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© 2005 Dan Houser, All Rights Reserved
Digital Deception:
Raising the Stakes on Hackers
Dan Houser, CISM, CISSP, ISSAP
Overview
Changes in Hacker Space
Weather & Early warning systems
Dirty Deeds Done Dirt Cheap
Big Freakin’ Haystack Introduction
• Emulation of 16 million node network
• Intrusion Management Network
What next?
Q&A
Goals…
Use of Digital Deception
Confuse, Harass, Confound the enemy
Dramatically, drastically, overwhelmingly
increase the economic cost of system
scanning and worm target acquisition
Make script kiddy and worms infeasible
Force a paradigm shift
We are locked in a cold-war arms race, where only the arms dealer wins.
Internet attacks have changed…
Old school attack
Lone interloper targets major firm
Studies publicly available information
Hangs out at local pub, befriends sales team
Dumpster dives to obtain manuals, phone lists
Uses war-dialer to find modems & remote
hosts
Uses social engineering to obtain passwords
Dials up hosts, logs in, mayhem & mischief
“Modern” attack
Lone interloper targets IP range
Downloads script kiddy tools
Scans IP range looking for vulnerable
hosts
Port scans hosts looking for exploitable
services
Uses exploit tool, mayhem & mischief
Target selection now a target of
opportunity… indiscriminate attack
Make your real servers look bogus
 Save all .ASP code as .CGI files, perl as .ASP
 Configure responses from Apache that mimic IIS
 Open dummy NetBIOS ports on Unix servers
 Open bogus 21, 23, 25, 80 & 443 ports on all servers, with
netcat listening on the bogus ports
 Call your database server “Firewall”
 Route bogus traffic to IDS network
Confuse and harass attackers
Worms hit 10,000 networks at once…
What we need is early warning
Hide in the open:
Big freakin’ haystack
 Virtual honeynets + Intrusion Management
 Create server that emulates address range: 10.x.x.x
 Open tons of ports: 20, 21, 23, 25, 37, 42, 43, 49, 67, 68,
69, 80, 109, 110, 137-139, 389, 443, 666, 6667
 Emulate good hosts: MS-Exchange, Solaris/Oracle, MS-
SQL, RedHat/Apache/Tomcat, WinXP Pro
 Emulate bad boxes: botnet servers, Warez server,
trojaned workstations, Win95 workstation, backdoor
 Honeyd likely tool, or at least a starting point
 Convert unused address space into decoy tripwire nets -
16,320,000 decoys to 200 "real" servers
 Stop swallowing packets: route unreachable hosts to the
virtual honeynet
 190,000 decoys per “real” server = 99.9995% detection
 Any hits are malicious – route to IDS / IPS
• Research attack profile.
• Throttle attack / drop packets
• Block attackers for 1 hour, 2 hours, 24 hours, 1 week.
 You’ve gained breathing room to respond to real attacks
Hide in the open:
Big freakin’ haystack
Router
Real Network
BFH
Emulator IDS
Config IPS
Hide in the Open: Big Freakin’ Haystack
Security Through Obscurity?
Hide in the open
The fun has just begun…
LaBrea: SYN/ACK, TCP Window size = 0 (wait)
• Use Tarpit to freeze a scan, run on random port
• Freezes Windows-based scanners up to 4 minutes
• Change window size to vary randomly, 0-15
• Scanning 10,000 hosts takes 27 days.
• Detecting 100 unpublished hosts in Class B network would
take approximately 110 days
• Detecting 100 unpublished hosts in Class A would take
approximately 112 years
Storm Surge Mode: active re-configuration
• Suppose your “standard” BFH net emulates:
25% Apache/Tomcat on RedHat 7
25% Win2003 / SQL-Server
25% Lotus Notes/Domino on Win2k Server
25% Oracle 9i on Solaris
• IDS telemetry reports spike in Win2k attacks
• BFH configuration changes:
30% Win2000 / SQL 6.5
30% Win2000 / Exchange
30% Win2000 / IIS
10% Allocated among 30 other server/workstation images
The fun has just begun…
• Virtual honeynets: Make legitimate servers look like bogus servers.
• Make all servers (fake & real) look identical
• BFH in your internal network
 Malware outbreaks see your network with 16 million hosts
 Ability to detect worms while slowing spread by 600x
• Simulate sendmail open relays – Death to Spam!!
• If all Class A, B & C networks ran BFH:
 Emulation of 12,493,209,429,306 bogus hosts
 Port scans & profiling a thing of the past
• Worms and script kiddies would be economically infeasible.
The fun has just begun…
Where do we go from here?
Tactical changes
Strategic changes
Open source vs. commercial
Platform
Network changes?
• Firewall, router, switch, smart-switch, blades
Unintended consequences: little guys get beat up
Interactive, collaborative BFHnet
Do we even NEED a firewall anymore, with BFH?
Summary
Stop script kiddies for $30k, seems like reasonable
ROI
Imagine if every class A, B & C network ran BFH
• Emulation of 12,493,209,429,306 bogus hosts
• Port scanning infeasible, profiling a moot point
Q&A
Contact Information
Contact info: guru@xota.net
Further info:
“Submarine Warfare”, August 2003 issue of
InformationSecurity Magazine:
http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com
Big Freakin’ Haystack Initiative:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/bfhi
Some images courtesy of The Weather Channel, NASA.
Trogdor the BURNiNATOR image courtesy
homestarrunner.com

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Digital Deception: Raising the Stakes on Hackers

  • 1. © 2005 Dan Houser, All Rights Reserved Digital Deception: Raising the Stakes on Hackers Dan Houser, CISM, CISSP, ISSAP
  • 2. Overview Changes in Hacker Space Weather & Early warning systems Dirty Deeds Done Dirt Cheap Big Freakin’ Haystack Introduction • Emulation of 16 million node network • Intrusion Management Network What next? Q&A
  • 3. Goals… Use of Digital Deception Confuse, Harass, Confound the enemy Dramatically, drastically, overwhelmingly increase the economic cost of system scanning and worm target acquisition Make script kiddy and worms infeasible Force a paradigm shift We are locked in a cold-war arms race, where only the arms dealer wins.
  • 5. Old school attack Lone interloper targets major firm Studies publicly available information Hangs out at local pub, befriends sales team Dumpster dives to obtain manuals, phone lists Uses war-dialer to find modems & remote hosts Uses social engineering to obtain passwords Dials up hosts, logs in, mayhem & mischief
  • 6. “Modern” attack Lone interloper targets IP range Downloads script kiddy tools Scans IP range looking for vulnerable hosts Port scans hosts looking for exploitable services Uses exploit tool, mayhem & mischief Target selection now a target of opportunity… indiscriminate attack
  • 7. Make your real servers look bogus  Save all .ASP code as .CGI files, perl as .ASP  Configure responses from Apache that mimic IIS  Open dummy NetBIOS ports on Unix servers  Open bogus 21, 23, 25, 80 & 443 ports on all servers, with netcat listening on the bogus ports  Call your database server “Firewall”  Route bogus traffic to IDS network Confuse and harass attackers
  • 8. Worms hit 10,000 networks at once…
  • 9. What we need is early warning
  • 10. Hide in the open: Big freakin’ haystack  Virtual honeynets + Intrusion Management  Create server that emulates address range: 10.x.x.x  Open tons of ports: 20, 21, 23, 25, 37, 42, 43, 49, 67, 68, 69, 80, 109, 110, 137-139, 389, 443, 666, 6667  Emulate good hosts: MS-Exchange, Solaris/Oracle, MS- SQL, RedHat/Apache/Tomcat, WinXP Pro  Emulate bad boxes: botnet servers, Warez server, trojaned workstations, Win95 workstation, backdoor  Honeyd likely tool, or at least a starting point
  • 11.  Convert unused address space into decoy tripwire nets - 16,320,000 decoys to 200 "real" servers  Stop swallowing packets: route unreachable hosts to the virtual honeynet  190,000 decoys per “real” server = 99.9995% detection  Any hits are malicious – route to IDS / IPS • Research attack profile. • Throttle attack / drop packets • Block attackers for 1 hour, 2 hours, 24 hours, 1 week.  You’ve gained breathing room to respond to real attacks Hide in the open: Big freakin’ haystack
  • 12. Router Real Network BFH Emulator IDS Config IPS Hide in the Open: Big Freakin’ Haystack
  • 14. Hide in the open
  • 15. The fun has just begun… LaBrea: SYN/ACK, TCP Window size = 0 (wait) • Use Tarpit to freeze a scan, run on random port • Freezes Windows-based scanners up to 4 minutes • Change window size to vary randomly, 0-15 • Scanning 10,000 hosts takes 27 days. • Detecting 100 unpublished hosts in Class B network would take approximately 110 days • Detecting 100 unpublished hosts in Class A would take approximately 112 years
  • 16. Storm Surge Mode: active re-configuration • Suppose your “standard” BFH net emulates: 25% Apache/Tomcat on RedHat 7 25% Win2003 / SQL-Server 25% Lotus Notes/Domino on Win2k Server 25% Oracle 9i on Solaris • IDS telemetry reports spike in Win2k attacks • BFH configuration changes: 30% Win2000 / SQL 6.5 30% Win2000 / Exchange 30% Win2000 / IIS 10% Allocated among 30 other server/workstation images The fun has just begun…
  • 17. • Virtual honeynets: Make legitimate servers look like bogus servers. • Make all servers (fake & real) look identical • BFH in your internal network  Malware outbreaks see your network with 16 million hosts  Ability to detect worms while slowing spread by 600x • Simulate sendmail open relays – Death to Spam!! • If all Class A, B & C networks ran BFH:  Emulation of 12,493,209,429,306 bogus hosts  Port scans & profiling a thing of the past • Worms and script kiddies would be economically infeasible. The fun has just begun…
  • 18. Where do we go from here? Tactical changes Strategic changes Open source vs. commercial Platform Network changes? • Firewall, router, switch, smart-switch, blades Unintended consequences: little guys get beat up Interactive, collaborative BFHnet Do we even NEED a firewall anymore, with BFH?
  • 19. Summary Stop script kiddies for $30k, seems like reasonable ROI Imagine if every class A, B & C network ran BFH • Emulation of 12,493,209,429,306 bogus hosts • Port scanning infeasible, profiling a moot point
  • 20. Q&A
  • 21. Contact Information Contact info: guru@xota.net Further info: “Submarine Warfare”, August 2003 issue of InformationSecurity Magazine: http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com Big Freakin’ Haystack Initiative: http://sourceforge.net/projects/bfhi Some images courtesy of The Weather Channel, NASA. Trogdor the BURNiNATOR image courtesy homestarrunner.com