Defence and Security: Transparency International

Editor's Notes

• #2: I’d like to thank the university and the Global Development Institute in this, its inaugural week, for this invitation. Shalni had introduced TI, TI-UK and the two international programmes that we manage from the UK. I will focus on the Defence and Security programme, that was set up in 2004 with DfID funding – I had been working in the world of Aerospace and Defence for companies now owned by Lockheed Martin and BAe Systems and written a book on corruption in the military-industrial world and was asked by TI to become involved. I became a strategic advisor in 2004, became a Trustee in 2014 and now Chair the Trustee Committee for this international programme.
• #3: 2
• #4: 3
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• #7: 6
• #8: 7
• #9: Fuel for violent extremism Calling card for violent opposition movements – can be a powerful weapon in the hands of those who wish to see fragile institutions fail, and major cause of insecurity instability and conflict. The Taliban, ISIL and Boko Haram all draw on deep public anger at the abuse of official power to secure recruits and support.  Violent extremism flourishes wherever governments line their pockets at the expense of providing basic services, monopolistic elites limit the economic opportunities of ordinary people, or police orchestrate organised crime instead of tackling it. There is also a wealth of evidence that corruption is a facilitator of terrorism – whether in the supply of US passports to the Mumbai bombers or the support that corrupt capital provides to insurgent groups. Destroying institutions Corruption does not just drive people towards violent opposition movements, also corrodes the very institutions tasked with defending the state against these threats. This makes the challenge of building stability even more difficult. Pouring large quantities of practical support into weak institutions—in particular security institutions such as the armed forces—can sometimes do more harm than good when weapons and even training are at a high risk of being diverted or wasted.   Undermining state legitimacy When corruption is pervasive those in power lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public – not about ineffective government, happens when government is repurporsed (government line their pockets at the expense of providing basic services, elites limit the economic opportunities of ordinary people, police orchestrate organised crime instead of tackling it.) Countries without legitimate governments pose a serious threat to international community - in many cases leads to may find the solutions presented by groups pushing an ideology of violent extremism, so often their articulation of the problem rings true to even the most moderate of populations.  Corruption could well sow the seed of violent uprisings even in countries which seem stable and prosperous, as corruption or even just the perception of corruption caused by a lack of transparency will, in the end, kill public trust and support. Corrupt practices, institutions benefitting the privileged few, and elite failure to share the proceeds of development or engage their populations in debate, are proven to plunge countries into conflict.    
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• #11: Correlation but not necessarily causality. Add in GI?? This was done for the June 2014 Carnegie Institute report: Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security. Summary of that Report Systemic corruption has an unrecognized bearing on international security. Policymakers and private companies often pay insufficient attention to corruption when deciding what foreign and defense policies to pursue or where to invest. Greater understanding of the nature of acute corruption and its impact on global security would contribute to a better assessment of costs and benefits and therefore to improved policy and practice. Security Implications of Severe Corruption • Acute corruption should be understood not as a failure or distortion of government but as a functioning system in which ruling networks use selected levers of power to capture specific revenue streams. This effort often overshadows activities connected with running a state. • Such systematic corruption evokes indignation in populations, making it a factor in social unrest and insurgency. • It contributes to other international security threats, such as symbiotic relationships between states and transnational organized crime networks, facilitation for terrorist organizations, permeable international security regimes, and acute economic disruptions. • Corruption does not fuel these threats alone. It combines with other risk factors, such as ethnic, religious, or linguistic rifts in a population or severe economic disparities, to increase the likelihood of a security challenge. • Western policymakers typically prioritize other considerations, such as immediate security imperatives, the economic or strategic value of maintaining relations with a given government, or return on investment, over corruption concerns. As a result, Western institutions and individuals often enable corrupt governments, exacerbating security threats and incurring sometimes dangerous reputational risk.
• #12: However, not everything is so bleak. There are example where post-conflict nations can fight corruption even after conflict. Here are some example – even if only 7. Columbia is seen as a shining light internationally – it also has a very good TI chapter! Liberia, although corruption rears its head from time to time, is working hard under President Sirleaf.
• #13: That is a rapid round-up of DS corruption. So what do we do in TI-UK? We see the world of D&S Corruption in three sectors: Accountable Defence Sectors – government departments Defence industry integrity – the companies Conflict and Instability – the countries in post-conflict situations and / or at the highest risk 6.1 Background This is the first full year of implementing the new DSP strategy. Our goals are to:  ?Establish global standards, holding the advanced and emerging powers to account (ADS)  ?Address systemic risks in the supply side of the arms trade (II).  ?Prevent conflict and support fragile states by creating a measurable reduction in corruption risk in the defence sectors of key states (C&I) 6.2 Focus areas  ?Across each of the three teams, we will use high-quality advocacy based on DSP research to put forward policy positions and create change. The focus on advocacy is new for DSP, and we will develop our skills in this area.  ?A major focus for the year will also be fundraising; the DFID PPS comes to an end in December, and our strategy is to broaden the programme’s funding base so it is not overly-reliant on a small number of large donors, and has a greater diversity of types of donor. We will particularly target large foundations and institutional donors.
• #14: 6.3.1 Accountable Defence Sectors We will be working with governments and civil society to create a set of accountable global defence standards, using the GI as an instrument to facilitate agreement and progress. We aim to have a number of countries sign up to the idea. We will be build a network of support in key emerging and regional powers, such as Mexico, Indonesia or Ghana, and ensure continued buy-in from US, the UK and Germany. There will be a strong focus on activity in the Asia-Pacific region working closely with government, civil society and TI colleagues in Indonesia and India, and then with ASEAN as a regional organisation around its recent ‘ASEAN Blue Print’ for 2016 -2025, which has a stand-alone section to “Promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions”. We will be working with NATO to shape the detail of the ‘Building Integrity’ policy, to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016. Outputs  ?We will draft a set of accountable global defence standards and seek input from potential convening states, like Norway, Germany and the UK.  ?We will produce concrete reform tools and guidance that can underpin global standards –based on the GI 2015.  ?We will set up a chapter fund to support defence and security work across the TI movement.  ?We will conduct an advocacy campaign in ASEAN states.  ?We will have a colleague based in a key location outside of Europe / the UK, most likely in Asia.
• #15: 6.3.1 Accountable Defence Sectors We will be working with governments and civil society to create a set of accountable global defence standards, using the GI as an instrument to facilitate agreement and progress. We aim to have a number of countries sign up to the idea. We will be build a network of support in key emerging and regional powers, such as Mexico, Indonesia or Ghana, and ensure continued buy-in from US, the UK and Germany. There will be a strong focus on activity in the Asia-Pacific region working closely with government, civil society and TI colleagues in Indonesia and India, and then with ASEAN as a regional organisation around its recent ‘ASEAN Blue Print’ for 2016 -2025, which has a stand-alone section to “Promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions”. We will be working with NATO to shape the detail of the ‘Building Integrity’ policy, to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016. Outputs  ?We will draft a set of accountable global defence standards and seek input from potential convening states, like Norway, Germany and the UK.  ?We will produce concrete reform tools and guidance that can underpin global standards –based on the GI 2015.  ?We will set up a chapter fund to support defence and security work across the TI movement.  ?We will conduct an advocacy campaign in ASEAN states.  ?We will have a colleague based in a key location outside of Europe / the UK, most likely in Asia.
• #16: 6.3.1 Accountable Defence Sectors We will be working with governments and civil society to create a set of accountable global defence standards, using the GI as an instrument to facilitate agreement and progress. We aim to have a number of countries sign up to the idea. We will be build a network of support in key emerging and regional powers, such as Mexico, Indonesia or Ghana, and ensure continued buy-in from US, the UK and Germany. There will be a strong focus on activity in the Asia-Pacific region working closely with government, civil society and TI colleagues in Indonesia and India, and then with ASEAN as a regional organisation around its recent ‘ASEAN Blue Print’ for 2016 -2025, which has a stand-alone section to “Promote greater transparency and understanding of defence policies and security perceptions”. We will be working with NATO to shape the detail of the ‘Building Integrity’ policy, to be adopted at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, July 2016. Outputs  ?We will draft a set of accountable global defence standards and seek input from potential convening states, like Norway, Germany and the UK.  ?We will produce concrete reform tools and guidance that can underpin global standards –based on the GI 2015.  ?We will set up a chapter fund to support defence and security work across the TI movement.  ?We will conduct an advocacy campaign in ASEAN states.  ?We will have a colleague based in a key location outside of Europe / the UK, most likely in Asia.
• #17: 6.3.2 Industry Integrity We will be tackling the biggest barriers to reducing corruption in the defence industry - aiming for a fundamental shift in both industry and government practice on the use of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts. This campaign will be underpinned by strong evidence-based research into the role of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts in facilitating corruption. There will be work focussed on increasing standards in companies, following on from the CI 2015. One aim is to create sustained pressure on major companies based in EU and US markets that scored poorly. We will also begin work to map global sales and corruption to increase our understanding of the current state of corruption in the arms trade. We will also focus on the role of suspension and debarment with the aim of improving the utility of this tool in European countries. Outputs:  ?We will conduct an advocacy campaign on agents/intermediaries –targeting industry and government and focusing on the recommendations coming out of our forthcoming report.  ?We will produce a report on the corruption risks around offset contracting and scope out the concept of a ‘responsible procurement protocol’.  ?We will implement tailored engagement plans for companies in the CI and engagement plans for each group. We will conduct a methodological review and impact assessment of Companies Index and begin preparatory work for possible third edition of the Companies Index or similar tool.  ?We will develop a defence corruption mapping tool.  ?We will publish recommendations on the role of suspension and debarment in the EU or UK, and secure the support of US debarment officials as advocates.
• #18: 6.3.2 Industry Integrity We will be tackling the biggest barriers to reducing corruption in the defence industry - aiming for a fundamental shift in both industry and government practice on the use of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts. This campaign will be underpinned by strong evidence-based research into the role of agents/intermediaries and offset contracts in facilitating corruption. There will be work focussed on increasing standards in companies, following on from the CI 2015. One aim is to create sustained pressure on major companies based in EU and US markets that scored poorly. We will also begin work to map global sales and corruption to increase our understanding of the current state of corruption in the arms trade. We will also focus on the role of suspension and debarment with the aim of improving the utility of this tool in European countries. Outputs:  ?We will conduct an advocacy campaign on agents/intermediaries –targeting industry and government and focusing on the recommendations coming out of our forthcoming report.  ?We will produce a report on the corruption risks around offset contracting and scope out the concept of a ‘responsible procurement protocol’.  ?We will implement tailored engagement plans for companies in the CI and engagement plans for each group. We will conduct a methodological review and impact assessment of Companies Index and begin preparatory work for possible third edition of the Companies Index or similar tool.  ?We will develop a defence corruption mapping tool.  ?We will publish recommendations on the role of suspension and debarment in the EU or UK, and secure the support of US debarment officials as advocates.
• #19: 6.3.3 Conflict & Instability We will be working with four priority fragile states:  ?Afghanistan: we will focus on addressing the problem of payment schemes and ghost soldiers  ?Kenya: our aim is to strengthen civil society awareness, to increase pressure for government reforms  ?Nigeria: we will use the opportunity of the new Buhari government and the enthusiastic chapter to develop a strategy to influence the MOD’s activities and strengthen civil society oversight  ?Ukraine: we will be implementing the pilot project (funded by DMFA) to create the Defence Corruption Monitoring Committee, which will involve hiring a member of staff to work in Kiev. We are looking to conduct a major advocacy campaign to ensure corruption is recognised as a threat to stability and peace, and that practical recommendations to reduce it are implemented. We will be using our research to feed into legislation in the US and UK, and the Anti-Corruption Summit this May. We aim to influence peace operations through the UN and engage in the debate around the SDG national indicators to ensure that defence and security sector integrity is factored in. We will be updating our training courses, prioritising making new and engaging modules for BISL/BOG and OpTACC as needed. This we will continue to do in collaboration with UKDA as well as establish relationships with new training institutions. Outputs:  ?We will publish a report on fragile states, making the case for the link between corruption and conflict.  ?We aim to also publish a report on ghost soldiers in Afghanistan and establish an in-country reporting mechanism.  ?In Ukraine we will implement the DCMC project – recruiting a staff member in Kiev, establishing a committee, producing four progress reports on the MOD, developing a website for reporting corruption concerns and making security assistance more transparent.  ?We will develop strategies, alongside chapters, for influencing reform in Nigeria and Kenya.  ?We will develop ‘Understanding Corrupt Networks’ maps for Kenya, Nigeria and Ukraine.  ?We will publish a risk assessment of the UN’s peace operations system and a methodology and plan for how we could monitor a UN mission in 2017.  ?We will generate research on managing corruption through peace settlements, oversight mechanism in fragile environments, and create a guidance document aimed at security assistant providers.  ?We will manage the delivery of three high quality training courses through the UK Defence Academy: BISL, BIF, and OpTACC, and establish a relationship with one new training provider.
• #20: 6.3.3 Conflict & Instability We will be working with four priority fragile states:  ?Afghanistan: we will focus on addressing the problem of payment schemes and ghost soldiers  ?Kenya: our aim is to strengthen civil society awareness, to increase pressure for government reforms  ?Nigeria: we will use the opportunity of the new Buhari government and the enthusiastic chapter to develop a strategy to influence the MOD’s activities and strengthen civil society oversight  ?Ukraine: we will be implementing the pilot project (funded by DMFA) to create the Defence Corruption Monitoring Committee, which will involve hiring a member of staff to work in Kiev. We are looking to conduct a major advocacy campaign to ensure corruption is recognised as a threat to stability and peace, and that practical recommendations to reduce it are implemented. We will be using our research to feed into legislation in the US and UK, and the Anti-Corruption Summit this May. We aim to influence peace operations through the UN and engage in the debate around the SDG national indicators to ensure that defence and security sector integrity is factored in. We will be updating our training courses, prioritising making new and engaging modules for BISL/BOG and OpTACC as needed. This we will continue to do in collaboration with UKDA as well as establish relationships with new training institutions. Outputs:  ?We will publish a report on fragile states, making the case for the link between corruption and conflict.  ?We aim to also publish a report on ghost soldiers in Afghanistan and establish an in-country reporting mechanism.  ?In Ukraine we will implement the DCMC project – recruiting a staff member in Kiev, establishing a committee, producing four progress reports on the MOD, developing a website for reporting corruption concerns and making security assistance more transparent.  ?We will develop strategies, alongside chapters, for influencing reform in Nigeria and Kenya.  ?We will develop ‘Understanding Corrupt Networks’ maps for Kenya, Nigeria and Ukraine.  ?We will publish a risk assessment of the UN’s peace operations system and a methodology and plan for how we could monitor a UN mission in 2017.  ?We will generate research on managing corruption through peace settlements, oversight mechanism in fragile environments, and create a guidance document aimed at security assistant providers.  ?We will manage the delivery of three high quality training courses through the UK Defence Academy: BISL, BIF, and OpTACC, and establish a relationship with one new training provider.