CHINA'S ROLE IN MYANMAR'S INTERNAL CONFLICTS

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China’s Role in Myanmar’s
Internal Con icts
Friday, September 14, 2018 / BY: USIP China Myanmar Senior Study Group
PUBLICATION TYPE: Report
This report is the rst in the Senior Study Groups (SSGs) series that
USIP is convening to examine China's in uence on con ict dynamics
around the world. A group of thirteen experts met from February to
June 2018 to assess China’s involvement in Myanmar’s internal
con icts, particularly those in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states, as
well as China’s impact on Myanmar’s overall peace process. This
report draws in part on previous research commissioned and
published by USIP, including China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,
by Yun Sun; Understanding China’s Response to the Rakhine Crisis,
by Adrienne Joy; Burma’s Northern Shan State and Prospects for
Peace, by David Scott Mathieson; and Reframing the Crisis in
Myanmar’s Rakhine State, by Gabrielle Aron. Unless otherwise
sourced, all observations and conclusions are those of SSG
members or of expert guests at SSG meetings.
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Since gaining its independence from British colonial rule in 1948,
Myanmar (also known as Burma) has faced ethnic division and con ict.
For decades, an array of ethnic political movements and their armed
wings have sought political, economic, cultural, and social rights as
protection against domination by (majority) Burman authorities, even as
the Myanmar military (the Tatmadaw) has asserted that its mission is to
ensure the country’s sovereign independence, territorial integrity, and
unity. Majority-minority ethnic relations and the distribution of power and
resources have been the most serious problems since independence.
Achieving mutual trust and a system of governance agreeable to all of
Myanmar’s diverse peoples are the country’s de ning challenges.
In northern Myanmar near the Chinese border, ghting between the
Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups has increased despite e orts to
advance a comprehensive peace process that gained momentum under
the Thein Sein government beginning in 2011. A Nationwide Cease re
Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight groups in October 2015, but
most of the larger groups abstained, including those along Myanmar’s
border with China. Under the National League for Democracy (NLD), led
by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, progress has been slow: the
peace process has stalled, con dence in it has fallen, and violence has
increased, particularly in Kachin and northern Shan states along the
Chinese border. Divisions between NCA signatories and nonsignatories
have grown, the divide roughly corresponding to whether a group is
Executive Summary Search

located on the India or Thai border (signatories) or China border
(nonsignatories). Several nonsignatory groups formed the Northern
Alliance to strengthen their military and political power.
Driven by security concerns, economic interests, and a desire for
political in uence in a country with which it shares a 1,500-mile border,
China is playing a key role in Myanmar’s internal security and peace
process. Armed clashes between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed
groups along the Myanmar-China border occasionally spill into China.
The Chinese province of Yunnan has sheltered tens of thousands of
refugees during periods of intense ghting in Myanmar. In 2013, China
designated a special envoy, selected from among its most seasoned
diplomats, to serve as lead point of contact and formal observer to
Myanmar’s peace talks. This envoy, who changed in 2015, remains an
important player in facilitating talks between the ethnic armed
organizations (EAOs) and the Myanmar government.
China has also come to the defense of the Myanmar government over
the crisis in Rakhine State to the west, where the Tatmadaw has carried
out a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing, if not genocide, against the
mostly Muslim Rohingya population. China has protected Myanmar from
sanctions at the United Nations and has o ered rhetorical and material
support for its handling of the so-called terrorist attacks. Furthermore,
China has extensive economic interests in Rakhine, including a major
port at Kyaukphyu, a planned special economic zone (SEZ), and a road,
rail, and pipeline network to move energy and other materials and
supplies from the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar to Yunnan Province.
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For its part, the United States has long supported Myanmar’s reform
process but has had a limited role in the peace process. This is in part—
though by no means entirely—due to China’s explicit opposition to US
engagement, particularly in areas along the Chinese border, and
general concern about US in uence in Myanmar. Myanmar will serve as
the ultimate arbiter of any US involvement in its a airs. Nonetheless,
assessing China’s role in and perspectives toward Myanmar’s internal
con icts may o er important insights into overall con ict dynamics
inside the country and help inform potential US peace-support policies
going forward.
China has set aside its stated adherence to the principle of
noninterference to become more proactively and assertively involved
in Myanmar’s peace process. It has made e orts to be directly involved
in the primary con ict issues Myanmar faces and has sought to shape
the decisions and choices of Myanmar’s various players. It has o ered
itself as a mediator in the con ict and pressured nonsignatory groups
along its border to attend successive Union-level dialogues in
Naypyidaw. As indicated, it has sought to limit the involvement of third
countries (including the United States) in the peace process, despite the
desire of several Myanmar groups for broader international
engagement. In response to the Rohingya crisis, China has proposed
principles and a process for resolution, and o ered, unsuccessfully, to
mediate between Myanmar and Bangladesh to resolve their disputes.
Observations
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Myanmar considers China’s engagement to be constructive overall.
Both government-a liated and uno cial interlocutors, including those
from ethnic groups, commented that China’s involvement in peace has
not been unduly obstructive or harmful to the process to date. They
note that Myanmar’s government has alternately resisted and welcomed
China’s involvement as long as China helps promote Naypyidaw’s goals.
Ethnic groups have responded similarly, although those along the
border have few options but to accede to Chinese pressure.
Myanmar harbors questions about China’s ultimate motives, however.
Myanmar observers have remarked that China ultimately bene ts from
neither hot war nor complete peace. Beijing seeks a reduction of
ghting along its border to safeguard stability, maintain cross-border
economic ties, and mitigate refugee ows. Cessation of ghting more
broadly, including in Rakhine State, allows for its investments to proceed
unobstructed, including strategic infrastructure projects linking Myanmar
—and the Indian Ocean—to China under its Belt and Road Initiative and
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
At the same time, genuine peace risks China’s strategic position in the
country. Continued friction between central authorities and border
populations provides Beijing a major source of in uence over
Naypyidaw. That leverage may be used, among other things, to prevent
“unwelcome” in uence of the United States in the country and thus the
region. Genuine sustained peace also would weaken China’s in uence
over ethnic nationalities, particularly along the border. That includes the
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Wa people, who speak Chinese, trade in Chinese currency, and receive
substantial support from China to maintain the thirty-thousand-person
Wa army and political autonomy. Because China does not expect that
real peace is possible for the foreseeable future, it calculates little cost
to its generally constructive, if interested, role in Myanmar’s peace
process.
China has demonstrated little interest in coordinating peace-support
e orts with others. Successive Myanmar governments have sought to
ensure the international community is coordinated in its support of the
peace process. Ethnic groups have likewise sought united support for
the goal of peace with justice. Although many mechanisms have been
established to ensure such coordination, China has been notably absent
from them. Beijing worked side by side with the United Nations as an
o cial observer of the process under the Thein Sein government, but
since 2012 has continued to operate independently—and opaquely—to
help Myanmar address its internal challenges.
The Rohingya crisis has provided China an opportunity to reestablish
its primacy among Myanmar’s foreign relationships, attract popular
support in Myanmar, and assert its leadership in regional a airs. As
Naypyidaw’s handling of the Rohingya crisis has strained its relations
with the United States and other Western countries, China has bu ered
Myanmar from international pressure and taken steps to protect
Myanmar from criticism and punitive actions in the United Nations
Security Council. Beijing seeks to use its pro-government position on
the Rohingya issue to win Naypyidaw’s support for China’s political and
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economic interests throughout the country, including development of
the Kyaukphyu port and SEZ in Rakhine State.
Private actors within China and outside o cial control also contribute
to con ict, including illicit cross-border trade and mercenary services.
Largely illicit Chinese entities that tra c in Myanmar’s natural resources
often act in concert with corrupt o cials in the Myanmar government,
military, and EAOs to fuel con ict in Kachin and Shan states. As a result,
Chinese business actors provide revenue to con ict actors on both
sides and help sustain Myanmar’s civil war. Chinese citizens, including
retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers, have reportedly sold
their services as mercenaries for EAOs. There is no indication that
o cials in Beijing support, let alone sponsor, such activity.
China has strengthened central direction over Myanmar policy in the
past decade, ensuring improved coordination and control of the
diplomatic, military, and economic aspects of its relationship with
Myanmar. In the past, Yunnan actors have tried to exploit vague central
government directives on cross-border activity. However, Beijing has put
Yunnan provincial authorities on a tighter leash, largely in response to
crises along the border. It has also reduced the space previously
accorded Yunnan’s provincial leadership in the Sino-Burmese
relationship.
Even as Beijing strengthens ties with Myanmar’s government and
military, a number of domestic factors will continue to constrain
Chinese in uence in the country. Myanmar, like other countries in
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Southeast Asia, seeks to avoid overreliance on any single country and
to maintain a balance of power among large countries to enable it to
maximize its leverage and defend against undue external in uence in its
a airs. Myanmar particularly worries about Chinese in uence because
of China’s size, power, and proximity, as well as the way China’s
economic development projects have been carried out without due
consideration for the well-being of Myanmar’s population and ecology.
At the same time, Myanmar admires China’s rapid economic
development, wants to bene t from Chinese trade and investment, and
recognizes that geography is destiny and thus Myanmar must maintain
a constructive relationship with its neighbor to secure its own long-term
stability and development.
The United States should continue to support the complete and timely
implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on
Rakhine State (the “Annan Commission”) report in 2017. Among other
things, the report’s recommendations called for citizenship veri cation,
freedom of movement, and access to livelihoods for the Rohingya, and
socioeconomic border security and socioeconomic development more
broadly in Rakhine State. In the process, the US government should
consider ways to both apply pressure and appropriately engage the
Myanmar military in a way that empowers democratic institutions in
Myanmar, moves toward resolution of the Rakhine crisis, and continues
the progress of reform inside the country.
Recommendations
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The US government should seek more open dialogue with Beijing about
respective peace-support activities to avoid attitudes that could
complicate an already di cult peace process and resolution of the
Rakhine crisis.
At the same time, the United States should encourage China to support
implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission,
and to participate in broader international aid coordination initiatives
related to the peace process and Rakhine State to maximize e ciency
and improve e ectiveness. That would require China to avoid viewing
the United States and other nations’ engagement in Myanmar in zero-
sum terms.
The US government should also encourage Beijing to be more
transparent about its peace strategy and engagement with various
players, including ethnic armed organizations along its border. In the
process, China should avoid any actions or policies that obstruct or
inhibit furtherance of peace inside Myanmar due to narrow
consideration of its own national interests.
Finally, The US government should encourage Beijing to develop a
framework for responsible investment in Myanmar’s con ict areas that
takes into account the concerns of local communities and minimizes the
potential to fuel con ict.
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China’s Role in Myanmar’s
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USIP SENIOR STUDY GROUP FINAL REPORT

USIP Senior Study Group Report
Cover illustration by meyrass/iStock.
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of
the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website
(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.
© 2018 by the United States Institute of Peace
United States Institute of Peace
2301 Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037
Phone: 202.457.1700
Fax: 202.429.6063
E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org
Web: www.usip.org
First published September 2018.
ISBN: 978-1-60127-735-0
This report is the first in the Senior Study Groups (SSGs) series that USIP is convening to examine
China's influence on conflict dynamics around the world. A group of thirteen experts met from
February to June 2018 to assess China’s involvement in Myanmar’s internal conflicts, particularly
those in Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states, as well as China’s impact on Myanmar’s overall peace
process. This report draws in part on previous research commissioned and published by USIP,
including China and Myanmar’s Peace Process, by Yun Sun; Understanding China’s Response to
the Rakhine Crisis, by Adrienne Joy; Burma’s Northern Shan State and Prospects for Peace, by
David Scott Mathieson; and Reframing the Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, by Gabrielle Aron.
Unless otherwise sourced, all observations and conclusions are those of SSG members or of
expert guests at SSG meetings.
SEPTEMBER 2018 | No. 1

1China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts
CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
China’s Interests in Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Nationwide Peace Process and Conflict in Kachin and Shan States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The Rohingya Crisis and Conflict in Rakhine State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
U S I P S E N I O R S T U D Y G R O U P F I N A L R E P O R T
China’s Role in
Myanmar’s
Internal Conflicts

2 USIP Senior Study Group Final Report
Preface
As China becomes more assertive internationally, it
increasingly projects its economic and strategic influ-
ence across its periphery and beyond. Through such projects
as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s reach is global and
touching nations on every continent at every stage of national
development. In the process, it has begun to confront, if not
navigate, conflict-laden conditions in fragile countries world-
wide.
Myanmar, also known as Burma, is one of those states. China
has long had a complex relationship with this nation along its
southwest border. At the crossroads of South and East Asia,
its extensive coastline stretching along the Bay of Bengal,
Myanmar offers China an outlet to the Indian Ocean and access
to strategic and potentially lucrative new trade routes. Massively
underdeveloped, Myanmar presents boundless opportunities
for Chinese economic development and infrastructure projects,
as well as the potential projection of Chinese strategic influence
into the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean.
Myanmar’s long-standing internal conflicts, however, have
obstructed development and dangerously destabilized the
region. The Rohingya crisis in Rakhine State has produced
some one million refugees who have fled into Bangladesh,
China has begun
to confront, if not
navigate, conflict-
laden conditions
in fragile countries
worldwide. Myanmar
is one of those states.


AA Arakan Army
ABSDF All Burma Students’
Democratic Front
ALP Arakan Liberation Party
ARSA Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
BCP Burma Communist Party
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CNF Chin National Front
DKBA Democratic Karen Benevolent Army
EAO Ethnic armed organizations
FPNCC Federal Political Negotiation
and Consultative Committee
Kachin Independence Army/
Organization
KNU Karen National Union
KPC Karen National Liberation Army–
Peace Council
LDU Lahu Democratic Union
Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army
NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement
NDAA Shan State East National
Democratic Alliance Association
NLD National League for Democracy
NMSP New Mon State Party
PLA(N) People’s Liberation Army (Navy)
PNLO Pa-O National Liberation Organization
RCSS Restoration Council of Shan State
SSA Shan State Army—North
TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army
UWSA United Wa State Army
REPORT ABBREVIATIONS
leading to charges of ethnic cleansing against Myanmar security forces. Fighting between the Myanmar
military and armed ethnic groups—heightened by systemic violence, injustice, and inequality—continues,
fueled by illicit resource trade and human trafficking, both of which flourish in areas where governance
and security are weak. Such activity has flared in recent years, particularly in the north of the country and
especially along the Myanmar-China border.
As a result, China has become a central external player in both Myanmar’s peace process and internal
affairs in general. How Beijing—and neighboring Yunnan Province—engages Myanmar will have substan-
tial impact on the ongoing transition there, and thus on long-standing US interests in a stable, secure,
peaceful, just, and democratic Myanmar able to maintain its sovereign independence.
That, in short, is the reason for this study—the first in a series on China to be conducted by USIP. Myan-
mar’s location makes the country a unique case, particularly in regard to US-China cooperation. It is well
known that China harbors a singular sensitivity to Western activity along its extensive border. We believe
this study offers a window into themes of Chinese foreign policy and national interest globally. We further
believe it essential to not ignore the potential impact of great power cooperation—or competition—on
Myanmar’s pursuit of peace, the achievement of which will reverberate positively throughout Asia.
Any consideration of supporting peace in Myanmar, however, must have the approval and support of
Myanmar’s people. It is in their hands that the promise of peace, justice, and democracy lie. We offer this
report as a contribution to them and to their dreams of peace.
Derek Mitchell
President, National Democratic Institute
Daniel Twining
President, International Republican Institute
MNDAA
KIA/KIO

Since gaining its independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Myanmar (also known as
Burma) has faced ethnic division and conflict.1
For decades, an array of ethnic political
movements and their armed wings have sought political, economic, cultural, and social rights
as protection against domination by (majority) Burman authorities, even as the Myanmar mili-
tary (the Tatmadaw) has asserted that its mission is to ensure the country’s sovereign indepen-
dence, territorial integrity, and unity. Majority-minority ethnic relations and the distribution of
power and resources have been the most serious problems since independence. Achieving
mutual trust and a system of governance agreeable to all of Myanmar’s diverse peoples are
the country’s defining challenges.
In northern Myanmar near the Chinese border, fighting between the Tatmadaw and ethnic
armed groups has increased despite efforts to advance a comprehensive peace process that
gained momentum under the Thein Sein government beginning in 2011. A Nationwide Cease-
fire Agreement (NCA) was signed by eight groups in October 2015, but most of the larger
groups abstained, including those along Myanmar’s border with China. Under the National
League for Democracy (NLD), led by State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi, progress has been
slow: the peace process has stalled, confidence in it has fallen, and violence has increased,
particularly in Kachin and northern Shan states along the Chinese border. Divisions between
NCA signatories and nonsignatories have grown, the divide roughly corresponding to whether
a group is located on the India or Thai border (signatories) or China border (nonsignatories).
Several nonsignatory groups formed the Northern Alliance to strengthen their military and
political power.
Executive
Summary

Driven by security concerns, economic interests, and a desire for political influence in a country with
which it shares a 1,500-mile border, China is playing a key role in Myanmar’s internal security and
peace process. Armed clashes between Myanmar’s military and ethnic armed groups along the Myan-
mar-China border occasionally spill into China. The Chinese province of Yunnan has sheltered tens
of thousands of refugees during periods of intense fighting in Myanmar. In 2013, China designated a
special envoy, selected from among its most seasoned diplomats, to serve as lead point of contact and
formal observer to Myanmar’s peace talks. This envoy, who changed in 2015, remains an important
player in facilitating talks between the ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the Myanmar government.
China has also come to the defense of the Myanmar government over the crisis in Rakhine State to
the west, where the Tatmadaw has carried out a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing, if not genocide,
against the mostly Muslim Rohingya population. China has protected Myanmar from sanctions at the
United Nations and has offered rhetorical and material support for its handling of the so-called terrorist
attacks.2
Furthermore, China has extensive economic interests in Rakhine, including a major port at
Kyaukphyu, a planned special economic zone (SEZ), and a road, rail, and pipeline network to move
energy and other materials and supplies from the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar to Yunnan Province.
The Myanmar military's commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing (front left), State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi (front center), and government and ethnic
leaders pose for a photo after the opening ceremony of the 21st Century Panglong conference in Naypyidaw, August 31, 2016. (Photo by Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)

CHINA
LAOS
THAILAND
INDIA
MYANMAR
VIET
N
AM
KAYAH
STATE
AYEYARWADY
REGION
BAGO
REGION
CHIN
STATE
SHAN STATE
YUNNAN
PROVINCE
SAGAING
REGION
YANGON
REGION
KAREN
STATE
MON
STATE
RAKHINE
STATE
MANDALAY
REGION
KACHIN
STATE
MAGWAY
REGION
Irawaddy
River
Mekong
River
Yangtze
River
Naypyidaw
Yangon
Kunming
LUCIDITY INFORMATION DESIGN, LLC
0 60 MILES
0 60 KILOMETERS
Map 1. Myanmar’s Border with China

For its part, the United States has long supported Myanmar’s reform process but has had a limited
role in the peace process. This is in part—though by no means entirely—due to China’s explicit
opposition to US engagement, particularly in areas along the Chinese border, and general concern
about US influence in Myanmar. Myanmar will serve as the ultimate arbiter of any US involvement
in its affairs. Nonetheless, assessing China’s role in and perspectives toward Myanmar’s internal
conflicts may offer important insights into overall conflict dynamics inside the country and help
inform potential US peace-support policies going forward.
Observations
China has set aside its stated adherence to the principle of noninterference to become more
proactively and assertively involved in Myanmar’s peace process. It has made efforts to be
directly involved in the primary conflict issues Myanmar faces and has sought to shape the deci-
sions and choices of Myanmar’s various players. It has offered itself as a mediator in the conflict
and pressured nonsignatory groups along its border to attend successive Union-level dialogues
in Naypyidaw. As indicated, it has sought to limit the involvement of third countries (including the
United States) in the peace process, despite the desire of several Myanmar groups for broader
international engagement. In response to the Rohingya crisis, China has proposed principles and a
process for resolution, and offered, unsuccessfully, to mediate between Myanmar and Bangladesh
to resolve their disputes.
Myanmar considers China’s engagement to be constructive overall. Both government-affiliated
and unofficial interlocutors, including those from ethnic groups, commented that China’s involve-
ment in peace has not been unduly obstructive or harmful to the process to date. They note that
Myanmar’s government has alternately resisted and welcomed China’s involvement as long as
China helps promote Naypyidaw’s goals. Ethnic groups have responded similarly, although those
along the border have few options but to accede to Chinese pressure.
Myanmar harbors questions about China’s ultimate motives, however. Myanmar observers have
remarked that China ultimately benefits from neither hot war nor complete peace. Beijing seeks a
reduction of fighting along its border to safeguard stability, maintain cross-border economic ties, and
mitigate refugee flows. Cessation of fighting more broadly, including in Rakhine State, allows for its
investments to proceed unobstructed, including strategic infrastructure projects linking Myanmar—and
the Indian Ocean—to China under its Belt and Road Initiative and China-Myanmar Economic Corridor.
At the same time, genuine peace risks China’s strategic position in the country. Continued
friction between central authorities and border populations provides Beijing a major source of
influence over Naypyidaw. That leverage may be used, among other things, to prevent “unwel-
come” influence of the United States in the country and thus the region. Genuine sustained peace
also would weaken China’s influence over ethnic nationalities, particularly along the border. That
includes the Wa people, who speak Chinese, trade in Chinese currency, and receive substantial

support from China to maintain the thirty-thousand-person
Wa army and political autonomy. Because China does not
expect that real peace is possible for the foreseeable future,
it calculates little cost to its generally constructive, if inter-
ested, role in Myanmar’s peace process.
China has demonstrated little interest in coordinating
peace-support efforts with others. Successive Myanmar
governments have sought to ensure the international
community is coordinated in its support of the peace
process. Ethnic groups have likewise sought united support
for the goal of peace with justice. Although many mecha-
nisms have been established to ensure such coordination,
China has been notably absent from them. Beijing worked
side by side with the United Nations as an official observer
of the process under the Thein Sein government, but
since 2012 has continued to operate independently—and
opaquely—to help Myanmar address its internal challenges.
The Rohingya crisis has provided China an opportunity to reestablish its primacy among Myan-
mar’s foreign relationships, attract popular support in Myanmar, and assert its leadership in
regional affairs. As Naypyidaw’s handling of the Rohingya crisis has strained its relations with the
United States and other Western countries, China has buffered Myanmar from international pres-
sure and taken steps to protect Myanmar from criticism and punitive actions in the United Nations
Security Council. Beijing seeks to use its pro-government position on the Rohingya issue to win
Naypyidaw’s support for China’s political and economic interests throughout the country, including
development of the Kyaukphyu port and SEZ in Rakhine State.
Private actors within China and outside official control also contribute to conflict, including illicit
cross-border trade and mercenary services. Largely illicit Chinese entities that traffic in Myanmar’s
natural resources often act in concert with corrupt officials in the Myanmar government, military, and
EAOs to fuel conflict in Kachin and Shan states. As a result, Chinese business actors provide revenue
to conflict actors on both sides and help sustain Myanmar’s civil war. Chinese citizens, including
retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers, have reportedly sold their services as mercenaries for
EAOs. There is no indication that officials in Beijing support, let alone sponsor, such activity.
China has strengthened central direction over Myanmar policy in the past decade, ensuring
improved coordination and control of the diplomatic, military, and economic aspects of its
relationship with Myanmar. In the past, Yunnan actors have tried to exploit vague central govern-
ment directives on cross-border activity. However, Beijing has put Yunnan provincial authorities on
a tighter leash, largely in response to crises along the border. It has also reduced the space previ-
ously accorded Yunnan’s provincial leadership in the Sino-Burmese relationship.
The Rohingya
crisis has provided
China an opportunity
to reestablish its
primacy among
Myanmar’s foreign
relationships, attract
popular support in
Myanmar, and assert
its leadership in
regional affairs.

Even as Beijing strengthens ties with Myanmar’s government and military, a number of domestic
factors will continue to constrain Chinese influence in the country. Myanmar, like other countries
in Southeast Asia, seeks to avoid overreliance on any single country and to maintain a balance
of power among large countries to enable it to maximize its leverage and defend against undue
external influence in its affairs. Myanmar particularly worries about Chinese influence because of
China’s size, power, and proximity, as well as the way China’s economic development projects
have been carried out without due consideration for the well-being of Myanmar’s population and
ecology. At the same time, Myanmar admires China’s rapid economic development, wants to
benefit from Chinese trade and investment, and recognizes that geography is destiny and thus
Myanmar must maintain a constructive relationship with its neighbor to secure its own long-term
stability and development.
Recommendations
The United States should continue to support the complete and timely implementation of the
recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State (the “Annan Commission”) report in
2017. Among other things, the report’s recommendations called for citizenship verification, freedom
of movement, and access to livelihoods for the Rohingya, and socioeconomic border security and
socioeconomic development more broadly in Rakhine State.3
In the process, the US government
should consider ways to both apply pressure and appropriately engage the Myanmar military in a
way that empowers democratic institutions in Myanmar, moves toward resolution of the Rakhine
crisis, and continues the progress of reform inside the country.
The US government should seek more open dialogue with Beijing about respective peace-support
activities to avoid attitudes that could complicate an already difficult peace process and resolution
of the Rakhine crisis.
At the same time, the United States should encourage China to support implementation of the
recommendations of the Advisory Commission, and to participate in broader international aid
coordination initiatives related to the peace process and Rakhine State to maximize efficiency and
improve effectiveness. That would require China to avoid viewing the United States and other
nations’ engagement in Myanmar in zero-sum terms.
The US government should also encourage Beijing to be more transparent about its peace strategy
and engagement with various players, including ethnic armed organizations along its border. In the
process, China should avoid any actions or policies that obstruct or inhibit furtherance of peace
inside Myanmar due to narrow consideration of its own national interests.
Finally, The US government should encourage Beijing to develop a framework for responsible
investment in Myanmar’s conflict areas that takes into account the concerns of local communities
and minimizes the potential to fuel conflict.

Myanmar’s approach to China reflects its historical suspicion of big powers and its desire to
fiercely protect its national sovereignty. Its geographic location between India and China
and its experience over the centuries of foreign invasion, colonization, and political pressure from
various countries have made Burmese leaders wary of foreign intentions and fearful of their coun-
try’s becoming a pawn of foreign powers.
Sharing a 1,500-mile land border, China and Burma have been inextricably linked for centuries
through politics, war, bloodlines, and commerce. From the Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty in the late
thirteenth century through the Qing dynasty in the 1760s, China repeatedly attempted to conquer
Burma, yet geographical obstacles such as mountain ranges and rivers proved unsuitable for large-
scale military action.4
The two sides signed a peace treaty in 1769, and Burma had loose tributary
ties to China until the British colonized it in 1885.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China and Burma increased contact via border-
land horse caravans, rebels, and refugees that moved between Yunnan and northern Burma as
a result of ongoing wars in China and expanded bilateral trade.5
Chinese immigration to Burma
increased during the colonial period, as it did in many Southeast Asian states. As a result, many of
the same ethnic groups in Burma also are in China, and the border creates opportunities for smug-
gling, illegal activities, and investment that strongly affect Sino-Burmese relations today.
During World War II, the Republic of China allied itself with the United States, the United Kingdom, and
other allied powers, dispatching an expeditionary force into Burma to aid the British troops against
the invading Japanese forces. The China-Burma-India theater became the Achilles’ heel of Japan’s
occupation of mainland China. This large Chinese military presence during World War II, followed by
Historical
Overview

the retreat of the Chinese Nationalist, or Kuomintang, forces into Burma after losing the Chinese Civil
War in 1949, complicated relations between Burma and China. In the early 1950s, Burma suspended a
US economic aid program for several years over CIA aid to the remnant Kuomintang forces.6
The decolonization of the British Raj after World War II gave birth to the independent nations of India
and Pakistan in 1947 and Burma in 1948.7
The delineation of the borders between these new(ly iden-
tified) nations created tensions that are still unresolved. The most pressing concern for Burma is that
the lines drawn in 1947 and 1948 meant that hundreds of thousands of Bengali-speaking Muslims,
later known as Rohingya, remained in Rakhine, and that communities with similar demographics
found themselves citizens of East Pakistan, which in 1971 became independent Bangladesh.8
Postcolonial Burma was among the first noncommunist countries to recognize the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) following its establishment in October 1949. Burma and China established
official diplomatic relations in 1950, and the Yangon government coined the term pauk phaw to
describe the friendly (fraternal) relationship between the two countries.9
In 1960, Burma and China
peacefully demarcated the colonial border that previous Chinese governments had refused to
A sign on a bridge on the China-Myanmar border warns people not to cross, January 2009. (Photo by Ben Blanchard/Reuters)

recognize, both sides ceding some territory to the other.
China agreed to this in part to demonstrate internationally
that it was not an aggressive state.10
The expulsion of Chinese communities from Burma in the
early 1960s under General Ne Win and the anti-Chinese riots
in 1967 during the early stage of Mao’s Cultural Revolution
generated hostility in both countries.11
In the aftermath of
the riots, Beijing severed bilateral ties and began overtly
supporting the armed struggle of the Burma Communist
Party (BCP) against the Burma government; it viewed party-
to-party relations as different from state-to-state relations.12
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provided financial,
military, and personnel support for the BCP to help it estab-
lish a “liberated area” of more than twenty thousand square
kilometers along the shared border in Shan State.13
China’s active support for the BCP is just one example of China’s support for similar communist
party-led insurgencies in virtually every Southeast Asian country.14
After Deng Xiaoping came back
to power in 1978, he severed all these ties—except the CCP’s relationship with the BCP. In 1989,
China finally ceased its assistance to the BCP, leading to the latter’s collapse, but has maintained
relationships with former BCP splinter groups. Chinese support for the BCP is not forgotten within
today’s Tatmadaw, many of whose senior leaders fought the BCP insurgency and their Chinese
allies in their youth.
Nevertheless, in the 1990s, China-Myanmar relations improved. Nearly two-thirds of the Myanmar
army, navy, and air force personnel sent abroad for training between 1990 and 1999 received
training in China.15
In return, the Tatmadaw offered China access to natural resources in Myanmar’s
remote areas, especially Kachin State, and Myanmar’s generals profited from Chinese investments.
China was interested in opening the border for trade and extracting natural resources to fuel its
own economic development, particularly in southwestern Yunnan Province.
China’s relations with Myanmar also improved following their respective crackdowns on polit-
ical reform movements in the late 1980s that resulted in the international isolation of both. China
supplied Myanmar with military assistance that was no longer available from Western countries
and pursued broad military cooperation with the military government. Since the late 1980s, China
has been a major supplier of military hardware to Myanmar, providing more than 90 percent of its
military transport.16
China’s military sales also include anti-ship cruise missiles, targeting radar, naval
guns, and corvettes.17
Myanmar bought $1.4 billion in arms from China between 2000 and 2016,
approximately $1 billion since 2011, when Thein Sein became president.18
China also used its perma-
nent seat in the United Nations Security Council to shield Myanmar from international condemna-
tion and sanctions in the 1990s through the 2000s.
In the 1990s through
the 2000s, China used
its permanent seat in
the United Nations
Security Council
to shield Myanmar
from international
condemnation
and sanctions.

Figure 1. Timeline of Contemporary China-Myanmar Relations
1950
The People’s
Republic of China
and an independent
Burma establish
diplomatic relations.
1960
China and Burma
settle their border
dispute.
1967
Anti-Chinese riots
in Burma lead to
severed bilateral
ties and China’s
overt support for the
Burma Communist
Party’s armed
struggle against the
government.
1971
China and Burma
renormalize relations.
1989
China ends support
and assistance to the
BCP, leading to the
latter’s collapse.
2007
China vetoes a
draft United Nations
Security Council
resolution calling for
the Myanmar military
to halt attacks on
civilians in ethnic
minority regions.
2009
Thein Sein’s
government and
China agree to
construct oil and gas
pipelines connecting
Kyaukphyu port
to Kunming and
develop the Myitsone
Dam in Kachin State.
2011
Thein Sein’s
government
suspends the
controversial
Myitsone Dam
project after
widespread protests.
2013
China hosts talks
between the Kachin
Independence
Organization and the
Myanmar government
in Yunnan, marking
Beijing’s first formal
role in the peace
process.
2015
JUNE: Aung San Suu
Kyi makes first visit
to China as leader of
the National League
for Democracy and
meets with Chinese
President Xi Jinping.
OCT: China signs the
Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement as an
official international
witness, alongside
the UN, EU, India,
Japan, and Thailand.
2017
MAY: Aung San
Suu Kyi attends
Xi Jinping’s Belt
and Road Forum in
Beijing. China attends
second Panglong
conference.
NOV: China proposes
a three-point plan
to address the
Rohingya crisis.
DEC: China votes
against a UN General
Assembly resolution
calling for the
Tatmadaw to end
its campaign against
the Rohingya.
2016
China attends
the “Union Peace
Conference – 21st
Century Panglong” in
Naypyidaw.
2018
China attends the
third Panglong
conference.
China and Myanmar
renegotiate deal
to develop the
Kyaukphyu port.

A shift in China’s approach to Myanmar took place after
2011 as Myanmar began to transition from military rule
toward an elected civilian government and China found
that it could no longer rely on its strong relationship
with the military to protect its dominant position in the
country. Chinese leaders shifted their engagement to the
quasi-civilian government of President U Thein Sein, who
was also a former prime minister and a general. They
were shocked, however, when in September 2011 he
suspended construction of the Chinese-financed Myit-
sone dam project in Kachin State following protests by
local residents and others across the country.19
Coupled
with more protests against Chinese-backed mines and
factories in Myanmar, the Myitsone suspension under-
scored the risks to China of relying on relations solely with
one set of actors in Myanmar, such as the military or the
Thein Sein government, to protect their interests. Accord-
ingly, Chinese policymakers sought to diversify China’s
engagement and embarked on a multilayered engage-
ment strategy to improve relations and its public image in
Myanmar, including outreach to the NLD, other opposition
parties, and the public.20
China’s Relations with the NLD and the Tatmadaw
Today, Beijing is bolstering relations with both the NLD government and the Tatmadaw
because it recognizes that it needs the acquiescence of both to achieve its interests in
Myanmar. When the NLD government won the 2015 elections in a landslide, Chinese
observers worried that China-Myanmar relations would weaken under the new leadership
because Aung San Suu Kyi appeared to be more open to the West. Beijing was at first fearful
of her because, among other things, she had been educated in India and in Britain and had
strong ties in the West. In response to improved relations between Myanmar and the United
States, Chinese authorities worked to restore China’s close relations with Myanmar, appointing
a high-level special envoy for Asian affairs to concentrate on Myanmar.
When the NLD took office, the Chinese mounted an aggressive campaign to strengthen
ties between Beijing and Naypyidaw. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was the first foreign
counterpart to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi in her capacity as foreign minister, and Xi Jinping
has continued to court her since. In fact, Aung San Suu Kyi has made several trips to China
since taking office. Chinese officials opened multiple channels of communication with the NLD
and maintained a strong interest in the peace talks launched in 2011 with ethnic armed forces
Today, Beijing
is bolstering
relations with both
the government
Aung San Suu Kyi
and the military
because it recognizes
that it needs the
acquiescence of both
to achieve its interests
in Myanmar.

along the border. The Chinese government also courts Myanmar citizens through diplomatic
outreach and “soft power” study tours, and this pattern of Chinese engagement has increased
after the onset of the Rakhine crisis in 2017.
Beijing has also made efforts to strengthen its military-to-military relationship with the
Tatmadaw, continuing to enhance contacts and increase training and technical exchanges
between China’s and Myanmar’s armed forces. In May 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) conducted its first joint exercises, including communications and search and rescue,
with the Myanmar navy. Chinese navy ships visited Myanmar in what is seen as an important
milestone in the projection of Chinese naval power into the Bay of Bengal and the Indian
Ocean.21
Amid ongoing fighting along the China-Myanmar border, Beijing is also seeking ways
to improve cooperation on border management.22
The Tatmadaw, however, does not want to
be solely dependent on China and has cultivated military ties with—and purchased weapons
from—Russia, India, and Israel, among other countries.
State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi shakes hands with President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, May 16, 2017.
(Photo by Damir Sagolj/Reuters)

Beijing has several clear strategic interests in Myanmar: stability on its shared border, access to
the Indian Ocean, and a wide variety of economic interests.
STABILITY ON THE BORDER
China is keenly focused on maintaining security and stability along its porous border with Myanmar.
Refugees fleeing conflict in Myanmar have sought safety in China, and continued violence on the
Myanmar side of the border threatens China’s commercial interests and the security of Chinese
citizens living in both countries. In August 2009, for instance, fighting between the Kokang army,
known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Tatmadaw drove more
than thirty-seven thousand refugees into Yunnan.23
During MNDAA clashes with the military in 2015,
Myanmar warplanes dropped bombs that hit China’s side of the border, killing five Chinese citizens.24
In March 2017, two Chinese citizens on the Myanmar side of the border were killed during clashes.25
At the same time, continued conflict has facilitated drug and human trafficking, resource
smuggling, and other illicit activity along their common border. It has also prevented effective
responses to emerging health challenges, including drug-resistant malaria, tuberculosis, and
other infectious diseases.26
ACCESS TO INDIAN OCEAN
Myanmar’s lengthy coastline along the Bay of Bengal is integral to China’s efforts to secure multiple
points of access to the Indian Ocean.27
This access is critical for enhancing trade and interregional
economic connectivity, supporting Chinese naval activities, and furthering China’s objectives.
Myanmar’s Kyaukphyu port project on the Bay of Bengal can reduce the shipping costs of imported
goods and oil from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, to inland Chinese provinces.28
China has
China’s
Interests in
Myanmar

long coveted such a direct outlet to the Indian Ocean. But Chinese investment in Myanmar’s ports is
unlikely to lead to a permanent Chinese military presence there, given that Myanmar’s 2008 consti-
tution prohibits the presence of foreign troops on its territory.29
Nevertheless, Myanmar experts and
officials have raised concerns that Myanmar risks falling into a debt trap over the project, citing the
case of the Hambantota port, which Sri Lanka handed over to China on a ninety-nine-year lease in
2017. This, they say, is what could happen were Myanmar to default on its debt repayments.30
ECONOMIC INTERESTS
China also has significant economic interests in Myanmar, particularly in the resource-rich northern
areas. For decades, China has been investing in, extracting, and importing natural resources,
including jade, lumber, metals, and oil. Bilateral trade totaled $10.8 billion in fiscal year 2016–2017,
according to Myanmar’s official statistics, the bulk of it passing through Muse and other border
towns in northern Myanmar into Yunnan.31
Trade with Myanmar is particularly important for Yunnan:
although it is less than 1 percent of China’s total trade volume, it accounts for 24 percent of
Yunnan’s.32
Myanmar is thus important to Yunnan’s economic growth, and Yunnan is both one of
China’s poorest provinces and a key priority in the PRC’s national development plans.
China's People's Liberation Army Navy vessel Zhenghe on a goodwill visit to Myanmar, May 23, 2014. (Photo by Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)

Andaman
Sea
INDIAN
OCEAN
BayofBengal CHINA
LAOS
THAILAND
INDIA
MYANMAR
B
A
N
G
LADESH
KACHIN
STATE
SHAN
STATE
RAKHINE
STATE
Irawaddy
River
Naypyidaw
Yangon
Sittwe
Rathedaung
Maungdaw
Buthidaung
Kyaukphyu
Mandalay
Ruili
Muse
Lashio
Pangsang
KunmingMyitsone
dam
Offshore
gas facility
Planned
deep-water
port
0 100 MILES
0 100 KILOMETERS
GAS PIPELINE
OIL PIPELINE
LUCIDITY INFORMATION DESIGN, LLC
Map 2. China’s Trans-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines

China is also a market for illicit cross-border trade in drugs, logging, wildlife, charcoal, jade,
and other gems. Transnational organized crime actors from China are known to have been
“deeply and intimately involved” in these illegal economies for decades.33
Neither government
provides figures for illicit cross-border trade, but both acknowledge it.34
Chinese actors have
been accused of fueling conflict in northern Myanmar by engaging in natural resource extraction
and other economic projects in the conflict area, thereby generating revenue for Myanmar’s
various conflict actors. Local communities have also criticized what they perceive to be Chinese
exploitation of Myanmar’s resources, which has led to not only economic but also environmental
concerns.35
Chinese hydropower developers, alongside Thai companies, have proposed a
number of dams in ethnic areas of Myanmar, including a cascade of dam projects on the Than-
lwin (Salween) River, that are currently on hold but have contributed to mistrust between the
government and locals over environmental concerns and social impacts.
Myanmar is a key element of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative. Several BRI projects are
slated for Myanmar, including the East-West and North-South road corridors. Other proposed
road projects would provide transport infrastructure to areas of the Irrawaddy River Basin and
Logs on the Yangon River, July 2015. (Photo by Ye Aung Thu/AFP/Getty Images)

surrounding mountain areas. During Aung San Suu Kyi’s visit to Beijing in December 2017, Presi-
dent Xi urged her to consider the construction of a China-Myanmar Economic Corridor to further
advance bilateral ties. Chinese state-run media reported that Aun Sang Suu Kyi agreed to China’s
proposal, but it is not yet clear whether the proposed corridor will amount to anything more than a
slogan for projects already under way.36
Earlier, China had proposed a rail project from Kyaukphyu
in Rakhine State to Kunming (Yunnan’s capital), but the project was suspended in 2014.
One of China’s key strategic moves in Myanmar is its plan to construct a deepwater port at
Kyaukphyu on the Indian Ocean. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in the Bay of Bengal, a $7.3
billion project, is an important entry point for the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and other
commercial activity to fuel the development of China’s southwest. In 2015, a consortium led by
Chinese developer CITIC won bids to develop the port and an attached industrial park, but the
deal was suspended. China is now seeking a 70 percent stake in the port, but renegotiation of
the agreement is not yet finalized.37
Shipping containers in Yangon, May 2016. (Photo by Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)

Chinese companies have also invested in twin oil and gas pipelines to bring crude oil from the
Middle East and Africa and natural gas from offshore Myanmar to Kunming for consumption in
China. Myanmar, which has proven reserves of twenty-three trillion cubic feet of natural gas, is
an important regional source of gas for China.38
In 2009, the Thein Sein government and China
agreed to construct a 690-mile crude oil pipeline and 1,123-mile natural gas pipeline worth a total
of $5 billion to connect Kunming to the Indian Ocean via Kyaukphyu port.39
The China-Myanmar
oil and natural gas pipelines, running parallel inside Myanmar, start near Kyaukphyu port and run
through Mandalay, Lashio, and Muse (the second two are in northern Shan State) before entering
China at the border city of Ruili in Yunnan Province. The oil pipeline was completed in 2014 but
did not begin operations until April 2017 because of delays over the Myanmar government’s
request that China pay an extra crude oil tax.40
These overland systems through Myanmar will
transport 5 percent of China’s oil imports and 6 percent of its natural gas imports and allow China
to avoid the Strait of Malacca, the key oil shipping chokepoint in Southeast Asia.41
GEOSTRATEGIC INTERESTS
China’s geostrategic interests lead it to seek privileged access and influence inside Myanmar and
to diminish influence of Western countries, particularly the United States, and especially along
Myanmar’s border with China. In early 2016, for instance, the newly arrived PRC ambassador
repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) urged the US ambassador not to travel to Kachin or eastern parts
of Shan states because the United States “should respect China’s interests”—implying that China
deserved to have predominant presence and influence in these areas, if not elsewhere in Myanmar,
regardless of the wishes or interests of Myanmar, let alone the interests of other countries.
India sees itself as competing with China for influence in Myanmar. Viewing Myanmar as part of its sphere of influ-
ence, India feels threatened by China’s penetration of Myanmar and increasing naval presence in the Bay of Bengal
and Indian Ocean. India and Myanmar, once a single territory under British colonial rule, share deep historical ties,
democratic institutions, familial linkages, and more recently a common objective of preventing China from becom-
ing the regional hegemon. India is also concerned about its northeast and Myanmar’s Naga minority, which has
had relations with Indian Naga insurgents and has often operated out of bases inside Myanmar. However, informed
observers argue that India is punching below its weight and underperforming in Myanmar. This is primarily because
Indian policymakers have not paid enough attention to Myanmar, and Indian trade and investment in Myanmar pale in
comparison to those of China.
INDIA’S INTERESTS IN MYANMAR

Fighting in Kachin and Shan states—the northern borderlands near China—has thwarted prog-
ress on a nationwide peace process. The current-day peace process began in 2011 under
Thein Sein’s quasi-civilian government. Over the following several years, the government negoti-
ated the multilateral Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed by eight of twenty-one
ethnic armed groups on October 15, 2015. After coming to power in 2016, the NLD govern-
ment took over the peace process and made it its signature initiative, hosting three 21st Century
Panglong peace conferences in Naypyidaw, in 2016, 2017, and 2018. In February 2018, after the first
two meetings concluded, two more EAOs signed the NCA. Through that peace process, the signa-
tories and representatives from the Myanmar military, parliament, political parties, and civil society
have met to discuss a range of political, social, economic, and security issues, the goal being to
reach an accord that supported durable peace with all ethnic groups.
Many of the groups that have signed the NCA are from Myanmar’s eastern and western borders
with Thailand, India, or Bangladesh. Most of the nonsignatory groups are from the northern border
with China, in particular Kachin and northern Shan states.42
Here, fighting has intensified, leaving
some one hundred thousand people displaced as of April 2018.43
In Kachin State, the Tatmadaw and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) have been fighting
since a seventeen-year ceasefire agreement collapsed in 2011. In 2018, the Tatmadaw has
The Nationwide
Peace Process and
Conflict in Kachin
and Shan States

Attendees pose for a picture after the signing ceremony of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in Naypyidaw, October 15, 2015.
(Photo by Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)
stepped up attacks on KIA positions in Kachin State, an upsurge in conflict that has sparked
antiwar protests in Myanmar.
The conflict in neighboring northern Shan State is more complex. Following the breakdown
of the KIA ceasefire, KIA base areas became hubs for the formation or remobilization of other
ethnic armed groups that have expanded their operations into northern Shan State.44
Here,
the Tatmadaw is currently fighting the KIA and three of its allies—the Myanmar National Demo-
cratic Alliance Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army (AA),
which together form the Northern Alliance.45
This northern coalition has also joined with other groups from Shan State that are not currently
engaged in fighting with the military to form the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative
Committee (FPNCC). Under the leadership of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the FPNCC is
the mechanism through which these groups engage in discussions with the government’s peace
process representatives. The incorporation of the FPNCC bloc, which currently rejects the NCA,
into a national peace process is key to any long-term resolution of conflict in northern Myanmar.46

As China engages with each of the groups in this complex conflict scenario, its actions are
equally complex and at times seemingly contradictory. Beijing supports the Myanmar government
and its peace process, but at the same time provides shelter, weapons, and other assistance to
some of the ethnic armed organizations.
China’s Role in Myanmar’s Peace Process
Despite Beijing’s professed commitment to the principle of noninterference in the internal
affairs of other countries, China has had both direct and indirect influence on conflict and peace
dynamics in northern Myanmar. After the Tatmadaw launched airstrikes against KIA positions
around its headquarters in Laiza on the Chinese border in December 2012 and three bombs
landed on Chinese territory, thousands of Kachin refugees crossed the border into Yunnan. As
a result, China’s special envoy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Vice Minister Fu Ying, visited
Myanmar to meet with President Thein Sein in December 2012 and January 2013. China hosted
several rounds of talks between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and Myanmar
government representatives in the border town of Ruili in Yunnan Province. Naypyidaw rejected
China’s offer to mediate the dispute as an inappropriate intrusion into Myanmar’s internal affairs,
but allowed China’s special envoy, along with the UN envoy, to observe the broader array of
bilateral and multilateral peace talks in ensuing years. China signed the NCA in October 2015 as
an official international witness, alongside the UN, the EU, India, Japan, and Thailand.
Figure 2. Ethnic Armed Organizations
FPNCC
UWSA
NDAA
SSA-N
Note: Some English-language Myanmar media outlets use the name Northern Alliance as a shorthand for the FPNCC, but officially
the two groups do not have the same member organizations: three FPNCC members are not members of the Northern Alliance.
KNU
RCSS
CNF
PNLO
DKBA
KPC
ALP
ABSDF
NMSP
LDU
NCA Signatories
Northern Alliance
KIA
MNDAA (Kokang)
TNLA
AA

As scholar Yun Sun notes, China’s participation in peace talks with the Kachin marked a policy shift
in response to China’s rising concerns about border stability.47
Prior to 2012, Beijing was concerned
that any direct involvement would be seen by Naypyidaw as unwelcome interference in its internal
affairs. Yet as hostilities resumed in Kachin State and disrupted stability along the border area,
Beijing faced increased domestic pressure to act.48
China and the Panglong Conferences
On occasion, China has actively pressured EAOs to engage in dialogue with the government. In
advance of all three 21st Century Panglong peace conferences, China’s Special Envoy Sun Guo-
xiang played a key role in urging EAOs to attend the meetings, including groups engaged in
fighting with the Tatmadaw and opposed to the NCA on which the conferences are based. In an
unprecedented show of shuttle diplomacy in May 2017, Sun met in Yunnan with ethnic armed
groups from the FPNCC, urged them to attend the conference, and then flew them from Kunming
to Naypyidaw on a chartered Chinese plane.49
Many of the representatives of the ethnic armed
groups reported that they attended solely because China had pressured them to do so. After
one day, however, frustrated KIA and UWSA representatives walked out. Despite the walkout,
their attendance demonstrated that China could exercise enough influence to persuade even the
groups least invested in the peace conferences to attend, though Beijing could not control their
decisions once there.
More recently, China helped arrange travel for Northern Alliance members, who flew from Kunming
to Naypyidaw, accompanied by Sun, to attend the third conference in July 2018.50
Sun, who had
urged the Northern Alliance to attend, was also present at the meetings in Naypyidaw.51
The Kachin Independence Army, Myanmar’s second largest ethnic army, boasts an estimated ten thousand troops
and another ten thousand reserve forces.a
A predominantly Christian ethnic minority, the Kachin are related to the
Jingpo (Jingpaw) ethnic minority in China. The KIA battled the Tatmadaw for autonomy until KIA leaders agreed to a
ceasefire with the Burmese government in 1994. This ceasefire remained in place for seventeen years but fell apart
in June 2011 after the Tatmadaw launched a major military offensive against the KIA. In 2018, the Tatmadaw stepped
up attacks on KIA positions in Kachin State, seeking to reduce the KIA’s area of operations and wrest control over the
jade, gold, and other mines that generate profits for the group. In 2017, shortly after a meeting in Wa territory, the KIA
left the United Nationalities Federal Council, an ethnic umbrella organization representing nonsignatory groups in
negotiations with the government over the NCA, and joined instead the Wa-led FPNCC, which rejects the NCA.
THE KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ARMY
a. Myanmar Peace Monitor, “KIO,” www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/armed-ethnic-groups/155-kio.

In addition to facilitating talks, China has also contributed funds to the peace process. In 2017, China
donated $1 million and pledged $3 million to the government’s peace process work, in addition to
separate contributions for relief to internally displaced persons.52
Because China is not a member
of the Joint Peace Fund, an eleven-member grouping of primarily Western donors to the peace
process, its contributions are not coordinated through this body, but go directly to the Myanmar
government with fewer requirements for accountability.
Chinese Decision Making: Beijing and Yunnan
Much of the day-to-day engagement between China and northern Myanmar has historically been
conducted out of neighboring Yunnan. Beijing and Yunnan continue to both play important, yet
different, roles on Myanmar issues. Beijing makes national and foreign policies regarding Myanmar
that the Yunnan provincial government is expected to implement. Yunnan officials remain a part of
decision making on issues related to trade, investments, transnational crime, and other issues that
have socioeconomic impact in Yunnan.53
The three-thousand-member Kokang army, known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, is an ethnic
Han Chinese group based in Shan State on the Chinese border and has special ties with China. Following clashes in
2009 with the Tatmadaw, its leader Peng Jiasheng (also known as Phone Kya Shin) spent five years in exile in Yunnan
and Thailand before launching new offensives against the Tatmadaw in the Kokang region in 2014 and 2015. Amid
the clashes, China reportedly allowed Peng’s troops to use Chinese territory to outflank the Tatmadaw; meanwhile,
the Myanmar government claimed that the Chinese armed, trained, and financed Kokang fighters.a
In 2015, Myanmar
warplanes dropped bombs on China’s side of the border, killing five Chinese farmers in Yunnan.b
Chinese netizens re-
acted strongly to the Tatmadaw’s military operations against the Kokang and called on the Chinese government to do
more to protect their fellow Han Chinese Kokang.c
In March 2017, fighting drove more than twenty thousand refugees
into Yunnan, where local Chinese residents gave them food and other assistance.d
MYANMAR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE ARMY
a. Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” Special Report no. 401 (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, March 2017), www.usip.org/sites
/default/files/SR401-China-and-Myanmar-Peace-Process.pdf; The Economist, “The Han that Rocked the Cradle,” March 12, 2015, www.economist.com
/asia/2015/03/12/the-han-that-rock-the-cradle.
b. Reuters, “China Says Myanmar Apologizes for Bombing, Admits Responsibility,” April 2, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-myanmar-idUSKBN-
0MT0MA20150402.
c. Enze Han, “Geopolitics, Ethnic Conflicts Along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes toward Myanmar,” Asian Security 13, no. 1 (2017): 67.
d. Yimou Lee and Shwe Yee Saw Myint, “Thousands Flee Myanmar Army Clashes with Insurgents Near China Border, Official Says,” Reuters, March 8,
2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-insurgency-china-idUSKBN16F0LD; Reuters, “Dozens of Myanmar Soldiers Killed in Rebel Clashes Near
China Border,” March 14, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-insurgency-china-idUSKBN16L0FG.

In the past several decades, Kunming has in some cases acted on cross-border issues without
first receiving Beijing’s approval. This is the result, in part, of Yunnan’s geographical distance from
Beijing; moreover, Chinese attention to Myanmar tends to be low and Myanmar issues do not
often rise to the highest levels of Chinese decision making in Beijing unless there are crises along
the border, such as the Kokang conflict in 2009. Beijing has issued general statements on what
Chinese entities should do at the border, namely, to ensure peace and stability. However, without
clear and explicit regulations and restrictions, some Chinese actors in Yunnan may believe that they
have a green light to pursue activities as they see fit.
Over the last ten years, however, Beijing has put Yunnan provincial authorities on a tighter leash,
largely in response to crises on the China-Myanmar border. After Myanmar’s military government
regained control of the Kokang region from the MNDAA in 2009, Beijing conducted a policy review.
It found that Yunnan’s exclusive access to information and relations with ethnic armed groups in
northern Myanmar harmed China’s national security. As a result, Beijing began to communicate with
ethnic armed groups in Myanmar more directly.54
Myanmar’s Minister of the Office of the State Counselor Kyaw Tint Swe and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi meet at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in
Beijing, June 28, 2018. (Photo by Greg Baker/Pool via Reuters)

Although Beijing has consolidated control over Myanmar policy, Chinese bureaucratic actors
have differing views of China’s national interests in Myanmar. The Chinese Communist Party’s
International Liaison Department and the MFA are focused on improving party-to-party relations
and state-to-state relations, respectively, as well as supporting Myanmar’s peace process. They
also have taken steps to strengthen people-to-people ties between the two countries, such as
through numerous, fully-funded “soft power tours” to China for Myanmar civil society organiza-
tions to promote friendly ties.55
Stakeholders in Myanmar trust China’s MFA, and view the PLA as more sympathetic to ethnic
minority leaders and more likely to take actions that fuel the ongoing conflict. For example, some
experts believe that the PLA and actors with possible links to the PLA are supplying weapons
to ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, and may even have tried to pressure the Tatmadaw to stop
offensives against ethnic armed groups.56
Retired PLA also continue to engage in lucrative busi-
ness deals and even serve as mercenaries for ethnic armed groups in Myanmar.
United Wa State Army soldiers march in Pangsang, October 4, 2016. (Photo by Soe Zeya Tun/Reuters)

China and the United Wa State Army
China’s seemingly contradictory policies on the peace process are clearly reflected in its ties with
the United Wa State Army. A formidable force of thirty thousand active fighters, the UWSA plays a
central role in conflict in northern Myanmar even though it has not fought with the Tatmadaw since
1988; it has had its own bilateral ceasefire with the Myanmar government since 1989 and rejects the
NCA. Today, it provides arms to Northern Alliance groups and, through the FPNCC, leads them in
negotiations on the peace process.
Located in eastern Shan State along the Chinese border, the UWSA operates in the Wa Self-Admin-
istered Division, an area with constitutional status just under that of a region or state. UWSA leaders
do not seek independence from Myanmar, but instead want to be officially recognized as a sepa-
rate ethnic state with a high degree of autonomy over Wa internal affairs.57
The Tatmadaw can enter
the Wa’s self-administered division only by invitation and without arms; otherwise, the Wa area is
accessible only via China. For this reason, the PLA views the Wa as a strategic buffer zone along its
border against Western influence.
The UWSA enjoys a strong relationship with China, particularly with actors in the PLA and Yunnan
Province. Many Chinese advisers, including Chinese intelligence officers and former PLA personnel,
are close to the Wa leadership, and the UWSA often echoes official Chinese talking points.58
For
example, the UWSA convened a summit in February 2017 with seven ethnic armed groups at its
Pangsang (Pangkham) headquarters on the Chinese border. The summit leaders called on China
and the United Nations to mediate the peace process, voiced support for China’s BRI projects, and
offered security guarantees for Chinese projects in ethnic armed group areas—all of which were
music to Beijing’s ears.59
China’s links with the Wa are also strengthened by investment, communi-
cations, and transport, which are all linked to Yunnan; moreover, the schools in the Wa area teach
mostly in Chinese. Observers have noted the extraordinary level of Chinese influence on the UWSA,
as well as the Wa’s allegiance to China, highlighting that China’s ties with other ethnic armed groups
in Myanmar are notably weaker.60
Relative to its steady relations with UWSA, China could probably
exert more pressure over the Kachin Independence Army but has not. The KIA and other ethnic
armed groups at times operate independently in ways not always consistent with Chinese interests.
In addition, an informed expert argues that China is a major supplier of arms to the well-
equipped UWSA. The expert argues that the Chinese government seeks to maintain central-
ized control of the arms to the ethnic armed groups by sending weapons only to UWSA.61
In an
upgrade to the Wa’s military capability, China reportedly shipped tank destroyers and several
helicopters armed with air-to-air missiles to the Wa indirectly via Laos in 2013.62
In turn, the
UWSA, which has its own arms factories, supplies Chinese-style arms to other members of the
FPNCC, including the Northern Alliance.63

The Rohingya
Crisis and Conflict
in Rakhine State
The plight of the predominantly Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State has attracted intense
international attention over the last two years, after wide-scale violence by the Tatmadaw
against the Rohingya in 2016 and 2017, in response to attacks carried out by the Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), led to profound atrocities and prompted a massive exodus of
refugees to Bangladesh.64
Despite hundreds of thousands of Rohingya residing in the northern
part of the state for generations, Myanmar’s government and a large majority of the population
do not recognize the Rohingya as citizens, let alone as a recognized ethnic nationality, but as
illegal immigrants at best, if not a national security threat to the country.
In addition, the Tatmadaw faces a conflict with the Arakan Army, whose arrival in Rakhine
State introduced a new threat to peace in Myanmar’s western states. The AA draws on ethnic
Rakhine grievances that its people have been treated as second-class citizens and fears that
the Rohingya, if politically empowered, will diminish the influence of ethnic Rakhine and domi-
nate Rakhine State.65
Established in Kachin State in 2009, the AA is composed of Buddhist
ethnic Rakhine (Arakan) rebels that currently operate in Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, and Shan
states. It has trained with the KIA and is organized and equipped with weapons. Since 2015, it
has operated in Buddhist townships close to the state capital of Sittwe and expanded to the
Rohingya townships of Buthidaung and Rathedaung, effectively complicating the Tatmadaw’s
attempts to fight ARSA by presenting it with an additional threat.66

Burmese and Chinese flags on a newly built processing camp for Rohingyas in Rakhine State, March 2018. (Photo by Joe Freeman/AFP/Getty Images)
China’s Security and Economic Interests in Rakhine
Unlike the conflicts in Myanmar’s northern borderlands, conflicts in Rakhine State do not pose an imme-
diate security threat to China because Rakhine State is far from its border. Violence in Rakhine has been
concentrated in the northern townships of Buthidaung and Maungdaw, not near Chinese investment
projects such as the Kyaukphyu port in the southern part of the state. China also does not have strong
ties with ARSA or share a cultural or ethnic affiliation with the Rohingya or Rakhine populations, although
it does maintain some contact—as it does with all ethnic armed groups on the China-Myanmar border—
with the Arakan Army, which trained in neighboring Kachin State and now has a presence in Kyaukphyu.
Although the security threat is low, the expansion of extremist activities by these armed groups may
threaten Chinese interests in the future. Moreover, discussions with informed observers suggest that
China likely analogizes Myanmar’s perception of a Rohingya terrorist threat to its perception of a Uyghur
terrorist threat in its northwest province of Xinjiang. Beijing may seek to make common cause with
Naypyidaw on that basis.

Local opposition could threaten the security and success
of massive Chinese-led infrastructure projects in Rakhine
State. The Kyaukphyu port project includes development
of an industrial park in a special economic zone in Rakhine,
and has ignited local protests over its potential negative
impact on the environment and local livelihoods.67
Some
local Rakhine leaders are suspicious of China’s ambition on
their soil and do not want to see the Naypyidaw government
trade away Rakhine sovereignty in exchange for economic
deals with China. Instability in Rakhine State since 2012,
specifically around Kyaukphyu, has created concerns in
China about the viability of its port and SEZ plans and has
led some in China to propagate a conspiracy theory that the
United States was behind the Rohingya turmoil, as part of a
plan to undermine Chinese activity. This perspective took
root within Myanmar society more broadly following US and
international condemnation of the ethnic cleansing of the
Rohingya in late 2017.
China’s Impact on the Rakhine Conflict
As Western countries criticize Naypyidaw’s handling of the Rakhine crisis and call for investiga-
tions into ethnic cleansing, Beijing has taken advantage of the opening to support Myanmar’s
government and recover lost ground in the bilateral relationship, including among the broader
public with its anti-Rohingya sentiments. China has opposed or weakened UN resolutions aimed
at punishing or pressuring the Tatmadaw to cease its violent oppression of the Rohingya.68
Following the August 2018 release of a UN fact-finding mission report that called for senior
Tatmadaw generals to be investigated for possible culpability in genocide, China’s foreign
ministry did not call for follow-up but defended Myanmar by referring to Rakhine's “complex
background.69
Chinese officials have expressed support for Myanmar’s need to address a
terrorist threat and stressed that others should not condemn Myanmar for the way it handles its
affairs.70
By blunting international criticism of the policies of Myanmar's government and military
in Rakhine State, Beijing also hopes to avoid broader condemnation of China’s approach to its
own Muslim minority population, in particular, the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.71
To address the Rohingya crisis, in November 2017 China proposed a three-point plan. It called
for a ceasefire, an agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh on the repatriation of
Rohingya refugees, and international efforts to promote economic development in Rakhine.72
Naypyidaw declined Beijing’s offer to mediate an agreement but welcomed China’s political
support, particularly at the UN.
Myanmar’s leaders
are wary of relying
too heavily on China.
They recognize that
Beijing is pursuing
its own national
interests that do not
always coincide with
what would be best
for Myanmar.

In addition to diplomatic support, China has provided material support to security personnel and
some humanitarian aid in response to the crisis. Unlike many Western donors, China prefers to
provide aid directly to the Myanmar government rather than working through international orga-
nizations. In the months after the August and September 2017 violence, for instance, China sent
two hundred prefabricated houses for displaced persons.73
It also donated about $150,000 to the
Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement to assist the Myanmar government’s efforts to
“help restore peace and stability” in Rakhine.74
Last, it gave 150 tons of supplies, including tents
and blankets, to Bangladesh for Rohingya refugees in the country in September 2017.75
As Myanmar has become more alienated from the West on the basis of differing perceptions of
the Rohingya crisis, China’s efforts to strengthen its economic and political influence in Myanmar
have had a notable impact. After the Thein Sein government’s opening to the West, the NLD
government is turning back to China for assistance and protection. When confronted with
increasing Western criticism and isolation, even Western-oriented individuals within Myanmar’s
senior leadership are reported to say, “We always have China.” Although Chinese influence in
Myanmar under the NLD government may be as strong, if not stronger, now than during the
years of the Thein Sein administration, it has natural limits. Myanmar’s leaders, both civilian and
military, are wary of relying too heavily on China. They recognize that Beijing is pursuing its own
national interests that do not always coincide with what would be best for Myanmar. As a result,
Naypyidaw has gradually become more willing to cooperate with the United Nations. Myanmar
welcomed a United Nations Security Council delegation to Rakhine State in May 2018 and
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with UN agencies in June 2018 to help oversee any
future repatriation of Rohingya refugees.

As China becomes more involved in conflict zones
around the world, its engagement in Myanmar has
been particularly direct and influential. That Myanmar sits on
China’s border creates a unique dynamic that sets China’s
interests and role in Myanmar apart from its objectives and
influence in other conflict-affected countries.
The United States should pay attention to the impact of
China’s role in Myanmar’s internal conflicts given the broader
US interest in the success of Myanmar’s peace efforts and
overall reform experiment. To that end, the United States
should sustain long-term and high-level engagement on a
wide range of political, social, economic, and security issues
to help Myanmar through its difficult transition, at all times
making clear that the only way to achieve lasting peace is
through a common commitment to justice, compromise,
mutual respect, and equal rights and equal protection for all
of Myanmar’s diverse people.
Conclusion
The United States
should pay attention
to the impact of
China’s role in
Myanmar’s internal
conflicts given its
interest in the success
of Myanmar’s
peace efforts.

Notes
1. Without political intent, the report uses Burma as the state’s name before 1989, Myanmar thereafter, and Burmese as an adjec-
tive and to describe the citizens and the language.
2. “Rakhine Issue Is an Internal Affair: Chinese Ambassador,” Global New Light of Myanmar, September 14, 2017,
www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/rakhine-issue-internal-affair-chinese-ambassador. In September 2017, China donated
equipment and supplies, including bulletproof helmets, to police in Rakhine State to help promote stability there. “Zhongguo
xiang miandian zhengfu juanzeng jing wu wuzi” (China Donates Police Supplies to the Myanmar Government), CRI Online,
September 21, 2017, http://news.cri.cn/20170921/2c766065-c534-a299-5b34-974d67965d99.html.
3. Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine, August
2017, www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf.
4. C. Patterson Giersch, Asian Borderlands: The Transformation of Qing China’s Yunnan Frontier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2006), 101.
5. David Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873 (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2005), 21, 44, 186, 188.
6. David I. Steinberg, “Burma-Myanmar: The U.S.-Burmese Relationship and Its Vicissitudes,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Foreign
Policy and Poorly Performing States, edited by Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert L. Ayres (Washington, DC: Center
for Global Development, 2006), 224.
7. The Dominion of Ceylon also gained independence in 1948, and in 1972 became the Republic of Sri Lanka.
8. Between 1947 and 1971, Pakistan contained a Western Wing and an Eastern Wing. In 1971, the Bengali-speaking Eastern Wing
gained independence as Bangladesh.
9. The term pauk phaw can be translated as fraternal but has a closer Chinese connotation of siblings from the same womb.
David I. Steinberg and Hongwei Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Independence (Copenhagen:
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2012), 7.
10. Ibid., 66–67.
11. South Asian minority communities also suffered during these riots and were precursors to the Rohingya crisis today.
12. Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations, 78, 104.
13. Bertil Lintner, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) (Ithaca, NY: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell Univer-
sity, 1990), 26.
14. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1970), 132–38.
15. Maung Aung Myoe, Building the Tatmadaw: Myanmar Armed Forces Since 1948 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2009), 139.
16. Kinling Lo, “China Eyes Closer Military Cooperation with Myanmar as It Looks to Expand Sphere of Influence Near India’s
Borders,” South China Morning Post, November 27, 2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2121298
/china-eyes-closer-military-cooperation-myanmar-it-looks.
17. Dean Cheng, “China’s View of South Asia and the Indian Ocean,” Heritage Lectures no. 1163 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foun-
dation, August 31, 2010), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/hl1163.pdf.
18. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), “China and the World,” in USCC 2017 Annual Report to
Congress, November 2017, 304, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2017_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf.
19. Yun Sun, “China and the Changing Myanmar,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs (Germany), April 2012, 58–59.
20. Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, China’s Multi-Layered Engagement Strategy and Myanmar’s Realities: The Best Fit for Beijing Policy
Preferences, Myanmar China Research Project working paper no. 1, Institute for Strategy and Policy, February 2018, 10, 14.
21. Anthony Davis, “China Holds First Joint Exercise with Myanmar Navy,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 23, 2017.
22. Reuters, “China Tells Myanmar Military It Wants Closer Ties,” November 22, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-china-myanmar
-defence/china-tells-myanmar-military-it-wants-closer-ties-idUSKBN1DN07C.

23. Human Rights Watch, “Burma: Events of 2009,” World Report 2010, www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/burma.
24. Reuters, “China Says Myanmar Apologizes for Bombing, Admits Responsibility,” April 2, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/us
-china-myanmar/china-says-myanmar-apologizes-for-bombing-admits-responsibility-idUSKBN0MT0MA20150402.
25. Kristen Huang, “Chinese Teacher Killed in Myanmar Conflict after Shelling Hits School,” South China Morning Post, March 13,
2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2078409/chinese-teacher-killed-conflict-myanmar.
26. That said, China has contributed to opium eradication in some parts of northern Myanmar by subsidizing the establishment of
plantations in areas where poppies used to be cultivated.
27. China is also building ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Singapore.
28. Gregory B. Poling, “Kyaukpyu: Connecting China to the Indian Ocean,” CSIS Briefs, March 2018, https://csis-prod.s3
.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180402_Poling_Kyaukpyu_.pdf.
29. Ibid.
30. John Reed, “Myanmar Reviews $9bn China-backed Port Project on Cost Concerns,” Financial Times, June 3, 2018,
www.ft.com/content/f2f476d2-6575-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56.
31. Xinhua, “Myanmar-China Bilateral Trade Hits 7.42 Bln USD in First Eight Months of FY 2017-2018,” January 22, 2018,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/22/c_136914463.htm.
32. The Economist, “The Han that Rocked the Cradle,” March 12, 2015, www.economist.com/news/asia/21646248-kokang-conflict
-causes-problems-china-too-han-rock-cradle.
33. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Myanmar Maneuvers: How to Break Political-Criminal Alliances in Contexts of Transition, Crime-Conflict
Nexus Series, no. 9, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, April 2017, 3, https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu
/attachment/2445/Myanmar-Maneuvers-How-to-Break-Political-Criminal-Alliances-in-Contexts-of-Transition.pdf.
34. Chan Mya Htwe, “Illegal Trade Soars without Customs Teams,” Myanmar Times, February 12, 2016, www.mmtimes.com
/business/18954-illegal-trade-soars-without-customs-teams.html.
35. Yimou Lee and Wa Lone, “China’s $10 Billion Strategic Project in Myanmar Sparks Local Ire,” Reuters, June 8, 2017, www.reuters
.com/article/us-china-silkroad-myanmar-sez/chinas-10-billion-strategic-project-in-myanmar-sparks-local-ire-idUSKBN18Z327x.
36. Xinhua, “Xi Meets Aung San Suu Kyi, Calls for More Party-to-party Cooperation,” December 1, 2017, www.xinhuanet.com
/english/2017-12/01/c_136793872.htm.
37. A Chinese consortium led by China’s state-owned CITIC Group initially held an 85 percent stake, but later reduced its share
in response to complaints from locals in Rakhine and communities across Myanmar. Yimou Lee and Shwe Yee Saw Myint,
“Exclusive: China Seeks Up to 85 Percent Stake in Strategic Port in Myanmar,” Reuters, May 5, 2017, www.reuters.com/article
/us-china-silkroad-myanmar-port-exclusive/exclusive-china-seeks-up-to-85-percent-stake-in-strategic-port-in-myanmar
-idUSKBN1811DF; Yimou Lee and Thu Thu Aung, “China to Take 70 Percent Stake in Strategic Port in Myanmar – Official,”
Reuters, October 17, 2017, www.reuters.com/article/china-silkroad-myanmar-port/china-to-take-70-percent-stake-in-strategic
-port-in-myanmar-official-idUSL4N1MS3UB.
38. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Burma (Myanmar),” www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=MMR.
39. USCC, 2010 Report to Congress, November 2010, 130, www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/2010-Report-to
-Congress.pdf.
40. Chen Aizhu and Aung Hla Tun, “New China Refinery Faces Delay as Myanmar Seeks Extra Oil Tax - Sources,” Reuters,
October 10, 2016, https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL3N1C633Y.
41. As much as 82 percent of China’s imported oil is shipped through the Strait of Malacca. USCC, 2017 Annual Report to
Congress, 281.
42. The exception is the Arakan Army.
43. Relief Web, “Myanmar: IDP Sites in Kachin and Northern Shan States,” January 31, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/map/myanmar
/myanmar-idp-sites-kachin-and-northern-shan-states-31-jan-2018.
44. David Scott Mathieson, “Burma’s Northern Shan State and Prospects for Peace,” Peace Brief no. 234, (Washington, DC:
US Institute of Peace, September 2017), www.usip.org/publications/2017/09/burmas-northern-shan-state-and
-prospects-peace.
45. Some of these groups are also engaged in fighting with other ethnic armed organizations.
46. “A Return to War: Militarized Conflicts in Northern Shan State,” Institute for Security & Development Policy Asia Paper, May
2018, 15, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/05/A-Return-to-War-Print-V-w-cover-21.05.18.pdf.
47. Yun Sun, “China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict,” Great Powers and the Changing Myanmar, Issue Brief no. 2,
Stimson Center, January 2014 (updated), 8, www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Myanmar_Issue_Brief_No_2_
Jan _2014_WEB_3_1.pdf.
48. Yun Sun, “China’s Intervention in the Myanmar-Kachin Peace Talks,” Brookings Institution, February 20, 2013, www.brookings
.edu/articles/chinas-intervention-in-the-myanmar-kachin-peace-talks.
49. Bertil Lintner, “China Captures Myanmar’s Peace Process,” Asia Times, June 3, 2017, www.atimes.com/article/china-captures
-myanmars-peace-process.

50. Lawi Weng, “All Members of Northern Alliance Invited to Attend Panglong Peace Conference,” The Irrawaddy, July 4,
2018, www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/members-northern-alliance-invited-attend-panglong-peace-conference.html;
Global New Light of Myanmar, “10 NCA Signatories, Northern Alliance Arrive in Nay Pyi Taw for Peace Conference,”
July 11, 2018, www.burmalibrary.org/docs24/GNLM2018-07-11.pdf.
51. Chan Thar, “China Urges Northern Alliance to Attend Panglong Conference,” Myanmar Times, May 21, 2018,
www.mmtimes.com/news/china-urges-northern-alliance-attend-panglong-conference.html.
52. Chan Thar, “China Gives $1 Million for Peace Process,” Myanmar Times, December 20, 2017, www.mmtimes.com/news
/china-gives-1-million-peace-process.html.
53. Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, “Conceptualizing China’s Central-Local Nexus: Beijing’s Repositioning on Border Issues with
Myanmar,” Myanmar China Research Project Working Paper no. 2, Institute for Strategy and Policy–Myanmar, forthcoming.
54. Yun Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” Special Report no. 401, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, March
2017), 7, www.usip .org/publications/2017/03/china-and-myanmars-peace-process.
55. Knowledgeable sources in Yangon estimate that several hundred Burmese have been brought to China on such tours
in recent years. Expert, SSG meeting, Washington, DC, March 6, 2018.
56. Skype interview with anonymous expert, June 12, 2018.
57. Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, “UWSA Politician: Wa to ‘Continue Asking for Autonomous State,’” The Irrawaddy, June 29, 2017,
www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/uwsa-politician-wa-continue-asking-autonomous-state.html.
58. Interview with anonymous expert, Washington, DC, May 16, 2018; Bertil Lintner, “Who Are the Wa?” The Irrawaddy, June
2014, www.irrawaddy.com/news/military/wa.html.
59. International Crisis Group, “Building Critical Mass for Peace in Myanmar,” Asia Report no. 287, June 29, 2017, 4,
www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/287-building-critical-mass-peace-myanmar.
60. Sun, “China and Myanmar’s Peace Process,” 13; interview with anonymous expert, Washington, DC, May 10, 2018.
61. Skype interview with anonymous expert, June 12, 2018.
62. Radio Free Asia, “China Provides Fighter Copters to Burma Armed Group: Report,” April 30, 2013, www.rfa.org/english
/news/myanmar/wa-04302013201404.html; Daniel Schearf, “With Burma in Mind, China Quietly Supports Wa Rebels,”
Voice of America, January 25, 2013, https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-support-for-wa-rebels-designed-to-counter
-burma/1590718.html.
63. Interview with anonymous expert, Washington, DC, May 16, 2018.
64. In October 2016, ARSA attacked three police outposts on the Maungdaw and Rathedaung townships, killing nine police
officers. In August 2017, ARSA militants attacked police stations, killing twelve security personnel forces. “Myanmar Says
Nine Police Killed by Insurgents on Bangladesh Border,” The Guardian, October 9, 2016,
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/10/myanmar-nine-police-killed-insurgents-bangladesh-border; Wa Lone and
Shoon Naing, “At Least 71 Killed in Myanmar as Rohingya Insurgents Stage Major Attack,” Reuters, August 24, 2017,
www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya/at-least-71-killed-in-myanmar-as-rohingya-insurgents-stage-major-attack-
idUSKCN1B507K. More than nine hundred thousand Rohingya have fled to neighboring Bangladesh since August 2017.
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Rohingya Refugee Crisis,” www.unocha.org/rohingya
-refugee-crisis; Inter Sector Coordination Group, “Situation Report Data Summary Rohingya Refugee Crisis, Cox’s Bazar,”
May 24, 2018, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iscg_situation_report_summary_24_may_2018.pdf.
65. Gabrielle Aron, “Reframing the Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,” Peace Brief no. 242, (Washington, DC: US Institute
of Peace, January 2018), 3, www.usip.org/publications/2018/01/reframing-crisis-myanmars-rakhine-state. In addition,
Rakhine was only conquered by Burma in 1785.
66. Anthony Davis, “Myanmar’s Other Rakhine Problem,” Asia Times, November 29, 2017, www.atimes.com/article
/myanmars-rakhine-problem.
67. Yimou Lee and Wa Lone, “China’s $10 Billion Strategic Project in Myanmar Sparks Local Ire,” Reuters, June 8, 2017, www
.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-myanmar-sez/chinas-10-billion-strategic-project-in-myanmar-sparks-local-ire
-idUSKBN18Z327; Adrienne Joy, “Understanding China’s Response to the Rakhine Crisis,” Special Report no. 419,
(Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, February 2018), www.usip.org/publications/2018/02/understanding-chinas
-response-rakhine-crisis.
68. In March 2017, China, backed by Russia, blocked a UN Security Council statement that would have noted the renewed
fighting in parts of Myanmar and stressed the importance of humanitarian access to all affected areas. In November
2017, China backed a Security Council presidential statement condemning the violence in Rakhine and raising concerns
about human rights abuses by security forces, but only after negotiating watered down language on Rohingya citizen-
ship rights and a demand to allow a UN human rights mission into Myanmar, and after indicating it was willing to use
veto power to block a resolution. In December 2017, China, along with nine other member nations, voted against a UN
General Assembly resolution, which was adopted with 122 votes in favor, calling for the Tatmadaw to end its campaign
against the Rohingya, allow access for aid workers, and ensure the return of all refugees and grant citizenship rights to
the Rohingya, as well as the appointment of a UN special envoy. Reuters, “China, Russia Block U.N. Council Concern
about Myanmar Violence,” March 17, 2017, www.reuters .com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/china-russia-block-u-n
-council-concern-about-myanmar-violence-idUSKBN16O2J6; United Nationals Security Council, “Statement of the Pres-
ident of the Security Council,” United Nations Security Council, November 6, 2017, http://undocs .org/S/PRST/2017/22;

The Guardian, “UN Increases Pressure on Myanmar to End Violence against Rohingya,” November 6, 2017, www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/07/un-increases-pressure-on-myanmar-to-end-violence-against-rohingya; The
Guardian, “China and Russia Oppose UN Resolution on Rohingya,” December 24, 2017, www.theguardian.com
/world/2017/dec/24/china-russia-oppose-un-resolution-myanmar-rohingya-muslims.
69. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Myanmar: Tatmadaw Leaders Must Be Investigated for Genocide,
Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes—UN report,” August 27, 2018, www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages
/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23475; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Confer-
ence,” People’s Republic of China, August 28, 2018, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401
/2511_665403/t1589014.shtml.
70. Global New Light of Myanmar, “Rakhine Issue Is an Internal Affair: Chinese Ambassador,” September 14, 2017,
www.globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/rakhine-issue-internal-affair-chinese-ambassador.
71. Yun Sun, “China Finds Opportunity in Myanmar Crisis,” Asia Times, February 14, 2018, www.atimes.com/article/china
-finds-opportunity-myanmar-crisis; Joy, “Understanding China’s Response,” 4.
72. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Wang Yi: China Proposes 3-Phase Solution to Address Issue of the Rakhine State of
Myanmar,” People’s Republic of China, November 20, 2017, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1512592.shtml.
73. Yang Yuguo, “Zhongguo xiang miandian zhengfu juanzeng jingwu wuzi [China Donates Police Equipment to Myanmar
Government], China Radio International, September 21, 2017, http://news.cri.cn/20170921/2c766065-c534-a299-5b34
-974d67965d99.html; Xinhua, “China Donates Prefabricated Houses for Displaced People in Myanmar’s Rakhine State,”
January 6, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/06/c_136876842.htm.
74. Xinhua, “China Provides Assistance for Restoring Peace, Stability in Myanmar’s Northern State,” September 20, 2017,
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/20/c_136621910.htm.
75. PRC Embassy, “Zhongguo zhengfu xiang jinqi ru meng nanmin tigong jinji rendao zhuyi yuanzhu wuzi” (Chinese
Government Provides Emergency Humanitarian Aid to Recent Refugees in Bangladesh), Embassy of the People’s
Republic of China in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, September 28, 2017, http://bd.chineseembassy.org/chn/zmjw
/t1498000035.htm. By comparison, US humanitarian assistance for displaced people in and from Myanmar has reached
more than $299 million since August 2017, to be managed by international organizations including UNICEF, UNHCR,
and the IOM. USAID, “The United States Announces Humanitarian Assistance for Rohingya and Other Vulnerable
People in Burma and Bangladesh,” Fact Sheet, May 15, 2018, www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/may
-15-2018-united-states-announces-humanitarian-assistance-rohingya-burma-bangladesh; USAID, “Burma – Complex
Emergency: Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2018,” June 29, 2018, www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866
/burma_ce_fs03_06-29-2018.pdf.

United States Institute of Peace
The United States Institute of Peace is an independent national institute, founded by Congress
and dedicated to the proposition that a world without violent conflict is possible, practical,
and essential for US and global security. USIP pursues this vision on the ground in conflict zones,
working with local partners to prevent conflicts from turning to bloodshed and to end it when they
do. The Institute provides training, analysis, and other resources to people, organizations, and
governments working to build peace.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, DC • George E. Moose
(Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC •
Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George
W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University
Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, American
University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and
Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las
Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford
University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, International Council on
Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University,
Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive
Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC
MEMBERS EX OFFICIO
Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State • James Mattis, Secretary of Defense • Frederick J. Roegge,
Vice Admiral, US Navy; President, National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, United
States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

Senior Study Group
Derek Mitchell, National Democratic Institute, SSG Co-Chair
Daniel Twining, International Republican Institute, SSG Co-Chair
Jonah Blank, RAND Corporation
Priscilla Clapp, United States Institute of Peace
Christina Fink, George Washington University
Carla Freeman, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
Murray Hiebert, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Satu Limaye, East-West Center
Michael Schiffer, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
David Shambaugh, George Washington University
David Steinberg, Georgetown University
Jonathan Stivers, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
Jonathan Stromseth, Brookings Institution
SSG Executive Director: Jennifer Staats, United States Institute of Peace
SSG Research Team: I-wei Jennifer Chang and Rachel Vandenbrink, United States Institute of Peace
Senior Study Group members express their support for the general findings and recommendations
reached by the group, but do not necessarily endorse every statement or judgment in the report.
They participate in the SSG in their personal capacities, and the views expressed are their own
and do not necessarily represent the views of their institutions or employers.
The views and opinions expressed in this report also do not necessarily reflect the official policy,
views, or positions of Mr. Schiffer, any member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, or the United States Senate.

2301 Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037
202.457.1700
www.USIP.org
USIP SENIOR STUDY
GROUP SERIES
The United States Institute of Peace is
convening a series of bipartisan Senior Study
Groups (SSGs) to examine China’s influence on
conflict dynamics around the world. Over the
last decade, China has become more engaged
internationally, including in conflict zones and
fragile states of strategic interest to the United
States. From civil wars in neighboring countries,
such as Afghanistan and Myanmar, to more
distant conflicts in Africa, China is becoming
an increasingly important player in regional
and international efforts to mitigate conflict. In
countries where China exerts a strong influence,
its engagement can have a substantial impact on
local and international efforts to curb violence
and extremism. The SSGs offer new insights
into China's objectives and role vis-à-vis various
conflicts, and generate recommendations
for ways the US government and other key
stakeholders may account for China’s impact in
their work to prevent and resolve conflict and
support lasting peace.

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