ION Singapore - Dan York: DNSSEC Introduction
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This document provides a summary of a panel discussion on deploying DNSSEC from end customers to content. The panel discusses next steps that top-level domain operators, network operators, and enterprises can take to deploy DNSSEC, including signing their domains, accepting DS records, working with registrars, and deploying validating DNS resolvers. The Internet Society's Deploy360 program is also introduced, which provides real-world deployment information on technologies like DNSSEC through case studies, tutorials, videos, and other resources.
ION Singapore - Dan York: DNSSEC Introduction
- 1. Deploying DNSSEC: From End-Customer To Content March 28, 2013 www.internetsociety.org
- 2. Our Panel Moderator: • Dan York, Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society Panelists: • Sanjeev Gupta, Principal Technical Architect, DCS1 Pte • Jitender Kumar, Technical Account Manager, Afilias • Richard Lamb, DNSSEC Program Manager, ICANN www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 3. A Quick Introduction to DNS and DNSSEC
- 4. What Problem Is DNSSEC Trying To Solve? DNSSEC = "DNS Security Extensions" • Defined in RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035 • Operational Practices: RFC 4641 Ensures that the information entered into DNS by the domain name holder is the SAME information retrieved from DNS by an end user. Let's walk through an example to explain… www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 5. A Normal DNS Interaction Web Server example.com? Resolver checks its local cache. If it has the 3 DNS answer, it sends it back. 1 https://example.com/ Resolver example.com 10.1.1.123 4 If not… web page Web Browser 2 10.1.1.123 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 6. A Normal DNS Interaction DNS Svr root .com NS DNS Svr .com Web example.com NS Server example.com? 5 DNS 2 https://example.com/ 1 Resolver DNS Svr example.com 3 6 10.1.1.123 web page Web Browser 4 10.1.1.123 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 7. DNS Works On Speed First result received by a DNS resolver is treated as the correct answer. Opportunity is there for an attacker to be the first one to get an answer to the DNS resolver, either by: • Getting to the correct point in the network to provide faster responses; • Blocking the responses from the legitimate servers (ex. executing a Denial of Service attack against the legitimate servers to slow their responses) www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 8. Attacking DNS DNS Svr root .com NS DNS Svr .com Web example.com NS Server example.com? 5 DNS 2 https://example.com/ 1 Resolver DNS Svr example.com 10.1.1.123 6 web page Web 3 Browser 4 192.168.2.2 Attacking 192.168.2.2 DNS Svr example.com www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 9. A Poisoned Cache Web Server example.com? Resolver cache now has wrong data: 3 DNS 1 example.com 192.168.2.2 https://example.com/ Resolver 4 This stays in the cache until the web page Web Time-To-Live (TTL) expires! Browser 2 192.168.2.2 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 10. How Does DNSSEC Help? DNSSEC introduces new DNS records for a domain: • RRSIG – a signature ("hash") of a set of DNS records • DNSKEY – a public key that a resolver can use to validate RRSIG A DNSSEC-validating DNS resolver: • Uses DNSKEY to perform a hash calculation on received DNS records • Compares result with RRSIG records. If results match, records are the same as those transmitted. If the results do NOT match, they were potentially changed during the travel from the DNS server. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 11. A DNSSEC Interaction DNS Svr root DNS Svr .com Web Server example.com? 5 DNS 2 https://example.com/ 1 Resolver DNS Svr example.com 3 6 10.1.1.123 web page Web DNSKEY RRSIGs Browser 4 10.1.1.123 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 12. But Can DNSSEC Be Spoofed? • But why can't an attacker simply insert DNSKEY and RRSIG records? What prevents DNSSEC from being spoofed? • An additional was introduced, the "Delegation Signer (DS)" record • It is a fingerprint of the DNSKEY record that is sent to the TLD registry • Provides a global "chain of trust" from the root of DNS down to the domain • Attackers would have to compromise the registry www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 13. A DNSSEC Interaction DNS Svr root .com NS DS DNS Svr .com Web example.com NS Server DS example.com? 5 DNS 2 https://example.com/ 1 Resolver DNS Svr example.com 3 6 10.1.1.123 web page Web DNSKEY RRSIGs Browser 4 10.1.1.123 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 14. The Global Chain of Trust DNS Svr root .com NS DS DNS Svr .com Web example.com NS Server DS example.com? 5 DNS 2 https://example.com/ 1 Resolver DNS Svr example.com 3 6 10.1.1.123 web page Web DNSKEY RRSIGs Browser 4 10.1.1.123 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 15. Attempting to Spoof DNS DNS Svr root .com NS DS DNS Svr .com Web example.com NS Server DS example.com? 5 DNS 2 https://example.com/ 1 Resolver DNS Svr example.com 10.1.1.123 6 DNSKEY RRSIGs web page Web 3 Browser Attacking 192.168.2.2 DNS Svr DNSKEY example.com RRSIGs www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 16. Attempting to Spoof DNS DNS Svr root .com NS DS DNS Svr .com Web example.com NS Server DS example.com? 5 DNS 2 https://example.com/ 1 Resolver DNS Svr example.com 10.1.1.123 6 DNSKEY RRSIGs web page Web 3 Browser 4 SERVFAIL Attacking 192.168.2.2 DNS Svr DNSKEY example.com RRSIGs www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 17. What DNSSEC Proves: "These ARE the IP addresses you are looking for." (or they are not) Ensures that information entered into DNS by the domain name holder (or the operator of the DNS hosting service for the domain) is the SAME information that is received by the end user. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 18. The Two Parts of DNSSEC Signing Validating Registries Applications Registrars Enterprises DNS Hosting ISPs www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 19. DNSSEC and SSL
- 20. Why Do I Need DNSSEC If I Have SSL? A common question: why do I need DNSSEC if I already have a SSL certificate? (or an "EV-SSL" certificate?) SSL (more formerly known today as Transport Layer Security (TLS)) solves a different issue – it provides encryption and protection of the communication between the browser and the web server www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 21. The Typical TLS (SSL) Web Interaction DNS Svr root Web Server DNS Svr .com 5 https://example.com/ DNS Svr 6 example.com TLS-encrypted web page 2 example.com? 3 1 10.1.1.123 DNS Resolver Web Browser 4 10.1.1.123 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 22. The Typical TLS (SSL) Web Interaction DNS Svr root Web Server DNS Svr .com 5 https://example.com/ DNS Svr 6 example.com TLS-encrypted web page 2 example.com? 3 1 10.1.1.123 DNS Is this encrypted Resolver with the Web CORRECT Browser 4 certificate? 10.1.1.123 www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 23. What About This? DNS Web Server https://www.example.com/ Server www.example.com? Firewall https://www.example.com/ TLS-encrypted web page (or 1 with CORRECT certificate attacker) 1.2.3.4 2 Web TLS-encrypted web page Browser with NEW certificate (re-signed by firewall) www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 24. Problems? DNS Web Server https://www.example.com/ Server www.example.com? https://www.example.com/ TLS-encrypted web page Firewall 1 with CORRECT certificate 1.2.3.4 2 Web TLS-encrypted web page Browser with NEW certificate (re-signed by firewall) www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 25. Problems? DNS Web Server https://www.example.com/ Server www.example.com? https://www.example.com/ TLS-encrypted web page Firewall 1 with CORRECT certificate 1.2.3.4 2 Web TLS-encrypted web page Browser with NEW certificate Log files (re-signed by firewall) or other servers Potentially including personal information www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 26. Issues A Certificate Authority (CA) can sign ANY domain. Now over 1,500 CAs – there have been compromises where valid certs were issued for domains. Middle-boxes such as firewalls can re-sign sessions. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 27. A Powerful Combination TLS/SSL = encryption + limited integrity protection DNSSEC = strong integrity protection How to get encryption + strong integrity protection? TLS + DNSSEC = DANE www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 28. DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Q: How do you know if the TLS (SSL) certificate is the correct one the site wants you to use? A: Store the certificate (or fingerprint) in DNS (new TLSA record) and sign them with DNSSEC. A browser that understand DNSSEC and DANE will then know when the required certificate is NOT being used. Certificate stored in DNS is controlled by the domain name holder. It could be a certificate signed by a CA – or a self- signed certificate. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 29. DANE DNS Web Server https://example.com/ Server example.com? 2 Firewall https://example.com/ TLS-encrypted web page (or 1 with CORRECT certificate attacker) 10.1.1.123 DNSKEY RRSIGs TLSA Web TLS-encrypted web page Browser with NEW certificate w/DANE Log files (re-signed by firewall) or other servers DANE-equipped browser compares TLS certificate with what DNS / DNSSEC says it should be. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 30. DANE – Not Just For The Web • DANE defines protocol for storing TLS certificates in DNS • Securing Web transactions is the obvious use case • Other uses also possible: • Email via S/MIME • VoIP • Jabber/XMPP • ? www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 31. DNSSEC Deployment In Asia
- 32. Map courtesy of Shinkuro, Inc. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 33. Map courtesy of Shinkuro, Inc. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 34. Panel Discussion
- 35. Our Panel Moderator: • Dan York, Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society Panelists: • Sanjeev Gupta, Principal Technical Architect, DCS1 Pte • Jitender Kumar, Technical Account Manager, Afilias • Richard Lamb, DNSSEC Program Manager, ICANN www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 36. Next Steps In Deploying DNSSEC
- 37. Three Steps TLD Operators Can Take: 1. Sign your TLD • Tools and services available to help automate process 2. Accept DS records • Make it as easy as possible (and accept multiple records) 3. Work with your registrars • Help them make it easy for DNS hosting providers and registrants 4. Help With Statistics • Can you help by providing statistics? Implement DNSSEC and make your TLD more secure www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 38. Three Steps For Network Operators and Enterprises 1. Deploy DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers 2. Sign your own domains where possible 3. Help promote support of DANE protocol • Allow usage of TLSA record. Let browser vendors and others know you want to use DANE. Help raise awareness of how DANE and DNSSEC can make the Internet more secure. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 39. Internet Society Deploy360 Programme Providing real-world deployment info for IPv6, DNSSEC and other Internet technologies: • Case Studies • Tutorials • Videos • Whitepapers • News, information English content, initially, but will www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/ be translated into other languages. www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/
- 40. Dan York, CISSP Senior Content Strategist, Internet Society york@isoc.org www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/ Thank You! www.internetsociety.org