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WFA guide to

choosing and using
a media auditor
Second edition

In association with:

WFA guide to choosing and using

a media auditor

CONTENTS
Page
1

Introduction

2

2

Objectivity and independence

3

3

Confidentiality

5

4

Transparency and best practice

6

5

Professionalism

8

6

Remuneration and data ownership

9

7

Representation and conflict of interest

10

8

Other key considerations

10

8.1

Online, interactive media

10

8.2

Auditing expertise across the globe

11

8.3

Media inflation, deflation

11

8.4

Who audits the auditors?

12

Appendix
Bibliography

Published 2003, Revised 2010

12

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1

a media auditor

INTRODUCTION
1.1

The media spend of any advertiser company is typically one of its highest outgoings and
it is for this reason that most companies wish to assess this spend regularly to ensure
that maximum effectiveness and efficiency are being achieved. One way to do this is to
employ an independent media auditor to evaluate how its media budgets are being deployed and the level of value being delivered by its media planning and buying agency.

1.2

Although these auditing companies are sometimes referred to as media consultants, the
functions can be separated. Media auditing involves assessments of media buying performance, usually comparative, whereas media consultancy – such as the evaluation of
media strategies and planning – usually implies more custom-made, subjective project
work. This guide concerns itself mainly with the auditing practice.

1.3

The media auditor has become an important figure in assessing the performance of media agencies since the early 1990’s. There are different approaches to auditing media
value, including:
– performance can be compared to a pool of comparable data;
– it can be tracked year-on-year after adjustment against prevailing media (and general)
cost changes i.e. inflation or deflation;
– it can be analysed in comparison with whatever market data is available to the auditor,
within the same or other countries;
– or, finally, benchmarked against ‘market prices’ estimated from all the above through
econometric modeling procedures.
It is not the purpose of this guide to express a preference for one route over others – indeed, different solutions, or combinations of them, may be suitable for different categories, media, markets, countries.

1.4

While many advertisers may now employ auditors, the need has arisen for a comprehensive guide, international in its perspective, describing and defining the advertisers’ needs
and objectives, the auditors’ working methods and operating principles, and making recommendations on how they should work together.
This paper is designed to address this, and is intended to help the client – and also its
agency partners – to obtain optimum value from the audit process. It is intended to apply
to assignments where an independent media auditor is analyzing media performance
data. It doesn’t pretend to be prescriptive and refers to best practice principles, which
should be borne in mind by all parties involved in a media audit.
Similar documents, more or less detailed, exist in some countries (see: Bibliography). In
case of conflicts or discrepancies, the existing national codes – if published with the participation or the official agreement of the local advertiser association – shall prevail over
this international guide.

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2

a media auditor

OBJECTIVITY AND INDEPENDENCE
2.1

The choice of the auditor is the exclusive role of the advertiser, although it may chose to
consider input and advice from its agency.

2.2

In choosing the auditor, the advertiser will obviously take into account its integrity, expertise and reputation, sector-specific experience but also the particular purpose of the
assignment:
– auditing of media buying performance, whether on a permanent or ‘ad-hoc’ basis; or
– a more a complex task, such as the assistance in an agency review, or the selection of
a new agency.
Depending upon the geographic scope of the services it is seeking, the advertiser will carefully consider the extent, nature and composition of the auditing company’s offices:
– are the local offices fully owned?
– do they have the appropriate size and set of competencies?
– if they are not fully owned, what is the nature of the relationship, is it exclusive or not,
what controls the central office is entitled to make, how and how often these controls
are actually made?
– if the relationship is not exclusive, what legal protocols are in place to ensure the absolute confidentiality of the advertiser’s data?
– are the staff of sufficient professional media expertise to ensure a collaborative relationship with the advertiser’s media agency, should the advertiser require this?

2.3

Advertisers generally use the services of auditors for one or more of the following controls
and/or tasks1:
A) Services provided by the agency:
– actual delivery by the agency of the best possible (or promised by contract) media
buying conditions, in terms of cost, quality, and respect of agreed strategic and
tactical specifications;
– clarity and compliance of financial streams (invoicing, payments, bonuses, discounts);
– did the media companies execute the orders transmitted by the agency on behalf
of the client, accurately and in compliance with the agreed specifications (prices,
units, dates, sizes, positions…), for all media, including – and particularly – the digital ones.
B) When the advertiser works with more than one agency, locally and/or internationally:
– the consolidation, and comparison, of the various agencies’ buying performance,
using data from audits of these agencies and/or provided by the advertiser.

1

See WFA Media Auditing Survey Results 2009 (APAC, EMEA & LATAM – available on request to WFA members)

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a media auditor

C) The relationship itself with the agency:
– actual delivery of the services: competency of personnel, actual use of available
media research and tools, respect of work processes, according to best practices
and/or as agreed in the contract;
– compensation systems: their set-up, and on-going implementation. Monitoring of
models and KPI’s, especially when incentives are included in the system;
– review of the relationship: overall evaluation of the incumbent, new agency selection process (pitch), assistance in the negotiation, choice of a compensation system, and establishment of the contract.
D) (Sometimes) the strategic and tactical output of the agency:
– advice on, and evaluation of, the agency’s strategic and tactical recommendations:
media mix, intensities, timing, scheduling, choice of vehicles, post evaluation.
In this last case, generally the advertiser is not looking for an ‘audit’, but for alternative
advice – the auditing company providing a subjective consultancy, not an objective
audit (see also below, § 7.2).
The advertiser may decide to use the services of a media auditor either on a permanent
basis, or occasionally to benchmark periodically (e.g. every 3-4 years) the work of the media agency, or in exceptional situation only (e.g. a media agency review, or the selection
of a new agency). The decision about how often the services of a media auditor should be
used depends essentially upon the situation and needs of the advertiser: for example if it
has some kind of internal auditing resource or not, if it has consolidated its budgets with
only one agency, or it works with more than one agency. In the latter case, the comparison
of the 2-3 agencies’ strategies and buying performance provides useful benchmarks, even
if there are differences in the targets and media mix.
2.4

In the interests of best practice and transparency, when circumstances allow it, the advertiser would normally choose to involve the Agency in selected phases of the auditing process. This will protect the quality of relationship with the agency, ensure total alignment,
transparency and collaboration and make easier to bring into action the audit’s outcome.

2.5

To ensure the objectivity of its advice, the media auditor should have no business connections, either itself or through any subsidiary or associated company, with any media owner
or advertising or media agency or agency holding company.

2.6

Any other business relationship between the auditor and agencies or media companies,
such as consulting or other assignments constituting a potential source of conﬂict of interest, should be disclosed to the advertiser or agency holding company.

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a media auditor

CONFIDENTIALITY
3.1

It is the responsibility of the media auditor always to ensure the absolute confidentiality
of every client’s individual data and other information. This applies before and during the
audit, as well as following its completion.

3.2

The media auditor should ensure that any data pools or databases used in the course of
delivering its services are of an adequate size to protect the absolute confidentiality of
each individual client’s data (see also 5.3). Wherever circumstances justify this, a client
can ask to have its data not included in the database.

3.3

The media auditor should not pass any information about the media agency’s activities
to any third party without specific prior consent of the client and agency, nor should it pass
on any other market data, research findings, or research methodology, which are exclusive
to the client and/or the agency.

3.4

It is recommended that the media auditor’s undertaking to keep all client and agency
data confidential, is reinforced by a non-disclosure agreement which binds the three parties.

3.5

Client disclosure may sometimes present a difficult issue. On the one hand, existing
clients’ wishes for their custom not to be disclosed must be respected. On the other, it is
reasonable for an advertiser considering using an auditor to request a current client list,
particularly those in the same sector. Within these opposing constraints, providing prior
consent has been sought from existing clients, auditors should therefore make every effort
fully and transparently to provide such data on request.

3.6

Subject to their mutual agreement, an advertiser may ask a media auditor to work exclusively for them and not accept any work for any named competitor2. If an advertiser
requests exclusivity but a named competitor is already client to the auditor, then he is
bound to inform the advertiser he cannot accept this clause though he need not divulge
the identity of the conflicting advertiser. The advertiser will then retain the right to choose
whether to engage the auditor in the knowledge that they also work for a competitor.
If an auditor has already agreed to work for a client on an exclusive basis, it must decline
any subsequent approach from a competing client.

3.7

2

When the auditor provides its service for more than one country, using a network of local
partner entities (fully owned or affiliate), all the considerations about confidentiality apply
to each and every entity. Each of them should underwrite non-disclosure agreements (see
above § 3.4)

Exclusive arrangements may in certain circumstances infringe competition law. Advertisers should seek legal advice
before entering into such arrangements.

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a media auditor

TRANSPARENCY AND BEST PRACTICE
4.1

The media auditor should clearly identify in all reports all data sources used in the delivery
of its services.

4.2

The agency is required to provide the media auditor with all information relevant to the
assignment on request, in the respect of the pre-agreed timescales and processes.

4.3

Where databases or pools are used, the media auditor should make clear to the advertiser
the size and scope of any such database, the age of the data where relevant, the composition by media and product/service categories, and the methods of calculation used in
the delivery of its services. Under normal circumstances, only the most relevant and up to
date data will be used. In the interests of best practice, the auditor would normally choose
to keep both the advertiser and agency informed on these issues. In cases where the database is to be shared with other auditors, the terms of such sharing must be disclosed to
the client.

4.4

Media auditors should allow clients the right to commission an examination of data and
methodology used, subject to this being carried out by an agreed, neutral expert and
being subject to absolute confidentiality on all matters relating to individual client companies and individual media agencies.

4.5

Ensuring that all the relevant audit results and analyses, describing an agency’s performance, are visible to that agency can help make the process more transparent. It is recommended practice, at the client’s exclusive discretion and initiative, to share these analyses
with the media agency.

4.6

If the advertiser decides that the media auditor’s results are to be discussed in a meeting
with the media agency, the media auditor should send his report to the media agency in
advance of the meeting to allow the agency a reasonable opportunity to review the findings. The objective of such meetings will be to achieve the best quality verification, learnings and actionable points, as such it will be preferable to circulate all relevant material
at least one week in advance in order to give all parties adequate time for preparation. No
information should be sent to the agency, before the client has reviewed it, and approved
it for sharing.

4.7

Where a media agency’s contract with an advertiser includes an incentive element linked
to media planning/buying performance, the media auditor should consult with the advertiser to ensure that the agency is evaluated specifically against the pre-agreed objectives.
Any deviation should be subject to previous, mutual agreement, between the agency and
the advertiser.

4.8

Media auditors should under no circumstances seek or call for media buying economies
which would be to the detriment of the effectiveness of the media plan, or in conflict with
the brief or agreed guidelines. In the latter situation, they may recommend to the client to
modify the brief and/or the guidelines.

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4.9

a media auditor

The media auditor should demonstrate absolute integrity and independence throughout
the audit process, as stated earlier, § 2.5 and 2.6. If the audit involves any media strategy
or schedule in which the auditor or any associated company has had any involvement in
planning or buying, it must be clearly disclosed to all parties. The methods and processes
involved should be also adequately disclosed.

4.10 In the event of being appointed to evaluate an agency’s performance and consequently
recommending an agency review, the media auditor must provide the advertiser with a
full breakdown of the basis for that recommendation and the reasons for suggesting such
a review. The advertiser should first and foremost consider giving the agency appropriate
opportunity to address its perceived shortcomings and avoid a review unless absolutely
necessary under the circumstances.
4.11 The client may choose to enlist a media auditor to advise them on any review of their
media arrangements, and/or the selection of a new media agency. In which case – as in all
others – the choice of which media auditor will perform this task, remains with the client.
It is the responsibility of the auditor to full disclose any potential conflicts of interest in
the accomplishment of this specific assignment. Where a review is deemed necessary, the
advertisers’ representative body can contribute expertise to this process in most markets.
4.12 The client may seek advice about the agency’s remuneration: the system, amount or both.
In this case the auditor must be given access – by the agency and the client – to all relevant client specific information, necessary to prepare and justify a recommendation. The
agency should be given the opportunity to challenge the auditor’s conclusions, either with
the client and auditor together, or confidentially with the client, at the client’s discretion.
In any event, all shared information must be treated in total confidence by all parties.
4.13 If clients wish for further guidance in this area, then they may ask the agency to make
all appropriate data available to an independent financial auditor, whose confidentiality
is mutually recognized. However, it should be noted that whilst such parties might offer
further objectivity, they may not be as close to media and related issues of specific detail.
Again, the local advertiser representative body may be able to offer further advice and
assistance in this area.
4.14 Whichever the kind of assignment, all the auditor’s requests for data from agencies should
be specific to clients’ needs and operate to a fair and reasonable timescale, but one which
is also relevant to the client’s business needs.
4.15 In some circumstances the work to be carried out by the media agency in order to comply
with the requirements of the media auditor will be extensive and supplementary to the
usual workload carried out in the normal course of servicing the client. Where this is the
case, the agency will reserve the right to raise any concerns with the advertiser and media
auditor prior to the commencement of the audit in order to identify workload implications, and agree upon solutions.

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a media auditor

PROFESSIONALISM
5.1

The media auditor should provide to the client full CV’s of all relevant personnel working on the business, in order to demonstrate the qualifications, experience, ability and
in-depth craft skills necessary to the media auditing process. This experience should be
appropriate for each market and country in which services are offered.

5.2

Whichever technique or combination of techniques a media auditor uses to perform the
media audit, it should be able to demonstrate the robustness and sensitivity of their approach and/or methodology in its application to the individual advertiser’s requirements.

5.3

If data pools are used, they should be of sufficient size and relevance to offer a meaningful
benchmark and to conceal the identity and data of individual constituents. They should
therefore ideally comprise no less than four pieces of activity in the same medium, running
at broadly similar weights across a closely-comparable period of time and aimed at the
same target group. Local circumstances may also mean that attention should be given
to each constituent’s media mix. The media auditor must always be able to defend the
robustness of any data pool/base they use and the client should be provided with details
regarding the size, structure, and methodology behind the benchmarking pool though, for
reasons of competition law compliance, not regarding the identity or data of individual
constituents to the pool.
If the advertiser is a large investor in the marketplace, and/or in any given media, additional attention should be devoted to the pool composition. In particular, regarding the size
of the other advertisers included in the pool itself:
– a single advertiser shouldn’t overly influence average cost levels;
– in case a single advertiser represents more than a reasonable proportion of any relevant pool, this should be disclosed. The advertiser and the auditor then will agree if and
how to use the pool. As a guideline such “reasonable proportion” could be set at around
10%;
– meaningful comparisons can be made only if the pool contains enough advertisers of
comparable size.

5.4

The media auditor should have the necessary contractual access to all relevant media
research and audience measurement data and adequate software in those markets in
which it sources original analysis. It should be noted that in certain circumstances, copyright regulations may prevent media agencies from passing some data to auditors or
other third parties. It will be the agency’s responsibility to gain all such necessary clearances, but where incremental access costs are incurred, these may need to be funded by
the auditor as a component of the costs for providing the service. Any and all additional
cost implications should be highlighted by the relevant party – agency, auditor or both –
before the agreement between the client and the auditor is finalized.

5.5

To insure accurate and fair assessment and comparisons, the auditor must use audience
data fully comparable with that used by the Agency for planning, buying and control of
execution. This should be clearly highlighted to the advertiser (and, upon its request, to the
agency) at all stages of the media audit.
In case data from other sources is used, at any level, for the assessment of an agency’s
performance, this should be clearly explained and justified to the advertiser (and, at its
request, to the agency) and mentioned in all the documentation produced by the auditor.

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5.6

a media auditor

Beyond the control of performance and compliance of what has been done by the agency
in the past, the key purpose of audits is to improve the overall performance and ROI of
present and future media investments.
In addition to (or instead of) traditional, formal presentations, the output of the auditor’s
work should be delivered at times and in ways that maximize its immediate actionability
(and ROI of its own cost), such as:
– use of internet/intranet communications and access to data
– clear summaries with conclusions and recommended actions
– presentation material, and conclusions, shared in advance with the advertiser and, at
its request, other interested parties.
At the time of publication of this document (early 2010) it appears there is abundant
room for improvement in this area, at the initiative of the auditing companies. With the
support (and the input from) their clients, they should offer more innovative ways to deliver their work, as the tool of an effective partnership for the short and long term optimization of the media investment.

5.7

All parties, and in particular the client, should have a positive/constructive attitude towards the whole process, and remain fully open-minded regarding its outcome.
Initially and along the whole process, the auditor should be able to manage expectations,
be and remain neutral and open minded regarding the possible outcome of its work, and
avoid speculation or over-promising which could influence its objectivity.
The audit will not necessarily lead to a reduction of costs, if the agency is already providing professional, efficient and effective services. In this case, the audit’s cost will paid
back by the increased trust and the strengthened quality of the client-agency partnership,
in which both should be interested to further invest.
The existence of an ongoing monitoring and benchmarking procedure, performed by an
independent 3rd party, is an additional incentive for the agency to deliver its commitments, provide the best possible cost efficiencies, and offer state-of-the-art service. This
element will also contribute to pay back the cost of the auditing.

6

REMUNERATION AND DATA OWNERSHIP
6.1

It is strongly recommended that the media auditor’s remuneration is independent of the
client’s delivered and assessed media buying performance (see also 4.8).

6.2

All reports and findings relating specifically to the advertiser’s business should belong to
the advertiser and should not be passed on beyond their organization or resold; ownership
of generic data and benchmarking pools rests with the media auditor.

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7

a media auditor

REPRESENTATION AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST
7.1

Media auditing is a commercially-offered advertiser-focused service activity. Media auditors are not representative bodies, but should nevertheless stand for, and indeed promote,
their advertiser customers’ interests in at all times every area of their activities, including
participation in industry issues and the public arena. This may involve consultation and/or
liaison with the appropriate global or local advertiser and agency representative bodies.

7.2

Media auditing companies may have consultancy divisions which undertake work for media owners, agencies and advertisers – amongst other clients. This raises serious potential
conflicts of interest:
– ideally, media auditing companies should therefore not undertake work for media
owners. In those cases where a media auditing company, a division of it or an associated company, does undertake work for media owners, this work and its scope should be
declared to its advertiser clients;
– the same applies with regard to agencies and/or communication groups/ holding companies;
– an advertiser may feel the need to hire a media consultancy service, to improve its media strategies and/or agency arrangements, as a result of a ‘negative’ audit. Conversely, if the current strategies and agency arrangements are audited as satisfactory,
there is no need for further involvement of a third party. This can create a conflict of
interest for the auditing-consulting organization. In most circumstances, the organization’s professionalism and integrity are sufficient to control such risks. But it is important for all the involved parties, and especially the advertiser, to devote specific attention to this aspect of the relationship.

8. OTHER KEY CONSIDERATIONS
8.1

Online, interactive media.
Given the importance of the online media, and their fluidity, it is recommended to the
advertiser to devote special attention to the experience, expertise and equipment of the
auditor:
– at the date of publication of this document (early 2010), most of the international auditing companies were still in the process of building their online-auditing operations;
– given the extreme fragmentation and segmentation of the media, is the size and composition of the pool suitable for comparisons with the media vehicles actually used by
the advertiser?
– there are not (yet) standardized metrics to measure exposure to the interactive media,
the advertiser should make sure that the one (or more) proposed really correspond to
its needs, and are consistent across vehicles and, if applicable, countries. Cost comparisons may be meaningless, or misleading, if they don’t refer to appropriate, consistent
units of count.

 10


8.2

a media auditor

Auditing expertise across the globe
Media auditing is a profession that started in Europe (first the UK, then other Countries)
and is still in development: mature in some countries, it is in its infancy or non-existent in
others. While the direct knowledge of the local marketplace is crucial for a reliable and
meaningful audit, the companies’ networks may by at different stages of their development and maturity.
If the needs of the advertiser encompass large geographies, special attention should be
devoted to who actually will do the work on a country-by-country basis. In some cases it
may be better to postpone the audit for a given country, if the conditions of accuracy,
reliability and confidentiality are not met.
Where the appointed international auditor chooses to use a network of local affiliates,
this should be clearly disclosed to the advertiser. In any case, it is the responsibility of that
international auditor to ensure continuity in process, methodology and output, especially
all ROI and media value calculations, when assessing an agency’s media planning-buying
performance.
Best practice dictates that where a composite of affiliate partners are used across a variety of companies to provide an advertiser with a regional validation of media planning/
buying performance, the international auditor appointed to the advertiser’s business
should ensure consistency in process, methodology and output to reflect an agency’s true
performance. They should also ensure consistency in all ROI and media value calculations
when pools are used.

8.3

Media inflation, deflation
Most evaluations of media buying performance include comparisons with the general
evolution of media costs i.e. media inflation or deflation. The assessment of the work of
the media agency is largely influenced by the outcome of such comparison.
In most markets there is no official, or even generally accepted, source for obtaining and
tracking media cost trends. Most of the time, they result from estimates. Auditors should
pay particular attention to the cost trends data they use, or produce. They should explain
and justify to the clients the sources and methodologies, and check as much as possible
their accuracy against historical data and other meaningful indicators (e.g. general inflation, GDP trends, client’s prices and general economic data.
The assessment of the inflation-deflation rates and trends used by the agency, is an integral component of the auditing process. If the auditor considers that such rates should
have been different, the issue should be submitted immediately to the advertiser. Then,
under its supervision, an agreement will be found with the agency, on which inflation-deflation data, finally, will be used.

 11


8.4

a media auditor

Who audits the auditors?
Literally “auditing” the work of an auditor doesn’t make practical sense and, in most circumstances, it is not needed.
Assessments of the quality and consistency of an auditor’s work can be provided by:
– ﬁrst and foremost, the advertiser’s in house media expertise (media director, coordinators), informed by its interactions with media companies, media and other agencies,
the input from local and international professional organizations, general trends and
changes in the marketplace, opinions and perceptions of client referees and client partners;
– if the size of the advertiser allows, and the in-house media expertise is strong, it could
be useful to work with more than one auditor (e.g. by geography, or broad categories/
brands).

APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY
CANADA
ACA, CMDC, ICA, AAPQ
“Media Auditing, a guidebook on best practices for the Canadian Market”
70 pages – year 2008
FRANCE
UDA, UDECAM
«Guide des Relations Annonceur.Agence Media», chapters on Auditing
100 pages (total) – May 2006
UNITED KINGDOM
ISBA in association with IPA
“Guide to Choosing and Using a Media Auditor”
5 pages, largely based upon the 2003 WFA 1st edition guide - June 2003
EUROPE
EACA and WFA
“European Guidelines on Client-Agency relationships and Best Practice in the Pitch process”.
16 pages, April 2009

 12

European Association of Communications Agencies
152 Bld Brand Whitlock
B-1200 Brussels – Belgium
T +32 2 740 0710 – F +32 2 740 0717
info@eaca.be – www.eaca.eu

World Federation of Advertisers
Avenue Louise, 166
B-1050 Brussels – Belgium
T +32 2 502 57 40 – F +32 2 502 56 66
info@wfanet.org – www.wfanet.org

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