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<YOUR COURSE NAME HERE>
Deploying DNSSEC
at Scale
Today’s Speakers
2
•Matt Bromiley – SANS Instructor & Incident
Responder
•Dani Grant – Cloudflare product manager,
responsible for Cloudflare’s web portal and core
DNS product
•The Importance of Elliptic Curves
•A Unique Approach to Negative Answers
•Wrap-Up
•Q&A
Today’s Agenda
3
Cloudflare DNS
Cloudflare DNS
● 6M+ domains, 120K with DNSSEC
● 100+ billion DNS queries daily
● ~20M DNSSEC signed queries daily
Without DNSSEC:
TLDR; How DNSSEC Works
Query for A record:
With DNSSEC:
A A A A A
RRSIG
DNSSEC at Scale
1. The Importance of Elliptic Curves
2. A Unique Approach To Negative Answers
Elliptic Curves
Background
● CloudFlare mitigates large DDoS attacks (often 500+ Gbps)
● DDoS is sometimes done through DNS amplification (small DNS query
returns large DNS answer)
● Signed zones with large signature sizes are good for attackers doing
amplification attacks
Elliptic Curves: Small Packet Size
● CloudFlare uses ECDSA to keep key and signature sizes small
● Almost all DNS answers CloudFlare returns are < 512 bytes, even with
DNSSEC
Why does ECDSA have smaller key sizes?
Energy to break 228 bit RSA key
vs. 228 bit ECDSA key
RSA:
Energy to boil a teaspoon of water
RSA:
same as boiling a teaspoon of water
ECDSA:
boiling all the water on earth
Energy to break 228 bit RSA key
vs. 228 bit ECDSA key
Comparing DNSKEY Answers
ietf.org. 985 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AwEAAdDECajHaTjfSoNTY58WcBah1BxPKVIHBz4IfLjfqMvium4lgKtK ZLe97DgJ5/NQrNEGGQmr6fKvUj67cfrZUojZ2cGRizVhgkOqZ9scaTVX
NuXLM5Tw7VWOVIceeXAuuH2mPIiEV6MhJYUsW6dvmNsJ4XwCgNgroAmX hoMEiWEjBB+wjYZQ5GtZHBFKVXACSWTiCtddHcueOeSVPi5WH94Vlubh HfiytNPZLrObhUCHT6k0tNE6phLoHnXWU+6vpsYpz6GhMw/R9BFxW5Pd
PFIWBgoWk2/XFVRSKG9Lr61b2z1R126xeUwvw46RVy3hanV3vNO7LM5H niqaYclBbhk=
ietf.org. 985 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAavjQ1H6pE8FV8LGP0wQBFVL0EM9BRfqxz9p/sZ+8AByqyFHLdZc HoOGF7CgB5OKYMvGOgysuYQloPlwbq7Ws5WywbutbXyG24lMWy4jijlJ
UsaFrS5EvUu4ydmuRc/TGnEXnN1XQkO+waIT4cLtrmcWjoY8Oqud6lDa Jdj1cKr2nX1NrmMRowIu3DIVtGbQJmzpukpDVZaYMMAm8M5vz4U2vRCV ETLgDoQ7rhsiD127J8gVExjO8B0113jCajbFRcMtUtFTjH4z7jXP2ZzD
cXsgpe4LYFuenFQAcRBRlE6oaykHR7rlPqqmw58nIELJUFoMcb/BdRLg byTeurFlnxs=
ietf.org. 985 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 1800 20170213210526 20160214200831 45586 ietf.org. lv7deO/DZ+5Q6mZa9NsT4QQ7ibFU5s73yv7+gHoRyhis/3JmsMy8NIA9
7xoQcYhw1kYNqIgJYZ39XbKcmLyxVG9lzIMFcJOWcWA7QZQ8dW7IbQ4Z /jm8tuoXWWCmO9m1MgSwYfpuPz6IELh8czNylHuG+RZJn1t31wIOnet/ xUDrM5btKotJFeYKAEyVPiuC5N3+R3icd8U96lS1ybKCkXVzbcaDMBNe
r21/avPL7ympHeDiR4ubSTJ4xHr0pg5wCusZS0VRrKMPZrYrW/XW1gWl qRIyY/i4rxl9xyaBiP39eD7B7JvyyRTJObsnjpdd1blchM+DLLzl/7q1 y/vFXw==
ietf.org. 985 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 1800 20170213210642 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. J3FK20+dp6Dy8QnDE4xlv9LJroKfrYQIa4i+ymYWulZqL0GQhEIkkfLb
vyjMrNoVPhKjzNiBobFZDgjhFBDur9GONuWMkM4isBc4gBAKgNrirmh7 963HJ+ngsgHsfRTUHp27ISTgPw/SaxrUOz5JJJytNvr6eTiIsKHgtpaP Xn44E210XQd5ak71//xY2/yCNJHjN3zH41Z0ipDG8UlITWzScFRZcEA+
9frDMBwiv7M9CBbOBeMNDAZXXa6JjkuASROmNIu8mU2XRa+Q8yDnYfF1 1r7JrdASF+zLIrxBX0HHjWtCjn+GvEoPDDTDN6J9oDHlmt8WH6Tmt57h oIuC+g==
cloudflare.com. 3574 IN DNSKEY 257 3 13 mdsswUyr3DPW132mOi8V9xESWE8jTo0dxCjjnopKl+GqJxpVXckHAeF+ KkxLbxILfDLUT0rAK9iUzy1L53eKGQ==
cloudflare.com. 3574 IN DNSKEY 256 3 13 koPbw9wmYZ7ggcjnQ6ayHyhHaDNMYELKTqT+qRGrZpWSccr/lBcrm10Z 1PuQHB3Azhii+sb0PYFkH1ruxLhe5g==
cloudflare.com. 3574 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 13 2 3600 20160310040015 20160110040015 2371 cloudflare.com. kgH/IAYN5endrnFAfJsNZPJHQvcYXqOLHDgrkhMXwvVJzyac/892fFwa
r5jo6u/57JnMJTCGF3P+YHmLiBKE1w==
RSA: 1181 bytes
ECDSA: 313 bytes
ECDSA is fast
...important when you are computing 56.9
billion signatures a day.
Speeding up ECDSA in Go
● Native implementation in assembly (by Vlad Krasnov)
● 21x speed improvements
● Now part of standard Go crypto library as of Go 1.6
● Takes CloudFlare 0.0001 seconds to sign a DNS record
Before After Speedup
ECDSA Sign 1,015,006 ns/op 48,741 ns/op 20.8x
ECDSA Verify 3,086,282 ns/op 146,991 ns/op 21.0x
Negative Answers
What goes into an NXDOMAIN negative
answer w/ DNSSEC?
dig bogus.ietf.org +dnssec
ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800
1800
SOA
ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800
1800
ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452
ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP
8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed
vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg
U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI
0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK
WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ==
SOA
SOA
RRSIG
ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800
1800
ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452
ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP
8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed
vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg
U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI
0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK
WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ==
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC
SOA
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800
1800
ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452
ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP
8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed
vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg
U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI
0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK
WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ==
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC
SOA
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
bogus.ietf.org is between these two names
ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800
1800
ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452
ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP
8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed
vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg
U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI
0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK
WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ==
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170308083322 20160308073501
40452 ietf.org. NxmjhCkTtoiolJUow/OreeBRxTtf2AnIPM/r2p7oS/hNeOdFI9tpgGQY
g0lTOYjcNNoIoDB/r56Kd+5wtuaKT+xsYiZ4K413I+cmrNQ+6oLT+Mz6
Kfzvo/TcrJD99PVAYIN1MwzO42od/vi/juGkuKJVcCzrBKNHCZqu7clu
mU3DEqbQQT2O8dYIUjLlfom1iYtZZrfuhB6FCYFTRd3h8OLfMhXtt8f5
8Q/XvjakiLqov1blZAK229I2qgUYEhd77n2pXV6SJuOKcSjZiQsGJeaM
wIotSKa8EttJELkpNAUkN9uXfhU+WjouS1qzgyWwbf2hdgsBntKP9his 9MfJNA==
SOA
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
NSEC
RRSIG
ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800
1800
ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452
ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP
8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed
vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg
U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI
0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK
WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ==
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170308083322 20160308073501
40452 ietf.org. NxmjhCkTtoiolJUow/OreeBRxTtf2AnIPM/r2p7oS/hNeOdFI9tpgGQY
g0lTOYjcNNoIoDB/r56Kd+5wtuaKT+xsYiZ4K413I+cmrNQ+6oLT+Mz6
Kfzvo/TcrJD99PVAYIN1MwzO42od/vi/juGkuKJVcCzrBKNHCZqu7clu
mU3DEqbQQT2O8dYIUjLlfom1iYtZZrfuhB6FCYFTRd3h8OLfMhXtt8f5
8Q/XvjakiLqov1blZAK229I2qgUYEhd77n2pXV6SJuOKcSjZiQsGJeaM
wIotSKa8EttJELkpNAUkN9uXfhU+WjouS1qzgyWwbf2hdgsBntKP9his 9MfJNA==
SOA
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
NSEC
RRSIG
I ran out of space, continuing on the next page
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
NSEC
RRSIG
SOA
ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG
NSEC DNSKEY SPF
NSEC
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
NSEC
RRSIG
SOA
ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG
NSEC DNSKEY SPF
NSEC
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
NSEC
RRSIG
SOA
*.ietf.org would exist between these names
ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG
NSEC DNSKEY SPF
ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 2 1800 20170308083303 20160308073501 40452
ietf.org. homg5NrZIKo0tR+aEp0MVYYjT7J/KGTKP46bJ8eeetbq4KqNvLKJ5Yig
ve4RSWFYrSARAmbi3GIFW00P/dFCzDNVlMWYRbcFUt5NfYRJxg25jy95
yHNmInwDUnttmzKuBezdVVvRLJY3qSM7S3VfI/b7n6++ODUFcsL88uNB
V6bRO6FOksgE1/jUrtz6/lEKmodWWI2goFPGgmgihqLR8ldv0Dv7k9vy
Ao1uunP6kDQEj+omkICFHaT/DBSSYq59DVeMAAcfDq2ssbr4p8hUoXiB
tNlJWEubMnHi7YmLSgby+m8b97+8b6qPe8W478gAiggsNjc2gQSKOOXH EejOSA==
NSEC
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
NSEC
RRSIG
SOA
NSEC
RRSIG
NSEC
SOA
RRSIG
NSEC
NSEC
RRSIG
SOA
NSEC
RRSIG
for the previous and next name
for the wildcard
ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800
ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org.
S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP 8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed
vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI
0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P
QyuCpQ==
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC
www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170308083322 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org.
NxmjhCkTtoiolJUow/OreeBRxTtf2AnIPM/r2p7oS/hNeOdFI9tpgGQY g0lTOYjcNNoIoDB/r56Kd+5wtuaKT+xsYiZ4K413I+cmrNQ+6oLT+Mz6
Kfzvo/TcrJD99PVAYIN1MwzO42od/vi/juGkuKJVcCzrBKNHCZqu7clu mU3DEqbQQT2O8dYIUjLlfom1iYtZZrfuhB6FCYFTRd3h8OLfMhXtt8f5
8Q/XvjakiLqov1blZAK229I2qgUYEhd77n2pXV6SJuOKcSjZiQsGJeaM wIotSKa8EttJELkpNAUkN9uXfhU+WjouS1qzgyWwbf2hdgsBntKP9his
9MfJNA==
ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY SPF
ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 2 1800 20170308083303 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org.
homg5NrZIKo0tR+aEp0MVYYjT7J/KGTKP46bJ8eeetbq4KqNvLKJ5Yig ve4RSWFYrSARAmbi3GIFW00P/dFCzDNVlMWYRbcFUt5NfYRJxg25jy95
yHNmInwDUnttmzKuBezdVVvRLJY3qSM7S3VfI/b7n6++ODUFcsL88uNB V6bRO6FOksgE1/jUrtz6/lEKmodWWI2goFPGgmgihqLR8ldv0Dv7k9vy
Ao1uunP6kDQEj+omkICFHaT/DBSSYq59DVeMAAcfDq2ssbr4p8hUoXiB tNlJWEubMnHi7YmLSgby+m8b97+8b6qPe8W478gAiggsNjc2gQSKOOXH
EejOSA==
1096 BYTES!!
Problems with negative answers @ scale
1. Requires authoritative server to return
previous and next name
a. Expensive $$$
2. Large answers
a. Big answers = slow answers, and reflection attack
bait
Cloudflare “Black Lies” for NXDOMAIN
● The next name is always
000.[themissingname]
● One NSEC per answer
cloudflare.com. 1799 IN SOA ns3.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2020905521 10000 2400
604800 3600
bogus.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN NSEC 000.bogus.cloudflare.com. RRSIG NSEC
cloudflare.com. 1799 IN RRSIG SOA 13 2 86400 20160309213638 20160307193638 35273
cloudflare.com. mgx1FncjVdOpWhMOqm6+kcPBi/6zC8LF00ccG3DA1RNiI6hXmrqnFiUg dsngBT3VYo0+8AsZ1l0vJiopCdNoTw==
bogus.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 3 3600 20160309213638 20160307193638 35273
cloudflare.com. 8nbevvyI/RsSjunQzjlPkIHphiAOu5gti+aj2ucBx3Nhc7cnaHtJbJ5C dFrOF7eoZuPeiegf0KTtMyhAYp3tWQ==
Comparing Negative Answers
ietf.org. 1799 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000317 1800 1800 604800 1800
ietf.org. 1799 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170213210533 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. P8XoJx+SK5nUZAV/IqiJrsoKtP1c+GXmp3FvEOUZPFn1VwW33242LVrJ
GMI5HHjMEX07EzOXZyLnQeEvlf2QLxRIQm1wAnE6W4SUp7TgKUZ7NJHP dgLr2gqKYim4CI7ikYj3vK7NgcaSE5jqIZUm7oFxxYO9/YPz4Mx7COw6 XBOMYS2v8VY3DICeJdZsHJnVKlgl8L7/yqrL8qhkSW1yDo3YtB9cZEjB
OVk8uRDxK7aHkEnMRz0LODOJ10AngJpg9LrkZ1CO444RhZGgTbwzN9Vq rDyH47Cn3h8ofEOJtYCJvuX5CCzaZDInBsjq9wNAiNBgIQatPkNriR77 hCEHhQ==
ietf.org. 1799 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY SPF
ietf.org. 1799 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 2 1800 20170213210816 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. B9z/JJs30tkn0DyxVz0zaRlm4HkeNY1TqYmr9rx8rH7kC32PWZ1Fooy6
16qmB33/cvD2wtOCKMnNQPdTG2qUs/RuVxqRPZaQojIVZsy/GYONmlap BptzgOJLP7/HOxgYFgMt5q/91JHfp6Mn0sd218/H86Aa98RCXwUOzZnW bdttjsmbAqONuPQURaGz8ZgGztFmQt5dNeNRaq5Uqdzw738vQjYwppfU
9GSLkT7RCh3kgbNcSaXeuWfFnxG1R2SdlRoDICos+RqdDM+23BHGYkYc /NEBLtjYGxPqYCMe/7lOtWQjtQOkqylAr1r7pSI2NOA9mexa7yTuXH+x o/rzRA==
www.apps.ietf.org. 1799 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC
www.apps.ietf.org. 1799 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170213210614 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. U+hEHcTps2IC8VKS61rU3MDZq+U0KG4/oJjIHVYbrWufQ7NdMdnY6hCL
OmQtsvuZVRQjWHmowRhMj83JMUagxoZuWTg6GuLPin3c7PkRimfBx7jI wjqORwcuvpBh92A/s/2HXBma3PtDZl2UDLy4z7wdO62rbxGU/LX1jTqY FoJJLJfJ/C+ngVMIE/QVneXSJkAjHV96FSEnreF81V62x9azv3AHo4tl
qnoYvRDtK+cR072A5smtWMKDfcIr2fI11TAGIyhR55yAiollPDEz5koj BfMstC/JXVURJMM+1vCPjxvwYzTZN8iICf1AupyyR8BNWxgic5yh1ljH 1AuAVQ==
cloudflare.com. 1799 IN SOA ns3.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2020742566 10000 2400 604800 3600
blog.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN NSEC 000.blog.cloudflare.com. RRSIG NSEC
cloudflare.com. 1799 IN RRSIG SOA 13 2 86400 20160220230013 20160218210013 35273 cloudflare.com. kgjtJDuuNC/yX8yWQpol4ZUUr8s8yAXZi26KWBI6S3HDtry2t6LnP1ou
QK10Ut7DXO/XhyZddRBVj3pIpWYdBQ==
blog.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 3 3600 20160220230013 20160218210013 35273 cloudflare.com. 8BKAAS8EXNJbm8DxEI1OOBba8KaiimIuB47mPlteiZf3sVLGN1edsrXE
+q+pHaSHEfYG5mHfCBJrbi6b3EoXOw==
NSEC: 1096 bytes
Black Lies: 357 bytes
To Review
To Review
Save compute on DNSSEC:
● Small answer sizes utilizing ECDSA
● Auto-generate negative answers
•DNS has inherent vulnerabilities that attackers are
taking advantage of – we must mitigate this.
•DNSSEC provides a reliable method to secure DNS
resolutions.
•While DNSSEC is a good idea in theory,
implementation must match current DNS 1-to-1.
Wrap-Up
37
Please use GoToWebinar’s
Questions tool to submit questions
to our panel.
Send to “Organizers”
and tell us if it’s for
a specific panelist.
Q&A
38
Thanks to Cloudflare!
For more questions, contact
dani@cloudflare
And to our attendees,
Thank you for joining us today
Acknowledgements
39

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Deploying DNSSEC at Scale

  • 1. <YOUR COURSE NAME HERE> Deploying DNSSEC at Scale
  • 2. Today’s Speakers 2 •Matt Bromiley – SANS Instructor & Incident Responder •Dani Grant – Cloudflare product manager, responsible for Cloudflare’s web portal and core DNS product
  • 3. •The Importance of Elliptic Curves •A Unique Approach to Negative Answers •Wrap-Up •Q&A Today’s Agenda 3
  • 5. Cloudflare DNS ● 6M+ domains, 120K with DNSSEC ● 100+ billion DNS queries daily ● ~20M DNSSEC signed queries daily
  • 6. Without DNSSEC: TLDR; How DNSSEC Works Query for A record: With DNSSEC: A A A A A RRSIG
  • 7. DNSSEC at Scale 1. The Importance of Elliptic Curves 2. A Unique Approach To Negative Answers
  • 9. Background ● CloudFlare mitigates large DDoS attacks (often 500+ Gbps) ● DDoS is sometimes done through DNS amplification (small DNS query returns large DNS answer) ● Signed zones with large signature sizes are good for attackers doing amplification attacks
  • 10. Elliptic Curves: Small Packet Size ● CloudFlare uses ECDSA to keep key and signature sizes small ● Almost all DNS answers CloudFlare returns are < 512 bytes, even with DNSSEC
  • 11. Why does ECDSA have smaller key sizes?
  • 12. Energy to break 228 bit RSA key vs. 228 bit ECDSA key RSA: Energy to boil a teaspoon of water
  • 13. RSA: same as boiling a teaspoon of water ECDSA: boiling all the water on earth Energy to break 228 bit RSA key vs. 228 bit ECDSA key
  • 14. Comparing DNSKEY Answers ietf.org. 985 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 AwEAAdDECajHaTjfSoNTY58WcBah1BxPKVIHBz4IfLjfqMvium4lgKtK ZLe97DgJ5/NQrNEGGQmr6fKvUj67cfrZUojZ2cGRizVhgkOqZ9scaTVX NuXLM5Tw7VWOVIceeXAuuH2mPIiEV6MhJYUsW6dvmNsJ4XwCgNgroAmX hoMEiWEjBB+wjYZQ5GtZHBFKVXACSWTiCtddHcueOeSVPi5WH94Vlubh HfiytNPZLrObhUCHT6k0tNE6phLoHnXWU+6vpsYpz6GhMw/R9BFxW5Pd PFIWBgoWk2/XFVRSKG9Lr61b2z1R126xeUwvw46RVy3hanV3vNO7LM5H niqaYclBbhk= ietf.org. 985 IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAavjQ1H6pE8FV8LGP0wQBFVL0EM9BRfqxz9p/sZ+8AByqyFHLdZc HoOGF7CgB5OKYMvGOgysuYQloPlwbq7Ws5WywbutbXyG24lMWy4jijlJ UsaFrS5EvUu4ydmuRc/TGnEXnN1XQkO+waIT4cLtrmcWjoY8Oqud6lDa Jdj1cKr2nX1NrmMRowIu3DIVtGbQJmzpukpDVZaYMMAm8M5vz4U2vRCV ETLgDoQ7rhsiD127J8gVExjO8B0113jCajbFRcMtUtFTjH4z7jXP2ZzD cXsgpe4LYFuenFQAcRBRlE6oaykHR7rlPqqmw58nIELJUFoMcb/BdRLg byTeurFlnxs= ietf.org. 985 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 1800 20170213210526 20160214200831 45586 ietf.org. lv7deO/DZ+5Q6mZa9NsT4QQ7ibFU5s73yv7+gHoRyhis/3JmsMy8NIA9 7xoQcYhw1kYNqIgJYZ39XbKcmLyxVG9lzIMFcJOWcWA7QZQ8dW7IbQ4Z /jm8tuoXWWCmO9m1MgSwYfpuPz6IELh8czNylHuG+RZJn1t31wIOnet/ xUDrM5btKotJFeYKAEyVPiuC5N3+R3icd8U96lS1ybKCkXVzbcaDMBNe r21/avPL7ympHeDiR4ubSTJ4xHr0pg5wCusZS0VRrKMPZrYrW/XW1gWl qRIyY/i4rxl9xyaBiP39eD7B7JvyyRTJObsnjpdd1blchM+DLLzl/7q1 y/vFXw== ietf.org. 985 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 5 2 1800 20170213210642 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. J3FK20+dp6Dy8QnDE4xlv9LJroKfrYQIa4i+ymYWulZqL0GQhEIkkfLb vyjMrNoVPhKjzNiBobFZDgjhFBDur9GONuWMkM4isBc4gBAKgNrirmh7 963HJ+ngsgHsfRTUHp27ISTgPw/SaxrUOz5JJJytNvr6eTiIsKHgtpaP Xn44E210XQd5ak71//xY2/yCNJHjN3zH41Z0ipDG8UlITWzScFRZcEA+ 9frDMBwiv7M9CBbOBeMNDAZXXa6JjkuASROmNIu8mU2XRa+Q8yDnYfF1 1r7JrdASF+zLIrxBX0HHjWtCjn+GvEoPDDTDN6J9oDHlmt8WH6Tmt57h oIuC+g== cloudflare.com. 3574 IN DNSKEY 257 3 13 mdsswUyr3DPW132mOi8V9xESWE8jTo0dxCjjnopKl+GqJxpVXckHAeF+ KkxLbxILfDLUT0rAK9iUzy1L53eKGQ== cloudflare.com. 3574 IN DNSKEY 256 3 13 koPbw9wmYZ7ggcjnQ6ayHyhHaDNMYELKTqT+qRGrZpWSccr/lBcrm10Z 1PuQHB3Azhii+sb0PYFkH1ruxLhe5g== cloudflare.com. 3574 IN RRSIG DNSKEY 13 2 3600 20160310040015 20160110040015 2371 cloudflare.com. kgH/IAYN5endrnFAfJsNZPJHQvcYXqOLHDgrkhMXwvVJzyac/892fFwa r5jo6u/57JnMJTCGF3P+YHmLiBKE1w== RSA: 1181 bytes ECDSA: 313 bytes
  • 15. ECDSA is fast ...important when you are computing 56.9 billion signatures a day.
  • 16. Speeding up ECDSA in Go ● Native implementation in assembly (by Vlad Krasnov) ● 21x speed improvements ● Now part of standard Go crypto library as of Go 1.6 ● Takes CloudFlare 0.0001 seconds to sign a DNS record Before After Speedup ECDSA Sign 1,015,006 ns/op 48,741 ns/op 20.8x ECDSA Verify 3,086,282 ns/op 146,991 ns/op 21.0x
  • 18. What goes into an NXDOMAIN negative answer w/ DNSSEC?
  • 20. ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800 SOA
  • 21. ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800 ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP 8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI 0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ== SOA SOA RRSIG
  • 22. ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800 ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP 8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI 0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ== www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC SOA SOA RRSIG NSEC
  • 23. ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800 ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP 8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI 0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ== www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC SOA SOA RRSIG NSEC bogus.ietf.org is between these two names
  • 24. ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800 ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP 8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI 0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ== www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170308083322 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. NxmjhCkTtoiolJUow/OreeBRxTtf2AnIPM/r2p7oS/hNeOdFI9tpgGQY g0lTOYjcNNoIoDB/r56Kd+5wtuaKT+xsYiZ4K413I+cmrNQ+6oLT+Mz6 Kfzvo/TcrJD99PVAYIN1MwzO42od/vi/juGkuKJVcCzrBKNHCZqu7clu mU3DEqbQQT2O8dYIUjLlfom1iYtZZrfuhB6FCYFTRd3h8OLfMhXtt8f5 8Q/XvjakiLqov1blZAK229I2qgUYEhd77n2pXV6SJuOKcSjZiQsGJeaM wIotSKa8EttJELkpNAUkN9uXfhU+WjouS1qzgyWwbf2hdgsBntKP9his 9MfJNA== SOA SOA RRSIG NSEC NSEC RRSIG
  • 25. ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800 ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP 8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI 0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ== www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170308083322 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. NxmjhCkTtoiolJUow/OreeBRxTtf2AnIPM/r2p7oS/hNeOdFI9tpgGQY g0lTOYjcNNoIoDB/r56Kd+5wtuaKT+xsYiZ4K413I+cmrNQ+6oLT+Mz6 Kfzvo/TcrJD99PVAYIN1MwzO42od/vi/juGkuKJVcCzrBKNHCZqu7clu mU3DEqbQQT2O8dYIUjLlfom1iYtZZrfuhB6FCYFTRd3h8OLfMhXtt8f5 8Q/XvjakiLqov1blZAK229I2qgUYEhd77n2pXV6SJuOKcSjZiQsGJeaM wIotSKa8EttJELkpNAUkN9uXfhU+WjouS1qzgyWwbf2hdgsBntKP9his 9MfJNA== SOA SOA RRSIG NSEC NSEC RRSIG I ran out of space, continuing on the next page
  • 27. ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY SPF NSEC SOA RRSIG NSEC NSEC RRSIG SOA
  • 28. ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY SPF NSEC SOA RRSIG NSEC NSEC RRSIG SOA *.ietf.org would exist between these names
  • 29. ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY SPF ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 2 1800 20170308083303 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. homg5NrZIKo0tR+aEp0MVYYjT7J/KGTKP46bJ8eeetbq4KqNvLKJ5Yig ve4RSWFYrSARAmbi3GIFW00P/dFCzDNVlMWYRbcFUt5NfYRJxg25jy95 yHNmInwDUnttmzKuBezdVVvRLJY3qSM7S3VfI/b7n6++ODUFcsL88uNB V6bRO6FOksgE1/jUrtz6/lEKmodWWI2goFPGgmgihqLR8ldv0Dv7k9vy Ao1uunP6kDQEj+omkICFHaT/DBSSYq59DVeMAAcfDq2ssbr4p8hUoXiB tNlJWEubMnHi7YmLSgby+m8b97+8b6qPe8W478gAiggsNjc2gQSKOOXH EejOSA== NSEC SOA RRSIG NSEC NSEC RRSIG SOA NSEC RRSIG
  • 31. ietf.org. 1179 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000325 1800 1800 604800 1800 ietf.org. 1179 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170308083354 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. S0gIjTnQGA6TyIBjCeBXL4ip8aEQEgg2y+kCQ3sLtFa3oNy9vj9kj4aP 8EVu4oIexr8X/i9L8Oj5ec4HOrQoYsMGObRUG0FGT0MEbxepi+wWrfed vD/3mq8KZg/pj6TQAKebeSQGkmb8y9eP0PdWdUi6EatH9ZY/tsoiKyqg U4vtq9sWZ/4mH3xfhK9RBI4M7XIXsPX+biZoik6aOt4zSWR5WDq27pXI 0l+BLzZb72C7McT4PlBiF+U86OngBlGxVBnILyW2aUisi2LY6KeO5AmK WNT0xHWe5+JtPD5PgmSm46YZ8jMP5mH4hSYr76jqwvlCtXvq8XgYQU/P QyuCpQ== www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC www.apps.ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170308083322 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. NxmjhCkTtoiolJUow/OreeBRxTtf2AnIPM/r2p7oS/hNeOdFI9tpgGQY g0lTOYjcNNoIoDB/r56Kd+5wtuaKT+xsYiZ4K413I+cmrNQ+6oLT+Mz6 Kfzvo/TcrJD99PVAYIN1MwzO42od/vi/juGkuKJVcCzrBKNHCZqu7clu mU3DEqbQQT2O8dYIUjLlfom1iYtZZrfuhB6FCYFTRd3h8OLfMhXtt8f5 8Q/XvjakiLqov1blZAK229I2qgUYEhd77n2pXV6SJuOKcSjZiQsGJeaM wIotSKa8EttJELkpNAUkN9uXfhU+WjouS1qzgyWwbf2hdgsBntKP9his 9MfJNA== ietf.org. 1062 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY SPF ietf.org. 1062 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 2 1800 20170308083303 20160308073501 40452 ietf.org. homg5NrZIKo0tR+aEp0MVYYjT7J/KGTKP46bJ8eeetbq4KqNvLKJ5Yig ve4RSWFYrSARAmbi3GIFW00P/dFCzDNVlMWYRbcFUt5NfYRJxg25jy95 yHNmInwDUnttmzKuBezdVVvRLJY3qSM7S3VfI/b7n6++ODUFcsL88uNB V6bRO6FOksgE1/jUrtz6/lEKmodWWI2goFPGgmgihqLR8ldv0Dv7k9vy Ao1uunP6kDQEj+omkICFHaT/DBSSYq59DVeMAAcfDq2ssbr4p8hUoXiB tNlJWEubMnHi7YmLSgby+m8b97+8b6qPe8W478gAiggsNjc2gQSKOOXH EejOSA== 1096 BYTES!!
  • 32. Problems with negative answers @ scale 1. Requires authoritative server to return previous and next name a. Expensive $$$ 2. Large answers a. Big answers = slow answers, and reflection attack bait
  • 33. Cloudflare “Black Lies” for NXDOMAIN ● The next name is always 000.[themissingname] ● One NSEC per answer cloudflare.com. 1799 IN SOA ns3.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2020905521 10000 2400 604800 3600 bogus.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN NSEC 000.bogus.cloudflare.com. RRSIG NSEC cloudflare.com. 1799 IN RRSIG SOA 13 2 86400 20160309213638 20160307193638 35273 cloudflare.com. mgx1FncjVdOpWhMOqm6+kcPBi/6zC8LF00ccG3DA1RNiI6hXmrqnFiUg dsngBT3VYo0+8AsZ1l0vJiopCdNoTw== bogus.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 3 3600 20160309213638 20160307193638 35273 cloudflare.com. 8nbevvyI/RsSjunQzjlPkIHphiAOu5gti+aj2ucBx3Nhc7cnaHtJbJ5C dFrOF7eoZuPeiegf0KTtMyhAYp3tWQ==
  • 34. Comparing Negative Answers ietf.org. 1799 IN SOA ns0.amsl.com. glen.amsl.com. 1200000317 1800 1800 604800 1800 ietf.org. 1799 IN RRSIG SOA 5 2 1800 20170213210533 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. P8XoJx+SK5nUZAV/IqiJrsoKtP1c+GXmp3FvEOUZPFn1VwW33242LVrJ GMI5HHjMEX07EzOXZyLnQeEvlf2QLxRIQm1wAnE6W4SUp7TgKUZ7NJHP dgLr2gqKYim4CI7ikYj3vK7NgcaSE5jqIZUm7oFxxYO9/YPz4Mx7COw6 XBOMYS2v8VY3DICeJdZsHJnVKlgl8L7/yqrL8qhkSW1yDo3YtB9cZEjB OVk8uRDxK7aHkEnMRz0LODOJ10AngJpg9LrkZ1CO444RhZGgTbwzN9Vq rDyH47Cn3h8ofEOJtYCJvuX5CCzaZDInBsjq9wNAiNBgIQatPkNriR77 hCEHhQ== ietf.org. 1799 IN NSEC ietf1._domainkey.ietf.org. A NS SOA MX TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY SPF ietf.org. 1799 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 2 1800 20170213210816 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. B9z/JJs30tkn0DyxVz0zaRlm4HkeNY1TqYmr9rx8rH7kC32PWZ1Fooy6 16qmB33/cvD2wtOCKMnNQPdTG2qUs/RuVxqRPZaQojIVZsy/GYONmlap BptzgOJLP7/HOxgYFgMt5q/91JHfp6Mn0sd218/H86Aa98RCXwUOzZnW bdttjsmbAqONuPQURaGz8ZgGztFmQt5dNeNRaq5Uqdzw738vQjYwppfU 9GSLkT7RCh3kgbNcSaXeuWfFnxG1R2SdlRoDICos+RqdDM+23BHGYkYc /NEBLtjYGxPqYCMe/7lOtWQjtQOkqylAr1r7pSI2NOA9mexa7yTuXH+x o/rzRA== www.apps.ietf.org. 1799 IN NSEC cloudflare-verify.ietf.org. A RRSIG NSEC www.apps.ietf.org. 1799 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 4 1800 20170213210614 20160214200831 40452 ietf.org. U+hEHcTps2IC8VKS61rU3MDZq+U0KG4/oJjIHVYbrWufQ7NdMdnY6hCL OmQtsvuZVRQjWHmowRhMj83JMUagxoZuWTg6GuLPin3c7PkRimfBx7jI wjqORwcuvpBh92A/s/2HXBma3PtDZl2UDLy4z7wdO62rbxGU/LX1jTqY FoJJLJfJ/C+ngVMIE/QVneXSJkAjHV96FSEnreF81V62x9azv3AHo4tl qnoYvRDtK+cR072A5smtWMKDfcIr2fI11TAGIyhR55yAiollPDEz5koj BfMstC/JXVURJMM+1vCPjxvwYzTZN8iICf1AupyyR8BNWxgic5yh1ljH 1AuAVQ== cloudflare.com. 1799 IN SOA ns3.cloudflare.com. dns.cloudflare.com. 2020742566 10000 2400 604800 3600 blog.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN NSEC 000.blog.cloudflare.com. RRSIG NSEC cloudflare.com. 1799 IN RRSIG SOA 13 2 86400 20160220230013 20160218210013 35273 cloudflare.com. kgjtJDuuNC/yX8yWQpol4ZUUr8s8yAXZi26KWBI6S3HDtry2t6LnP1ou QK10Ut7DXO/XhyZddRBVj3pIpWYdBQ== blog.cloudflare.com. 3599 IN RRSIG NSEC 13 3 3600 20160220230013 20160218210013 35273 cloudflare.com. 8BKAAS8EXNJbm8DxEI1OOBba8KaiimIuB47mPlteiZf3sVLGN1edsrXE +q+pHaSHEfYG5mHfCBJrbi6b3EoXOw== NSEC: 1096 bytes Black Lies: 357 bytes
  • 36. To Review Save compute on DNSSEC: ● Small answer sizes utilizing ECDSA ● Auto-generate negative answers
  • 37. •DNS has inherent vulnerabilities that attackers are taking advantage of – we must mitigate this. •DNSSEC provides a reliable method to secure DNS resolutions. •While DNSSEC is a good idea in theory, implementation must match current DNS 1-to-1. Wrap-Up 37
  • 38. Please use GoToWebinar’s Questions tool to submit questions to our panel. Send to “Organizers” and tell us if it’s for a specific panelist. Q&A 38
  • 39. Thanks to Cloudflare! For more questions, contact dani@cloudflare And to our attendees, Thank you for joining us today Acknowledgements 39