
Knowledge gaps in this area include the effectiveness of PLA efforts to
improve morale and discipline and insufficient systematic information
about how widespread such problems are and how they affect the PLA’s
ability to generate and sustain combat power. If assessments that this
issue is important are incorrect, we would expect to see the PLA per-
form well in training and combat now and into the future, even as suc-
cessive “one-child” generations continue to staff the force. Apart from
targeting morale or benefitting from the sloppiness of soldiers who do
not follow orders or maintain operational discipline, it is not clear how
foreign militaries could seek to exploit such vulnerabilities.

Assumption 15. China-Russia Relationship and Russia’s
Strategic Orientation
We assume there will be no major change in the China-Russia rela-
tionship or Russia’s broader strategic orientation. This is important
because, if this assumption is incorrect, it could change China’s exter-
nal security environment in ways that could have major implications
for the PLA. For example, a sharp downturn in Beijing’s relationship
with Moscow would require the PLA to devote more attention to deter-
ring or preparing for a crisis or conflict involving Russia. On the other
hand, if China’s relationship with Russia remains on course but if Rus-
sia’s relationship with the United States and its NATO allies deterio-
rates to the point that Washington must strengthen its military posture
in Europe, this could result in important changes in China’s assess-
ment of the international situation and potentially alter its view of the
regional security environment in Asia.
Assumption 16. Major Technological Surprises
We assume that there will be no technological surprises so drastic
that they dramatically change Chinese views on future warfare. How-
ever, it is possible that the emergence of a dramatic technological sur-
prise, such as in the areas of directed-energy weapons or hypersonic
technology, could create new challenges or opportunities for China,
potentially changing Beijing’s thinking about its force modernization
requirements and the demands of future military campaigns.

147
Abbreviations
AEW&C airborne early warning and command
ASBM antiship ballistic missile
ASW antisubmarine warfare
C2 command and control
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CMC Central Military Commission
CSC Central Special Committee
DDG guided missile destroyer
DoD U.S. Department of Defense
EW electronic warfare
FFG guided missile frigate
GAD General Armament Department
GLD General Logistics Department
GSD General Staff Department
HADR humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IT information technology
MIRV multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle
MOOTW military operations other than war
MRBM medium-range ballistic missile
N/A not applicable
NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO noncommissioned officer
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NSRD RAND National Security Research Division
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PKO peacekeeping operation
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAA People’s Liberation Army Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PLANAF People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force
PLASAF People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force

Abbreviations 149
PRC People’s Republic of China
RDA research, development, and acquisition
SAM surface-to-air missile
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLOC sea line of communication
SPD Strategic Planning Department
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UN United Nations
USG U.S. government

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与中国海上能源通道安全”],” Study Monthly [学习月刊], No. 1, 2012, pp. 45–46.
Zhu Hui [朱晖], ed., Strategic Air Force [战略空军论], Beijing: Blue Sky Press [蓝
天出版社], 2009.
Zong Zhaodun and Zhao Bo, “Major Reform Considered in Work on the Prices of
Our Army’s Armaments,” Liberation Army Daily, November 13, 2009.

Index
173
A
ability to achieve missions
and air domain weaknesses,
107–110
and human capital weaknesses, 61
and land domain weaknesses,
83–85
and organizational weaknesses, 60
and PLAA capabilities, 83–84
and PLAAF capabilities, 107–110
and PLANAF capabilities, 107–110
and PLASAF capabilities, 83–84
and sea domain weaknesses, 94–96
See also inability to perform
missions (Type I weakness)
active defense, 26, 30
Advance News, 6
airborne campaigns, 31–32
airborne surveillance, long-distance, 40
air capabilities, 15, 19–20. See also air
domain weaknesses
aircraft, 16
aircraft carrier capabilities, 19–20
air defense campaigns, 29, 30
air domain weaknesses, 101–114
addressing, 110–112
assessments of, 112–114
PLAAF and PLANAF force
structures, 101–105
PLAAF and PLANAF training,
105–107
and PLA’s ability to achieve
missions, 107–110
Air Force News, 6
airlift capability, 105, 111–113
air offensive campaigns, 32
anti-air raid campaigns, 34
maritime claim missions, 35
periphery missions, 32
Taiwan missions, 33
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), 93,
98–100
army-centric force, 65
assumptions of study, 139–146
ASW (antisubmarine warfare), 93,
98–100
Ayuso, Wanda, 87
B
Battle Flag News, 6
Bhutan, 31
Bi Xinglin, 4
blockade campaigns, 33, 35
bombers, 16
border missions
capabilities to conduct (through
2025), 39–40
and PLAAF/PLANAF weaknesses,
107, 109
and PLAA/PLASAF weaknesses, 84

relevant campaigns and intended
campaign effects, 28–30
Brunei, 34
budget of PLA, 47
Burma, 31
C
campaign essentials, 5
campaign outlines, 5
Campaign Theory Study Guide (Bi
Xinglin), 4
CCP. See Chinese Communist Party
Central Military Commission (CMC),
56–57, 67
PLAA, PLAAF, PLAN, and
PLASAF representation on, 51
possible addition of civilians to, 62
recent transformation of, 65
and Sichuan earthquake response,
45, 46
Central Special Committee (CSC),
128–129
C4ISR (command, control,
communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance) capabilities, 15,
116–117
China-Russia relationship, 146
China-U.S. relationship, 22–23
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
authoritative articles of, 5
civilian oversight, 144
civil-military relations, 143
party-military relations, 44, 61–62
and PLA’s support of peaceful
development, 27
political commissars, 55, 56
preservation as top priority of, 139
preserving political supremacy of,
25
civilian oversight, 46–47, 62–63,
143–144
civil-military relations, 45–46, 62, 143
Clausewitz, Carl von, 2
close air combat training, 106, 112, 113
CMC. See Central Military
Commission
Coast Guard (China), 28
combat capabilities, likely future
improvement of, 21
combat capabilities weaknesses, 69–124
air domain, 101–114
inability to carry out new historic
missions, 72
lack of modernization, 70–71
land domain, 74–87
nuclear deterrence, 119–124
sea domain, 87–101
space, cyber, and electromagnetic
domains, 114–119
and two gaps, 69–70, 72–74
and two incompatibles, 69–74
See also individual domains
command, control, communications,
computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
capabilities, 15, 116–117
command structure, 18–19, 56–58, 67
addressing weaknesses, 67
Central Military Commission,
56–57, 67
General Staff Department, 57, 58
likely future modernization of,
20–21
military regions, 57, 58, 67
compensation, 49–50, 64
Comrade-in-Arms News, 6
conventional missile attack campaigns,
33, 34
coral reef offensive campaigns, 35
core missions, 26
corruption, 18, 48–49, 63–64
and compensation, 50
in defense industry, 132
and professionalism, 60
counterlanding campaigns, 29, 30
counterspace capabilities, 20, 114–115,
118

Index 175
CSC (Central Special Committee),
128–129
cyber capabilities, 115, 117–119
cyberspace, national security interests
in, 26
cyber warfare capabilities, 17–18
D
Dai Xu, 92
defense budget(s), 47, 142–143
defense industry, 125–133
bureaucratic fragmentation in,
127–129
corruption in, 132
improving capabilities of, 125–126
lack of transparent pricing in,
131–132
monopoly structure of, 127
outdated administrative tools of,
130–131
potential impact of weaknesses, 133
weaknesses of, 126–132
defense spending, 21, 143
deterring China’s use/threat of force,
137
disaster response, 45–46. See also
humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HADR) missions
doctrine of PLA, updating of, 18
domestic problems, future PLA
modernization and, 21–22
dominance of PLA, 140–141
E
East China Sea, 34, 40–41
economic growth rate, future PLA
modernization and, 21–22
electromagnetic domain, 118
cyber and EW capabilities in, 17,
115, 118–119
weaknesses in, 115, 118–119
electronic warfare (EW) capabilities,
16, 17, 115, 118–119
equipment
inexperience in use of, 76
PLAA, 78–80, 86
PLASAF, 82
ethnic minority regions, violence/unrest
in, 22
EW capabilities. See electronic warfare
capabilities
F
fighters, 16, 20
Finkelstein, David, 18
fleet air defense weaknesses, 88–91,
96–100
force composition, 55
force development problems, 71
force structure
force composition, 55
noncommissioned officer corps, 55,
66
and personnel enablement policies
weaknesses, 53–56, 65–66
PLAAF and PLANAF, 101–105
political commissars’ role, 55–56
recruitment, retention, and veteran’s
benefits, 53–55, 66
size of PLA, 53, 65–66
future modernization (through 2025)
factors that will influence, 21–24
likely trajectory of, 19–21
G
Gabon, 36
GAD (General Armament
Department), 129–131
Gao Rui, 4
Gates, Robert, 18, 145

General Armament Department
(GAD), 129–131
General Logistics Department (GLD),
129–130
General Staff Department (GSD), 57,
58, 129
generational equipment issues
improvements in, 126
for PLAAF and PLANAF, 78–80,
103–104
generation gap, 76–77
GLD (General Logistics Department),
129–130
ground force domination, legacy of,
51–52
GSD. See General Staff Department
Gu Junshan, 48, 49, 132
Gulf of Aden, 37, 41, 91
Guo Boxiong, 45, 46, 48, 129
H
HADR missions. See humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief missions
Henley, Lonnie, 87
Hua Xiaoping, 57
Hu Jintao, 26, 46, 69, 130
human capital weaknesses, 43, 58–60
addressing, 67–68
mental and physical health, 59, 68
and PLA ability to achieve missions,
61
professionalism, 60, 68
quality of recruits, 58–59, 67–68
humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief (HADR) missions
2025), 41
PLAAF/PLANAF weaknesses, 109
PLAA/PLASAF weaknesses, 85
PLAN weaknesses, 95
campaign effects, 36
I
ideological thinking, 75
inability to perform missions (Type I
weakness)
addressing problem of, 73–74
as most severe form of weakness,
2–3
problems identified with, 72, 73
sea domain, 94–96
See also ability to achieve missions;
combat capabilities weaknesses
India
battle tanks of, 79
and periphery mission capabilities,
40
strategic rivalry with, 23
unresolved disputes with, 31
Indian Army, 30
Industry for National Defense, 126
inefficiencies in military capabilities
(Type 3 weakness), 3
human capital weaknesses, 61
organizational weaknesses, 60
sea domain, 94–96
information dominance, 17
informatization level, PLAA and,
77–78, 86
informatized wars, 70–72
internal auditing of PLA, 63
international military exchanges, 18
international perceptions of China, 27
Intimidation Warfare (Zhao Xijun), 5
Iran-Iraq Tanker War (1984-1988), 38
Iraq war, 143
J
Japan, 34, 40–41
Ji Shengde, 48

Index 177
Johnson South Reef, 34
joint blockade campaigns, 33
joint border counter attack campaigns,
29–30
joint island landing campaigns, 33
joint operations
capability for, 140
centrality of, 140
as challenge for PLASAF, 81,
86–87
K
knowledge gaps, 11, 49
Korean War, 23
Kristensen, Hans, 121
L
land domain weaknesses, 74–87
addressing, 85–86
assessments of and PLA-wide issues,
86–87
People’s Liberation Army Army,
74–80, 85
People’s Liberation Army Second
Artillery Force, 80–83, 85–86
missions, 83–85
leadership, for strategic weapons
programs, 128–129
leadership abilities, 75–76
Liberation Army Daily, 6
Libya, 36, 37
“little emperor” phenomenon, 60. See
also one-child policy
Liu Mingfu, 60
Liu Weidong, 92
logistics, 71, 72
PLAA, 80, 87
PLAN, 91–93, 98, 100
PLASAF, 82–83
M
Malaysia, 34
Mali, 36
maneuver warfare campaigns, 31
maritime claim missions
2025), 40–41
PLAAF/PLANAF weaknesses, 109
PLAN weaknesses, 95
Ma Xiaotian, 51, 104, 107, 110, 112
mental health of PLA forces, 59, 68
methodology of study, 3–7
military budget (2013), 15
military capabilities
problems identified with, 72, 73
See also inability to perform missions
(Type I weakness)
military diplomacy, 18
military education, 18, 20. See also
training
military operations other than war
(MOOTW), 21, 25, 27, 70. See also
missions of PLA
military regions, 57, 58, 67
military spending, 15
military strategic guidelines, 20
military weakness, forms of, 2–3.
See also specific forms, e.g.: combat
capabilities weaknesses
militia, 13n1
Ministry of Defense, 46–47
missile attack campaigns
conventional, 33
strategic missile force, 20
missile capabilities, 15, 16, 20
missions of PLA, 25–42
ability to achieve (see ability to
achieve missions)
border missions, 28–30, 39–40
2025), 39–42

humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief missions, 36, 41
inability to perform (see inability to
perform missions)
maritime claim missions, 34–36,
40–41
mission sets, relevant campaigns,
and intended campaign effects,
27–39
new historic missions and combat
capabilities weaknesses, 72
noncombatant evacuation
operations, 36–37, 41
periphery missions, 30–32, 40
sea line of communication missions,
37–38, 41
strategic deterrence, 38–39, 41–42
strategic objectives, 25–27
Taiwan missions, 32–34, 40
mobilization capabilities (PLAA), 80,
87
modernization levels
problems identified with, 70–72
See also combat capabilities
weaknesses
modernization of PLA, 13–24
factors that could change direction
of, 21–24
lack of, as combat capability
weakness, 70–71
likely trajectory through 2025,
19–21
nuclear forces, 142
since 1990s, 13–19
MOOTW. See military operations
other than war
mountain offensive campaigns, 31
N
nationalization, 44, 61
National People’s Congress, 62–63
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty
Organization), 24, 146
naval base defense campaigns, 29, 30
naval capabilities, 15, 19–20. See also
sea domain weaknesses
naval coastal raid campaigns
sea line of communication missions,
38
NCOs. See noncommissioned officer
corps
NEOs. See noncombatant evacuation
operations
new missions
combat capabilities and inability to
carry out, 72
core, 26–27
Ni Wenxin, 105
noncombatant evacuation operations
(NEOs)
and airlift capability, 105
2025), 41
109–110
and PLAN weaknesses, 96
noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps,
55, 66, 76
Norris, Robert, 121
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 24, 146
North Korea, 23–24, 31
North Vietnam, 23
nuclear counterstrike campaigns, 39
nuclear deterrence, 119–124
addressing shortcomings, 123–124
capabilities and weaknesses,
121–123
improvement of capabilities for, 16
PLAN’s future role in, 20
strategic and nuclear deterrence
concepts, 119–121
nuclear force modernization, 142
nuclear weapons, 121–122

Index 179
assumptions about role of, 141–142
no-first-use policy for, 38, 120
See also strategic deterrence
O
one-child policy, 60, 68, 145
operational initiative, 50
organizational culture weaknesses,
47–53, 63–65
addressing, 63–66
army-centric force, 65
compensation, 49–50, 64
corruption, 48–49, 63–64
legacy of ground force domination,
51–52
operational initiative, 50
professional worldview
development, 52–53
realistic training, 50–51, 64
organizational structure weaknesses,
44–47
addressing, 61–63
civilian oversight, 46–47, 62–63
civil-military relations, 45–46, 62
organizational weaknesses, 43–58,
60–67
command structure, 56–58, 67
force structure and personnel
enablement policies, 53–56, 65–66
and military capabilities, 72
and modernization, 71
organizational culture, 47–53,
63–65
organizational structure, 44–47,
61–63
60
P
Paracel Islands, 34
Peace Ark, 36, 41
“peace disease,” 105, 106
Peace Mission exercises, 31
peacetime mentality, 76
Peng Guangqian, 4
People’s Armed Forces, 6
People’s Armed Police, 13n1, 28
People’s Front, 6
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 13n1,
140–141. See also individual topics,
e.g.: missions of PLA
People’s Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF), 101
and 2011 NEO in Libya, 36, 37
airlift capability, 105, 111–113
capabilities for border missions, 39
close air combat training, 106, 112,
113
on CMC, 51
combat capabilities weaknesses,
83–85
conventional missile attack
campaigns, 33
dominance of, 51
force structure, 101–105
GSD management of, 58
likely future modernization, 20
modernization of, 15–16
multiple-generation aircraft, 103–
104, 110, 113
pilot instruction, 107, 112, 114
107–110
PLAA domination of, 65
“principle contradiction” for, 70
safety training, 106–107, 112, 114
special-mission aircraft, 104–105,
110–111, 113
sustained operations training, 106,
113
training, 105–107

People’s Liberation Army Army
(PLAA)
74–80, 85
as dominant PLA force, 65
ideological thinking, 75
and informatization, 77–78, 86
logistics support, 80, 87
mobilization capabilities, 80, 87
personnel problems, 75–77
missions, 83–84
training, 77
weapons and equipment shortfalls,
78–80, 86
People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN)
antipiracy patrols, 37
antisubmarine warfare, 93, 98–100
on CMC, 51
conventional missile attack
campaigns, 33
fleet air defense, 88–91, 96–98, 100
HADR missions, 41
likely future modernization, 19–20
logistics support, 91–93, 98
modernization, 15
overwatch of 2011 NEO in Libya,
36, 37
PLAA domination of, 65
potential weaknesses, 88–94
SLOC missions, 41
training, 93–94, 99–101
People’s Liberation Army Navy Air
Force (PLANAF), 101
close air combat training, 106, 112,
113
force structure, 101–105
multiple-generation aircraft, 103–
104, 110, 113
107–110
110–111, 113
sustained operations training, 106,
113
training, 105–107
People’s Liberation Army Second
Artillery Force (PLASAF), 51
80–83, 85–86
in conventional missile attack
campaigns, 33
joint operations challenges, 81,
86–87
likely future modernization, 20
logistics, 82–83
modernization, 16
missions, 83–84
training, 52, 81–82
weapons and equipment, 82
People’s Navy, 6
People’s Republic of China (PRC), 1
periphery missions
2025), 40
109
and PLAA/PLASAF weaknesses, 84
use of force against, 23
personnel enablement policies, 53–56,
65–66
personnel problems, 141
PLAA, 75–77
PLASAF, 80–81
personnel turnover, 141
Peru, 36
Philippines, 34, 35
physical health of PLA forces, 59, 68
piracy
antipiracy patrols, 37
counterpiracy missions, 93

Index 181
PLA (People’s Liberation Army), 13n1,
140–141. See also individual topics,
e.g.: missions of PLA
PLAA. See People’s Liberation Army
Army
PLAAF. See People’s Liberation Army
Air Force
PLAN. See People’s Liberation Army
Navy
PLANAF. See People’s Liberation
Army Navy Air Force
PLASAF. See People’s Liberation Army
Second Artillery Force
political commissars, 55–56
Pollpeter, Kevin, 117
positional defense campaigns, 28–30
positional offensive campaigns, 31
PRC (People’s Republic of China), 1
professionalism of PLA forces, 60, 68,
145
professional worldview, 52–53, 145
Q
quality of PLA recruits, 58–59, 67–68
R
RDA (research, development, and
acquisition) of weapons, 127, 130
realistic training, 18, 50–51, 64,
144–145
recruitment, 53–55, 66, 141
recruits, quality of, 58–59, 67–68
Republic of Vietnam, 34
research, development, and acquisition
(RDA) of weapons, 127, 130
retention of personnel, 53–55
risk of failure (Type 2 weakness), 3
organizational structure, 60
sea domain, 94–96
Rocket Force News, 6
Russia
assumed strategic orientation of, 146
battle tanks of, 79, 80
change in strategic orientation of, 24
China-Russia relationship, 146
fighters of, 110
and periphery mission capabilities,
40
Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969),
31
S
SAM (surface-to-air missile)
capabilities, 16
satellites. See space capabilities
Science of Campaigns, The (Wang
Houqing and Zhang Xingye), 4
Science of Campaigns, The (Zhang
Yuliang), 4
Science of Military Strategy, The, 4, 120
Science of Second Artillery Campaigns,
The (Yu Jixun), 5
sea-based air defense, 40
sea-based nuclear deterrence, 122
sea blockade campaigns, 35
sea domain weaknesses, 87–101
addressing, 96–100
antisubmarine warfare, 93, 98–100
assessments of, 100–101
fleet air defense, 88–91, 96–98, 100
logistics support, 91–93, 98, 100
and PLA’s ability to achieve mission,
94–96
potential PLAN weaknesses, 88–94
training, 93–94, 99–101
sea force group campaigns, 35
sea-line guarding campaigns, 38
sea line of communication (SLOC)
missions

2025), 41
110
and PLAN weaknesses, 91–92, 96
Second Thomas Shoal, 34, 35
Senkaku/Daioyu Islands, 34–35
Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
31
Shou Xiaosong, 118–119, 121, 123
Sichuan earthquake (2008), 45–46
Sino-Indian Border War (1962), 30
Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969), 31
Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 31
size of PLA, 53, 65–66
SLOC missions. See sea line of
communication missions
social instability, future PLA
modernization and, 22
Soldiers News, 6
sources
limitations of, 7–11
for studying PLA weaknesses, 3–7
South China Sea, 34, 40, 109
space, national security interests in, 26
space capabilities, 15, 114–115
improvement in, 17
likely future modernization of, 20
weaknesses in, 114–119
SPD (Strategic Planning Department),
129–130
110–111, 113
Spratly Islands, 34
State Administration for Science,
Technology, and Industry for
National Defense, 126
State Oceanic Administration, 28
strategic deterrence, 141
2025), 41–42
China’s concept of, 38, 119–120
strategic missile force, 20
strategic objectives of PLA, 25–27
Strategic Planning department (SPD),
129–130
submarine fleet, 15, 19
surface ships, 15
surface-to-air missile (SAM)
capabilities, 16
sustained flight operations, 106, 113
T
Taiwan
deterring moves toward
independence by, 26
and joint-island landing campaign,
34
and One-China Principle, 32
potential peaceful unification with,
24
and South China Sea claims, 34
Taiwan missions, 24
2025), 40
109
and PLAA/PLASAF weaknesses,
84–85
and PLAN weaknesses, 94–95
technological surprises
assumption about, 146
and likely future improvement of
PLA, 24
terrorist attacks, future PLA
modernization and, 22
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996),
32
Tian Xiusi, 107
Tibet
containing separatist forces in, 26
invasion/annexation of (1950-1951),
31

Index 183
violence in, 22
traditional core missions, 26
training
increasing realism and complexity
of, 18
likely future modernization of, 20
and military capabilities, 72
and modernization level, 71
PLAA, 77, 85
PLAAF and PLANAF, 105–107
PLAN, 93–94, 99–101
PLASAF, 52, 81–82, 85
realistic, 18, 50–51, 64, 144–145
two gaps, 69–70, 72–74, 135–136. See
also Combat capabilities weaknesses
two incompatibles, 19, 69–74,
135–136
military capabilities, 72
modernization levels, 70–71
problems identified with, 70–72
See also Combat capabilities
weaknesses
Type 1 weakness. See inability to
perform missions
Type 2 weaknesses. See risk of failure
Type 3 weaknesses. See inefficiencies in
military capabilities
U
United Nations peacekeeping
operations (UN PKOs), 36
United States, 14–15, 18, 22–23
and China’s leverage over Taiwan,
40
and cyber/EW capabilities, 115
fighters of, 110
implications of PLA’s capabilities/
weaknesses for, 135–138
and maritime claim missions,
40–41
strategic weapons programs of, 129
tension between Russia and, 24,
146
U.S.-China relations and future
PLA modernization, 22–23
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 16
UN PKOs (United Nations
peacekeeping operations), 36
urban assault campaigns, 31
urban defense campaigns, 29, 30
V
Vanguard News, 6
veterans’ benefits, 53–55
Vietnam, 34, 79–80
Vietnam War, 23
W
Wang Houqing, 4
weaknesses of PLA, 1–11
defining, 2–3
implications of, 135–138
source limitations and knowledge
gaps, 7–11
sources and methodology for
studying, 3–7
understanding, 1–2
See also individual weaknesses
weapons
PLAA, 78–80, 85–86
PLASAF, 82, 85–86
RDA management system, 127, 130
See also defense industry; nuclear
deterrence
Wen Jaibao, 45, 46
Willard, Robert, 145
Wu Hui, 93
Wu Shengli, 70

X
Xi Jinping, 6, 7, 20, 46, 61, 63, 67, 132
Xinjiang, 22, 26
Xu Caihou, 48, 63
Xu Qiliang, 51, 71, 72, 132
Y
Yao Youzhi, 4
Yin Zhuo, 92
Yu Jixun, 5
Z
Zhang Dan, 93
Zhang Xingye, 4
Zhang Youxia, 127
Zhang Yuliang, 4
Zhao Xijun, 5, 121
Zhou Yunxiang, 92

NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION
www.rand.org
RR-893-USCC
9 7 8 0 8 3 3 0 8 8 3 0 7
ISBN-13 978-0-8330-8830-7
ISBN-10 0-8330-8830-0
52950
$29.50
Through extensive primary source analysis and independent analysis, this
report seeks to answer a number of important questions regarding the state
of China’s armed forces. What have been the overall scope and scale of People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) modernization since the mid-1990s, and what is its likely
trajectory through 2025? What are the missions Beijing has assigned to the PLA?
What are the weaknesses in the PLA’s organization and human capital? What
are the weaknesses in the PLA’s combat capabilities in the land, air, maritime,
space, and electromagnetic domains? What are the weaknesses in China’s
defense industry (research and development and production)? The authors found
that the PLA is keenly aware of its many weaknesses and is vigorously striving
to correct them. Chinese military publications recognize that this is a tall order.
Indeed, the PLA leaders and ofﬁcial media frequently state that the force seeks
to harness the capabilities of the information age to conduct complex joint
operations, even though it is not yet fully mechanized or structured to command
and control the campaigns it aspires to conduct. Although it is only natural to
focus on the PLA’s growing capabilities, the authors found that understanding
the PLA’s weaknesses—and its self-assessments of the shortcomings—is no less
important. Doing so can help provide a sense of the PLA’s priorities for future
modernization efforts, support U.S. military engagement with the PLA, and inform
the development of strategies to deter or defeat Chinese coercion or use of force.

China's Incomplete Military Transformation

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