DISSERTATION FINAL DRAFT

‘Hellenism and Pessimism’: Conflict in
Nietzsche’s ‘Birth of Tragedy’
CHARLIE MANNIX BEALE
200888147
2015-26
Supervisor: Dr Juan Arana Cobos

CONTENTS
‘Hellenism and Pessimism’: Conflict in Nietzsche’s ‘Birth of Tragedy’ 0
Abstract 1
Abbreviations 1
Introduction 2
The ‘Curse’ of Individuation 4
Nihilism and the Problem of Meaning 6
Is ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ Pessimistic? 9
Apollonian Veiling 11
The Paradox of Dionysian Insight 19
Pain and Pleasure: Two Sides of the Same Coin 21
Aesthetic Redemption 24
Conclusion 27

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Abstract
Is the Birth of Tragedy a pessimistic work? If we follow the view that Nietzsche, in his first
published book is a complete disciple of Schopenhauer, then we are likely to conclude that it is.
However, this reading, presented notably by Julian Young (1994), I argue, is misled because it
makes two presuppositions that, on closer inspection, are unmerited. Firstly whilst Nietzsche
accepts that suffering is something objectionable (BT, 10), I take the position that his primary
concern in this text is with meaningless suffering and as such suffering per se is not held to accuse
life. Second, Young considers Nietzsche’s metaphysics to be thoroughly Schopenhauerian in BT.
Whilst BT’s metaphysics is highly ambiguous, I will argue that mapping the Apollonian and
Dionysian on to Schopenhauer’s descriptive account of reality runs contrary to Nietzsche’s position
on ‘truth’ and negates the mythical and aesthetic function of the two drives and therefore ought to
be re-evaluated.
Abbreviations
ASC: Attempt at Self Criticism
BGE: Beyond Good and Evil
BT: The birth of Tragedy
GM: On the genealogy of morality
GS: The Gay Science
KSA: Nachgelassene Fragmente
UM: Untimely Meditations
WP: The Will to Power.
Unless otherwise stated, Nietzsche’s work is referenced using the abbreviation followed by the
relevant section/chapter number.

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1.
Introduction
Wretched, ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do you force me to tell
you the very thing which it would be most profitable for you not to hear? The very best
thing is utterly beyond your reach not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However,
the second best thing for you is: to die soon.
The Wisdom of Silenus (BT, 3)
Suffering is a central theme in ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ (‘BT’ hereafter) and an area that Nietzsche’s
works return to frequently. As such, it is important that we have clear understanding of what
Nietzsche takes to be the problem of suffering, if there is one. It is, as Young points out, inadequate
to take ‘disease, the death of friends, natural disasters and such things’ to be the substance of
Nietzsche’s definition (Young, 1994: p39). This type of conflict is not ignored by Nietzsche, but
BT, as Gemes and Sykes (2012) argue, operates on another level. Nietzsche remarks in his later
work that ‘the meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse thus far stretched
over humanity’ (GM, III, 28), and I take this to also be the position he adopts in BT.
BT can be read as an attempt to appease the two great influences on its thought: on the one hand
there is Schopenhauer’s compelling argument that this world can afford us no true satisfaction (WR
vii, p434); and on the other, the project of constructing meaning in the bleak face of modernity
where Wagner’s work plays the lead role (Gemes and Sykes, 2012). Nietzsche’s goal I think is to
reconcile Schopenhauer’s pessimistic (yet undeniably realistic) view that suffering is the keynote of
life, with the prescriptive Wagnerian vision that myth and culture can meaningfully affect the way

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in which we relate to suffering. In chapters 1 and 2, I draw the distinction between Schopenhauer’s
descriptive account of conflict on the one hand, and the problem of meaningless suffering on the
other. Whilst Nietzsche clearly adopts - and quotes at some length - significant portions of
Schopenhauer’s descriptive account of reality, I take the position that on crucial points (that concern
the affirmation of life), Nietzsche’s thought in BT cannot be directly mapped on to Schopenhauer’s.
In this evaluation I stand in opposition to Julian Young (1994) who argues that BT fully embodies
that thought of Schopenhauer.
Given Nietzsche’s use of Schopenhauerian terminology and image, the pretext for this
‘conventional reading’ is ever-present in BT. However, in fully pursuing this approach one crudely
ends up equating Apollo with ‘representation’ or ‘illusion’ and Dionysus with ‘the Will’ or ‘thing-
in-itself’. However, as I will argue, in BT Nietzsche does not offer a substantive metaphysics in
which this dichotomy is made. There are two key problems with this reading proposed by Young
(1994), and these are the focus of the remainder of this paper. Firstly, Apollonian illusion (Wahn) is
regarded as a way of ‘hiding’ the terrors and horrors of existence from the individual. Like
Schopenhauer, Young conceives of illusion in negative terms arguing that if it is necessary to ‘veil’
oneself from reality, then the notion of Apollonian transfiguration must suggest that reality itself is
unbearable. This however suggests that there is a normative distinction to be made between the
character of ‘reality’ and ‘illusion’, which I think is unmerited. Second, if Dionysus pertains
directly to the thing-in-itself, then ‘Dionysian insight’ it follows must provide some sort of
knowledge about reality or truth. Not only does this seem to contradict the renowned Nietzschean
disdain for philosophical approaches that pursue truth as something valuable in-itself, but it also,
paradoxically, implies a pessimistic outlook given Nietzsche’s negative description of ‘crude
reality’. For this reason I argue that by committing to Schopenhauer’s metaphysical distinctions in
his reading of BT Young obscures important elements of the Apollonian and the Dionysian.

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The key issue I take with Young’s argument is that he regards suffering as intrinsically problematic
and therefore requires suffering itself to be justified by art. On this approach one has to argue that
the redemptive qualities Nietzsche finds in art directly mitigate the pain of individual suffering as
opposed to view that suffering is an essential part of life. Nietzsche does view individual suffering
as something objectionable in itself (BT, 10), but only on a Schopenhaeurian reading - such as
Young’s (1994) - do we want to be freed from that which is ‘objectionable’. This I believe is not
Nietzsche’s position as he highlights the reciprocal necessity of pain and pleasure in life, which is a
significant step away from the pessimistic view that pleasure is merely the absence of pain.
2.
The ‘Curse’ of Individuation
Whilst BT accepts that suffering is something objectionable in itself (BT, 10), the real problem of
suffering for Nietzsche, I will argue, is that it occurs without meaning; which indicates that
suffering per se is not something that can be ‘resolved’. Nietzsche judges conflict to be an
inevitable feature of life and argues it is a delusion on the part of Socrates to believe that it is
possible to ‘heal the eternal wound of existence’ (BT, 18). This is because Nietzsche conceives of
reality as an untidy boiling sea of ‘eternal becoming’ (EH, IV, 3), and there is nothing we can do to
change this ‘eternal essence of things’ (BT, 7). In BT this ‘eternal becoming’ is expressed in terms
of the Will, specifically in Schopenhauer’s terms. Nietzsche entirely adopts the Schopenhauerian
perspective that the Will is the metaphysical essence of the entire physical world: a constant,
endemic, and mysterious ‘primal unity’ (BT, passim) that underpins everything. Beyond this
however, the extent to which Nietzsche helps himself to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics in BT is
controversial. Young (1994) and Soll (1990) for example, argue that he does thoroughly adopt his
descriptive view of reality. I on the other hand am of the view that Nietzsche does not fully pursue

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the Schopenhauerian notion of the Will as thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer’s view is that pure Will is
universal and non-individuated and therefore importantly contains no awareness of distinct
subjecthood or individuation (Nussbaum, 2002: p46), which suggests that the concept of an
individual will is indeed an illusion and that it must be the case that the universal Will precedes the
existence of ‘the individual’. Here it is useful to draw upon the distinction between ‘phenomena’
and ‘noumena’, in which the universal Will is broadly characterised by the latter. Individuation and
in fact self-awareness, according to Schopenhauer relate to the world of phenomena (note that
Nietzsche does associate the principle of individuation with the Apollonian illusion), that is to say
that self-consciousness is an illusion that has only come about through the activity of representation
(ibid). Schopenhauer’s view is that as a result of individuation, the Will, whilst being noumenally
united, is phenomenally divided, or, in Nietzsche's words, “torn asunder and shattered into
individuals” (BT, cited in Han-Pile, 2006).
In the phenomenal realm of individuation, the Will - which is manifested in representational terms –
is what creates desires. In other words, because the Will
is acting through a representational individuated ‘me’ it is no longer a blind striving, but an
encumbered and divided phenomena which now seems personalised. I as an individual therefore
move through the world seeing particular objects in terms of how they relate to my desires. Yet for
Schopenhauer, as for Nietzsche, there is an opportunity cost associated with our desires. Though
sometimes we may satisfy some of our desires, Schopenhauer contends that for every
one wish that is fulfilled there remain at least ten that are denied… No attained object of
willing can give a satisfaction that lasts and no longer declines; but it is always like the alms
thrown to a beggar, which reprieves him today so that his misery may be prolonged till
tomorrow. Therefore, so long as our consciousness is filled by our will, so long as we are

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given up to the throng of desires with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the
subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace.
(Schopenhauer, 1967: p196)
Suffering is thus held to be the keynote of existence because individuation divides the will towards
particular objects which basically can never all be attained at once. As Han-Pile (2006) suggests,
for both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche there is the (desirable) possibility that if we manage to shift
from our perspective to that of the will, we can go some way to mitigate the pain of individuation,
‘as if the veil of Maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter before the mysterious
primordial unity’ (das Ur-Eine) (BT, 1). Limiting our reading of BT though to just this so-called
problem of suffering however, is insufficient because it indicates that conflict and suffering is all
that Nietzsche seeks to address. The aforementioned account of suffering is at the core of
Nietzsche’s analysis, and expressed in the same Schopenhauerian terms, but as I shall argue, only as
a descriptive account of conflict. That is to say, that whilst he employs Schopenhauer’s language to
describe that conflict is inevitable, unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche’s goal is not to prevent such
conflict. So at this stage, they both agree on a crucial point that there is an underlying Will which is
in conflict in the world. Nietzsche however, intends to locate the problem of conflict on another
level to Schopenhauer, in terms of how it acquires significance, how it acquires meaning.
3.
Nihilism and the Problem of Meaning
Whilst Nietzsche himself operates within a nihilist paradigm in this early work, he is acutely aware
that in the face of meaninglessness and an ‘excess of possibilities’ man can see ‘what is terrible
(Entsetzliche) or absurd in existence wherever he looks’ (BT, 7). Suffering must be understood with

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this existential caveat which I shall argue is the basis of Nietzsche’s prescriptive account in BT.
Life, and therefore suffering, does seem to occur both indefinitely and without true justification.
This was a dawning realisation in the age of modernity and Nietzsche noticed that when the
meaning is pulled from under the sufferer’s feet, he tumbles towards a state of ‘suicidal nihilism’
(GM, 3). For only when suffering acquires meaning can an individual make any sense of it in order
to discharge his emotions properly (Leiter, 2002). It is therefore not just suffering, but meaningless
suffering which poses a threat to life.
The natural world however, poses an existential problem in that it contains no values or standards
which provide meaning to life. Given that suffering has no intrinsic significance, the way in which
individuals and groups via their practices and culture relate to conflict is of particular interest. Far
from pursuing ‘truth’, Nietzsche’s philosophical enterprise is concerned with the changing
relationship, over time, between suffering and culture (Tanner, 2000); between conflict and the
meaning that it acquires. In order to judge the value of life, this is the direction Nietzsche begins on
in this early work. Thus Nietzsche’s focus in BT, and thereafter, is not preoccupied with the
metaphysical ‘truth’ of human activity and culture, but how far it addresses the problem of
meaningless suffering. If, for example, suffering truly took place within a teleological framework
such as Christianity, then it would have a source of meaning - the sufferer could see himself and his
suffering as taking place within the context of a greater purpose. And although Nietzsche later
claims BT expresses a ‘hostile silence’ (ASC, 5) towards Christianity, I think in many regards the
work is deeply sympathetic to the needs that it seeks to address.
Given that nature however, ‘is not merely cruel, it is also purposeless’ (Young, 1994: p40), we
might agree with the later Nietzsche’s Christianity does not fully embrace this latter feature of
existence in this life; at least not in the same way as the Dionysian. This is the criticism he levels at
Socratism in BT: that it is in denial about the cruelty and purposelessness inherent in life. Just as

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suicidal nihilism provides no service to life, nor does the belief in ‘theoretical optimism’ according
to Nietzsche, which holds on to the ‘delusion of limitless power’ (BT, 18). Nietzsche’s contention is
that a commitment to Enlightenment values provides us with no useful resources for dealing with
conflict and existential suffering because it is built on a commitment nihilism. It only fosters a
reliance on reason and an unhealthy belief that everything will turn out fine: that man alone is
capable of mastering his surroundings.
Theodore Adorno once described Walt Disney as one of the most dangerous men in America
(Adorno and Bernstein, 1991), and similarly Nietzsche saw a comparable level of danger
manifested in Socratic culture. Adorno, like Nietzsche, had ambitious ideas about the power of art
and culture for improving individual and collective life. As such, he argues the way we spend our
leisure time - what we spend it on - has a huge impact on how we relate to suffering. The type of
culture that a people consume and produce is an indicator of what matters and what ought to be
done about it; culture must, in some way or another, latch on to suffering and people’s concerns and
respond to them. Fifth century Attic-tragedy was no different, its purpose according to Meier, was
to carry ‘out quite publicly the maintenance and development of mental infrastructure’ (Meier,
1993: p4). However, the introduction of ideas like ‘no ill can befall a good man’ and ‘scientific
knowledge will lead to increased human happiness’ implicit in Socratic optimism (Guess, BT
introduction: xvii), breeds expectations and beliefs about existence that are not reciprocated by the
cruel world in which we live.
Exhibiting a growing demand for metaphysical truth and a declining appetite for mythical
narratives, modern man’s capacity to suffer (without succumbing to suicidal nihilism) is, according
to Nietzsche, under threat. ‘Without myth, however, all cultures lose their healthy, creative, natural
energy; only a horizon surrounded by myths encloses and unifies a cultural movement (BT, 23).
Optimism thus differs from Nietzsche’s ‘affirmation’ insofar as ‘optimism’ claims that if we see life

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for what it really is - stripped of myth and cultural narratives - we would still find it worthwhile
(Guess, BT introduction: pxxv). Nietzsche on the other hand argues that we do need to foster
certain drives and illusions in order to make life worth living. Nietzsche clearly rejects the ‘shallow
optimism’ of Socrates (Kauffman, 1975: p27), however, the extent to which Nietzsche successfully
departs from Schopenhauer’s pessimistic outlook and the Wisdom of Silenus in BT remains
controversial. In the sections that ensue I will explore the terrain of Nietzsche’s ‘affirmation’ and
attempt to disentangle Nietzsche’s affirmative thought from its pessimistic formulation. In this
analysis the question of meaning plays an important role because this is one important area where
Nietzsche’s approach to suffering has evolved from Schopenhauer’s.
4.
Is ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ Pessimistic?
“It is an eternal phenomenon: by means of an illusion spread over things, the greedy Will
always finds some way of detaining its creatures in life and forcing them to carry on living.
One person is held fast by the Socratic pleasure in understanding and by the delusion that he
can thereby heal the eternal wound of existence; another is ensnared by art's seductive veil
of beauty fluttering before his eyes; a third by the metaphysical solace that eternal life flows
on indestructibly beneath the turmoil of appearances’ (BT, 18)
I have so far suggested that Nietzsche accepts Schopenhauer’s conclusion that, due to the principle
of individuation, suffering (or at least conflict) is a constant feature of existence (BT, 5). Whilst
Schopenhauer sees this as an irresolvable problem – hence his signature pessimism – Nietzsche’s

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position in BT is harder to clarify. On the one hand he agrees that ‘the state of individuation [is the]
source and primal cause of all suffering and therefore something objectionable in itself’ (als etwas
an sich Verwerfliches) (BT, 10). But on the other, Nietzsche refuses to accept that suffering itself
should be viewed as an objection to life (Gemes and Sykes, 2012). I believe that it is difficult to
reconcile these two strands of Nietzsche’s thought if one is committed to reading BT as entirely
adopting Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, as indeed Julian Young (1994) does. Nietzsche’s
metaphysics in BT are, by some accounts (Han-Pile, 2006) extremely complex and by others
(Gemes and Sykes, 2012) actually non-existent. For this reason I will not attempt to explicate a
substantive metaphysic in BT, but will argue that Nietzsche does depart from core Schopenhauerian
assumptions about the world and for this reason Young’s assertion that BT is pessimistic should be
re-evaluated.
Before addressing this question we should ask ‘what exactly is pessimism?’ The unitary notion of
‘pessimism’ clearly does not suffice for the level of analysis Nietzsche applies to ancient Greece,
and a later innovation Nietzsche introduces the distinction between ‘pessimism of weakness’
(Schopenhauer), and a ‘pessimism of strength’ (Pre-Socratic Greece) (ASC, 1). This suggests that
both Schopenhauer and the likes of Sophocles and Aeschylus have the same core assumption that
there will always be conflict in the world, however, they offer vastly differing responses to this
reality. That said, given that it is Young’s argument I intend to refute in this section I shall work
with his definition of pessimism which is both incisive and befitting: it is Silenus’ evaluation of life
(which BT first refers to in section 3), ‘his view is that the best response to human existence is “to
die soon”’ (Young, 1994: p47).

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5.
Apollonian Veiling
Nietzsche establishes the Apollonian with numerous descriptions and symbols, three of which stand
out: Firstly, Apollo is described as the ‘soothsaying God’ (der wahrsagende Gott) (BT, 1) which I
think is the primary link to the ‘dream world’ and this can assert the provisional, ambiguous and
dreamlike nature of perceived reality. That said, the link between prophecy and dreams is quite
ambiguous and unfortunately Nietzsche does not spend much time developing it. However, the
reference to prophecy is no doubt more relevant to the context of Ancient Greece given its historical
significance; here I think what Nietzsche is pointing to is a non-rational form of insight. The notion
that creativity and insight must be built on reason - a way of thinking attributed to Euripides - is
something Nietzsche wants to distance himself from. In chapter 12 for example, he says that poetry,
dream-interpretation and prophecy are not dependent upon reason, in fact the poet can only work
once ‘he has lost consciousness and reason no longer dwells within him’ (BT, 12). And we can see
how this idea conflicts with the image Nietzsche gives us of Euripides: the overthinking
perfectionist who forcefully applies reason to his creative process. Contrast this overcritical and
hyperconscious drive with the calm, affirmative instinct we tend to associate with soothsaying,
where there is a sense in which fate (moira), whatever it bears will always be looked upon in a calm
and composed manner. The image Nietzsche borrows from Schopenhauer of a boatman sat calmly
in his frail little vessel, in the midst of a storm, ‘rising and falling with the howling, mountainous
waves’ (BT, 1), gives the sense that Apollo stands for this composed individual in a chaotic world
(Lenson, 1945), but who equally knows that ordering this chaos is beyond him. The second symbol
associated with the Apollonian is the sun. The idea of Apollo as ‘the shining one’ relates to this
important notion that an aesthetic, augmented, beautiful, or someway transfigured version of

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existence has the seductive power to reverse the wisdom of Selinus. ‘Under the bright sunshine of
such gods existence is felt to be worth attaining’ (BT 3). Thus the sun’s capacity to show us the
world in a new and more beautiful light, is captured in Nietzsche’s presentation of Apollo who
becomes a symbol of transfiguration. Finally, Apollo is also associated with ‘image making
energies’ (BT, 1), or “plastic” energies (Kauffman, 1975), which connects Apollo to sculpture and
the production of forms. The capacity to shape and mould the image world asserts the Apollonian’s
creative powers, which understood in relation to the destructive Dionysian impulse represents an
important antithesis within tragic effect.
Whilst the creative energy associated with Dionysus is ‘intoxication’, for the Apollonian it is
‘dream’. Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, places a huge emphasis on the dream world and its
importance in relation to creativity. The ‘lovely semblance of dream is the precondition of all the
arts of image-making, including, as we shall see, an important half of poetry’ (BT, 1). The dream
world seems for Nietzsche to be an important aesthetic realm because it comprises images and
forms that relate directly to perceived phenomena. But, as Schopenhauer tells us, given that things
in the world can only exist to the individual as representations, or in Kant’s words, as ‘phenomena’,
the world of dreamlike representation is, in a way, actually indistinguishable from ‘real life’ in
terms of its claim to truth, since reality for individuals is expressed in representational terms
anyway, whether they are awake or asleep. Dream and life are in Schopenhauer’s words ‘leaves of
one and the same book’ (Schopenhauer, 1967: p18). That is to say, dreams are an illusion, but ones
to be taken seriously since reality too, as one perceives it, is an illusion; a representation. The
‘dream’ and ‘reality’ dualism - in which the experience of ‘real life’ and ‘dream’ are separated from
each other - is dismissed by Nietzsche. Thus in some sense Apollo actually becomes not only a
creative force but the god of phenomena: things as they appear.

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At the very least we can therefore take Nietzsche’s position to be that reality, existence, truth or
whatever term one chooses can never appear as such (Rampley, 1999). At the heart of this position
is Nietzsche’s concern that conflict occurs in a framework devoid of intrinsic meaning. To this the
Schopenhaurian response is resignation. In ‘the knowledge that the world and life can afford us no
true satisfaction’ the best response is that they are ‘not worth our attachment to them. In this the
tragic spirit consists; accordingly it leads to resignation’ (Schopenhauer in BT, 1). However, for
Nietzsche, there are two things to say about this. Firstly, the highly ambitious condition that true
satisfaction would make life bearable, is something that Nietzsche not only disagrees with in
principle, but something that there is substantive evidence to disprove from the Ancient Greeks,
who, on account of their culture, saw life to be deeply pleasurable (BT, 7). Second, the lack of
intrinsic meaning in the world clearly does not preclude the possibility of socially constructed
meaning that can seduce in us an attachment to life. ‘At the same time I grasped that my instinct
went into the opposite direction from Schopenhauer’s: towards a justification of life, even at its
most terrible, ambiguous, and mendacious’ (WP, p521 emphasis mine). The Greeks’ ability to see
life in a new way via culture and change its appearance is what I think Nietzsche hints at with the
term ‘mendacious’ and Apollo is also characterised as such. Existence, Nietzsche argues, can and
must be shown in a different, transfigured and more beautiful light if we are to take pleasure in it:
the ‘luminous glorification’ of appearance is what seduced the Homeric Greeks to embrace life.
Defined as ‘a complete change of form or appearance into a more beautiful or spiritual state’
(Stevenson and Waite, 2011), ‘transfiguration’ is a key term in Nietzsche’s philosophy, and one
that is particularly useful for understanding the function of Apollonian art in relation to suffering. In
this context Apollonian art manifests itself as an altered illusion or ‘cultural lie’ (BT 3, 7, 16).
Nietzsche here, as in future works, reveals a sympathy and admiration towards one central feature
of most religions: their images. The beautiful, the awe inspiring and the sublime power of religious
images should not be overstated, and despite his eventual loathing of Christianity, the role of Apollo

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and the use of the term ‘transfiguration’ tells us that Nietzsche’s vision for cultural renewal would
certainly embrace practices and ideas central to religions like Christianity. In this regard Nietzsche
is perceptively aware that the metaphysical ‘truth’ is not only inaccessible but largely irrelevant in
helping us deal with the struggles of existence. This is again echoed in Nietzsche’s attack on
‘scientific man’ who is only interested in ‘uncovering truth’ (Young, 1994: p43), whereas
‘[w]henever truth is unveiled, the ecstatic eyes of the artist remain fixed on what still remains
veiled, even after the unveiling’ (BT, 15 emphasis mine). The value of the Apollonian drive in
human psychology is therefore not just in its creativity but its readiness to actively participate in
myth and storytelling. Whilst there may be a mendacious element to it, Nietzsche regards
transfiguration as a wholesome pursuit, arguing that complete ‘honesty would lead to nausea and
suicide’ (GS, 107). Therefore, it is not merely desirable to tell ourselves stories about the world but
vital to our existence so Nietzsche argues. However, what does this tell us about the character of
reality if we have to lie to ourselves?
Young’s first argument is that if the Apollonian solution to the world is to lie to oneself then life
cannot be worth living (Young, 1994). I agree that this is a controversial and sizeable issue in BT -
especially since, as I shall argue, the emphasis on myth and deception is one of BT’s most important
innovations - which Young is right to question. If ‘life is at bottom indestructibly mighty and
pleasurable’ (BT, 7), why is it necessary to conceal or ‘veil’ our experience of it? The Apollonian
solution does seem to imply a pessimistic assessment of the value of human life because, as Young
suggests, the word “lies” (BT, 3) seems to imply ‘that in the fullness of knowledge (emphasis mine)
one would not affirm life as worth living’ (Young, 1994: p48). And Nietzsche is very explicit that
the essence of the Apollonian solution is a mendacious ‘cultural lie’ which at the very least seems to
point us in the wrong direction, away from life itself.

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Whilst it seems pessimistic to ‘veil’ life in order to make it bearable, Young’s argument
presupposes that ‘life’ has a specific character and that ‘lies’ or ‘illusions’ - as well as intoxication
(Young, 1994: p48) - imply a deviation or escape from life and are therefore life denying. Does the
Wisdom of Silenus not permit life to be embellished though? If the veil of Maya, Apollonian
illusions and the like are considered to be exclusively of the phenomenal-representational realm
then it might be reasonable to suggest that indulging in Apollonian illusions is life denying because,
by their very essence, they cannot reveal the Will, but can only act on a detached level as obscuring
it. This characterisation of illusion however, I think is misled. Nietzsche himself, is somewhat to
blame for this as he uncritically employs certain Schopenhauerian terms which do not entirely fit
with his argument, and therefore yield subtle inconsistencies when applied to it (ASC, 6). But
Nietzsche, I believe, does not want us to view the Apollonian as a separate or removed phenomena
in the same way as Schopenhauer’s (Platonic) Ideas; ‘not like a mere play of shadows on the wall’
(BT, 1 cited in Silk and Stern, 1981: p337). In fact, the thing-in-itself/phenomena distinction I think
obscures what Nietzsche wants to say in a subtle way that Young appears to overlook. The
distinction implies that to avoid pessimism, so-called ‘crude reality’ (BT, 1), or ‘fullness of
knowledge’ in Young’s words (quoted above), should be privileged over the world of illusion
which is both unnatural and detached. But this argument must ultimately hold that any type of
image-making culture or practice, no matter how minor, accuses life because it obscures its horrors.
But this seems to be a very static conception of culture.
As Nussbaum contends, we ought to view illusion and image making as sense-making practices
which are profoundly practical and the way in which we try to master the world (Nussbaum, 2002).
Myth and image making on this reading are therefore not just activities but psychological functions
(as well as illusions) that are constantly at work. In the same way as one might use logical reasoning
or make generalisations (GS, 111), image making and storytelling are means by which we make
sense of perceptual content and live with continuity. That is to say that without (Apollonian) image

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making it is not merely that case that life would be unbearable, but I think Nietzsche would argue
that by removing these tendencies you could not label what is remaining as an individual existence.
Nietzsche’s point seems to be that image making is the essence of individuation and one cannot
separate the individual life from illusion. If we follow Young’s argument to its logical conclusion it
would follow that every sense making practice, image, metaphor and instance of logical reasoning
which also acts as a veil to the ‘real world’, ought to be removed before we can judge if life is
affirmable or not. Obviously we would be left with nothing that resembles life. I think we should
therefore read Nietzsche’s argument as suggesting that these drives and impulses to order the world
or make sense of it via image are impossible to separate from life itself. Therefore, although we
should not discard the idea of Apollo as ‘illusion’, we should recognise that for Nietzsche the
Apollonian mode first and foremost ‘belongs to the very nature of man’ (Silk and Stern, 1981:
p336). The Apollonian is thus not something distant and unnatural; as the first section of BT tells
us, both the Apollonian and Dionysian are presented as “tendencies” (Tendenzen) and “drives”
(Triebe) in human nature (Nussbaum, 2002: p53); they spring from our very essence and for this
reason deserve our attention. Therefore, the veil of Maya and Apollonian illusions and don’t merely
hide from us from the fabric of life, they are instead made of that very fabric. As a means for
overcoming Nietzsche’s problem of suffering this is coherent because, as we have seen Nietzsche
loosely subscribes to the idea that the world is representation. That is to say that perception can
only be understood in terms of representation. The assumption here is that there is nothing wrong
with embellishing what is already an illusion: we cannot access reality in-itself, we only have an
image of it which is the canvas for the Apollonian artist.
The Apollonian and the Dionysian, as we shall continue to see, spring from a human need; they are
psychological drives and impulses, as Nietzsche tells us (BT, 1). For this reason Apollonian art is
not necessarily a distorted version of the outside world, but I think we are better placed viewing it
as a dynamic and active response to the nauseating feeling that comes from being in the world and

17
from individuation. It is the symbolic analogue of the struggles of existence. The process of seeing
oneself in this ‘transfigured mirror’. Unlike on the Schopenhauerian position this does not relate to
glorified end results, Apollo stands for the very act or process of myth making. The light that we are
free to shine on the world because it is a dream world, an illusion anyway. By noting the
provisional and illusory nature of reality that the Apollonian artist is working with Nietzsche’s
expression ‘beautiful appearance’ can be better understood. In English translations it can be
difficult to disentangle the common terminological association of working with ‘appearance’
(Schein) and a very different kind of activity, ‘deception’ (Täuschung). The latter relates to the
production of comforting and false beliefs about the essence of our existence (Gemes and Sykes,
2014) - something Nietzsche saw as characteristic of modernity - whereas the world of appearances
is more similar to a dream in that it is not attempting to produce ideas that relate to facts or
knowledge, but instead to a symbolic narrative. ‘It is a dream! I will dream on!’ (BT, 1). It is
creative but not misleading. As with normal dreaming, the Apollonian illusion does not erase the
darker and more absurd sides of our existence in favour of a sweetened version of reality, but
instead glorifies the entire narrative. Homer - an exemplary Apollonian artist according to
Nietzsche - ‘does not hide the pathos of Hector and Andromache’s suffering’ (Han-Pile, 2002:
p381), he shows life to be sublime, complex and conflictual with no pretense that everything will be
just fine. ‘Not that it is only the pleasant and friendly images which give him this feeling of
complete intelligibility; he also sees passing before him things which are grave, gloomy, sad, dark,
sudden blocks, teasings of chance, anxious expectations, in short the entire 'Divine Comedy' of life,
including the Inferno’ (BT, 1).
As I have argued, suffering per se is not the problem for Nietzsche, and therefore neither is willing
or desiring. In fact, it seems that the power of Homeric ‘naïveté’ was not so much that it cancelled
desires but glorified excited them. ‘The true goal is obscured by a deluding image; we stretch out
our hands towards the image, and nature achieves its goal by means of this deception. In the Greeks

18
the 'Will' wanted to gaze on a vision of itself as transfigured by genius’ (BT, 3). On this issue,
Nietzsche is far closer to Wagner than to Schopenhauer who only identifies one level to the
problem of willing. Nietzsche and Wagner see illusion as relating to the true problem of their time
which is the relationship between conflict and meaning, not as a means of escaping conflict. As
Gemes and Sykes point out, this is evident in Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic use of the term ‘Wahn’
(illusion) which, true to Wagner’s usage, has an affirmative character (Gemes and Sykes, 2014).
Schopenhauer’s (and the typical German) usage of the term, on the other hand is generally negative
and suggests falseness or delusion. On this particular point we can show Young’s argument to be
lacking because he too takes illusion (Whan) to have a negative connotation. Thus we cannot say
that Nietzche is an unrelenting follower of Schopenhauer on the issue of illusion, and given the
importance and value he places on transfiguration and myth we must conclude that the Apollonian
is not escape from willing, but an affirmation of it, consistent with Wagner’s thought. It was after
all Wagner who coined the strange and oxymoronic phrase “wahrster Wahn” which literally means
‘truest delusion’ (ibid: p35). Furthermore, if we take Nietzsche at his word that the Apollonian and
Dionysian are tendencies inherent in human psychology (Nussbaum, 2002), this further affirms the
notion that Apollonian art is a glorification of willing, not a denial of it. This conjunction of Will
and illusion has utility in Nietzsche’s eyes: the realisation that the world can never appear as such is
a liberating realization and an opportunity to construct meaning. This is therefore a significant
departure from Schopenhauer who saw existing in a phenomenal world as intrinsically problematic.
The only way to escape is to see ‘the phenomenon of the world as something foreign… as an object
of contemplation, expelling his willing from consciousness’ (Schopenhauer, 2007: p387).

19
6.
The Paradox of Dionysian Insight
Having established that illusion (or ‘transfiguration’) should be viewed as an organic phenomenon
which, contrary to Young’s assertion, does not undermine ‘the truth’ or life itself if we accept that
there is no normative distinction made between ‘reality’ and ‘illusion’ in BT, we are now in a
position to address Young’s second argument. Nietzsche, according to young, would endorse the
Dionysian ‘solution’ to suffering over the Apollonian because the Dionysian drive ‘performs the
greatest service for life’ (Young, 1994: p48) and it is the Dionysian prophylactic that we are now in
a position to address. One of the main difficulties one finds with interpreting BT is Nietzsche’s
notion of ‘Dionysian insight’ (Erkenntnisse). On the conventional reading of BT, Dionysus is
likened to the Will, but more specifically to ‘tragic insight’: the ‘pessimistic’, thing-in-itself wisdom
of Schopenhauer in which we are faced with the ‘destructive havoc of so-called world history’ and
‘the cruelty of nature’ (BT, 7). What seems to follow by way of ‘solution’ is that that the Dionysian
destruction of images and individuation leads to a state of intoxication where the sufferer ceases to
be individuated; his identity melts in to a state of primal oneness where the individuated will is no
longer painfully divided among many particulars, but felt in its full unity. ‘We are for a brief
moment, the primordial being itself’ (Nietzsche cited in Young, 1994: p45) and this, according to
Young’s Schopenhauerian reading, is the Dionysian approach to affirmation. The Dionysian artist,
through music or choral odes shatters the individual so he identifies with purposeless reality in its
entirety.
However, as a solution this seems paradoxical as there is a blatant contradiction between the terrible
and absurd content of Dionysian insight and the optimistic power attributed to it by Nietzsche (Han-
Pile, 2006). If the Dionysian impulse is to destroy Apollonian illusion and reveal the terrors of

20
existence, how can we derive any ‘healing substance’ (BT, 21) from it? What makes the Dionysian
desirable? Part of Young’s answer is that we should understand the Dionysian as pertaining directly
to the Will. In a state of rapturous ‘primal unity’ the feeling of individuation and the pain of the
Will vanishes. So in this sense existence is justified from the noumenal undivided perspective of the
Will.
We may very well assume we are already images and artistic projections for the true creator of
art, and that our highest dignity lies in our significance as works of art - for only as an aesthetic
phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified - although, of course, our awareness
of our significance in this respect hardly differs from the awareness which painted soldiers have
of the battle depicted on the same canvas. (BT, 5)
But for whom could this world be justified? Young argues that it clearly cannot be for the soldiers
on the canvas because there is no suggestion that their perspective has any value at all. Perhaps
from perspective of the creator or observer the lives of the soldiers may be justified as an aesthetic
phenomenon, but how does that relate to us, the suffering soldiers? It is all very well to posit that if
we adopt a will-less standpoint we can look upon our lives as a work of art, a set of phenomena, a
‘divine comedy’; but then it seems we are to affirm something that hardly resembles ‘life’ at all. To
say as Nietzsche does that “we have our highest dignity and significance as works of art” hardly
provides us with any motivation to go on living (Han-Pile, 2006: p8). That is to say that whilst life
may seem justified by the extent to which we can, through aesthetic means, identify with the
creative forces that shape us, this is an external God-like position which, for ordinary people - as
opposed to the few geniuses that history has known (ibid) - there is no hope of attaining.
Nietzsche likens ‘the force that shapes the world to a playing child who sets down stones here,
there, and the next place, and who builds up piles of sand only to knock them down again’ (BT, 24).

21
This wanton creation of individuated shapes and forms followed by their destruction is portrayed as
pleasurable for its creative (Apollonian) and destructive (Dionysian) processes. But as Guess points
out, whilst we might identify with this reality of creation and destruction, we are in the important
sense not identical with that joyful child, we are only ‘one of the insubstantial shapes with which it
plays.’ (Guess, BT introduction: xxv). This is the general thrust of Young’s second argument, that
just because a subject is part of a work of art it does not follow that his suffering is somehow
justified. ‘To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that because a concentration camp “justifies”
itself to its sadistic… commandant as a pleasurable “entertainment” (BT, 6), so too must the
inmates find it justified’ (Young, 1994: p52).
However, this conclusion assumes that BT entirely adopts Schopenhauer’s descriptive account of
reality and as I have suggested this is not entirely true. The problem with this reading for me is that
it implicitly accepts that aesthetic redemption requires the absence of pain. For this reason, Young’s
terms such as ‘solution’ or ‘justified’ are used in a completely different vein to Nietzsche’s
‘affirmation’ which is predicated on the presence of pain. It is therefore important that we try to
judge affirmation by standards that do not place a premium on the pain as the problem, that are (in
Nietzsche’s words) beyond good and evil. The next chapter (7) follows this line of thought,
recognising that if pain and pleasure are inextricably linked, Young is misled in focusing his
analysis on pain alone.
7.
Pain and Pleasure: Two Sides of the Same Coin
Schopenhauer’s pessimism lies I think not in his solution (or lack thereof) to the problem of
suffering, but instead in the magnitude of the problem that he identifies. Nietzsche's theory of
tragedy does work within a similar descriptive framework, but compared to Schopenhauer he offers

22
a more nuanced position on the status of pain. Schopenhauer holds that ‘so long as we are the
subject of willing, we never obtain lasting happiness or peace’ (Schopenhauer, 1967: p196), and his
pessimism is based on this idea that lasting happiness or peace is a (or rather, the) desirable end and
escaping desire is the avenue to it. In other words, because this world can afford us no ‘true
satisfaction’ or peace, life is not worth living. But this in itself is a highly ambitious and lofty
position to strive for and Schopenhauer I think is right to suggest that it is unattainable. However,
just because it is the case that true peace is unattainable should we all be pessimists? More
importantly, just because Nietzsche seems to accept Schopenhauer’s case that the very nature of the
universe precludes the possibility of any continuing human happiness (Guess, BT: introduction),
should we view BT as a pessimistic work?
On this Schopenhaurian reading, Nietzsche is a metaphysical pessimist in that he agrees that
‘lasting happiness or peace’ (freedom from conflict) is impossible as a purely metaphysical
phenomenon (Simmel, 1986). But BT cannot be called pessimistic, as defined by Silenus’
evaluation of life, so long as we recognise that illusion and myth are part of existence and that
suffering is not intrinsically problematic for Nietzsche. On the contrary, suffering is a vital feature
of the pleasure we derive from myth. The pessimism of the Will that Young identifies seems to be
based on the Schopenhauerian view that pleasure/happiness is nothing more than the absence of
suffering. Nietzsche on the other hand sees pain and pleasure as two sides of the same coin. “The
belonging together of pain and pleasure in the essence of the world is what we live from” (KSA I: 7
cited in Han-Pile, 2006: p378). Pleasure – like pain for Schopenhauer – is now also conceived of in
positive terms. That is to say that it is not just the absence of pain but something generated by Will
and illusion too. The relationship between Will and representation is no longer just dissatisfaction.
Nietzsche decisively argues that pleasure cannot be the absence of pain because these concepts,
‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’, depend on one another for their meaning. Thus, in contrast to Young’s
argument, the absence of pain would actually negate the possibility of pleasure too.

23
With this in mind, the ‘eternal contradiction, father of things’ (BT, 4) that BT mentions, despite its
tone, is a significant departure from Schopenhauer’s conception of the eternally divided will. For
Nietzsche, in the contradiction of primal unity, the will is torn between ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ (Han-
Pile, 2006) - as opposed to just being torn by individuation - and it is only through the aesthetic
interplay between the Apollonian and Dionysian that we are able to grasp the ‘reciprocal necessity
of these two things’ (BT, 4). The relationship between pleasure and pain is no longer conceived of
as a dialectical contradiction where the negation (aufgehoben) leads to a higher state, the creative
interplay is already there in its essence like a ‘continual spasm’ (BT cited in Han-Pile, 2006). The
dynamism and creativity associated with this opposition prefaces Nietzsche’s later argument that
we should look upon our enemies, and our true feelings towards them, with a genuine love (GM,
10) because there is something about our meaning that actually depends on this opposition. The
conflict itself is the source of great pleasure; an agenda that pursues resignation or resolution on the
other hand will ensure that we are left with nothing at all. What we have established here is that
whilst pain might be the keynote of existence, this does not preclude – in fact, Nietzsche argues that
it necessarily includes – the presence of pleasure. In art, Nietzsche suggests that dissonance in
music is a good example of this in that there is something particularly pleasurable in a harmony or
melody when it deviates from the standard scale and we hear beautiful notes in relation to troubling
ones. Beauty is understood in relation to terror when ‘the Dionysian artist has become entirely at
one with the primal unity, with its pain and contradiction, and he produces a copy of this primal
unity as music’ (BT, 5). This therefore presents a possibly that was previously, under the
Schopenhauerian reading closed to us, that existence could be pleasurable and therefore worthwhile
even with the omnipresence of conflict.

24
8.
Aesthetic Redemption
In this section we explore my second point of dispute with Young’s argument formulated in section
6 (above) which again relates to the premise that Nietzsche’s metaphysics is thoroughly
Schopenhauerian. Because Young maintains that Dionysus and Apollo pertain directly to the
‘illusion’ and ‘reality’ distinction, it follows that Dionysus’ role is to offer us metaphysical insight
in to the reality of the thing-in-itself; he ‘shatters the ‘individual’, drags him into the great ship-
wreck’ and pain is resolved from the privileged position of ‘original being’ (Deleuze, 2006: p13).
But as Deleuze argues, a thousand pointers in BT suggest that Nietzsche has stepped away from the
idea that art provides consolation through metaphysical insight (ibid). In fact, we ought to be
slightly suspect of this position anyway because it seems deeply ‘un-Nietzschean’ in the first place.
The idea that a philosophical approach should pursue truth for its own sake, or as a panacea for
life’s problems was opposed by Nietzsche both in earlier (UM) and later (BGE et al) works (Gemes
and Sykes, 2014). We should therefore view Dionysian insight as illusory in character too and not
in noumenal terms.
Art’s redemptive power also holds new possibilities under this reading, but not, as I will argue,
though contemplation and nor by providing metaphysical insight. As we have so far seen, Nietzsche
is optimistic about human creativity. He has suggested that while dreaming and while perceiving
the world we are artists; we simply have to be because all knowledge is illusion. This is also true of
Dionysian knowledge – though we should hesitate to call it ‘knowledge’. Whilst we might be
tempted to pursue the idea that Dionysian art, by destroying the individuated self for however long,

25
gives us a critical vantage point on reality, this argument is predicated on a substantive metaphysics
that says we have access to the will as thing-in-itself; to some sort of true knowledge. Nietzsche
however, offers no such account. As I have suggested, Nietzsche’s vision for BT is not to place
value on the revealing of metaphysical truths. Stylistically it is therefore befitting that text itself
offers no real metaphysics but a metanarrative: a story, in which the main focus is the existential
value of myth. The so-called ‘artiste’s metaphysics’ (ASC) in BT and the narrative of culture in the
UM can be seen as self-consciously structured mythic narratives in which Nietzsche’s aim is to
make existence bearable (Gemes and Sykes, 2014). Myth and story-telling are hence presented as a
deeply human activity that spring from the contradiction of the will as a way to situate existence
within a horizon of meaning.
A people - or, for that matter, a human being - only has value to the extent that it is able to put
the stamp of the eternal on its experiences; for in doing so it sheds, one might say, its
worldliness and reveals its unconscious, inner conviction (unbewusste innerliche
Ueberzeugung) that time is relative and that the true meaning of life is metaphysical.
(BT, 23 emphasis mine).
As we can see in one of the most telling but misleading passages in the BT, Nietzsche is not
asserting that the true meaning of life is metaphysical (Gemes and Sykes, 2014). Trying to identify
with or expose metaphysical truth is not the path to redemption, as Nietzsche frequently asserts. It is
the belief – the unconscious inner conviction – that Nietzsche is highlighting; the active and creative
process of connecting ‘everything they experienced, immediately and involuntarily, to their myths’
(BT, 23) that Nietzsche so admires about the Ancient Greeks. Far from providing metaphysical
consolation, the narrative that they bought into connected the ancient Greeks’ experience of the
world to a meaningful identity. Their ‘artistic middle world’, far from negating the will, suffused

26
existence ‘with a higher glory’ (BT, 3). Art therefore has a practical function, through glorification
of experience our interest in the empirical world is heightened and willing itself is celebrated.
Whilst Young’s argument forces us the question the role of art in relation to suffering, it
presupposes an epistemological relationship between the observer and the art which is thoroughly
Schopenhaurian. On this line if thought, the reciprocal-necessity of beauty and suffering is largely
inaccessible because beauty is held to be the absence of conflict. On this line of thought I suffer
when I attend to a beautiful person or a nice bowl of fruit because I cannot escape from viewing
these objects as particulars as opposed to abstract forms. Due to the individuated, striving and
forceful Will, my sexual desire or my hunger is causing practical needs in me that follow from
attending these objects. The problematic character of these desires is that they will never all be
satisfied and therefore only when I am liberated from these sexual desires and pangs of hunger can I
escape, albeit momentarily, from all the difficulties that from these particular desires.
Schopenhauer’s theory is that tragedy is particularly useful because the action on stage not only
pacifies the will, but through the content we are reminded of the many motives we have for turning
towards art, and away from the will (Nussbaum, 2002). That is to say that it represents the
sufferings to which we may be prone if we pursue a life guided by our will and its desires (ibid). On
the other hand, Nietzsche’s account suggests that in some way the individual will actively
participates in the aesthetic experience. The possibility of affirmation on the Schopenhauerian
reading, as Young rightly argues is closed because art is given a cognitive role. Young, like
Schopenhauer subscribes to the view that salvation lies in artistic contemplation, affirmation
however, depends on the creative and affecting role art that plays on the will, not in its capacity to
negate it.

27
Conclusion
My goal in this essay has been to challenge a conventional reading of The Birth of Tragedy which
holds that Nietzsche fails to evade the pessimistic outlook of Schopenhauer. Whilst I agree that
Nietzsche’s deployment of Schopenhauerian language and images provides a reasonable grounds on
which to make this claim, I have suggested that Nietzsche’s focus on meaning as opposed to
suffering per se indicates an important departure from Schopenhauer’s pessimism. Young rightly
highlights two controversial elements of Nietzsche’s argument which under the Schopenhauerian
reading cannot be reconciled with the conclusion that BT is successfully affirms life.
The ‘mendacious’ character of the Apollonian illusion however, is only problematic if we place a
premium on truth telling. For example, if we could identify a value measure in the world that asserts
that embellishing reality is problematic for existence, we could follow this argument. However,
drawing on Nussbaum’s incisive account I have argued that illusion, image making and storytelling
– even logical – should not necessarily be viewed as ‘lies’, but sense making practices (Nussbaum,
2002). Creating images and ‘embellishing’ the appearance of perceived reality is not a disservice to
life, but the very essence of human existence. Thus we should not argue that the veil of Maya hides
us from the terrible and horrible fabric of reality because it is made of that same fabric.
Nietzsche’s philosophical endeavour therefore, is not to uncover the truth. [T]he ecstatic eyes of the
artist remain fixed on what still remains veiled, even after the unveiling’ (BT, 15). In fact, as I have
argued it is therefore somewhat inappropriate to suggest that the Dionysian drive relates to
knowledge of the thing-in-itself because this is the very approach to philosophy that so enraged
Nietzsche: the idea that ‘truth’ is the fundamental goal of philosophy as opposed to making life
worthwhile. A reading of this kind, as Young illustrates, will do nothing to provide suffering with

28
meaning. Dionysian insight must, as I have argued be read as offering us another type of illusion,
one which recognises the reciprocal necessity of pleasure and pain.
Therefore, whilst conflict is an inevitable feature of existence, as Nietzsche argues (contrary to
Schopenhauer), the absence of conflict is not where we derive pleasure or satisfaction. Art’s
function is not to silence the ever-wanting will, but to glorify its journey. Of course this idea has not
reached full maturity in this stage of Nietzsche’s philosophical career, and BT, as Nietzsche tells us
(ASC), falls short of his great works in many subtle ways. Nonetheless, the notion that it is
unsuccessful in departing from a pessimistic view of reality I have argued is misled. There are many
philosophical innovations in BT, but some of the most important ones, as I have contended, are
obscured by the Schopenhauerian reading.

29
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