Design failure modes and effects analysis (dfmea) of an all terrain vehicle

IJRET: International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology eISSN: 2319-1163 | pISSN: 2321-7308
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Volume: 04 Issue: 06 | June-2015, Available @ http://www.ijret.org 339
DESIGN FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (DFMEA) OF
AN ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLE
Sidhartha Pattnaik1
1
B.Tech, Department of Mechanical Engineering, College of Engineering and Technology (BPUT), Bhubaneswar,
India
Abstract
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) organizes a student engineering design competition named Baja in which an All-terrain
vehicle (ATV) is designed and fabricated by undergraduate engineering students. ATV is a vehicle that can run on a wide variety
of terrains and travels on low-pressure tires with a seat straddled by the operator. SAE BAJA involves designing and fabrication
of a modified and scaled down smaller version of ATV. Starting from initial design and analysis to actual fabrication of ATV,
everything is done by the students. As in any engineering design, there is a constant need to design a safe and sustainable vehicle.
This involves predicting and defining all failure modes in the initial design step itself. An effective method of doing this failure
analysis is DFMEA (Design Failure Modes and Effects Analysis), which is an extension of popular Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) technique and is done in the design stage. In this paper DFMEA technique is used to list out all modes of failure
for various components of the ATV, its causes, effects and ways of preventing it. Risk Priority Number methodology of FMEA is
used to find out the components which are more susceptible to failure and needs more attention than others.
Keywords: All Terrain Vehicles (ATV), Baja SAE, Design Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (DFMEA), Risk Priority
Number (RPN)
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1. INTRODUCTION
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and Special
Vehicle Institute of America (SVIA) in ANSI/SVIA 1-2007
[1] define All-Terrain Vehicle is a Motorized, off-highway
vehicle designed to travel on four low-pressure tires, with
seat designed to be straddled by the operator, and handlebars
for steering. Baja competition organised by Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE) involves design, fabrication
and racing of an off-road all terrain vehicle powered by a 10
hp Briggs and Stratton engine [2]. This ATV is a modified
version of the one defined by ANSI and SVIA. This
specially designed ATV consists of a combination of roll
cage and frame. The main objective of the competition is to
design and fabricate the roll cage and frame from the scratch
along with other critical components.
Along with design and development of the frame and roll
cage, the a-arms and trailing arms of the suspension systems
are also designed. Assembly of other components like
power-train, steering system, braking system, wheels etc. are
also a part of the competition. On overall, the entire ATV is
designed, fabricated and raced by the students.
The design stage is critical for the development of the
vehicle. Being an off road and low powered vehicle, a sturdy
and safe design is a pre-requisite. Various components of the
vehicle can fail in different circumstances leading to
compromise in safety and jeopardising the entire project.
Hence a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the
vehicle in the design stage is off utmost importance.
As advised by Baja in its rulebook [2], this systematic
failure analysis can be done by a popular reliability analysis
technique called Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA). As defined by Institute of Heath Care
Improvement (IHI), “FMEA is a systematic, proactive
method for evaluating a process to identify where and how it
might fail and to access the relative impact of different
failures, in order to identify parts in the process that are most
in need of change” [3]. FMEA evaluates potential failure
modes, its causes, effects and ways of prevention. An
effective application of FMEA in product design stage is
Design Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (DFMEA)
which is used in this project. Risk Priority (RPN)
methodology of failure prioritisation, a popular sub-method
of FMEA is used in this project.
2. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
(FMEA)
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic
step-by-step failure analysis technique. It evaluates
processes for possible failure and to prevent them by
correcting the process rather than reacting to effects after
failure has occurred. FMEA is useful in evaluating new
processes prior to implementation. FMEA is an efficient
quality and reliability analysis technique. American Society
of Quality defines FMEA as “FMEA is a step-by-step
approach for identifying all possible failures in a design, a
manufacturing or an assembly process or a product or
service” [4].

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FMEA has wide range of applications in almost every field.
FMEA technique was first adopted by National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) for its various space
programs like Viking, Voyager, Magellan, and Galileo in
1960s [5]. Later it was adopted by civil aviation and
automotive industry, with Society of Automotive Engineers
publishing ARP926 [6] [7]. Hoseynabodi et al. (2010)
applied FMEA to wind turbine systems [8].It was useful to
prevent failures at the design stage of Wind Turbines.
FMEA can be broadly classified into system FMEA, Design
FMEA and process FMEA [9]. DFMEA is used to analyze
product design before it is released to manufacturing and
Process FMEA is used to analyze manufacturing and/or
assembly processes.
In SAE Baja project, DFMEA methodology has been used
to systematically analyze failure modes of various critical
components of the ATV. Since the ATV contains numerous
components, it is essential to prioritize different components
according to their risk of failure and its effects. In this
methodology Risk Priority Number (RPN) method is used to
prioritize the failures, its effects, causes and ways to prevent
it.
3. DFMEA METHOD AND RISK PRIORITY
NUMBER
Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (DFMEA) is first
done by identifying all the components of the All-Terrain
Vehicle. This is followed by identifying failure modes for
each component, its causes and its effects on the individual
component and the vehicle as a whole. After the above step,
severity of the failure, likelihood of occurrence of failure
and likelihood of detection the failure is determined for each
failure mode. The above parameters are given a numerical
rating from 1 to 10. The criteria for the rating are described
in later sections of this paper. The above ratings are
multiplied to calculate a quantity/index called Risk Priority
Number (RPN).
Risk Priority Number (RPN) is the product of the numerical
ratings of Severity, likelihood of occurrence and likelihood
of detection. RPN is mathematically given in equation 1.
RPN = (Severity Rating) × (Likelihood of Occurrence
rating) × (Likelihood of Detection rating) (1)
RPN helps to prioritize components to focus on and work in
the direction of its improvement. After the RPN is calculated
the failure modes of components are prioritized according to
the obtained RPN. The failure mode with highest RPN is
given the highest importance followed by the next failure
mode with next lower RPN and so on. A graph is plotted for
different component failures and its RPN.
After the above steps the prevention techniques for each
failure mode is listed out and appropriate action is taken
according to the priority of the failure modes. The aim of the
overall method is to minimize the total RPN (which is the
sum total of all individual RPN) of the process. The whole
process of DFMEA of the ATV is illustrated in a flowchart
in figure 1.
4. SEVERITY, LIKELIHOOD OF
OCCURRENCE AND LIKELIHOOD OF
DETECTION
Severity (S) is the hazard potential of the particular failure to
the individual component and the vehicle as a whole. It is
numerically rated from 1 to 10, with 1 meaning no or very
minor harm to the system and 10 for extremely dangerous
effect on the system. The severity evaluation and rating
criteria along with its definition is illustrated in table number
1.
Likelihood of Occurrence (O) gives how likely a failure will
occur. Again a rating of 1 to 10 is assigned where 1 meaning
“very unlikely to occur” and 10 meaning “failure is
inevitable and persistent”. The likelihood of occurrence
evaluation and rating criteria along with its definition is
illustrated in table number 2.
Likelihood of detection (D) gives how likely the current
control will detect the failure mode. Similar to above two
parameters, a numerical rating of 1 to 10 is assigned to it,
where 1 meaning “the failure will be detected very likely”
and 10 meaning “the failure can’t be detected with current
controls”. The likelihood of detection, its evaluation and
rating criteria along with its definition is illustrated in table
number 3.

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Table-1: Severity Evaluation and Rating Criteria
SL.
No.
SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION SEVERITY RATING DEFINITION AND DESCRIPTION
1. Extremely
Dangerous/Hazardous and occurs
without warning
10 Failure occurs unpredictably often without
warning. It involves non-compliance with
government/safety regulations. Machine
operator/driver’s safety compromised. Often
the machines are beyond repair and vehicle
becomes inoperable.
2. Very Dangerous/ Hazard occurs
with warning
9 Failure is hazardous and very dangerous, but
occurs with a warning. It endangers
operator/human life and results in damage to
vehicle/machine beyond repair. It also
involves non-compliance with regulations
3. Very High 8 Vehicle/Machine/Item inoperable (primary
function loss). It involves major repair and
rework. Here safety is not compromised and
failure is in compliance with govt. and safety
regulations.
4. High 7 Vehicle/Machine is operable but at reduced
performance. Repair and rework can be done
but with difficulty.
5. Moderate 6 Primary function of vehicle/machine intact
i.e. vehicle is operable but
comfort/convenience is compromised.
Failure occurs in a part of the overall system
but can be repaired.
6. Low 5 Vehicle/system is operable but at reduced
comfort and with performance is affected. It
creates enough performance loss for repair.
7. Very Low 4 Small failure which can be overcome by
minor modifications. There is no critical
loss/effect to the system. Fitting and
Finishing failures are involved here.
8. Minor 3 It causes little annoyance but no loss of
performance. It can be overcome by minor
rework.
9. Very Minor 2 System/Vehicle is operable with minimum
deterrence. Failure is not observed easily.
Repair and rework may not be needed.
10. None 1 No noticeable effect of the failure and does
not affect the operation/performance in any
way.
Table-2: Likelihood of Occurrence Evaluation and Rating criteria
Sl.
No.
LIKLIHOOD/PROBABILITY OF
OCCURRENCE
RATING DEFINITION
1. Very High: Failure is inevitable and persistent 10 Failure in every third component
(1:3)
2. High: Similar processes have often failed 9 Failure in every sixth
component(1:6)
3. High: repeated failures 8 Failure in every ninth component
(1:9)
4. High: frequent failures 7 Failure in every 50 component
(1:50)
5. Moderately High: Frequent failures 6 Failure in every 150 component
(1:150)
6. Moderate: Occasional failures 5 Failure in every 800 component
(1:800)

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7. Moderately Low: infrequent failures 4 Failure in every 4500 component
(1:4500)
8. Low: Few failures 3 Failure in every 30000
component (1:30000)
9. Very Low: Isolated failures 2 Failure in every 150000
component (1:150000)
10. Remote: Failure unlikely 1 Failure in every 1.5 million
component (1:1.5million)
Table-3: Likelihood of Detection
Sl. No. DETECTION RATING DEFINITION
1. Absolutely no detection or
almost impossible
10 Almost certainty of non-detection. No known
controls capable to detect failure mode
2. Very Remote 9 Very less chance of detection of failure by
controls
3. Remote 8 Controls have poor chance of detecting the
failure mode
4. Very Low 7 Very low chance of detection of failure mode
by controls
5. Low 6 Controls may detect the failure mode
6. Moderate 5 Moderate chance of detection of failure by
control
7. Moderately High 4 Controls have a good chance to detect the
failure mode
8. High 3 Controls certainly detect the failures,
automatic detection of failure by the process
9. Very High 2 Controls almost certain to detect failure mode
10. Very High/Almost certain 1 Certain detection of failure and controls
5. DFMEA IMPLEMENTATION
DFMEA is implemented on 20 critical components of the
ATV. The analysis is done on the components namely
Frame, Bracket, Support, Engine, Transmission, A-arm and
trailing arms, Springs, Dampers, Steering column, Steering
Wheel, Rack and pinion, Knuckles, Pedal, Braking System,
Tires, Rim, Driver seat, Body Panel, transponder and vehicle
electrical components. The detailed DFMEA process is
illustrated in table 4.
Table-4: DFMEA Chart
Sl.
No
COMPONENT FAILURE
MODE
FAILURE
CAUSE
FAILURE
EFFECT
S* O
*
D* RPN
*
PREVENTIVE
ACTIONS
1. Frame Structural
failure;
Bending
and
breaking of
frame
Axial stress
exceeds yield
stress of
material due to
excess load
and impact
loading
Overall Damage to
roll cage. Frame
breaks or bends.
Driver’s safety is
endangered
10 6 7 420 Choose material
with
appropriate/high
factor of
safety(FOS),
effective design
and analysis;
constant testing
2. Bracket Structural
failure,
bending
and
breakage
Bearing and
yielding stress
caused by
excess load
and constant
vibration
Bracket fracture
leading to
dislocation of
mechanical/structur
al components
which in turn leads
to mechanical and
structural
component damage.
Damage to roll cage
as a whole
9 5 6 270 Choose materials
with high FOS;
Effective design
and analysis

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3. Support Bending,
Breakage
and
structural
failure
Axial stress
exceeds
yielding stress
of material
due to excess
load and
impact loading
Structural damage
to Roll cage and
driver’s safety
compromised
10 6 6 360 Choose materials
with high FOS;
effective design
and analysis
4. Engine Mechanica
l Failure,
Engine
component
damage
Unavailability
clean air and
proper fuel
Vehicle become
inoperable due to
engine failure
/damage and risk to
driver’s life
9 3 4 108 The engine’s
position should
be such that it
has free access to
clean air and risk
to driver is
minimum
5. Transmission Mechanica
l failure
Fatigue/
cyclic loading
Vehicle becomes
inoperable
8 2 4 64 Choose
transmission
system according
to given load,
performance and
other
specification
6. A-Arms and
Trailing arms
Bending,
Breakage,
cracks,
structural
damage
and
mechanical
failure
Axial stress
exceeds
yielding stress
of material
due to excess
load and
impact loading
Damage to
suspension system
and rough operation
or non-operation of
the vehicle
with high FOS
and according to
vehicle
specifications;
effective design
and analysis
7. Springs Spring
fractures
and fails
Due to faulty
choice of
springs, spring
fails due to
loads
exceeding the
yield stress of
the material
Damage to
suspension system
and rough of the
vehicle
6 1 3 18 Choose springs
according to
vehicle loads and
other
specification.
8. Dampers/
Shock
Absorbers
Mechanica
l failure,
Leaking of
suspension
oil
Cylinder
damage due to
foreign
body/debris
Damage to
suspension system
and rough of the
vehicle
6 2 2 24 Verification of
specifications
and testing
9. Steering
Column
Mechanica
l failure,
excess
vibration
Debris leading
to steering
column failure
Steering failure;
Safety of driver and
others
compromised
desired
specification and
testing
10. Steering Wheel Breakage,
mechanical
failure
Excess load
applied by
driver
Steering failure;
others
compromised
desired
specification and
testing
11. Rack and
Pinion
Mechanica
l failure,
Leaking of
fluid,
Loosening
of Lug nut
Obstruction in
movement of
pinion over
rack, damage
to components
Steering failure;
others
compromised
desired
specification and
testing

_______________________________________________________________________________________
12. Knuckles Breakage
due to
structural
failure
Failure due to
bending,
crushing and
tensile stress
and double
shear
Damage to
suspension system
and rough operation
or non-operation of
the vehicle
with high FOS
and according to
vehicle
specifications
13. Pedals Structural
failure die
to fatigue,
bending
and
breaking
Excess
application of
load by driver
causes axial
load to exceed
yield strength
of material
Brake failure 9 2 1 18 Choose material
with high FOS
and careful
testing should be
done
14. Braking
System
Mechanica
l failure
Not sufficient
braking force
Damage to vehicle
in undesired
circumstances
with high FOS
and careful
testing
15. Tires Mechanica
l failure
Puncture by
foreign debris
Inability to operate
vehicle
proper
specification and
testing
16. Rim Mechanica
l failure
Damage by
debris
Inability to operate
vehicle
proper
specification and
testing
17. Driver seat Structural
failure
affecting
safety
Excess load
leading to
bearing stress
Endangers driver’s
safety
9 2 3 54 Proper fitting
and material
according to
correct
specifications of
load
18. Body Panels Structural
failure
Colliding of
foreign object,
Impact
loading
Loss in aesthetics 4 4 2 48 Choose material
of high FOS
19. Transponder Electrical
failure
Water
damage/electri
cal failure
safety;
disqualification
from competition
10 3 5 150 Proper insulation
should be
provided and
wiring should be
done properly
20. Vehicle
Electrical
components
Electrical
failure
Water
damage/electri
cal failure
safety due to
contact from
electricity
9 5 2 90 Proper insulation
should be
provided and
wiring should be
done properly
* S is Severity Rating, O is Likelihood of Occurrence Rating, D is Likelihood of Detection Rating and RPN is Risk Priority
Number
6. PRIORITY GRAPH
After DFMEA is done, the failure modes of the components
are prioritized according to their RPN in a Risk Priority
Graph. Prevention techniques are applied according to the
priority of the components from largest RPN to smallest.
The RPN graph is illustrated in Chart 1.

_______________________________________________________________________________________
Chart-1: Risk Priority Number Graph
7. DFMEA REPORT ANALYSIS
After prioritising the components according to their RPN, it
was found that Frame, A-Arms and Trailing arms, Support,
Rack and pinion, Knuckles were in top five according to
their failure risk. They also had RPN above 250, which
indicate they are very critical to the quality of ATV.
Detailed prevention techniques were listed out and proper
action taken for these components as well as other
components of the ATV.
8. CONCLUSION
DFMEA was carried out listing out all possible failures of
the components, its causes and effects. Along with this the
severity of the failure modes, its likelihood of occurrence
and detection were also singled out. Finally the RPN was
calculated for each failure mode, its graph was plotted and
the components prioritized according to its failure modes.
Preventive measures for each and every component were
suggested in this paper to reduce risk of failure of the ATV.
REFERENCES
[1]. Speciality vehicle Institute of America, Technical
Programs http://www.svia.org/Programs/Programs.aspx
[2]. 2016 BAJA Rule Book http://www.bajasaeindia.org/
[3]. Institute of Health Care Improvement, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USAFMEA Tool
http://www.ihi.org/resources/Pages/Tools/FailureModesand
EffectsAnalysisTool.aspx
[4]. American Society of Quality (ASQ), Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) http://asq.org/learn-about-
quality/process-analysis-tools/overview/fmea.html
[5]. Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) in Preferred Reliability Practices National
Aeronautics and Space Administration Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL), PD–AD–1307.
[6]. Design Analysis Procedure For Failure Modes, Effects
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). Society for Automotive
Engineers. 1967. ARP926
[7]. Matsumoto, K.; T. Matsumoto; Y. Goto (1975).
"Reliability Analysis of Catalytic Converter as an
Automotive Emission Control System". SAE Technical
Paper 750178.doi:10.4271/750178
[8]. Arabian-Hoseynabadi, H, Oraee, H, Tavner, P.j. 2010
“Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) for Wind
Turbines”, International Journal of electrical power and
energy system.32 (7), pp-817-824.
[9]. Six Sigma Green Belt Training Material, ICSL VSkills,
p-22,23,24,147 www.vskills.in
BIOGRAPHY
Sidhartha Pattnaik is currently pursuing
B.Tech Degree in Mechanical
Engineering from College of
Engineering and Technology (BPUT),
Bhubaneswar, Odisha, India. He is a
member of American Society Of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). He is also serving
as the Student Chair of ASME CET-Bhubaneswar Chapter.
He is also a certified Six Sigma Green Belt Professional
from ICSL Vskills (Reg. 7278). He can be contacted
through email- sidharthapattnaik28@gmail.com

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